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Ziblatt On Federalism
Ziblatt On Federalism
Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory, and Evidence from NineteenthCentury Europe Author(s): Daniel Ziblatt Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Oct., 2004), pp. 70-98 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054284 . Accessed: 12/03/2012 10:32
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RETHINKING
Puzzle, Theory,
THE ORIGINS
and Evidence from
OF FEDERALISM
Nineteenth-Century
Europe
ByDANIEL ZIBLATT* I. Introduction builders and political reformers frequently seek a federally organized political system. Yet how is federalism actually achieved? STATE
Political federations. security founded, enough stituent on this has noted a paradox about question to secure such as common public goods a a moment state is at and national but the market, federal can a core be strong a dilemma How emerges. political science scholarship States are formed
a union but not be so as to overawe the con forge powerful a state? states, thereby forming unitary a new answer to this the article proposes This by examining question cases of state formation two most in nineteenth-century prominent and Italy. The aim is explain why these two similar Europe?Germany state for cases resulted in such different institutional forms: a unitary to a federal state for two cases the stand Germany. The challenge Italy and as a views which federalism ard interstate bargaining model, voluntary states that is sealed "contract" or compromise among constituent only so weak core is must grant it that when the state-building militarily to subunits. concessions The count, evidence one in this article that identifies ac an alternative supports state-society a different to federalism. The central pathway are formed determines Mann through if a state calls of a po "in a is
is that all states, including federations, argument combination of coercion and compromise. What created tential
*The
as federal federation
or
unitary high
is whether
the constituent
states
possess
at Yale University, the of the Comparative Politics Workshop author thanks the members and faculty seminars at George Washington Politics Faculty Group atHarvard University, the feed the author especially acknowledges and Brigham Young University. Additionally, University back and advice on earlier versions of this paper from Anna Grzymala Busse, Daniel Nielson, Paul Pier Will Phelan. reviewers and the research assistance and critical comments of son, and three anonymous Comparative
RETHINKING
THE ORIGINS
OF FEDERALISM
71
frastructural capacity."1 That is, federalism is possible only if state building is carried out in a context inwhich the preexisting units of a potential federation are highly institutionalized and are deeply embed
ded both in their the core societies?and hence are
capable
of governance.
Why?
stitutionalized subunits
state builders
Absent
to absorb
such high-infrastructural
all the preexisting state. to show
subunits
section
An Empirical Puzzle: Nineteenth-Century Germany and Italy and the Limits of Classic Bargaining Theory This analysis begins with a puzzle in the development
nation-states in nineteenth-century institutional divergent the cases together are well
of two late
that
unifying
Germany adopted tional unification. Though have rarely been considered hypotheses century on institutional Germany
Italy and Europe: to solutions the task of na known to to historians, they test
in an effort
for theory opportunity that help state builders in different places and times. so promising? First, there
out of a similarly
(Cambridge:
fragmented
University
collection
Cambridge
Press,
1993), 2:59-61.
72 WORLD
POLITICS
Map
1 Figure of Europe,
1815
states of and foreign-ruled Until the 1860s both Europe. were a set of states and monarchical Germany Italy independent mostly with borders and boundaries that in many cases had been drawn by oth dependent after 1798 and by the Vienna Peace Congress of ers?by Napoleon an overview 1 states in 1815. Figure of the German Italian and provides context as their European 1815 and national unifi they stood between
monetary system, larger In both nation-states. inspired a new liberal nationalism, and shaped by the diplomatic interests of by was In both cases, moreover, national unification great powers. Europe's two undertaken in ambitious north states?Prussia and by Germany's in Piedmont north. Italian The historian Rosario Romeo has Italy's dubbed sionary German south "the Prussia of Italy."2 Indeed, Piedmont, actions provoked similar armed resistance and Italian states?chiefly the projects Bavaria of German and their similar expan on the part of other several other states in national
1959).
Germany's
2 Romeo,
in 1860. Finally,
Risorgimento
and capitalism)
rethinking
Prussian and Piedmontese
the
origins
of federalism
73
century Germany and Italy has demonstrated, is that the ideology of federalism thrived in both cases, as political leaders in both settings
preferred form.4 This to two nation-states under a federal institutional unify the context. But it is is perhaps less surprising for the German
all too often forgotten that, as Robert Binkley has noted of the 1860s in
in Italian statecraft had been present Italy, "the idea of confederation not as an exotic for more than a generation, invention but as a political to the situation in inevitable alternative established 1815."5 seemingly One lutions important returned historian time of nineteenth-century Europe has
written of post-1815
in a manner unknown
similarly
chitect of national unification in Italy, reflected the ethos of his politi cal environment and undertook his political project with deep
In his about excessive centralization. of biography ideological misgivings a Mack Smith "Cavour had been theoretical Cavour, writes, always of decentralization and local self-government."7 Likewise, champion in Pied members of the coalition governing center-right important mont of confederative principles.8 context the similar historical and the common broadly despite state Prussian for and Piedmontese federalism, ideological preference Yet were advocates
3 in both settings, the political cores (Prussia and Piedmont) were wealthier than the Additionally, states they absorbed. Recent estimates of preunification that Prus regional GDP per capita demonstrate sia was on average 1.9 times wealthier than the states it absorbed. Piedmont was 1.7 times wealthier than the states it absorbed. This finding undercuts the notion that the different institutional choice in in regional socioeconomic the two cases reflected deep underlying differences inequality. See Alfredo Journal ofEuropean Economic per Capita Income: Italy, 1861-1914," Esposto, "Estimating Regional no. 4 (1997), 589; see also Harald Frank, im deutschen Regionale Entwicklungsdisparit?ten History 26, in the German 1849-1939 industrializa disparities (Regional development Industrialisierungsprozess, tion process, 1849-1939) (M?nster: Lit Verlag, 1996), appendix 8, p. 30. 4 strands that were self-consciously federal in nineteenth There were at least three intellectual such as the priest Vicenzo Gioberti, who advocated a confederacy of century Italy: the neo-Guelphs as Carlo Cattaneo and Ferrera; and regional autono princes under the lead of the pope; liberals such mists in Italy's south. 1852-1871 (New York: Harper and Row, 1935), 197. 5Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 6 Stuart Woolf, The Italian Risorgimento 1969), 7. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 7Denis Mack and Nicolson, Smith, Cavour (London: Weidenfeld 1985), 249. 8 1900-1914 in theMaking, William Salomone, Italy in the Giolittian Era: Italian Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 13.
