Regime-Creation by A Coalition of The Weak

Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities Author(s):
Robert L. Rothstein Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 307-328 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600633 . Accessed: 18/07/2013 10:37
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International StudiesQuarterly (1984) 28, 307-328
Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities
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theNew International Neither EconomicOrdernor theIntegrated for Program Commodities have been analyzedas examples ofattempted The regime-creation. results ofdoingso, especially fortheIPC, suggest twospeculative, but plausible, a coalition oftheweakcan affect that conclusions. First, regime-creation, provided thecoalition a bargaining remains unified and develops tothe strategy appropriate context ofdecision. itsconceptual can Second,regime thinking, despite weaknesses, a useful, ifpartial, havea beneficial effect frame ofreference practical byproviding for decision-makers. are illustrated These arguments for the Group of 77 by an alternative and sometactical in the discussing bargaining strategy implications IPC case. Some suggestions are also made about possible in regime improvements as in theneed to treatappropriate thinking itself, especially bargaining strategies variablesbetween and outcomes. intervening regimes
The attempt by thedeveloping countries to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) has failed.This is a judgment thatseems valid regardless ofthecriteria the gap betweeninitialaims and current employed:whether outcomesdiminished, determination ofwhichsideneededquickagreement or suffered itsabsence, mostfrom or even thelonger-range and lesspower-determined issueofwhether thenegotiations createda rising learningcurve (in the senseof rethinking the terms of the existing about whythe negotiations bargaining game). There is verylittleagreement failed, which is hardly sinceeach side-North and South,for surprising convenience started with widelydifferent values, perceptions, and objectives.1 Nevertheless, one study thefollowing listofconditions to thefailure: (Sengupta,1980:xlvi) offers contributing inexpedient bad tactics, conflictual strategies, poor timing, inadequate preparation, interests, erroneous inconsistent and perceptions, diverse conceptualizations, interests, domesticpolitical circumstances. One would need to add that the constraining obscuredtrade-offs on theissues,and valued negotiating system encouraged rigidity, intra-group unity morethaninter-group compromise. It shouldbe clearthatthere is no single wayin whichto interpret theNIEO and the thatitgenerated oraccelerated, or toaccount for therelative manyspecific negotiations degreesof successand failure.There is, however,one analyticalperspective that, somewhat has not been widelyused in attempting to understand these surprisingly,
Author's note:I would like to thank ProfessorErnst B. Haas forcomments on an earlier draftof this essay. I would also like to thank the editors of thisjournal and the refereesfor comments and advice, some of which have been incorporated in the text. 0020-8833/84/03/0307-22/$03.00 (D 1984 International Studies Association
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negotiations:thecreation and maintenance ofinternationalregimes(Keohane and Nye, 1977; Haas, 1980; Krasner, 1982). Consequently, we shall be concerned in what follows with the question of what contributionregime analysis might make to understanding and explaining the NIEO negotiationsand the negotiationsto establish an Integrated Program for Commodities (IPC) within UNCTAD. We shall accept Krasner's (1982: 186-187) definition ofregimes'as sets ofimplicitor explicit principles,norms,rules, and decision-makingprocedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'. The inclusion of decision-makingprocedures is especially important in North-South negotiations,not only because they represent a key element of Southern power, but also because manipulation ofsuch procedures has sometimesbeen used (or attempted) by the North to undermine apparent shifts in principles and norms or to concede somethingin form but not in substance.2 Since regimes are ongoing arrangements,the original termsof which may be very general, how theyare implemented is crucial and at least partially dependent on the decisional rules adopted. We shall also accept that regimes are not equivalent to agreements, that regimes exist to facilitate agreements, and that they incorporate more than short-term calculations of interest(Krasner, 1982: 187). The organization of this paper is as follows.The next section will briefly discuss the NIEO as an instance of a particular kind of (failed) regime-creation. Subsequent in commodities, sectionswill provide a much more detailed analysis of regime-creation froman analytical perspectiveand thesecond froma policy perspective.What is the first meant by thisdistinctionwill be made clear shortly.It should also be noted that both cases emphasize not only the causal variables that are crucial forregime-creation, but also the relationship between different configurationsof those causal variables and appropriate bargaining strategies.In effect, this seeks to link regime analysis with an importantcomponent of traditional analysis of negotiations. This linkage is especially crucial in section 4 where an expliciteffort is made to illustratethe (potential) practical value of regime thinkingby indicating how political leaders, especially in the Third World, mighthave used the framework provided by regime thinkingto choose a more effective bargaining strategy.Finally, a concluding section notes a few implications of the preceding analysis. Utility of Regime Analysis In an earlier work on the IPC (Rothstein, 1979), I avoided emphasizing regimes, because it was not clear to me that such a focus on regimesadded anythingbut a new vocabulary to the analysis. Moreover, neither the NIEO nor the IPC were 'pure' examples of regime-creation,since much of the bargaining was about better terms within the existingregime, and the Group of 77 was never completely or consistently committed to the idea of radical regime change. Both the NIEO and the IPC also divided the world into a North-South pattern that seemed likelyto be undermined by in traditionalpatterns increasingdifferentiation withinthe Third World, by some shifts of interaction (forexample, export of capital and advanced goods by some developing countries), and by the pressures generated by deteriorating economic conditions. Consequently a North-South focus for regime-creation might be inappropriate or misleading forsome issues (Rothstein, 1984a). All of these points retain some force.Nevertheless,I have been led to reconsiderthis argumentwhile attemptingto answer the question whetherthe Group of 77 did in fact available to it during theseand otherNorth-South negotiations.I have a betterstrategy
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now argue that regime thinking,suitably broadened to include an emphasis on its practical utilityand on appropriate bargaining strategiesforregime-creation, may be able to make a usefulcontributionto understandingthesenegotiationsand perhaps even to improvingthe prospectsin some futurenegotiations.The argumenthere goes much furtherthan my Global Bargaining(1979) in providing a new interpretiveframework (regime analysis) and a new argument about appropriate bargaining strategiesfor a particular kind of regime-creation. By the same token, I also hope to make some contributionto regime analysis itselfthroughthe emphases and the argumentsthat are developed. The attempt to assess the utilityof regime analysis, as with any other venture into 'pre-theoretical'conceptualization, is not a completelystraightforward task. First,the effort mustbe at least partlysubjective,since empirical confirmation or refutation is not likelyto be conclusive at thisstage ofdevelopment. Second, while thereare a varietyof meanings that can be attributed to the idea of 'usefulness' in this context, two such meanings will be considered. One interpretationof utility will rest on an effortto understandwhetherthe concepts and ideas thatare central to regimeanalysisdo indeed provide a better,or at least different, explanation of the NIEO and IPC negotiations than the more traditionalconcepts and ideas that analystshave tended to employ. The central question posed by the second interpretation will be whetherthe participantsin thesenegotiationswould have been betterable to understand thecontextofdecision and theproblemstheyconfronted iftheyhad attemptedto thinkabout thesemattersin terms Some ofthe problemsassociated with an attemptto understandtheconceptual utility of regime analysis are merely a subset of the familiar weaknesses of social science knowledge,3 which include the absence of well-grounded theory, the frequency of contradictoryresultsor resultsthat increase complexity and uncertainty,the shifts in vocabulary withoutcorrespondingincreasesin explanatorypower, and thedifficulties of using such knowledge in a policy context that has its own values and interests(Weiss, 1977; Lindblom and Cohen, 1979; Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980). However, I will concentrate more narrowlyon some of the weaknesses of regime analysis itself.One is especially importantin the context of regime-creationby a coalition of the weak. The creation ofregimesis rarelyan autonomous process,since eventsoutside theprocessmay be more importantthan eventswithinit. This is especially trueforattemptsby theweak, or generallyin conditionsofdispersedand fragmented less power, and perhaps relatively importantin conditionsofhegemonyor perhaps when thereis a widespread sense of the need for a new regime. The key point here is that the formercases will obviously mix traditional and regime politics,thus implyingthe need fora clear strategyto move the mix toward regime goals. These strategic or bargaining considerations seem undervalued in much regime literature,although how we can get regimesis as important a question as why we should want them.4 The utilityof regime analysis, given its limitations,cannot be assessed against some abstractstandard ofwhat genuine theorymightprovide or what a complete explanation of the NIEO and IPC cases would entail. Expectations must be more modest. As Haas has noted (personal communication), regimethinking provides 'a multi-variatecontext forinterpreting interdependence relationships',which is potentiallyvaluable but also intrinsicallyambiguous. In this sense, the questions that arise concern not only the specification of the key variables themselves, but also how they perform against alternative approaches. We might also ask whether regime analysis generates new and suggestsnew directionsforresearchand whetherit is a necessarypart ofany insights
of regime-creation.
