Viable Learning Systems

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Viable Learning Systems

Interactive Learning Environments, 2000, vol. 7, no. X, pp1-21.


M.I.Yolles
The Business School,
Liverpool John Moores University
m.yolles@livjm.ac.uk

Abstract: Learning theory has not yet developed sufficiently to address such notions as the
relationship between learning behaviour and strategy, and evolutionary learning. To do this
within the modern context, it needs to call on the paradigm of complexity. One approach
towards this has been developed that comes from Viable Systems Theory. Applying its
conceptualisations to learning situations gives us what we call Viable Learning.

Keywords: Learning theory, behaviour, strategy, evolutionary learning, viable learning.

1. Viable Learning Theory


Viable learning theory derives from viable systems theory as developed by Yolles (1999), that
itself comes from a base of work by Beer (1959, 1975, 1979, 1981) and Schwarz (1994,
1995). From management systems theory, we take the notion that organisations may be seen
as viable systems. Stafford Beer was a pioneer in this field, and was interested in dealing with
organisations that were involved in uncertain complex problem situations, for which he
developed managerial cybernetics. Part of his theory involves conceptualisations about viable
organisations that are purposeful, adaptive, and are able to maintain their long term stability,
and he referred to this as the viable systems model. More recently, Eric Schwarz has published
in the associated area of general systems. He developed his own theory of (Schwarzian) viable
systems that applies the dynamic concepts of chaos and complexity generically to self-organising
systems capable of evolving. Yolles has linked these two approaches, but also calls on ideas
that come from cognitive and social psychology, connectionism, and artificial intelligence. He
has developed a new theory of viable systems that belongs to management systems, but which
has broader application.
The notions of complexity are thus implicit to viable systems theory. This enables it to link
with the notions associated with the complexity paradigm, that explain such ideas as
evolutionary development. It includes for example, the notion that viable systems may be
dissipative (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989) and thus implicitly unstable. Variety is a concept
that encapsulates this because it is a measure of complexity. Having said this, however,
probably few (if any) attempts have been made to formulate quantitatively measures of
complexity because fundamentally, viable systems theory is qualitative.
It is possible to model any organisation as a viable system that is seen to be active, purposeful,
and adaptive. A viable system is an organisation that survives. In doing so it can respond to
changes (whether or not they have been foreseen) that can generate sufficient variety through
self-organisation to deal with that variety impacting on it from its environment (called
requisite variety).
A viable organisation is able to support adaptability and change while maintaining stability in
its behaviour. In particular an organisation is viable if it can maintain stable states of
behaviour as it adapts to perturbations from its environment. Now, the environment can be
differentiated into a suprasystem of interacting organisations that exists in its environment.
Such organisations are normally considered to be autonomous, in that they are taken to be

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analytically and empirically independent from one another. What constitutes independence is
a matter of practical requirement that enables, for instance, measurements to be taken from a
given organisation without conceptually complicating them with data from other
organisations. The question of whether an organisation in a suprasystem of them is indeed
autonomous is one of estimating its degree of interactivity with the other organisations. It is
perspective driven, and is ultimately axiomatic.
These ideas can be applied in learning contexts. This might relate to either individual learners,
or to learning organisations (that are in any case the subject of management systems). At the
individual level we can see a learner as a viable organisation. Thus, the individual learner will
undertake viable learning if s/he can maintain stable learning behaviour, while being able to
adapt to changes in a given learning environment that changes the learning situation. Whether
a learner can adapt to the changes in the learning environment is a function of his/her plastic
limit. In the systems literature, when perturbations push it beyond this limit, the system either
changes its form (incrementally through morphogenesis, or dramatically through
metamorphosis) or dies. As an example of this, an individual learner studying on a university
course who is struggling “dies” in this context when s/he leaves the course prematurely,
because new learning behaviours cannot be found. If a viable organisation survives, then it is
able to change its form, to adapt. We refer to the model that describes such learning
capabilities as the viable learning model (VLM) that was first introduced by Yolles (1997).
While at this stage it is a purely qualitative model, it could benefit from experimental research
for quantitative verification.
If a learning situation is to be seen as a viable system, then the question must be raised: what
is its systemic nature?
A system can be seen as a non-separable entity that is composed of a set of objects of attention
that are defined in mutual relation to each other, and which is not reducible into a sum of its
objects. If each object is thought of as a component of the system, then commonly the system
is a set of components that interrelate. A system is bounded through a frame of reference that
is defined for and within the context of a situation. The boundary will change according to the
learning purpose and worldview of a viewer. A system boundary may also be defined in terms
of the degree of interaction between the parts that define it. Thus, a viewer may see the parts
to be richly or poorly interactive. In modelling a situation systemically, a viewer will make a
judgement about what constitutes a rich set of interactions, and distinguish this group by
forming a boundary around it. This boundary distinguishes the set of parts within its perimeter
from the poorly interactive ones that lie outside it in the environment. Viewers often have to
justify this boundary to their peer group through language and logic that is common to the
group.
To see learning systemically, we can define a set of analytically and empirically independent
objects of attention that together form a rich learning situation. Other objects of attention that
are less rich in terms of their mutual learning interactions are not part of the system, even
though they may influence it. We can define three objects of attention as:
(a) a learner,
(b) a learning source (such as predesigned courseware or a natural learning situation),
(c) a target situation (that may exist in either a “real” behavioural world or an artificial
one).

