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Down Syndrome 1
Down Syndrome 1
Down Syndrome 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) involves the testing of embryos produced through in vitro fertilisation (IVF) or intracytoplasmic sperm injection. One or two blastomeres are excised from the embryo at the 6to 8-cell stage, and a genetic analysis is conducted with probes to detect heritable genetic conditions. Most commonly, only unaffected embryos will then be transferred to the uterus in the hope of initiating a pregnancy that in all likelihood will not be affected by the familial disorder or chromosomal anomaly tested for.1 PGD was originally developed in the late 1980s as an alternative to prenatal diagnosis (PND) for couples wishing to produce a genetically related child free of an undesired, heritable, genetic condition where at least one of the prospective parents is a known carrier.2 Given that it is possible, and in the opinion of some desirable3 to utilise PGD to select against Downs syndrome embryos in the context of IVF, is it appropriate for health care professionals to offer, and society to permit, the use of this technology for this purpose? What makes this condition so seriousin contradistinction to other not-serious-enough conditionsthat PGD testing for it is deemed an appropriate intervention.
2 3
This research was funded by a Canadian Institutes for Health research grant Towards a Single Embryo Transfer in the Human. Thanks to Franc oise Baylis, Heather Cockwell, Andrew Fenton, Christopher Kaposy, Simon Outram, the Novel Tech Ethics research team, the Dalhousie University Bioethics Department Works in Progress Seminar, and two anonymous reviewers from this journal for very helpful, critical feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. CM Conn and others, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Couples at High Risk of Down Syndrome Pregnancy Owing to Parental Translocation or Mosaicism (1999) 36 J Med Genetics 45. AH Handyside and others, Biopsy of Human Preimplantation Embryos and Sexing by DNA Amplication (1989) 1 Lancet 347. M Twisk and others, Preimplantation Genetic Screening as an Alternative to Prenatal Testing for Down Syndrome (2007) 88 Fertil Steril 804; Y Zhang and others, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Down Syndrome Pregnancy (2007) 8 J Zhejiang Univ Sci B Biomed Biotechnol 515.
Medical Law Review # The Author [2011]. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
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The objective of this paper is to challenge the validity of offering PGD services for Downs syndrome on the basis of English law and policy, not to argue for a ban on PGD testing for Downs syndrome. First, I outline the factors to be considered when deciding the appropriateness of any PGD application as given in English law and policy. I then demonstrate that licensing PGD testing for Downs syndrome not in itself, but on the basis of these factors is problematic, or at the very least debatable. In this regard, the justication for extending PGD testing for Downs syndrome under the current regulatory instruments as an appropriate application of this technology do not follow from a consideration of the evidence as given in the relevant literature about the capacities and quality of life possible for persons living with Downs syndrome. I next consider why the recent move of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority (HFEA) to have an exclusive list of serious genetic conditions,4 for which PGD testing is approved in principle, stands to reinforce prejudices, stigmas, and unjust social discrimination against persons living with Downs syndrome (and potentially their families as well).
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HFEA, PGD Conditions Licenced by the HFEA (29 November 2010) , http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm . accessed 29 November 2010. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990 (c.37), s11. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 2008 (c.22). All references hereafter to the 1990 Act (as Amended 2008) will be to the following: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. As Amended (2008)an Illustrative Text (26 November 2008) , http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/ Publications/PublicationsLegislation/DH_080205 . accessed 4 December 2010. At the time of writing, the HFE Act 1990 had not been re-written to incorporate the 2008 amendments. Also at the time of writing, the two pieces of legislation were meant to be read alongside each other. The illustrative text incorporates the two documents but has no ofcial status.
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M Brazier, Regulating the Reproduction Business? (1999) 7 Med L R, 166, 169. HFE Act 1990. As Amended (2008) (n 6) Sch 2, s1(3). Ibid, Sch 2, s1(1)(d). HFEA and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, Regulating Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for the Future: Listening to Your Views (Report) (26 January 2009) 1, 5. Report on le with author; available upon request from HFEA. HFE Act 1990. As Amended (2008) (n 6) Sch 2, s1ZA(1)(b). See C OToole and J Tizzard, Licensing Embryo Testing (18 March 2009) s1.1 1.4 , http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/AM_Item_12_March09.pdf.pdf . accessed 4 December 2010. HFE Act 1990. As Amended (2008) (n 6) Sch 2, s1ZA(2)(ab). HFEA, Code of Practice, 8th edition (2009), s10.5
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When deciding if it is appropriate to provide PGD in particular cases, the seriousness of the condition in that case should be discussed between the people seeking treatment and the clinical team. The perception of the level of risk for those seeking treatment will also be an important factor for the centre to consider.15 In any particular case, the appropriateness of using PGD should be determined through consideration of the following factors: (a) the views of the people seeking treatment of the condition to be avoided, including their previous reproductive experience (b) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition (c) the availability of effective therapy, now and in the future
(d) the speed of degeneration in progressive disorders (e) the extent of any intellectual impairment
(f ) the social support available, and (g) the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment.16 In using these factors as criteria for assessment, licenced clinical centres in the UK are given the responsibility to consider in which cases they can and in which cases they cannot justiably offer PGD services. The HFEA has already approved PGD for Downs syndrome.17 Taking into account factors (a) (g)excluding (d)18how is it that Downs syndrome qualies as a serious condition for which PGD testing is to be judged appropriate? In what follows, I assess the relevant evidence that can be brought to bear for each of the above factors to determine the validity of such a judgment. I discuss in order: (A) the relevant reproductive experience and views of those seeking PGD for Downs syndrome [factor (a)]; (B) the availability of effective therapies for Downs syndrome, now and in the future [factor (c)]; (C) the extent of expected intellectual impairments associated with Downs syndrome [factor (e)]; (D) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition from the perspective of the individual with Downs syndrome [factor (b)]; (E) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition from the perspective of families to individuals with Downs
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Ibid. Ibid, s10.6. Conn and others (n 1); J Cozzi and others, A Trisomic Germ Cell Line and Precocious Chromatid Segregation Leads to Recurrent Trisomy 21 Conception (1999) 104 Hum Genet 23. Downs syndrome is not a progressive disorder, and therefore factor (d) is irrelevant.