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effort to understandnegotiationsthat include a strongnormativecomponent. These are the kinds of questions that concern us, although the answers are at best partial and
provisional.
In what follows,we shall be concerned with instances offailed regime-creationby a and coalition of the weak. Many analysts,including neo-realists,dependency theorists, Marxists, would reject this approach on the implicit or explicit presumptionthat only the powerfulwho dominate the internationalsystemneed to be taken into account. In some cases thisis surely true,but it is a central theme of thisessay that thereare other cases in which it is not or need not be so. On many issues,especially in the international that thestrongcan only thwart dispersedand fragmented economy,power is sufficiently regimes that they oppose, but not impose regimes by fiat; they need the negotiated cooperation ofat least a substantialnumber ofthe weak. The leverage ofthe developing countriesis increasing,not only because of theirgrowing economic importance forthe developed countries,but also because, ifthe powerfulcannot agree among themselves, the weaker states may have the ability to influencethe likelihood and the substance of any possible agreement. The continued ability of the weak to influence stronglythe processby which theinternationalagenda is set may also be consequential. In any event, an analysis of failed regime-creationin a condition of dispersed power and structural on itsown terms as a uncertainty(i.e., about both ends and means) may be instructive model that is more appropriate to present concerns than the BrettonWoods model, a model ofwidespread perceived need, or an evolutionarymodel (building on precedents as in the common law) that is too slow and contingentfor cases that require a rapid response.5 The NIEO as an Exercise in Regime-Creation incorporatinga varietyof The NIEO mightbe perceived as a normativesuperstructure more specific regimes (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982). For example, Murphy (1983) to assure argues that the core idea ofthe NIEO emerged in the 1940s,largelyas an effort the right to use national policies for industrial development, that is, to accept international regulation of national rules, but not internationally-mandatedelimination of national regulations that violated the tenets of liberalism. This may well the historicalcontextin the 1940s, and it surelyignoresotherthemeswithin oversimplify the NIEO, but it does suggesthow specificregimescan be seen as embedded in a wider set of norms and principles. From thisperspective,the NIEO could be perceived as an attempt to establish a new regime of regimes. Nevertheless,while thereis some validity to thisapproach to the NIEO, thereis also some danger of oversimplification. The relationshipbetween the NIEO and the more was hardly unidirectional. In some cases, the key specificproposals forregime-creation themes (norms, principles) emerged within the issue-areas themselves, were then generalized in various NIEO texts (see Sauvant and Hasenplug, 1977), and subse(although not with thedeveloped countriesthat quently exertedsome legitimizingeffect voted against the NIEO) withinspecificnegotiations.Moreover, while all the elements within the NIEO had a long and familiarhistory,the attempt to package them into a was largelyad hoc:an opportunityarose suddenly that single program of reconstruction of altering existing seemed to promise some hope, because of apparent power shifts, patternsofinteractionand the opportunitywas grasped by adding togethervirtuallyall the demands made by the developing countriesin the previous two decades without any effortto eliminate inconsistencies, to consider the interests of the developed
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countries,or to thinkthroughthe strategyand tactics ofimplementation.In short,the was not entirelycoherent and was certainlynot determinativeof NIEO superstructure actions and proposals in theissue-areas; rather,it was loose and permissiveand tolerated a great deal of autonomy in specific negotiations. If the NIEO had incorporated consensual proposals or if it had rested on a firmeranalytical base, its influence on specificnegotiationsmighthave been more profound;as it was, itsinfluencewas largely rhetoricaland atmospherical. or NormNorm-Governed Transforming Change Should the NIEO, despite some ambiguities, be regarded as primarily-but -not exclusively-an instance of 'norm-governed' or 'norm-transforming' change (Ruggie, 1982)? The essential norms of the NIEO reflectedthe assumption that Third World developmentshould be theprimarysystem goal and that thecreationofan international social welfaresystemand the acceptance of the idea of internationalsocial justice were imperative. Underlying these norms were a series of controversial and essentially unproven assumptions about the responsibilityof the international economic and political systems for domestic development problems and the need for, and the possibility of, massive government intervention to control, guide, or manage the international economy. One need hardly add that many of the developed countries rejected these proposals, insisting that domestic policy failures were responsible for on the scale demanded was neitherdesirable nor underdevelopment,that intervention possible,and that thecontemporarycrisiswas essentiallya cyclical adjustmentproblem. The operating principles reflectedthese norms and assumptions. Seeking a greater share oftheincome and wealth derived froma varietyofactivities,the Group of77 the negotiatingarm of the developing countries-supported two kinds of proposals: those more resourcesmore rapidly (and more automatically) and those thatsought to transfer that sought by various means to reduce the domestic impact of externally-induced 'shocks'. And to ensure continued implementation, the Group of 77 also sought new decision rules (i.e., more power) forthe institutions responsibleforparticular programs (Rothstein, 1981). In effect, these principles sought to ensure new patternsof control over the operation and outcomes-of the international economy. A reverse Bretton Woods system was envisaged: a conference, or a series of conferences,that would institutionalize a new order that overturned or sharply modified many of the key principlesoftheexistingliberal orderand thatwas biased or tiltedtoward theinterests of thosewho feltunfairly treated (or badly situated,given initial startingpoints) in the old order. On the face ofit, then,the NIEO seems a reasonably clear case ofnorm-transforming change. There are, however,several ambiguitiesthatmake thecase much less clear. One such ambiguity,of course, is that many of the NIEO's ostensiblesupporterswere quite willing to accept much less change, even incremental change, either because of the pressuresof immediate needs or because theynever believed that the NIEO principles eithercould or would be implemented.6There were also analystswho believed that the NIEO did not go far enough and that it was in whole or in part regressive(Galtung, 1979). The regressiveargument is not entirely persuasive another instance of the half-full, half-empty glass but it is clear that even immediate implementationof most of the NIEO's principlesand demands would not have quickly solved the problems of the developing countries (Cline, 1979). Taken together,these comments suggest that the NIEO was more an instance of norm-governed change, or intra-system change, than is commonlyunderstood. A more
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revolutionary NIEO would have had to give much more emphasis to delinking to establish and to a more seriouseffort strategies, to national and collectiveself-reliance, would have been cooperation. But such a strategy producer cartelsand cross-commodity virtually irrational because of the weakness of the developing countries, because of conflictinginterestson many substantive issues, and because the NIEO negotiations, were not autonomous that is, they whether norm-governedor norm-transforming, always had to adjust to changes in the external environmentand in the policies of the developed countries. Causal Variables Do the causal variables generally used to explain the development of regimes help to change or to resolve the ambiguities between norm-governedand norm-transforming place them in a wider contextual framework?Krasner (1982: 86-87) lists five such political power, norms and principles,and two supplementary variables: self-interest, two variables would ofcourse variables, usage and custom and new knowledge. The first be employed in virtuallyany kind of analysis of these events,but norms and principles are more ambiguous since they have been treated at best as supplementaryin most traditional,realistanalyses. Since normsand principlesare central to regimeanalysis,it is presumably the role ofthisvariable thatshould be mostrevealing.The supplementary variables will probably prove to be much less incisive. which were crucial in the NIEO negotiations,shifted The calculations of self-interest, over time and varied greatly between and within the Group of 77 and the developed countries.For example, judgments about whethera radical strategyor an intra-system strategy(i.e., usingextremedemands only as bargaining leverage,not as practical goals) rapidly was more appropriate were verydisparate fromthebeginningand began to shift as the euphoria induced by OPEC dissipated and as economic conditionsdeteriorated. In addition, while some calculations reflected careful attempts to weigh national ofgood standingwithinthe Group of an estimateofthe benefits othersreflected interests, 77, stillothersaspirationsand promisesmore than calculations, and stillothersideology. does not reallydistinguish regimeanalysis Thus, assertingthe importance ofself-interest calculations of fromother approaches and fails to specifyvery carefullyhow different interestcan be amalgamated into support fora particular regime. a desire to register and institutionaRegime-creationby great powers usually reflects ofpower. A structural challenge by theweak, which has few,ifany, lize a new distribution in the some kind offavorable shift historicalprecedents,presumablyought also to reflect ofpower. Certainlysome membersoftheGroup of77 perceivedjust such a configuration as attestedby frequentreferences to 'resourcepower', the creation ofnew 'OPECs', shift, and the 'threat fromthe Third World'. But thereis also some obvious sleight-of-hand here, since neither the developed countries nor most of the commodity producers genuinelybelieved that new cartelswere feasibleor that resourcepower was much more than metaphorical. Thus, one mightargue that the effort to establish the NIEO, rather a new distributionof power, was an attempt to use regime-creation than reflecting as a meansof altering the basic power structure.In effect, rather than a case of 'structural causes and regime consequences' (Krasner, 1982), we have an attempt at something close to the reverse:regime development and structuralconsequences. in power had occurred, additional ambiguitiesarise. How widely must Even ifa shift the shiftbe perceived and by which states? How does a state deal with asymmetrical power shifts, say a global shiftthat obscures the retentionof issue-specificpower by conservative states (or vice versa)? The simple point is that regime analysis, if it is to