Normally these three objects of attention are sufficient to define the system. It may be the case
that we will wish to include a viewer also (e.g., an examiner who is to evaluate the learner).

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However, to do this it is sufficient to define the system and the viewer together in a larger
suprasystem.
These objects of attention are analytically independent because they can each be examined as
a separate whole, and they are empirically independent because measurements can be taken
about one without necessarily having to take measurements about another. What constitutes
such independence is, in the end, a matter of judgement and peer group agreed decision. Thus,
a learning source (e.g., courseware) and a target situation (e.g., a case study) will define the
context of a learning situation for a learner, noting that here all objects of attention are richly
interactive. We as learners, or as viewers in the wider suprasystem, will decide upon the
nature and extent of the boundary that defines the system. We can attempt to examine the
learning capability of a learner, without immediate reference to the other two objects of
attention. We can also take measurements about the learning capability of the learner (for
instance through an examination) within that context without immediate reference to them
(e.g., from a marking scheme).
When we refer to a learner, we must also consider the context of the situation that itself
implies the systemic accompaniment (b) and (c). This can be defined because a learner in a
purposeful adaptive activity “system” will have a structured relationship with the learning
source and the target situation. This relationship effectively drives the learning behaviour of a
learner.
This is a quite different from non-purposeful learning, which occurs when learners learn
through the daily events that become “life” teachers (can we perhaps think of these as virtually
purposeful?).
Now, each of the objects of attention (a)-(c) can have associated with it a worldview, an idea
that we shall explore in some detail now.
2. Worldviews
Pedagogic perspectives involve different worldviews. According to Yolles (1999), the notion
of worldview is a literal translation from the German weltanschauung that derives from
Scheler (1947) and was developed by Mannheim (1967). Worldviews are relative to the
institutions that one is attached to in a given society, and they change as the institutional
realities change (Berger and Luckman, 1966).
More recently (Yolles, 1999), weltanschauung has taken on the meaning of a view or
perspective of the real world that is determined by cultural and other attributes of the viewers.
Through a process of socialisation, a view is formed within the institutions one is attached to
in a given society, and they change as the institutional realities change. Worldviews may be
shared by a group of people, though when this occurs the individuals each retain their own
realities while using common models to share meaning. Further, worldviews have boundaries
that are generated within the belief system and cognitive space of their viewholders, and as a
result we can explore worldviews in terms of their knowledge attributes.
We can distinguish two forms of worldview for the system domain: weltanschauung and
paradigm. The term weltanschauung was originally used by Churchman (1979) within the
systems context. It has been given a distinct definition by Checkland (1981) and Checkland
and Davis (1986) when used as one of the cornerstones of his own systems methodology
directed at solving problem situations that involve purposeful human activity. The use of the
word by Checkland has been variously defined as the worldview: (a) that determines model
building of relevant systems and conceptual models; (b) for which in a particular situation