74
WORLD POLITICS
builders adopted starkly different institutional formulas for their na tion-states. On the one hand, in Italy in 1861 Piedmontese state
builders fused together the long-independent Italian states under a uni
tary political model that erased the political map. On the other Prussian state builders adopted
formerly independent areas of discretion wide public finance.9 states
the formerly independent states from hand, inGermany in 1867 and 1871 a federal political model inwhich the
states that maintained regional in policy, administration, and jurisdiction and became
of the creation
from which
he draws
the compelling conclusion that has provided the central assumptions most for instances of federal analyses of "coming together" subsequent are met. two conditions is struck, that is,when ism.11 A federal bargain on the to the bargain part of those offering a new constituent into po governments expand territory by combining litical entity in order to secure a public good such as security or a com mon market. there must be for those accepting the bargain, Second, First, there exists some a desire
willingness
to sacrifice
political
control
in exchange
for access
to
75
of the federal to
seek direct control over the periphery if that is possible. State building
in unitary governance when the political are
posits
the political
always
prefer
granted when the political center ismilitarily too weak to impose itself
on the of this theory are clear and logi expectations periphery.14 The center is vis-?-vis the regions, cal: the militarily the political stronger the militarily weaker the less likely is a federal structure, and conversely, the political or confederal How is here does that center is vis-?-vis the regions, the more likely are federal contexts? so It institutions. this argument fare in the Italian and German the German and Italian comparison becomes run counter to these theoretical
directly to all traditional measures of military sia, according power, could easily to these have conquered southern Germany while Piedmont, according same measures, was much weaker vis-?-vis southern Italy. Several years of the future before national Prussia possessed 57 percent unification, on 54 of all German Reich's percent public expenditures population, of the future German the military states, and 54 percent by German in the 1850s Piedmont Reich's only 6 territory. By contrast, possessed of its 29 of the future soldiers, percent percent Italy's population, only
as the cases
76
WORLD POLITICS
and a relatively weak broadly, what does this teach system
did a strong center create a federal Why center create a more unitary system? And, us about federalism's origins?
An Alternative Model
An alternative account
states of a of state-society relations inside the constituent federation. Rather than horizontal interstate potential power stressing re stresses vertical relations among states, this framework state-society as the lations within the subunits of a potential federation structuring factor can be called alternative account, which accounts of federalism, with agrees existing state formation. about the impetus behind But it departs from those ac counts in two ways. First, it argues that all federa states?including a combination tions?can be formed of coercion and through behind federalism. This an infrastructural model the key issue that determines whether federalism Second, compromise. is for a state is the degree of institutionalization and the re adopted at the moment of the subunits of sulting infrastructural capacity polity formation. An infrastructural ism's origins ought of federalism. This tive to standard specifies ments a different capacity to be more account account attentive of federal argues that theorists to the institutional prerequisites a coherent alterna theoretically a new distinct causal variabley empirical pre discussion.
of the constituent
accounts
and makes
The
An of infrastructural model First, what gives rise to state formation? mo state accounts with that is federalism often agrees existing building and na tivated by the pursuit of public goods such as a national market to states tional seek smaller conquer security. Typically, large a common market a states to establish and neighboring larger military, on the world stage. significance thereby assuring greater geopolitical While the account I offer agrees with this assessment, classic bargain By fusing to mistake
of what type of state is created after state formation. question the issues, as Gibson there is a tendency and Falleti observe,
77
of Federalism Empirical
Prediction
Traditional
bargaining
pursuit such as
core
the militarily
weaker center, the the
public goods
security and market
strike federal
bargain when lacks military capacity unitary solution
model of
federalism's
more likely
federalism
origins
to force
Infrastructural
pursuit such as
of
vertical
state relations'.
core
concedes and
the
infrastructurally more developed the constituent states, the
account of
federalism's origins
public goods
security market and
authority
periphery seeks
when autonomy subunits have infrastructural capacity to
states their
more likely
federalism
societies
deliver public
goods of union
the causes
of national
unification
of federalism.16
There
determines
the structure
of a state after
Capacity
as
account offers an argument from a distinct capacity classic bargaining model. To understand is possible we when federalism not to focus on the interstate relations states and constituent of ought states of a the relative "military power" of the constituent fed potential eration lations vis-?-vis of Mann each other. We states in his power" should vis-?-vis book on focus their instead on the vertical re constituent own or what societies, state formation calls the "in refers to the social or rela
Michael
frastructural
power"
L. Gibson and Tulia in Gibson, Federalism," Argentine Press, 2004). Hopkins University
16 Edward
of and the Origins Falleti, "Unity by the Stiele Regional Conflict in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns ed., Federalism and Democracy
78
WORLD POLITICS
tions in reference to (1) the degree of institutionalization of a state and (2) the capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and logisti
I use the term, the In the sense in which decisions.17 cally implement the subunits of a potential crucial issue is not merely whether federa tion exist. Instead, the issue is the extent to which the subunits of a po institutions tential federation both that are possess parliamentary in society via a constitution embedded and well-developed administra I argue, the coercion these attributes, possess a process of will be accompanied by negoti state structures with ation and devolution of authority. Absent high lev via els of institutionalization and parliamentary constitutional If subunits inherent in state formation tive structures.