III. IS PGD FOR DOWNS SYNDROME APPROPRIATE? A. The Views and Reproductive Experiences of Those Seeking PGD
(a1) the views of the people seeking treatment of the condition to be avoided, (a2) including their previous reproductive experience19 In what ways could factor (a2), couples reproductive experiences, be seen as relevant for determining whether PGD for Downs syndrome is an appropriate application of this technology? Trisomy of chromosome 21, which leads to Downs syndrome, is one of the most frequent aneuploidies. But most cases of Downs syndrome are not inherited, and therefore being a carrier, let alone a known carrier, would be very rare: the recurrence risk of a Downs syndrome pregnancy after a previously affected pregnancy is approximately 1 2%.20 PGD for Downs syndrome has been reported in a few studies: in the case described by Cozzi and colleagues, at least 70% of ovulated oocytes were hyperhaploid for chromosome 2121; in the two cases reported by Conn and colleagues, 64% and 91% of unfertilised oocytes/embryos showed chromosome 21 aneuploidy and chromosome 21 imbalance, respectively.22 Though studies have demonstrated that the majority of second trisomy 21 pregnancies could be a product of chance alone,23 cytogenic analysis can be used to rule out the possibility of parental translocations or mosaicisms24 which may have implications for relevant risk of recurrence.25 In those cases involving these predisposing factors, prospective parents who wish to avoid a child with Downs syndrome could opt for either: (i) PGD or (ii) PND and (as necessary) elective termination. PND for Downs syndrome is available through either chorionic villus sampling (usually conducted at 11 14 weeks of
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HFEA (n 14) s10.6. M Mikkelsen and J Stene, Previous Child with Down Syndrome and Other Chromosome Aberrations, in JD Murken, S Stengel-Rutkwski and E Schwinger (eds), Prenatal Diagnosis: Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders (Enke, Stuttgart 1979) 22. Cozzi and others (n 17). Conn and others (n 1). CG Pangalos and others, DNA Polymorphism Analysis in Families with Recurrence of Free Trisomy 21 (1992) 51 Am J Hum Genet 1015. Conn and others (n 1). Zhang (n 3). See Cozzi and others (n 17).
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gestation) or with amniocentesis ( performed after 15 weeks). Both methods involve an increased risk of miscarriage of approximately 1 2%.26 The tests are invasive and carry slight risks to the foetus. As such, some reproductive clients nd this route unsatisfactory owing to concerns about: (i) the safety of diagnostic testing during pregnancy; (ii) the risks of miscarriage; and (iii) ethical issues related to potential harms to the foetus.27 There are rare cases of women whose reproductive experience involves repeat pregnancies involving a conceptus affected by trisomy 21.28 Hudson and colleagues reported on a woman who after 2 years of experience with infertility enlisted IVF services and successfully delivered a trisomy 21 infant. The patient then spontaneously conceived another conceptus with Downs syndrome, after which the woman and her husband had their supernumerary embryos (from the initial IVF cycle) genetically tested and screened for trisomy 21. Reportedly, this couple did not consider a voluntary interruption of pregnancy a viable option in their circumstance.29 For this coupleas for others who have the experience of living through the processes of repeat prenatal testing followed by elective termination(s)PGD presented as an acceptable alternative to PND.30 Factor (a2) takes into consideration why certain couples who wish to reproduce might want to enlist PGD treatment services to prevent having a (or another) child with Downs syndrome as opposed to using other alternative methods for doing so. Factor (a1) speaks to the prospective parents subjective views on the condition to be avoided. The HFEA guidance maintains that the only conditions for which PGD should be made available are those where there is a signicant risk of a serious genetic condition.31 Though (as stated above) no ofcial denition of serious has informed either the relevant law or policy, a public consultation document from the Authority explains that: How serious a condition is depends on how having the condition affects, threatens, or limits the life of the individual, although these factors may be difcult to predict before the affected person is born. If the condition did not cause someone to suffer or detrimentally affect their life, the condition is unlikely to be regarded
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D Tapon, Prenatal Testing for Down Syndrome: Comparison of Screening Practices in the UK and USA (2010) 19 J Genet Couns 112 30. S Hartway, A Parents Guide to the Genetics of Down Syndrome (2009) 9 Adv Neonatal Care 27; Tapon (n 26). Cozzi and others (n 17). SB Hudson and others, Preimplantation Genetic Screening in a Case of Recurrent Trisomy 21 Offspring (2009) 91 Fertil Steril 930, 930.e18. Conn and others (n 1); Cozzi and others (n 17); Zhang (n 3). HFEA (n 14) s10.5.
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HFEA, Background to Choices & Boundaries (10 November 2005), s4.3 , http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Choices_and_Boundaries.pdf . accessed 4 December 2010. Ibid. Ibid, s4.4. SA Lavery and others, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Patients Experiences and Attitudes (2002) 17 Hum Reprod 2464. M Selikowitz, Down Syndrome: The Facts (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997), 7. W Lenhard and others, Psychological Benet of Diagnostic Certainty for Mothers of Children with Disabilities: Lessons from Down Syndrome (2005) 133 Am J Med Genet A 170.
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PGD treatment services may very well relieve anxiety and offer reassurances38 at the earliest possible timereassurance that the prospective offspring, in all probability, will be unaffected by trisomy 21. The question is whether PGD is an appropriate treatment application for addressing this sort of anxiety and need for reassurance. The HFE Act authorises PGD as a treatment service in order to determine that embryos are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman,39 where treatment services means medical, surgical, or obstetric services provided to the public or a section of the public for the purposes of assisting women to carry children.40 In this regard, the term suitable has been given by the courts both a narrow41 and a wide42 interpretation in the case of R. (Quintavalle) v HFEA. On the narrow interpretation, as discussed by Lord Brown, PGD would be allowable only insofar as it is necessary or desirable43 for screening embryos to determine those that are medically suitable to ensure that the woman can carry the child successfully to termin other words embryonic screening to eliminate just such genetic defects as may affect the viability of the foetus and no other.44 There is some evidence that embryos with numerical chromosomal anomalies, as with trisomy 21, have been signicantly correlated with a higher incidence of implantation failures and repeat pregnancy loss.45 It might seem, then, that embryo screening for these purposes could be justied in reassuring the woman (or couple) that suitable embryos are chosen for implantation, where suitable is taken to mean those that have a better chance at initiating a pregnancy that will result in a live birth. At this point, the literature is inconclusive as to whether PGD in practice either reduces repeat pregnancy loss or IVF failure.46 However, these ndings are mainly based on the results of applying PGD for screening purposes for all-comers to IVF where the population is too varied, and has a low risk of genetic issues, so any effect that one would see with PGD is diluted signicantly. If one were to take only those patients with repeat pregnancy loss who have an identied parental translocation and utilise PGD to screen their
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
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See Lavery and others (n 35); Twisk (n 3). HFE Act 1990. As Amended (2008) (n 6) Sch. 2, s1(1)(d). Ibid, s2(1). R (Quintavalle) v HFEA [2002] EWHC 2785 (Admin), s17. R (Quintavalle) v HFEA [2002] EWCA Civ. 667, s3745; R (Quintavalle) v HFEA [2005] UKHL 28, s14, 2428, 35, 56, 62. HFE Act 1990. As Amended (2008) (n 6) Sch 2, s1(3). Quintavalle [2006] UKHL 28 (n 42), para 49. N Findikli and others, Embryo Aneuploidy Screening for Repeated Implantation Failure and Unexplained Recurrent Miscarriage (2006) 13 Reprod BioMed Online 38. [Anon], Preimplantation Genetic Testing: a Practice Committee Opinion (2008) 90 Fertil Steril S136 43.
