FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES GR 160261 CARPIO MORALES, J.

: Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides: ARTICLE XI Accountability of Public Officers SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such
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referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
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all the Members of the House.

impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed

initiated on the day the Committee on Justice 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

11TH CONGRESS RULES

finds that the verified complaint and/or

RULE II INITIATING IMPEACHMENT Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment.

RULE V BAR INITIATION IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL Section Impeachment Proceedings Initiated. Deemed In cases 16. AGAINST OF

resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in

substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the that said the

Committee verified

Impeachment shall be initiated only by a

complaint

and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least onethird (1/3) of the

verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of

where a Member of the House files a verified complaint impeachment or of a

Representatives or by any citizen upon a of by any

resolution endorsement

citizen files a verified complaint that is

Member thereof or by a verified complaint or resolution of

endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of

Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of

impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of

endorsement against an impeachable officer,

2

the

filing

of

such or of

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution House Committee on Justice: first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
9 8 7 6 5

verified

complaint

resolution

impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V BAR AGAINST

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year Of

voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
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10

IMPEACHMENT Section 14. Scope of Bar. No impeachment proceedings initiated shall be the

from

the

date

was by

impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such,

Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
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against

same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.

can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and supplied) underscoring

Instant petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a

HREP adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
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member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
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arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint. In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim. To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. We look to the

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The Court, in construing a Constitution, should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
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The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
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language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
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It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
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1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, nonadversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.
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friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.' 2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.' 3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide

FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION Judicial Restraint More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
127

only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
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In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is

not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty." "Seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review , enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA
135

as follows:

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement 3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
136

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories: 1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case 2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case 3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground 4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute 5. that the parties are not in estoppel 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review: 1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION BY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967

Congress passed Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Petitioner prays for judgment: 1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments in the said resolutions; b) the Director of Printing from

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents. G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967

printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. CONCEPCION, C.J.: The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 to a maximum of 180. 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
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No. 4913; and 2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void. BECAUSE 1. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention at the same time; 2. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and 3. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments. ISSUE: whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution THE MERITS

Available Alternatives to Congress R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the same time. In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election? Article XV of the Constitution provides: . . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the
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Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite." Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution? It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. The measures provided by RA 4913 are adequate to comply with the constitutional

requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly sufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendment sought to be made. Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is under R. B. H. No. 1 the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3 the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We who constitute the minority believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION (initiative) G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents. SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and that he and the members of the Movement intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. The Delfin Petition contained the following proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
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DAVIDE, JR., J.: The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order 1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC issued an Order
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(a) directing Delfin "to

cause the publication of the petition and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m. Petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However , it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative. ISSUE (1): Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. ISSUE (2): Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
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This provision is not self-executory. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

proposals to AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII.

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?" A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding: As to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
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wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
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PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION (submission)

A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution. COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition. Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971.

BARREDO, J.: .

ISSUE (1): whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution HELD (1): Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress.

is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2. Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: . CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.
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Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides: ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability, But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an

ISSUE (2): Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? HELD (2): The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose 1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution. The same provision also as
13

amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole.

SEPARATION OF POWERS G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL." RESOLUTION

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. Atty LAURETA takes exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts were done; Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam

PER CURIAM: Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that st it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1 Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot. She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustres letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.

Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical

pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice." HELD: The Court found that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur.
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Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated. The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration. Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.

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G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE. E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.
2

The Solicitor General, for the public respodents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for resolution or determination. ISSUE (1): WON the President has the authority to indiscriminately transfer funds from one

FERNAN, J.: Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."

department to another, as provided by PD 1177. HELD (1): The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS. B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE. Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
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for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:

appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the

general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. ISSUE (2): WON the court can interfere with the conduct of a coordinate political department in the performance of its duties. HELD (2): Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained: ... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within
17

the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law"

18

THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

(7) herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua: filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation; PETITIONER contends: (a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents. LAUREL, J.:

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the FACTS: (1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; (2) provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes; (3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office; (4) National Assembly in session assembled, passed resolution [No. 8] As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, (5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua: be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified; (6) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, allege that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the (c) that the protest in question
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proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly; ISSUE: Does Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, HELD: Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.

but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority

accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and was filed out of the prescribed period;

over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly , notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld. Electoral Commission is a constitutional organ, created to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
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adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions . The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." Summarizing, we conclude: (a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. (c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

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JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999

In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. HELD: This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The term "political question" connotes a question of policy. It refers "to those questions which under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act

PUNO, J.: FACTS: On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
1

or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not

On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
2

petitioners have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.

