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CHAPTER THREE
Japan-Ch ina Relations
Introduction
N
othing marks Japan's shift toward reluctant realism mere de
finiti\ely than the changing relationship with China.!
Throughout the postwar period Japan main:ained a policy of
constructive engagement toward Beijing. This strategy was established
byYoshida Shigeru. who predicted that Japan and the West would even
tually \"lean China away from Moscow by providing an alternative to
dependence on the Soviet Union. In Yoshida's view, a prosperous China
would inevitably become friendly wi th Japan and the United States.
2
At
the core of his strategy was a faith in the principles of economic inter
dependence ,vith China and in Japan's own growing merclI1tile power.
Yoshida's approach was hotly debated between the pro-Taipei and
pro-Beijing groups within the ruling LDP, but his assessment of Sino
japanese rclations was largf'ly prescient. Beijing began splitting with
Moscow by the 19605, and shortlv after President Nixoi1's VISit t6 China
.
in 1972, the Japanese government normalized relalic5hs with the main=-
~
land. With time, Sino-Japanese economic ties deepened, particularly
3fter rhe Cold V/ar. Trade bet:\\een Japan and China grew from $18.2
billion in 1990 to S62.-+ billion in 1996. Over the roughly the same pe
riod, japan's foreign direct investment into China expanded from $438
million in 19t9 to S4.S billion in 1995. The consensus behind Yoshida's
forl1lub for China relations deepened, and confidence in a close Sino
japanese relationship shaped Japan's vision of a post-Cold War diplo
macy in Asia.
But Y05.hida's predic.tions \vere only p3rtly correct. Greater trade, aid,
and inwstment could not fully insulate Sino-Japanese rebrions from the
rurbukllt dC\Tloplllt'nrs of the 1<)<)Os. fir st the end of rhe Cold War
opened the prospect of tenserbilatera"l- reiation-s -\:)6:ause Japan and
China were no longer indirectly aligned against the Soviet Union. Then
the shocks of the Gulf W,r and the collapse of the Japanese econOmic
bubble undermined Japanese confidence. while the interruption of sta
ble long-term LDP rule opened the Japanese foreign policy process to
greater pluralism and unpredictability. And eventually Chinese power
and anibition became more visible in Asia.
The impact of these changes was not felt in the bilateral relationship
for several years, however. Ironically, the crisis created by the. Chinese
g_overnment's massacre of student protesters in Tienanmen Square in
1989 created an artificial honeymoon in Sino-Japanese ties. After ini
tially suspending yen loans to Beijir;g.1 in tandem with other Western
sanctions to protest the incident, Japan was sucked back in to the vac
uum created by China's international isolation a year later.lnJune 1991
Tokyo resumed aid; China responded by inviting Emperor Akihito for
a historic visit in 1992 while heaping praise on Japan's regional security
role when the JSDF was dispatched to Cambodia for peacekeeping.
Heartened by tllis new Chinese attitude. Japanese intellectual leaders
began writing of the new "Asianization of Asia."
By the middle of the decade, however, the real impact of the collapse
of the Cold War structure was being (elt directly in bilateral relations.
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and Foreign MillisterHata Tsu
tornu began setting a new tone the relationship ill 1993 when they
pressed Beijing publicly for greater military Subsequently,
an angry Diet then forced the Foreign Ministry to slispend $75 million
in grant assistance after China ignored Jap:IIIl'<;l' warnings and continued
with a string of nuclear weapons tests in J 905.:; Theil in 1996 the Tai
wan Straits crisis, the rc;affirmation o( the US-Japan alliance, and an
emotional dispute over the Senkak.. {Dianvut;)i) Islands se!lt Sino-Japa
nese relations to a postwar low. These pUlictuarcd ch:-lilges ill official re
lations were accompanied by a sea change in :mirude to\vard China
demonstrated in Japanese public opinion polls ;tIHj Ill'WSpaper editorials
over the same period(' The Japanese a!ld Chillesl' foreigll ministries
tried to tllrn the tide with a cel t' bration of c\V<:nty-tiVL' Yl' ;lrS of relations
in 1997, but a disastrous visit to Tokyo by Jiang ZC/Ilin in December
1998 oilly solidified the new view of China. In the spacl' of only a few
years, Japan's fundamental thinking on China shifred fi-olll ;) f,ith in
economic interdependence' to a reluctant realiSIll.
The shift is relative, however. A strict realist poli cy based 011 balance
of-power logic would have Jap:111 pursliing relatiw g;lins al rill' expense
-.-.
ofChina.Japan would cut off all aid and investment and generally take
policies to retard China's economic growth. This Japan has not done.
Instead, Japan'5 China policy is moving forward at t\VO levels. At one
level Tokyo to provide massive economic assistance in the
form of yen loans, with only slight decreases in ODA (matching the
pace ofJapan'. overall aid budget). At another level, however, Tokyo is
actively seekins. Co counter Chinese political influence in Asia while
hedging ap.iD{i.}, prospect of longer-term Chinese threats. This syn
thesis of e-= 2 Srnt and hedging ,vas well expressed in an LDP for
1997: "Ultimately, China's future rests in its own
stably it will develop. Therefore, even as we seek
our amicable relations with China, we must
on the direction China is headed and be pre-
variety of contingencies."7
consensus in Jap:m that friendly relations must
be maintained Wftli the People's Republic of China (PRC). There is
also a continuing search for economic, technological, and diplomatic
tools to shape the growth of the Chinese economy and Chinese foreign
and security policy in directions that are beneficial-or at least not
harmful-to Japan. However, this traditional strategy of engagement is
now tempered by a slIspicion of Chinl'se motives, doubts about Japa
nese capabilities to cfTc:ct change in China, and a desire to use multilat
eral and bibrcral security Iletworks to balance, and even contain,
Chinese
This chapter illustrates these change) \Vlth five vignettes in post-Cold
War Sino-JIf)a!H'sc relations:
1. The 1(Y)S Chi/lese nllclear tests , which exposed the limits of
Japan's economic influence on Chinese behavior
2. The 1<)'J()-07 Senbku dispute, wChich highlighted the changing
domestic politics of China policy in Japan
3. The Sino-Japanese colltretemps over strengthening of the U.S.
Japan :t!liance in 1096-07, which revealed the post-Cold War bi
lateral defense dilemma between Tokyo and Beijing
4. The 1<)98 Jiang-Obuchi summit, which demonstrated how much
the divergent Chinese and Japanese treatment ot history would
obstruct future cooperation
5. The changing patterllS ofJapanese trade and inwsrl11e/lt in China
from 1995 to 1<,)99, which suggested thatJapan's rehtive economic
influellce on is 011 the dl'cline
The chapter concludes by examining the implications of this emerg:
ing Sino-Japanese relationship for the US-Japan alliance.
The First Shock Wave: China's Nuclear Tests
Aid and Security
At the core of Japan's traditional policy of engagement toward China
has been foreign aid. China experts in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs often comment that Tokyo's bilateral economic assistance has
grown from the "seed to the roots and the trunk" of bilateral Sino-Jap
anese relations. After opening contact \vith Beijing in 1972, the United
States was barred by legislation from providing aid to Communist
coL1I1tries. This opened up an enormous role for Japan. Beginning with
the 1978 Japan-China Treaty of Friendship, Japan agreed to provide
large five-year loan packages to China.;'; By the 1990s these yen loan
packages accounted for half of China's total economic assistance from
abroad. For Beijing, the yen loans were seen as mandatory reparations
tor Japan's subjugation of China during the war. In Tokyo, however,
economic assistance had meaning as the centerpiece of broader eco
nomic interdependence and as insurance against futLlre political or mil
itary confrontation. Beneath these diwrging views of economic
lay even broader gaps in each nation's assumptions about the
other. These gaps were exposed by a series of nllck:lr n:plosiollS deep
in the Chinese interior-the first shock ,,ave in Sino-Japanese relations
after the Cold War.
Beijing Explodes Bombs . .. and Tokyo '5 Complacency
May 15, 1995, China conducted its forty-second underground' nu
clear explosion in Lop Nur, a remote desert arc'.l south of Mongolia.
While the existence of Chinese nuclear weapons was h:lrdly shocking,
the timing of the test stunned Tokyo, Prime Minister MuraY:1I1L1 Tomi
ichi had only just asked the Chinese premier, Li Peng, for a moratorium
on testing during a visit to Beijing the same month, reminding his Chi
nese hosts of the Japanese people's intense feelings about I1uclear
weapons, If Japan's economic interdependence with China h:ld teeth,
this was an .issue rh.at Jl1.:1ttered.But as it was. the nuclear teSts proved
just how limited economic investment and years of yell 10:1l1s Jnd for
Cigll aid were as cOllstrJims all Chinese miliLlry behavior. Illtkl'd, the
LOJl Nllr tcst gl'IH'r;lrcd :111 illt"i1S,' rkh:lt,' ill I,lJl;]ll :lholl{ wltl'tltn l'l' O
;,j
nomic tools should be used as sticks against China at all.-There was a
consensus within MOFA and MITI that Japan should move from mul
tiyear loan agreements to annual negotiations with China in order to
increase Japanese leverage, However, interrupting aid was seen by many
in the government as toO heavy a stick to use on China, even in re
sponse to nuclear testing.') On the other hand, since 1991 MOFA had
been bound by an aDA charter that specifically required japan's aid
policy to give full consideration of a recipient'S military expenditures
and the possible development, production, import, or export of rrussiles
and weapons of mass destruction, III This charter had been created pre
cisely to demonstrate Japan's readiness to use aid as a strategic tool after
the Cold War, but thus far it had been applied only to distant and not
terribly powerful Burma. Would it now be applied to the "root and
trunk" of Sino-Japanese relations:
MOFA went back and forth on this question after the Lop Nur test,
On May 15 Vice Foreign Minister Saito Kunihiko called in the Chinese
charge Wu Dawei in Tokyo, and warned specifIcally that Japan's 1991
aDA charter might require an aid cut-ofT in response to the Chinese
tests, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei then backed off from this threat in
testimony to the Diet tWO days later. However, his suggestion that Japan
would not-and in fact could not-Lise aid to demand better behavior
from Beijing provoked a firestorIll from within and outside of the gov
ernment. The political pressure Oil K()no and MOFA was intense, Se
nior politicians fWIll all thre.c coalition p:uties were calling for
suspension of yen loans to punish Chil1<l. On the Left of the coalition
Sakigake and the Socialist parties were motivated by antinuclear senti
ment. On the the LDP was pushing for a more assertive Japanese
stand toward Beijing for reasons of national pride,l I Even the
Sllilllbllll warned that, given China's clear violation of t.he prin.C1ples ar
ticulated in the aDA chart er, "japan's diplomacy is being questioned."12
As one anonymous senior MOFA offIcial told the Yomillri Shil11bllYl, "we
call not le:1ve the situation as it is,"\}
Ourftlflked on both the Right and Left in a far more fluid political
environment, MOFA and the government compromised
with the coalition partners on a symboliC suspension of $75 1l1l11ion in
grant assistance, exempting medical equipment and Oood relief. Bei
jing was unimpressed, however, and conducted further nuclear tests in
August Jlld September of 1995, With the Taiwan missile tests in March
of the next year and worsening tensions over the Senbku Islands, LDP
ellls for :1 suspension of the yen loans src' \V loudn. St'llior Chinese of
tlci:tl, rClctcd \\ith rh:lt SlI\pe11S
1011
oClhl' yen loans
constituJe._"interference....in_China's_imemal affairs" and pointing
to japan's obligation to continue paying reparations, "particularly on the
50th anniversdry of the end of World War 11."15 Beijing's claim that the
loans were not j apan's to suspend further raised the ire of the LOP Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi Sadayuki warned the LOP that the
ye n loans we re still "the main pillar of japan's China policy.'>J(, But
MOFA-officiah also recognized that continued Chinese nuclear testing
might leave littl e cholce but to reconsider the yen loan packages.
