Economic Research:

Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

Credit Market Services: Paul Sheard, Chief Global Economist and Head of Global Economics and Research, New York (1) 212-438-6262; paul_sheard@standardandpoors.com

Table Of Contents
Following The Fed But Different Carney Is Not King Forward Guidance As A Natural Innovation Within Inflation-Targeting The Limits Of Forward Guidance Forward Guidance And The Reaction Function Monetary Policy Evolution: Replication Of Another Mutation Endnotes Related Research

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 1

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research:

Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

(Editor's Note: The views expressed here are those of Standard & Poor's chief global economist. While these views can help to inform the ratings process, sovereign and other ratings are based on the decisions of ratings committees, exercising their analytical judgment in accordance with publicly available ratings criteria.) The decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England (BoE) on so-called forward guidance announced on Aug. 1 were landmark ones. The incorporation of forward guidance into the BoE's monetary-policy framework and policy settings marked an important evolution of the framework and practice. It was also a sign that the new governor, Mark Carney, is putting his stamp on the institution (1). Still, don't expect too much. As with much in monetary policy when the central bank is forced to operate at or near the zero interest rate bound, the impact-to-fuss ratio is probably pretty low. Overview New governor Mark Carney has put his stamp on the Bank of England's monetary framework by launching a new policy of "forward guidance," an approach not favored by his predecessor. The BoE has taken a leaf out of the U.S. Fed's forward guidance book, but there may be concerns that it is over-engineering and going soft on inflation. Forward guidance attempts to provide more certainty about the central bank's future actions, and thus enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy, but its effect is likely to be more marginal than game-changing. Forward guidance fits naturally into the philosophy and practice of inflation-targeting and lacks the potency of precommitment to "time-inconsistent" behavior by the central bank. In the shadow of and shocked by the recent financial crisis, global central-banking practices continue to evolve incrementally and by diffusion; a final settling place is likely still far off.

In response to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's request to the MPC to consider the issue in a letter accompanying its 2013 annual "remit" (2), the MPC on Aug. 1 provided "some explicit guidance regarding the future conduct of monetary policy." Specifically, it said: "The MPC intends at a minimum to maintain the present highly stimulative stance of monetary policy until economic slack has been substantially reduced, provided this does not entail material risks to price stability or financial stability." In particular, the MPC stated that it "intends not to raise Bank Rate from its current level of 0.5% at least until the Labour Force Survey headline measure of the unemployment rate has fallen to a threshold of 7%" (versus the current 7.8%), subject to any of three so-called "knockout" conditions. The forward guidance would cease to hold if any of these three conditions were breached: "in the MPC's view, it is more likely than not that CPI inflation 18 to 24 months ahead will be 0.5 percentage points or more above the 2% target; medium-term inflation expectations no longer remain sufficiently well anchored; the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) judges that the stance of monetary policy poses a significant threat to

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 2

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

financial stability that cannot be contained by the substantial range of mitigating policy actions available to the FPC, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Prudential Regulation Authority in a way consistent with their objectives." The MPC also issued forward guidance regarding its quantitative easing (QE), stating that it "stands ready to undertake further asset purchases while the unemployment rate remains above 7% if it judges that additional monetary stimulus is warranted. But until the unemployment threshold is reached, and subject to the conditions [above], the MPC intends not to reduce the stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves and, consistent with that, intends to reinvest the cash flows associated with all maturing gilts held in the Asset Purchase Facility."

Following The Fed But Different

If this all sounds similar to what the Federal Reserve announced in two stages last September and December, it is because it is. Both the Fed and the BoE now have explicitly cast their monetary-policy frameworks and actions in terms of an intermediate target for the unemployment rate. But there are some noteworthy differences, too. One is their respective predicaments. Both central banks are trying to speed up a painfully slow recovery in the shadow of a devastating financial crisis and recession. But the Fed is doing so from a starting point of inflation since the crisis being consistently below target, the BoE from one of inflation being usually above (see chart). From an inflation-targeting perspective, the BoE has much less leeway to try to speed up the recovery by easing monetary policy further, which makes its forward guidance more controversial. That is why the BoE is making so much of the two inflation "knockouts." The Fed has essentially the same two knockouts, but it doesn't call them that.