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of the operationof the needs much moredetailedspecification becomemoreuseful, a tritedescriptive-analytical power variable. Without such, it merelyreaffirms generalization. at stakein theNIEO debate. Indeed, thepower wereobviously andprinciples Norms and principles whichnorms (and the about who woulddetermine 'waslargely struggle werereally states aboutwhich Butambiguities rules)weretoprevail. operating ensuing for technical as well as thelack ofpersuasive arguments whichproposals, supporting ofthe aboutcontrol completely wasnever meantthatthestruggle manyoftheproposals, and the Traditionalcalculationsof power and interest, superstructure. normative benefit or would genuinely wereworkable someproposals about whether uncertainty doubts game. Intellectual complicatedthe bargaining the Third World,inevitably and Southernstates.Thus, otheranalyseswere as aware both Northern affected and perhapssomewhat and principles, ofnorms of theimportance analysis as regime calculationsof power and very traditional more aware of the danger of ignoring self-interest. are notmuchmore and new knowledge, andcustom usage variables, The supplementary agendaand overand usageoftheinternational control case. Forexample, in this helpful the in thrusting factor institutions by theSouthwas an important someinternational being able to compel but merely concern, of international NIEO into the forefront and perhaps was notveryuseful without beingable to compelcompliance discussion aboutthe New knowledge on persuasion. thatrested strategies from attention distracted was made to create it, because of issueswas not available, and no special effort of tangiblepower,because the need to keep the Group of 77 together overestimates bynew be endangered might (which something topromise thatseemed policies required and in part because of the need to respondquicklyto the knowledge)to everyone, to be of thetime.In any case, bothofthesevariablesseemmorelikely opportunities of conference thanin a singlenegotiating rather negotiations, in protracted important theNIEO. thesortthatconsidered ofthisbrief as a consequence appearjustified thatmight One practicalconclusion as a case is thattheNIEO shouldbe regarded for regimes ofthecausalvariables analysis wereso greatthat and uncertainties The ambiguities of premature regime-creation. enough enoughor consistent werestrong or together, singly noneoftheconsiderations, viewis alsoinsufficient, order. Butthis totheexisting challenge a fundamental tosustain theThirdWorldto compelled of1973-74almost thefactthattheevents for itoverlooks still might to theold order;theodds againstsucceeding launchsomekindofchallenge viewis as this toget.Insofar werelikely as they as short havebeenlong,butwereperhaps was issued,but thatit was done is not thatthechallenge true,themostvalid criticism that or theconditions itwouldencounter about theresistance thought withinsufficient were necessaryto make it succeed-if not in achieving the NIEO, which was implied. strategy morethanan incremental thenin achieving improbable, to and immediately iftheintention was directly Indeed, theNIEO was premature and thenorms from thestart toestablish or evenmerely ofregimes createa newregime (the thefactthattheconditions Apartfrom thatweretoguidesuchan effort. principles theGroupof77 madethe insufficient strength, notpresent weresimply causalvariables) as thekey ThirdWorlddevelopment ofemphasizing tooexclusively error fundamental the itignored ofpower, oftheholders enoughoftheinterests Thisfailedtosatisfy norm. and it did notconsider was doubtful, sucha principle basisfor factthattheconceptual other concerns incorporate must ofregimes stableinternational regime thata genuinely and Emphasison the mutualneed forreform than,but not less than,development.
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proposals were driven out or obscured by proposals that presentationofsensible reform were badly grounded or too one-sided. favorable fora different strategy ofregime-creaWhetherconditionswere sufficiently tion is less clear, however. If such a strategywere indeed possible, then the correct charge against the NIEO is not that it was premature,but ratherthat an inappropriate on this insuredfailure.There is obviouslyno way in which definitivejudgments strategy are possible, but it can reasonably be said that the NIEO negotiations,coming at a time of great euphoria, treated as largely symbolic,and completed within a shortperiod of time, were probably unlikely to generate a realistic negotiating strategy.A realistic approach would have had to recognize the mix between old and new principlesand to emphasize moderate, mutually acceptable proposals, which was probably politically impossible for the Group of 77 at the time. As we shall see, the case might have been strategy might different forthe IPC (and similarnegotiations)in thesense thata different have been able to capitalize on opportunitiesto achieve agreementsthatfellwell shortof what the Group of77 desired but exceeded by some marginwhat the Group managed to achieve. it can hardly provide a If the NIEO is not a very good example of regime-creation, very reliable test of the value of regime analysis. Nevertheless, with this strong qualification in mind, there are a few comments worth making. Analytically, regime analysis does not do any better (or worse) than traditional analysis in attemptingto explain the NIEO, largely because the causal variables are too broadly specifiedand insufficient attentionhas been given to how to proceed in ambiguous (but not irrelevant) circumstanceswhen a desire to preservethe old regime and the hope of creating a new one must coexist,and when each side, despite vast power asymmetries, has some power to thwart but not to impose its views on the other at least at an acceptable cost.7 Practically, this suggests the need to add an interveningvariable between 'structural causes and regime consequences' (Krasner, 1982): an appropriate bargaining strategy that indicates how to achieve regime goals in a mixed environment.There were surely some officialson both sides who could have profitedgreatly if some analysis of this variable had been available, although the pleasures mighthave been largelyaestheticin the NIEO case. Regime-Creation in Commodities: The Failure of a Confrontational Strategy The effort within UNCTAD to establish the Integrated Program for Commodities, which began in 1974 and still continues, is an excellent example of attempted regime-creation. In the firstplace, there was wide recognition from the start that something more was implied than incremental reform.Thus UNCTAD's Secretaryofsome kindof General Gamani Corea declared thatthe IPC 'implied theestablishment regulatoryregime to govern world commoditytrade' (Rangarajan, 1978: 295). In the second place, an effort to negotiate modest and more narrowlyfocused arrangements was specificallyrejected. Neither the traditional, case-by-case approach, which was favored by the developed countries, nor an approach that concentrated only on or in termsofalternativeland uses commoditiesthat were linked togetheras substitutes (e.g., copper-aluminium, coffee-tea-cocoa, oilseeds-fats-butter-sugar-grains)were acceptable to the Group of 77 and UNCTAD officials. of Instead, a decision was made to seek 'global resource management in the interests the development process', using means that were to 'encompass the totality of the
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commodity problem from production to consumption' (Rothstein, 1979: 49-50). Stabilizing prices via bufferstocks (for commodities of interest to the developing countries for which stocking was deemed feasible) was the initial objective; also contemplated were efforts to restructurethe economies of the developing countries (through,forexample, diversification, increased domestic processing,a greater role in distributionand marketing), to improve market access to the developed countries,to interveneto control the 'unfetteredoperation of markets',and to create an institution that reflected the new commodity power of the developing countries to guide and control this vast process of change. Price stabilization, which in some cases might actually lower average earningsforproducers,was usuallyjoined to a demand for'price strengthening' via indexation or othermeans. Finally, the Group of 77 demanded initial agreement-in-principle to the whole IPC, particularlythe Common Fund (a financing mechanism designed to integrate a series of individual commodity agreements), after which details could be negotiated: principle first, feasibilitylater. In short, the goal became revolution, to aim for a new regime with a different distributionof power, income, and wealth, not reform,to incrementallyadjust the old regime (Rothstein, 1979; Brown, 1980). A shift in bargaining power appeared tojustifythisdecision as the eventsof 1973-74 almost compelled an initiative in commodities, although not necessarilyan initiative centeredon the IPC and the Common Fund. In any case, the OPEC phenomenon and the euphoria it induced in much of the Third World, the disarray among the developed new perceptionsofthe resourceuniversethatwere emergingin responseto the countries, 'limits to growth' debate, and fears of insufficient investmentin resources were all important in generating a new sense of resource power. These factors tended or appeared to give the developing countries more leverage than any simple reading of relative power balances mightsuggest.That theywere certainlyweak, largely because theycould not easily adjust to adverse trendsby domestic means (which meant a strong bias toward international solutions for commodity problems), that they needed help quickly, and that they had much more at stake in the negotiationssince commodities were so crucial fordomestic economic performancewas self-evident, but theywielded relativelymore power on resource issues than theypossessed in most other areas of the internationaleconomy. Some tactical considerationsreinforced thisjudgment.The Group of77 was relatively more unifiedin commodities because most members had a stronginterestin the issue, therewere many shared goals, and potential losers were relativelyfew in number and could be compensated by a variety of direct or indirect means. In addition, despite disagreementwith the notion of resource power or with the notion that OPEC would react adverselyby raisingpricesor fundingcartelsifresponsesto the IPC were negative, many of the developed countrieswere genuinelyworried about access to resourcesand about long-termcost trendsif resource investmentscontinued to seek out presumably safer, but costlier, havens. Some of the conservative developed countries were reconsideringthe mutual benefitsof controlling inflationand maintaining access to Third World resources implicit in commodity agreements and price stabilization schemes provided theywere not a disguise to raise prices arbitrarily. Real or apparent shifts in power and strongelementsof self-interest mightthus have appeared to justify an attempt at regime-creation.The impact of new norms and principlesis more problematic, but even in this case it might be argued that the fears aroused by demands for radical change such as global resource management were or mightbe considerablyallayed by recognitionthat the commodityeconomy was already
