WH 0300615

Interview of the President by Bob Woodward and Dan Bah of The Washington Post,
December 20, 2001. (2 hours)

(000242)
• President Bush says he'd asked the CIA (& NSC?) "to start thinking about how to get
"them"" in June, 2001, starting w/ UBL and al-Q. Says "I hadn't seen a report yet,
interesting enough," but that they'd been getting "some intelligence hits" throughout the
summer, mainly focused on overseas.
• Implies that at least one of the reasons he kept Tenet on as DCI was that he brought a lot of
knowledge on terrorism and on UBL and al-Q to the administration.

(000244)
• "I know there was a plan in the works" before 9-11, though doesn't cite when it was to be
presented (interviewers suggest 9-10), and "I don't know how mature the plan was."
Mentions how impressed he was with Tenet's local knowledge presented immediately after
9-11, however, ie. "My point is that they had in their mind a plan. There's no question about
it."
• Re. Question on whether Bush wanted to have UBL killed before 9-11: "Well, I hadn't seen a
plan to do that. I knew that we needed to—I think the appropriate word is bring him to
justice." States that there was a significant difference in his attitude before & after 9-11. Pre-
9-11, "I knew he was a problem.. .1 knew he was responsible [for the East Africa bombings
and others]. And I was prepared to look at a plan that would be a thoughtful plan that would
bring him to justice, and would have given the order to do that." But didn't feel the same
sense of urgency, anger as post-9-11.

(000248)
• Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, looking toward a response: "I remember watching in
frustration as American tried to wage a conventional war against a guerilla force in Vietnam.
And I.. .just instinctively knew that we were going to have to think differently about how
we're going to fight."
• "The military strategy was going to take a while to unfold. I became frustrated—and let me
say this on this point. Early on, the history will show that I asked for all options on the table,
and knew that we were going to have to have what they call boots on the ground, knew we
were going to have to have troops deployed.. .[But] it took a lot longer for us to get the
appropriate air and rescue mission in place and the appropriate boots on the ground."
• Confirms that at the Camp David meetings immediately after 9-11, Rumsfeld really didn't
have any good instant options: "The whole focus was on the fact that there was limited—it
was not a target-rich environment.. .1 took from that discussion that we were not going to be
able to bomb our way to victory. That we were going to have to wage a different kind of war,
which included—I wanted all options discussed. We discussed Cruise missiles only; Cruise
missiles and bombers; Cruise missiles, bombers being B-2s, B-ls and B-52s; as well as
Special Forces troops.

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(000249)
• Notes that Tenet & CIA made the case that the Northern Alliance "was rife for recruitment,
that they could serve as our boots."

(000250)
• Night of 9-11, Mueller & Tenet began to give clear indications that the attack was UBL' s
operation.

(000251)
• Re. General Shelton, 9-12: notes that the military had 3 points of uncertainty. First, ".. .my
sense was that he [Shelton] was a little uncertain as to whether or not we were going to create
expectations for him that he couldn't live up to." Second,".. .these guys are not going to
commit U.S. troops to an obscure mission, and without a plan to make sure that safety.. .is
built into the mission..." Third, ".. .they had yet to be challenged to think on how to fight a
guerilla war using conventional means."

(000252)
• Hughes reads off the 5 questions drawn up by Rumsfeld and delivered in the smaller NSC
meeting after the President's speech on the evening of 9-11:
1. Who are the targets?
2. How much evidence do we need?
3. How soon do we act? The sooner we act, the more public support we'll have if
there's collateral damage, but some major strikes could take up to 60 days to put together.
4. Are there any targets that are off limits?
5. Do we include the allies?
• Bush states that for him and his team it was immediately understood that the war on terrorism
was the main focus of the administration.
• "I was in a hurry to get a strategy. I wanted the military to move as quickly as possible. It
became clear the military wasn't."

(000253)
• Bush states that he's always seen the war on terrorism as going beyond Afghanistan—as an
"opportunity to shake terror loose where it might exist," including Syria, perhaps Iran, Iraq.
• The coalition is an important part of this goal to rout out terror, "because the war goes beyond
just the military phase," and includes also diplomatic pressure, going after money.
• 9-12, Bush tasked Powell with putting together a coalition, but w/ the US in the lead.