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certain notional systems are seen as relevant; (c) behind the perceived social reality of the
situation in which the study is made. An interpretation of this is: the perspective of a situation
that has been assumed, and in particular how it is regarded from a particular (explicit)
viewpoint (including the assumptions made about the system) (Patching, 1990). It has also
been defined (Yolles, 1999) as the worldview of an individual or the shared worldview of a
group that is more or less visible to the viewholders, but not more generally to others who are
not viewholders.
We can relate the notion of a shared weltanschauung to that of paradigm. A paradigm is more
than shared weltanschauung. It is shared weltanschauung together with the explicitly defined
propositions that contribute to understanding. When weltanschauungen are formalised they
become paradigms, and more or less transparent to others who are not viewholders. A
formalisation is a language that enables a set of explicit statements (propositions and their
corollaries) to be made about the beliefs and other attributes that enable (more or less)
everything that must be expressed to be expressed in a self-consistent way. This does not of
course mean that the paradigm is able to express ideas for which it has no concepts. Formal
propositions define a logic that establishes a framework of thought and conceptualisation that
enables organised action to occur, and problem situations to be addressed. Formal logic
provides a standard of validity and a means of assessing validity (Kyberg Jr., 1968). While
groups may offer behaviour in ways that are consistent with their shared weltanschauung,
paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through formalisation.
It may be said that informal worldviews are more or less composed of a set of undeclared
assumptions and propositions, while formal ones are more or less declared. More, since
paradigms are forms of worldviews they are by their very nature bounded, and thus constrain
the way in which situations can be described. Now paradigms can change (Yolles, 1998;
Kuhn, 1970) so that the nature of the constraint is subject to a degree of change - however
bounded it might be.
The idea of a paradigm (or more generally worldview) is illustrated in figure 1, and derives
from Yolles (1996). An alternative way of representing a paradigm as shown in figure 2,
proposed because some perceive that: (a) worldview is culture centred, (b) cognitive
organisation (beliefs, values, and attitudes) are its attributes, (c) it may not be seen that
normative and cognitive control of behaviour or action can be differentiated, (d) there may be
debate about whether there is a distinction between formal and substantive rationalities.
The cognitive space is seen as a space of concepts, knowledge and meaning, and its
relationship to culture is underlined. Exemplars form part of the cognitive space. It also relates
directly to action and communication that is a prerequisite for organised behaviour.

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Paradigm

Language
epistemology
Propositional base creates
knowledge & communicates
Exemplars stimulates concepts ideas and
concrete supports reinforces
problem
solutions Culture
attitudes
affect
Cognitive
organisation normative
beliefs standards
in views or models values of conduct

affect

influence

Figure 1
Context Diagram Showing Concept of a Paradigm

Culture

Attitudes Beliefs Values Language

Cognitive
Normative space
standards Concepts, knowledge &
meaning to construct behaviour
Propositional base.
Action/behaviour Exemplars.
& communication
World View

Figure 2
Idea of the Paradigm

3. The Cybernetics of Learning


From the well accepted propositions of Beer, every purposeful adaptive activity system has a
metasystem. The system has form, thus has structure, process and associated behavioure. It is
assigned to an energetic behavioural domain. The knowledge related metasystem is the
“cognitive consciousness” of the system that it drives, and is assigned to a cognitive domain.
According to Yolles (1999), the two domains are connected across a gap that we refer to as
the transformational or organising domain. It is strategic in nature, and operates through
information (figure 3). This model can be applied to any purposeful adaptive activity system
by distinguishing between cognitive, strategic, and behavioural aspects of a situation.
This defines the basis of viable systems (as defined by Yolles) that, through transformational
self-organising processes, are able to support adaptability and change while maintaining
stability in their behaviour. In a plastic organisation the nature of that behaviour may change,
and in so doing a viable system will maintain behavioural stability. Stability does not imply
behavioural equilibrium, rather that behaviour is coherent and can occur in a consistent way
that relates to purpose. In the learning context, an individual will undertake viable learning if

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s/he can maintain stable learning behaviour while being able to adapt to changes in a given
learning environment and different learning situations. We refer to the model that describes
such learning capabilities as the viable learning model (VLM).

Transformational/organising
domain
Behavioural domain Paradigm
representation (formal worldview)