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G .R. No. 127882

January 27, 2004

Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
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LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC. respondents.
4

Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996. On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding

DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon.
36

35

giving the

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction: FACTS: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or investors for contracts or agreements involving assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." The law prescribes the qualifications of contractors including timber,
16 15 8 6

Respondents argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met and that the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus. Additionally, respondent WMCP argues that there has been a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. HELD: REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

and grants them certain rights,

19

water

17

and easement

18

rights, and the right to possess explosives.

20

When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
23
58

Surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from entering private lands and concession areas. settlement of conflicts is likewise provided for.
21

A procedure for the

The Act restricts the conditions for exploration, the transport, sale and processing of minerals,
26

22

quarry

23

and other

24

permits. It regulates
27

25

and promotes the development of mining

communities, science and mining technology, and safety and environmental protection.

Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." The power of judicial review, therefore, is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
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In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have standing to assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of which the FTAA was executed. Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to the FTAA, cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul it.
71

In other words, they contend that petitioners are

not real parties in interest in an action for the annulment of contract. Public respondents' contention fails. The present action is not merely one for annulment of contract but for prohibition and mandamus. Standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings , is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, would amount to an advisory opinion.
62 61 60

lest the decision of the court

The power does not extend to hypothetical

63

questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.
64 65

certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. Hence, the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." As earlier stated, petitioners meet this requirement. The challenge against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40 likewise fulfills the requisites of justiciability. Although these laws were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication. Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review that the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity WMCP points out that the petition was filed only almost two years after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.
24

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
67 66

Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous people's cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. These petitioners have standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury. They claim that they would suffer "irremediable displacement"
70 69 68

as a result of the implementation of the FTAA allowing

WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence . They thus meet the appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAA's validity.

The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later.
73

A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise

unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.

25

ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY (PREMATURITY) G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955

assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforcement of the criticized statute. It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents. BENGZON, J.: The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.) As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.) In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and

The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that

Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction ." Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned. It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents

before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
1

26

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.. And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may be.

27

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents. G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995 JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general

reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not

PUNO, J.: At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."
1

expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
28

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving

for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

29

G.R. No. 152295

July 9, 2002

Petitioners allege that public respondents "connived, confederated and conspired" to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership age in the SK to at least

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority Leader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Local Government of the House of Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents. CARPIO, J.: The Case

15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be "summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization." FACTS: On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros ("Montesclaros" for brevity) sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. On February 20, 2002, Chairman Benipayo for brevity, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
9 10 8 1

about the status of pending bills on the SK and

Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was "operationally very difficult" to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763 dated
11

The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK" for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK.

February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.
12

The Bicameral Committee's consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayer's and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK; and (3) compel
30

2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.

public respondents to allow petitioners and those who have turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any re-scheduled SK elections. The Court's Ruling The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
21

to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before. Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress.
23

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
22

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three coequal, coordinate and independent branches of government. Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684 , the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.
24

The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of
31

May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners' remedy is legislation, not judicial intervention. Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By "real interest" is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.
26 25

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. G.R. No. 97855 June 19, 1997 PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC. petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. RESOLUTION

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections. ROMERO, J.: =

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional . To grant petitioners' prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY (MOOTNESS) G.R. No. 93100 June 19, 1997 1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands.
32

and petitioner-in-intervention Archie's Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail some provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. , as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner:
1

2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. 3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities. 4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its governmentinduced investments in aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth. The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms. While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act. On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress. Provisions of said Act pertinent to the assailed provisions of CARL are the following:
6 4

Sec. 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise: (b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. xxx xxx xxx b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial
33

farms

deferment

or

notices

of

compulsory

compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized

acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. when the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same.

cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage the said lands for the workers beneficiaries. Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 a section to read as follows Sec. 32-A. Incentives. Individuals or entities owning

