"SELECTIVE OBJECTION.

" THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY TO REFUSE TO SERVE IN AN UNJUST WAR: THE MOVEMENT OF 1968-75 AND ITS PREHISTORY

John Howard Yoder, unpublished, 1992. Revised, Fall 1993. A source collection and research guide (with special reference to the American Roman Catholic experience up to 1983, and to Notre Dame). Also available as "Working Paper" from the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame.

I. Preface as to concepts and vocabulary

We have inherited from a conversation on another subject a set of standard tools for dealing with our theme. For that reason we must attend to our words and be aware of their limits, before we can reach the substance.

"Conscience" is an established concept in western Christian pastoral and moral thought.

In the ordinary usage of our society, yet in no substantial clash with usages reaching back through the centuries, the notion of "conscience" has had about it quite regularly the following marks:

- that it is knowable immediately to the acting and deciding subject. That knowledge may have been "formed" by cultural and social experience, but once established it is unequivocal in its status, and quasi-unreflective, spontaneous in its accessibility;

- that it forbids or commands with clarity. If one's moral judgments are uncertain or confused, they can hardly be classified as "conscientious".

- that it designates a kind of synthesis or togetherness. The prefix "con-" means "together" (as does the equivalent in the Greek), referring to some kind of integration of the person's functions or faculties. To act against conscience is to lack integrity.

- that conscience may quite validly contradict other moral positions held to by others, including those which dominate one's milieu. In fact one usually does not use the appeal to "conscience" to describe conformity to majority norms. Nothing prevents a person's being conscientiously conformist, but in that setting the appeal would usually not be needed.

- thus to contradict the positions of others may be essential to a person's integrity, in such a way that it is morally preferable to obey an ill-informed conscience, by doing the objectively wrong thing which one think's is right, than to do the objectively right thing which one thinks is wrong. This preference is a commonplace of classical pastoral care.

- such a contradiction to the views of others can hardly be based on vague shadings of dissent in one's interpretation of the state of affairs in the world; the most appropriate base for a "conscience" appeal, if not the only one, is a transcendent value commitment, "religious" in some historical sense, or "ideological" in some sense that is functionally equivalent to "religion." That value overrules for that individual any prudential readings about needs or duties illuminated by ordinary empirical readings of the real world. - such dissent will by the nature of the case be rare. Society will not be harmed or weakened by permitting such dissenters to be exempted from ordinary duties, since there will be few of them. They will be sorted out both by the fact that such kinds of strong commitment are rare and by the fact that society is inhospitable to them and makes them costly.

When all or most of the above characteristics are present, then an action qualified as "conscientious" can make a moral claim (in our legal tradition, in recent generations) for exceptional treatment by the authorities of a state, on the grounds of the free exercise of religion. In one of the paradoxes of the way our law works, this moral claim has seldom needed to be adjudicated in principle, as a First Amendment free exercise claim, by the courts of the United States, since some provision or other has regularly been made for "conscientious objectors," whether by legislation or by administrative discretion(1).

What has been said above is purely formal, not dependent on what particular dictates of whose "conscience" collide with what civil obligations. One may have "conscientious" reasons for not having one's picture taken, or for not taking off one's jewish headgear, or for refusing blood transfusions, or for not working on Sunday, or for not hanging a reflective red triangle on the back of one's buggy. The logic is similar; whether such freedoms of religious exercise are conceded by administrative flexibility or by the courts will depend on the administrators' flexibility.

From here on, however, this introduction will be referring to "conscientious objection" only as it applies to military service. "Conscientious objection" is called "conscientious" because an individual's request (or in fact demand) to be dispensed from military service obligations fits the

above description of individual conscientiousness.

It should be pointed out that in Christian thought and pastoral care "conscience" does not always have the kind of firmness which the legal recognition presupposes; we speak of the "troubled" or "uneasy" conscience, or of "searching one's conscience"; nonetheless what the legal right to exemption presupposes is a firm rejection of any participation in any war.