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JE Mersereau and others, Preimplantation Genetic Screening to Improve in vitro Fertilization Pregnancy Rates: a Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial (2008) 90 Fertil Steril 1287. K Nakamura, S Sheps and PC Arck, Stress and Reproductive Failure: Past Notions, Present Insights and Future Directions (2008) 25 J Assist Reprod Genet 47. AM Bergant and others, Spontaneous Abortion and Psychosomatics (1997) 12 Hum Reprod 1106; MP Milad and others, Stress and Anxiety Do Not Result in Pregnancy Wastage (1998) 13 Hum Reprod 2296. Quintavalle [2005] UKHL 28 (n 42) para 51. See ibid, paras 49, 60, and 62. S Sheldon, Saviour Siblings and the Discretionary Power of the HFEA (2005) 13 Med L R, 403, 408. See Quintavalle [2002] EWCA Civ. 667 (n 42) para 128.
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condition. Insteadand also obviousfactor (a1) speaks to that which could make Downs syndrome a serious genetic condition for the parents as based on their particular subjective views, personal beliefs, and psychology.53
B. Effective Therapies
(c) the availability of effective therapy, now and in the future54 Assessing the relevant evidence with respect to factor (c) is difcult since the term effective therapy is used without a denition in the Code of Practice (8th edition). Interestingly, the Joint Working Party of the HFEA and the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) originally recommended a more inclusive wording, stating that: the availability of effective therapy or management now and in the future be taken into account when determining the appropriateness of PGD for any given condition.55 Downs syndrome is a chronic condition that presents from birth. Because there is neither a known cure for it, nor are there any probable, prospective cures in sight at this time, most treatments aim to either control or mitigate adverse symptoms and to manage co-morbidities. It cannot be ignored that there are distinct medical challenges that come with Downs syndrome. For some parents, the health status of having a child with Downs syndrome can be a source of uncertainty, most notably in the rst years of an affected childs life.56 The health conditions faced by persons with Downs syndrome can include: cardiac birth defects; congenital heart disease; hearing problems; gastrointestinal blockages; celiac disease; eye problems (e.g. cataracts); hypothyroidism; skeletal problems (e.g. hip dislocation); dementia; and a higher risk for acute lymphocytic leukaemia.57 Interestingly, a longitudinal study by Carr that compared health at ages 4, 11 and 21 of persons with Downs syndrome with matched controls concluded that:
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Quintavalle [2005] UKHL 28 (n 42), paras 27 and 61. HFEA (n 14), s10.6. HFEA and HGC, Outcome of the Public Consultation on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (November 2001) s37, recommendation 15 (emphasis added). M van Riper, What Families Need to Thrive (15 May 2008) , http://www. downsyn.com/thrive.php . accessed 4 December 2010. MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, Down Syndrome (20 April 2005) , http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/downsyndrome.html . accessed 4 December 2010; E Kennedy Shriver, Down Syndrome (16 February 2007) , http://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/Down_Syndrome.cfm . accessed 4 December 2010.
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R Turner and others, Health Problems in Children with Downs Syndrome (1990) 16 Child Care Health Dev 83. JH Carr, Downs Syndrome: Children Growing Up (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995), 115. NJ Roizen and D Patterson, Downs Syndrome (2003) 361 Lancet 1281. Nonetheless, studies show that access to healthcare services can be a greater challenge for persons with intellectual disabilities (including persons with Downs syndrome) on account of their learning and communication challenges, as well as healthcare providers beliefs and attitudes. See SA Cooper, C Melville and J Morrison, People with Intellectual Disabilities (2004) 329 BMJ 414; P Raji and others, Offering Health Checks to People with Intellectual Disabilities As Part of Medical Students Primary Care Course (2009) , http://www.intellectualdisability.info/how-to../offering-health-checks-to-people-with-intellectual-disabilities . accessed 4 December 2010. G Viola and A Rosano, Time Trends of Survival among Infants with Downs Syndrome (2005) 31 Ital J Pediatr 254. Mothers 35 Plus, Down Syndrome (2010) , http://www.mothers35plus.co. uk/down.htm . accessed 4 December 2010. Downs Syndrome Association, Key Facts (2009) , http://www.downs-syndrome.org.uk/news-and-media/key-facts.html . accessed 4 December 2010. Ibid.
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the social determinants of healthincluding mental health65for persons with Downs syndrome.66 A study that analysed (by racial grouping) the death certicates of Downs syndrome Americans found the average median age at death in 1997 to be 50 years for Caucasians, 25 years for African Americans, and 11 years for other races (including Asians, Hispanics, and First Nations Americans).67 Friedman noted two factors that could explain the limited improvement in median age at death for the American racial minority groups in this study: (i) the frequency of life-threatening malformations and (ii) differences in social factors and care68 provided.69 According to Friedman, there is no evidence that those persons with Downs syndrome from the indicated racial minorities were at greater risk of life-threatening malformations.70 He concluded, saying: Because differences in ascertainment or severity probably do not explain these observations, differences in care received by persons with Downs syndrome might explain racial disparity in survival. Possibilities include differences in factors that may be associated with improved health in the general population such as socioeconomic status, education, community support, medical or surgical treatment of serious complications, or access to, use of, or quality of preventative health care. A combination of factors seems likely, as appears to be the case for racial disparity in mortality in the U.S. population in general.71 In summary, the evidence given in the literature shows that for Downs syndrome72 effective therapies are now available. Questions of access73 to these therapies now and providing for them to be available in the future, while posing challenges not to be underestimated, are
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SH Ailey and others, Evaluating an Interpersonal Model of Depression among Adults with Down Syndrome (2006) 20 Res Theory Nurs Pract 229. Q Yang, SA Rasmussen and JM Friedman, Mortality Associated with Downs Syndrome in the USA From 1983 to 1997: a Population-based Study (2002) 359 Lancet 1019, 10223. Ibid. See SA Rasmussen and others, Survival in Infants with Down Syndrome, Metropolitan Atlanta, 19791998 (2006) 148 J Pediatr 806. JM Friedman, Racial Disparities in Median Age at Death of Persons with Down SyndromeUnited States, 19681997 (2001) 50 MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 463. Ibid. Ibid, 465. See P Alderson, Prenatal Screening, Ethics and Downs Syndrome: a Literature Review (2001) 8 Nurs Ethics 360. See R Jenkins and R Davies, Neglect of People with Intellectual Disabilities (2006) 10 J Intellect Disabil 35.