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 3

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

A second difference is that the BoE has a single forward guidance aligned to both its QE and policy-rate decisions. By contrast, the Fed has two strands of forward guidance pertaining to these, respectively, which differ also in their degree of specificity. The BoE says it will not hike its policy rate or reduce its stock of QE assets until the unemployment rate falls to at least 7%. The Fed says it will keep expanding its balance sheet "until the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability" and will not hike the federal funds rate until the unemployment rate falls to at least 6.5%. In June, reflecting Federal Open Market Committee discussions, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke indicated that "in the vicinity of 7%" is the "magic number" (my words) corresponding to a "substantial improvement in the labor market outlook." The BoE trumps the Fed on the simplicity of its forward guidance. The BoE's forward guidance differs from the Fed's also in making a specific allowance for financial stability considerations. On paper, the way this is done is innovative and reflects the BoE's evolved institutional structure. As a result of learning from the financial crisis, the BoE now has a Financial Policy Committee (FPC) that operates parallel to the Monetary Policy Committee, with overlapping membership (but not completely so) (3). The FPC, one arm of the BoE, can in effect veto an aspect of the monetary policy decisions of another arm, the MPC, "knocking out" its forward guidance. This may be a first in central banking history. One should not, however, mistake a tendency toward over-engineering for substance. For one thing, given the core overlapping membership, the relationship between the two committees is hardly arms-length. Also, before the FPC

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 4

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

exercises this partial "veto power," it and the Prudential Regulation Authority (another new arm of the BoE) and the Financial Conduct Authority (whose chief executive sits on the FPC) must have exhausted their own efforts to mitigate the threat to financial stability using the panoply of their tools. Moreover, this and the other two knockouts do not trigger any changes in actual monetary policy settings; they just remove the guidance about possible future actions. The actions--for instance, a hike in the policy rate to X% or the beginning of a reduction in the stock of asset purchases at future date Y--are still possible, although the subjective probability assigned to them by the market will likely have changed. Eyes starting to glaze over?

Carney Is Not King

To see what a departure from its previous position the forward guidance is for the BoE, consider the views of former governor Mervyn King. In the Q&A after a speech at the Economic Club of New York on Dec. 10 last year, former chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors Glenn Hubbard asked then-governor King his views on the matter. Hubbard: "I wanted to know what you think, if there would be any gain in following the approach in Canada or in the United States of specifying how long interest rates would remain low? And if you disagree with that, why?" King: "Well, we don't believe in the Bank of England that we have a crystal ball which enables us to foretell the future. So we simply do not know what we will be deciding six months, twelve months, two years from now. What is important I think is to have sufficient transparency about how we will react to events as they unfold. So we certainly don't want to leave vast uncertainty about our future actions. But instead of saying interest rates will be low at a certain point in time, what we would rather say is we'd rather talk about our actions in a way that people are confident that they understand how we might react to events as they unfold. And I think the proof of the success of that is that if you look at market interest rates, there's actually rather little difference in terms of what markets expect the yield curve to be looking ahead between those central banks that are willing to talk more openly about what they will do and those banks who don't talk about the future but talk about how they would respond to events as they unfold. And of course the other reason for doing that is our committee structure in the Bank of England, the Monetary Policy Committee comprises nine individuals each of whom is individually accountable for their actions, appears before parliament to explain their actions, and has one vote. And I only have one vote. And I have been in a minority on three or four occasions since I became governor. So I don't think it's actually easy for us to pretend how the committee will behave in two or three years' time. What we should be doing is to say, look, let's be honest about it, no one knows what the future holds. What we have to do is to give the impression that we have a very clear set of objectives. We have instruments to meet those objectives. What we will actually choose to do at any particular date in the future will depend on the conditions at the time." Mervyn King is clearly no fan of forward guidance. But his stated reason for that--not having a crystal ball--is a little puzzling. Monetary policymaking, indeed all human decision-making, is about looking into the future, armed with information about the past and present, crystal ball to hand or not.