There is thus an important change in tone and setting, when we move to the phenomenon which in the last decades has come to be called "selective conscientious objection." Why the term itself is questionable becomes evident if we juxtapose the more recent events to the description of "conscience" unfolded above. "Conscience" traditionally had to be absolute, exceptionless to be genuine. SCO on the other hand "selects" from among the imperatives addressed by the state to its citizens, some which the objector is willing freely (or when drafted) to obey and others which are held not to be binding. The discernment is not based on an absolute, subjectively overwhelming certainty of the kind previously characterized as "conscientious", but rather on the rational evaluation of a particular deed in the light of a broad range of pertinent moral obligations. This "range of pertinent obligations" usually corresponds to the criteria of the "just war tradition," which when honestly applied to real wars will permit some lethal acts and forbid others. Of course such a person is subjectively "conscientious"; but the substance of the moral judgment is drawn not from his/her "conscience" (in the traditional sense) but from honest moral assessment of the facts of the case.

A more formal way to describe the difference between the two kinds of objection is that the "general" or "integral" objector makes an a priori judgment, whereas the "selective" judgment is a posteriori, reached by a decision process based on facts which differ from one case to another. This makes it more difficult for the civil authorities to recognize "conscience", since that judgment shades into differences of partisan political evaluation and different readings of "fact". The civil administrator sees the "selective objector" as glorifying political dissent with religious language.

The young man refusing to be sent to Viet Nam in 1968 was asking questions about legitimate authority, about noncombatant immunity, proportionality, probable success -- all of them subject to debate on the basis of empirical data which in turn could be challenged, could be manipulated.... That explains why our civil society has thus far not been able to handle "SCO" by the simple extrapolation of the older notion of "conscience." A citizen's differing from the government about considerations of jus ad bellum, or a soldier differing from his officer in matters of jus in bello, is dissenting on grounds not of exceptionless, undiscussible "conscience" but of concrete factual readings and debatable political judgments.

For that reason it would be more fitting, if we could start the conversation from scratch, to have another word. "Selective" suggests a mood of unpredictable or impressionistic arbitrariness

rather than the rigorous application of legal criteria. "Conscientious" suggests an element of unaccountable spontaneity or sectarian distance, which does not apply either. For such reasons Dr. Drew Christiansen S.J. has suggested that the label really ought to be "legal objection;" its appeal is to the law. Some would say "just war objector". Dr. William Yolton of the National Interreligious Service Board would prefer "discriminating." But for the present study I shall not try to impose a better vocabulary.

The above considerations describe the setting which makes so important the rising visibility of the notion of SCO in the thought of America's mainline church leaders. The following selection of citations is intended to document the old and wide respectability of the notion, something many have not been aware of, as discussion continues about whether a civil society can afford to acknowledge that its citizens (or, even more delicately, in a time without conscription, its soldiers) have a duty and right to make their own decisions.

There is something jurisprudentially odd when thorough-going pacifists "on the grounds of religious training and belief" are more or less automatically recognized as "conscientious" and worthy of recognition, exemption, and assignment to alternative service, whereas citizens from the mainstream non-pacifist denominations, applying with no less conscientiousness their communions' traditional view of war, cannot be recognized(2) (see below item II/7).

The collection of texts gathered below ends just before the bishops' pastoral The Challenge of Peace was published (1983). An addendum will offer comments on that text. The collection is intentionally located at Notre Dame; i.e. it includes texts of local origin, and gives more than proportionate space to Roman Catholic statements.

II. Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars: Sources on the Movement of 1965-75 and its Prehistory 1. Statement: "Peace Be With You: Moral Perspectives; Nuclear Weapons - Disarmament." Bishop William E. McManus of Fort Wayne and South Bend, New Year's Day, 1982.

One need not be a pacifist, opposed to war of any kind even in defense against aggression, to disapprove of any use whatsoever of nuclear weapons. Many who continue to believe in the morality of a "just war," notably a war of national self defense, nonetheless hold firm to the moral view that use of any nuclear weapons would be absolutely wrong. Their reasoning is sanctioned by Vatican II's declaration that "any act of war aimed at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and against humanity. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation."

2. 1971 Declaration of the United States Catholic Bishops, October 21, 1971:

For many of our Catholic people, especially the young, the question of participation in military service has become a serious moral problem. They properly look to their spiritual leaders for guidance in this area of moral decision and for support when they judge their sentiments to be in keeping with Catholic Christian tradition. For this reason, we wish to express ourselves on the following principles.