C. Intellectual Impairments
(e) the extent of any intellectual impairment75 Determining the relevant evidence that applies in the case of factor (e) is challenging since nowhere in the Code of Practice is intellectual impairment dened. Clinically speaking, Downs syndrome is classied as a form of mental retardation. Degrees of mental retardation are conventionally measured according to standardised intelligence tests. Individuals who test consistently below the intelligence quotient (IQ) level of (usually) 70 are classied as retarded. Persons with Downs syndrome are expected to have moderate-to-severe mental retardation, with an IQ of 20 85 (mean score, approximately 50).76 This means that 50% or more of this population function in the mild (IQ 50 69) or moderate (IQ 35 49) range of intellectual disability. Some have just a borderline degree of intellectual disability, while a minority has severe (IQ 20 25 to 35 40) intellectual disability.77 The average estimated intelligence of persons with Downs syndrome has been steadily increasing since the early 20th century. At that time, persons with Downs syndrome were initially regarded as profoundly mentally retarded (i.e. IQ , 20).78 According to CluniesRoss, combined surveys of Downs syndrome children and adults from the rst half of the century showed notable, widespread gains with most being classied as severely mentally retarded (IQ 20 34).79 By the 1960s, reports estimated that 10% of cases were regarded as mildly retarded; by the mid-1970s,80 these estimates increased to the point that researchers were suggesting that as many as 30 50% of older Downs syndrome children and adults were within the mild range for mental retardation, and even a few were thought to be within the normal range for intelligence.81 Borthwick, whose study analyses the above trends, observes that in the
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Ibid. HFEA (n 14) s10.6. H Chen, Down Syndrome (22 March 2010) , http://emedicine.medscape. com/article/943216-overview . accessed 4 December 2010. Selikowitz (n 36) 117. D Gibson, Downs Syndrome (Cambridge University Press, London 1978), 35 7. GG Clunies-Ross, The Development of Children with Downs Syndrome (1986) 22 Aust Paediatr J 167. Ibid. C Cunningham and C Cunningham, Down Syndrome: an Introduction for Parents and Carers (3rd revised edn Souvenir Press, London 2006).
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space of only 60 years, these developments represent a general shift in the Downs syndrome mean of some 30 IQ points, from an average IQ of approximately 15 20 to an average IQ of, depending on the study, between 40 and 60.82 These ndings are in some tension with: (i) a common stereotype that individuals with Downs syndrome are unintelligent, incapacitated and incapable of social function83 and (ii) the perception of mental retardation as a permanent, unmodiable trait attributable almost exclusively to physical causes84a prejudicial viewpoint that has been shown to foster community reactions of hopelessness, helplessness, and rejection.85 There are several reasons to explain the stigma concerning the developmental potential of persons with Downs syndrome. Until the 1960s, effective education and training were rarely provided to persons with Downs syndrome, in part owing to the prevalent view thenand all too commonly still with usthat intelligence is a natural endowment, genetically determined and immutable, thus distinguishing those with mental retardation in a fundamental sense from the rest of the population.86 As Clunies-Ross surmises: In this climate, institutionalization seemed an appropriate alternative, but unfortunately the clients became a self-fullling prophecy. Little was expected of them, so they were taught little and therefore achieved little.87 Only once the belief in xed intelligences came to be challenged, did researchers come to view experience and environment as having a major impact on cognitive development in infants and children.88 For some time now it has been widely agreed that the developmental characteristics of Downs syndrome children are extremely variable and that motor, mental, and social development is faster for those raised at home than in institutions.89 Connolly (among others) in a study involving non-institutionalised children with Downs syndrome, has also observed the signicant advantaging effects of early intervention
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C Borthwick, Racism, IQ and Downs Syndrome (1996) 11 Disabil Soc 403, 407. C Uzoigwe, Life Goes on with Chris Burke (7 December 2008) , http://scienticaesthetic.com/2008/12/07/life-goes-on-with-chris-burke. html . accessed 4 December 2010. JF Goodman, Does Retardation Mean Dumb Childrens Perceptions of the Nature, Cause, and Course of Mental-Retardation (1989) 23 J Spec Educ 313, 314. EE Jones, Social Stigma (W.H. Freeman, New York 1984). Borthwick (n 83). Clunies-Ross (n 80) 167. Ibid. SA Centerwall and WR Centerwall, A Study of Children with Mongolism Reared in the Home Compared to Those Reared away from the Home (1960) 25 Pediatrics 678 cited in Clunies-Ross (n 80).
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BH Connolly, S Morgan and FF Russell, Evaluation of Children with Down Syndrome Who Participated in an Early Intervention Program. Second Follow-Up Study (1984) 64 Phys Ther 1515 cited in Clunies-Ross (n 80). J Carr, Six Weeks to Twenty-One Years Old: a Longitudinal Study of Children with Downs Syndrome and Their Families (1988) 29 J Child Psychol Psychiatry 407, 424. Ibid, 425. See EM Dykens, Psychiatric and Behavioral Disorders in Persons with Down Syndrome (2007) 13 Ment Retard Dev Disabil Res Rev 272, 276. C Gillberg and H Soderstrom, Learning Disability (2003) 362 Lancet 811, 815. Turner (n 58). S Carvill, Sensory Impairments, Intellectual Disability and Psychiatry (2001) 45 J Intellect Disabil Res 467. Borthwick (n 83) 407 8. A Coppus and others, Dementia and Mortality in Persons with Downs Syndrome (2006) 50 J Intellect Disabil Res 768.
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syndrome.98 Gillberg and Soderstrom in one study, and Burt and colleagues in another,99 found that Downs syndrome research participants with an increased IQ tended to experience less cognitive deterioration than matched controls with lower IQ scores. Given that IQ may be associated with level of education, Gillberg and Soderstrom hypothesised that improving cognitive functioning could be useful for deferring the onset of dementia. Their study also associated good caregiver support . . . with a slower decline in cognitive abilities in Downs syndrome.100 Oliver and colleagues further established that: When age was controlled for, cognitive deterioration was signicantly positively associated with caregiver difculties and service use and negatively associated with life experiences for the individual. Results suggest a potential role for caregiver difculties in inuencing life experiences of adults with Downs syndrome showing cognitive decline.101 Hence, it is evident that various confounding, contingent, situational, or environmental factorsmany of which can be corrected for, according to a growing body of evidenceare implicated in the overall course of intellectual development and cognitive capacities of persons with Downs syndrome. The effects of intellectual impairments for persons with Downs syndrome have thus been exaggerated through history, and the differences in cognitive functioning as measured by IQ can be accounted for (at least) in part by social deciencies unrelated to what the standard classication describes as signicantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.102 Borthwick further argues that just as racial minorities have been unfairly disadvantaged on IQ testing, so also prejudice against persons with Downs syndrome is likely to unfairly disadvantage this population on IQ testing with the effect of yielding inaccurate and spuriously depressed scores.103 He suggests that people with Downs syndrome may be, precisely, handicapped, as racehorses are handicapped that they carry lead in their saddlebags from the effects of prejudice and physical disability, and if it was possible to remove these then they would be expected to come further up the list of nishers than they do.104
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Carr (n 92) 423. See also SA Cooper, High Prevalence of Dementia among People with Learning Disabilities not Attributable to Downs Syndrome (1997) 27 Psychol Med 609. DB Burt and others, Aging in Adults with Down Syndrome: Report From a Longitudinal Study (1995) 100 Am J Ment Retard 262. Gillberg and Soderstrom (n 94) 818. C Oliver and others, Cognitive Deterioration in Adults with Down Syndrome: Effects on the Individual, Caregivers, and Service Use (2000) 105 Am J Ment Retard 455. Borthwick (n 83) 404. Ibid, 403 10. Ibid, 408.