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heavily managed (i.e., 'free' marketswere largely a myth) and that therewere strong a sector of the world economy that was clearly malfuncjoint interests in restructuring tioning.Of course, thesecommentsneed to be balanced by recognitionthatto thedegree enough to support power shifted(forwhich therewas no agreement), it had not shifted of the Group of 77 in the IPC was strong,but radical change. Further,the self-interest not strong enough to overcome internal and external conflictsof interest.Also, while ofnormsand principles,there therewas some overlap between each side's interpretation were even sharper contradictionsand distrust.In short,prospects for regime change were clearly better than forthe NIEO as a whole, but theywere still not very good. negotiating process Chosen bargaining strategies obstructed The Group of 77 and the UNCTAD leadership could have responded by withdrawing theirchallenge to the existingorder,but theywere neitherpoliticallynt)rpsychologically and perhaps not economically able to do so. Alternatively, they could have and sought to devise a strategythat would get analyzed the situation theyconfronted, the most that could be obtained, while keeping open the longer termchances formore profound change. In effect,they could have accepted norm-governedchange while change. Instead, seeking to encourage the conditions necessaryfornorm-transforming however, theyplunged ahead with a strategythat has achieved so fewofits initial goals that Taylor (1982: 327) has described it as a 'fiasco' and 'a resoundingfailurethat had much to do with draggingother,more sensibleNIEO proposals down'. Why thiswas so has no simple or uncontroversialanswer. While both sides generally agree that the negotiationshave fallen farshortof expectations, theyagree on littleelse except that while externalfactorssuch as failureshould be attributedto theotherside. Nevertheless, an unusual degree ofuncertainty had some influenceon what transpired,theywere not as importantas anotherset offactorsthatdirectlyaffectedthebargaining process.These factorsinclude the dynamics of Southern politics and Group of 77 'decision-making', both of which informand constitutethe South's bargaining strategy.I have discussed restatethemhere because thesefactors elsewhereat length (Rothstein, 1979) and briefly the question of whether the Group of 77 could have done better with an alternative which will be discussedlater,can be answered only by reference to theabilityof strategy, that new strategyto deal with the obstacles discussed below. of The bargaining strategythateach side adopted greatlycontributedto thedifficulty the negotiatingprocess. The Group of 77's demands fora fundamentalrestructuring of the world economy, among several other problems, did not emphasize mutual benefits (except in the long-term). Since such vast and untried changes were bound to be of resisted,not only because of the pull of the familiarbut also because of the difficulties assimilating new procedures, accepting unknown outcomes, and coordinating expectationsaround new focal points,fora reasonable hope ofsuccess the Group of 77 should have developed a careful preparatory strategythat suggested some means of dealing with resistanceby the developed countriesand with the inevitable strainson coalition unity that would emerge during the negotiating process. (See Young [1982] for an interesting discussion of regime transformation.) assertingits The Group of 77 did not have any such strategy,apart fromforcefully demands, alluding with diminishingcredibilityto the OPEC 'threat', and waiting until somehow the developed countries capitulated. By failing to develop a strategy of persuasion, the Group of 77 also dissipated the power that it did have, in part by encouraging the developed countries,who grew increasinglydoubtful that moderate goals could be successfully pursued, to follow a negative, damage-limitation strategy
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that sought to delay action rather than to achieve positive goals.8 Little genuine bargaining (exchanging concessions, probing each side's position, learning about the other side's interests)took place since the developed countriesfearedconcessionswould generate even more radical demands and since the Group of 77 was never very clear about whetherit was committed to radical reform or intenton using such demands as leverage to extract a greater share fromthe existingdistributivegame. A second factor responsible for creating a difficultnegotiating process was the decision apparently made by the Secretary-General afterconsultation with a small number of advisers and diplomats from key Third World countries to treat the negotiationsas iftheywere primarilypolitical encountersand as ifonly the absence ofa mystical'political will' in the developed countriesprevented immediate acceptance of Third World proposals. This decision had some crucial consequences: oversimplificaa loss of tion, an inflationof expectations about likelygains, dissensionwithinthe staff, credibilitywith the developed countries,and a loss of credibilitywith the Group of 77 since otheranalyses indicated thedoubtfulnature ofsome ofUNCTAD'sjudgments and promises.Technical and economic issues were too importantto ignore,but the Group of 77's leadership feared that careful analysis would threaten group unity.9There were both positive-sumand zero-sumelementsin thesenegotiations,but excessive politicization insured that the latter would dominate. In short, the bargaining strategychosen and the politicization of the debate guaranteed a clash of broad principles and a de-emphasis on the need to develop consensual knowledge as a foundation for the 10 negotiations. If the original decisions were mistakes,why were theynot changed when it became clear that the prospects for a new regime had been overestimated?To an important degree, the ensuing rigidityin the bargaining strategyand hence in the negotiating process can be attributedto the caucusing systemby which national objectives of over 150 statesare amalgamated into a fewbroad group positionsthatprovided thestructure and dominated the process of most of the IPC negotiations. Since agreement can be achieved only at a broad level of generality,an exceedingly complex and ambitious package proposal usually emergesfromthe deliberationsof the Group of 77. The operating principlein the quest foragreementis, as PresidentNyerere once noted, that successfulpackages must provide 'equal benefitsforall participating Third World countriesin each package ofcooperation' (Rothstein, 1981: 22). Since this is virtuallyimpossible,given the range ofdivergentinterests that must be satisfied, each agreementis also usually burdened with promisesof side paymentsor compensation to potential losers,none ofwhich can be accurately calculated. In addition, since consensus can be blocked by any countryor sub-group,each set ofdemands is simplyadded on to the others and not genuinely compromised. When the discussion moves from grand statements of principles to the specifics of who gets what, the package is always to come apart. It is in factalways easier,given thevalue attached to unity,to threatening stand fastat the level ofprinciple.As a result,inter-group bargaining can easily become an exercise in the exchange of rhetoric, usually compromised by an agreement to disagree or by deliberate ambiguitythatallows each side to claim 'victory'and thegame to go on. There are three points about the group systemthat are especially importantin the present context. First, the political nature of the Group of 77 tends to mean that the group asks questions of the experts that theycannot answer forexample, to produce all the acceptable technical proposals that also provide gains to all membersor to satisfy divergent goals that the members seek through commodities. But economists cannot