organisation of develpoment/ formation/ Cognitive


Behavioural world intervention learning consolidation domain

interpretation
Weltanschauung
(informal worldview)
reflection/creation

Figure 3: The Relationship between the Behavioural and Cognitive Domains in a Viable
System
The organising process is a transformation that manifests worldview constructs (seated in the
cognitive domain) into the behavioural world (seated in the behavioural domain). This
conceptualisation enables us to collapse the worldview domain into a single cognitive domain
that defines what may be called a learning metasystem. To explain this, let us collapse the
types of worldview (paradigm and weltanschauung) of figure 3 into a deep or cognitive
domain (figure 4). It is through organising (also called transmogrification - or transformation
with surprises) that attributes of the cognitive world are mapped to the physical manifest
behavioural world.
Suppose that this manifest world is seen to be composed of individuals that create
organisations that each have form. Then that manifest behavioural form is sensitive to the
composition of individuals that defines a possibly innumerable number (n, which may be
large) of situations over time. Variation in that composition will potentially influence the
nature of organising, and thus the forms that are manifested. That is, organising is sensitive to
group nature and its conceptualisations, and any concept can be manifested behaviourally in
many different ways. This argument is implict when we say that the mapping between the
congitive and behavioural domains is homeomorphic. We can also say that organising defines
a homeomorphic potential, implying that there is a feasible set of manifest forms each of
which depend in part upon group composition. These forms will each be different, and have
associated with them different behaviours. To illustrate the idea of homeomorphic potential,
from figure 3 we construct figure 4 as a set of embedded closed curves.
We can use this figure recursively to show how we can attribute the properties of a system to a
behavioural situation rather than declaring it to be one. In the same way that we can map from
the cognitive to the behavioural domain, so too we can map from the domain of worldviews to
the “explicitly imagined” behavioural domain. From this we can project a cognitive system
model onto the dotted line in figure 4. This can now be designated as the boundary of a “new”

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cognitive domain that can be mapped into the behavioural domain. Alternatively, some may
wish to see the dotted line imposed on the behavioural domain, taking it to be a system.
This representation we have adopted is reminiscent of the model developed by Chomsky
(1975), in his structural model of the relationship between syntax and semantics in language
theory. It is also structurally similar to that used in the field of artificial intelligence by Clancy
and Letsinger (1981). This distinguishes between “deep” knowledge and “surface”
knowledge, the former relating to principles, and the latter to skills.

Manifest behavioural domain

Organising
Domain

World view populated


Cognitive Domain

Figure 4: Relationship between the Cognitive and Behavioural Domains, through a


homeomorphic potential

4. Learning Behaviour, Strategy, and Metalearning


The construction of the above theory of viable systems can be applied to learning. In so doing
we will draw on the ideas of learning behaviour, learning strategy, and metalearning.
Kolb (1974) proposed that learning behaviour occurred as a continuous learning cycle (figure 5).
It implicitly defines a behavioural schedule that is buried within the set of phases, and indicates a
set of behavioural steps that a learner will pass through (e.g. read this, do that,…). It is not
always the case that a set of steps will be predefined, but this is really a topic beyond the scope
of this paper.

E x pe rie n cial C on cr ete experien ce R e fle c tiv e


le arning le arnin g
qu adrant quad rant

A ctive Reflective
exper im en tation obser va tion

A c tiv e A bstrac t
le arning le arn ing
quad ra nt qu adran t
A bstra ct con cep tua lisa tion

Figure 5: The Kolb Learning Cycle


The behavioural schedule defines how a learner tackles and deals with learning material. For
traditional open and distance learning materials that operate as a schedule of programmed
learning, a number of steps may be defined and the learner will make an ordered selection of
them. Thus, suppose that we have a traditional form of open and/or distance learning material
that is composed of units. It is through learning behaviour that a learner will pass through each
unit, from the introductory unit to the final one, in some order and according to some stepped