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall no longer be necessary, however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3. Section 11, Paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cutflower farms and shall cacao, be coffee to and rubber

or operating fishponds and prawn farms are hereby mandated to execute within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, an incentive plan with their regular fishpond or prawn farm workers'

organization, if any, whereby seven point five percent (7.5%) of their net profit before tax from the operation of the fishpond or prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60) days at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other pond workers in such ponds over and above the compensation they currently receive. In order to safeguard the right of the regular fishpond or prawn farm workers under the incentive plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn owners shall be subject to periodic audit or inspection by certified public accountants chosen by the workers. The foregoing provision shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequently converted to fishponds or prawn farms provided the size of the land converted does not exceed the retention limit of the landowner.
34

plantations,

subject

immediate

compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands, upon payment of just

The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

35

G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

RESOLUTION MELO, J.: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring

PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents. ---------------------------------------G.R. No. 147781 May 10, 2001

that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region . She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region . Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court (1) G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao; (2) G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago; (3) G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. ANGELO REYES, Secretary of National Defense, ET AL., respondents. ---------------------------------------G.R. No. 147799 May 10, 2001

RONALDO A. LUMBAO, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO BERROYA, respondents. ---------------------------------------G.R. No. 147810 May 10, 2001

of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and (4) G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino. All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that
36

THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL DIOMEDIO VILLANUEVA, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.

the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments: [I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted. (Comment, G.R. No. 147780, p. 28; G.R. No. 147781, p. 18; G.R. No. 147799, p. 16; G.R. No. 147810, p. 24)

the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).1wphi1.nt Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar. G.R. No. 147780 In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino,

With this declaration, petitioners' apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (DefensorSantiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise
37

and mancao pray that the "appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a duly issued warrant. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

G.R. No. 147781 The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award (Palileo v. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272). Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested without a warrant.

verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. x x x (at pp.22-23)

G.R. No. 147799 The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers. We disagree. To be sure, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" Thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000): x x x The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to
38

of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted. G.R. No. 147810 Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf ( KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]). Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the

declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. However, in G.R. No. 147780, 147781, and 147799, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the may 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang

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ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY ( EXEPTION TO MOOTNESS) [G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004] SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

They came in the middle of the night.

Armed with high-powered ammunitions and

explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). [1] In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation [G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004] SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents. WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high[G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004] REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents. [G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004] AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.:
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No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in full: PROCLAMATION NO. 427 DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION

powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the government; WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of rebellion. In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:

WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion. I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the

GENERAL ORDER NO. 4 DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with highpowered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the government;

Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435: DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a state of rebellion was declared; WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion;

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WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist. In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.), [2] party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. [3] They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period. [4] Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers. [5] Like Sanlakas and PM, they claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. [6] They contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that confuses, confounds and misleads because [o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens. [7] Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. [8] Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. [9] In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of
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Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion. [10] Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed Forces. [11] They argue, however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a superfluity, and is actually an exercise of emergency powers. [12] Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. [13] In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution. [14] In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion opens the doo r to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion. [15] Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration. [16] In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit. [17] The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual controversies. [18] Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. [19] The case at bar is one such case. Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into Malacaang. [20] Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases [21] precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.

To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. Enriquez, [22] this Court recognized that: To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. In Philippine Constitution Association v.

interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens. 3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same. [24] [Emphasis in the original.] Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress emergency powers, thus impa iring the lawmakers legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the Presidents exercise of martial law powers. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [23] Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that: 2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
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Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez: petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and

supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[]s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. [25]

Even assuming that petitioners are peoples organizations, this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato: [26] The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means, that their right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. (Art. XIII, 15-16) These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. [27]

It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation

That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. [28] No such illegal disbursement is alleged. On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [29] Again, no such injury is alleged in this case. Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail.

or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
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During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.] The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated power[s]. [30] From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. [31] However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, [32] [t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The executive power shall be vested in the President. As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . . .... Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article II Executive Power] Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign powers, which are drawn chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of State or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion. [33] First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as the protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the people by driving the patricians from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolinas nullification effort. [34] The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not pacify the hotspurs

The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. President executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in their original simple form since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part: Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America . . . . ....

from South Carolina. Its State Legislature ordered an election for a convention, whose members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any who sought to pay or collect customs duties. [35] Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy. Technically, the President might send troops into a State only if the Governor called for help to suppress an insurrection, which would not occur in the instance. The President could also send troops to
45

see to it that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at individual citizens, and provided no enforcement machinery against violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a force bill. [36]

under which he felt authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States. [40] Lincolns Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their first service,