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M Cuskelly, P Hauser-Cram and M van Riper, Families of Children with Down Syndrome: What We Know and What We Need to Know (2009) 12 Down Syndrome Res Practice 105, 108 9. P Alderson and C Goodey, Enabling Education: Experiences in Special and Ordinary Schools (Tufnell, London 1998). S Buckley and others, A Comparison of Mainstream and Special Education for Teenagers with Down Syndrome: Implications for Parents and Teachers (2002) 2 Down Syndrome News Update 46. Alderson and Goodey (n 107); J Wishart, Motivation and Learning Styles in Young Children with Down Syndrome (2010) 7 Down Syndrome Res Practice 47. HFEA (n 14) s10.6. S Buckley, Living with Down Syndrome (2000) , http://www. down-syndrome.org/information/development/overview/ . accessed 4 December 2010.
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some smaller qualitative studies have been conducted involving interviews with individuals from this population.111 Anecdotal reports conrm that said persons do not consider having the condition (itself ) to be a source of suffering,112 nor that their lives on this account are seriously limited,113 onerous, or handicapped.114 Instead, amongst relevant interviewees and advocates a prevalent impression voiced is that societys behaviour in response to them is seen as a primary source of what suffering there is in their lives in the forms of prejudice and social discrimination.115 It might be objected that the rst-person accounts in these studies and testimonials come from select individuals who areas some researchers describehigh functioning and therefore not representative of those that face more profound communication barriers. Admittedly, personal life satisfaction assessments for nonverbal persons with Downs syndrome point to a lacunae in the research and literature, even though, as Alderson points out: research through interactions and observations with people who do not speak about their quality of life [is possible and] can be very informative.116 This is not to diminish the challenges (from a rst person perspective) of a life with Downs syndrome,117 but rather to point out that the experience of a life with Downs syndrome is not co-extensive with a life of suffering. More on point research is needed in this respect.118 2. Associated Suffering from the Perspective of the Family, as well as the Impact of Social Supports and Family Circumstances (b) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition (f ) the social support available, and (g) the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment.119 Over the past decade, the HFEA has come to give more weight to families experiences and their perceptions of the gravity of genetic
111 112
Ailey (n 66); P Alderson, Downs Syndrome: Cost, Quality and Value of Life (2001) 53 Soc Sci Med 627. Alderson (n 112); Buckley (n 111); J Kingsley and M Levitz, Count Us in: Growing Up with Down Syndrome (Harcourt Brace & Co, New York 1994). C Burke and JB McDaniel, A Special Kind of Hero: Chris Burkes Own Story (Doubleday, New York 1991). Kingsley and Levitz (n 113) 35. Alderson (n 112); M Paez, Perspective, in L Nadel and others (eds), Down Syndrome: Living and Learning in the Community (Wiley-Liss, New York 1995), 60. Alderson (n 112) 636. Dykens (n 93). Alderson (n 112). HFEA (n 14) s10.6.
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HFEA, Choices & Boundaries Report 2006 (2006) , http://www.hfea.gov. uk/docs/Choices_and_boundaries_Report_2006_summary.pdf . accessed 4 December 2010. PM Ferguson, Mapping the Family: Disability Studies and the Exploration of Parental Response to Disability in GL Albrecht, KD Seelman and M Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA 2001) 373; PM Ferguson, A Gartner and DK Lipsky, The Experience of Disability in Families, in E Parens and A Asch (eds), Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights (Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 2000) 72; MW Krauss, Child-related and Parenting Stress: Similarities and Differences between Mothers and Fathers of Children with Disabilities (1993) 97 Am J Ment Retard 393. For references, see R Scott, Prenatal Testing, Reproductive Autonomy, and Disability Interests (2005) 14 Camb Q Healthc Ethics 65, 68; Ferguson and others (n 122) 81, 85. Roizen and Patterson (n 60). GA King and others, A Qualitative Investigation of Changes in the Belief Systems of Families of Children with Autism or Down Syndrome (2006) 32 Child Care Health Dev 353.
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with Downs syndrome. Seventy per cent of the seventy-six mothers polled reported their overall family functioning as either 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale (1 poor; 5 excellent).125 Hodapp and colleagues found no signicant difference between parents of Downs syndrome children and parents of typically developing children with respect to their perceptions of the rewards of parenting their children.126 Cuskelly and colleagues actually found that mothers of a child with Down syndrome reported signicantly more reinforcing aspects to their relations with their children than did mothers to typically developing children.127 Parents who raise children with Downs syndrome are often very aware of the prevalent and persistent effects that the childs unique needs can have on siblings.128 In this regard, various studies have reported on parents who testify to the benets of having a Downs syndrome child for their other children.129 Children with Downs syndrome, for instance, manifest characteristics that have worked to maintain and develop relations between family members and signicant others outside the family.130 Cuskelly and Gunn found that siblings of children with Downs syndrome reported less unkindness and, if in a same-sex dyad, more empathy than did comparison children.131 In a very recent review article, Cuskelly and colleagues conclude that: ndings suggest that there are no important differences in the adjustment of the siblings of a child with Downs syndrome and children in families where all are developing typically and that relationships are as good as, or better, than in these families.132 Research has also shown that (neurotypical) siblings to Downs syndrome relations have favourable self-concepts.133 Carr found that these siblings did not feel themselves unduly burdened by having a
125 126 127 128
129
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132 133
M van Riper, Families of Children with Down Syndrome: Responding to a Change in Plans with Resilience (2007) 22 J Pediatr Nurs 116. RM Hodapp and others, Less Stress, More Rewarding: Parenting Children with Down Syndrome (2001) 1 Parenting 337. M Cuskelly and others (n 106) 107. S Mulroy and others, The Impact of Having a Sibling with an Intellectual Disability: Parental Perspectives in Two Disorders (2008) 52 J Intellect Disabil Res 216. Cuskelly and others (n 128); BG Skotko and SP Levine, What the Other Children Are Thinking: Brothers and Sisters of Persons with Down Syndrome (2006) 142 Am J Med Genet C Semin Med Genet 180. J Poehlmann and others, Family Experiences Associated with a Childs Diagnosis of Fragile X or Down Syndrome: Evidence for Disruption and Resilience (2005) 43 Ment Retard 255. M Cuskelly and P Gunn, Sibling Relationships of Children with Down Syndrome: Perspectives of Mothers, Fathers, and Siblings (2003) 108 Am J Ment Retard 234, 234. Cuskelly and others (n 128) 107. M van Riper, Family Variables Associated with Well-Being in Siblings of Children with Down Syndrome (2000) 6 J Family Nurs 267.
