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R v White (1910)

R v Benge (1865)

"but for" test

The action of third party

R v Pagett R v Michael [1840]

Factual Causation

The actions of victim

R v Swidall & Osborne [1846]

R v Dhaliwal [2006] Escapes cases It must be "substantial" cause but not deminis principle.

R v Williams
R v Roberts

Causation

Legal Causation

The accused take his victim as he find him- The Egg-shell skull Rule.

R v Blaue R v Jodan [1956]

Medical Treatment cases Neglect by victim

R v Smith [1959]

R v Cheshire
R v Holland

Naturally occuring events

Definition: Causation: The relationship between an act and the consequences it produces. Factual Causation: it must be shown that, 'but for' the defendant's act, the event would not be occurred The act must be a causa sine qua non ("cause without which") of the event, a test sometimes known as the "but for" test. Legal Causation: the defendant's act must be an operative and substantial cause of the consequence. His act may not be the sole cause, but must take significant and not trivial (de mininis non curat lex) contribution to the result. "but for" test: damage has resulted from a multiplicity of causes. de minis principle: Latin- de minis non curat lex; Translate- The law does not concert itself with trifles. novus actus interveniens ( nova causa interveniens): An act or event that breaks the causal connection between a wrong or crime committed by the defendant and subsequent happenings and therefore relieves the defendant from responsibility for these happenings. Cases Summary: The action of third party o R v Benge D, the foreman of a track laying crew, misread the railway timetable so that track was up at a time when a train was due. A signalman with a flag was placed 540 yards away instead of the specified 1,000 yards. Further the engine driver was not keeping a proper look out and several deaths resulted from the ensuing accident. o R v Pagett The accused whilst trying to escape from the police came out, holding a pregnant victim as his shield. The accused shot at the police and the police spontaneously shot back at the accused without taking aim and killed the victim. It was held that the accused should be held liable for the death of the victim. o R v Michael It was held in this case, that if the third party's action or intervention was a voluntary act (meaning the action of the third party can be said to be free, deliberate and informed) then this will break the chain of causation. The action of victim o R v Swindall & Osborne The accused ran over and killed an old man, Pollock CB directed by jury that it was immaterial that the man was deaf or drunk or negligent and contributed to his own death. o R v Dhaliwal The Court of Appeal, following the case of Chan Fook [1994], held that the ambit of 'bodily harm' was restricted to recognised psychiatric illness although it was stated per curiam that unlawful violence on an individual with a fragile and

vulnerable personality which is proved to be a material cause of death, even if the result (death) is suicide is arguably capable of amounting to manslaughter.

Escape Cases R v Blaue [1975] 3 All ER 446 Court of Appeal The victim was a Jehovahs Witness. Blaue stabbed her in a street attack, piercing her lung. At hospital, she refused a life-saving blood transfusion because of her religious belief. Consequently, she was death. Lawton LJ: Robert Konrad Blaue, the appellant was acquitted of the murder of a girl named Jacolyn Woodhead but was convicted of her manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility (count 1). He was also convicted of wounding this girl with intent to do her grievous bodily harm (count 2) and of indecently assaulting her (count 3). He pleaded guilty to indecently assaulting two other women (count 4 and 5). In the final speech of jury, counsel for the crown accepted that the girls refusal to have a blood transfusion was cause of her death. It does not lie in the mouth of the assailant to say that his victims religious beliefs which inhibited him from accepting certain kinds of treatment were unreasonable. The question for decision is what caused her death. The answer is the stab wound. The fact that the victim refused to stop this end coming about did not break the causal connection between the act and death. In the case the judge would have been entitled to have told the jury that the appellants stab wound was an operative cause of death. Appeal dismissed. R v Roberts [1971] 56 Cr App R 95 Court of Appeal A young girl who was a passenger in the appellants car injured herself by jumping out of the car while it was in motion. She ran, shouting for help, to a house and was seen to be in a very distressed condition. Her explanation was that she had been assaulted and threatened by the appellant. Stephenson LJ: This appellant, Kenneth Joseph Roberts, was convicted on June 23, 1971 of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm and he was fined 50 by the chairman. The jury had to consider: was the appellant guilty of an assault occasioning her actual bodily harm? Of course, for that to be established, it had to be established that he was responsible in law and in fact for her injuries caused by leaving in a hurry the moving car and it is the chairmans direction with regard to the law on the second count which leads to this appeal. The judge directed the jury that, if they felt sure that they ought to accept the evidence of the girl on what induced her to