Infrastructural
causal variable,
Capacity
account
my
speci
that high infrastructural subunits that are constitutional, parliamentary, to federal states serve as a and administratively modernized pathway reasons. can serve as two credible negotiating ism, for First, they part ners in a process of state formation. Second, they can also deliver the
benefits that state builders seek with state formation in the first place:
tax revenue, greater access to and greater manpower, greater military the infrastructural social stability. Since these subunits already possess
capacity. are federation the subunits of a potential If, by contrast, patrimonial states and rationalized systems of lacking constitutions, parliaments, the of breaks down and administration, prospects usually negotiation are state the formation after limited, way to leading self-governance these states lack basic institutions.18 When annexed, unitary political own As a result, political their societies. vis-?-vis governance capacity
autonomy infrastructural
of their higher
Press,
79
to greater centralization. Moreover, states, facing government collapse, to the center because they political are more and when the nature assured in a larger leaders
new
forming Instead,
political
seek federalism, it is not the military power of the political center that
the structure of a state. of state-society
relations inside the states is key; highly institutionalized and hence highly infrastructural states provide the crucial building blocks of fed
eralism.19 state structures do not lead to federalism But well-developed are harder to conquer. Rather, gov they simply because well-developed ernance structures to deliver the the capacity provide public goods of both to the political core and to other constituent states. By
federalism
Applying
In retrospect, mistakenly
that the institutional form that actually carried the day in each case in
the 1860s was namics Rikerian cause made the only form institutions by which is to miss the important dy as a are created. Moreover, to assume, a state be that Piedmont achieved unitary use coercion to achieve its aims and Prussia a federal "contract" because it had to is to ever available
In fact, political get the causal logic of federalism's origins backward. use of coercion to seal unifica leaders in both instances made strategic in both settings were tion. Moreover, leaders inclined toward political federalism. The key difference the cases is that state formation between was undertaken in the face of differing of state-society rela patterns tions inside the German and Italian constituent states.
19 "Institutionalization" refers to the degree to which a political system has acquired value and sta and proce bility, indicated by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of organizations Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University dures. See Samuel Huntington, Press, 1968), 12.
80 To summarize not
WORLD POLITICS
the argument: blocks stumbling an in Germany well-developed that constrained Prussian state struc plans to cre
relatively that combined pursue for Italy: a unification process among monarchs a coercion with compromise in of existing by leaving key constituency stitutions and actors in place. In Italy the absence of well-developed meant institutions and effective outside that a unitary of Piedmont across the entire was as necessary of unification strategy perceived peninsula. negotiating The Piedmontese, to carry partners out what like the Prussians, sought the Piedmontese monarchical themselves
these well-developed Instead, to pursue that allowed Bismarck the opportunity not low risk domestic that could Cavour but agenda sought
nation-state.
dubbed a "German" strategy of gradual or federal unification.20 Yet by 1859-60 they found themselves instead adopting a strategy of unilat
eral "conquest" in both Italy's center and south that between 1859 and
federalism
possible.
building plans thatwere circulating in Piedmont and Prussia before na tional unification; both cases exhibited similar ideological commitment
to federalism. from was Second, I will discuss structure the actual strategies of unification in each
Federalism
Observers of Italian and German affairs in the 1850s and 1860s would have found themselves frustrated by rapidly changing events had they
tried to use the expressed to predict which political adopted after national on intentions of Prussia's and Piedmont's or Italy unitary?would adopted there were leaders be a institutions?federal Though unification
unification.
eventually cases,
20"Cavour
Emanuel, Baden-Baden, July 24,1858," 1799-1999 (New York: It?lica Press, 2001),
Naples:
81
and his it, "For Bismarck that a union of German this apparent ideologi over the strategic al
however, great uncertainty to achieve Prussia about how national actually facing a unification. The question was asked: should federal or unitary strategy In an 1866 session in the Prussian of unification be adopted? parlia two Bismarck the choices and ment, presented expressed his preference for a federal strategy over the unitary stated: strategy used in Italy. He One [method] is the integration and complete merger with Prussia itself even in
of popular resistance?resistance, in particular, by civil servants and of
the face
ficers (officer estates) who feel duty-bound to the previous governments. The Prussian government intends to overcome the difficulties of these [groups] in a German way, through indulgence for [their/local] particularities and through gradual habituation, and not?as is customary for a Romanic [Italian] peoples
?all at once.22
The ternatives
of "complete
merger"
or from
for Bismarck.
and from
were
real al
in the wake of and military of southern Germany conquest occupation in In corre Bismarck remained ambivalent. 1866, victory military summer in France in the with the Prussian of ambassador spondence two to unifica the 1866, Bismarck again presented potential pathways one he called a "maximalist annexation tion that he was pondering: a "minimalist annexation strategy."23 Since the strategy" and the other
strategy of "indulgence" concessions whereas Cavour The most while obvious from Cavour's becomes
states, the critical analytical ques that Bismarck was willing and able to pursue with Germany's south that generated federal and Piedmont were a not? starkly dif process of uni not correct. and corre so Bismarck's aims were gradual did not?is
answer?that that he we
the intentions,
debates,
21 im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht: Untersuchungen zu Bun Stefan Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarit?t in German and subsidiarity federal constitutional desstaatstheorie unter dem Grundgesetz (Integration Mohr law: A study of federalism theory in the constitution) Siebeck, 1998), 29. J.C.B. (T?bingen: 22 zur des Abgeordnetenhauses Otto von Bismarck, "Rede in der Kommissionssitzung Beratung an den vom 17.8 1866," in Eberhard einer Adresse Scheler, ed., Otto von Bismarck: Werke in Konig von Auswahl Bismarck: Selected works) (Otto (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965), 3:799. 23 to his ambassador terms come from a memo from Otto von Bismarck in Paris Ibid., 755. These on July 9,1866.
