G.R. No. 104813 October 21, 1993 HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S.

OLVIGA, VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR, SERILINA G. JAMON, EMELITA G. MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR, GAUDENCIO GLOR and CORNELIO GLOR, respondents. Facts: Together with his father, Eutiquio Pureza, cleared and cultivated the land in question and introduced improvements during the early 1950s. When the area was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in 1956 in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without his application having been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelia Glor in 1961. Neither the homestead application of Eutiquio nor the proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was acted upon by the Director of Lands for reasons that the records of the Bureau of Lands do not disclose. Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family who were the real and actual occupants of the land. Issue: whether or not plaintiffs' action is really one for quieting of title that does not prescribe; or assuming that their demand for reconveyance of the lot in question prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied trust Held: With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997 HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents. Facts: The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west. The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay. Issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered as foreshore land Held: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990 EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents. Facts: In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin. As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968. In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents. Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank. in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of plaintiffs-private respondents. In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises. On April, 1970, private respondents filed a complaint to recover their lots and the accretions. Issue: Whether the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a result of accretion Held: The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567)

G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992 JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and DOLORES A. CARLOS, and HEIRS OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION CARLOS, respondents.

Petitioner Jose Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of herein private respondents, over a fishpond located at Barrio Liputan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. During the tenancy, petitioner Jose Reynante constructed a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan) he had planted on lots 1 and 2. Petitioner harvested and sold said nipa palms without interference and prohibition from anybody. Neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos question his right to plant the nipa palms near the fishpond or to harvest and appropriate them as his own. After the death of Don Cosme Carlos, his heirs (private respondents' predecessors-in-interest) entered into a written agreement with petitioner Jose Reynante whereby the latter for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000.00 turned over the fishpond he was tenanting to the heirs of Don Cosme Carlos and surrendered all his rights therein as caretaker. Pursuant to the said written agreement, petitioner surrendered the fishpond and the two huts located therein to private respondents. Private respondents thereafter leased the said fishpond to one Carlos de la Cruz. Petitioner continued to live in the nipa hut constructed by him on lots 1 and 2 and to take care of the nipa palms he had planted therein. private respondents formally demanded that the petitioner vacate said portion since according to them petitioner had already been indemnified for the surrender of his rights as a tenant. Despite receipt thereof, petitioner refused and failed to relinquish possession of lots 1 and 2. private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner. Issues: 1.who between the petitioner and private respondents has prior physical possession of lots 1 and 2 2. whether or not the disputed lots belong to private respondents as a result of accretion.

Held: An action for forcible entry is merely a quieting process and actual title to the property is never determined. A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria (German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495, 498, 499). On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot prove prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 469 [1942]). Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river Assuming private respondents had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to acquisition through prescription by third persons. It is undisputed that petitioner has been in possession of the subject lots for more than fifty (50) years and unless private respondents can show a better title over the subject lots, petitioner's possession over the property must be respected. G.R. No. 94283 March 4, 1991 MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and MISAMIS ORIENTAL CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC.,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), JANITA F. EDUAVE and RUDYGONDO EDUAVE Facts: The appellant [private respondent Janita Eduave] claims that she inherited the land from his father, together with his co-heirs, acquired sole ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. The land was eroded sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng, destroying the bigger portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966 due to the movement of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded increased the area to almost half a hectare and in 1970 the appellant started to plant bananas. In 1973 the defendants-appellees [petitioners herein] asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area. The appellant engaged the services of a surveyor who conducted a survey and placed concrete monuments over the land. The appellant also paid taxes on the land in litigation, and mortgaged the land to the Luzon Surety and Co. Appellant also applied for concession with the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 cubic meters of gravel; and after an ocular inspection the permit was granted. The defendants-appellees [petitioners herein] denied the claim of ownership of the appellant, and asserted that they are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. The defendants started occupying the land in 1969, paid land taxes and tax clearances. Issue: Between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-navigable and non-flotable river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, who has the better right thereto? Held: The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the Court of Appeals also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.