Then on july 30, 1996, China set off its last nuclear test at Lop Nur
and announced its readiness to j oin the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) . The immediate crisis passed. The yen loans survived. How
ever,japan's f.lith in the power of econonuc interdependence and japa
nese ODA was badl y shaken. It was now cl ea r to the japanese public
that China saw little obligati on (<< In) beca use of economic assistance just
as it \vas cl ear to China that Tokyo could no longer manage Jnti-China
sentiment within the Diet. The LDP's senior China hand, Gotada
Masayoshi, tried to warn his Chinese Judience in a speech in Beijing
that summer that the j apanese peopl e had "connected China's nuclear
tests with its potential for becoming a major military power." Gotada
was alarmed by the strong anti-China sentiment that had suddenly
emerged within his own party and the opposition, particularly among
younger members. ,
"If Sino-japanese relations continue like thi s," he cJ utioned, "things
will be rough."I?
The Senkaku Dispute
Diverging Elites .
,)
Gotada was speaking to 'his hosts as the ti st of a dying breed of
elder statesmen who had managed the normalization of relati ons with
Beijing since 1972. These were men whose views of China had been
fo rged in the: 1937 to 1945 Sino-japanese Wa r; men w ho eq uat ed
japan's l11i1itarism w ith its mistreatment of Clllna ; men who wa,lted to
make amends. Prime Ministn TanJ b Kaku l' l had bel'n a sergea nt in the
Kwa mung Army and developed a particularly close relati onshi p with
the leadership in Beijing after he normalized relati ons with th e People's
Republic as prime minister in 1972. Tanaka's pursuit of sLlble ti es with
Beijing was al so the result of his lurd-headed pragmatism. As a leader
o f th e most powerfi.d fJction ill the he and other elder St:Ht'Sll1en
ill til e p:lrty W;llltl?d to :,\'oid ideologiClI splits ;lIl11)JJg \'llullgn Di ct
--<'I
members comparable to confrontation' between -the pro-Tai\\'an Asia
ken group and the pro-13eijing Asia-Africa ken group in the late 1960s.
Gotada's warning to the Chinese in 1996 stemmed from his knowl
edge of the changing ties between Japanese and Chinese elites. Gener
ational change and unfolding political realignment had remm'ed some
of Beijing's closest supporters frolll the ranks of the LOP leadership. In
1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto R YlItara and opposition leader Ozawa
lchira were both products of the Keiseikai (T;ll1aka faction). But neither
had the sa me emotional or political ties to Beijing that their mentor,
Tanaka Kakuei , had. Indeed. observers in Beijing tended to \'iew both
men has dangero us nationalists, since Hashimoto headed the World War
II Veterans War Bereavement Association (Izokubi) and Oza\\'a was au
thor of a best-selling book calling for japan (0 become a "normal na
tion." Other influential Diet members active in China policy included
Takemi Keiza, a former professor at Takai University fluent 111 Man
darin and weary of the old way of doing business with Beijing. These
"hawks" and ncw China hands were counterbalanced by political in
heritors of th e Yoshi da sc hool, including Kata Kaichi, a former diplo
mat who served in Hong Kong, Jnd Hayashi Yoshira, chairl11.l11 of the
Japan-China Fri endship League. However, even those ad\'ocating a
softer line toward Chi n,l lac ked the commitment to relations \\'ith Bei
jing of thc prevIous generation,lrI Thc breakdown of China's network
in japan extended to th t' Left as well, where the ASllitl Shlll//JlllI-once
all amplifier of C hill esc criticisllls ofj J palleSe llationalism-I ed the ed
itorial attack Oil C hina 's lluclear tests. I')
Tokyo's li'a yillg dit t' tics with Beijing were beillg paralleled by a quiet
btl( growing affinit y for Tai wan among the ne\Ver generati on of japa
IlCse politiciaJlS. The original Taiwa n lobby \\'as moti va ted by the ide
olob';' of the Cold War. After Cold War, j apan's Tai wa n connection
lost sOllle 01' tlwst' elite frat er'nal ti es, similar to what occurred in rela
tions w ith 13cijing, But there was a critical difference. Taiwan became a
dl..'lll()(' ra cy ,Illd shared not only a comparati vely benign colonial legacy
\\'it!J Jlpan , but now ;1 value s'y-stem as well. Taiwan's president , Lee Teng
Hui, t.'njoyed broad popularity in all the lIIajor parties ill japan for his
t1uelH japanese Ianglugc skills (he attended Kyo(() University) Jnd his
Il\ltering view ofJlpJn'S historical legacy in Asia. When the People's
Republic EmbJssy ill Tokyo attempted to establish a "p,lriiamentary ex
change" to lure younger politiciallS away from Taiw;lll , th e endeavor
backfired."') The S,lIl1e japanese participants who had met fell ow politi
l' i;\I1S ill Taipei \ven.' treated to lectures on the WJ'( )J] gs o f'J apancse his
tDr\, hy Chillese.' COllllllUIliq IJ:mv (eCI') ll tli ci;ils ii , This
'....
. _ ............ .... ... IJIII
. .' -: .
affinity-for Taiwan has not been operationalized in Japan's formal for- '
eign policy-Tokyo maintains a strict consistency in its "One China"
policy-but the quiet Japan-Taiwan connection increasingly began to
worry Beijing in the 1990s.
21
Finally, the political changes in Japan since 1993 have loosened the
LDP's control of the Far Right group.s that _championed anticommu
nism during the Cold War. Though not necessarily larger in numbers,
these groups are in many respects less constrained. This vocal national
ism weighed heavily on those like Gotoda who were concerned about
Chinese behavior transforming the politics of Sino-Japanese relations in
Tokyo.
In short, new electoral rules and political realignment in Japan added
a further fluidity to the politics of diplomacy toward China-a fluidity
that surprised the Foreign Ministry and the Chinese in the attacks on
foreign aid after China's !luclear tests and later allowed the cork to fall
off the bottle of u;ltionalisl11 during a dispute over some uninhabited
rocks less than lOt) l11iles off Okinawa.
Diaoyutai or Seukakll?
In 1895 the Meiji governmcllt sent a ship from Okinawa to c:-;plore a
collection of eight islands and reefs near Taiwan that were cdlec\ the
Senkaku Islands in Japanese and the Oiaoyutai in Chinese. The ship re
ported back that the islands were uninhabited and apparently 1I11chimed
by Imperial Chim. III 1895, after Japan's victory over China in the
Sino-Japanese War, the Meiji government issued a cabinet resolution
claiming the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territorv. The islands appe;lred
to have little importance and were even used for fighter bomber prac
tice by the U.S. N;l\-Y during the occupation ofJapan after the But

the islands took on new value in 1969 when UN geologists issued :I 1"(:'
port stating that considerable reserves of oil and natural gas might lie
around them. With the prospect of oil reserves, Beijng formally an
Iloullced its own cLim to the Diaoyutai in 1970, arguing that Chinese
vessels had first charred the islands in 1534. The Japanese Foreign Min
istry formally rejectcd this position, arguing that China had never es
tablished a presence all the islands and pointing out that the United
St,ltes had implicitly recognized Japanese sovereignty by transferring
";ldlllinistr:ltivt' cOl1trol" over the isbnds with the return of Okinaw:I to
J1tW1 in 1'171.
While diplolll.lh ill Ikijlllg ;111<-1 Tokyo tLlded hisrorical ;111(\
()\\'r tilt' Isl.IIHk iw\\,'\n. rhe poliric.t1 k:ltkrs Oil b(l[il ,ilk,
'-r-"
r we-re --always carefuTno-t to alrow- the territorial issue to become emo
tienal or nationalistic. During his visit to Japan in 1978, Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping announced that the territorial issue should be put off
for the future so that Tokyo and Beijing could focus on jointly devel
oping the islands' resources based on the spirit of the new Japan-China
Friendship Treary. This formula for the Senkaku issue
held for over a decade. In 1991, for example, \\"hen Right-wing LOP
politicians threatened to land on the islands to plant the Japanese flag,
the Prime Minister's Office and the LOP leadership persuaded them to
desistY Other potential clashes over rights around the islands
were also quickly averted by quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations be-
t\:veen Tokyo and Beijing.
2
.
1
However, by the middle of the 1990s, this formula was strained to the
breaking point. First the rules began to change \\"ith the opening of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in November
1994. Intent on establishing its territorial claim in the context of UN
CLOS, Beijing had passed a territorial seas Ia\\ in 1992, which opened
the islands to Chinese oil exploration and asserted that force might be
lIsed to protect China's claim. By 1995 Chinese oil exploration vessels
were regularly reported around the islands, and in February 1996 For
eign Minister Ikeda confirmed that a Chinese rig was seen drilling for
oil near one of the islands. These iricursions \\'ere played up in the Ja
panese press-parricubrly in the conservatl\-e S(l/zkci Shilllblill-and
rhey amplifIed the impression of a belligerent China already created by
the nuclear testing. MOFA protested through official channels, but by
this point these sorts of official channels were no longer suffIcient to
contain a bilateral confrontation.
In July 1996 the Right wing again took the Senkaku's problem back
iilto their \,,-hen six mejnbers of the Japan Youth Federation
put up J lighthouse on one of the islands. Beijing protested that Tokyo
h:ld broken the formub for nonpoliticization introduced in 1978 and
dClllanded that the Japanese government stop the Right-wing groups as
it had dOl1e si:-; years e:lrlicr. But Tokyo's response was very different
this tilllC. The Chinese nuclear tests had worn down the already frayed
(:l1il1:1 h:lllds in rhe LDP and MOFA, and politici:lns in Tokyo were far
less willing to respond to Chinese complaints about the Senkakus than
they h:ld bcen in 1991. Even if the LOP had been inclined to control
the wing, it W:1S f:lr .Iess able to do so since the collapse of the
\ \is,) sysrclll. Even within MOFA, where China experts \\"ished to
.I\'()J(.! cOIJii-o[l[;nioIL the general mood W:lS Ilor aIle of concili:](ion. If
tll"I",' \\.1S ri,illg Sl'lllillll'llr Wilhlll rhe Chill:] ,chooi th:lt till')'
should no longer be China's "puppet."25 the re
sponse it expeCted. The governri1enr\ spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secre_
tary Seiroku, tolrl the press on July 18 that there was some
danger of a diplomatic incident, but added:" I personally don't think we
should say this and that about something being constructed legitimately
with permission fi'om the bndlord."2()
Emboldened by the hesitation in Tokyo and the implicit SlI
many in the LOp, the Right-wingJapan Youth Federation
situation by placing a war memorial on the islands in August.
September the group was allowed back to the islands to rep .
hOlls
e
. The Japanese Transport Ministry refused to officiaUy
the lighthouse, but it also claimed that the Rightists were
the Ll\\', based on permission received from the islands'
It was. after all, Japanese territory, they maintained,
and Hong Kong increased, and there were even
China. where the government usually attempted to
taneous activities for fear that an anti-Japanese
against the ruling COlllmunist Party.::>! Chinese ch
panest' natiOO;llisIll were further fueled by Prime M..........ashimoto's
"personal" visit to the Yasukuni Wlr Memorial Shri""' July 29, De
spite \\'arnings of"'serious damage" to Sino-Japanese relanons (rol11 Bei
jing, 11O\\'ever, the Japanese government did not back down- indeed,
the Maritime Safety Agency sent seventeen cutrl!rs to I'C'pc:1 protc'st boats
sent ti-om Taiwan and Hong Kong. Even MOrA otlici:ds who were
eager to prevellt further damage to bilateral n:Iarioll\ I'CCOgllizcd that
stopping the Rightists from visiting the island would klvc giVCl1 legiti
macy to Beijing's claims and weakened Japan's IIcgo[iaring position. In
any case, the ruling LOP would allow no backillg dowlI in the (Jce of
Chint'se pressure, clearly si&nalcd ill the party's 1<)<)6 cam
paign platform, which claimed that the Sellkakus would n:.'lll:lin Japa
nese territory despite Beijing's pressure.::>H
The of Japan's pOsition On the Sl'llbkus \Vas not just the
reslIlt of it\ ill:lhilit\ to colltrol the Right willg, of COllr\L'. The Japanese
goverlllllL'lIt \\":1\ ,l!so legiti1J}ately concerned abollt rilL' growing na
it pVITvin'd ill China, including Ueijillg's I <)l)2 cbim that
force could Ill' to (kfi..'IIc1 the islands, a tht:llle repeated in state
ments br t' 1I1l1J1I:l1I</cr of the People's Liberation Army's Academy
of SCil'/lCl'\ ill S"Pl t 'lIlbl'l' I <J<)(l. 2')
From tht" U.S, rhis t:scalating cOllti'olltarioll Owr the
Senkaku \ \'ill:1 ill rhe U.S. gOVtTllllll'1l[ thollght that
Jlpan arhl Chill.! w" &lM t'WI 1l'\l11'1 ro f(lrev to r('Soln' dll' ("(lllfi'(llll.lliOIl,
IIAaiItration's first priority was to diffuse the.tension as
delllonstrating strict US. neutrality on the territo
thc administration had completely missed the Japa
and unprecedented sense of insecurity about China.