82
WORLD POLITICS
na
tional unification in 1858, Cavour, who himself had never even been to southern Italy before unification, frequently articulated a vision of a
confederation eration. achieved letter III of Italian Cavour's confed states, inspired in part by the German vision was even criticized the future by prime minis
ter Crispi
unification would be
,Cavour
one a regions by one.24 In a with Napoleon king summarizing meeting his vision of confederation. Just as Bismarck as a model. Cavour wrote:
As
the events
of Italian
unification
quickened
their
pace,
in the
spring of 1859, Cavour and his king, Victor Emanuel, pleaded with the new king inNaples to accept his proposal that "Italy be divided into
two
Cavour desired a federal solution for national unification. Why? For both actors, federalism represented what might be called "the path of
that is, believed the costs Both least resistance." statesmen, realpolitik reasons of a strategy of conquest far outweighed the benefits. Several a to lesser degree, Cavour fundamen stand out. First, Bismarck and, a unifi and considered distrusted rule tally "negotiated" parliamentary
powerful
states
of the North
and
the South."26
Like
Bismarck,
to be the
cases
preferred at least in part by the motivation actors were also well both Second, reservations that while annexation of Europe's those around
aware of the concerns and enough a redraw to seek too dramatic "great powers"
into
24 Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and GaribalidvA Study in Political Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1954), 50-51. University 25 in Santore (fn. 20), 164. "Cavour to Victor Emanuel, Baden-Baden, July 24,1858," 26 Modern Italy (Oxford: Clarendon The Makers Press, 1931), 125-26. J. A. R Marriott, of
83
it clear that we don't live alone in Eu III provided a key impetus for
the other German states.28 Likewise,
marck's
proceeding
Cavour s limited territorial interest in southern Italy reflected the config uration of international power inEurope. Beginning in 1858 allCavour's
agreements with France assured a nervous Napoleon that Piedmont
would respect the existing borders of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. In sum, both Bismarck and Cavour preferred and in fact initially
as the least unification costly and national unifica route?diplomatically, politically, financially?to tion. the two options of forced both actors considered Though "merger" or of in both local there existed gradual "indulgence" particularities, an a contexts for unification ideological preference gradual, negotiated in which monarchical leaders would remain in power. Motivated by do sought negotiated settlements to national mestic demand cation and international for federalism. there existed considerations, was in Germany But only was gradually cannot in both such a settings strategy a
adopted. In Italy, between 1859 and 1865, the strategy of federal unifi
and federal organization that actual state-building strategies clear abandoned, making the be assumed from simply
expressed intentions of state builders.Why state building diverge from each other? of State-Society The Catalyst to Federalism Relations
The key difference between the situation confronting Cavour in 1860 and Bismarck in 1867, the one that generated the divergence in strategywas that of the different contexts inwhich national unification
was being carried Germany, at the subunit ity cure if these a set of institutions states were states of is, in the preexisting prenational with high levels of infrastructural capac level assured that the gains of unification would be se out. That left intact. By contrast, in the preexisting states
of Italy, such institutional building blocks were decisively absent. In Italy statemakers believed that if the constituent stateswere left intact
after unification, rise to a relatively
27 Gordon
of unification strategy
would at
be unitary
gave
aimed
1955), 200.
1640-1945
University
Press,
28 Hermann
ed., Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleon HI von 1863-1870 (The Rhineland poli IQ between 1863 and 1870) (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags
WORLD POLITICS
secure were of national the purposes unification similar greater fiscal resources, greater military greater personnel, on the and stage. Like Prussia, Pied stability, prestige European
like
faced three times debt crisis, with as to of the other Italian states.29 effort build any per capita up Any or Prussia's on the Piedmont's stage would position European require and greater fiscal resources. And the quick greater military manpower est route to these resources was national unification.30
Papal States nor the Kingdom of Two Sicilies did the central govern
dent on taxation; in both cases, there were retain amonopoly indepen tax zones within the territory that in theory were controlled by the states to maintain central government.32 the ability of these Similarly, control tance over their own territory was period, of Austrian peasant troops uprisings called in to bolster over questionable; were subdued its territory.33 throughout only with and the pre the assis sporadic
unification
the arbitrary
government
29 e II Bilancio G. Felloni, "La Spese Effettive degli Stati Sabaudi dal 1825 al I860," inArchivio Econ?mico delVUnificazione Italiana (Archive of Economie Unification of Italy), ser. 1, vol. 9 (1959), 5. 30This argument has a long pedigree. For the German case, see Helmut B?hme, Deutschlands Weg und Witsch, Zur Grossmacht (Germany's path to great power status) (1966; Cologne: Kiepenheuer Modern Italy (New York: Co 1972); for the Italian case, see Shepard Clough, The Economic History of lumbia University Press, 1964). 31 See Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National (London: Rout Unification 1994). ledge, 32 Italiana (Public finance in the Luigi Izzo, La Finanza Pubblica: Net Primo Decennio DelVUnita a Giuffre Editore, 1962), 3-4. first decade of Italian unification) (Milan: Dottore 33 For a description of these rural uprisings, see Charles, Louise, and Richard Tilly, The Contentious Press, 1975), 124. Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University
85
efforts that of offi period
settlement
states record
between
of 1859-61.34 We