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organisation of learning. At a more detailed level of behaviour, each unit may be composed of
objectives, summaries, examples or case studies, a glossary, and a form of learning evaluation
that may be either for the personal use of a learner of the formal use of an institution.
Learning behaviour, if constrained to a set of predefined activity steps, occurs as a schedule of
those activities. The schedule will be defined according to a strategy that a learner adopts. In
many traditional paper based open learning texts, a programme of work would be structured
into units, and from the earlier theory, each might begin with the objectives of the learning
materials, have summaries, embed examples and a glossary. If a tutor adheres to a rigid
learning strategy, then he or she will devise a set of very tight constraints on learning strategy
that will define a unique behavioural schedule permitting only one possible way for a learner
to pass through this material. Thus for example, a sequential ordering of objectives,
summaries, and so on may occur that define only one learning path for a learner. This may not
be consistent with the personal strategy of a given learner who may wish, for instance, to
sample parts of the learning material or consult the glossary before embarking on the learning
material. Perhaps a more flexible approach is for a tutor to offer a menu that enables the
learner to define his or her own strategy of learning within less tightly tutor defined
constraints, for example presenting materials on a website. So the degree of flexibility on
learning strategy offered to a learner is tutor determined through the constraints imposed on
the learning material.
Learners have cognitive processes that within our model are be assigned to a cognitive
domain. This is defined by the worldview(s) of a learner or group of learners, that defines not
only the nature of the manifest strategy that a learner will adopt, but also changes in learning
strategy. It also defines the behavioural schedule that a learner adopts, or enables an
interpretation of some one else’s behavioural schedule to occur. This relates to the idea of
metalearning.
Learning about learning is referred to as metalearning, and enables learners to:
(1) have knowledge to reason about its own operation;
(2) have a structure which simplifies the reasoning process;
(3) infer conclusions from a chain of inference rules;
(4) determine accuracy, consistency, and plausibility of its conclusions;
(5) explain reasoning behaviour.
Metalearning induces learners to assess the patterns by which they learn (Cunningham, 1990).
Patterns describe process, event schedules, or inter-relationships.
In terms of metalearning, a behavioural schedule will establish personal criteria that enables a
strategic trigger to be defined, and that will enable a behavioural schedule to be changed. It
may redefine what constitutes the elements of a learning domain by creating new
conceptualisations, thus explicitly influencing the nature of a learning strategy. This will then
affect the behavioural schedule or sequencing of learning material in the learning domain. It
can enable new maps of learning material to be created, based on the new conceptualisations.
It can result in new logical strategic processes that sequence learning material, and can result
in the definition of new rules to provide a way of overcoming highly constrained learning
domains.
Returning now to Kolb’s learning cycle, Kolb associated each phase with a learning “style” that
brought out the idea that learners can be classified as having a particular style of learning. From
this work, the notion of learning style has become an accepted typology of the learning penchant
of individual learners. Learning cycle approaches may be a satisfactory simplification of the

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learning behaviour/styles and process, but according to Cunningham (1987), Kolb’s work was
deficient in a number of ways:
(a) as a reaction against theory based learning, there can be an over-value of experience based
learning;
(b) learning can be perceived to be based entirely on what others hand down and by self-
reasoning;
(c) research evidence does not support learning cycle theory: e.g., the cycle does not indicate
how learners gain ability in learning.
Neither does Kolb’s work consider learning strategy. The concept of learning strategy centres
on the notion that the acquisition of knowledge in learning environments is very much related
to the strategy through which a learner learns. Learning strategy is to do with controls and
constraints. Examples of control features are a content index and a content map. Laurillard
(1987) argues that constraint minimisation provides better results in learning than its
maximisation. Constraints are apparent when learning goals are predefined for a learner,
rather than allowing them to be learner-defined.
How a learner understands the steps in a cycle of behaviour is another issue that we shall not
consider here.
If learning behaviour is stable then its scheduling process of these steps is controlled. Contrary
to this, under chaos the scheduling process will be arbitrary. Let us suppose that the learning
system passes from a condition of stability to one of chaos, and then back to one of stability.
As stability is regained, a new metasystem arises so that the system has passed through a
metamorphosis. To understand the nature of the new metasystem, we must explore the
learning process a little further.
5. The Domains and their Cognitive Properties
It is possible to develop what we call “cognitive properties” associated with each of the
domains in figure 4, which clearly relate to the ideas of learning behaviour, learning strategy,
and metalearning.
We can apply the work of Habermas as explored by Jackson (1992) to our basic model, and its
extensions developed by Yolles (1999). The work actually lies within the context of the
complemenetary use of systems methodologies within management systems, but we can easily
extend this. Associated with the behavioural domain is what Habermas (1970) calls cognitive
interests. The organising domain has what Yolles calls cognitive purposes. Finally, there is the
cognitive domain cognitive influences, as illustrated in table 1 (Yolles, 1999).
The Habermasian classification of cognitive interest has technical and practical attributes. The
former of these relates to work. In our context this can also be directly connected to Kolb’s
behavioural phases of the learning process in figure 1, so that, the notion of work refers to the
work of learning. The practical attribute is concerned with learners interaction within a
learning process. These can also be related to Kolb’s ideas, and from Habermas’ perspective
this should ideally be accompanied by emancipation in the way learning occurs to enable
learners the opportunity to maximise their learning potential.
Learning also occurs according to cognitive purpose, and the cybernetic attributes of this
relate to intention by the strategic pursuit of learning goals and control processes. Rational and
ideological attributes also affect cognitive learning purposes. Finally, cognitive influences can
occur with respect to social, cultural or political attributes that guide learners to learn
according to their embedded knowledges about learning (and metalearning). The social

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attribute is connected to structures, processes (including facilitating technologies), and roles,
and learning will have attributes that relate to this. Similarly one is able to identify cultural
and political attributes, the meaning of these being relative to the nature of the learning
situation that one is concerned with. Thus for instance, in the political nature of learning,
polity is seen as being concerned with engineering the enablement of group form, condition of
order, and related processes. It relates to the learning situation that a learner wishes to be in.
Its commodity is power that determines who directs the learning process, and how it is
directed.

