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Cyclical Global Economic Crisis: Instability in The Post-Bretton Woods International Monetary Order
Cyclical Global Economic Crisis: Instability in The Post-Bretton Woods International Monetary Order
Introduction
In the 20th century the world has encountered many setbacks to the economic stability of
individual states and which appear to create disruptions in the fundamental grounding of
the world economy. The dependence of international monetary order on one common
currency, the ‘dollar standard’ as Barry Eichengreen1 names it, has proved to be the
upside as well as the downside in different circumstances encircling the question of
stability of the dollar as a standard currency on the platform of international exchange.
The global economy of the 21st century has emerged through many monetary systems
from the 19th century gold standard to the interwar years of gold exchange standard to the
Bretton Woods System and into what is the unnamed new world order with the fall of
Bretton Woods system since 1970s. This new world order has a legacy of the this long
history of economic cooperation and repeated global monetary imbalances. The issue that
emerges from this long history is the cyclic digression of order into a crisis engulfing the
majority of the world economy still maintaining its cooperative, hegemonic, and open
liberal attitude. The purpose of this retrospection into history is to find out the possibility
of a fundamental reason for a repetitive disarray in the international monetary order with
concomitant conflicting and converging interests of states during the periods of crisis.
Drawing this argument to context of the international monetary order using states as
economic actors in a scenario of the world economy an important support for the
economic cooperation in the 20th century arises as an imperative for the working of the
world economy. Also the hegemonic intervention and control in the sustaining a
proposed monetary order for the case of Britain in the gold standard and the US in the
post WWII and even beyond the Bretton Woods system period can be argued as a neutral
exercise of economic coercion and foreign intervention to satisfy the common good of
the world economy.
During the 19th century Gold Standard, Britain played the role of the hegemonic power
over the international monetary policy and control. With a gold exchange standard all
currencies involved had a fixed exchange rate and London emerged as the centre of the
free flowing capital market. Several compromises were sustained by Britain like
increased unemployment due to increase in bank interest rates to curb capital outflows to
maintain a good health of the world economy and its dependence on the British
Capitalism.
The isolationist attitude of the US towards the stability of the post WWI world economy
had unreasonably pushed the European states to repay the war debts that had been
accumulated to a value far beyond their repaying capability. Many countries used
deflationary measures and still found their currencies heavily undervalued in the foreign
market. While at the same time the US economy saw its currency exchange touched and
its gold reserves intact after the WWI. The US policy of not taking the responsibility of
stabilizing the world economy during the interwar years can be associated with the nature
of its diplomacy towards the European block. A major reason towards the fall of gold
exchange standard was the withdrawal of the European countries from the world
economy. This also paved the way for a national capitalism rising in some countries like
Germany.
In his analysis of the three different monetary systems he explains the role of a
hegemonic power and its sustainability can be argued on the basis of some fundamental
reasoning.
According to the analysis of Eichengreen, the three major categories considered for
operation of a monetary system and the theory of hegemonic stability are adjustment,
liquidity, and the lender-of -last-resort. Adjustment is method of harmonizing of national
policies and the ability to preserve and regulate the smooth operation of the international
monetary system, using once hegemonic power. The 19th Century hegemonic experience
of the collective European centre relative to the non-European periphery is an example of
a weak hegemonic stability theory. In a weak stability theory the befits of the stability are
accrued exclusively to the powerful. Under Bretton Woods, the hegemonic stability was a
consensus of the players in the international monetary order. A collective circumstantial
acceptance, post WWII, to the dominance of the US in international trade and financial
markets and to the imperative of dollar accumulation as a means of restoring economic
stability.
Maintenance of liquidity in the global market in the post WWII period was a major
contribution of the US towards a two decade long monetary order without much
disruptions. In the absence of US, or more specifically the Financial Institutions like IMF,
the liquidity crisis would have sustained in the world economy for a long period possibly
resulting in another depression like that of the 1930s. The same period saw the US
surplus grow due to increased demand for US goods creating the famous ‘dollar
shortage’.
The reason behind US abandoning the postwar early support for the restrictive Bretton
Woods system, as Ruggie4 mentions is as the compromise of ‘embedded liberal
framework‘, was the strategic change in the position of the US in global economy, both
in terms of trade and finance. After the 1970s the major shift in the US International
Policy was due to its transformation from a creditor to a debtor economy. Even with
many corrective measures taken by the US policy makers to adjust the problems of large
dollar surplus with foreign countries and making gold conversion unimpressive in 1968 it
became evident that the foreign dollar reserves could not have been settled with the US
gold reserves.
Another major reason for a shift of policy for the US was the fact that majority of states
had their individual reasons to back a global financial order with each state serving its
own purpose, inturn accepting the continued US hegemony over capital markets. Post
Bretton Woods the hegemonic position of the US in trade may have been declining, but
the US retained a dominant position in the financial order well into the 1980s because of
the relative attractiveness of the US financial markets, the preeminence of the US
financial institutions and the dollar in global markets, and the relative size of the US
economy. Like the Japanese economic crisis with a market crash in 1987 threatened the
US financial stability but was withstood by financial liberalization steps taken by the
Japanese government under US pressure.5
References:
1. Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System, Barry
Eichengreen
2. Introduction; Empire of the Capital, Ellen Wood
3. Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System, Barry
Eichengreen
4. International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in Post War
Economic Order, John Gerard Ruggie
5. Introduction; States and the Remergence of Global Finance, Eric Helleiner
6. The Fallacy of the Revised Bretton Woods Hypothesis: Why Today’s
System is Unsustainable and Suggestions for a Replacement, Thomas I. Palley [2006]
7. Introduction; Superimperialism, Michael Hudson