Carr (n 92). Skotko and Levine (n 130) 180. M Cuskelly and P Gunn, Maternal Reports of Behavior of Siblings of Children with Down Syndrome (1993) 97 Am J Ment Retard 521. RI Brown and others, Family Quality of Life When There Is a Child with a Developmental Disability (2006) 3 J Policy Practice Intellect Disabil 238. Carr (n 92). See also P Sloper and others, Factors Related to Stress and Satisfaction with Life in Families of Children with Downs Syndrome (1991) 32 J Child Psychol Psychiatry 655. N Ferguson and J Watt, The Mothers of Children with Special Educational Needs (1986) 12 Scottish Educ Rev 31. J Bradshaw, The Family Fund: An Initiative in Social Policy (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1980). J Carr, A Pearson and M Halliwell, The Effect of Disability on Family Life (1983) 38 Z Kinderchir 103. Carr (n 92). M van Riper, Maternal Perceptions of Family-Provider Relationships and Well-Being in Families of Children with Down Syndrome (1999) 22 Res Nurs Health 357.
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More generally, patterns of parental stress are reported to track gender distinctions in families whose members include children with disabilities (also including those with Downs syndrome children).144 Roach and colleagues have observed that parents of children with Downs syndrome perceived more care-giving difculties, child-related stress, and parent-related stress than did matching controls of parents with typically developing children. While mothers stress tracked experiences of difculty related to responsibilities of caring, fathers stress tracked experiences of difculty related to accepting their Downs syndrome childrens group status as non-normal or disabled.145 Those mothers who assumed disproportionately higher care-giving duties reported more difculties with their own health, sense of autonomy (i.e. role restriction), and partner support. Conversely, fathers who assumed more responsibility for relevant childcare reported not only fewer difculties with attachment but also a greater sense of parental competence. Spousal stress correlated with both mothers and fathers stress.146 This study suggests that distribution of responsibility for care, if realigned to avoid gender stereotypeswhere mothers assume disproportionately higher responsibilities for care of children147can signicantly impact the experience of stress associated with raising a child with Downs syndrome. Hodapp has observed that most studies focussing on families experiences of having a member with Downs syndrome examine only parental or sibling levels of stress and coping strategies. Increased attention is needed to determine the effects of spousal, occupational, health, educational, and other socio-economic outcomes for family members.148 In this regard, more generally, the prevalent impact of the social determinants of health is well known,149 and has an over-riding impact on the health and well-being of parents to children with intellectual disabilities.150 Hodapp concludes the above-mentioned study, saying:
144 145
149
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Krauss (n 122); Sloper and others (n 139). MA Roach, GI Orsmond and MS Barratt, Mothers and Fathers of Children with Down Syndrome: Parental Stress and Involvement in Childcare (1999) 104 Am J Ment Retard 422. See also Sloper and others (n 139). Ibid. Cuskelly and Gunn (n 137). RM Hodapp, Families of Persons with Down Syndrome: New Perspectives, Findings, and Research and Service Needs (2007) 13 Ment Retard Dev Disabil Res Rev 279. R Mykitiuk and JA Nisker, Social Determinant of Health of Embryos, in J Nisker and others (eds), The Healthy Embryo: Social, Biomedical, Legal, and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), 116. E Emerson and others, Socio-Economic Position, Household Composition, Health Status and Indicators of the Well-Being of Mothers of Children with and without Intellectual Disabilities (2006) 50 J Intellect Disabil Res 862.
IV. DISABILITY: THE REALITIES OF FUNCTIONAL LIMITATION AND CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE
As stated before, the suffering associated with Downs syndrome is a most signicant consideration in gauging whether or not PGD is an appropriate intervention so as to prevent the birth of children with this genetic condition. The extent of expected suffering is one concern; the likelihood of suffering is yet another. And, obviously, the likelihood and extent of suffering are related to the different kinds and different sources of disability associated with Downs syndrome. Clarifying this relation is important for understanding some of the reasons and overt pressures that could propel (and perhaps compel) parents to consider PGD as a way to avoid the risks of having aor anotherchild with Downs syndrome.
151 152
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Hodapp (n 149) 279. Ailey (n 66); WN Friedrich, LT Wilturner and DS Cohen, Coping Resources and Parenting Mentally-Retarded Children (1985) 90 Am J Ment Dec 130. Sloper and others (n 139). Alderson (n 112); R Brown, Down Syndrome and Quality of Life: Some Challenges for Future Practice (1994) 2 Down Syndrome Res Practice 19.
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It is a reality that persons with Downs syndrome face all sorts of disadvantages. Broadly speaking, many of these disadvantages can be seen as a product of their interaction with society as persons with functional limitations. Hull explains this relation, saying: Without societys being as it is, peoples functional limitations would be different, no less than society would be without people with functional limitations.155 Models of disability, as Scott aptly observes, not only affect our perception of disability, but they also affect the desirability of avoiding it.156 In the literature, the distinction is drawn between the medical and the social models of disability. On the medical model, disability marks a disadvantage stemming from impairment(s)a restriction or lack of ability to perform normal human activities.157 Briey put, medical models of disability tend to locate the source of disability in what is understood as the inherent loss of functioning owing to physical or intellectual impairments in the individual. Medical models counsel the investigation and delivery of effective forms of medical treatment for affected individuals impairments. Medical models also put a great deal of emphasis on disease/disorder prevention.158 On the other hand, social models of disability (in general) emphasise the distinction between having impairments and being disabled,159 such that functional limitation or impairment does not guarantee disadvantage.160 Social models argue that the main sources of disability reside in the ways that society is structured to exclude, or insufciently accommodate, the different needs of persons with impairments.161 Most theorists who uphold social models maintain that whether an impairment results in a disability is dependent on the character of the environment in which the individual lives. For these theorists, while disability is social in nature, impairments are not.162 Contrastingly, medical models of disability tend to locate disability within the individual.
155 156 157
158 159
R Hull, Dening Disability: a Philosophical Approach (1998) 4 Res Publica 199, 203. Scott (n 123) 66. R Cohon, Disability: I. Ethical and Societal Perspectives in SG Post (ed), Encyclopedia of Bioethics (3rd edn, Macmillan Reference USA, New York 2004), 655. Ibid; L Waddington, Disability, Employment, and the European Community (Maklu, Antwerpen 1995), 33. M Oliver, Dening Impairment and Disability in C Barnes and G Mercer (eds), Exploring the Divide: Illness and Disability (Disability Press, Leeds 1996), 39; SM Reindal, Disability, Gene Therapy and Eugenicsa Challenge to John Harris (2000) 26 J Med Ethics 89. Hull (n 156). Reindal (n 160); Waddington (n 159) 34. As discussed by Scott (n 123) 66.
