Moving Forward?: Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri Jamie Ferris Anne Dunning, Ph.D.

Urban Planning 750 14 December 2012

ABSTRACT
The early 20th century saw great development in the midtown area of Kansas City. The 1947 Master Plan made assumptions about the allocation of public services, roads, and other amenities based on a valuation of communities as to their normality. The layout of the city *was+ perceived in terms of white districts and Negro districts (2011). The construction of the Kansas City Loop, the connecting interstates and highways surrounding downtown, cut through many neighborhoods, promoted the demolition of many buildings, and further encouraged sprawl. Kansas Citys vast urban renewal eff orts dislocated poor and primarily African-American neighborhoods and subsequently relocated them into higher concentrations in the urban core. Although Americas population is 65 percent white, 12 percent African American, 16 percent Latino, and 4. 5 percent Asian, the composition of Kansas City is 59 percent White, 30 percent Black, 10 percent Latino, and 2. 5 percent Asian in a city of nearly 500,000 (compared to 81 percent white and 6 percent black for Missouri as a state), which shows a higher concentration of minorities located in the urban areas (Census Bureau, 2010). (396) Gentrification associated with some efforts to mitigate the transportation problem, such as commuter rail, often displaces residents by increasing property values, forcing residents who have few alternative housing options to farther away from their jobs and social networksa problem that is compounded by limited transportation options (2003). Transportation policies favoring highways over transit have also helped to create spatial mismatchthe disconnect that occurs when new entry-level and low-skill jobs are located on the fringes of urban areas that are inaccessible to central-city residents who need those jobs (2003). (253) In attempt to address this problem, the federal government passed various legislation; ISTEA was the first major federal transportation policy to give any consideration to the health, economic, and social effects of transportation policy on racial minority and low-income communities (2003). (199) Because the Kansas City urban core has experienced negative effects of urban sprawl, the city has, in recent years, supported downtown revitalization efforts, hoping to minimize the effects of previous policies as well as the great sprawl prevalent in the area, by promoting the development of not only business but residential and entertainment areas an attempt to re-grow the tax base and bring residents, art, culture and tourism to the area, including the contentious streetcar transit proposal.

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri TRANSPORATION EQUITY IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI A Historical Framework

Kansas City, Missouris *henceforth Kansas City+ transportation history begins in 1821, the year Missouri entered the Union. The city was chartered as Town of Kansas in 1850, becoming Kansas City in 1889, by which time the population had grown to over 60,000 (KCMO). Growth in the city was rapid and prosperous, located along the lucrative Missouri River. In the 1880s, Kansas City built the country's third-largest cable car system, which over time was replaced by electric streetcar lines with over 64 miles of rail lines and 34 million riders yearly by 1885 (KCMO). As ridership grew, an interurban network began to appear that sought to connect more distant cities such as St. Joseph and Liberty in Missouri and Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Olathe in Kansas. By the 1920s ridership was reaching 375,000 passengers a day and the system consisted of over 319 miles of track and 740 cars (KCMO). Slowly, and with the advent of the automobile, the system integrated trolley busses into the network. Concurrently, landscape architect George Kessler's assessment of Kansas City was published in 1893 as the first park board report; it appeared at what is generally considered the beginning of the City Beautiful movement. He planned the citys renowned parks and boulevards system, resulting in some of Kansas Citys most impressive and famous neighborhoods and vistas including Hyde Park and Armour

2 Boulevard (Kessler Society of Kansas City). Much of this development revolved around the ever-more-prevalent mode of transportation in Kansas City the private automobile. On January 4, 1959 Kansas Citys last trolley bus was pulled from service. Buses had slowly replace streetcars and automobiles became a status symbol; public transportation became associated strictly with the poor, a challenge it still faces today (Kelly, 2011). It was about this time as well that racial segregation became a tangible element of Kansas City development (2011). The early 20th century saw great development in the midtown area of Kansas City. Developer J.C. Nichols, who is widely regarded as one of Americas most influential entrepreneurs in land use during the first half of the 1900s pioneered the development of sustainable, mass market residential neighborhoods built for permanence, and automobile-oriented shopping centers, (ULI) began reshaping the environment and influencing trends on a national scale. Nichols vision included creating housing in ideal neighborhoods (See Figures 2 and 3) that were characterized by residential and racial stability, comfort, and security (University of Missouri Kansas City). Nichols developed restrictive covenants to ensure the quality of his neighborhoods. While most of the covenants restricted the lands to residential uses, and contained other features such as setback and free space requirements, homes in the Country Club District were restricted with covenants and deeds that prohibited

