Professional Documents
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Hyacinth James Ningisa & Others Versus The State
Hyacinth James Ningisa & Others Versus The State
and
THE STATE
SILUNGWE, AJ
12/11/2008
and
CORAM: SILUNGWE, AJ
SILUNGWE, AJ: [1] In this judgment, the applicants will retain the same
numbers that they have had since the inception of their trial.
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whereas Messrs Murorua and Neves kindly appear amica curiae in respect of
indebted to both of them not only for their assistance in the current
proceedings, but also for having given their valuable time towards the
[3] The applicants, having been variously convicted of, and sentenced for,
crimes ranging from robberies with aggravating circumstances to, inter alia,
theft, are now applying for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against their
submissions on which the applications rest, and to which I will later return,
Mabena Apani (Mike). The substance of the challenge is that the provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 (subsections (1), (6) and (7) of
section 316 of the Act) which require a convict to apply to this Court for leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court, and, in the event of the Court’s refusal to
grant him such leave, to petition the Chief Justice which petition “shall be
apparent that his primary reliance rests on Article 12(1)(a) which provides,
“12(1)(a) In the determination of their civil rights and obligations or any criminal charges
against them, all persons shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by an
independent, impartial and competent Court or Tribunal established by law …”
(Emphasis provided).
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He submits that every Accused has a right to a fair hearing which includes
Mike’s approach is that, in the light of the fair trial constitutional provisions,
he has a right to appeal directly to the Supreme Court with the result that the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act which subject him to the application
no provision for the right of appeal procedure. However, Articles 80(3) and
“80(3) The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to appeals shall be determined by
Act of Parliament.”
“79(4) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with regard to appeals shall be determined
by Act of Parliament.”
“140(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all laws which were in
force immediately before the date of independence shall remain in force until
repealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are declared
unconstitutional by a competent Court.”
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[6] Act 51 of 1977 (the Act) was in force when this country achieved its
independence in March 1990 and still remains in force. Section 316 of the Act
is the section that regulates, inter alia, the criminal appeal procedure; this
section has thus far neither been repealed nor declared unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, the Court is now being called upon to declare the allegedly
procedures as unconstitutional.
Ganeb 2001 NR 294 (HC), the Full Bench, citing what the Supreme Court had
said in Muller v President of the Republic of Namibia and Another 1999 NR 190
“The decisions of the South African Courts and more particularly (sic) those of the
Constitutional Court, are very relevant and in the past this Court and the High Court of
Namibia have frequently applied these decisions but this must always be done with
due recognition of the differences between our two Constitutions. In my opinion there
are some differences between our art 10 and s.8 of the Interim Constitution and s.9 of
the South African Constitution, which must be kept in mind when comparisons are
drawn.”
[8] In the case of S v Rens 1996(1) SACR 105 (CC) the Constitutional Court
procedure prescribed by section 316 of the Act was consistent with section
25(3)(h) of the Constitution Act, Act 240 of 1993, which provides that –
“25(3) Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, which shall include the
right –
…
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(h) to have recourse by way of appeal or review of a higher Court than the Court of first
instance …”
It was there (at 106i-j) contended on behalf of the applicant, in the Court a
quo, that this section afforded him an automatic right to appeal, and that,
in that they were repugnant to, and in conflict with, section 25(3)(h).
[9] In S v Rens case, supra, and with reference to section 102(11) of the
In S v Madise and Others, the same issue as in the present case as well as s.
102(11) was raised for decision. The accused in that case had taken the point
that the need for leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence had been
eliminated by the provisions s. 25(3)(h) of the Constitution.
He accordingly dismissed the application, and also refused to refer the issue to
the Constitutional Court, holding that he was only entitled to refer the issue of
the validity of s. 316(1)(b) if it should be considered to be in the interests of
justice to do so. In that case, so his judgment ran, it was not in the interests of
justice to refer an unarguable point to the Constitutional Court or to any other
Court.”
does not mention specific criteria which have to be complied with for the
the provisions of section 25(3)(h). The applicant in that case had been
When leave was sought to appeal and, in response to the argument that
“I should indicate that I have very grave doubts whether this provision entitles a
convicted person to have an absolute right of appeal. The phrase to have
recourse by way of appeal is in my view perfectly capable of meaning to have
recourse to a Court of appeal if the proper procedure is followed’.”
shown, regulated by section 316 of the Act. The provisions of this section do
guarantees a fair trial, by virtue of the provisions of Article 80(3) and 140(1) to
which reference has already been made. The underlying practical reason for
the leave to appeal procedure is to guard against abuse vis-à-vis appeals that
are devoid of merit by protecting the Supreme Court from the burden of
Supreme as such appeals would only serve to prejudice the speedy resolution
convict may then approach the Chief Justice, by way of the petition
disputed facts and lacks full oral argument or full hearing of the matter in
open Court.
[14] In S v Rens, supra, where both the leave to appeal and the petition
rehearing does not per se mean that the procedure is unfair. Furthermore,
the Court made it clear in the judgment that “it cannot be in the interests of
law or fact to be placed before three judges of the appellate tribunal sitting in
open Court to rehear oral argument. The roll would be clogged by hopeless
cases, thus prejudicing the speedy resolution of those cases where there is
share the view that, in the context of the petition procedure, lack of oral
argument or a complete rehearing does not per se mean that the procedure is
open Court.
[15] For the reasons given above, I find that the leave to appeal and the
petition procedures stipulated in section 316 of the Act are not inconsistent
one, the proper test is whether another Court may reasonably come to a
issues that arise, coupled with the sheer enormity of the matter, the Supreme
dismissed.
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____________________
SILUNGWE, AJ
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