OFA privately-and the Sallkci and the YullJiliri Slzilllbul/
ftl'esscd for a symbolic statement that the United States would
11 if China used force to seize the Sellkiku Islands, the State
responded that the US.-Japan alliance did lIul apply in this
In flet, the United States was obligated to defend territory adminis
by Japan-which the islands were, according to US. records from
the return of Okinawa in 1971. Bur the administration's extension of
neutrality on the territorial issue to neutrality ill Ille evelll cf Chillese lise if
force seemed safe, since military confrontation was so unlikely, Under
growing domestic pressure and fealful of an anti-alliance backlash in the
LOP and the press, MOFA put its diplomatic efforts into high gear in
Washington to clarify the US. defense cOI11Illitment:'1I Eventually, senior
Defense Department officials stepped in and unilaterally told the Japanese
government and the Japanese press that the United States was still oblig
ated to defend the Senkakus against attack according to the Security
Treaty. 31 For the time beillg, the Senkaku issue quieted down, but it was
striking that after decades of maneuvering to entrapment in a US.
confrontation with mainland Chim, Tokyo \\'as for the first time urging
a harder line thall Washillt,Tton.
In September 1997 Prime Minister Hashimoto finally reached an
agreement in Ikijing to set aside the issue of ownership of the Senkaku
Islands and to establish a 200-rnile-wide "joint management zone" that
would allow fishing in the area by both nations md coordinated uti
lization of resources. However, Chinese warships and research vessels in
creased their activities around the islands, ignoring Japanese Maritime
Safety Agency requests to clear the areaYG"U.S. officials had been puz
zled by the Japanese Foreign Min.istry's repeated insistence on an iron
clad defense cOIl1mitment on the islands when the possibility of
Chinese hostilities was Sf) rel1lote'. But the Jlpanese government and the
Japanese press were becoming far lIlore attuned than Washington to the
activities of the Chinese navy and the elilerging test of wills \vith Bei
jing. It was precisely to .,l\oid a confrontation-to discourage the na
tionalists in Japan from Cllling for a unilateral military capability to deal
with the St:nkaku Islands-that MOFA \\":1S so adamaIlt about clarify
ing the U.S. COllllllitlllellt.
Tokyo h:1d :11l0thn concerti JS well. During this sa'me period the
Ullit,'d SUtl'S :llld JqUl1 \\,Tl' ill (h" process of' re:JffirJlIiIlg ;lIld
88 Japan's Reluctant Realism
strengthening their bilater;l! :lIliance, Tokyo needed that reJffirl1l:niol1 to
increase its diplomatic le\'erage vis-a-vis Beijing, but it needed
proof in the Senbku dispute that the United StJtes would not abJndon
Japan after asking Tokyo co pby a more active role in regional secu
rity-a role thJt now appeared likely to spark a Chinese backlash,
The Guidelines, Taiwan Theater Missile Defense,
and the New Defense Dilemma
A Shift ill the 'Ji'ilateral StYllctllre of SeCllrity Relations
During the Cold War Sino-Japanesc securiry rt'lations wcre calculated al
most t'Iltirely within till:' context of the US-Jlpan ;llll:ll1ce But while
JapJn's formal relations \\'ith Bcijing had to \\ait until a shift ill U.s. China
policy in 1972, Tokyo cl e'l rly diverged from Washington a ll the LIuestion
of whether China represcnted a military threat, If anything, the leg;l cy of
World \v!ar II convinced the Illajoritv ofJlpJIlL'Se political leaders that a
hostile relationship \vith Beijing was cOIltrar;; to Japancse interests,
Fear of entrapment in a U.S, military confrontation with C hina over
Taiwan or Southeast Asia therefore led successivc Jlp;1I1CSe governments
to deny full military cooper,,\1tion to U.S, forces , even asrl:lPJIl reconsti
tuted its own Self Defeme Forces,
The United StJtes squeezed an offi cial c:-;:pressioll of support from
Japan for the U,S, defense commitment to TJiwan ()Illy Ollcl'--in the
1969 Nixon-Sata commulliquc-\vhen negotiating pressurL' to secure
the return of Okinawa led the Japanese gO\'ernnwnt to concede that
"maintaining-peace- in Taiwan region- is :lI sa all importallt elelllent in
, '1 ",,1 , "," d' I I '
-Japan s n:ltlOna. " Lli)mg s reacno!) ,was pre ICta) y negative,
and officials in MOFA Jnd the JDA spent the next decade retreating
from any hint of ,1 CO ml1litlllent to helping Lkfend Taiwan, When the
United States and Jap;l1l l1l'gotiJted the first Guidelines for Defense Co
operation ill 1978, \X/a shington tried again to lock ill a co mmitment of
Jlpanese support tor the ofTaiw;]1l and South Korea, However,
Tokyo \\"as concluding a TrcJty of Pcace ami Frinldsilip with Beijing at
the time and \'v'as 110t about to eldist for mi ss ions provoke a
Chinese backlash , The Defense Cuidelil1es were completed
'vvith det;)iiL'd 011 bilatl'r,ll cooperati on for the defense of the
j:1P:l1lCSl' archipehgo against dircct ;lttack, but plallning for cooperation
ill rq.>;ion,11 \\,IS kIt t(l!' Lbv,
1:(11' [il ,' Ill(),r 1),11'1, h" "',',,,T. '.1J. hhill!.C.[('11 (('!cLlrt'LI ,I,,!),III " ("onsciell
I\<\)I\ "h,',I\'I' \1,1111 \ III !I I,' ""lll.1illlll('111 , ' I' t ' hlll.l . ,\ , "',1\ 1I\'(l'l1 ill Ch;lP
..
Japan-China Relations 89
ter 1.Jap:lll 's primary rok ill US military strategy was to host U.S, bases,
and Tokyo \\'on the suppOrt of its ally by prO\'iding ever brger amoulHs
of tinancial suppOrt, while not Cluesti oning too closely how U.S, tOI'Cc:' s
in J;lpan \\"t're III f:lCC, Tokyo put only one restri cti oll 011 U.S, de
ploymt'llts li'o!ll Japatl when the government bowed to Diet pressure, on
February I()60, to detine the" Far Eastern" clause of the tfeary (Ar
ticlt' VI),"I ;I S the area north of the Philippin,'s, Thi s insulated Japan fi-om
the unfolding connict in Indochina (though U.S, forces continued to op
erate indirectly trom Jlpan througho ut the Vi etnam war), ;l nd it left both
Taiwan and KorcJ theoreticall y within the scope ' of per missibl e direct
operations by u.s. military forces in Japan, Late'[ not ol1ly the bases but
also the JSDF capabiliti es themselves came to be seen as a military aSSet
for u.s, srrateSry, particubrl y after th l' Soviet milit:J ry expansion ill the
Far East ill the btl' 1L)7( Is Jap:l11 was not politically to npand
the securiry mit- of the JSDF. but th e locati on of the Japanese archipel
ago near the Soviet hr Lm llleJnt that Tokyo could obstruct a Sm'iet
breakout b\' tocusing on the' self-defense missions already stipulated in
the Defense CuidelillL'sJ:lp;l1l built LIp its forces in the 19HUs for its 0\\"[1
defense against direct ;m:l ck, but with t\lc h ne\\- minesweeper and F-15.
the Sovie ts' in the region \\ItTe furth er thwart ed,
This served China's intl'rests as well. Behind their fierce
rhetoric the alliance in ISJS I ;l1ld its rcvisioll in 1l)()O, C hinese
leaders al\\'ays recognized th;n the US-J;lp;lIl alliance conuint: d the re
turn of militarism in Japan, With the Sino-Soviet split ill the 1 <)()(Is, and
with th e growing Sino-Soviet confrontation in the 1(nOs, the U.S,- '
Japan alliance :llso contributed to China's strategic objecti ves by con
taining the Soviets' Ell" Eastem forces, As Washington playcd its " China
c lrd" ag;lillSl Moscow in the Litc' 127()s, Japan made al1 CVl'll cle;lrer tilt
ro\\'ard D<,:'ijing, including a tLlnsparently anti-Sovi et "Jllti-ht:gelllony"
claUSe' in the' <)78 Pc' ace and Friendship Treary with 13cijing,
r\l elld of the Cold War. ho\\'ever, thi s ti'alllework for sustaining
ll11ltu;t1k rl.'inforeill<> sccuritv ties \\' jth W;] shin"cotl <111(1 COlllllll'rci,ll
, 0,
\\irll Bl'ijing began to L1nraH'1. First. Tokyo camc ulldn increased pres
"url. to support US forces more e:-;:plicitly in conflicts like til t: Cul(V/ar
.11ld hter in the s howdown with North Korea over l) vong:vall(Y's sus-
J J b
Pl' ltl'd IlUclcar weapons progr:llll in 11)94 , There W;lS al so a grO\ving
,'O!bl.' Il SUS in Tokyo that Japan sllould pursue ;} morc 110rlllal defense
polin, panicuhrly aft:l' f the of the Soci;llist Left: rellloved one
1J1.IJ()r obsuck, l1;1d :lppl.lLldnl j:lp,ln \'I);lrtil' ip;ltion ill peal'\:,
ill C',llllhntii,1 ill ,llld Iud IIP( l.Tllj,i/ld rill.' U,S, -I;tp.11l ,t! ..
11.111'
III
ii",
""v
I,
(' ( !('n' "',1\ I ll.'I,' I\' I'<. ' \ (1111,'
'I
I I II
"
(' ,-<',',1, ,'" II "1'111111'''11
Wi!
90 Japan's Reluctant Realism
Beij ing might not fear an incrementalk strengthened alliance o r more
::Ictive japanese security policy, Tokyo \\'::IS wrong,
The Difense Guidelines alld Taiwa.n
The changes in japanese defellSe policy in the mid-l ()0()s-while
aIJrming from Beijing's perspective-followed a logical and incremen
tal progression from japan's previous approach to the alliance, The first
step came when Socialist Prime Ministe r Murayama approved revision
of japan's basic force structure guidance, the 1")76 Nati o nal Defense
Program Outline (NDPO), in November J995, The revisioll hac..l begun
under Hosokavv'J in 19<)3 ill order to stre;lInlill e the JSD f for post-Cold
War missions, but by 1903 the JDA was ,llso using the NDrO revision
to clarify japanese support for UN pe:-acekeeping and for US, opera
tions in "situations that arise in the areas surroundingjapan"-the miss
ing pieces from the 1978 Ddense gllidelines,.'l5 The changes in the
NDPO were followed in April 1996 b;-' th e US,-japan Security Decla
ration, in which President Clillton and Prime Minister Hashimoto
"reaffirmed" the importanc e:- of the alliance and promised to revise the
bilateral 1978 Guidelines so that they too addressed cooperatiol1 ill "si t
uations that ar ise in the arelS around japan,"
The timing of the Clinton-Hashimoto Security ])echLltioll was,
fateful. President Clinton had or iginall y pbnned to sign th e d l'c!a ratio!1
with Prime Mini ster Mura\'ama the previoLls November on the heel s of
the annual APEC su mmit, but the presidellt stayed home to ;m e llc1 to a
domestic budget crisis with the Congress, When he did travel to Jap:1I1
in April of 1996, the atmosphere had changed signiflC::Intly :1I1d what
mi ght have been a mo dest bureaucratic achievement instead took on
the character of a new strate:-gic initiati\'e, Two events ac
counted for this . first, Mura\'ama was replac ed by Hashimoto, marking
a change from the Socialist's p:1cifism to th e LDP :1l1d :1 politician with
:1 long inrerest in defense policy. Second. alld probably mo rt> important ,
Chin,l launched a series of missile tests :1cross the Taiwan Straits :1nd
held l11ilit:1ry exercises ill 1Vbrch 19lJ6 in effort to intimidat e Tlipei
b,'fore elections and sign:11 th e !)eopk's Libe r:nion Army's rcadiness to
li se force if necessary to prc'\'ellt Taiw:1lH'se independenc e,'v, til response
to tht: Chilll'Se mi ssile tesb. th e United St:Jtcs c1eployed two Clrrier bat
tle groups to th e area, while Japan protested C hinese :1cciollS alld Joined
AlIS(Ldi :l ;Ind rhl' U llited :lS the olll\' :dli l's "lIlldcr
()f rll,' US, ,kf'l()\'llll'IH, III t.I,(, ,1,11':111 tUUK (\11 "UII,i,kr:tbly
Illl'I' ,' 1Ii,III (',lld','I'!'.1 (lI ' I ,)lilllllJ. " Ik,' ('II ,' pl'Ii,,' \\\(' ll,.\, (',t rriers
Iaoan-CIlliTC["""KeTIl"l-rlr.urr,
-- .. . .