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 5

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

Forward Guidance As A Natural Innovation Within Inflation-Targeting

In the wake of the financial crisis and Great Recession, major central banks have needed to ease monetary policy more than their conventional policy rate ammunition would allow. Having hit the so-called "zero [interest rate] bound," they had to find other ways to ease financial conditions. They found two: QE and forward guidance. "Forward guidance" is a (rather horrible) piece of central-bank jargon. The idea is simple. The central bank influences current financial conditions by its interest rate and balance sheet (QE) decisions today, but what really matters is what economic agents and market participants expect those monetary policy settings, and associated monetary conditions, to be over an indefinite future. The essence of so-called "inflation-targeting" regimes is that, by communicating clearly its objectives, its "reaction function" (the explicit or implicit rules the central bank uses to map economic developments and changes in the outlook into policy decisions), and its assessment of economic conditions and the economic outlook, the central bank can influence the public's expectations about the future course of policy, and therefore its economic decisions; and that it can do so in a way that is conducive to its achieving its policy goals. In an inflation-targeting world, transparency and predictability are good. They don't eliminate uncertainty--that's impossible--but they do reduce it. For central banks, the more communication, the better. And forward guidance provides more. In fact, forward guidance is a natural way to refine inflation-targeting. Market participants are always trying to extract information from the communications and actions of central banks. Forward guidance tries to make it easier for them to do so. It tries to provide an uncertainty-reducing dividend for monetary policy.

The Limits Of Forward Guidance

All of that being said, forward guidance, of the kind the BoE is undertaking, while likely increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy a bit, is no silver bullet. For one thing, while forward guidance reduces some uncertainty about the central bank's future actions, it is likely to do so only marginally. That's not just because forward guidance provides further stimulus only to the extent that it loosens even further already pretty loose financial conditions. It is also because a central bank implementing forward guidance will already have communicated much about its objectives, reactions, and assessments and put its "money where its mouth is" with its current and recent policy actions. For instance, the markets and the public now get the message that the BoE will not likely hike its policy rate or start to reduce its stock of asset purchases before the unemployment rate gets down to 7% (it is currently 7.8%). But was there really much doubt about that before the forward guidance was announced? For another, all the forward guidance that central banks are currently issuing, including and most notably that of the BoE, is conditional on the inflation objective not being compromised. To varying degrees of explicitness, it's also conditional on financial stability not being put at risk. This kind of forward guidance is very different from "precommitment" (4).

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 6

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

Suppose a central bank wants to achieve a challenging policy objective--for example, to quash a deflation risk or bring about a big fall in unemployment. Precommitment involves the central bank announcing that it will maintain certain policy settings until specific publicly observable and therefore verifiable conditions are met. Appropriately designed precommitment can be potent because it can allow the central bank to tie its hands and commit to "time inconsistent" behavior. That is, the central bank may be able to commit "today" to take an action "tomorrow" that will not be the optimal thing for it to do when tomorrow arrives (5). Economists usually impose "time consistency" on their models and market participants, and the public, regardless of whether they understand the theory and jargon or not, assume that policymakers behave in a "time consistent" way. Because for central bankers precommitting not to do so goes against the grain so much, they are very reluctant to do it, which would only increase its potential potency if they did (6). Conditionality, by respecting time consistency, paradoxically weakens the potency of forward guidance. In fact, to an extent, conditionality may merely shift the location of uncertainty regarding the central bank's future actions within the monetary-policy framework, as opposed to reducing it. For instance, tying monetary policy settings to an intermediate target of a 7% unemployment rate seems to reduce uncertainty about the future path of interest rates because the public should not expect higher policy rates until unemployment falls to at least 7%. But if the net effect of the forward guidance is stimulatory, can the public be confident that the inflation knockouts will not kick in ahead of that? An apparent reduction in uncertainty because of the transparency surrounding the intermediate target may lead to increased uncertainty surrounding the knockout conditions. After all, the one time that the Bank of Canada used conditional forward guidance under its then-Governor Carney, the forward guidance was overtaken by the conditionality kicking in (7). This experience may engender confidence that Carney-style forward guidance will work. But lurking somewhere in the argument seems to be a violation of the canonical assumption that the public has rational expectations. Another limitation of forward guidance, applicable to QE as well (and arguably endemic to monetary policymaking more generally), is that longer-term rates and the yield curve have to serve double duty. They must transmit the effects of monetary easing (via lower rates) and reflect its success (which must lead to higher rates). It is hard for the yield curve to do a good job at both at the same time.