COGNITIVE LEARNING INTERESTS OF THE BEHAVIOURAL DOMAIN


Technical Practical Critical Deconstraining
Work as learning. This enables Learning interaction. This requires Emancipation. This enables people to (i)
people to achieve goals and that people as individuals and groups liberate themselves from the learning
generate material well-being. It in a social system learn to gain and constraints imposed by power structures (ii)
involves technical ability to develop the possibilities of an learn through precipitation in social and
undertake learning action in the understanding of each others political processes to control their own
environment, and the ability to subjective views. It is consistent with destinies.
make prediction and establish a practical interest in mutual
control. understanding that can address
disagreements, which can be a threat
to the social form of life
COGNITIVE PURPOSES OF LEARNING WITHIN THE ORGANISING DOMAIN
Cybernetical Rational Ideological
Learning intention. This is through Logico-relational. Enables learning Manner of thinking about learning. An
the creation and strategic pursuit of source missions, goals, and aims to intellectual framework through which policy
learning goals and aims that may be defined, and approached through makers observe and interpret reality that has a
change over time, enables people planning. It involves logical, politically correct ethical and moral
through learning control and relational, and rational abilities to orientation, provides an image of the future
communications processes to organise thought and learning action that enables action through politically correct
redirect their futures. and thus to define sets of possible strategic policy, and gives a politically correct
systemic and learning behaviour view of stages of historical development in
possibilities. respect of interaction with the external
environment and related learning processes.
COGNITIVE INFLUENCES ON LEARNING WITHIN THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN
Social Cultural Political
Formation. Enables Thinking. Influences occur from Freedom. Influences occur from knowledges
individuals/groups to be influenced knowledges about learning that about learning that affect our polity
by knowledges about learning that derive from the cognitive determined in part by how we think about the
relate to our social environment. organisation (beliefs, attitudes, constraints on group and individual freedoms
This has a consequence for our values) other worldviews. It to learn and in connextion with this to
learning about social structures and ultimately determines how we learn organise and behave. It ultimately has impact
processes that define our social to interact and defines our logico- on our learning related ideology and our
forms that are related to our relational understandings. degree of emancipation.
intentions and behaviours.
Table 1: Relationship between human cognitive interests, purpose, and influences

Learning processes can occur at three levels: cognitive, strategic, and behavioural. The
cognitive domain is knowledge related, some of this being the acquisition of knowledge about
the learning process itself (metalearning). Part of this process also concerns planning as
considered by Lester and Kroll (1990). It is through metalearning that an ability to develop
learning strategy is developed that itself determines the nature of learning behaviour and
associated style. Metalearning operates from a learner paradigm which has within it a learning
system as its metaphorical “cognitive consciousness” that provides the system with direction

