SOLIVEN vs.

MAKASIAR 167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscals finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

ISSUES: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

RULING:

This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause. Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way

defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom. Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling effect point.

ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2,2001

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit" Singson, a close friend the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde" a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post". Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president", but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:

Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign. Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits. RULING: The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. As to the issue of the petitioners contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure. (the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

SENATE VS. ERMITA G.R. NO. 169777 APRIL 20,2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not is the Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 85468 SEPTEMBER 7, 1989

FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan.

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him.

The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter. ISSUES:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution. Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same subject matter. Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation. RULING:

Yes, The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

Yes, The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.

No, The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it

defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXEC. SEC., 194 SCRA 317 FACTS:

Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.

Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.

Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and exofficio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land.

Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS (PART 1) 177 SCRA 668

FACTS:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar Honasans failed coup Communist insurgency movements secessionist movements in Mindanao devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives

them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. ISSUES:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. RULING:

No, Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23).

Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing

liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

No, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS (PART 2) 178 SCRA 760

FACTS:

In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:

Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted.

RULING:

No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.

Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino illegal claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.

President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers. It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

BIRAOGO et. al vs. PHIL TRUTH COMMISSION G.R. NO. 192935 DECEMEBER 7,2010

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:

E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission. E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the

Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that: E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1; Whether or not E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

DENR vs. DENR EMPLOYEES G.R. NO. 149725 AUGUST 19, 2003

FACTS:

Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, which reads in part:

Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Offices:

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim administrative arrangement to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in delivering its services pending approval of the government-wide reorganization by Congress, the following redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative units in the regional and field offices are hereby promulgated:

Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units: The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional District except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital Region (NCR). The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with the attached distribution list per region which forms part of this Order. Likewise, the following realignment and administrative arrangements are hereby adopted:

xxx 1.6.

xxx

xxx

The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be

transferred from Region XI to XII.

Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:

Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR. RULING:

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 17.

The President shall have control of all the executive departments,

bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

The DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional centers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896 dated May 31, 2000 and

August 20, 2001, as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No. 389, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is LIFTED.

MONDANO vs. SILVANO 97 PHIL143 MAY 30,1995

FACTS:

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao. Consolacin Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling. The Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. The provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection. The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect

ISSUES:

Whether or not the investigation of the charges against petitioner by theprovincial board is unauthorized and illegal. Whether or not the suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law. RULING:

Sec. 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007 expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the

matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. "In the instant case, the charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised

Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve "neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office." The Court ruled that before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28years of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon a sworn complaint of the offended spouse. Hence, the charges preferred against the petitioner, Municipal Mayor of Mainit,province of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in Sec.2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. Consequently, the suspension of the petitioner, of the Municipality of Mainit, is unlawful and without authority of law.

VILLENA vs. SEC. OF INTERIOR 67 PHIL 451

FACTS:

Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.

In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUES: Whether the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority:

(a) to order an investigation, by a special investigation appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and (b) to decree the suspension of the said mayor pending the investigation of the charges

RULING:

Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:

The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.

The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in the service of any bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon, witness by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant to the investigation.

The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions. Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose. Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed

with the board within five days. The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.

The suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.

Under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO, INC vs. PANO 21 SCRA 895

FACTS:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permitted and actual occupant of a 1,103hectare pasture land situated in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public land to the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. On 1955, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation. When the case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it would be for public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion on which the petitioner have made improvements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary and whether it can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary

RULING:

The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or

nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

GANZON vs. CA 200 SCRA 271

FACTS:

Furthermore, we may already take judicial notice of the recently-approved Local Government Code of 1991 (recently signed into law by the President) 18 which provides (as to imposition of preventive suspensions) as follows:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension xxx xxx xxx

b) . . . that, any single preventive suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.(emphasis supplied) The main decision refers to the three (3) suspension orders the first, the second and the third. As shown earlier, the first and the third orders have already been served. It is only the second order which seems to have been unserved. If we follow the decision which states that the three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the second order should not be served for another 60-day period. However, there is no cogent reason why, under the bizarre circumstances of this case where the respondent Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead of consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and close vintage we cannot allow the concept of simultaneous service to apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would follow then that the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of said second order would have started on 5 August 1991 (when the main decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court found and affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension orders, including the second order). The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4 October 1991.