jump out the car, they should convict of assault occasioning bodily harm. The court finds no misdirection in the summing-up and nothing in the grounds of complaint made on behalf of the appellant and this appeal against conviction must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. R v Williams and Davis [1992] 95 Cr App R1 Court of Appeal John Shephard was hitch hiker who was picked up in a car driven by Williams. Davis and the co-accused Bobat were passengers. After travelling about 5 miles, John Shephard jumped from the car while the car travelling at about 30mph. he sustained head injuries from which he died. The appellants were convicted of manslaughter (count 1) and robbery (count 2). Stuart-Smith LJ: The deceased, John Shephard smoked cannabis quite often but it would not have caused him to act in an irrational manner which is proved by psychiatric. The deceased had given 5 after rejecting an offer of 2 and some cannabis. The appellant David tried to take money from deceaseds wallet but there had been no prior agreement to rob. Bobat was the front seat-passengers. He too denied being involved in any plan or attempt to rob the deceased and blamed Davis. Siraz Ahmed Bobat was acquitted on both counts. Williams Appeal: The first ground of appeal on behalf of Williams is that the evidence against Williams and specifically the evidence of joint enterprise were so tenuous that the judge should have upheld the submission that was no case to go to jury. Second, which is convenient to consider first, is that the verdict of guilty against Williams is inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty against Bobat. It is difficult to see how Williamss request for 5 for petrol could amount to robbery. The only threat that accompanied this was that if Shephard did not want to pay he could get out of the car. Williams said that interview that it was after Shephard had handed over 5, whether or not assisted by Davis that Davis had attempted to grab the rest of the money from the wallet. In our judgment there is nothing in Williamss interviews that points to a joint enterprise to rob between himself and Davis. The only evidence of joint enterprise to rob, namely such inference as could be drawn from the deceased voluntarily jumping from the car, coupled with the behavior of the three men and the car afterwards, which the judge commented might be explicable by panic, bore against all three defendents.

The robbery conviction against Williams must be quashed. Since the manslaughter count was dependent on the robbery as constituting the unlawful act, the conviction also must be quashed. Daviss Appeal: There is no evidence as to the nature of the threat. Davis conceded that the victim was frightened, but he attributed this fear to Williamss behavior. It may be possible to infer that it was a threat of force from Davis from the fact that the deceased jumped from the car rather than hand over the money. Daviss conviction on count 2 must be quashed.

Appeals allowed. Convictions quashed. The Egg-shell skull Rule o Refer to cases of 'escapes cases'. Medical treatment cases R v Jordan [1956] J, coloured American airman, was convicted at Leeds Assizes of the murder of B, by stabbing him in the abdomen. The evidence at the trial was that the cause of death was that pneumonia followed the stab wound. However, it was submitted that the cause of death was not consequent on the stab wound inflicted, but was a result of Bs treatment in hospital. On appeal against conviction to the court of criminal appeal, it was contended on behalf of J, that the medical evidence at the trial was wrongly interpreted as meaning that the pneumonia was the natural consequence of the stab wound. Held: In the present case, this court had heard 2 doctors give evidence that, in their opinion, the death was not caused by the stab wound but was caused by an antibiotic wrongly administered and by the wrongful introduction of large quantities of liquid intravenously. Allowing the appeal, that it was only in the most exceptional cases that the court would hear additional evidence. R v Smith [1959] On 13 April1958, just before 10pm, a fight took place at a barracks which was then being shared by a company of the K. regiment and a company of the G. regiment and 3 men of the G. regiment were stabbed with a bayonet. C, one of the wounded men had been stabbed in the back and although this was not known at the time his lung was pierced. While he was being carried by another soldier to the medical reception station, he was dropped twice. When he was eventually brought into the reception station, about an hour after he was stabbed, the seriousness of his condition was not at first realized. There was