that these were capacity. First, we
tablish a diplomatic relationship among the Italian states that might have led to aGerman model of negotiated and federal unification.35 For
example, Tuscany Tuscany autonomy in the period made multiple to evict Austria of Tuscany.36 1858-59 offers from As Cavour's diplomatic of an alliance between representative Piedmont in and
in exchange for continued the peninsula an absolutist monarch with limited contact
with the growing civic unrest in his population, the grand duke of Tus cany rejected all offers and inApril 1859 was suddenly facing the im plosion of his regime, which left an institutional vacuum filled by
Piedmontese In response government... envoy to form each Italian who feared sympathizers to calls from Piedmont's "revolution" to envoy to prevent disorder," Cavour an interim This government.38 (a pattern that was and "anarchy."37 for a "military Tuscany asked his Piedmontese de facto absorption of
diplomatic
partners orchestrated tral Italian with the
envoy himselfbccame
state builder.Without
negotiating
the Piedmontese structures, government collapsing a process of unconditional annexation of each of the Cen
settlement
of Two Si
in Count Camillo di Cavour, dei Carteggi Di Camillo Cavour e del Regno d'Italie (Cavour s corre delMezzogiorno laformazione of Italy), vol. 2 and the formation of the kingdom of the mezzogiorno
1961). (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 35 see the collection of For examples of repeated efforts at negotiation, correspondence diplomatic and Rosanna Roccia, in the multivolume eds., Camillo Cavour Epistolario work, Carlo Pischedda s (Camillo Cavour letters) (Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 2000). 36 seen Ibid. Evidence of these diplomatic reports between Cavour and his envoy in Florence can be 18 (p. 352); see also aA Carlo Bon in "Da Carlo Bon Compagni di Mombello," Doc. 380, March di Mombello" (p. 619). Compagni 37 are Cavour's Doc. 800 (pp. 628-29). These di Mombello," Ibid. uDa Carlo Bon Compagni words envoy's 38 Ibid. describing the situation inTuscany in his April 27,1859, report.
86
WORLD POLITICS
1860. As the underinstitutionalized absolutist monarchy of the King dom of Two Sicilies collapsed, news of Italy's south trickled in to gov ernment ministries in Piedmont. In the summer of 1860 Garibaldi,
who was in contact in rural order.39 Italy system with areas the Piedmontese governors maintain southern orderly of Sicily Piedmontese Similarly, to Turin crown, began Piedmontese requesting officials Finance on to hear from to in an troops assignment
sent word
of their difficulties
of tax collection.
Piedmontese
Ministry
maintaining officials
Piedmontese
situation. And he announced in letters to Bertani in July 1860 and to Garibaldi in September 1860 that the only solution for managing the
fiscal and social chaos was immediate annexation by Piedmont.45 In
short, by the summer and fall of 1860 Cavour and the officials around him realized that they had inherited a set of states incapable of doing
the work of modern governance.
39 Press, 1998), 106. Lucy Riall, Sicily and the Unification of Italy (Oxford: Clarendon and Roccia (fn. 35), August ^Pischedda 16,1860, Doc. 639 (p. 94). 41 Ibid., August 2,1860, Doc. 528 (p. 8). 42 Alberto Caracciolo, Stato e societa civile (State and civil society) (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1960), 119. 43 at the annual meeting James Albisetti, "Julie Schwabe and the Poor of Naples" (Paper presented of Education, of the International for the History Birmingham, England, July Standing Conference 12-15,2001). "Pischedda and Roccia (fn. 35), August 17,1860, Doc. 647 (p. 99). 45 Riall (fn. 39), 84.
87
2 regional
Measure 2 Rate: as
of
italian
states
(1850-60)a
Measure Control: Rate 3
Military
Conscription Personnel
Enrollment of Primary
% of Male Population
2.3 2.0 0.7 2.0 1.6 1.2 NA 1.53:1
14.7
25-35 32 36 36 90
2.3:1
revenue data from Izzo (fn. 32), 123; military personnel data from Singer and Small (fn. 15); enrollment data from Zamagni (fn. 15), 14-15; population data from Singer and Small (fn. 15). b was part of the structure of the Austro-Hungarian Because Lombardy-V?neto imperial Empire, it is excluded from this analysis.
Beyond
the perceptions
themselves,
what
fur
ther evidence supports this impression of low infrastructural capacity in Italy outside of Piedmont? The limited extant evidence on public
revenue, conscription Piedmontese Italian tural capacity. states to make and stability also suggests that non capacity, states suffered from of infrastruc deep problems In Table 2 we can see an overview of each of the Italian
assessments in of levels of infrastructural rough capacity areas: extraction, see three defining and We education.46 conscription, states Prussia would that in comparison with the German inherit (see account Table confirms the narrative above. But, sec 3), the evidence ond, than even more
states it inherited was very high, and asTable 3 shows, much higher
the relative gap between Prussia several years later. of infrastructural three measures The the measure and the states it would inherit
importantly,
Piedmont
and the
in the same capacity all point we can assess of "state revenue per capita," direction. Using the ability of each of the Italian states to extract revenue from its popu
46 to the concepts of "extraction, conscription, and control," three measures These correspond inTilly, ed., The Formation of European Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History State-Making," National States inWestern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 50.
in of
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TABLE 3 INFRASTRUCTURAL CAPACITY OF THE GERMAN Regional
Measure Extractive Capacity: State 1
Governments
(1850-66)a
Measure 2 Measure Control: Road Density: KM Roads per 3
Revenueper
as % of Male
Population 2.2 4.3 1.1 1.4 2.3 2.8 2.1 2.8
Capita
Prussia Bavaria Baden W?rttemberg Saxony Hannover Kurhessen Darmstadt Ratio of Prussia of states 1:1.04 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.2 thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler thaler
228
141 143 229
1:1.09
and road density data are drawn from Borchard population, data are from Singer and Small (fn. 15).