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

African Americans and Jews from owning or occupying the homes, unless they were servants (University of MissouriKansas City). Nichols was influential on a local level, but he was also instrumental in the National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB). Nichols influence was present at just the time when public monies were being allocated for single-family housing (Kelly, 2011). He and other urban planners in Kansas City were not just perceiving or expressing an objective reality but, in a normative and strategic sense, were constructing an urban future that prescribed how and where specific racial groups should live (2011). Notably, Kansas Citys 1947 Master Plan made assumptions about the allocation of public services, roads, and other amenities based on a valuation of communities as to their normality. The layout of the city [was] perceived in terms of white districts and Negro districts (2011). Ultimately, the 1948 Supreme Court decision Shelley v. Kraemer made such covenants unenforceable, however they remained in place for many years, solidifying the designation of such neighborhoods, predominately those located east of Troost Avenue, as minority enclaves. The 1930s era Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was the first federal program to introduce, on a mass scale, the use of long-term, self amortizing mortgages with uniform payments (2011). Under this system the valuation of homes depended upon their desirability and associated value, and the ranking resulting from the racial and socioeconomic features of the community where the properties were located. There

4 were four color codes, and the color code of red, the category that highly AfricanAmerican occupied neighborhoods received, were not eligible for HOLC loans: consequently the term redlining (2011).

Racial segregation for blacks in the Kansas City area became an institutionalized phenomenon, supported by government policy, developers, real estate boards, legal codes and market dynamicsand fair housing codes were not consistently enforced. This simultaneously created a condition of written and unwritten policy that excluded blacks from residential areas and created conditions of relative housing shortages for blacks at various periods of time due to population growth and associated housing needs. While redlining and other discriminatory practices were not uncommon throughout the 1970s and beyond, patterns of residential segregation based on historical and socioeconomic factors shape the landscape of the Kansas City metropolitan area to the present (2011). The increased availability and use of automobiles, beginning in the 1930s, and federal subsidies through such instruments such as FHA (Federal Housing Administration) and VA (Veterans Administration) loans contributed to the growth of suburbs (Sanchez, Stolz, and Ma, 2003). The construction of the Kansas City Loop, the connecting interstates and highways surrounding downtown, cut through many neighborhoods, promoted the demolition of many buildings, and further encouraged sprawl. Kansas Citys vast urban renewal efforts dislocated poor and primarily AfricanAmerican neighborhoods and subsequently relocated them into higher concentrations in the urban core. Kansas City proper sprawled to 320 square miles; the bi-state metropolitan area became even vaster, extending in all directions, most densely to the

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri North and South, creating far-reaching suburbs.

The housing boom in the suburbs lead to the relocation of businesses, which sought environments of relatively unorganized labor, and therefore the ability to affirm more control over labor, and also lower occupancy costs (2011). The change of the urban economy from one based less on manufacturing and focused more service-oriented jobs exacerbated the problem of segregation (2011). First white, single-family housing, moved from urban center to the outlying suburbs, then companies and jobs followed suit. The division of jobs between Kansas Citys urban core and the metropolitan area outside the core in 1970 was approximately 58 percent and 42 percent, respectively (2011) In 1990, Kansas Citys urban core had 41 percent of the areas jobs, compared with 59 percent in the suburbs (2011). Compounding the division, black residential housing in the suburbs had obstructed for so long, suburbs were just generally seen as more available to white residents (2011). Transportation and Access Implications The ultimate objective of transportation equity is to provide equal access to social and economic opportunity by providing equitable levels of access to all places" (2003).