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and guidance. Learning behaviour can therefore be seen as a manifestation of this. Thus, for
instance, a learner (who may be an individual, a group of individuals, or an organisation),
enters a learning situation. Learning strategy is determined from the learner’s metasystem, but
is an organising process that ultimately determines behaviour. It is a result of cognitive
purpose that Kroll (1988) refers to as metacognitition. It involves cybernetic and rational
process that operate as transformations that may be subject to surprises, and that will constrain
learning behaviour. As an example of this, learning strategy may break down, when the
learning process become destabilised, and learning becomes an ad hoc affair. This can occur
in situations of learning “chaos”.
We are aware that according to VLM metalearning, learning strategy, and learning behaviour
are all directly linked, and any change in one domain can directly affect the others. Thus for
instance, suppose that a perturbation caused by the environment occurs in the domain of a
learner’s learning strategy, then under the appropriate conditions we should see an affect in
either learning behaviour and/or metalearning. In the event that these perturbations are very
severe, then chaos can be induced and the learning system becomes divorced from its
metasystem. This may appear to occur as an arbitrary learning behaviour from the perspective
of a viewer. However, according to propositions by Yolles (1997d) that conform to chaos
theory, a new metasystem may spontaneously arise that provides a metalearning basis for the
new learning behaviour.
Now, cognitive influences, purposes and interests are all analytically independent. They have
been assembled together in the rows of Table 1, there being horizontal interactivity between
the row attributes. The columns of this table are also analytically independent, and have
vertical interactivity. Now, it is tempting to see the table as a typology, which will mean that
we need to represent each column by a concept that we shall have to invent. To do so, let us
propose that there are mutual commonalties in each column. Take the initial column first. The
element in the first cell is practical cognitive interest that is a function of interaction. More
simply we can discuss this element in terms of its functional attributes alone, as we can for
whole table. Taken together with logico-relational processes and thinking, all contribute to a
formative orientation of the learner that determines its present and future learning trajectories.
In the second column, we have work, intention, and formation, and this gives the idea of
something kinematic (“of motion considered abstractly”) that relates to movement of the
learning process. Finally, in the third column, we have emancipation, manner of thinking, and
freedom, suggesting that by releasing greater potential to learners, the possibility of greater
learning viability is ultimately enabled.
6. The Viable Learning Metasystem
Earlier we considered three objects of attention (a)-(c). For the VLM this suggests that there
are also a triad of worldviews that in some way complement one another. Worldview
complementarism has been critisised by what we have referred to as the “fundamentalists” of
paradigm incommensurability (Yolles, 1999a) that suggests that worldviews cannot be made
complementary since they conceptually or qualitatively different. Approaches to counter this
have occurred using table 1. The nature of complementarism is of interest in this section,
arguing that from it a worldview results that provides a learning model that the learner
pursues.
We can consider that each of these objects of attention is itself a viable system in its own
right. In the case of (a), this means that the learner is able to be purposeful and adaptable in
his or her learning behaviour, and is able to survive as a learner. In the case of (b) and (c), a
learning source and target situation seen to form the basis of a viable system will have

11
associated with them groups of people who themselves form a viable learning organisation.
As a consequence, each of the three objects of attention can be thought of as having cognitive,
organising, and behavioural domains. Concentrating on the former of these for a moment, we
can represent the embedded worldviews associated with each as in figure 6. The intention of
this diagram is to illustrate that the three objects of attention can be:
 kept analytically apart the relationship between the target situation, the inquirer, and the
targeting methodology
 clearly indicated that the processes of learning and learning sources influences are distinct.
In te r a c tiv e s p a c e o f w o r ld
v i e w s d e fi n i n g t h e
m eta system
o f lea rn in g P a ra d ig m (s) o f
le a r n in g so u r c e

P a r a d ig m (s )/w o r ld W o r ld v ie w (s )
v ie w (s ) o f ta r g e t s itu a tio n o f lea rn er

Figure 6: Learning triad defining an interactive space of worldviews and their knowledges

The diagram is also intended to highlight the idea that in learning situations:
 the worldviews of the actors in a situation are seen as an abstract property
 learning involves a learner with a worldview (or worldviews for a plural inquirer)
 there is an interaction and influence between the formalised worldview(s) of a learning
source, the worldviews of a learner, and the target situation through their cultures and
“truths”.

The context of the situation can be defined within a framework of thought that constructs
these three objects of attention as its orthogonalities against which changes in one can be
related to the other. This visulaisation is not unlike traditional approaches where independent
but related variables (e.g. space and time) are graphed one against another within a frame of
reference to enable changes (e.g., velocity) to be represented.
Part of our interest here is to argue that learning can be represented as a viable system, and we
do this through a direct translation from systems theory to the learning domain. Thus the
explanations that we propose will be subject to experimental varification, yet to come.
The precepts that define a viable learning system will involve the arguement that a
metasystem can be formed that is manifested as a purposeful adaptive learning system that can
evolve according to the principles of viable systems theory as proposed by Schwarz (1994).
The formation of a cognitive domain as represented in figure 3 requires the creation of shared
paradigms through the establishment of a common cognitive model. This enables at least
some of the knowledge of a learner to be used to apply at least some of the knowledge of a
learning source to at least some of the knowledge of the worldviews that make up a target
situation. The selection of knowledge comes from the frame of reference that enables a learner
to learn within a given context.