In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He wrote: . . . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the Union, the balance of the people composing this Union have a perfect right to coerce them to obedience. Then in a Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon South Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable interference with the execution of the laws, and dared them, disunion by armed force is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt? [37] The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of agreement, and the President announced that the national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the south had declared nullification and accession confined to contempt and infamy. [38] No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable, and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so daunting, as Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of Congress explicit and restricted, and sought some source of executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage. He seized upon the Presidents designation by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the executive power provision and joined them as the war power which authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of Congress. [39] Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the Presidents independent power and duty under his oath directly to represent and protect the people. In his Message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the government forced upon him. He could not but perform the duty or surrender the existence of the Government . . . . This concept began as a transition device, to be validated by Congress when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into an independent power
46

according to the proclamation, would be to recapture forts, places and property, taking care to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens. [41] Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincolns report to use the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The decision was handed in the celebrated Prize Cases [42] which involved suits attacking the Presidents right to legally institute a blockade. Although his Proclamation was subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants contended that under international law, a blockade could be instituted only as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the State. Since under the Constitution only Congress is exclusively empowered to declare war, it is only that body that could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld Lincolns right to act as he had. [43] In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The United States introduced the expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902. [44] The use of the power was put to judicial test and this Court held that the case raised a political question and said that it is beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of the power. [45] Later, the grant of the power was incorporated in the 1935 Constitution. [46] Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to mean that it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the maxim that Public office is a public trust, which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme Court, the

principal issue was by what authority of the Constitution or statute had the President to send troops without the request of the Governor of the State. [47] In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al, [48] the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the governments province to mix in merely individual present controversies. Still, so it went on, whenever wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties. [49] Thus, Clevelands course had the Courts attest. Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt launched what political scientists dub the stewardship theory. Calling himself the steward of the people, he felt that the executive power was limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional powers. [50] The most far-reaching extension of presidential power T.R. ever undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvanias coal mines under his authority as Commanderin-Chief. In the issue, he found means other than force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he had made detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal production would begin again. [51] Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In the Philippines, this led to the incorporation of Section 6, [52] Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was later carried over with modifications in Section 7, [53] Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18, [54] Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State. In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the unitary and highly centralized nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, There is no counterpart of the several states of the American union which have reserved powers under the United States constitution. Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote: . The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the government in this manner: The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be provided by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, a grant of legislative power means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in one official the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate and direct than

47

the United States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. [55] The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines. [56] Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter has restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the Presidents powers as Chief Executive. In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the Presidents power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majoritys ruling rested on the Presidents unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. [57] [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.] Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-inChief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or

regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.] The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. [58] At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. [59] Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. [60] Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, [61] then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. [62] At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that [i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, [63] if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion. [64] In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
48

whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. [65] The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 23. (1) . (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner

SO ORDERED.

withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
49

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 164978

RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO,

Present: Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents. October 13, 2005

Promulgated:

CARPIO, J.:

The Case This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T.

- versus -

Corona, Carpio Morales,

Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries.

EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO,

Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Antecedent Facts Chico-Nazario, and The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their regular session Garcia, JJ. on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004.
50

Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments[2] to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your Oath of Office.

Appointee Arthur C. Yap Alberto G. Romulo Raul M. Gonzalez Florencio B. Abad Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. Rene C. Villa Joseph H. Durano Michael T. Defensor

Department Agriculture Foreign Affairs Justice Education National Defense Agrarian Reform Tourism Environment and Natural Resources

Date of Appointment 15 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004

Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Edgardo J. Angara (Senator Angara), Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile), Luisa P. Ejercito -Estrada (Senator Ejercito-Estrada), Jinggoy E. Estrada (Senator Estrada), Panfilo M. Lacson (Senator Lacson), Alfredo S. Lim (Senator Lim), Jamby A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal), and Sergio R. Osmea, III (Senator Osmea) (petitioners) filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments[3] to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. The appointment papers are

The appointment papers are uniformly worded as follows:

uniformly worded as follows:

Sir: Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed SECRETARY [AD INTERIM], DEPARTMENT OF (appropriate department). By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your oath of office.
51

Sir:

Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed ACTING SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF (appropriate

department) vice (name of person replaced).