Forward Guidance And The Reaction Function

The real significance of forward guidance may lie less in its uncertainty-reducing effects and more in revealing how a central bank's reaction function may be changing. Through their respective forward guidance, the Fed and the BoE have both signaled that they are placing more weight on labor-market conditions and the unemployment rate. Despite protestations by the central banks to the contrary and inflation-linked conditionality, some segment of the public and market participants may believe or suspect that their central bank is "going soft" on inflation (8). This issue would seem to be more acute for the BoE than for the Fed, for two reasons. One, as mentioned, is that in the BoE's case inflation has been consistently above target, while in the Fed's case it has been below. This means that for the BoE, but not the Fed, there is a trade-off between employment and price stability goals rather than the two being

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 7

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

complementary. This may well account for another difference between the BoE and the Fed: the Fed's more aggressive monetary-policy stance. The Fed is continuing to expand its balance sheet, adding $85 billion of assets a month, whereas the BoE is holding its stock of assets purchased constant. A second is that, whereas the Fed has long had a "dual mandate" to maximize employment and pursue price stability (9), the BoE, since gaining operational independence in 1997, has been seen much more as a "pure" inflation targeter. That has been more a perception than a reality, or at least what should have been the reality. The Bank of England Act of 1998 stipulates: "In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall be (a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty's Government, including its objectives for growth and employment." The BoE has always had a kind of dual mandate; perhaps it is now just coming more to the fore.

Monetary Policy Evolution: Replication Of Another Mutation

Stepping back from the BoE's recent move, the bigger picture remains one of central banks, in the wake of the financial crisis and with economic and market conditions remaining challenging, continuing to evolve their frameworks and learn from each other. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) pioneered forward guidance when it launched its first experiment with QE in March 2001 (10). Now, more than a decade later, not just the BOJ again, but the Fed, the BoE, and the European Central Bank (ECB) are all doing various forms of forward guidance. It is a fair bet, when it comes to central bank practices, that the active process of experimenting, learning, adopting, modifying, and diffusing will continue for some time to come. Taken in isolation, each innovation and its incremental cross-fertilization may look minor. But, akin to biological evolution, the cumulative effect can end up being both substantial and irreversible.

Endnotes
(1) For full details and background analysis, see the 44 page report issued by the Bank: "Monetary policy trade-offs and forward guidance." (2) In March, the Chancellor wrote: "Transparency plays an important role in communicating the tradeoffs inherent in setting monetary policy. I welcome the Bank of England's response to the independent Stockton Review into the Monetary Policy Committee's forecasting capability, which was published this month. Over the past year, reflecting the exceptional challenge facing monetary policy makers, there has been ongoing innovation by central banks around the world. The Bank of England, with the Treasury, has launched the Funding for Lending Scheme; the European Central Bank has introduced Outright Monetary Transactions; the US Federal Reserve has developed its forward guidance such that it is currently using state-contingent intermediate thresholds to influence expectations. The Committee has discussed a range of instruments, communicating that discussion through its minutes and the speeches of Committee members. Monetary activism has a vital role to play in the Government's economic strategy as the Government delivers on its