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We think in terms of systems having learning structure and related behaviour. Then the
cognitive domain can be thought of as forming a metasystem that directs learning into
complex target situations, and that we have earlier referred to as metalearning. When the
learning metasystem couples with a system we refer to it as a purposive in its learning
behaviour. If the three apexes of worldview do not relate to each other in a common model,
then the triad of figure 6 is not seen to form the basis of a systemic learning process. As a
result, the learning process will be seen to be composed of an arbitrary selection and
application of learning to the target situation. Some might refer to it as illustrating a
misunderstanding of a learning material, of a target situation that manifests as behaviour what
has been learned, of source learning, or of the application of the latter to the former. Any
learning behaviour that results from a strategic learning process will likely be meaningless and
of little value.
When a learning process falls into chaos, it loses its connection with the learning metasystem,
and in response to stimulus from a target situation the learning process behaves spontaneously
in a way that is structure determined.
To understand this, we can say that if a learner’s structural approach is defined as an ordered
set of procedural steps of learning, then only these steps are available for selection in that
order by an inquirer making an inquiry.
In the formation of a viable learning system, we have proposed three objects of attention to be
required. Each has its worldview, but together they do not define a whole metasystem. What
functions as a metasystem is a disconnected and disjointed set of worldviews that simply
contributes to the confusion of chaos. It is only when the objects of attention come together by
forming a whole metasystem that defines purpose, that the system will be able to achieve and
maintain that purpose. The emerging metasystem occurs through the formation of a virtual
paradigm that may endure for the duration of the inquiry into the situation. Three functions of
the metasystem are that it will:
1. define a shared worldview that enables a structured learning approach to be applied to a
situation by a learner meaningfully,
2. constrain the learner by use of a structured learning approach
3. control the selection or use of structured learning to make it appropriate for the target
situation, having care in how the learning is applied to the situation.

The first of these results come through the creation of a virtual paradigm that formalises a
learner’s approach. Part of this process is to define the purposes of a learner. This comes from
the learner’s understanding of the actors’ view(s) of the target situation, the mission and goals
of the structured learning, and his own purposes in applying the learned knowledge and skills
to the target situation.
Within the learning process, a learner will adopt a set of propositions from the different
worldviews that represents its “truths” and enables knowledges to be recognised. In structured
learning situations this is guided by the selection of a learning approach such as illustrated in
table 1, or a circumstantial one that comes through action learning. In the former case the
learning content is directed by the institution, while in action learning it is directed by the
circumstances of the target situation. Sometimes it can also be a result of both of these as in
cooperative learning, where we see the target situation as being the cooperative group.
The idea that there are three autonomous worldviews in interaction is complexified because
the worldviews attached to each autonomous apex of figure 6 are themselves likely to be

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plural. This means that there may be many worldviews in a target situation that must be
addressed, that the learner may be a group that involves a number of worldviews, and that the
paradigm that defines learning content may also be pluralistic.
The nature of cooperative learning (Yazdani and English, 1997; Yolles, 1997a and 1997b)
may be of particular interest since it consists of a plurality of learner worldviews. The group
assembles, and the individuals more or less together form a set of common cognitive purposes
within a single frame of reference defined within a virtual (or working) paradigm that enables
them to work together (more or less) as a team. Group behaviour is possible because of the
formation of a shared weltanschauungen. This occurs through a common cognitive model that
enables meaning to be shared. Its boundaries are defined as a frame of reference for group
behaviour. The individual weltanschauungen are maintained, though through association there
may well be a learning process in which weltanschauungen are changed in some way. If
failure of a group process occurs, then one explanation is through weltanschauung
incommensurability.
In any situation, worldview plurality can occur with respect to both the informal and formal
worldviews of an organisation. There is always an interaction between weltanschauungen and
paradigms in the same way as there is between different weltanschauungen and different
paradigms. The plurality of informal worldviews is often ignored by supposing that there is a
consensus in a situation. Often, little is done to determine what the consensus actually means
in a given context, and whether it has any value in respect of an intervention strategy. With
respect to formal worldviews, it is normally the dominant paradigm that is referred to during
an inquiry. This can also be seen as a supraparadigm of the organisation.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to show that learning situations can be seen as viable learning
systems. Consequently, it is possible to see learners within a given definable context having
properties of viable systems, including purposefulness, adaptability, and learning survivability. It
also provides the opportunity of discussing such problems as complexity, chaos, and
evolutionary learning within this context. More, it offers the possibility of encompassing and
developing existing learning theory, subject to experimental evidence that the propositions of
viable system do indeed operate.
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