Issue The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyos appointment of

an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.[8] However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments

respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session. The Courts Ruling The petition has no merit. xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Preliminary Matters On the Mootness of the Petitio The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress. As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[4] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[5] In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment. On the Nature of the Power to Appoint Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.[6] Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.[7] The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to
52

does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:

Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. xxx[9] On Petitioners Standing The Solicitor General states that the present petition is a quo warranto proceeding because, with the exception of Secretary Ermita, petitioners effectively seek to oust respondents for unlawfully exercising the powers of department secretaries. The Solicitor General further states that petitioners may not claim standing as Senators because no power of the Commission on Appointments has been infringed upon or violated by the President. xxx If at all, the Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of the Congress) may possess standing in this case.[10]

unconstitutional acts of the President.[11] Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President Arroyos appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners cite Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary[12] as basis, thus:

To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. xxx An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on Appointments of the 13 Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmea as members. xxx
th

SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. - The Undersecretary shall:

(5) Temporarily discharge the duties of the Secretary in the latters absence or inability to discharge his duties for any cause or in case of vacancy of the said office, unless otherwise provided by law. Where there are more than one Undersecretary, the Secretary shall allocate the foregoing powers and duties among them. The President shall likewise make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from among them; and

Petitioners further assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition. The Constitutionality of President Arroyos Issuance of Appointments to Respondents as Acting Secretaries Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.[13] Petitioners base their argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),[14] which enumerates the powers and duties of the undersecretary. Paragraph 5 of Section 10 reads:
53

whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.[15] In sharp contrast, respondents maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Respondents point to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 reads: SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in

the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read: SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.] (2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned. (3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. (Emphasis supplied)
54

Petitioners and respondents maintain two diametrically opposed lines of thought. Petitioners assert that the President cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power. In contrast, respondents insist that the President can issue such appointments because no law prohibits such appointments. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.[16] In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether

temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even

appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions.[17] Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

SO ORDERED.

appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.[18] However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
55

PROPER PARTY G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993

silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino

DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA, PROF. RICARTE M. PURUGANAN, IRMA POTENCIANO, ADRIAN CRISTOBAL, INGRID SANTAMARIA, CORAZON FIEL, AMBASSADOR E. AGUILAR CRUZ, FLORENCIO R. JACELA, JR., MAURO MALANG, FEDERICO AGUILAR ALCUAZ, LUCRECIA R. URTULA, SUSANO GONZALES, STEVE SANTOS, EPHRAIM SAMSON, SOLER SANTOS, ANG KIU KOK, KERIMA POLOTAN, LUCRECIA KASILAG, LIGAYA DAVID PEREZ, VIRGILIO ALMARIO, LIWAYWAY A. ARCEO, CHARITO PLANAS, HELENA BENITEZ, ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, ROSALINDA OROSA, SUSAN CALO MEDINA, PATRICIA RUIZ, BONNIE RUIZ, NELSON NAVARRO, MANDY NAVASERO, ROMEO SALVADOR, JOSEPHINE DARANG, and PAZ VETO PLANAS, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: All thirty-five (35) petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank. The antecedents: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique
56

Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one (71) cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.
1

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit (COA) through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: (a) the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.
2

On 15 November 1990, PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote President Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo.
3

On the same date, Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a

certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence, this petition originally filed on 7 January 1991 by Dean Jose Joya, Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Prof. Ricarte M. Puruganan, Irma Potenciano, Adrian Cristobal, Ingrid Santamaria, Corazon Fiel, Ambassador E. Aguilar Cruz,
4

Florencio R. Jacela, Jr., Mauro Malang, Federico Aguilar Alcuaz, Lucrecia R. Urtula, Susano Gonzales, Steve Santos, Ephraim Samson, Soler Santos, Ang Kiu Kok, Kerima Polotan, Lucrecia Kasilag, Ligaya David Perez, Virgilio Almario and Liwayway A. Arceo.

subject items; and, (f) whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above issues warrant resolution from this Court. The issues being interrelated, they will be discussed jointly hereunder. However, before

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
5

proceeding, we wish to emphasize that we admire and commend petitioners' zealous concern to keep and preserve within the country great works of art by well-known old masters. Indeed, the value of art cannot be gainsaid. For, by serving as a creative medium through which man can express his innermost thoughts and unbridled emotions while, at the same time, reflecting his deep-seated ideals, art has become a true expression of beauty, joy, and life itself. Such artistic creations give us insights into the artists' cultural heritage the historic past of the nation and the era to which they belong in their triumphant, glorious, as well as troubled and turbulent years. It must be for this reason that the framers of the