was the Yokosuka-based USS /llriepc/II{m(c-a fact not lost on BeiJln-g or
ignored in subsequent Chinese criticislll of japan. Priv:1tely, Jlpanese
diplomats in 13eying told the press that the missile tests showed the C hi
nese were "no better dun Y:1kuza g:1ngsters,,,l7
The Chinest' saw the U S.-japan Security Declaration as a response
to the Taiwan Straits incide nt-which in a senseH \\'as, since Murayama
had not yet approved th e D efe nse Guidelines revi sio n for the original
draft of the document in N ovember, while Hashillloto had no difficulty
convincing his cabinet to include the revision n,/rcr the Chinese missile
tests:lH China's response was tough, Beijing ch:1rged th:1t the Securiry
Declaration had expanded the alliance by referring to j:Jpan's role in the
"Asia-PacifIC region" rather than the " f ar East," the language used in
the original 1W,O trc:1ty, Ue ijillg ::lIsa <ugued that the alliance was now
deliberately being aimed at C hina :111d intervention in the Taiwan
Straits; and if that was not the else, JapJn should explicitly exclude Tai
wan froIll the newly revi sed guidelines, While the United StJtes and
japan thought that they WtTC re inforcing the statuS gl:O, Beijing thought
the alli:1nce was being redirec ted ;lg;li nst Chim,
US. and japanese o fficials attempted to rcassure Beijing that the Se
curity Declar:1tion and the new Defense Guidelines were not aimed at
China and ultimat ely se rwd Chin ese interests in a 111 0 re stabl e Asia
Pacific region, Officdly, Tokyo and Washington argued that the J;.e
gional comillgencics in th L:' IT\' iew of the guidelines
we re situation:1l, not geographiC:1I :") Japan also expIJined that the re
view was uking pbce wi thin the current framewo rk o f j apa n's Consti
tution :1nd thc existing defensive missions of the jSDF Privately
j.lpaneSl' o tlici:1ls 1l1:1de itkar thro ugh the press that the original im
petus for revising the guidelines W;l S the tense situaflono
n
-
the
Korean
PCllinsuh :l11d IlOt the crisis in the Tai\van Straits, , 21
Howcver, these efforts at transpa rency Jnd rea ssurance were ham
pered by the Llct that the United States :1nd japan had refused to rule
ill or out ,11 1)' specific scenario or geographic locati on around japan , in
cluding Taiw::In, Confusion t'IlSUCc..l, When the LDP secretary gent'r:JI,
](;1t (\ K()ichi, proll1isedhis co unte rp:nts during a visit to Be ijing ill AlI
-
l!,ltst 1l)'n that Taiw'an wo uld not be illcll/dcd, he forced hi s ri va l. C hi ef
' '
Cabillet Secret:1ry Kajiyalll ;l, to respond the next day that T:1iwan could
not be The guidelines \vere released in September 11(:'\\'
I()l)7 without mClltioning T,li"';( ll , but since th:1t time the Chincse
ILlS ll';ed K:lji\':lll1<l's SLll c nlt'llt to argul' th at Taiwan is ill
,' ltll""l ill th,' \ x)h,'ll rh ,' North AlllcricJIl Atllirs bun:a u di
Il'd ,ll I "j',' i:-',II [,) 1,\ \h,' 1)1,'( PII 1\/\:1\ 22. tl1.1\
- --the guidelines \v6-t:dd- riot- exceed the geographic definition of Article
VI of the Security Treaty, he was forced to resign by Prime Ministet
Hashimoto. Hashimoto had told the Chinese that there was no geo
graphic definition, and the director general had made the mistake of
reminding the Diet that the government's standing interpretation of
Article VI of the treary included Taiwan. I
From Tokyo's perspective, these attacks marked a change in China's
policy toward the alliance. If China saw a reaffirl11t'd U.S.-Japan alliance
as inimical to its interests-in COntraSt to Beijing's previous tacit sUPPOrt
for the alliance-then there was good reason to Ivorry about long-term
Chinese imentions. In addition, Beijing's demand that the guidelines
exclude Taiwan suggested that China views military action in the Tai
II'an Strait's as an inrernalmatter with no bearing on Japanese security.
While J;lpan mJintained a strict policy of recogniziIlg only one China,
the Chinese Jssenioll that a conflict ill the Taiwan StrJits had no re
gional implications lIas an unacceptable premise. Finally, it became clear
In' September 1 thJt l3eijing was focusing its pressure almost entirely
onJapan Jnd avoiding high-level criticism of the guidelines ill relations
"'ith the United States.
n
The efforts at transparency and clarification
had not exactly led to confidence building.
Theater Missile Difense
A I'ery silllibr dynamic was rt'peated in the debate over tht';1[(.:'r missile
ddt'nse (TMD).japJn first embarked on ajoint study of missile defense
requirements with the United States in 1994 afi:er several years of U.S.
prodding for japJnese participation in this mJjor program. TMD,
. though costly and uncertain in terms of technical feasibiJity, had the
suPpOrt ,:fjap;mese ilkiustry, the JDA, and MOFA, as an
enhancer, a technologY-driver, and a buttress for the U.S. nllcle;lr deter
rell[ against North Korcan :1I1d Chinese ballistiL' missiles. Like the
Ddense Guidelines rt'l'iew,joinr work 011 TMD \\";lS seen ill Tokyo and
WJshington ;IS stJbilizing :1Ild reinforcing the SCItLIS guo ;lg;linst new
threars; but Ollce again Beijing S:l\.V the dt'velopll1ellt as aillled :It under
mining Chinese security.
ConspicuoLls Chinese objections to japanese p:-micip:1tioll in TMD
bt'ga!l in 19<)5 and have been JS strenuous as the objcctions to the re
visL'd Defells
e
Guidelines. Beijing Mgued trom the beginning that U.S.
JapaJl TMD cooperation 1I1lderJllines Chin:l's nuell. ;)r lktL'rl"cllt and
111ighr lk' L':\tL'llded to rh
"
ofTli\\":II1.-
I
\ !'lll' I'mhklll with this
logk tillllll()/-;I"l), f'n'f)l'l'[il"L' 11.1' rlul ilf).111 f""','.",., IIll 1I1I,'k.11"
Japan-China Relations 93
weapons, and therefort' China's concern about its ability to maintain a
nuclear strike c:tp:tbility :1gainst japan suggests that Chinese missiles not
only target Japant'se territory, but that ChillJ's policies o('"no first use"
and "no use against nonnuclear states" do not apply to J:lpan. Ironically,
the Chinese to TMD only heightened japanese concerns
about a Chinese ballistic missile threat that had been a secondary con
cern after North Korea in the initial discllssions over
China's verbal battle.to obstruct TMD cooperation in japan was dealt
a serious blow ill August 1998 with the North Korea Taepo-dong mis
sile launch. Washington and, Tokyo had privately agreed to collaborate
on research on [he missile interceptor for the Navy- Theater Wide sys
tem (a major step beyond the joint "study" of requirements starred in
199-+) and were delayed only by MOFA's concern that the announce
ment not undercut the visit ofjiang Zemin to Tokyo th ,lt fall. With the
Taepodong launch. how('vcr, diplom,ltic ddt.'rence to China fell quickly
by the wayside, and the United States and japan announced joint de
velopment in October 199H, a month beforc jiang's visit. Politicians and
officials in Tokyo still have many qUt'stiol1S ;1bout TMD. Will it work?
Will it undermine the Anti-Ballistic Missik Treaty? Will it be afford
able; However, Chinese objections alone arc 110 longer enough to de
rail TMD and could even enhaJlce its support in japan.
A Neill Difense Dilemma?
The predictable trilateral securiry dynamics of the 1<)7()s ;lnd 1<)80s are
mer. Tightly constrained and JSYl1lllletric US.-japan military coopera
tioll is no longer credible in Washington or Tokyo. The Chinese roler
ance for the U.S.-japan alliance has ,,aned. And japanese planners now
;IS\1I111e military assets could pose a pOtential long-term
threat to Japanese interests. Ironically, JIl of this became clear as both
Chill,) alld japan sought to reestablish wh,l[ they saw as the status guo:
( :hil l,l by laul1ching mi ss iles to discourage Taiwanese independellce, ;lnd
_hf' ,111 by reaffirming the U.S.-j;lpan alliance. Thc'se :He tht' ingrL'dients
t()j <I classic defense dilemma, as each side pnceives rhl:' other's etrort.to
protect itself from change as J ne\v threJt. Fortunately, the Sino
Japanl'se defense dilemma is largely cushioned by the overwht'lming
presl'nee of the United States in the region ;lI1d by jJp,1n's continuing
relidllCl' on the US.-japJn alli:lIlce.
:\[ .IIWthL'r k\"L-I, hOlICH'I", dforr') to confidence and ,Ivoid a
hil.l t, l.d dill'llllil .1 hW,' hl'CII l' ollll,lil':ttni h the dil'L'rgillg
\ I,'", _'II Ili,ll'l"k.d I'I",,['L-Ilh h,I "l Ci l. l.q,.111 .111,1 (:hill.;
The History losing Tractio_n .
Jlllar Guilt as Diplomacy
At the base of the postwar str ucture of Sino-japanese relations lies the
legacy of the Sino-j apa nese War of 1937 to 1945. The japanese yen loan
program, the domestic political consensus on China policy, and even the
complementary C hinese and japanese security policies of the Cold War
era all rested on a common understanding that japan had to make
amends for the past. The war defined the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communi st Party, which had resisted the Imperial jap:lI1ese Army, and
empowered Beijing to pJSS judgment on th e direCtion of postwar j apan.
When LOP leaders worshipped at the Yasukuni War Shrine or called
for dramatic increases in defense spending, the Japanese media would
amplify Ch inese criti cism to demonstrate the dangers of relllilitari za
ti o n. The legacy of the past ga\'t" BeUing a pO\wrful card in J apan 's do
mestic debate. Beijing has been unwilling to yield that ca rd umil it can
be convinced militari sm is ckad forever in j<lp,ln.
In Japan , however, the re is increasi ng apology fatigue . A nt'\\' genera
tion ofJapallese leaders no longer instinCtively understand why China has
the right to obstruct Japan's aspirations for influence. While they recog
nize still the necessity of dealing with the past, the\' are resentful of what
they see as cynical Chinese manipulati o n of the hi story c mi in bilateral
negotiations over iss ues unrelated to hisrory. After fifty of den10c
racy, they believe Jap,l11 is a ditferent couIltry. Thc'y are to apologize
for the past, but only if they can put it behind thl'lll :llld IllOVl' fOl\vard.
japanese leaders have attempted to move beyolld the histor y problem
with Beijing by expressing remorse ;lI1d self-corltt'lllplatioll on :1 num
ber of occasions. For example:
.,
In 1982 Prime Minister Nabsone Ya suhiro t()ld th
l
' I )iL't rlnt Japan
must acknowledge the "strict illternatioml Critlcisill th:lt j apJn in
vaded" other countries.
In J98<) Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru told tilt' ])ict Budget
Committee th:u " it is a fact th:u Japan brought grc:u dt'struction on
Ilelghboring countries ;1I1d peoples" ;lIld thal' "It Cl llil ot be denied
th;lt Japan im-:ldcd these coulHries."
III 19<)() Eillperor Akihit o gJW a speech rlLlt the " unhappy
P;lst of this century .. . never be repe;ul' d again."
III 1l) ')() Primc Millistl'r KJifu Tosh iki "full .lCtl'pt;lllce of
thl' (;1<'t th;n J:IP:1II im'xkd" the other ILuioll'. of Asi:l.
i
I
1
In 1<)<)2 Prllne Minister Ml YJZ;l\\'J Kiichi noted ina -speecb that
japan must "demonstrate deep reflection and regret."