no time for a careful medical examination as the medical officer were dealing with a number of other cases and the treatment which C, received was, in light of subsequent knowledge, inappropriate and harmful. He died about 2 hours after being stabbed. Appeal against conviction by general court-martial The appellant, Thomas Joseph Smith was convicted by a general court-martial. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. He appealed against his conviction, the main grounds of appeal being (a) that confession alleged to have been made by him were wrongly admitted as evidence at the trial and (b) that the summing-up by the judge-advocate on the question of causation was defective. Lord Parker, C.J The court thinks that the principle to be deduced from the case is really this: If the threat or promise under which the first statement was made still persists when the second statement is made, the second statement is inadmissible. Only if the time limit between the two statements, the circumstances existing at the time and the caution are such that it can be said that the original threat or inducement has been dissipated can the second statement be admitted as a voluntary statement In the present case, the judge-advocate never had to rule on the confession on the second confession. As he had admitted the first confession, there was no question but that confession on the second occasion must also be admissible. Accordingly, he never had to rule on the question of admissibility. He never had to exercise any discretion in the matter and there was no occasion for his leaving it the court to determine the value or weight to be attached to the second confession. The court, however, is of the clear opinion that the second confessions were admissible. No doubt, the opening reference to what appellant was said to have said to be regimental sergeant-major put the appellant in a difficulty. The effect of any original inducement or threat under which the first confession was made had been dissipated. On those grounds this court has come to conclusion that the oral and written statements made to Sergeant Ellis were clearly admissible. The medical officer, Captain Millward and his orderly were trying to cope with number of other cases. 2 serious stabbings and some minor injuries and it is clear that they did not appreciate the seriousness of the deceased mans condition or exactly what had happened. There were no facilities whatsoever for blood transfusion, which would have been the best possible treatment, he might not have died. Indeed, if it had facilities for blood transfusion and been administered, Dr Campus said that his chances of recovery were as high as seventy-five percent.

If at time of death the original wound is still an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also operating. One conclusion: A man is stabbed in the back, his lung is pierced and haemorrhage results; two hours later he dies of haemorrhage form the wound; in the interval there is no time for a careful examination and the treatment given turns out in the light of subsequent knowledge to have been inappropriate and indeed, harmful. In our view possibly come to any other conclusion than the death resulted from the original wound. Accordingly, the court dismisses the appeal. Appeal dismissed. R v Cheshire [1991] On December 10, 1987 during a disturbance C shot J, the deceased, at close range with a handgun. 2 bullets entered his thigh and stomach. J was taken to hospital where he was given blood transfusions and was in intensive care. Respiratory problems developed and he had a tracheotomy. A further abdominal operation was necessary and chest infection and discharges from the abdominal wound occurred. He required treatment for lung congestion and difficulty with breathing which was diagnosed as partly due to anxiety state. On February 15, 1988 J died. The cause of death was given as cardio-respiratory arrest due to gunshot wounds to abdomen and leg. At the trial a defense medical witness said that by February 8, 1988 the wounds to thigh and abdomen no longer threatened Js life and his chances of survival were good. The cause of death was failure to recognize the reason for a sudden onset of breathless after February 8 and the severe respiratory obstruction and the failure to treat properly a complication known as stridor on the day before his death: medical negligence had therefore cause Js death. The judge directed the jury that for the chain of causation between the shooting and the death to be broken, there must be gross negligence or recklessness on the part of the doctors; mere negligence or carelessness was not sufficient. C appealed against conviction for murder, submitting, (inter alia) that this was misdirection. Appeal dismissed.

Neglect by victim o R v Holland Victim ignored medical advice and eventually died. The court attributed the cause of the death of the victim to defendant's initial act of cutting victim's finger. Naturally occurring events o The issues to be determined is whether the natural event was a foreseeable occurrence If the event was objectively foreseeable then, it will not avail the defendant to argue that his conduct did not cause the unlawful consequence.

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