When survival of the wider community has been threatened by external force, the Church has traditionally upheld the obligation of Christians to serve in military defensive forces. Such community- oriented service, that is, soldiers devoted to the authentic purposes of securing peace and justice, has merited the Church's commendation. It was also recognized by the Second Vatican Council that the common good is also served by the conscientious choice of those who renounce violence and war, choosing the means of nonviolence instead:

...we cannot fail to praise those who renounce the use of violence in the vindication of their rights and who resort to methods of defense which are otherwise available to weaker parties too, provided that this can be done without injury to the rights and duties of others or of the community itself. ("The Church in the Modern World," Section V, paragraph 78). Furthermore, the Council Fathers, addressing themselves more specifically to the rights of the conscientious objector to war, stated:

...it seems right that laws make humane provisions for those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms, provided however, that they accept some other form of service to the human community. ("The Church in the Modern World," paragraph 79) Although a Catholic may take advantage of the law providing exemption from military service because of conscientious opposition to all war, there often arises a practical problem at the local level when those who exercise civil authority are of the opinion that a Catholic cannot under any circumstances be a conscientious objector because of religious training and belief. This confusion, in some cases, is the result of a mistaken notion that a person cannot be a conscientious objector unless the individual is a member of one of the traditional pacifist churches (for example; a Quaker).

In the light of the Gospel and from an analysis of the Church's teaching on conscience it is clear that a Catholic can be a conscientious objector to war in general or to a particular war "because of religious training and belief." It is not enough, however, simply to declare that a Catholic can be a conscientious objector or a selective conscientious objector. Efforts must be made to help Catholics form a correct conscience in the matter, to discuss with them the duties of citizenship, and to provide them with adequate draft counseling and information services in order to give them the full advantage of the law

protecting their rights. Catholic organizations which could qualify as alternative service agencies should be encouraged to support and provide meaningful employment for the conscientious objector. As we hold individuals in high esteem who conscientiously serve in the armed forces, so also we should regard conscientious objection and selective conscientious objection as positive indicators within the Church of a sound moral awareness and respect for human life.

The status of the selective conscientious objector is complicated by the fact that the present law does not provide an exemption for this type of conscientious objection. We recognize the very complex procedural problems which selective conscientious objection poses for the civil community; we call upon moralists, lawyers and civil servants to work cooperatively toward moral and civil order concerning this issue. (Cited from In The Name of Peace: Collective Statements of the U.S. Catholic Bishops..., Washington, 1983, pp. 53-57.) 3. A statement signed June 13, 1970 by thirty-one members of the Theology Department, University of Notre Dame.

The undersigned theology teachers of the University of Notre Dame are drawn to express themselves regarding the dilemma in which many young men find themselves, between the demands of their country and the demands of their conscience.

Christian moral thought cannot be complacent about killing. The intent of the traditional concept of the "just war," taught by the majority of the Christian moralists for centuries, has been to limit and to test the cases in which Christians might claim just grounds for participation in war. We are confident that the following statement is consonant with the majority tradition.

Christian conscience, properly understood, is not an unaccountable individual intuition, nor an expression of a merely personal moral code, but in response of faith to the teaching of Scripture and the Church. A Christian, applying honestly the "just war" standards, may properly conclude that he cannot participate in the kind of war he now faces. Indeed, sober attention to the reality of contemporary war, its goals and methods, makes its moral justification increasingly dubious.

The fidelity to conscience of such a sincere objector is more than merely tolerable or acceptable. He is to be commended for a costly form of courage, an authentic national loyalty, and a highly useful service to the community. He deserves the same respect and support as the man whose conscience moves him to serve in the armed forces. The nation and its laws should accord to such a conscientious objector the recognition to which he is morally entitled.

The signers of the above text included the then President Theodore Hesburgh, former Dean Charles Sheedy, Former Department Chair Albert L. Schlitzer, then Department chair James T. Burtchaell (all of the above CSC), scripture scholars John L. McKenzie SJ and Josephine M. Ford. Other signers since retired: Laporte, Storey. Signers still at Notre Dame in 1992: Dunne, Miceli, Yoder.