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resolve political dilemmas and theytend to respond by providinganswers that sacrifice broad coverage of the issue for validity (even if the latter must rest on doubtful assumptions about the real world). Thus, even if the experts could agree among themselves,the new knowledge would probably be too narrow and conventional (in assumptions) to deal with thereal problemsofthe commodityorder. Second, theneed to keep the coalition togetherby promisinggains to all virtuallyguarantees the need fora ambitious ventureinto norm-transforming bold and extremely regime-creation. It is one stocks as a reason why the Common Fund came to dominate the negotiations: buffer means of stabilization were the crucial technical issue, but the Common Fund, have essentiallya financingmechanism for stocks,was the only institutionthat might developed the power and the resourcesto meet demands thatwent beyond stabilization. In effect, of the bargaining game tended to determineor heavily condition the structure the kinds of goals that could be pursued. Third, the negotiating process settingthe agenda, formingproposals, determiningstrategyand tactics is dominated by a small This gives oligarchy of delegates and staff members of a few internationalinstitutions. and theirleadership enormous power, as theyplay key roles in both technical the staff as presently constituted, makes itvery and political decisions. In short,thegroup system, approach to regime-creation,and thereby difficultto devise a moderate, reformist impedes successfulresolutionof the negotiations. on the IPC negotiations.Many virtues The absence ofa mediator also had some effect have been attributedto mediatorsin the bargaining literature, includingsuggesting new alternatives, emphasizing norms of fairness and equity, and providing face-saving to mechanisms by suggestingcompromisesthat eitheror both sides would finddifficult offer on theirown (Rubin and Brown, 1975: 60-61). In the IPC case, a mediator could also have sought to reduce developed country fears that any concession would only with generate a new set ofdemands, perhaps by advocating a period ofexperimentation existingproposals beforenew demands could be discussed. Finally, a mediator could be perceived as the participant with a stake in promoting agreement itself and with protectingthe negotiatingprocess as a means of reaching agreement. The most obvious candidate to fillthe role was the Secretary-Generalof UNCTAD, but by becoming the prisoner of, and leading spokesman for, one coalition, the as an impartial mediator. The mediator Secretary-Generalvirtuallydisqualifieshimself need not be completelyimpartial since agreement mightbe facilitatedifhe has strong ties to the party with greater control over the outcome or if he is close to the more obstinate party or the party that must make the larger concessions (Pruitt, 1981: 136-147). The keypoint,however,is that themediator musthave some power over both parties; in the IPC case, Secretary-General Corea lacked power with bothsides, especially the developed states where he lacked credibility. It might well be asked how a process that confrontsso many obstacles and has produced such meager results has kept going. Part of the answer reflects two interconnectedfactors:the momentum of the negotiatingschedule, which was largely controlledby theGroup of77, and the beliefoftheconservativedeveloped countriesthat it was betterto participate (and practice damage-limitation) than not to participate and earn thefullopprobriumforfailureofthe negotiations.For example, therewas a kind of in-house dogma at this time within the US State Department that it was unwise or impolitic to refuse to attend international meetings, even if one disagreed with the purpose of the meeting. One might also note that as economic conditions deteriorated and as it became even clearer that the developed countrieswere not going to concede much, the negotiatingprocess became increasinglydominated by traditionalprinciples
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(trade liberalization, compensatory finance rather than price stabilization) and traditional practices (incrementalism), so that a flawed attempt at regime-creation, sometimesnorm-transforming, gradually became a convensometimesnorm-governed, tional exercise in diminishingdemands and minimal responses. Analysis ofRegime Contribution Does regime analysis itself make a significantcontribution to understanding these events? The quick answer would be no, since it is apparent that the events can be described and analyzed without any referenceto regimes.But thismay be too hasty or place, one must rememberthat the IPC was never a superficiala judgment. In the first 'pure' case of regime-creation.Very traditional calculations of power and interestand ofthe viabilityofthe existingregimeand the nature ofthe interpretations verydifferent prospective regime were mixed togetherwithin a very complex and rapidly changing context of decision. As a result,it should hardly be surprisingthat regime analysis by and that it was frequentlysuperseded by, or joined togetherwith, itselfis insufficient and approaches. other interpretations In the second place, and perhaps most critically,it should be noted that traditional were equally deficient.The keypoint is that both sides approaches, taken by themselves, recognized that theywere bargaining about more than the termsof the issues and that and tactics-although obviouslyan thisawareness had a conscious influenceon strategy on particular issues,states,and time periods. greatlyin its effect influencethat differed Both sides recognized that more was at stake than the division of benefitsfrom an activity;also at stake were fundamental questions about which norms and principles were to dominate and which rules of the game were to be operated by which group of states.As long as such questions were raised (along with directdistributionalquestions), a form of analysis that at least raised the same kind of questions implicit in regime analysis was essentiallyenjoined by the events themselves. One response to this might be that other approaches could also raise the same othershave viewed a part questions,but thefactremainsthatfewhave done so. In effect, as the whole, a deficiencythat is apparent not only in realist approaches that cannot supported proposals fromwhich they explain why some developing countriesfervently were unlikelyto benefitor indeed why a coalition ofthe weak would even launch such a challenge, but also in many studies that have seen 'simple' political challenges or flawed economic challenges as the sole basis ofthe conflict.In cases where normsand principles are at stake and in which the central question is Haas' (1980) 'why cooperate', regime analysisat least triesto focusattentionon theneed to understandhow power and interest is under great strainand when are interpretedwhen the existingnormativeframework new developments (the growing role of the developing countries,continued erosion of etc.) seem to require a cooperative the boundary between domestic and foreignaffairs, means ofadapting old normsand search fornew normsand principlesor more effective principles. The refocusingof attention and the provision of some degree of 'plausible order'-those familiaraspects of 'pre-theory' may not be heroic virtues,but it would be a mistake to dismiss them as irrelevant. This defenseof the analytical virtuesofthe regimeapproach should be taken forwhat it is: a clearlyqualified endorsementofan additional weapon forthe analystin seekingto understand some of the complexitiesof an interdependentworld. To do more, regime analysis requires much more work on some of its conceptual weaknesses. For example, regimeanalysis,like mostotherapproaches to world politics,lacks a persuasive theoryof change, which tends to make it more useful in explaining why and how a particular
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regime is maintained than in explaining except in a very general sense why new since the latterusually occur regimesemerge or old ones collapse. This is not surprising, in confused situations when the new and the old are mixed together and when uncertaintyis high. As in the NIEO case, these comments also implicitlysuggest the need fora much more detailed specificationofthevariables employed,somethingwhich may emerge as more comparative researchis done. Also, regimeanalysisfailsto provide many usefulinsightsabout the relationship between regimes and exogenous events, a crucial failure in cases of regime-creation by the weak when the process may be overwhelmed by events that have littledirectlyto do with it. Finally, as we shall see, more concern with how to move frominitial conditionstoward desired goals would also be useful.More work on regimesotherthan BrettonWoods mightbegin to fillin some of must be tempered by recognitionof the fact that most these gaps. Still, these criticisms theorizing about regimes treats them as dependent variables, the outcome of interactionsbetween traditional variables like power and interest,perceptions of the need fornew principlesand norms,and the specificsofthe contextofdecision. Inability to provide completelysatisfactory explanations of theseinteractionsis a deficiencythat regime analysis shares with other attemptsat conceptualization. Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Was a Better Strategy Available? We turnnow to the practical question ofwhetherthe Group of 77 could have achieved better results,if less than desired or needed results,by devising a different strategyof regime-creation forsinglenegotiationslike the IPC. l We shall also ask what help regime thinkingmighthave provided in this effort. A new approach to regime-creationby the Group of 77 would have required greater understanding by the Group's leadership of the context of decision and greater willingnessto actually exerciseleadership that is, to lead the group ratherthan merely the power that the was to understandcorrectly expressitsaspirations. One keynecessity Group had and did not have. Thus in commodities, it had genuine elements of countervailing power, especially in controllingaccess and investment,but it did not have the power to impose its views. In this sense, it needed a strategyof persuasion, which would have meant farmore concern forthe technical quality ofproposals so that theywere convincing to both sides, and a strategyto deal with the problems ofkeeping itsown coalition unified.The latterwas necessarysince thenegotiationswere likelyto be withinand between the ofperspectiveand interest lengthy,because therewere conflicts groups, and because prior agreement to sacrifice some short-run gains would be necessaryin order to thwartdivide-and-conquer strategiesby the developed countries. Strategic agreement was also necessary to prevent some members of the Group from privately telling developed country governmentsthat their support for the IPC was largely rhetorical(thus bolsteringdeveloped countryassumptionsthat the Group of 77 would not hold togetheror could be bought off with cosmeticconcessions) and to retain the support of members that were not likelyto benefitgreatly. Finally, the leadership (and perhaps a mediator,ifone could be found) would have needed to considermeans of avoiding encapsulation of the bargaining process,which meant that intra-groupneeds for unity took precedence over inter-groupneeds for agreement, by considering the needs and interestsof the other side from the start and not only at a negotiating conference. The practical obstacles to dealing with theseissueswere severe.But what made it even
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more difficult was the absence of a conceptual frameworkthat would have helped the leaders to understand more clearly what they were seeking to do, what factors they needed to take into account in doing it, and what kind ofstrategy seemed mostlikelyto be effective. And it is in attemptingto answer thesequestions that regimeanalysis might have been useful.In short,the Group's leadership mighthave realized that the quest for a new regime has different requirementsthan the quest for a greater share from the existingregimeand that,in lightof the difficulties ofthe task,the strategy chosen had to recognize that immediate success was highlyimprobable and that traditional calculations of power and interestwould continue to exert great force. This implied that a mixed, indirect,and long-term strategy was imperative.The new strategy would have a betterchance ofsucceeding ifother changes were made in the bargaining process itself, such as the creation ofa Third World 'OECD' (so UNCTAD could be mediator) and a new principle of representation(small group negotiationspreceded by an expertgroup that provided a map of the technical terrain). For details, see Rothstein (1984a). Most of the developed countriesresponded to the directchallenge of the Group of 77 by closingranksand defendingthe old system fromwhich theywere prime beneficiaries. Apart from perceived threats to national interests,many of the developed countries could and did insist that what the developing countries wanted was too ambitious, untried, and dangerous for a complex and uncertain world. In these circumstances, what the Group of 77 should have soughtwas a strategy that put much less emphasis on power and national interests, and more emphasis on shared interests and small agreementsthat testedwhat could be accomplished. The effect ofpower and conflicting interestscould not be overcome simply by positing one (weak) group's preferencefor new normsand principles;the latterwould emergeonly by diminishing conflicts and the apparent need to assertpower. The implication is a gradual formof regime-creation in which neitherside imposes its views, in which both sides are assured that theirinterests will be taken into account fromthe start,and in which limitationsof knowledge and understandingare not ignored. Put differently, incrementalism seemsjustifiednot only by the complexityof the issues, but also by the extent to which it avoids or diminishes grand conflicts of principle and power. It may also be a sensible response to increasing differentiation within the Third World. Unfortunately, as it has been incrementalism, practiced thus far, has serious deficiencies that need to be remedied.'2 Especially problematicforpoor countriesare itsshort-run bias and itstendencytoward policy drift and a lack of direction. Can these problems be ameliorated? Any answer must be at least partlyspeculative. Nevertheless,it is arguable that one in these circumstanceswould seek to preface the operation of potentiallyusefulreform the incrementalsystemwith a formaldecision on purpose and direction (Etzioni, 1967, for a similar suggestion domestically). The initial and fundamental decision would provide a statementofintentions and a standard by which to assessspecificdecisions at a level more precise and less rhetorical than, say, the communique at the Cancun summit. Intentions and goals would be adjusted in response to experience and the incremental systemitselfwould be encouraged to experiment with pilot projects, to weigh costs as well as benefits, to evaluate results,and to avoid prematurecommitment to anyone's grand design. Moreover, should the need arise in certain areas or should consensus emerge on particular issues, some fundamental decisions might be more rapidly implemented. This might be described as 'directed incrementalism', superficiallya contradiction in terms,but realistically an attempt to preserve some of the of incrementalismwhile diminishingits most crucial weakness.'3 This kind of strengths incrementalismdiffers fundamentallyfromthe tendencyin traditionalincrementalism
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to respond to deterioratingconditions or a loss of power by simplytaking the best that can be obtained in an ad hocfashion.Here, ratherthan an exercisein improvisation, even minor agreementsshould be informedand guided by an agreed goal. Was such an agreement in fact possible during the IPC negotiations?The answer is unclear but it can at least be said (on the basis ofinterviews)that therewere some on both sides who sought somethingvery similar during 1978-79. Particularly in the months before UNCTAD-V in Manila, there was a serious effort by a number of influential officialsand some non-governmental institutionsto end the existing stalemate by agreeing on what I have elsewhere described as a liberal system (moving toward increasing openness but with differentialrules for differentgroups of developing countries) to be approached by 'conservative' (i.e., moderate, incremental) steps (Rothstein, 1981). In effect,the developed countries were to be asked to make a commitmentto a reformprocess and to end reliance on damage-limitation policies in exchange fora commitmentby the developing countriesto accept moderate means, to and forgodemands forprior commitmentto controversialprinciplesof transformation, to recognize thatdevelopmentcannot be the only criterion ofchoice in theinternational policy process. This was, then, a deliberate effortin directed incrementalism but one that for diversereasons did not get veryfar.The keyhere is not the specificsofthisapproach but rather the awareness by some important officialson both sides that a reformprocess mightbe mutually beneficial,that one needed to move beyond traditionalincrementalismbut not to an immediate 'global compact', and that,froman analytical perspective, thinkingin terms of regime-creationled, or might lead, to different outcomes than thinkingin traditional terms. There is another illustrationof the potential ofdirectedincrementalismthat is worth noting.The ministerial-level meetingwithinUNCTAD on debt, scheduled forMarch, 1978, seemed likely to end in failure as a result of sharply conflictingprinciples and interpretations of what needed to be done. The initial papers by the UNCTAD staff were very ambitious and very controversial (especially given the limited state of knowledge about the magnitude of the problem or its effects).But the leading debtors within the Group of 77 refused to support the UNCTAD position and some of the developed countries refusedto support a completely negative response. As a result,a small and reasonably successful compromiseemerged: no real change in thecase-by-case approach but an agreementto diminishthe debt burden ofthe least developed countries and to begin more detailed studies of the problem itself.One verycriticalfactorin this case was that the group facade was breached and therewere serious negotiationsacross interests and perspectives.Obviously this group lines between countrieswith different agreementdid not resolvethedebt problem,but it did preventstalemate over conflicting in thenegotiationswere not principles,it suggestedthat new principlesofrepresentation inconceivable, and it established an initial agreement that might serve as a bridge to further to seek the kind of agreements.This small success also encouraged some officials agreement discussed in the preceding paragraphs. There are tactical implicationsthatfollowfrom ofincrementalregime-creaa strategy tion. Two are of importance in the IPC case. The first concerns the issues on which to take a stand. Bhagwati (1977) has argued that commoditieswere the wrongissue forthe ifonly because failure Group of77 to emphasize during thisperiod. This seemsincorrect, to reform the commodityorder virtuallyguarantees prolonged economic difficulties for a large number of developing countries; the increased prominence of manufacturing exportsdoes notimplythatcommoditiescan be ignored. Rather, thekeypointis thatthe
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wrong sectors within commodities were allowed to become the focus of the debate. Sectors for initial emphasis should have been chosen that least threatened prevailing ideologies and/or that had the greatest promise formutual benefits.This would have meant an emphasis on trade liberalization and compensatory finance rather than an emphasis on controversialissues like the Common Fund and 'strengthened'prices.'4 In addition, much more efforthas to be expended on producing sound and mutually commitmentto a particular program. persuasive technical analysis before The second issue concerns the bargaining tactics the Group of 77 should have adopted. Conventional bargaining theorydoes not provide many usefulinsights.One reason, of course, is that most studies tend to assume conditionsonly rarelyappropriate in the 'real' world: complete information,bilateral monopoly, ranked and stable here are primarilydirected preferences, rational behavior, etc. However, my criticisms at the practical advice the theoristshave given. For example, the theoriststend to advocate acting on expectationsofhow theotherside will respond,seekingsolutionsthat are consistentwith the other side's principlesand power position,avoiding ideological conflict,building on shared interests,refrainingfrom excessive initial demands, and 'fractionating' problems so that momentum can be built behind a series of partial agreements.However, these propositionsassume a relativelysettleduniverse in which basic values are not at stake, in which the rules of the game are settled,and in which bargaining over shares is central. While the Group of 77 was too weak and divided to completelyignoresuch prudenttactics,especially as conditionsworsened,thefactthatit was also seekingto establishnew normsand new rules means that the decision to relyon different tacticswas not necessarilyunwise or irrational even ifthe alternativechosen was itselfincorrect.)5 Bettertacticsmighthave been devised by the Group of 77 ifit had recognized that it in holding togetheron substantiveissues,that the developed would have great difficulty countrieswould not make concessions without somethingtangible in return,and that some means had to be found to develop such tangible concessions. The problem in the latter case was not only the poverty of the developing countries and the limited concessions they could afford to make, but also the fact that concentration on the were likelyto generate only losses Common Fund and demands forprice strengthening forthe developed countries.Consequently, in contrastto the 'blue sky' tacticsadopted, the Group of 77 should have sought to create or fosterlinkages within and between
issues.