It appears that as to the second preventive suspension, petitioner manifested that there is still an existing preliminary injunction issued by the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon vs. Santos, et al. 20 One may ask as to the status of the case pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 33 insofar as the said case involves the issue on the validity of the second preventive suspension order. Under the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second preventive suspension has been affirmed; under the present resolution, said second preventive suspension has been served. Consequently, Special Civil Action No. 18312 before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City has been rendered moot and academic, insofar as the second preventive suspension order is concerned. ISSUE:

When will petitioner Ganzon may be allowed to re-assume his position and duties as mayor of Iloilo City. Is it only after 19 October 1991 as claimed by respondents, or at some earlier date? The answer to this question would depend on how petitioner has served the preventive suspension orders issued against him.

RULING:

As to the petition (docketed CA-G. R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court of Appeals, which involves the question of the validity of the fourth order, and which has clearly been served, petitioner admitted that he filed it, on the belief that it was the proper remedy for his reinstatement to office; thinking that his suspensions have been served and ended. 21 As we have ruled that petitioner has served the suspension orders decreed in the main decision and in the light of the finding of this Court that the fourth preventive suspension order has been served, the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840; have also become moot and academic, warranting dismissal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is hereby GRANTED. The temporary restraining order dated 5 September 1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents are ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City effective immediately.

The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having become moot and academic. The Region Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before which petitioner's action for prohibition (Special Civil Action No. 18312) is pending is also ordered to dismiss the said case for having become moot and academic insofar as petitioner prays therein to enjoin his (second) preventive suspension.

This resolution is without prejudice to the administrative cases (where the first, second, third and fourth preventive suspension orders were issued) proceeding on the merits thereof. Also, as decreed in the main decision of 5 August 1991. . . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. . . .

DADOLE vs. COA G.R. NO. 125350 DEMECEMBER 3,2002

FACTS:

In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.

On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates shall be granted but it shall not exceed P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities subject to the following conditions:

a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160.3" (italics supplied)

Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to petitioners. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied.

On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City. They also maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units. ISSUE:

Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING: The petitioners contention is meritorious. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:

"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."ii 6

In Taule v. Santos,iii 7 we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"iv 8 we said.

In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,v 9 the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

By constitutional fiat, local government units are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.

It was then held that LBC 55 went beyond the law it seeks to implement. LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceedP1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when

the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM overstepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.

SARMIENTO vs. MISON 156 SCRA 549

FACTS:

Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission onAppointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint.

(1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution,

(2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,

(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and

(4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups are the present bone of contention. ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president with or without the consent/confirmationof the CA

RULING:

The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicableconstitutional provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requiresconfirmation by the CA of all presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointmentwith hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments fromconfirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, theconfirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required.

The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutional authority of the President.

AYTONA vs. CASTILLO 4 SCRA 1

FACTS:

On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day.

At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillos right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillos appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytonas appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the new president has the power to cancel all ad interim appointments made by the previous president after they have all qualified?

RULING: To quote We are informed, it is Malacaan's practice which we find to be logical to submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time,

Malacaang submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.

IBP vs. ZAMORA G.R. NO. 141284 AUGUST 15,2000

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void andunconstitutional.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP RULING:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusand the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their

revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powershighlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment andsuppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

LACSON vs. PEREZ MAY 10,2001

FACTS:

President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them. ISSUE:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. RULING:

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,

providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaintshave been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ ofhabeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

DAVID vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO G.R. NO. 171396 MAY 3,2006

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as

basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

ISSUES:

1.

Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?

2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

RULING:

1.

NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,

were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject tshirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted

2.

pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

BAYAN vs. ZAMORA 342 SCRA 449

FACTS:

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA.

On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. RULING:

Petition is dismissed.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting state.

The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.

Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites :

a) it must be under a treaty b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State

There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution. The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA.

PIMENTEL vs. EXEC. SEC., G.R NO. 158088 JULY 6,2005

FACTS:

On December 28, 2000 The Philippines signed the Rome Statute throughCharge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute

Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Petitioner further claims it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. A petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit.; Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by the Philippine Member to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

RULING:

Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power as member of Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct injury from the non-transmittal and that they can seek redress in our domestic courts. Petitioners interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not belong to the Senate.

Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the ratification papers and forward the signed copy to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.

The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.

It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the President subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.

The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective.

Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is within the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus,