Brandi Cruz History 220 Dr.

Jordine Frieser Precis Karl-Heinz Frieser, in The Blitzkrieg Legend, focuses on the western campaign in 1940. Friesers goals within the book are to dispel the myths created by historians after the campaign and to show how the German military actual managed to defeat its more powerful enemies. 1 The rise in belief of the blitzkrieg theory after the 1940 campaign, he contends led to Germanys overconfidence and underestimation of the Soviet Union which resulted in their loss. Frieser argues that the blitzkrieg was not a planned strategy created by Hitler that the German army employed against the Allies but was instead improvised tactics. Frieser proves that blitzkrieg was not Hitlers creation by tracing the key elements of blitzkrieg to tactics previously used by the German army. For example, the use of speed and surprise as a means of victory, Frieser attributes to stormtroop tactics of WWI.2 Also, Frieser makes it clear that tactics unlike strategy occurs at the lower and mid-level command. Thus, the author recognizes the important contributions of people like Guderian and Manstein. He writes that Guderian took the stormtroop tactics and combined it with the elements of modern technology, such as the tank and aircraft.3 Also, Frieser points out in several areas where Hitler hesitates or worries about the progress of the panzer divisions and attacks by the Allies which something he might not have bulked at had he developed blitzkrieg. Frieser cites Hitlers command to halt at Dunkirk as an example. The author argues that by stopping the Panzers

Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, transl. John T. Greenwood (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 3. 2 ibid, 6. 3 ibid, 7.

before Dunkirk, he allowed himself to be trapped in a mistake that, in the end, undid the desired strategic success and thus was not a planned campaign of conquest.4 Friesers argument relies on the claim that inferior methods rather than numbers or arms is what led to the Germans victory. The second half of the claim is proven by the comparison of each nations weaponry and man power. He supports his argument of inferior methods on the part of the Allies by citing several instances where German actions were successful because of what he considers luck based on speed. 5 For example, Frieser cites the rigidity of the French command system. He writes that customary in the French army, each individual phase was planned in advance in detail and could be carried out only after an express order had been issued where as the German officers had been trained in critical situations to act independently.6 Frieser uses several primary and secondary sources. He has detailed maps, photographs, and studies. The author uses charts and tables to compare the types of weaponry of each nation and the effectiveness of those arms. He has official reports, military directives, memorandums, diaries, and personal papers. Frieser uses these sources demonstrate when and how strategies changed. Friesers argument has valid points that are thoroughly supported. The argument that Hitler did not create blitzkrieg is clear and that the tactical operations in the western campaign did not follow the strategic plans made before the war is a legitimate claim. Guderians and Rommels writings demonstrated well this continued change in orders from above that called for swift changes in tactics. However, his argument that the western campaign was only done in order to get out of a desperate situation where the French and British had declared war because
4 5

ibid, 349. Ibid, 348. 6 ibid, 185.

of the German invasion of Poland is less convincing given that previous reading indicate a willingness by the French to sacrifice Poland.