US vs Tang Ho Case Digest

US vs Tang Ho (1922) G.R. No. 17122 Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose". Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Then, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. Issue: WON the delegation of legislative power to the Governor General was valid. Held: By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve. These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority. The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says: That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the GovernorGeneral issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the GovernorGeneral issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the GovernorGeneral in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

Calalang vs. Williams Case Digest

Calalang vs. Williams [GR 47800, 2 December 1940] Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents.

petitioner,

Facts: The Manila Electric Company filed a petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO. MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act No. 1446, section 1 1 which states: Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over

portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. AKA: For every franchise granted, terms as to the usage and compensation to be paid to the grantee shall be fixed by the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators, a majority vote is required and this is final. Copies were sent to affected transpo company (one of which is the Pasay Transpo) and to Atty-Gen which disclaimed any interest. Frameworks of the statute: SC sitting as board of arbitrators and as an entity Decision is final Franchise granted to Meralco although only a contract bet parties to it is now affecting rights of persons not signatories to it The parties to an arbitration may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. It has been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. Issue: WON the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case Held: No. MERALCO is banking on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg Co vs Commissioners Court where it was held that a state legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. Dilemma of the court: SC sitting as board of arbitrators exercising judicial functions Case 1 would not fall within the jurisdiction granted the SC = if it does, it would mean that the courts would be ousted of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. If this is the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators Members of the SC sitting as arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions. Case 2 would mean that members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform.

Ratio: It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government. Its power should be confined strictly within that granted by the Organic Act. Exercise of jurisdiction by the SC cannot mean exercise of jurisdiction by the members of the SC sitting as board of arbitrators. Chief Justice Taney: The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. This is not the judicial power confided to the SC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the Organic Act and it would be illegal for the members of the SC to sit as arbitrators, the decision of a majority to be final, to act on the petition of MERALCO. G.R. No. L-28790 April 29, 1968 ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner, vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents. Facts: Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. He is "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." He answered the Secretary of Justice cannot suspend nor investigate since it can only done so in the same manner as a judge of the CFI and therefore papers relative to his case should be submitted to the SC. He received a letter signed by the Exec Sec that by virtue of the authority of the President, he is suspended for gross neglingence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest. Hence his petition before the SC claiming the lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion of the Secretary of Justice. Issue: whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statute. Held: No. One, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all. Two, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same. To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision and control. It is not the intention of the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. If it were, it should have clearly done so just like how it expressly provides that Judges of CAR and CTA are to be removed from office from the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance or members of the judiciary of appellate rank. It is also true for the Commissioner of Public Service. If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. Justice Cardozo in In Re Richardson said: There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. The SC is invested with judicial power only. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. Petioner Noblejas tried to exculpate himself by claiming that under section 4 of RA 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. His decision shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head. But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter. Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given, whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, Edu v Ericta Digest Facts: 1. Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and Admin Order No. 2 which implements it. Under the law, a vehicle has to comply with the requirements of having reflective device prior to being registered at the LTO. 2. The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police power for

being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.

Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional, and w/n AO2 is valid

Held: YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.

It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. What is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs." Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

Garcia v. Macaraig Facts: Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being

extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge. HELD:

Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.