4. Statement of the U.S. Catholic Bishops on Peace and War: November 1968.

...for many of our youthful protesters, the motives spring honestly from the principled opposition to a given war as pointless or immoral: Nor can it be said that such conscientious objection to war, as war is waged in our times, is entirely the result of subjective considerations and without reference to the message of the Gospel and the teaching of the Church; quite the contrary, frequently conscientious dissent reflects the influence of the principles which inform modern papal teaching, the Pastoral Constitution and a classical tradition of moral doctrine in the Church, including, in fact, the norms for the moral evaluation of a theoretically just war. The present laws of this country ... provide only for those whose reasons of conscience are grounded in a total rejection of the use of military force. This form of conscientious objection deserves the legal provision made for it, but we consider that the time has come to urge that similar consideration be given those whose reasons for conscience are more personal and specific. We therefore recommend s modification of the Selective Service Act making in possible, although not easy, to so-called selective conscientious objectors to refuse - without fear of imprisonment or loss of citizenship - to serve in wars which they consider unjust or in branches of service ... which would subject them to the performance of actions contrary to deeply held moral convictions about indiscriminate killing... Whether or not such modifications in our laws are in fact made, we continue to hope that, in the all-important issue of war and peace, all men will follow their consciences.

5. Parallel statements were made between 1967 and 1973 by the American Lutheran Church, The Lutheran Church in America, The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, and The Lutheran Council in the U.S.A. The fullest treatment was Richard J. Niebanck, Conscience, War, and the Selective Objector, Board of Social Ministry, Lutheran Church in America, 1968. The several statements are summarized in Studies: The Witness of U.S. Lutherans on Peace, War, and Conscience, published by the Lutheran Council in the USA, New York, 1973. A parallel statement was adopted February 23, 1967 by the General Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. The United Presbyterian Church has repeatedly (1969, 1970, 1983, 1990) urged the same claims.

6. One text from Gaudium et Spes (Rome, 7 December 1965) was already briefly cited above: there is however a still stronger statement earlier in par. 79:

Actions which deliberately conflict with these same principles [of universal natural law and conscience], as well as the orders commanding such actions, are criminal. Blind obedience cannot excuse those who yield to them.... The courage of those who openly and fiercely resist men who issue such commands merits supreme commendation.

7. Resolution adopted by the National Service Board for Religious Objectors, November 19, 1965:

For 25 years the NSBRO has provided counsel and information to all persons, regardless of creed, whose religious beliefs forbid them to take human life. The present Selective Service Act provides orderly procedures to cover registrants with religious objections to war in any form.

The Act does not provide for men who may object sincerely to particular conflicts as distinct from other wars which might be acceptable. To many it may appear that objection of the latter type rests on political rather than on religious consideration.

An important concept in our religious and moral heritage, however, distinguishes "unjust" from "just" wars. Today some religiously motivated persons invoke that doctrine. Though the present law does not speak to this point, it appears difficult from a moral or religious viewpoint to deny a conscience formed by this conviction the recognition now accorded to conventional conscientious objectors. Indeed, as the recent history of totalitarian governments warns us, no nation can offer to penalize the discriminating conscience. Proper recognition of conscientious objection to unjust wars, while obviously a complex matter, seems to require additional consideration by the President or the Congress or the courts.

The National Service Board was the agency representing traditional conscientious objectors before Congress and the Selective Service administration. Its testimony was therefore especially weighty, since by asking the government, as a matter of justice, to widen the accessibility of CO status, it ran the risk of jeopardizing the already established privilege of integral objectors. 8. "Conscientious Objectors: Theological Notes," Brother V. Alfred., F.S.C., Ph.D. in Religious Educator, Vol. 7, No. 7, April 1939, pp. 123-33 (significant for its having being said long before the particular application arose):

The other set of principles concerns the duty of citizens with respect to war. As subjects of the state we have an obligation in conscience to defend our country in a just war. If we

are doubtful of the justice of the war we are still bound in conscience, for in case of doubt authority takes precedence. Finally if we are morally certain of the injustice of the war we are bound in conscience to abstain from taking part in the hostilities.

If modern war as conducted is unjust, therefore, not only may one be a conscientious objector, but there is a definite duty to be one...

There is the consideration of the means used, and if these be not legitimate, the war is unjust, no matter how just the cause or right the intention. This is a hard nut to crack.

It is not altogether a pleasant situation to face. The conscientious objector will have to bear abuse even from fellow Catholics in all probability. The state will not be particularly pleased and may invent more stringent penalties for this 'offense'. But if worse comes to worse, it is better to die for peace than to die in an unjust war; better to obey God and conscience than authority commanding injustice." (editor's emphasis)

9. Representative religious journalism during the Viet Nam period: Harry R. Davis, "Christian Neglect of Political Values; the Case of Selective Objection," The Christian Century, November 26, 1969, pp. 1510ff.