Advocating deliberate issue-linkage is not very useful unless we can suggest some ofthe taskis perhaps evidentfromthefactthat means ofaccomplishment.The difficulty no such efforts were undertakenduring the IPC negotiations.Part ofthe reason was the Group of 77's fear that any movement away frominitial demands threatened unity. to were so great thatit was difficult Anotherreason was that complexityand uncertainty determinewinners on any single issue, let alone across several issues. Nevertheless,as long as we rememberthat the Group of 77 did have some assets of value, the quest for some of the uncertaintiesand by moving trade-offs could have been usefulby clarifying the debate away froma confrontation between abstract sets of principles. The analytical justification for issue-linkage is reasonably clear. In complex to trade negotiations with many issues and many actors, it may be more efficient concessions on one issue for more or less reciprocal concessions on other issues than sequentiallyto treateach issue on itsmerits.Trade-offsmay thusfacilitateagreementby adding more areas of potential compensation to the bargaining game (Froman and Cohen, 1970; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Haas, 1980). As Tollison and Willett (1979) have
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argued, thismay be mostimportantwhen the distribution on any singleissue ofbenefits is heavily skewed: one needs then to add other issues with offsetting patterns of distribution. Deliberately linking issues may also be important where there is no prominentor obvious solution, in the sense suggested by Schelling (1960), when each side has different priorities about the issues (Pruitt, 1981) or cannot agree about what is fair (which would probably undermineagreementon a salient outcome, ifone existed). All of these insights are relevant to the IPC case: the benefitswere skewed, more resourceswere necessary to compensate losers, and prioritieswere very different. Analysts have been betterat describing the obstacles that impede trade-offs than in suggestingways of overcoming them. For example, Wallace (1976) notes a variety of practical difficulties the limited attention span of decision-makers,the institutional and political conflicts that arise as issuescrossbureaucratic boundaries, thefactthat key officials get into the processtoo late to permitbringingin new issues but goes no further in his analysis. Tollison and Willett (1979) can only suggest that issue-linkageis more likelywhen the issues are clearly understood,with costs and benefits known,and do not generate bureaucratic conflicts. They also note the obvious fact that it is more difficult and more costlyto arrange trade-offs when the negotiationsinvolve many parties. But thisis not veryhelpfulfordealing with complex, multi-party negotiationsin a difficult environment. These obstacles are importantbut theyare not necessarilyimmovable. For example, the creation of an expert group to provide a map of the technical terrainbeforeactual negotiationsbegin could diminishsome ofthe uncertainties, thusfacilitating calculation of the trade-offs. Reforms of the bargaining process to encourage small-group negotiationsand earlier entrance into the negotiationsby key officials are also possible (Rothstein, 1979, 1984a); thismightpermitadditional issues to be added to the mix and it might prevent confrontations over grand principles. A Third World 'OECD' might also help in devising acceptable trade-offs. One problem with much of the literature on trade-offs is that it tends to ignore ambiguities about whetherto seek trade-offs withinone large issue (such as commodities), or between different issues, or between short-run or long-runcompensation. It is probably impossible to devise hard-and-fast rules about theseissuessince much depends on situational factorsthat are not predictable. Nevertheless,the IPC experience does suggesta fewveryrough rulesofthumb. Given thedeveloped countries'commitmentto a damage-limitation strategyand given their short-runpolitical and economic probshould probably concentrateon exchanges in thesame timeframe lems,initial trade-offs and withinthesame issue,so thatcalculations are relativelyeasier. The latteralso avoids the problems that arise from activating different bureaucracies and interestgroups. Over time,as (or if) both sides begin to value the process and to search for joint gains as well as distributionalgains, the search fortrade-offs could be broadened, crossingissues (concessions on commodities for concessions on debt, etc.) and time (concessions on in the IPC, say, forpotential long-termbenefitsfromgrowth). resource transfers The mostimportantaspect of thisdiscussionof trade-offs is not the question of tactics perse, but ratherthe need forboth sides to recognize the need for,and the value of,such an effort in the process of regime-creation.The need is particularly imperative for a coalition of the weak, since it will not achieve its goal a more favorable regime without protracted,complex, and competitivenegotiations.Trade-offsand linkages are not a panacea, but theyare likelyto be a necessaryelement to keep thegame going, not only by encouraging participation by the developed countries, but also by diminishing conflictswithin the coalition of the weak.'6
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Conclusions The leadership of the Group of 77 in 1974-75 graspedan apparentopportunity to restructure theinternational economic orderand launcheda frontal assaulton theold order. The result was a dismalfailure. The argument herehas beenthata morerealistic and weaknesses appraisaloftheGroup'sstrengths have led to a different might strategy thatmight haveproduced moresatisfactory The questfor a newregime results. was not itself inappropriate sincetheexisting commodity was malfunctioning regime and since thedeveloping countries wereunlikely to be able to improve their economic prospects and international reform. Butthey bothdomestic werefartooweak without commodity to imposetheir viewsagainstdetermined opposition, theyhad no long-term strategy appropriate fora protracted negotiating process, theydid not use theassetstheydid haveas a meansofinducing from thedeveloped and they cooperation countries, ignored theneedfor technical as a basisfor a stableregime. mutually persuasive analyses More ofwhatis impliedby a questfora regime, as distinct awareness from 'normal'politics, would not have producedthe regimethatthe Group of 77 desired, but it is at least arguablethatit wouldhave producedmorethanwhatwas achieved. This argumentis obviouslynot meant to imply that regimeanalysisby itself
or that it is guarantees betteroutcomes, since otherfactorswere also clearly significant, able to provide the policymakerwith direct answers to the practical problems that he confronts.But some of the indirect benefits of 'enlightenment' could have been important.Policymakerson both sides were confusedand uncertainin the face ofgreat complexity, rapid and almost disorientingchange, and declining confidence in the abilityofconventionaldoctrinesto produce conventional outcomes. The propensitiesto to insistthat littleof substance had actually changed, and to concentrate oversimplify, primarilyon short-runcoping strategieswere very strong.Now, it would be foolishto pretend that regime analysis could somehow cut through the confusion and point toward a clear path to agreement. Nevertheless, used with a proper sense of its it could have provided a useful ifstillpartial-frame ofreference, limitations, not only by implicitlyraising a set of questions not asked by traditional analysis, but also by suggestinga linkbetween theexistingsituationand desiredgoals and directions.Some of the new questions would have concerned issues such as the relationship between desirable and possible normsin a new commodityregimebut others,equally important, would have concerned how a coalition of the weak could most effectively employ its assets not a question of great concern in traditional analysis. In addition, by considering the requisites for a new regime, policy-makersmight have been led to understandthat,ifregimeanalysis was necessarybut not sufficient, thenacceptance ofa hybrid strategyof regime-creationwas imperative. In the argument here, the result would have been a strategy ofdirectedincrementalism, but the more importantpoint is awareness of the need fora strategythat takes account of both traditional constraints and growing need fora reformedregime in commodities and elsewhere. In short,while the elements of strengthpossessed by the Group of 77 were hardly overwhelming (some unity, some influence over the agenda, some control over resources,some sense on both sides of a growing role in systemicprosperity,etc.), a different at least part ofwhich owes its originsto regime-thinking, strategy, mighthave benefits and somewhat betterpositioningforgreaterchange produced greatershort-run in the future.I cannot see why such gains, limited as they are, should be dismissed as eithermorally or practically irrelevant,especially if one considers the alternatives. Conclusive proofofthe two unique propositionsin thisanalysisis impossible,since the
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of theWeak bya Coalition Regime-Creation