In 1992 Emperor Akihiro, in hi s hi sto ric visit to C hina, told his
Chinese hom dut he "deeply deplores" the historical actions of
Japan agaillSt ChinJ.
In 1993 Prime Minist e r Hosobwa Morihiro argued that Japan
must again feelings of "deep reflecti o n Jild remo rse for all
of the pain ,1nd sutTering caused to so many people in the past by
Japan's aggressive W,H and coIOlliz,lti o n ."
In 1994 Prime Minister Murayal11a Tomiichi repeated thi s call for
"deep retlection and remorse" in his opening speech to th e Di e t.
In 1995 Prime Mini ster MurayanLl visited the Marco Po lo I3ridge,
where fire fight bepn be twee n japanese and Chinese soldiers
which triggered eight of full-scale conflict between the twO
cou ntries until Japan lost World War II. Mur;lyama "prayed for
japan-China tj-iendshlp and ett'rILll pe:lce."
These expressions of deep rdll'ccion and remorse \wre repea ted by
Prime Mini ste rs Hashimoto and Obllchi in 1<)W). 1<)l)7 , and 1<)98.
Yet none of these tortuo usly negotiated and considered expressions
of remorse ever ended the hi story problem with ChIl1J. From Beijing's
perspecti ve, each one almost made things worse, since negotiations wi th
the Japanese gO\'ernmcnr over the eX,lCt wording ofi:t'n revea led the ex
tent to w hich l11any j apJnese leJders did not share tht' sentiments ex
pressed. Morl'o\-er, th e precedi ng list o t- apologle<; is ofEet by a
depressing lit of (gaffes) by senior japanese leaders over the same
period. A sho rt li st would include the following:
In August then EduC:l ti on Mi nis t e r Fujio Masayoshi \vas fired
;lftl'r he ;lrgucd th ;u japan did Il Ot coml11iC"murder-' in Nanjing ac
co rding to intl'r llat iollJ I bwY
011 April :?-t, 1 Okuno Sei\uke, thl'll director general of the
N;uioILt\ L;lIld Agcncy. \\ ';1S forced to resign after tclling a press con
fert"IlCt' that j apan \\'as forced into the war to help /\<; ia resist "\\ hite
;l ggressors."f,
In M;ty 1t)<)-t then just ice Minister N agano Shigt'to was forced to
res ign after tellIng Air/illichi ShilJlullIl t11;lt th e Nanjlng \vas
J "trumped-up stor y."
In August Il)l).') thell Education Mini st er Shi!ll,lJ1lUra Yoshillobu
\\';lS (c!1Sort,d lw the chief cahinet for at :1
96 Japan's Reluctant Realism
conference that the question of japanese culpabilic,' for World War
II \\'as a matter of personal inte rpretati on
n
The Chinese press :Illd premi er Li Peng were highly c riti cal of the

japanese governme nt's weak official apology on the fiftieth an
niver sar y of th e end of the 'vvar' because the debate re\'ealed such
mixed se ntiments <llllollgjapanese politicIans, Eve n Prime Minister
Murayama 's own speech express ing deep remorse for japanese ac
tions did not assuage
At the sallle time, however, Beijing has also failed to see the extent to
which the japanese government 's repeated efforts to express remorse have
brought closure 011 the hi story issue tor a ne\\' generat ion ofJapanese.
49
In
quantitati ve terms, these IIIOII,<?CII have decreased OVl' r the past decade, but
each ne\\' statement o nly confirms a deepening C hil1l'se smpicion that
jap;lIlese "militarism" is being reborn. ! ndeed. C hinese perceptions ofjapan
\\'orsened in the second half of the J990s, ,A. taken in 19<)6 by the
Institute for Reforlll of the Economic System in C hina after the Taiwan
missile tests in 1996. to r example, fOLlnd that the nation Chinese people
disliked most w;ls japan (47 percent) . tollowed by the United States at (37,7
percent), The di verge nce on thl' history problem is particuhrly st riking
among younger generati o ns of Chinese, W hil e you nger japaTlL"ie are in
c reasingl y eager to move beyond thL' hi stol"\" problem, yOllllgn C hin.... se
may be taking all inc reasingl y IlJrd-line \' ie\\', In 1996 the Chim Youth
Report conducted a sur vey of 100,000 youths in China a\"l:Tagillg age
t\\'enty-five on the qllestion ofjapan-China rel at ions and found that only
t 5 percent felt " proxi Illiey" with japan, and only 14 percent thougllt japan
China relations \vere good, while 42 percent 'did no(-have a
impression ofjapan. Inte resti ngly, an oven\'helllling majority olthe youths
n;lllled wartime pre mier T6j6 Hideki as the most famo us japanese. japan
did no t get many points for econolllic cooperation either, wit h 45 percent
of the youths responding that the main purpose of j;lpanese im'e,t1l1ent
il1to C hina is to the C hinese market. (Only ..L5 percent behn'e that
.};1palwse \\'ant to contr ibllte to the CClll10l1lic de\-cloplllcnt of
ChilLl.) Keio Ulli\'er,ity Chi nd scholar KOJlllU 1i.l I11l1yuki dttributes th e
\'iew of };lp;1l1 among the YOllnger ge llerat ion to the persistent
tL"lc1llng ofjapan \ \\ ';lrtil1le invasion of China ill ChiIlL'st' tc'\tbooks.'i
ll
Tile ])I/S( Collides Il'ilil till' Fulure: Thl' "1998 Jia"g-Olwelli 511111111il
","hi, i ll J'I'.III,",\' ,III,! l '''i ll('o; ( ' \u\\ ' \ '1 ' (1", III , I UI\'
"" , .1.1........ . ," ........ ., , I .. , "I ., ... "I. . .. 1 ,1.1 ": I....... . , 1.. .. " . I' . .,., I... " . 1, ,
., .
jiang Z eJllin's offIcial state visit .. to japan , This was the first official visit
ofa Chinese president tojapall ,OI :llld felljll st o ne year after the t\\"enty
fifth anniversary of the no rma\iz;1tion of relations betweell jaFln and
China. After tenSi011S over the nuckar tests, th e Taiwan Straits. the
Senkaku Islands, the Defense Guidelines, and TMD, the foreign min
istries of both countries were looking for a \\fay tol1
ut
TC\a{.jonson .J
1110 positive footing. The historic occasion of jiang's visit appeared
re
pregnant with opportunity. 13tH in the end it \\ 'ould only reintorce the
mistrust emerging between Beijing and Tokyo,
In preparation for the summit, the japanese and C hinese foreign
ministri es disCLlssed th e inclusion ofjapan's "deep relllorse" (/1<1II.'ci) and
"heartfelt apology" (0 II'llbi) in the joint declaration that would be
signed by ObLlchi :1I1 d jiang, ThiS same formula had worked in the Ja
panese joint decbr<1tion wi th South Korea n President Kim Dae Jung
t\VO months before, as we \\ill ,ee in th e ne'\t chapter. Ho\\'e\TL Kim
had acce pted the japanese apology as the "fild \\'ord" :1I1d had
to move forward \\'ith a ne\\ J;lpan-R.l'publi c of Korea (ROK) reb
tionship. jiang, in contrast. rejected hi s diplom<m' formula and argued
that there should be 110 " final \\'ord
n
011 the hI sto ry issue. Without clo
sure, japan's MOFA could 110t Will domestic political support for a
joint declaration th ;l t incluckd the word "apologize." Moreo\'er, the
LOP refused to support any refL'rcl1cl' to th e " Three No's" all Tai wan
(110 suppo rt for T:1 i\\,;1I1's indt.'pendencl', for membership in int erna
tlOn;)l nr for t\\"O delll:ll1d frol11 13 ei
tl);1t Prcs idL'nt C lintol1 had endorsed during hi s visit to Beijing
that jllllL.
\X/ith the hi story problem boiling over, expectations that stability
could he recst:.1blished to Sino-Jap<lncse relations quickly began to evap
matL'. J grew vis ibl y al1 gr y :.111d at hi s h osts'
(0 apologize. During the offlci;ll dinner wi th Emperor AkihitO on No
\'cl11bn 2(), he \\'ore a M ao j;lcket to cont1';l <;t \\'ith the imperial splen
dor in the: pa\:1cc :1nd lectured hi , host o n the hi story problen1 during
the for 111 al tOast. photo \\"as on the ti'ont p;lge of cvery lle\\'spaper
the not day. Politici;1I1s :111d politiClI co mmentators wnc shocked at the
Chill cse le;)der's " rlldel1ess,"';2 In hi s slllll mit sessiol1 with Prim.... Mini s
ter Obuchi the 11l''\t dav Jial1(r broke frol1l th e pre:"'llTreed a"enda to (r ive
I ' ;J ;:-"I 0
;) lengthy express ion of hi<; di ssJtisfacrio n \\'i th Japal1 's trea tment of th e
hi,rory iss ue and Tllwan,,1 Meal1whik, througho ut th e SUIl1I11it .li ang
l'OlllpiJll1l'd to till' Chll1l'o,c ;Ihullt th e of Jap:lll c' <;L' rCl1lili
1.11'1 /,111"" III illl,'n'll'\\" til.ll \\'l're i"'ol.llllh rC'pn) till l"l' d III thc'
98
Japan's Reluctant Realism iF'
Obuchi refused to yield Oil the history question and won broad
z

praise at home for his firm stand, The --4.salll ;md !'viainiclll' and the more
conservative YOJllillri and Saillm' either rem:uned silent or expressed sup
port for the government 's posi tion, Many LOP politicians skipped the
state dinner held for Jiang, choosing instead to att end a speech by Ko
rean Prime Mini ster Kil11,1ong Pi! in KYllshu at the same time , Even the
business leaders in the japan- China Business Ass oci at ion expressed sup
port for the gover nmem 's firm stand, The only notable dissen ter was
the chairman of the japan Communist Part\', who expressed dissatisfac
ti'on with the japanese government's statement on history during a
meeting with Jiang that symbolized th e renewed ties between the two
countries' Communist p;uties, Yet this Communi st connect ion only
further reintorced the impression the Chinese leadership was out
of tollch with contel1lpOLuy
The centerpien:' that the foreign ministries had planned for the Sllm
nllt sti ll held impressl\'l' (oments, Tile J;q..lall- China joint Declaration on
l3uilding a Partnership of Friendship Cooperatioll for Peace and De
velopment cont ained Jll for up ro 390 billion yen for t\\'enty
eight projects during thL' rem:li l1ll1g t \\'O years of the Fourth Yell Loan
Package, In additi on, Obllchi e,'\pressed his deep remorse (!lall ,\CI) for "the
serious distress Jnd dal1l:1ge that J1Pclll caused to tlw C hin ese people
through its aggression against Chlll :l," 13ut Obuchi stopped short of the
heartfel t apolos'), (l) I1'dln) that jlang h:lc1 wanted and that Kim Dae jung
had received, It \Vas ollly olle \\'orc! , but its ab\ellce spoke volumes,""
In the weeks before the slIIllmit. C hina scholars in japan had call ed
for a "new era 111 j Jpal1-ChinJ After the vis it, as one C hi na
scholar put it: " the tLlliition al pro-Chll1:1 school has b,,'Ci1 cLldicated by
C hina 's
The Declining Saliency of Economic Tools
III the lludst of tensiOllS over clolllestic politlcs, st'curiry policy, and hi s
rory, econolllic lllt erdependellCc' bet\\'e en Chin,l ,lnd jap:lll remains a
powerful force, According to MOE toed tLld e between tilt' two COUll-'
tries grew fi'0111 S1 billion in to S()(J.2 billi o n in 1l) ()9'i'J w hile
J:lp:lIl ese foreign direct iJl\'estrnent int o China ros e fi-om $43K million in
to S-1-,S bil li oll ill 1 ()l)Sf," (ThIS !lumber fell to $1, 1 billion in
, llJ l)?-jhl) These economic :H-ti\'lti c' s h,l \'e created illlportJllt sine\\'s bc
1\\l'l'11JIP;111 ,IIH1 tlLlr \\'l'I',' Iwt ill pl.l l'L' th e
'{,'I "\'l'll III hl'III"" 1'l-i.lli') II', ,I' lI-;lI:t1 is ll\' l'J'. 1)l's l)lr,' rhe
"' I, I' '' I,ljl "I 1i'.I,k ,111\1 111\,"I I)Il'I \{ , III ,',' Id;' <1. dlrl '\' 1II ,q,)J' l)h,\, kl ll '
emerged by the end of the 1l)l)()S to sugges t that Japanese economic in
fluence on Chin;] and Chin:l's cconomic influence on japan may have
,peaked for the time being,
First , there is rising presslIre fo r a decrease in the yen loans, As the
LDP Foreign Affairs COll1missioll wa rned in 19l17: '' It is highl y likely
that China will catch lip to :\lld overtake Japan economically by around
the year 2010, Whl'n this OCCllrs, the purpose of the yen credits pro
aral11, conceived 3U veors earlier, will have been fulfilled, Therefore, the
:::> '
time has come to initiate a comprehensive reassess ment of japan's :1ss is
tance to China, including discussions of whether or not y ell credits
should be cominued,"(,2
Within years , that \yarning became reality, In july 2000, MOFA es
tablishcd a pri\',ne sector stud,;-' group to revi ew the yen IO,lll policy to