Although Americas population is 65 percent white, 12 percent African American, 16 percent Latino, and 4.5 percent Asian, the composition of Kansas City is 59 percent White, 30 percent Black, 10 percent Latino, and 2.5 percent Asian in a city of

6 nearly 500,000 (compared to 81 percent white and 6 percent black for Missouri as a state), which shows a higher concentration of minorities located in the urban areas (Census Bureau, 2010). Transportation policies that support highway development over public transit have numerous indirect adverse effects; such policies encourage housing development increasingly farther away from the central cities, which has played an important role in fostering residential segregation and income inequalities (2003). Additionally, the locating of major highways in minority and low-income communities has reduced the available housing in those areas (2003). Gentrification associated with some efforts to mitigate the transportation problem, such as commuter rail, often displaces residents by increasing property values, forcing residents who have few alternative housing options to farther away from their jobs and social networksa problem that is compounded by limited transportation options (2003). Transportation policies favoring highways over transit have also helped to create spatial mismatchthe disconnect that occurs when new entry-level and lowskill jobs are located on the fringes of urban areas that are inaccessible to central-city residents who need those jobs (2003). Research implies that the average distance between a residents home in the center city and prospective employment locations has been increasing over time (2003). Because public transportation systems operate most effectively in densely populated urban areas and do a poor job of serving the dispersed

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

populations of the suburbs, workers who have or could have a job requiring a reverse commute and are transit-dependent are put at a definite disadvantage (2003). In attempt to address this problem, the federal government passed various legislation; The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) was the first major federal transportation policy to give any consideration to the health, economic, and social effects of transportation policy on racial minority and low-income communities (2003). ISTEA, enacted by Congress in 1991, included clear (if easy-tocircumvent) requirements for public participation in transportation planning (2003). Passed in 1998, TEA-21 significantly strengthened the opportunities for public involvement and required greater responsiveness to the concerns of minority and lowincome communities in the transportation planning process (2003). TEA-21 also created grant programs to serve the transportation needs of minority and low-income communities. For example, it established the Job Access and Reverse Commute grant programs to provide federal monies to local governments and transit agencies, and nonprofit organizations. Job Access grants were proposed to provide new and increased transportation services to help welfare recipients and eligible low-income persons get to jobs and employment-related services (2003). Income levels generally correspond with the form of transportation they use. Most Americans rely on private automobiles to meet their transportation needs, but many minorities do not have access to a car. Only 7 percent of white households do not

8 include cars, 24 percent of African-American households, however, own no cars (2003). Relatedly, in 2003, only 3 percent of whites relied on public transportation for work-related trips, compared with 12 percent of African Americans (2003). Compounding this problem, a Surface Transportation Policy Project report in 1998 fond that those in the lowest income quintile spent 36 percent of their household budget on transportation, compared with those in the highest income quintile, who spent only 14 percent on transportation (2003). Relatedly, in 2003, only 3 percent of whites relied on public transportation for work-related trips, compared with 12 percent of African Americans (2003). For those individuals who do utilize public transportation, there are substantial inequities between bus service, which tends to serve lower-income riders, and rail service, which tends to serve more affluent riders. These inequities are reflective of, if less severe than, the differences between governmental support for highway systems and for public transit systems. Many transportation planners and policymakers, concerned primarily with the needs of suburban commuters, have focused on constructing highways and commuter rail lines that do little to serve the needs of minority and low-income communities that depend on public transportation(2003). Kansas Citys Attempt at Solutions

Because the Kansas City urban core has experienced negative effects of urban

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

sprawl, losing much of the metropolitan population, particularly those affluent residents of the urban core, to surrounding suburban areas on both the Missouri and Kansas sides of the city, the city has, in recent years, supported downtown revitalization efforts, hoping to minimize the effects of previous policies as well as the great sprawl prevalent in the area, by promoting the development of not only business but residential and entertainment areas an attempt to re-grow the tax base and bring residents, art, culture and tourism to the area. Much of this development is currently struggling, however, due to the weak economy and therefore a hesitant consumer base in the metro area. The static tax income causes further problems for the city that is already facing a revenue shortage. The prevalence of TIF (Tax Increment Financing)-based incentives for business and economic development has been great throughout Kansas City due to the availability of program implementation and the allowance of discretion in approving TIF projects. The use of both TIF and Economic Activity Taxes (EAT) practices increased over 200 percent between 2000 and 2004 (Kelsay, 2007). Based on maps (see Figure 4) of TIF district demographics, [2007], 88 percent of TIF projects have occurred in KCMO Council Districts one, two, four and six. These districts are the most highly populated, and maintain the highest level of educated, affluent, non-minority residents. In contrast, Kansas City Council Districts, three and five which are the lowest income, highest minority districts, hold only 12 percent of TIF projects. This unequal TIF project