On 5 February 1991, on motion of petitioners, the following were joined as additional petitioners: Charito Planas, Helena Benitez, Ana Maria L. Harper, Rosalinda Orosa, Susan Carlo Medina, Patricia Ruiz, Bonnie Ruiz, Nelson Navarro, Mandy Navasero, Romeo Salvador, Josephine Darang and Paz Veto Planas. On the other hand, Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his capacity as former Executive Secretary, the incumbent Executive Secretary, and Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas were impleaded as additional respondents. Petitioners raise the following issues: (a) whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition; (b) whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties" contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act;" (c) whether the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress;

1987 Constitution mandated in Art. XIV, Sec. 14, that is the solemn duty of the state to "foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression." And, in urging this Court to grant their petition, petitioners invoke this policy of the state on the protection of the arts. But, the altruistic and noble purpose of the petition notwithstanding, there is that basic legal question which must first be resolved: whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case. The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites. On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
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6

(d) whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christie's of New York for the sale of the artworks; (e) whether, PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the

the

jurisdiction

of

the

court

as

party-plaintiff

in

an

action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
9 8

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and nonstock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution,
11 10

from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and

and when a

taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.
12

their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
13

this Court laid

down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty
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required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
14

At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved.
18

We find however that there is no

such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule. Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be the policy of the state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and national cultural treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. As to what kind of artistic and cultural properties are considered by the State as involving public interest which should therefore be protected, the answer can be gleaned from reading of the reasons behind the enactment of R.A. 4846: WHEREAS, the National Museum has the difficult task, under existing laws and regulations, of preserving and protecting the cultural properties of the nation;

Obviously, petitioners are not

challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money. Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the issues raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court of the issues in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a whole.
15

WHEREAS, inumerable sites all over the country have since been excavated for cultural relics, which have passed on to private hands, representing priceless cultural treasure that properly belongs to the Filipino people as their heritage; WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the Philippines, whether government or private property, which has not been disturbed by commercially-minded diggers and collectors, literally destroying part

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,
17 16

of our historic past; WHEREAS, because of this the Philippines has been charged as incapable of preserving and protecting her cultural legacies; WHEREAS, the commercialization of Philippine relics from the contact period, the Neolithic Age, and the Paleolithic Age, has reached a point

A case becomes

such as the case before us. Since

the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
59

perilously placing beyond reach of savants the study and reconstruction of Philippine prehistory; and WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on movement and a limited form of registration of important cultural properties and of designated national cultural treasures is necessary, and that regardless of the item, any cultural property exported or sold locally must be registered with the National Museum to control the deplorable situation regarding our national cultural properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law (emphasis supplied). Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." "Important cultural properties" are cultural properties which have been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional historical cultural significance to the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification of national cultural treasures.
19

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of their jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique

20

object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note

of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum. We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the inventory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts, of important cultural properties and national cultural treasures.
21

Findings of administrative officials and agencies

who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned.
22

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The Constitution as a Social Contract In Marcos v. Manglapus,[1] the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Cortes categorically opined that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. The Social Contract Theory is nearly as old as philosophy itself. In general, it is the view that persons moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement between them to form society.[2] As a modern political theory, it has taken its full shape in the writings of the three main social contract theorists: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the twentieth century, it gained revival in the works of John Rawls. In laying down the foundation and basis for this paper, a brief summary of the different versions of the social contract theory is in order, and for this purpose, I reproduce the summaries made by the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophys article on the Social Contract Theory[3] with very slight modifications, viz.: Thomas Hobbes Version According to Thomas Hobbes, the justification for political obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests. Hobbes argues for this by imagining men in their natural state, or in other words, the State of Nature. In the State of Nature, which is purely hypothetical according to Hobbes, men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are more or less equal to one another, there are limited resources, and yet there is no power able to force men to cooperate. Given these conditions in the State of Nature, Hobbes concludes that the State of Nature would be unbearably brutal and he concludes that the State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the state of perpetual and unavoidable war. The situation is not, however, hopeless. Because men are reasonable, they can see their way out of such a state by recognizing the laws of nature, which show them the means by which to escape the State of Nature and create a civil society.