China with ,In l' \'C to estJ bli shin g llt'W frolTle,,\'ork for the loans that
\Vould 11la:-.:illlizl' jap,mesl' leverage (bv sho rtening the duration of the
loans, COl' e:-':;llllple) ,llld SUStalll SOl l1 e level of domestic political su p
port for continuati on :ll1 d refol'lhing of the 10;lns
f
),\ That domestic
support is prm'iIlg more difficult. however, Wlth growi ng Chinese
ll1iliur y activitie<; in th e area , mounting eviden ce that Bei
jing provid ed tec hllicJI assistance to North Korean and P3kistani mis
sile progralllS, usc of ODA to enhance its own inUu ence
in Asia and thc Third World , the LDP's Foreign AffJirs 311d Defense
(OlllI11lrtceS dLltrillg 11L'\\' <;tricter guidelin es for aid to China in
lhL' <; Ullll11cr of 2( II
SL'lolld, fOI" ' igll dirL'ct investll lent in China is likel y to de-
tTl' :ISl' ill r,' Lt rl \'l' 1111 porLlIl ce to th e Chinese econ omy, The number of
f:J)1 (Oil ,1 cOlltract basi s) decreased 43 percent in 1<)9 -1-,22,2
pl..' rc ..l in Il),),::',)],7 PC1'Cl' llt in 1l1<:!6 , and 1-1- ,3 percent in \ <)l)7 ,(,S
I':r<llil 1()<):, (() IlJ')S rhL' ,1l110Ullt of new Jlpanese FDl to China de
creasecl from S7l)() million to :ti1l)O million,(,I, japan-C hin a Economic
Assoc i:lti oll rL',-e:lrch suggests th:1t thi s trend acct'ler3ted with the eco
1101IIIC UhI' In ,A,,,ia , but the economi c crisis is not th e onl\' fa ctor. J1P
:'11,><;(' t1rl11 '> h.l\'C grO\\'n frllstrJted with un cert:l illty about Chinese
l':\Ch:lllgC r:ltL' policy, diIllini shing returns Oil investment , and repeated
\\'ith h:ll' 1l1ful Chil1ese regulati ons. Most damaging has been
Chill,l'S rl'fusal to honor a pledge to dismantle tOX structures that favor
dOl11csri c producers by pLl cillg a 17 percent \'altle-added ta:-.: Oil sales
from IlHL'l gn atiiitatcs."- As Tlmb Naoki of Kc/ndlln'lI not es, "the real
It \' i-; t1Llr 1l 0 [ Ill.1I1\' l'll ll1palli l's ;lre level, of profits that are C0111
Illl'll-;II! ,ll l' \\irll rl1[' !to\',,1 ()I' ill\'l'Stlll,'llt b"illg 11LHk ill China and it i\
IIli , ' 1111t'1 1l I,-;' ,tl ll\ 11\.11 i, II I- Ill, illL?: .I In l,'\\ ,)1' rll,' il) \',',l ll1 CI H bl'illg
"""J

Pi? lI)d Co IAliA;; < RPllj( Utili RD.-ii igiti
made in China."('/{ III 199H japan's investment in to C hina (excluding
H o ng Kong and Tai wa n) was still hi gher than that of th e United States
or the European Uni o n, but japanese business leaders expect that U.S.
investment int o C hina \\ill surpass japan's in the future.!")
Finally, japanese economic relations \Vith China ha ve been affected
by ri valry at the strateg ic level. The j apan-C hina Econo mic Associ ation
annual business executi\e fo rums in Beijing began to turn sou r in 1995
w hen the C hinese side \\arned that j apan's sll spensio n of g:-ant aid aft er
the nuclear tests would have a negati ve impact on japanese econo mic
interests in C hina. Li Peng told the delegati o n headed by Toyota chair
man Toyoda Soi chiro that " the damage China received as a result of
japan's aggressi ve war canno t even be compared to j apan 's level of
aid.. !" In 1Y96 the Chinese side cl aimed that japan 's nati o nali sm on the
Senbkus "would affect business relati o ns."7 1 By the twe nty-fifth an
nive'rsa ry celebratioll o fjapaJ1-China busines ; ties in 1097, m e mbers of
the Japanese delegati o n e'xpressed frustration to the press at the heavy
handed Chinese approach
n
japanese business executi ves argue th:lt
working-level re lations \\" ith local autho riti es o r businesses often pro
ceed well, o nly to be ti-ustrat ed by decisi o ns taken ill Beijing t o reverse
j apanese advances fo r po liti ca l or strategic reaso ns
n
The net effect o f these changes o n japan's po litical :l1ld eco no mic re
lationship w ith C hina is still unce rtain. Orli c lals at the jap;m-China
Economic Associ ation maintain that th e COlltLldi c ti o ll S be t\\een the
Chinese C o nl111uni st Par ry's strategy of contail l lllgj ap,11I ;lJ1d th e desire
fo r Jlpanese investmellt at th e local level canJ10t COIHlilu e. Either the
Chinese side w ill emphasi ze the str,ltegic iss li es beClllse It h,ls confI
d ence' in the draw o f its marke t , or C hin a's eCOnOll1l C pro blelll s w ill lead
to a mo re concili ato r y posture tov" ard j apaJ1 in order to attr:l ct FO!.
What these Sar1;' p. o ffici als acknow ledge IS th :H th l' e xperi e nces fro ll1
1995 to 1998 have led to a conve rgence o f npilli o llS on C hin:l in the
business conullunity, th e governmeJ1t , academia , and th e l11 l' d ia . As one
execLlti ve at the japan-C hin'l Econo mi c ASS(Hi:ltioll pllt it: "Now that
we ha\ 'e come to llllJnStand C hin,l be tter, eVl'r yo ll C reali zes th ,lt coun
try's immense probl ems an d possibilities."n
Terms of Engagement
From Be ijing's 1l1l Clt' ;1I tc'S ts in 1095 to ji;1I1 g Z Clll ill's hi story-laden
SllilllllI[ in Tok yo in 1 ()f)S, th e .!ap:li1 ese ap proa ch to ( : hiILl , hit-ted re
ItI Cf. lI ltk t o\\' ,l rd :1 i"l ' ,di'lll. Thl' pdl.l r .; tlut hl'ld thc Slrlldllrl' of
Slllc)l.q).ll h" ( l,il.ll ('I'. d 1, \. ll l l )II ' III 1,l. lc( ill ( { ( )I , I \\ .I r ,dl ('1" \1111
.-, - ..... . .. ,...
bled to a significant ext e nt. japanese unhinged
and fr0 111 bo th the Left and the lZ.ight o f the Di et fo rced an un
precedellted suspension o f gralit aid. japanese and Chinese security
policies stood in stark co,ltradi cti o n fo r the first time with the Taiwan
Straits crisis and the guidelill es revi evv. The atrophying of elite t{es be
tween the twO cotilltri <:s all owed nati o nalists to set for the
Senkaku dispute, DissolLl nce g rew b etween n ew generati o ns of Chi
nese and japanese lead ers over the histori cal issu e. Econo mic interde
pendence continued to grow, but the relative influence o f japanese
economic tools may bc in decline.
Economic Engagement
At the sa me time, h oweyer, it is impo rtan t to account fo r wh at has no t
changed in Sino -jap;lI1e' se relat ions. For o ne thing, the yen loans-the
" root and trunk" of Sino-jap;1I1ese relati o ns-have survi ved re peat ed
atta cks fro m the D ie t. Despit e some call s fo r a policy of relative gains
vi s- a-\.is China, and desp ite the likelihood th at th e ye n loans w ill de
crease in b o th absolute Ilumbe rs and rel ative impac t to the Chinese
economy, japan simply ca nno t walk away from C hina's economi c de
vel opme nt. A p o liticall y uns ta ble Ch1l1a wo uld threate n japan's funda
mental interests as nlllch as a c(yh esive alld hege mo ni c C hi:na would.
And a'> a Kcln l1 11rCIl repo rt wa rned in ILJ LJ 4 , thc Ill OSt troubling near
term threat fro m C hin;l IS not military or politi cal at all, but rather the
that unbridled Chinese econo mi c growth co uld Cl use co mpe
tit ion fo r ene rgy suppl y as well as increased po lluti o n and environ
mental Fo r som e time to come, To kyo w ill have to use
its O\\n fundi;lg to addl:ess these C hinese problems as a matt er
of j apanese self-interest. ' ,
C hina 's excessi ve reliance 011 pot entiall y unsafe nucl ear pow er plants
Jnd fossil fuel s prescilh ;1 parti cularl y se ri o us pro bl e m fo r japan. The
j.lp:l1l- C hiILl Encq..;y L :c hall ge Associati o n l'stil11at ed 111 1993 that
C hin;] would requl r<: 1,3lJ2 MTOE (milli o n toIlS o il equi valent) by
2U111.jap:1l1t'se !luclear energy expert s warn that if the China Nuclear
Cor porati o il 's plallS for ilH.: reas in g nucl ear ca pacit y t e nfold to m eet thi s
ne\\. demand ;)re rea lized, japan would fa ce the possibility o f " multiple
C herno byl-style acc idents" in w hich "radi oacti ve clo uds w ill fIrSt hit
japail dnd tl1l'n sprl'ad aro und the wo rld.,,7!, China's burgeoning inter
est in fast hrct' de r reactors has also abrl11ed J;lp:lnCSe c lingy authori
\\hu IH1\\ ' sllPf'or( t\1 ;' (OIl Ct'pt o f Jil ASIA- ATO M n rgani z;ltioll
(\ Il tlh' 1() i\ \ ) III (' I\ kr 1( \ tlh' I' rosl' ('dS fur
I'Cdll::'JlI
ll1spectJon and control of China's future recycling programs (a nd to
give greater legitima cy to japan's own troubled program)77
In the 1 <)80s japan's grant aid and O\'erseas Economic Cooperation
Fund (OECF) spending in China was dn'oted almost entirely to large
scal e infrastructure projects, When acid rain from China began falling
on j apan in the early 199Us, however, the tOClIS of assistallce was quickly
rechanneled to cover environmental prot t'ct ion , The change in empha
sis was marked wi th the establi shment in 1<)<)1 of the S I 00 million
japan-China Friendship Environmental Protection Center in Beijing,78
The porti on of grant aid and concessional loans addressing environ
mental programs in China has steadil y in creased ever since, Of japan's
$5,52 billion FOllrth Yen Loan Package ( J 996 to 19<)8), S2,25 billion
were energy focused, and fifteen of the torry projects under the pack
age were environ mcntaI
7
'} EnvironlllenLll projects also accounted for
the bulk of proj ects ill the final phase of th e Fourth P,lCkage ( 1999 to
2()()1), Through the Green Aid Pl an, M[T[ has leveraged O])A to en
cOl1rage japanese industry associa ti ons to coopt'r;ne 011 large- scale envi
ronmental projcCts in China, j apanese interest has also focused on
pipeline projects inside China that would enhance interdependence and
discourage China from embarking on a na\'al 11lodt' rniz;)tioll program
aimed at secu ring natural resources, SfI
Concerned about Chinese political stabilirv, tilt' japJIH.:sl' goverllment
has also begun refocusing its yen loans 011 de\'el oplll t' nt of the Chinese
intt'rior. In 19,-}7 the japan-China Economic Associati on marked its
t\Venty-fifth anniversary (dating to normalization in 1 <)72) with :l major
symposi um in l3eijing for economic officials fro m the interior provinces
of China, The final installment of the Fourth Yen Loan package also fo
cused on projects in the Chinese interior. [n part this was driven by Bei
jing's stra tegy to usc j apanese aid to for the lack of private
investment in the imeri or regions, but Toh'o also has an interest ill pre
venting destabilizing gaps in \ve'llth withill China, l;1 of
C hilla is one of the WOrst scenari os cOll side red ill Tokvo,
Japan 's dTort to intt'grate the Chim imo (he global econoJ11Y has also
coJltillued, in spite of a new temions on othcc>r fi'Ol1ts, Japan quietly sup
purred Chinese pa rticipati on in the G-7 sLllllmits in tht' ('a ri y 1<)ljOs and
t()rllJally proposed China's' participcition in the N<lkl SlJl1lmit in Oki
11a\\i;J in july 2000 (which l3eijing rejectecl ), j apa n h:J s ;ll so pushed for
( : hill .l's "Jrly ad mi ssion in the World Trade Organization, re,lc hing
ill Jlllv 1,-}08 on the Jc,'essiOIl pn)(oLol, Prilllt' Min
istl'l ()bl l,' lli ', tl) T(lkn) ILl S ,III IIHl'r,',t ill til t' \X/TO
II' 1'1'\' (>1,,'11 ('Ilill"'" ,111 , 1 ,ds() h ' f'I,'\,'111 l 'hill.l li"'!11 1111,Jt-r
mining the global trading regime, As the 191.)7 report Oll WTO com
pliance by the Industri al StruCture Coullcil (an ,lcivisory body of MITI)
notes "China 's accession to the WTO, tollowed by ill1plelllcc>ntation of
its commitments for 100\'t.' rill g tariff rates, .:Iilllination of trade restric
tions, and improwments ill its trade and economic systems, should ben
dit both japan and the glob'll econ0111\ significantly,"": Fo r japan, a
China outside of the WTO denies "lll cc> ans for either WTO members
or China to resolve trade disputes bet\w':ll th em other th.ln to tr y to
b
'l II .. ,n
do so latera Y, "
cc>conomlc 1l1
japan-despite increased hedging-is still bt' tting on
in th e global
terdependence ,lnd the peJceful integration of Chilla
economy.