the measure lation.47 Using "military personnel we can assess the male population," conscription
of the percentage of each state, capacity the ability of the state to access a basic societal resource. Finally, using rate of "enrollment the measure age school children," we elementary can assess the state to penetrate and transform society capacity of the areas one for state the societal of of education, key regulation through as Table 2 shows, the leaders in the nineteenth century. Taken together, ca into the infrastructural evidence allows us a glimpse best available states in the decade before national unifi the Italian of of each pacity and constitutional the absence of parliamentary cation. Given institutions, the narrative the data not evidence: the picture confirm by suggested surprisingly Piedmont and the there was a large gap between state states. On average, Piedmont had twice as much five states, a gap that ismuch below. states, as discussed larger than that
as a
Given both the perception and the reality of low levels of infrastruc
47 In response to the criticism that this measure and the other two might simply reflect underlying it is instructive that the correlation between socioeconomic differences, regional GDP per capita and is very weak, suggesting that institutional capacity has a conceptual weight of its each of the measures own. For GDP per capita data on the Italian states, see Esposto (fn. 3), 585-604.
89
shift in strategy proceeded in two steps. First, in the fall of 1859 new
inModena, in the northern an instable and Tuscany, Parma, seeing and central states, called for Piedmon to for rapid Piedmontese annexation replace
and voted legislation structures. to in in Italy s south in 1860, in response existing Similarly, were unrest civic and thousand troops stability twenty-five dispatched to the south, and the state structures were dismantled. All remaining of Sicily, immediately for ex ex
were on the island governors twenty-four replaced was constitution the Piedmontese ample. Moreover,
tended to Sicily (August 3), along with the Piedmontese monetary system (August 17), copyright laws (August 18), the system of com munal administration (August 26), the military code (August 28), and the public security law of 1859 (August 30).48Finally, by the end of the
were thousand Piedmontese year, one hundred troops occupying Italy's to requests from Piedmontese south as a police force in response offi of taxation and education cials. Similarly, the organization and the col lection capitals bitious of official to Turin. state In sum, statistics the first were shifted from the other involved states' the am step of unification institutions all existing
and state actors strategy of dislodging from their previous of authority, shutting down former gov positions ernment ministries, from their positions, leaders and replac removing new Piedmontese institutions institutions these and with ing personnel and personnel.49 The second inforced tions cials step in this unitary strategy of state formation to grow
out of the legacy of low infrastructural capacity in the Italian states (re
was the turn to institu by the first step of unification) unitary in and to a rejection of federalism debates between parliamentary
of Interior offi
Italy, federalism
revenue and to public was in federalism states, low-capacity, imploding as unsustainable. in the Two factors were decisive
in
90
ac to the of 1860 would disorder revolutionary a an at As institu devolution.52 result, by 1865, company any regional states were tional erased from the level, the formerly independent
and
via an (3) no access to the national government was to constitution of Piedmont extended unitary
states and the creation six existing of an all a state in of centered first Turin (in apparatus encompassing unitary to the lack of and later in Rome was above all a response Piedmont) and institutionalization embeddedness and to the low infrastructural of capacity of the preexisting states of the Italian peninsula. The unevenly
man Confederation
1871. Like Also
in 1866-67
Prussia faced
in
Piedmont, like Piedmont, Prussia III to leave these states Napoleon man tese strategy of state formation
states. from
strategy of dissolving was achieved a state structure. via Indeed Prussia's unification unitary of some states accompanied and the annexation by regional concessions to other states. Rather than formally accommodations pragmatic away all existing sweeping man state institutionalized to a subunit a key and institutions, set of regional monarchical elites case the new Ger leaders and
the Ger Nevertheless, independent. the with Piedmon contrasted sharply to create states across the existing peninsula
institutions, federally organized leading than the Italian case, the German Even more lenge cessions
center will make federal to the that the political assumption the overbearing threats. That in the face of internal only state of Prussia could create a federal system despite
of these debates.
powerful
its over
RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF FEDERALISM whelming military power vis-?-vis the other German
an unexpected sions that weak irony: strong state-building centers cannot make. sometimes of a federation is not relations Prussia the strength in the subunits centers The can make conces
91
states highlights
establishment pattern
of state-society
of a potential
or federal a could negotiated adopt that Piedmont tried to use but ultimately to deal that was designed with simultaneously dilemmas of national concessions unification. in the face of
and domestic
state facing Piedmontese ne to in 1860, the Prussian had partners political leadership and devolve fis with could and, furthermore, easily successfully gotiate to state and political the well-developed cal, administrative, authority structures outside of Prussia the Ital after national unification. While ian states outside stitutionalized other German of Piedmont constitutional states. were ruled to varying degrees by brittle
this puzzle? Why make explains internal threats? Unlike the situation
in the absolutist
in 1861, not a single one had a constitu inherited inherited tion or parliament. the largest nine states Prussia By contrast, in 1871 all had constitutions As a result, with unifica and parliaments. six states Piedmont
1776-1866 constitutional Deutsche (German Grimm, history, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1776-1866) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 112. 54 und Reinhard Mussgnug,"Die rechtlichen zwischen Regierung, Beziehungen pragmatischen von Unruh, in Kurt Jeserich, Hans Pohl, and Georg-Christoph und Verwaltung," eds., Parlament, Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte Anstalt, (German administrative history) (Stuttgart: Deutsche-Verlags 1983), 2:96. 55 of these reforms, see Ernst Rudolf Huber, ed., Dokumente zur Deutschen Verfas For a description of German constitutional (Documents Verlag, history) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer sungsgeschichte 1964), 2:182-223. 53 Dieter
92
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POLITICS
the presence of constitutions noting an overview states of the German frastructural identical that we
in terms
not used in the Italian context. Though capacity" to the Italian measures, to the data nevertheless point impor tant differences in the relative of the German and Italian capacity states, as also evidenced in the narrative accounts.