Ibid, 67. SE Antonarakis and others, Chromosome 21 and Down Syndrome: From Genomics to Pathophysiology (2004) 5 Nat Rev Genetics 725. To be more accurate, Shakespeare has been throughout his career both an exponent and a strong critic of the social model of disability. See T Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (Routledge, London 2006), 56. Ibid; T Shakespeare, Debating Disability (2008) 34 J Med Ethics 11. Shakespeare (n 167) 13. Ibid, 11. Scott (n 123) 69 citing T Shakespeare, Choices and Rights: Eugenics, Genetics and Disability Equality (1998) 13 Disabil Soc 665, 670.
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Conventional views of disability, while acknowledging the social manifestation of many disadvantages, tend to assume that since they would not arise in the absence of functional limitation, then those disadvantages must, and unproblematically, originate in functional limitation.170 But, so long as persons with Downs syndrome (and their families) are included in the major gap between the disabled and nondisabled in terms of education,171 income,172 housing, employment,173 social participation,174 and access to healthcare services,175 then it makes no sense to assume that Downs syndrome as a genetic condition is mostly responsible for the resulting suffering, diminished quality of life, and the life prospects of these people. Structural disadvantages in terms of unemployment (or underemployment) are especially acute for this population. For instance, a report entitled, The Invisible Workforce by the Downs syndrome Association (UK), along with other anecdotal evidence, shows that prejudice and social discriminationoften driven by fear, ignorance and misunderstandingas well as inadequate access to public transport are common barriers to the workplace as experienced by persons with Downs syndrome.176 Of the 15,000 persons with Downs syndrome of working age (18 60 years) in the UK, only 18% are currently in paid employment.177 This is so even despite the fact that in response
170 171
172 173
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Hull (n 156) 203. R Hatcher, Social Class and Schooling Differentiation or Democracy, in M Cole (ed), Education, Equality and Human Rights (Routledge, New York 2006) 202. ME Snell and others, Characteristics and Needs of People with Intellectual Disability Who Have Higher IQs (2009) 47 Intellect Dev Disabil 220, 223. See C Barnes and British Council of Organizations of Disabled People, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination: a Case for Anti-Discrimination Legislation (C. Hurst & Co, London 1991), 96; Waddington (n 159). E Emerson and C Hatton, Contribution of Socioeconomic Position to Health Inequalities of British Children and Adolescents with Intellectual Disabilities (2007) 112 Am J Ment Retard 140; Emerson and others (n 151); NHS Health Scotland, Health Needs Assessment Report: People with Learning Disabilities in Scotland (NHS Health Scotland, Glasgow 2004). See Alderson (n 112) 635 and 636. A Alborz, R McNally and C Glendinning, Access to Healthcare for People with Learning Disabilities: Mapping the Issues and Reviewing the Evidence (2005) 10 J Health Serv Res Policy 173; J Hogg, Essential Healthcare for People with Learning Disabilities: Barriers and Opportunities (2001) 94 JRSM 333; Jenkins (n 74). Downs Syndrome Association (UK), The Invisible Work Force (January 2008) , http://www.downs-syndrome.org.uk/images/stories/ DSA-documents/news/invisible_workforce_2008.pdf . accessed 4 December 2010. See Alderson (n 112). Anonymous, Opening Doors: Workers with Downs Syndrome Still Face Huge Obstacles to a Fullling and Rewarding Career (18 August 2007) , http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2007/aug/18/discrimination. socialexclusion . accessed 4 December 2010.
Downs Syndrome Association, Adults with Downs Syndrome Still Facing Barriers to Employment (1 June 2007) , http://www.downs-syndrome.org. uk/news-and-media/press-releases/2007/143-adults-still-facing-barriers. html . accessed 4 December 2010. Buckley (n 111). JL Scully, Disability Bioethics (Rowman & Littleeld, Lanham 2008), 1723. See Shakespeare (n 166) 2. See Reindal (n 160) 92.
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experience of social discrimination as well as prejudice, stigmatisation, and a general history of segregation have done much to constrict the life opportunities of persons with Downs syndrome. These prevailing negative conditions and social circumstances have been, and continue to be, dominant factors in the various experiences of, and expectations for, disadvantage on the part of persons with Downs syndrome as well as their families.183
Waddington (n 159) 34. HFEA and HGC (UK) (n 55). Ibid, Pt 1, para 23. Ibid, Pt 1, para 22. See para 24.
OToole and Tizzard (n 12) s4.4. Ibid, s1, 1.1 1.4. C OToole and D Edwards, Licensing of Embryo Testing (8 July 2009) s1.3 ,http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Item_7_-_Licensing_of_embryo_testing.pdf . accessed 4 December 2010. OToole and Tizzard (n 12) s 5.3. Ibid. HFEA (n 10). D Edwards, Case by Case Decision Making in PGD (15 December 2009) s3.19 , http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/2009-12-15_ELAC_-_Case_by_case_decision_making_in_PGD_-_Paper.PDF . accessed 4 December 2010.
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Committees have thus published a list of select conditions (that include Downs syndrome) that can, in principle, be considered sufciently serious to warrant PGD testing.194 The list is no longer necessarily client driven, and is not to be misconstrued as representative of already approved applications. More specically, treatment centres no longer apply for variations to their licences to carry out PGD for particular couples. Now instead, licenced centres may carry out PGD for any of the conditions listed on the HFEA website.195 When applying for a condition not previously licenced, unlike in the past, centres are no longer required to apply to the HFEA on the basis of a particular patient case. Instead, they can make an in principle application for a given condition, and the HFEA makes an in principle judgment about that condition.196 Given the evidence that so much of what makes Downs syndrome disabling is socially induced, it seems somewhat of a strain to consider that there is some in principle nature of this condition that makes it an inherently serious condition. As Hull points out, to underestimate the socially induced factors of disability, in the language of Luka ` cs, is to suffer from a reied view of disability whereby disability is mistakenly viewed as being natural and xed.197 I have argued elsewhere that the practice of designating and singling out a special class of genetic conditions as serious and therefore
194 195
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HFEA (n 4). The list, according to the HFEA, serves as an informative reference point for clinics and patients. Obtaining IVF and PGD services can be a notoriously slow, involving process given the many barriers to access: for example, nancial costs, associated travel time due to the limited number of clinics, etc. Publication of licensable PGD conditions, besides meeting the goals of transparency, may also speed up the process of obtaining PGD services for any given couple. HFEA, Embryo Testing (21 August 2009) , http://www. hfea.gov.uk/5259.html . accessed 29 November 2010. Ibid. Defenders of the HFEAs approach here might argue that since the degree of impairment cannot be predicted in advance of a prospective life with a given genetic condition, an in principle decision to allow PGD for say, Downs syndrome, would be justied as taking account of the risk of serious impairment in, albeit, a small number of cases that are no less severe for being rare. Members of the HFEA 2006 Ethics and Law Committee are said to have recognized that if a condition is serious then any risk is signicant. (Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the HFEA (14 February 2006) s7.3 , http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/ELC__Minutes_Feb06.pdf . accessed 4 December 2010.) There is certain merit to this reasoning, and my position is such that I would denitely not wish to challenge prospective clients who are risk averse, so to speak. My challenge to the principlist approach to regulation according to seriousness is that it tends to place the emphasis on the condition itself rather than looking to environmental factors, thus sometimes overlooking the complexity of the involved causes and developmental contingencies for a life with trisomy 21. Hull (n 156) 208.