Rivalry
Howeve r, it is \\'hat is lll'\\ in Sino-jap.lllese relations since the end of
the Cold War th.1t is Illost stri ki llg-and th;lt is the pronounced rivalry
and hedging that have ell1erged si nce the.' mi ddle of the 19t)Os , Increas
ingly, j apanese diplomac\' has been energized by th e effort to engage,
const rain, and outmant' u\'c' r China ill Asia,
At fir st thc ]<lp;meSL' rL'\pOnSe to gro\\' ing tension in rela tions with
China was to push for grL' ,ner di'llogut' ,lnd transp;lrency SillCe Sino
Jap:Jnesl' r<:Lltioll\ had IT11UinL'd fri endl y for the first fe\\' \'ears after the
Cold War. there \\';15 cO llti cknce in Tok\o th;lt Chinese suspicioll of the
St'nkaku probklll , the guidelilles, and history could be resolved \\'ith a
simple ciarifl(;llioll ofjap'lIl's position, For e)\ample , a 1 <)'15 nongovc'rn
Jllciltal blut' ribbon on ChillJpqlicy " straightforward
di:Jlugul'" wi th China on securit y issues , iLlcIudillg a " frank of
hi stori cal Th t' 1<),)7 LDP forei gn
:l rgucd that ''Jap;l ll must he ca ndid \vith China and must not hesitate to
press for lllore open sharing of n,ltionJI defense illforlll ation or to re
quest pClCcful 11L'gotiatioJlS ",hell probleills do ;lrisl',"xo As ,\'illoll /(ci ::: ()i
Sf';IIl/HIII correspondellt 1m Hi sayoshi not ed skeptiCl lh' ;It thl' time,
"there is all illusion that L'\'l'rything \\'ill be resolved by t'ngagelllelH."i)(,
Newrtheless, MOFA has wielded the sword of dial ogue with gnsto,
Bureau director-l evel <;L'c urity polin' talks began \\' ith C hilla in
March 19<)()' \\'ith MOFA official s regist ering COJlCCl'n<> ,lhollt th e Tli
\\';]11 Strait 's crisis and Chilla rebutting \\ith ,1 li st of territori ;l l alld hi s
tori c. J! gri L' '';ll ll' l' S, In 1l)lJ7 Jt till' AS EA N IZ q.>;ional Forum (A RF)
Ill l'l,tillC'-' ill ,1,lk:'rt:" ti'Ol11 the ( :hillL" ,' .Inti .J;lP:l llL'''l'
ht'C'-,1 11 \\\,,:.1. , "\','\, '1' 1\ \1 ),1,,1\\,111. ,lilt! llll'

Then in April IlJ lJ t3 Kyuma Fumio made the first visit to
China by ;i jDA director general in eleve n yea rs,HI{ Other efforts to
expand di reet 111 iI ita ry-to- miI i tar y talks have proven less successful,
primaril y because of C hin ese resistance (t ho ugh China did fmally
agree to an exchange of ship visits in October 20(0), As we will see
in the chapter on multibteral d{ploma cy, th ese confrolltations in bi
hteral and l1lultilateral forums have continued, but japanese officials
still view am' Chinese engagement on security issues as a posi tive de
wlopl11 ent- e\'en if solutions are not found ,
Tokyo klS also pushed for other " l1linil atcral" forums to bring its
Clse to China, After th e Chinese criticisms of the U.S,-japan Security
Dechration in 1996 , for example, japanese offIcials and academics
began proposing a u.S,-japall- Chilla trilateral dial ogue, In 1997 the
LDP Foreign Poli cy Commi ssio n anu the / I-,(/ /Ii Shi"r!JIII/ editorial
pages both c dl ed on th e gO\'erIlIllell( to initiate a trilateral , security
\\'nh Was hin gton Jnd 13eijing,X'; Tokyo proposed a trilateral
nl ",'eting to the United Stat es in September 1L)97, but Washington was
ca uti ous <lnd Chinese Fo reign Min iste r Qiall Qichen formall y re
jected th e id ea ," " E\'elHually a tril ateral sc holars' forum was approved
by l3 eij ing,
Beijing's reject ion ofJlpanese proposa ls for tribteral sumlllits created
transparency, if not confidence- building, The Chinese emphasis 0 11 bi
lateral Sino- US, dial ogue the expense ofJapan sent an early signal of
Beijing's intenti ons to cOlHain japan's politi cal int111ence and protile in
East Asi;l. Subsl'qlll,!1t C hinese responses to Japanese diplomatic initi a
ti ws ha vt' onl y rei nforced evidence of Beijing's strategy:
In jul y I SiSO the J lpa nese FinJll ce Ministry's proposal for an Asian
MOnt't;lry Fund \\'JS for mall y rej ectef" by Beijing, jJpanese MOF
otTici ;lls noted th:lt \\orking-Ievel talks with Chinese otftcials went
well. but at the sl' ni o r In'el the japanese was rejected by
l3 eijing to r st r:ltegic re;l <;om, '"
III April I L)<)B the Chi nese Ciui etly rejected Prime Mini ster
Hashimoto', propos'll for a fOur- w;lY security sUl1lmit with Chi na,
Russia, th e Unit ed Stat e\, an d j apa n, The j;lpanese government
hoped to le\eragl' slippon ta r Russian membership in APEC for
Russi;ln prc' SS Ul'l' on C hina to agree to a regiona l security summit.
Mml'l)\\ ' cOli ld not deli\ 'er, ":'
In -'LInl' l ')<) K !3eijill g l'l',ieuc'll 'rokyo\ propos;ll fo r ;1 Illl'e ting of
rill.' f)<.'rlll.lll,' 111 ti \'l' In ,' lllb,' IS Il t' lil l' UN S,','lIril\' ('lllIII,'il plus
.1 ' '1',111 , 111 , / l ;, ' /111.111\ I ,) ,I,! ,I, ,'" III ,' III,li ,III ,llh l ",l ki , 1.1I11 1111""' ,11'
....,.......---..._.
tests , The State Departl1lcllt bro ught the ide;l to China, wh'ieh re
jected it olltright. The Si"''''!'; Sh;/JI1JIIII cOlll Ill entec. on C hina's at
tempts to prevent japan fro Ill r,l ising its profile in political and
, , -, 'J'>
secunty ;lttalrs, '
In July 19(m the Chi nese Ccnrra l Bank gO\'t'rnor, Dai Xiallglong,
attacked Japan's economi c poli cy, claimtng the "depr.eciation of
the yell increases pressure on L1St Asia" as it struggles to extrIcate
itself from thl' crisis,
In Febrllary :W{)() China rlJected Tokyo\ ill vitation to JOJl1 the
G-7 meeting in Okin;1\\ ,1.
Beijin'g continues to \\' ithhold endorselllt'llt of a larger role for
Japan in the United Nati ollS, including ;lllY form of per manent
membership on till' SecurIt\' Co uncil.
The pattt' rn of Chinesl' COllt;lillill Cllt of diplolll ,lCY WJS
made all the more probkllIati c ill thi, pl'I'iod b\' Beijing's effe cti ve en
li stment of of tell lIn\\'irrillg ClilltOIl The Asian MOIl
eta ry Fund propos:-d \\';1, opposed by the U.s. TrL' JSu ry Dcpartlnenr, and
this placed Chi na and th e Ull ited States 0 11 til ,' side against japan.
C limon 's JUll l' \ ()l)X C hilla visit further reinforced the im
press ion of Sino-U,S, cOlltJinIllL'1lt o f japaJl \\hCIl Clintoll joined jiang
ill jJp,lrl 's <:.'col lonli c policies ;1 press conference in
ShJllghJi ,"1
With the lilllited Sllccns o t- IllliitiLltt:ral dlploll);lcy,j;lpan ha\ rea ched
ou t to bii:ltl'Lll reiatioJl) w ith rill' L'o ulHriL's th ;lt ')urround
C hina, Th L' 19<)7 Ll)[> StrJteg:y P;lPcr ;lrt icuht ed this stra tegy ill llmll1
terl 11S: "N )( only IllU <; t \\'e Ill ake th e ,].lP;lI1-U,S, alli;lilcl' a kEy
dilllellsion of o ur Chill ;l polic\', b'llt \\'C nlll s"( ,11"ri ' srj'l' ll gth en the
,' Lltive cOll Iltr ies, South Kor<:.',l. ,llld \V \,i ch ,'i\o
1\,\lSOn to be cOllCerlll'd ;lbollt C hina's future L' ourse,"'J,)
)ll b'L'q uellt cklptns go illt o l11ure detail ,lbollt J.lp;lll 's bibter,ll reb
tiolh \\ 'ith the o thl'l' Il Jtiom ot' E.l <; t For 11OW, sutlin' it to S;lY that
lWCllI se of COI11petit ioll \\ith Chill ,l, has pur,ul'd np
prochCIlll'IH wit h ib hi stori c ll em' 1l1y, LllIll cllL'd ;1 Il e\\' illiti ;lti vc
to\\;ml propo\cd strategic di 'llogllt' \\ ith Associ;ltioll of
Sou(hcl<;[ Asiall N,ltiollS (AS EAN), Nl'\\' Zl' ,d,lnd, ,mel Australia ; and, of
(OllrsC, rl' ;lt'tirIIled the US-JapJJ1 all i;l Jl cc'. BL'ijillg ILlS accllSed J;lpan of
pur\ Uill g ,1 pol icy o t' COIlLlillllll'llt. but ;1\ Ollt' .IJ)A ofticiJI describes the
\ tr,lI q..;\', it i, dllk ''soft cOJ Hailllll l'IH,"'I(,
l\ llll Ill ,' , \q)IOll l.lIi( lilt'" ":.1 1/11.' \\' ith ill the r,'giull Ius only
ill ' l I " " '.lll ! ,
- , .. ,,, .. ,,:> ",clULldlll KealiSm
Japan's China Diplomacy and U.S. Interests
The p:merns of bilateral relatioll S that emerged in Japan 's China policy
in the mid to late 1 YYOs are likely to continue for the foreseeable fu
ture, To begin with, they :Ire clt:arly th e result ot illstitutional and nor
mative changes in Japan, In add i{-ioLl , China sho\\'s no sign of rel enting
011 its pursuit of expanded influence in the reglOn at the expense of
Japan, Moreover, Japan is not ye t f(.) rcecl to choose bet\Veen its poli cies
ot strategic r,ivalry and economic interdependence because China does
not ye t pose all immediate military threat to Jap;l n that would force a
poli cy of containment or the "pursuit of relati\'e gains," And beca use the
strategi c uncertainti es with China are long-term iSS ll t'S, Japan has gen
eraU:' beell able [(; avoid conti-ontati on over more dangerolls short-term
problems \\ 'here C hina is \\"lllillg to use force, In poli cy, for ex
<1l1l ple, J1!Jan has done no thing to promote Tal\\'a n 's independence or
illtertlati o nal stature :lnd k1S approached the guidelines review purely in
the Context of self-defense, Finai! y, Japan has belletited trom a generaUy
reliable to rward comlllitlllellt from the Uilited States, As long as the
U,S. strat eg'y to\\'ard China is al so a mix of eng,lgelllellt and balancing,
Japa n's o\\'n Course is fairl y cl ear.