The data presented inTable 3, when compared with the data in Table 2, highlight two points. First, in terms of the absolute level of in
frastructural developed capacity, than their the German Italian states counterparts. were far more by the 1850s even and perhaps Second,
more
many, much herited three whose
of federalism in Ger
between and as Prussia and it in
institutional as the
were ac capacity in critical tually higher shaping and strategies of Prussian elites as they negotiated perceptions political In short, given the aim of securing greater fiscal re national unification. and greater sources, more manpower, incorporation stability, Prussia's levels of institutionalization its own. This institutional fact was
institu
intended
that a gradual
path
and
It and
93
and compromise of federalism conquest a federal outcome.58 was a strategy of not to would It lead expect might to the Pied annexation that stands in sharp contrast plus concessions montese at entire annexation of the Italian peninsula. the end of Indeed, state of Hannover, in the 1866 war Prussia annexed the coercively its bargaining creasing But Prussia undertook the southern German states.59 power vis-?-vis a this explicit act of coercion, which eliminated states of from the map, while monarchy leaving the
long-established south intact. Germany's was wary of After Bismarck away the state of Hannover, sweeping was acts. coercive He farther motivated undertaking by both foreign concerns concerns with further Prussia's (French expansionary policy plans) German itwould and domestic Catholic policy element concerns. Bismarck wrote to his ambassador
inherit?in In contrast
because policy goals precisely as Bavaria, Baden, W?rttemberg, in German Confederation?were high to the unconditional states "conquest" of
frastructural three
southern Italy in 1860, the war of 1866 inGermany was ended with
sets of treaties that left the German intact as future negoti
ating partners for national unification: (1) the Nikolsburg Preliminary Treaty of June 26, 1866; (2) the Prague Peace Treaty of August 23,
1866; and of Bavaria, states. The (3) seven bilateral agreements between Prussia and the states Baden, W?rttemberg, terms of these treaties possible and Austria's as small Hessen, Saxony, left in place as much institutional and in exchange for disbanding the Ger removing itself from the sphere of and two other
Bund und die "Die Verhandlungen ?ber den Eintritt der s?ddeutschen Staaten in den Norddeutschen inTheodor 1870-71 der Reichsverfassung," Schieder, ed., Reichsgr?ndung (Founding of Entstehung the the empire, 1870-71) (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1970), 148-63. 58 The term "negotiated peace" is from Lothar Gall, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 307. annexed can be explained by two factors. 59That Saxony was left intact and Hannover completely to link itswest First, Hannover was of greater strategic and geographical importance, allowing Prussia see Stewart Stehlin, more on this ern and eastern provinces, creating a "tenable For territory." point, Bismarck and the Guelph Problem, 1866-1890 1973), 34-41. The sec (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, ond reason for the contrasting fates of Saxony and Hannover was that Saxony's independence , unlike "Graf Goltz Hannover's, was insisted upon by both French and Austrian powers. See correspondence an Bismarck," no. 224, inOncken (fn. 28), 372-75. July 23,1866, 60 Otto von Bismarck, in Scheler (fn. 22), 755.
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continued at an informal existed not only at a formal autonomy an to level. In order sent by Bismarck of 1866, he insisted that all administra
troops in the summer states be left in of the still sovereign "as little in place with as of administration terruption possible."62 Another feature of the 1866 peace settlement was the institutional ization of a diplomatic states. Between
rate Most
Prussia between and the other relationship and November 18,1866, 25,1870, eight sepa August treaties between the Prussian monarch and the monarchs of to bring signed was these among committed the the German the treaty Reich signed into existence. on August 18,
1866, by the Prussian king and the kings of sixteen north German
states. The union" aimed states to a "defensive and offensive of the the "independence" and "integrity" preserving new of the North German Confederation members (Norddeutsche made the Two features that confederation critical Bund). state-building
viable were
statement
(1) the call for the creation of a parliament and (2) the
that the
to allow their troops to be all agreed sovereigns of the Prussian under the leadership crown.63 In short, we see the adop tion of a federal strategy of unification that set the terms of unification via negotiation and rather states, left them intact and the formerly than dissolving in place for future negotiation. independent
Another key step in the process of making a distinctly federal Ger many was the writing of the North German Constitution in the fall andwinter of 1866. This would prove to be a critical period because the
German Reich's 1871 made effective constitution in 1866-67. and of agreements sented a path only Prussia. because was an extension of the set merely In this phase, federalism also repre to national unification that was possible states were in place outside of
of least resistance
legitimate
a set of constitutional that Bismarck Indeed, after viewing proposals to write in the summer of officials his ministry's had commissioned
final theoretical and strategic justification of the constitution in 1866 and 1871. Both his proposal for a federal structure and his justification
of the federal structure in his dictates to offer are that he considered federalism revealing the "easiest" insofar route as they show to unification.
61 Huber (fn. 55), 212-20. 62 in Scheler (fn. 22), 739-40. Otto von Bismarck, 63Text of treaty is inHuber (fn. 55), 224-25.