Jean Keenan, "Right Pew, Wrong Church: Justice for the Catholic Conscientious Objector," Commonweal, 24 July 1970, pp. 357 ff.

Joseph Pisani, "Conscientious Objection: No Longer Un-Catholic," The Christian Century, July 21, 1971, pp. 876ff.

10. Representative scholarly writings: Charles Lutz, "Objection to Participation in Combat: Legality and Morality" in Paul Peachey (ed.), Peace, Politics, and The People of God, Philadelphia, Fortress, 1986, pp. 151-162.

Patricia McNeal, Harder than War, New Brunswick, Rutgers U Press, 1992, touches the theme frequently; cf. index p. 313. Ralph Potter, "Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars," in Donald A. Gianella (ed.) Religon and the Public Order, No. 4, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 44ff.

Paul Ramsey, "Selective Objection" in The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, New York, Scribners, 1968, pp. 91-137.

LeRoy Walters, "A Historical Perspective on Selective Conscientious Objection," in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, June 1973, pp. 201ff. Reprinted in Richard B. Miller (ed.) War in the Twentieth Century, Louisville, Westminster/Knox, 1992, pp. 215-229. 11. Popular book-length treatments

James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C., (ed.) A Just War No Longer Exists, Notre Dame University Press, 1988; documents from the case of an Italian priest, unrelated to the American agenda. David Cartwright, Soldiers in Revolt, Garden City, Doubleday Anchor, 1974

James Finn, A Conflict of Loyalties: The Case for Selective Conscientious Objection, New York, Pegasus, 1968

Eileen P. Flynn, My Country Right or Wrong?, Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1985

Steven Franklin, If this be Treason: Your sons tell their own stories. . . New York, Wychen, 1970

Larry Gara, War Resistance in Historical Perspective, Lebanon, Sowers 1970

Alice Lynd, We Won't Go, Boston, Beacon Press, 1968

J. K. Osborne, I Refuse, Philadelphia, Westminster

Thomas Powers, The War at Home, New York, Grossman, 1973

John A. Rohr, Prophets Without Honor: Public Policy and the Selective Conscientious Objector, New York, Arlington, 1971

David Surrey, Choice of Conscience Boston, J.F.Bergin, 1982

12. Classical backgrounds: A. Francisco de Vitoria (d.1546)

If the injustice of a war is clear to a subject, he ought not to serve in it, even on the command of his prince. This is clear, for no one can authorize the killing of an innocent person. But in the case before us the enemy are innocent. Therefore they may not be killed. Again, a prince sins when he commences a war in such a case. But "not only are they who commit such things worthy of death, but they, too, who consent to the doing thereof" (Romans 1:32). Therefore soldiers are not excused when they fight in bad faith. Again, it is not lawful to kill innocent fellow-citizens at the prince's command. Therefore not foreigners either [editor's emphasis]. (On the Laws of War 22)

B. Martin Luther (d. 1546). i) from his "Treatise on Good Works."

But if, as often happens, the temporal power and authorities, or whatever they call themselves, would compel a subject to do something contrary to the command of God, or hinder him from doing what God commands, obedience ends and the obligation ceases. In such a case a man has to say what St. Peter said to the rulers of the Jews, "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). He did not say, "We must not obey men," for that would be wrong. He said, "God rather than men." [It is] as if a prince desired to go to war, and his cause was clearly uprighteous; we should neither follow nor help such a prince, because God had commanded us not to kill our neighbor or do him a wrong. Likewise, if the prince were to order us to bear false witness, steal, lie or deceive, and the like [we should refuse]. In such cases we should indeed give up our property and honor, our life and limb, so that God's commandments remain. (From Luther's Works, vol. 44, p. 100)

ii) from his "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can be Saved."

A second question: "Suppose my lord were wrong in going to war," I reply: If you know for sure that he is wrong, then you should fear God rather than men, Acts 4 [5:29], and you should neither fight nor serve, for you cannot have a good conscience before God. "Oh no," you say, "my lord would force me to do it; he would take away my fief and would not give me my money, pay, and wages. Besides, I would be despised and put to shame as a coward, even worse, as a man who did not keep his word and deserted his lord in need." I answer: You must take that risk and, with God's help, let whatever happens, happen. He can restore it to you a hundredfold, as he promises in the gospel, "Whoever leaves house, farm, wife, and property, will receive a hundredfold," etc. [Matt. 19:29]. (From Luther's Works, vol. 46, p. 130)

iii) Luther is still more vigorous about the duty to refuse to help in wrongful violence in his "Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the Peasants":