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 8

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

commitment to fiscal consolidation. Given the ongoing exceptional challenges facing the UK economy, it is possible the Committee may judge it necessary to deploy new unconventional policy instruments or approaches in future, including some of those deployed by other central banks in recent years. The remit clarifies that the development of new unconventional instruments should include consideration with Government of appropriate governance and accountability arrangements. It also requests that the Committee provide in its August 2013 Inflation Report an assessment of the merits of intermediate thresholds." And in the remit itself: "The Committee may also judge it to be appropriate to deploy explicit forward guidance including intermediate thresholds in order to influence expectations and thereby meet its objectives more effectively." (3) The governor, the deputy governor (monetary policy) and deputy governor (financial stability) are members of both the MPC and the FPC, but the remaining members differ. The BoE's chief economist and the executive director for markets and four external members sit on the MPC, while the BoE's executive director for financial stability, the chief executive of the Prudential Regulatory Authority, the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority, and four external members sit on the FPC. (4) See Mark Carney, "Guidance," Remarks to the CFA Society Toronto, Dec. 11, 2012. (5) For a classic paper making this point, see Paul Krugman, 1998: "It's Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2. (6) The ECB is fond of saying that it "never pre-commits." But it recently introduced a very weak form of forward guidance; the introductory statement to the press conference after the July 4, 2013, Governing Council Meeting stated: "Looking ahead, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time." Previously, the ECB had just said that "our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary," something that barely rose above stating the obvious. (7) In April 2009, the Bank of Canada lowered its policy (overnight) rate target by 0.25% to 0.25% and stated: "With monetary policy now operating at the effective lower bound for the overnight policy rate, it is appropriate to provide more explicit guidance than is usual regarding its future path so as to influence rates at longer maturities. Conditional on the outlook for inflation, the target overnight rate can be expected to remain at its current level until the end of the second quarter of 2010 in order to achieve the inflation target. The Bank will continue to provide such guidance in its scheduled interest rate announcements as long as the overnight rate is at the effective lower bound." In April 2010, the Bank kept the policy rate unchanged but removed the conditional commitment, and on June 1 it raised the policy rate by 0.25% to 0.5%. (8) In this regard, and at the risk of splitting linguistic hairs, it is worth noting a subtle difference between the Fed's and the BoE's respective conditions relating to inflation expectations. The Fed stipulates that "longer-term inflation expectations [must] continue to be well anchored," whereas the BoE requires that "medium-term inflation expectations [remain] sufficiently well anchored." With that one innocuous-looking word "sufficiently," is the BoE hinting at a slightly higher tolerance than the Fed for inflation?

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 9

1181609 | 301765622

Economic Research: Carney Guides The Bank Of England Forward

(9) Actually the Fed has a "triple mandate," promoting moderate long-term interest rates being the third. That is hardly an issue now, but conceivably it might become one day. (10) As one element, the BOJ announced a "CPI guideline for the duration of the new procedures," stating that "the new procedures for money market operations [will] continue to be in place until the consumer price index registers stably a zero percent [sic] or an increase year on year." CPI inflation at the time was negative and had been for some time.

Related Research
Repeat After Me: Banks Cannot And Do Not "Lend Out" Reserves, Aug. 13, 2013 "Hawk" And "Dove" Labels Are For The Birds, July 29, 2013 All You Need To Know About "Abenomics", June 12, 2013 Rethinking Monetary Policy: Lessons And Reminders From The Great Financial Crisis, April 3, 2013 Behind The Platinum Coin Ploy: The Monetary Mechanics, Jan. 15, 2013 The Fed: Parsing Its Communications, Jan. 7, 2013 The Fed: Full Steam Ahead, Dec. 13, 2012

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 10

1181609 | 301765622

Copyright 2013 by Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC. All rights reserved. No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an "as is" basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages. Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P's opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof. S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process. S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.standardandpoors.com (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com and www.globalcreditportal.com (subscription) and www.spcapitaliq.com (subscription) and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.standardandpoors.com/usratingsfees.

WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT

AUGUST 20, 2013 11

1181609 | 301765622