T Krahn, Where Are We Going with Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis? (2007) 176 CMAJ 1445; D Wasserman and A Asch, The Uncertain Rationale for Prenatal Disability Screening (2006) 8 Virtual Mentor 53. Krahn (n 199). A Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or Compatible? (2003) 30 Florida State Univ LR 315, 339. Wasserman and Asch (n 199) 54. A Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Geneticization: Mother Matters for All (1993) 8 Fetal Diagn Ther 175. See Asch (n 201) 318. Wasserman and Asch (n 199); Waddington (n 159) 338.
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addressed through the provision of adequate social supports and provisions for living, historically speaking, there is a long-standing practice of inadequate social provisions to persons with Downs syndrome as well as their families. Given this context, what is the HFEA to do in the meantime? Knowing that there will be inadequate support for people living with Downs syndrome (and their families), what weight should be attached to the fact that the effects of a disability could be ameliorated by adequate support when making a judgment about the seriousness of that disability? In responding to this question, it is important to re-emphasise that the language of seriousness as promulgated by the amended HFE Act and used in HFEA policies in these matters, tends to place emphasis on the in principleunderstood as inherently incapacitatingnature of the impairments that come with a given condition. The criticism just stated, then, actually underscores the social rather than genetic character of the disabilities which persons with Downs syndrome and their families face. The pragmatic concern of where adequate social and political support is to be found to address the needs of persons living with Downs syndrome and their families, is of course valid and the position of this paper is not to dispute the extension of PGD for those who wish to utilise this technology to prevent offspring with Downs syndrome.205 Critics of the position put forth in this paper might further rejoin that the evidence given, which seems to normalise much of the experience of having and raising a child with Downs syndrome, reects an exceptional ability of certain families to cope with the relevant difculties, but that this is not evidence of the comparative neutrality of living with, or raising a family member with, Downs syndrome. Retrospective judgments concerning whether the experience was rewarding or worthwhile as opposed to laden with suffering, are quite different from prospective judgments concerning what one might want to attempt to undertake. That many families with members with Downs syndrome are resilient and able to cope well (for the most part), does not prove it would be a mistake in reasoning (moral or otherwise) for prospective parents to want to avoid such challengeschallenges that may be perceived as holding too great a risk of suffering for the family, even if
205
Questions concerning the lines of responsibility for assuming the extra social supports and economic costs incurred in raising a child with Downs syndrome are also issues that need further exploration and research. For a critique of the lack of economic and social support for prospective parents choices to raise: (i) children with disabilities and (ii) children with Downs syndrome, see, respectively, Shakespeare (n 170) and Alderson (n 73).
E Parens and A Asch, Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing (2003) 9 Ment Retard Dev Disabil Res Rev 40, 434. Ibid s10.5; HFE Act 1990. As Amended (2008) (n 6) Sch 2, s1ZA(2)(a b); Code of Practice (n 14) s10.5 10.6. R Grant and K Flint, Prenatal Screening for Fetal Aneuploidy (2007) 29 J Obstet Gynaecol Can 580; C Julian-Reynier and others, Attitudes Towards Downs Syndrome: Follow Up of a Cohort of 280 Cases (1995) 32 J Med Genet 597.
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has Downs syndromeforecloses certain opportunities. As outlined above, some of the disadvantages accruing to persons with Downs syndrome and their families stem from impairment-induced disabilities that social supports may prove practically powerless to redress. The point here is simply to say that most of what is disabling in most cases of Downs syndrome is socially induced and there needs to be much more public debate over how we as a society will choose, or not choose, to practically address these needs. In lieu of this, we are allowing what are probably social preferences to drive regulatory decisions that underwrite restrictive (not open) access to PGD testing for Downs syndrome, and ex post facto giving ourselves a story about serious genetic conditions that makes it seem as if that which is serious about the resultant disabilities is much more determined and life-compromising than is actually the caseneither for the affected individual, nor for the family.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I have argued that according to the factors for assessment given in the Code of Practice section 10.6, approving applications for the use of PGD for Downs syndrome is (considering the evidence) problematic, or at the very least debatable. Those aspects of the syndrome which result in compromises to health can in most instances be successfully managed (or treated) through the provision of adequate medical care, while other aspects can be addressed through the provision of adequate social supports and provisions for living. The intellectual impairments associated with Downs syndrome have been exaggerated and the evidence points to systemic gains in terms of the intellectual and social capacities of persons with Downs syndrome by way of educational and other kinds of social reforms or interventions. The evidence also argues against any presumption that either persons with Downs syndrome or their families are likely to have lives dominated by suffering. In fact, most (though not all) suffering and disadvantage associated with Downs syndrome for the affected individuals and their relatives is either the product of social conditions (including, most notably, prejudice, stigma and social discrimination) or can be signicantly alleviated (or ameliorated) by way of changes to family circumstances, the provision of social supports, and various forms of societal reform.
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It is an interesting question whether there should be any justications relevantly required for accessing PGD services over and above considerations involved with factor (a1), namely the views of prospective parents seeking the treatment. Some have argued that where the future child would have a reasonable chance for a life worth living despite the associated impairments, there are no good grounds over and above parental preferences for restricting access to genetic information and the use of medical technologies to select against affected embryos or foetuses any more so than in cases with normal embryos or foetuses. Perhaps in those rare cases where the prospective child would not have a reasonable chance at a life worth living, then selecting against the relevant foetuses or embryos could be justied by concern to avoid undue suffering in a child. This line of argument would also stand to challenge the criteria in the Abortion Act 1967 (c.87) (amended by the HFE Act 1990) for selective termination of pregnancy for foetal abnormality (s37(1)(d)). These are important issues but beyond the scope of this paper. For relevant discussions, see Asch (n 201); S Sheldon and S Wilkinson, Termination of Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are There Grounds for a Special Exception in Law? (2001) 9 Med L R 85; D Wasserman, A Choice of Evils in Prenatal Testing (2003) 30 Florida State Univ LR 295. T Krahn and SI Wong, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Reproductive Autonomy (2009) 19 Reprod Biomed Online 34.
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