and much of the burden must reston argumentsthat available evidence is fragmentary are to some degree speculative. Nevertheless,one hopes that it is at least relativelymore plausible that a coalition of the weak can have some influence over non-hegemonic regime-creation, if that coalition maintains sufficientunity and if it follows an appropriate bargaining strategy,and that such hybrid formsof regime-creationmay in thedecade ahead. 17 become one ofthefewfeasibleapproaches to internationalreform In addition, one hopes that it is also somewhat more plausible that regimeanalysis and can make a practical, and gradually perhaps a conceptual, contributionto the thinking ofsuch regimes.Progressin thissense may be more likelyif development and functioning the analysis of regimes begins to move beyond very broad or abstract discussions of ofthe causal variables with to link particular configurations causal variables to an effort appropriate bargaining strategies that is, fromwhy regimesemerge to how. Notes
1. One shouldnotassumethatthestalemate was a short-run lossfor bothsides.Once theNorth determined thatit could notachieveitsgoals,and thusadopteda damage-limitation strategy, itsought a stalemate. 2. Forexample, intheCommon Fundnegotiations, thedeveloped states a division ofvoting permitted power on important issuesthatgive thedeveloping statesan apparentadvantage(49% to 42%), but defined fears abouttheprecedent setby 'important' suchthattheadvantageislargely illusory. Nevertheless, being in somedevelopedstates. muchcontroversy the49-42 splitgenerated in three this thatitis useful 3. One ofthereferees article to think ofregime for suggests analysis ways.Briefly, as attributes ofaction;(b) these are toconsider (a) regimes ofworldpolitics reflecting important patterns in worldpolitics; ofworldorder whichprovides and (c) regimes as a rhetoric howregimes affect outcomes notregime-maintenance or with someguidance for policy-makers. SinceI am concerned regime-creation, ifone It shouldbe clear,however, I shalldiscuss thethird regime effects, primarily category. especially inconstructing thattake interest thatsmalland weakstates havea strong examines theliterature, regimes ofagreednorms and rules. their interests intoaccountand thatat leasttemper powervia theoperation Considerthe movement of the world tradingsystem away fromregimerules and towardimposed etc. In effect, weak statesare likelyto takeforgrantedthatregimes are 'voluntary exportrestraints', important and can have important effects. thatarelikely to be protracted 4. One might also suggest another weakness here.This is thatin negotiations as 'supplemen(and subsequently forquestions ofregime maintenance) someofthevariablesdescribed as themajor consensual couldbecomeas important tary'(Krasner, 1982:197-198),especially knowledge, in the IPC case was causal variables.We shallnotdiscuss consensual knowledge herebecauseitseffect in merely to confirm or reaffirm policy decisions takenon other grounds (Rothstein, 1984b).Butitseffect ifeither thatitmust notcompel, theother side other casescould be greater, especially sidefeels persuade, to act. See also theimportant workofHaas (1980, 1982) on thisissue. thereappearsat least threeemphasesthatdiffer from muchofthecurrent 5. In thefollowing discussion thatthere for theweakto exert regime literature: (a) I am suggesting maybe opportunities considerable ofsome regimes; influence on the creation (b) I argue thatregimethinking may have some practical impactbysuggesting toofficials and others howtothink aboutthechoices they have;and (c) I focus on the And that seemmost for at leastoneconfiguration ofthecausalvariables. bargaining strategies appropriate ifwe had the space to do so, we could add a fourth an emphasis on some supplementary difference: in certain variablesthatcould becomemoreimportant forms ofregime-creation. 6. Jacobsonetal. (1983) providesome evidenceof differences withinthe Group of 77. They argue that in nationalcapitals,and delegates positions on the NIEO weredetermined wereactingas 'instructed agents'. Thisconclusion overlooks whattheinstructions were.Ifmany delegates weretoldmerely tofollow the group line, thenthe role of national capitalswas clearlymorelimitedthan the authorsimply. insomehomegovernments this ofthe'overload'on Technicaldeficiencies support view,as doesawareness the resources ofpoor governments. Rothstein additionalsupport forthisview. (1981: 24-27) discusses within national theGroupof77 reflected Jacobsonetal. (1983) also arguethatdisagreements conflicting interests, not the 'procedures of international institutions'. While thismay be trueforthe NIEO I doubtthatmanyLDCs really knewwhattheir wereon manyoftheissues it is not although interests and overa prolonged thatwenton elsewhere trueformanyofthedetailednegotiations period.In the and procedural issueswerefrequently an important factor. latter cases,institutional
ROBERT
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7. For different criticismsof regime analysis, see Strange (1982). 8. There were some clear distinctions between differentUS administrations. For example, the Carter Administration was much more sympathetic to Third World demands and much less opposed on ideological grounds to the Common Fund and commodity agreements. However, there was much continuityacross administrationson the key technical issues: the power and resources ofthe Fund and the number of bufferstocks. 9. This happened late in the negotiations when the African countries finallydiscovered how littletheywere likelyto gain fromthe IPC and demanded compensation in the formofa 'second window' ofthe Common Fund to finance measures other than price stabilization. 10. In familiarterminology, the strategyinsured a 'hard' versus 'soft'confrontation.For the terms,see Walton and McKersie (1965: 6-7). 11. Some Third World analysts have resisted the notion that a new strategyis necessary, arguing both sides would benefitfromcurrent demands. But this is clearly doubtful in some cases and stronglydisputed in many developed countries. Conversely, some developed country analysts insist that the quest for a new in exchange forconcessions. This is strategyis illusory,since the developing countries have nothingto offer clearly wrong in commodities, where both short-runand long-run interestsare at stake forthe developed countries. For details on these arguments, see Rothstein (1984a). 12. An early but still useful criticism of incrementalism is Dror (1964). I shall deal only with the main criticisms,but it is also useful to note that another criticism that the weak are frequentlyleftout of the bargaining game in incremental systems is less forceful here because of the ability of the Group of 77 to influence the international agenda and international institutionsand perhaps because of the growing perception of the importance of the developing countries in the world economy. 13. Haas (1976) uses the phrase 'managed incrementalism' in somewhat the sense implied here, but without discussion ofthe need fora prior agreement on direction. In addition, I prefermy termbecause ofitsfocus on common ends rather than improved management which mightnot have any particular end in view. 14. Trade liberalization and compensatory finance might have produced more benefitsfor the developing states than more controversialissues a point that was deliberately obscured by the UNCTAD leadership in order to maintain support forthe Fund. On the benefitsissue, see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981: 23-46). 15. Another approach to bargaining by Winham (1977) perceives negotiations as a process of managing interdependence and reducing uncertainty. This is not useful here because Winham ignores issues of power and politics (perhaps because of his focus on GATT, which is considered competent and unbiased, and where real interestsare at stake and negotiations are bilateral, etc.) and because the Group of 77 sought to maintain, not reduce, uncertainty.Zartman's (1975) notion of a prior need foragreement on a 'formula' also is not helpful here, since it merely shiftsthe problem back one level to the issue of how to arrive at an agreement about a formula,since a formula between sharply divided parties would probably be too vague to be useful, and since uncertainty and the absence of consensual knowledge would undermine the quest for a formula. One needs also to ask whether bargaining about the principles and norms ofa regime is different frombargaining about the distributionofbenefitsor losses within an existing in the two whether the means of gettinga formula and the purpose that it serves differs regime in effect, cases. 16. I might also note a third tactical issue, the role of informationand consensual knowledge (Haas, 1982; Keohane, 1982). For a discussion of the Group of 77's fears of risk to unity from new knowledge or information,see Rothstein (1984b). 17. I do not mean to assertthat these will be the only formsofregime-creation;rather,the point is thatformsof regime-creationthat require the active cooperation of most developing countries and that must go on in conditions ofuncertainty,complexity,and dispersed power could become importantin a number ofareas. It is also possible to imagine increased fragmentationand disunity in the Third World, suggesting the re-emergence of the 'inner circle' model, despite its limitations.
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Regime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated Program for Commodities Author(s):

International StudiesQuarterly (1984) 28, 307-328

Regime-Creation bya Coalition of theWeak

bya Coalition oftheWeak Regime-Creation

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Regime-Creation bya Coalition oftheWeak

Regime-Creation bya Coalition oftheWeak

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Regime-Creation bya Coalition of theWeak

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