Ho\Ve\'er, t\VO questi ons linger. First, \Vi II th e United St;1tes and Japan
remail l in ;tacti cal step on C hina poli cy ove r th e ncar tenn , alld, second,
ho\\ \yi ll Japan respond if Illdj or changes do emerge ill thL' Sino-US.
reLHl oll shi p-if the current state of strategic !lux ill ASIJ t;lke\ ;1 clea r
ne\\' direction;'
T he ofUS. -Japan approac hes to China is a near-t er lll prob
lelll. It is ;lpparent from the case studies ill thi s chapter th;1t th e process
of Illdint<li ning closely coordinated U, S, and Japan ese appro;lch es to
-China h;lS Il Ot al ways beell smoot h, in spite of (he growing unease in
both Cou!ltries with demOI1S(rati ons ot""Chincse po\Ver and ass ertiveness,
There are :It leas t four reasons for (hi s.
First,Jlpan cOI1tinllCS to \'ic\\' its rebti o ll ship \\'ith Chill :l as ;l sPt'
cia l ti e thJ t should not b,' deterl11 il led e:\clll\)\'el: ' by \Xlashillgtoll,
To b o is p;lrticuLlrly cOll ce l'lleci ;lbOLIt AIlleri C1I1 \'olatilit y 0 11 iss ues
rdHcd to' hUll1an ri ghts :llld Taiw,ln, As the junior partner in the al
li :l IlCl'. Jap;1l1 tor ciecacies guarded its China polin' aga'i nst eJl(rap ment
in (il ,' U,S, containl11ent stLltl"gy. Lat er Japan tllJ'll ed to C hina to de
til1L' 1[\ O\\n Asi an ide'ltity Jlld relati\'e illci epeJld"l1cl' hOil) [he United
St ,1t ,\. h"'ll [0(1:1;;-1 11 the' l1lids( of the greJ tl' st COlllPt,titioll iJl Sillo
.l.lf' ,III "'" ill ,I, , till <;Ol l1 l' tiJl1 ," 11'1 ,'\ tn pl.1 V th e:
" ( ' hll l.l ,'.lld " ill 1,'l. lI i" Il ' \\ ilh \\ ,I, hill;":I ') 1I II I,' ( ' hlll.l ,', 11, 1 11.1 \ 1> ,'_

come a weak olle for Japan 's dipl omac\' towa rd the United States, but
old habits die hard
Second, US.-Jap:1Tl pol icy coordination on China is lIndermined by
the U.S. penchant to i!;IlOre Japan in It S own China polt cy formation,
The 1972 " Nixon shock" was the most dramatic example of the United
Srates keeping Japan ill the dark about irs C hilla diplomacy, but exam
ples of "Japan passing" continue. The U.S, misstep on (he Senbku dis
pute, Presi de nt Clinton's decision to criticize the Japanese economy
during a press conference in China, the coillcidelltal convergence of
Chinese and US, objecti o ns to Japanese initiatives such as th e Asian
Monetary Fund-these all erode Tokyo's confidence in sharing its lim
ired sources of leverage on Chilla \vith (he United States . Apprehension
about abandonmeIlt by th e Uni ted Stat es undercuts polic\' coordination
;15 much as fcars of entrapment. If al1\thing, the impact of ' japan pass
ing" is more sisnifio'lt toda\' thall it \\ ,lS ill Nixon's time, since Japan
has moved towarci a more independeJlt <. tr:1tegi c aSSCSSll1 t' llt of its secu
rity concerll S with C hina,
Third, th e' domt' stl c politics of ChilLl policy in both countries have
become far l110re tluid and unpredl( t:lbll' , The Stat e Depa rtment has
collided with the Pent;lgon th e Congress over China the same
\yay that MOFA los t con tro l of it) C hilla account to the Diet and
the media . Domes(i c U,S, prcss ure') 011 11l1111;1ll rights and trade do l1 0t
coincide \\'ith ]:lp,ln', dOJ1les(l c prc,>\ urt'S 0 11 tn ritorial i')s ues and hi s
tory, CoordilLHi o ll ot'di ploill acy is ,1I\\';1),S more ditTicult ill liberal,
plurali sti,' ciL-ll1 ocr,lcICS-P:lrti cubrh ill Clses vvhere the country in
qucsti on Ius sp.lrkcd ;1 fUl1llamellLll do nlesric deb,1[ L' ;lbo ut foreign
,1nd sec urit\, polin
Finall y, US-]:Ipan coordin:1ti o ll 011 Chilla poli cy is ditticult because,
ill spite o f th e c1 osl' U,S. -Jap:1I1 allianCt', tillS remains a three-l egged ti- i=
;Illgle , has oft en taken step') , such as the 1l) l)() Taiwan Straits
i111SSile (h at push th e Unit ed SLlteS :1I1d J;l pJIl closer together. At
othL'r tiill,' S, ho\\e\'L'r, has foulld it Il,'cessan to make tacti ca l
shifts III its owrall <; trat egy of J:1p;ln down \\' hde developing a
bILHl'J' ;ll lllodus \IYl'ndi \Vith th e United St;HcS, Aft t'r Sino-U,S, reb
(i ol1S \\orsened in 1<)<Jl) ill th e wak,' of campai gn and fail
lIlC to re;1Ch bila (eral :lgret' l1lelH on WTO access ion, tor example,
l3elJing t(:l11porarilv softcllt'd its ')tal Ke to\\'Jrd Japan , Ncverth eless, a
\'lsit to Toky() b\ PrL' lllil'l' Zhu rz.ollgJi ill October :21111 11 helped to take
Sl) I11,' of the' 'Hit ofJi;lIlg's c;lrh' trip, n'l' n Z hu 's efforts
\\'L'I',' 11 11lk rI1l1l1,'d l' \;l I ):lih' li'PIII p.lpn .Irri ,'!c nirici zing,lap
.1I11,,' " 1I1illl .II ' i'II! " lllllll cdl.1l ,' I\ ,til ":' h , ,1" 1, .11' 1111 \ ' t';\ 'I !l ' 1\)K\l), Th ,'s,'
lUI}
Japan's
I
I
I
I
' "
!
tacti ca l changes in direction open gaps between the United States and
Japan, which is in part why Beijing employs them ,
There will therefore continue to be fluidity in the U.S. and Japanese
approaches to China, in spite of co111111 on strategic goals between Wash
ington and Tokyo. Coordina.tion would be easier if the United States
and Japan hJd a simple policy of containment, but China has two po
tential futures, and Washington and Tokyo should not foreclose the
more positive of those futures by crafting a strategy of containment just
for simplicity's sake. Instead, senior poli cymakers in both countries must
recognize that the United States and Japan are engaged ill a competi
tion for power ,,\lith China as \,,,.ell as a game of engagement and inte
gration. In that competition, the US-Japan alliance is a powerful asset,
not only in the military role of deterring contingencies, but also as a
diplomatic asset to enhance negotiating leverage. It is therefore in U.S.
andJapanese interests to work harder to reduce the opportunities for
China to dri\'e Jny wedge in the alliance, That l11e;ms more ;lcti ve con
sultation, dialogue, and coordination of policy on issues ranging from
WTO accession to arms control negotiations and multilateral diplo
macy as it relates to China,
And what if there is a change in Sino-U.S, relations? The dynamics
of Sino-Japanese relations since the Cold War are not predictive of the
future, but do suggest sever:-d outcomes, First, if the United States re
ve rsed its policy of forward engagement, it seems likely t1Llt Japan
would expand its active efforts to balance and constrain ChIlLI in com
pensation. While this would OCcur primarily in multilateral allc1 hilat,'r;ll
diplomatic settings, there should be little doubt that Japan would :llso
strengthen its unilateral military capabiliti c; to manage potential Chi
nese threats to Japan ese sea lanes and the home islands,
If the United States and China came into open conflict over Taiwan,
on the other hand, Japan would [lce its nightmare scenario, Ultimately,
the Japanese response would depend on the justness of the fight. A uni
btc'L1I provocltion of Chill;l by expanded u.s. support for Tliwanese
independenn:. for eX;II11ple, would likely lead to Japallese efTorts to con
strain the United St;ltes and would leave open to question Japall ese sup
port III a contingency, On the other hanci , in the case of an unprovoked
Chinese use of force agaillSt Taiwan, Tokyo would be more likely to
support :1 robust U.S. response, preferring diplomacy to force but ulti
IlLltcly had;illiI 6)r(c. These ;lre obVIously subjectiw judglll ell(S ill part,
hUI it is ,'k;lr ti"OIII the impact of Chinese miliur:' ,lCliollS Slllcr the
(:nld \Xlir I1uI "I,q',!II', Jlllliri",d ,"ldlm,' d,ll', CIt'llliIl' ill rC'il,)II,,' 10 Ilewl y
I"'J""I\',',I 1111",11' ,11!,IIIl.l1 1\ 11,) 1,\11,:,'11',1,,1\',' III til, ' (" ",, (" "' liCit

challenges, No matte r what the US respon se to a Taiwan contingency,
therefore, it is sate to predict that Japanese constraints on military pre
paredness \,"ill be weakened,
The key is to avoid a confrontation in the Taiwan Straits in the first
place. Closer U.S.-Japan coordination can contribute to that goal. The
U.S. policy on Taiwan is strategic ambiguity and "tactical clarity-that is
to say, it is not certain how the United States would respond to the use
offorce by China, but it is clear that the United States has interests and
could respond in a robllSt manner, if necessary. A strong US-Japan mil
itary :llliance reinforces that policy. The United States and Japan should
be clear that the alliance does not exist to protect Taiwanese indepen
dence, but that the alliance is prepared to deter and if necessary defeat
any actions rh,l( threaten the ,'ital interests of th e al1iance. A firm U,S.
Japan alliance complicates and deters any Chinese consideration of the
li se of force in the Straits Without provoking Chinese preemptive ac
tion . At the sa me tillle, closer U.S.-Japan coordination on Taiwan issues
(and closer US coordination with other al1ies as wt'lI, for that matter)
has a ll1utmlly constraining effect th at helps to mitigate against danger
ous changes Il1 the status quo, The United States exacerbated the Tai
wan situation by first breaking its pledge to China and allowing
President Lee Teng H ui to visit the United States and later compensat
ing with support for Beijing's !'Three Nos" on Taiwan. By comparison,
Japan has been ell- more consistent in its One China policy. A closer cal
ibration of U.s. policy with allies like Japan might have avoided
the unpredIctable and ultimately provocative nature of the U,S. ap
proach to T:1I\\an in the 1990s,
I t should be clear to U.s. policymakers that Japan is also now playing
;1 gaille of hedging and political-economic engagement with
Chim, Sll1ce U.S.:in-d Japanese ac tions have more of all impact on each
side's respecti\'e China policies, each side should be working harder to
coordinare JPproaches. With time, economic integration may smooth
the rough edges on C hina 's relations wi th both (he United States and
J:1p.lll, but rhar event is !lot certain. Until it is, the United States w ill
ha\'\.' to \\'ork '\'ith J;lpall as a real strategic partner in the region,