10 distribution is counter-intuitive considering the existence of [physical] blight as common criteria for project approval, though. The fact that socio-economic status or distress is not a factor in determining the location of incentive-based projects contradicts much of the literature on planning to incorporate consensus, or promote equality. The Kansas City Greater Downtown Area Plan (2010) specifically calls for community building, infill and rehabilitative development, and focus[ing] this initiative on under-served areas surrounding the Downtown Core such as 18th and Vine (63). As Peter Marris, Professor Emeritus of social planning at the University of California Los Angeles stated in his article on professional advocacy planning (1994) in regard to advocating for the underserved urban residents in the process of comprehensive planning, the problems of the city were to be tackled, not piecemeal, but by coordinating investment in schools, social services, business, police and probation, housing ever relevant agency, in a concerted attack on poverty and central-city decline (145). As can be seen by the distribution of incentive-based projects in the urban core *the Mid America Regional Council, MARC, considers the Urban Core to consist mainly of the third and fourth districts] (MARC), the more distressed areas are not truly given priority in redevelopment and renewal efforts. In order to successfully grow the population and economy of the urban Kansas City area,

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

11

particularly when attempting to reverse the damage done by the recent recession, the most severely distressed areas must be stabilized and made to prosper; if incentive use will increase once again in order to do this, it must be done equitably. The Greater Kansas City Downtown Area Plan (2010), however, denotes areas of development opportunity where the potential to revitalize and grow business is encouraged. Many of those areas are located along central corridors and on the East side of Troost road, a historically significant racial dividing line in the city (See Figure 5). In an effort to improve public transportation in the center-city, after years of failed ballot initiatives for a bi-state, inter-city light rail system, the City of Kansas City, Missouri proposed a streetcar initiative (Hudnall, 2012). After months of studies and public discussion, route linking the Crown Center/Union Station area just South of Downtown to the City Market area, the northernmost point before the Missouri River, was proposed (see Figure 6). For streetcar advocates, it is about growing business: tech business, bring in the so-called Creative Class. In theory, a streetcar's fixed route provides businesses and property owners along its path with financial security (2012). In 2009, the KCATA determined that a streetcar project would cost approximately $150 million and applied for a starter grant from TIGER to help with funding. The proposal was rejected. From there was the idea to create a Transportation

12 Development District (TDD) that encompasses roughly everything south of the Missouri River, east of Broadway, west of Locust, and north of Union Station (2012). A key element to the proposal was that it allowed the city to circumvent a proven-loser citywide vote by confining the streetcar ballot to residents within the TDD (2012). Within the TDD are approximately 3,600 registered voters, most of whom are not property owners, and only a small fraction of whom returned ballots in the election about whether to create the TDD (2012). This juxtaposition of voters and property owners (on whom the increased property tax would be increased) caused opposition from some of the area property and business owners, skeptical of the potential economic development benefits being touted as the impetus for the transit line (2012). To aid in funding, Kansas City Mayor Sly James and city officials were able to locate about $17 million in other grants, but the city plan[ed] to issue and to back about $80 million in bonds to pay for the construction of the streetcar line. Most of that repayment would come from a 1-percent sales-tax increase for businesses in the TDD (2012). On December 11, 2012, Election Day, the TDD measure passed 351 to 198, demonstrating just how small the population was, deciding such a costly and risky measure. This is has not proven the lines worth to critics, however. Opponents of the plan such as Crosby Kemper III, downtown resident and director of the Kansas City Public Library, claims that Bus routes actually serve the working poor. They help them get to work. This streetcar will be used by tourists, shoppers and lawyers who can