(000256)
• Re. 9-13, briefing w/ Tenet: Bush says it was at this point when he really began to understand
how they were going to win the war. "I had really never understood it until they actually
brought the videos into the Oval Office, during the CIA briefings, to be able to see what the
Predator can do..." [—these videos apparently shown ~ 2 weeks after the war in Afgh.
began—though President reminded that he saw video of the Predator pre-9-11, in June].
• Re. CIA plan: Bush says it was clear that they had been thinking of this plan during the
Clinton years.
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(000257)
• Bush notes importance of making sure that, if the CIA were going to be starting the ground
operation, there wasn't interagency squabbling (ie. w/ military). "I just made sure
that.. .Rumsfeld understood the utility of having the CIA involved. I think he quickly grasped
what I grasped.. .it was near unanimity on the immediate plan for Afghanistan, which was to
mate up our assets with the Northern Alliance troops. And Rumsfeld himself became
incredibly impatient over time, because he was unable to get Special Forces troops in with
the Northern Alliance different tribal unit. The CIA was incredibly important for the
Pentagon/.. ..they were able to explain the differences between the Uzbeks and the Tajiks and
the Pashtun./ I'm confident there were some moments where, as they began to mate up, there
were some kind of difficulties. It never quite made it to my level, though."
• When told by the CIA that the operation would take a lot of money, Bush replied, "Whatever
it takes."
• Bush keeps an al-Qa'ida score card in his top drawer in the Oval Office.

(000259)
• Bush asked State Dept. to develop a "what we expect" list from each country.
• "Our job is just as much making sure they don't attack us again as it is to win the war."

(000261)
• Bush describes his war plan to Tony Blair on 9-14: "I described it as how we're going to
fight—use conventional forces to fight a guerilla war. And I talked about mating up.. .Full
force of the U.S. military, bombers coming from all directions. I'm not sure if we had
secured—gotten all the logistics in place, whether or not the Diego Garcia decision had been
made. I think it had for the B-52s." Says how his view differed from Blair's in that Bush did
not want to limit the first phase of the war to Afghanistan—the Taliban and al-Q/UBL.
".. .my view was that.. .we're not limiting it to just Afghanistan, we're cutting off money,
we're rounding up people, we've gotten people to go after them." Ace. Hughes, Bush used
the analogy of circles emanating from a pebble dropped in water (261-2)

(000265)
• Re. Camp David meeting. Bush says the doctrine was already decided before the meeting,
(ie. if you harbor terrorists, you will be held accountable). "What was decided was that.. .this
war will be fought on many fronts, including the intelligence side, the financial side, the
diplomatic side, as well as the military side. What was decided is, is that we're going to hit
them with all we've got in a smart way./ What wasn't decided was, was the team stitched up
to the same strategy..."
• Bush describes how at Camp David, Afghanistan did not look like a very promising prospect,
hence Iraq was put on the table as a better prospect, as well as "if you're going after one, you
might as well go after them all."

(000266)
• Bush's view: "If we tried to do too many things—two things, for example, or three things—
militarily, then it would have been—the lack of focus would have been a huge risk. An

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 initial failure would have been a missed opportunity." Says the decision not to include Iraq
in the first phase was decided in the first round of discussions, on the morning of the 15th.

(000267)
• Re. Question of how restraining a coalition should be, Bush's attitude: "if we have to go it
alone, we'll go it alone, but I'd rather not." Powell understood full well the need for a
coalition.

(000268)
• Re. Powell's recommendation on the 15th: to tell the Taliban the US considered them
responsible, and would hold them accountable if they didn't comply. Stressed the need to
focus on military targets. Pushed hard to make the case that UBL was the guilty one.
• Re. Rumsfeld's recommendation: not undercutting our ability to act over the long-term—ie.
be patient; rooting out UBL will take different intelligence than we presently have; the
importance of hitting the enemy hard.
• Re. Tenet's recommendation: strike, strangle, surround and sustain.

(000269)
• Re. Card's recommendation: focus on homeland security.
• Cheney also focuses on homeland security; also mentions the need to make sure the war was
broad enough (eg. press the CIS, NGOs).
• Bush & Shelton discussed whether we need to reconfigure the military and beef up Special
Forces—discussed using British and Turkish special forces.

(000276)
• 9-17 NSC meeting: Bush assigns tasks for the first wave of the war against terrorism. "It
starts today."
> Tasks the AG w/ developing a legislative package;
> the CIA with undertaking an aggressive program to get UBL and destroy his organization;
> State to issue an ultimatum against the Taliban, warning them to hand over UBL/al-Q or
face the consequences.
> Directs the development of military plans—to attack w/ missiles, bombers and troop, incl.
special operations forces. Wants to signal a change from the past—to cause other
countries, such as Iran and Syria, to change their views.
> Outlines a financial front.
> Says he believes Iraq was involved, but not evidence at this point.

(000277)
• Shelton said it will take 4 days to establish an air bridge, maybe a week. Bush asks Shelton
about exploring the possibility of getting some Muslim nations involved.
• President issues written guidance to the NSC for first phase of the war, as above + develop a
plan to stabilize Pakistan against adverse consequences of working with the US. NSC
principals also establish working groups on campaign coordination & homeland protection.

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