Being reasonable, and recognizing the rationality of this basic precept of reason, men can be expected to construct a Social Contract that will afford them a life other than that available to them in the State of Nature. This contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the State of Nature. Second, they must imbue some one person or assembly of persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. After these contracts are established, then society becomes possible, and people can be expected to keep their promises, cooperate with one another, and so on. The Social Contract is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we depend upon to live well. Our choice is either to abide by the terms of the contract, or return to the State of Nature, which Hobbes argues no reasonable person could possibly prefer. John Lockes Version In contrast to Hobbes concept of the hypothetical State of Nature, Locke considers the State of Nature as a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one's life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others. So, the State of Nature is a state of liberty where persons are free to pursue their own interests and plans, free from interference, and, because of the Law of Nature and the restrictions that it imposes upon persons, it is relatively peaceful. However, since in the State of Nature there is no civil power to whom men can appeal, and since the Law of Nature allows them to defend their own lives, they may then kill those who would bring force against them. Since the State of Nature lacks civil authority, once war begins it is likely to continue. And this is one of the strongest reasons that men have to abandon the State of Nature by contracting together to form civil government. Jean-Jacques Rousseaus Version Rousseau for his part, begins with the most oft-quoted line Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains. He argues that humans are essentially free, and were free in the State of Nature, but the progress of civilization has substituted subservience to others for that freedom, through dependence, economic and social inequalities, and the extent to which we judge ourselves through comparisons with others. Since a return to the State of Nature is neither feasible nor desirable, the purpose of politics is to restore freedom to us, thereby reconciling who we truly and essentially are with how we live together.[4] The most basic covenant, the social pact, is the agreement to come together and form a people, a collectivity, which by definition is more than and different from a mere aggregation of individual interests and wills. This act, where individual persons become a people is the

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real foundation of society.[5] John Rawls Version Like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, Rawls belongs to the social contract tradition. However, Rawls social contract takes a slightly different form from that of previous thinkers. Specifically, Rawls posits that a just social contract is that which we would agree upon if we did not know in advance where we ourselves would end up in the society that we are agreeing to. This condition of ignorance is known as the Original Position. In the original position, no-one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like.[6] Rawls argues that any rational person inhabiting the original position and placing him or herself behind the veil of ignorance can discover the two principles of justice, Rawls has constructed what is perhaps the most abstract version of a social contract theory. It is highly abstract because rather than demonstrating that we would or even have signed to a contract to establish society, it instead shows us what we must be willing to accept as rational persons in order to be constrained by justice and therefore capable of living in a well ordered society. The principles of justice are more fundamental than the social contract as it has traditionally been conceived. Rather, the principles of justice constrain that contract, and set out the limits of how we can construct society in the first place.[7] Next in this inquiry is the concept of a Constitution. A Constitution, in the modern sense of the term, may be understood in the light of the British Parliamentary tradition that had no notion that a single document could serve as a Constitution and it may, in contrast, be understood in the light of the American Constitutional tradition that has its foundation in a single codified text, which they aptly named as the Constitution of the United States of America. Britain has taught America the core tradition of constitutionalism. The ancient Greek notion of politeia, a plan for a way of life, and the Roman concept of constitutio stand as the distant progenitors of the modern construction of the term.[8] Donald S. Lutz in his book The Origins of American Constitutionalism[9] reasons that while

the U.S. Constitution stands at the apex of American tradition, it remains simply another political document unless the people choose to use it in a certain way, as the summary of the political commitments and as the standard by which to assess, develop, and run the political system.[10] He regards the Constitution as a document of political founding or refounding and proceeds to discuss that the term constitution has to do with making or establishing something, giving it legal status, describing the mode or organization, locating sovereignty, establishing limits, and describing fundamental principles.[11] Viewed in the light of the Social Contract Theories, the Constitution may be considered as the Social Contract itself in the sense that is the very basis of the decision to constitute a civil society or State, breathing life to its juridical existence, laying down the framework by which it is to be governed, enumerating and limiting its powers, and declaring certain fundamental rights and principles to be inviolable. On the other hand, the Constitution, as a political document, whether embodied in a single code or scattered in numerous fundamental or organic acts, may be considered as the concrete manifestation or expression of the Social Contract or the decision to abandon the state of nature and organize and found a civil society or State. However, one clarification is in order to avoid confusion or inaccuracy. A common denominator to all the above treatises on the Social Contract is that the social contract to form a civil society is a contract that is theoretically entered into between and among the people themselves. It does not include the State per se as a party. The social contract precedes the very existence of the State and the government. Having preceded the existence of the State and the government, the social contract could not have had the State or the Government as a party. It is therefore inaccurate or even a mistake to regard the State or the Government as a party to the social contract. Therefore, the dictum in Marcos v. Manglapus[12] that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good should not be understood as a social contract between the people and the State or the Government. If it is to be consistent to the original thoughts and conceptions of the great social contract theorists, it must be understood as a social contract between and among the people themselves whereby they have agreed to form a State and surrendered certain powers to the State for the common good.

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