95
was "too cen that one of his ministry's First, Bismarck writes proposals tralized for the eventual accession of the South Germans." Displaying to southern German he argues moreover that the concerns, sensitivity
"central authority" of the Reich ought to be "not a singleMinistry but a Federal Diet, a body consisting of delegates from the individual gov
ernments."64 What was Bismarck's motivation? Here we see that what change contemporary often requires rhetorical Bismarck "The more explains, the easier things will social scientists call "path-breaking" that emphasize strategies we institutional
a remarkable for is appreciation sues of we more to he "In form shall stick continues, path dependence, in practice giving the confederation of states while it the character of a federal state with elastic, inconspicuous but far-reaching form."66 All of this was possible and desirable because the states that would retain ex be."65 Displaying clusive control over range of other policy to undermine Bismarck's cern with ation had monarchs the "easiest" to be accepted taxation, conscription, domains were effective aims route of national to national and education, states that did not hence a whole threaten the con
unification; unification.
the states
new autonomy, giving the only enue and over exclusive control nearly only military questions. policy admin the states retained control over their well-functioning Second, as the actors that would istrative structures, nearly all fed implement eral legislation. federal politics And
a direct control over third, the states maintained in the Bundesrat. In short, their membership through
"Gall (fn. 58), 317. 65 Erich Brandenburg, und Meyer, 1923), 219. 67 For an overview
Die Reichsgr?ndung
(The founding
of the empire),
Gestaltung 290-371.
96
WORLD POLITICS
with
the creation of the new Norddeutsche Bund inApril 1867, the groundwork was laid for the creation of the federal German Reich in 1871.
state structures In sum, well-developed to be achieved with of Germany project of dissolving existing states allowed lower chances for the gradual uni of revolt, less new state struc
fication
tures.As Herbert Jacob has also argued in his study of German public
the task of layering a new national government administration, (as was sense in states made done in Italy) atop already well little functioning the German context.68 By avoiding the massive fiscal costs of dissolving a new national states and from government existing constructing chief designer of political Count Otto scratch, Prussia's institutions, von Bismarck, for and federalism self-consciously opted intentionally In this unification. as, in his own terms, an "easier" route to national sense, it was the combination constituent center and well of a militarily powerful a viable federalism that made strategy of case. in the German states
Conclusion
To return to to our original a union question: why would but accommodating This article a center be unyielding to grant federal that the crucial
enough concessions
forge to subunits?
is not whether issue for forming federations subunits exist, nor whether to extract federal concessions from the they have the military capacity core. Instead, the crucial issue iswhether subunits are institutionalized, state forma
subunits
origins.
Without
units
such subunits, the political corewill seek to absorb all the sub
state. unitary account two the this makes strokes, points. First, against use of coercion does not the of existing theory, the expectations preclude to federal of federations. the formation Second, creating key challenge ism is not simply constraining the power of a political center; instead, In broad of subunits to do the work of governance
since Bismarck
to establish
(New Haven:
Press,
1963).
97
areas.
diversity differences, they identify formation gave rise to diverse outcomes of capitalism, and organization one area institutions. But has remained
the presence of national macroinsti the of explain origins how diverse pathways of nation-state the choice such as regime type, the na of national electoral
out of the range of scholars: the divide?the fact that state building gave rise to three federal-unitary states among seventeen federal states and fourteen the unitary largest an infrastructural states ofWestern account of federal Could Europe. ism's origins explain broader patterns nation-state of European forma tion? At untangle do first much the proposed infrastructural glance, of the diversity ofWest European framework nation-state does devel
69 opment. While
further
work
across a broader cases, the frame range of national testing a new identifies for along those Unes. hypothesis proceeding the results of the article may have policy relevance for con Second, decentralization best efforts beyond Europe. such It is true that my ar as the European
temporary gument
state-building explains trajectories not external or colo internal domestic actors?and experience where a of nial actors?played role in determining the structure primary we states. As recent must in has be modest demonstrated, scholarship to to export the lessons of state formation postcolo trying European or Africa.70 Where states were de nial state settings of Latin America signed internal
69 Of
to reflect
of external different
actors causal
rather logic
than
of state
the universe of seventeen cases, the only three inwhich state building gave rise to federal out Switzerland (1920), all had regional-level (1848), Germany (1871), and Austria parliaments, states at the moment in the constituent of the first mod and systems of administration constitutions, ern national constitution. In the remaining fourteen cases, state building resulted in unitary outcomes. subnational parliamentary insti Of these fourteen cases, only one case, Denmark (1849), had modern tutions at the moment In all other cases, including the Netherlands of polity formation. (1815) and were a institu Italy (1861), unitary institutions adopted in context where subnational parliamentary tions were absent. The single exception, Denmark, might be explained by the absence of a federal ide the prospects of federalism. For further systematic testing of the ology in 1849, which undermined see Daniel Ziblatt, account vis-?-vis other arguments, Divide: "The Federal-Unitary infrastructural Lessons of Seventeen European Nation-States," Center for European Studies Working Paper (Cam comes, 2005). bridge, Harvard University, 70 in the African For a discussion of the limits of the European model context, see Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power inAfrica: Comparative Lessons inAuthority and Control (Princeton: Princeton Univer a discussion of the limits of see in Latin America, sity Press, 2000). For Miguel Cen European models State in Latin America (University Park: Pennsylvania teno, Blood and Debt: War and theNation-State University Press, 2002).
98
WORLD POLITICS
since in many as regions of the
may be at work. Nevertheless, building world decentralization and federalism to a range of social are achieved ization
solutions possible of how federalism and decentral ills, the question takes on renewed urgency.71 Can my argument to contribute fills a other this argument Indeed, any insights regions? that the task of creating federalism is not about weak gap by proposing so often assumed. Rather, as is is creating federalism ening government, about the of While federal government. capacity ironically increasing as an institutional au ism is typically viewed solution that disperses thority, focused to assume that this is a prerequisite of federalism is to mistake at the
are viewed
the effectsof federalism for its origins. Indeed, insufficient attention has
"capacity" prerequisites level. The subnational central lesson of this article, relevant for any decentralization effort, is that with institutional structures the paradox of high-quality of federalism's origins. on the institutional of federalism a lesson potentially the skills, resources, to it is possible governance,
and
overcome
eds., Federalism
and Territorial
Cleavages