SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR COMMISSIONERS' JUNE 26,2003

BRIEFING FROM FBI DIRECTOR ROBERT MUELLER, III

The FBI's Shift from Reactive to Proactive/Preventative

After the September 11 attacks, you made a number of statements indicating that the
FBI's focus would be shifting from reactive to proactive and preventative. What are the
most important steps the FBI has taken at this point in its efforts to make this dramatic
shift?

What are the greatest obstacles you've encountered and that still remain for the FBI to
successfully make the transition from having a law enforcement counterterrorism
approach to having more of an intelligence approach?

Prior to the September 11 attacks, a frequent complaint of FBI counterterrorism

personnel was that despite the FBI Headquarters' official policies making
counterterrorism a top priority, the field offices had sufficient autonomy to ignore these
pronouncements.

What steps have you taken to ensure that FBIHQ can now enforce its priorities,
and that each field office provides sufficient resources and focus to
counterterrorism matters?

What flexibility do Field Offices currently have to set their own investigative
priorities?

Analysis

The FBI has been criticized for its inadequate analytic capability prior to September 11,
and you have publicly acknowledged this as a weakness. For example, a January 2002
internal FBI study found that approximately 65% of the FBI analysts in place were
unqualified for the position.

What steps has the FBI taken to address the numerous deficiencies in the analytic
program that existed prior to September 11, 2001?

What do you think the role of analysts should be at the FBI, and how should the field and
HQ analytic functions differ?

The FBI's pre-9/11 focus on prosecutions has also served as a hindrance to its analysts.
Analysts were often told not to put their thoughts in writing, because the product would
be discoverable in any criminal prosecution. To what extent is this still a problem at the
FBI, and what steps has the FBI taken to ensure that analysts are not prevented from
documenting their analysis?

How is the FBI ensuring that the analytic personnel have access to all necessary
information on a timely basis, particularly given the FBI's well publicized technological
problems?

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You have publicly acknowledged that the Phoenix EC was not properly handled when it
was sent to FBI Headquarters in the summer of 2001. If such an analytical product were
sent from the field to headquarters today, how would it be handled today?

Reports Officers

One of the reforms frequently cited by the FBI since September 11 has been the creation
of the Reports Officer position, both at FBI Field Offices and at FBI Headquarters.

Can you describe what you envision as the role of the Reports Officers at the FBI,
and how the HQ and Field positions differ from one another?

How is the FBI ensuring that the Reports Officers have access to all of the
necessary information on a timely basis, particularly given the FBI's well
publicized technological problems?

Training

What counterterrorism training is now required for agents assuming counterterrorism

management positions at FBI Headquarters?

The FBI's New Agent training at Quantico has been traditionally designed for criminal
law enforcement agents. Prior to September 11 out of the 16 weeks of training, there
were only approximately three days of training on National Security matters. To what
extent has the training been revised since 9/11, and how much counterterrorism training
is currently provided?

Office of Intelligence

One of the often cited post-9/11 FBI reforms has been the creation of the Office of
Intelligence.

What do you envision the Office's role to be in the FBI's counterterrorism

program?

What will the process be, and who will have input, into the establishment of the
FBI's collection priorities? Will collection priorities be set entirely by FBI HQ,
or will Field Offices have input into this process as well?

How will the collection priorities decided upon by the Office of Intelligence play
into specific investigations? Will agents be required to collect information in
their investigations based on these collection priorities?
If the office does not have responsibility for individual investigations, how will
they be able to enforce their priorities on the Field Offices?
FBI Understanding of Terrorist Threat in the United States

In your opinion, what progress has the FBI made since the September 11 attacks in
understanding the radical terrorist elements and threats within the United States?

What are the biggest intelligence gaps remaining, in terms of the FBI's understanding of
these issues?

How successful has the FBI been in developing sources in the radical Islamic
communities in the United States since the September 11 attacks? Has it gotten easier or
more difficult, in your opinion, and what are the reasons for the change?

Career Track for Special Agents Working Counterterrorism Matters

Agents working counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters at the FBI have often
complained that they were not promoted as quickly as agents working more traditional
criminal investigations. One reason cited has been that agents are rated on statistical
accomplishments, such as arrests, search warrants, and indictments, and counterterrorism
investigations do not generate as many "stats."

In your opinion, is this a fair and accurate complaint? If so, what has been done
to address this situation?

Some have suggested having a separate career track for agents working counterterrorism
and counterintelligence matters, both for the reason cited above and so that there could be
a cadre of agents with significant counterterrorism expertise. Do you think this is a
reasonable suggestion?

The FBI's current policies allow HQ agents to apply for promotions back to the field
after only 18 months at HQ. In other words, by the time the agents learn how to manage
a program, and begin to develop expertise in a particular area, they are getting ready to
leave HQ. Is this still the policy, and should this policy be changed so that there is
greater counterterrorism managerial expertise at FBI HQ?

Information Technology

Most of the intelligence shared within the intelligence community is classified as "Top
Secret." From an information technology perspective, however, the FBI has traditionally
operated only at the "Secret" level, and has been unable to easily handle and distribute
"Top Secret" information in a timely fashion to other than a limited number of personnel
in the field.

What is the status of the Top Secret LAN, and what impact has this made to date
on the FBI's ability to handle and appropriately manage Top Secret information
received from other intelligence community members?

Cooperation with State/Local Law Enforcement Authorities

A number of police chiefs and state and local law enforcement personnel have
complained publicly that the FBI does not share information adequately with them, and
that they have not been granted security clearances by the FBI despite their need for
classified information.

How does the FBI determine which state/local enforcement authorities need
clearances and access to classified information and which do not?

What do you view the primary role of JTTF members? To collect information
from their respective agencies for the FBI? To distribute FBI information to their
agencies? Or merely additional personnel to carry out the FBI's counterterrorism
mandate?

Cooperation with Other Federal Agencies

The newly created Terrorist Threat Integration Center is housed at the CIA and directed
by DCI personnel. What impact will this have on the FBI's ability to influence
intelligence analysis and sharing of information that comes into the TTIC?

Who will be the primary customers for TTIC products? To what extent will the FBI be a
consumer for TTIC products, and to what extent will TTIC products drive the FBI's
investigation priorities and collection strategy?

You and Director Tenet have publicly declared that the cooperation between the FBI and
the CIA is better than ever and information sharing is happening all the time. What have
you done to ensure that this is actually happening in the field as opposed to being merely
the announced policy of the directors of the two agencies?

Civil Liberties

Has the CIA's increased activity in the United States since 9/11, and greater participation
on the JTTFs presented legal and civil liberties challenges? Are you comfortable with the
balance that has been struck in this regard? Should the CIA become even more involved
than they are now?

How has the FBI used, and does it plan to use in the future, private sector data mining
companies in furthering its investigations?

What type of external and internal legal restrictions are currently in place for the use of
this type of technology and information?