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

13

afford to bill a two-hour lunch (2012). Regardless of continued opposition, the projected completion of the streetcar lines first phase is June 2015. There is potential that this project will act as a catalyst or at least a connecting elementfor other transit projects in the area. A study released in December 2012 recommends that if and when commuter rail service connects downtown Kansas City with Jackson County, those commuter cars would run along existing tracks that roughly parallel Interstate 70 (See Figure 7), the Westernmost point being the City Marketthe northernmost point on the streetcar line (Hendricks, 2012). Additionally, building on the momentum of the streetcar lines approval, project managers are already conducting studies and facilitating public discourse on a second phase expansion (2012). However, there isn't enough property value to capture anywhere outside of downtown to rely as heavily on local funding. More federal funding will be required, which adds both time and cost. Phase 2 studies will likely be funded entirely by city funds, as opposed to the downtown streetcar study, which was mostly paid for by federal funds (2012). It not clear what affect, if any, this new emphasis on downtown area transit will have on the lack of equitable options and opportunities for Kansas Citys minority groups. There are mixed findings on whether improved access to public transportation results in higher levels of employment. A 1997 study in Dade County, Florida did not find a strong relationship between public transportation access to employment locations

14 and rates of employment of minorities (2003). Conversely, a study examining Atlanta and Portland found that access to bus transit had beneficial effects related to increased employment for all races (2003). Recent research suggests, however, increased automobile ownership rates may have beneficial impacts on low-income workers and their familiesas autos not only improve job search activities, but also job retention, especially in cases where public transit service is unavailable (2003). This unsurprising finding reinforces that t he role of cars not be ignored in consideration of transportation mobility strategies for lowincome and minority groups (2003). Between the objectives set forth in the Master Plan and the recent actions taken to make transit more accessible, the implementation of such goals has, as of yet, left much to be desired. To make strides in overcoming the racial and socio -economic divisions in Kansas City, planners must take on a greater advocacy role, viewing the underserved minority groups as a client whose interests must be represented in a legal matter (Davidoff, 1965). Such planners must ensure that programmatic goals are not only placating citizens and providing them with to ken participation or inclusion (Arnstein, 1969, 217) for as Stafford and Ladner (1969) wrote, *often+ programs relay a false expectancy to the black communitythe reality is that they are not intended to give blacks any significant power in determining planning prioritiesthey are programs which are designed to fulfill the cities

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri vested interests (71).

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Goals expressed in the area plan (2010) include growing innovative industries as well as decreasing unemployment by seven percent and increasing Median Household Income by over 10 thousand dollars by 2020 (67). Much of the opportunity to grow in such a way must include sufficient and equitable access to employment. To make such goals feasible, care must be taken to consider and positively address the interests of all citizens including those who have been historically underrepresented in and adversely affected by planning efforts. Downtown streetcars and commuter rail may not be the solution. Privately owned cars may not be the solution either, however it is an issue tying together transportation systems, social inclusion, and repair of historical faults that is vital for the improving and continued success of Kansas City.

16 APPENDIX

Figure 1

Figure 2

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri

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Figure 3

Figure 4

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Figure 5

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Figure 6

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Figure 7

Transportation and Equity in Kansas City, Missouri REFERENCES

Arnstein, Sherry R. (1969) 'A Ladder Of Citizen Participation', Journal of the American Planning Association, 35:4, 216-224.

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Bloch, Matthew; Carter, Shan; and McLean, Alan. (2012). Mapping the 2010 Census. The New York Times.

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Davidoff, P. (1965). Advocacy and pluralism in planning. Journal of the American Planning Association , 31 (4), 331-338.

Hendricks, Mike. (2012). Study Recommends I-70 route for commuter rail. The Kansas City Star. http://www.kansascity.com/2012/11/27/3937209/study-recommends-i-70-routefor.html

Hudnall, David, (2012). Is the downtown streetcar a development engine or a luxury vehicle? The Pitch. http://www.pitch.com/kansascity/streetcar-transportation-developmentdistrict-kansas-city/Content?oid=3081278&storyPage=6

Kansas City Department of Planning and Development, FOCUS Kansas City Urban Core

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Snchez, Thomas W., Stolz, Rich, and Ma, Jacinta S. (2003). Moving to Equity: Addressing Inequitable Effects of Transportation Policies on Minorities. Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University.

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Wilkerson, Chad R., and Williams, Megan D. (2006). Minority workers in the tenth

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district: Rising presence, rising challenges. Economic Review , Fourth Quarter. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

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