Prashanth Ciryam Professor de Marchi Hierarchy and Spontaneous Order

I. Introduction
Diplomacy is a game of strategy and persuasion set in pre-World War I Europe. In our dorm, we have decided to play Diplomacy on a weekly basis for an indefinite, but finite, period of time. Over the course of this paper, we will go through the differences between this setup and a single-shot version of this game, strategies that would do well in this setup, types of people that would do well in this setup, effects on dorm life, and role of persuasion in the game.

II. Single-Shot vs. Iterated Diplomacy

In game theory, there is a clear distinction between single-shot games and iterated games games that are played on multiple occasions over a period of time. In single-shot games, there are limited repercussions for a lack of cooperation; the game is only played once so players cannot seek retribution for bad behavior. Iterated games behave entirely differently. There are two classes of iterated games: infinitely iterated and finitely iterated. Because the games of Diplomacy will presumably stop being played at the end of the semester, they are best treated as finitely iterated games. Since there is an end to the game, there is a great incentive to behave selfishly when possible. This is especially interesting given that the stalemate at the outset of a game of Diplomacy can only be broken by cooperation.

III. Possible Strategies

As previously mentioned, the start of Diplomacy essentially exists as a stalemate. At the start of a game, no meaningful moves can be made until at least two players cooperate. While single-player victories are possible, dual-player victories are also possible. Because the victory-standard for Diplomacy is so heavily dependent on cooperation for a great deal of the game, single-player victories (weighted most heavily for the regard of a players

Prashanth Ciryam Professor de Marchi Hierarchy and Spontaneous Order fellow diplomats) involve breaking cooperative bonds formed at some point in the game. Players who continually seek single-player victories will have broken so many of these compacts that they will set off Grim Trigger-like strategies from the other players when it comes to cooperation with them; players will continually refuse to ally with an untrustworthy player over the course of many games, even if it would be strategically advantageous to ally at any single instant. For this reason, a successful strategy would be to seek dual-player victories most of the time, only pursuing single-player victories in limited cases when single-player victory is nearly assured, thus minimizing risk of losing the ability to cooperate and maximizing the reward of street cred. It may also be useful for players to form alliances that exist over the course of multiple games. While there are advantages for specific countries to ally with other specific countries in Diplomacy, secure alliances between any two countries yield them an advantage in victory. Since the players who represent each country are variable (the countries are chosen at random), it is more useful to pursue long-standing alliances with specific players. Players can then become accustomed to their partners play-style and learn to trust them, leading to faster and more frequent victories for the first teams to pair up effectively. However, there would also be times when players realize that they cannot possibly win from certain positions in the game. Diplomacy is a zero-sum game; only one player (or in our case, two players) can win the game, while all others lose. Despite this, a game of Diplomacy can also end in stalemate if a certain number of turns pass without any of the players capturing supply centers. When in a position when it appears as if the possibility of victory is fairly low, a player may try to form alliances with remaining players in similar positions to bring about a stalemate. The advantage in such strategies is not immediately obvious. When analyzing the

Prashanth Ciryam Professor de Marchi Hierarchy and Spontaneous Order payoffs for winning and losing, however, it becomes more apparent. If a player is at or below the average number of wins, it is in that players favor to attempt to make the average decrease. Doing so prevents players who have an above-average amount of wins from gaining insurmountable leads because every player would be awarded 0 utility toward street cred in a stalemate.

IV. Possible Player Types

In order to have competitive games of Diplomacy, a variety of traits are desirable in the players participating in the games. Because the outset of the game involves a large amount of uncertainty, especially if no alliances have formed yet, it is necessary to have risk-seeking players engaging in the game. This will set off the first few phases of the game and allow it to progress normally. Further, because a game consisting of all risk-seeking players would quickly devolve in to chaos through continually high-risk moves, a mix of risk-averse and risk-neutral players also need to be represented. These players will require some convincing to enter alliances, but would be unwilling to compromise the compacts on which they are founded due to fear of retribution. Traits that should be exhibited by all players include willingness to cooperate (because so much of the game involves cooperation) and being somewhat rational (so that the moves are not done completely at random and involve the weighing of costs and benefits of each move, leading to a more competitive game).

V. Effects on Dorm Life

The combination of regularly being placed in a competitive environment for several hours at a time and the possibility of long-standing alliances could have drastic effects on dorm

Prashanth Ciryam Professor de Marchi Hierarchy and Spontaneous Order life for Diplomacy players. Because victories earn players street cred, the game of Diplomacy is clearly defined as a significant factor in dorm social life. Repeat winners can either be respected and admired for their street cred or envied and despised for it. If repeat winners are admired, then those who continually win at Diplomacy will begin to garner increased positive attention from other players of the game. Additionally, an alliance with repeat winners would be viewed as desirable strategically, which would mean that befriending and gaining the trust of repeat winners would be desirable. Below-average players would attempt to befriend these players the most, since they have the most to gain from allying with successful players. If repeat winning is envied, then factions would likely form among Diplomacy players. Players who are successful may form their own clique, while players who are unsuccessful would form another. Another possibility is that these rifts might separate various long-standing alliances from one another due to distrust of other alliances during gameplay. A final possibility is successful alliances forming into their own distinct clusters due to distrust of all other players since they can only do worse, while all unsuccessful players form a single cluster because they can only gain from cooperation to stalemate or win. These factions would be formed on trust or distrust and change how Diplomacy players treated each other outside of Diplomacy because trust is an integral part of interpersonal relationships. In any of these situations, it is clear that Diplomacy would drastically alter the dynamic of dorm life since it is a highly valued social factor.

VI. Role of Persuasion

The ability to persuade other players plays heavily into this view of Diplomacy, especially in its view of alliances.

Prashanth Ciryam Professor de Marchi Hierarchy and Spontaneous Order Alliances are formed on the basis that there is some mutual benefit in cooperation. In order to first form alliances, it is necessary to convince other players to let their guard down and play cooperatively. Such play involves the ability to negotiate, perhaps ceding certain supply centers to or forming neutrality zones with your new ally. Additionally, if an alliance has more than two players, as some alliances will in the beginning years of the game, it is necessary to convince all players within the alliance that they have a legitimate chance at winning the game or participating in a dual-player victory. This again may involve persuasion by a player gaining the trust of his allies by offering up small gifts to them that do not compromise his overall strategy. Finally, not all persuasion is peaceful. It is also possible to force players to cooperate through threats of invasion or destruction by players already in an alliance. The advantage of threats for compliance rather than simply invading the areas in question is that threats bypass the expenditure of resources on battles.