". . . you went along with the crowd and did not make your unwillingness known, and thus nothing helps you. . . . It is our duty to call upon God for help and to resist sin and wrong. If you die or suffer for it, good for you! Your soul is blessed before God and honored by the world! But if you yield and obey, . . . your death is shameful before God and the world because you have allowed yourself to be forced to do wrong." (From Luther's Works, vol. 46, p. 77)

It should be noted that in all of these cases Luther does not hesitate to consider the cost of refusing unjust military service as a form not merely of civil righteousness but of Christian martyrdom. C. Francisco Suarez (d. 1617) On Charity VI/8-11

...just as one is not allowed to proceed to an unjust war, neither is he allowed to undertake the obligation of serving in such a war [i.e. to sign on as a mercenary], nor even in any war indiscriminately, whether just or unjust; and the reason for these discriminations is that to fight in an unjust war is to act unjustly.

The specific concern with which Suarez is dealing in this text is not the wrongness of serving in an unjust war, which he takes for granted, but the degree of certainty one needs in order to make the decision about a war's injustice. Generals and nobles are fully responsible to make full enquiries, mercenaries a little less so, simple subjects even less so; yet Suarez quotes two authorities, including Pope Adrian VI (d.1523), who had said that even the simple subject should not obey without question but must make enquiries if there is any doubt at all (cf. E. below).

D. Hugo Grotius (d. 1645). On the Laws of War and Peace, Book III, Chapter XXVI:

There are others that are under a more servile condition, and such are the Sons of a Family, Servants, Subjects, and each particular Citizen, compared with the whole Body of the City whereof they are.

But these men, if either admitted to advise, or left to their own choice, whether they will either take up Armes or be quiet, ought to be guided by the same Rules, which are already set down for those who being free have power to make war either for themselves

or others.

But if commanded thereunto, as usually they are, then if it be evident unto them that the Cause is unjust, they ought altogether to forbear; for that God is rather to be obeyed than man, was not only the judgment of the Apostle, but even of Socrates also, as Plato testifies in his Apology.

E) A modern scholar's summary of some of the above:

When the prince's cause is manifestly unjust, subjects may not serve in his war. Suarez even pushes the issue back one step: when arguments have been advanced that raise some doubt in the consciences of the subjects, they must inquire into their prince's cause....If they discover that the cause is unjust, they may not serve. Suarez and Victoria offer a clear justification for individual conscientious object to particular wars....It is emphatically the subject's responsibility to dispel any doubt..., and if doing so results in certainty on his part that the war is unjust, he must in conscience refuse.... ( James T. Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War, Princeton , 1975, pp. 182f.)

III. Post scripts

1) the involvement of Notre Dame in the mid-1970's:

After the conclusion of the Viet Nam hostilities there arose a wide recognition that the men who had left the USA rather than accept being drafted, while not technically recognizable by USA Selective Service law as conscientious objectors, should not be further penalized for having been prematurely right about the wrongness of the war. The Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights sponsored the study Reconciliation after Viet Nam by Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, NDUPress, 1977, later followed by a fuller report Chance and Circumstance by the same authors (New York, Borzoi/Knopf 1978).

The point of departure for this study had been the assignment to Notre Dame's President Theodore Hesburgh CSC to serve on President Gerald Ford's "Clemency Board", charged with deciding about thousands of cases. The results of these studies provided the background information and orientation in line with which President Jimmy Carter's first action after his inauguration was to pronounce an amnesty in favor of such men. In God, Country, Notre Dame

(Doubleday 1990 pp. 265-279) Pres. Hesburgh recounts his leadership in the matter.

It is noteworthy that none of these texts makes an issue formally and overtly of the concept of SCO, of its logic, of how it differs from pacifism, or of the notion that particular just war criteria are not being met, despite the obvious fact that some kind of lay equivalent of just war thinking, issuing in some kind of SCO, must have been operative in the minds of most of those draft avoiders. Cf. Charles P. Lutz, "Amnesty as Value Clarification for America," The Christian Century 2 Oct 1974, pp. 904ff.

2). SCO in The Challenge of Peace (1983)

It is striking that for all the strong language about "undertaking a completely fresh reappraisal of war" (a citation from Gaudium et Spes, "The Church in the Modern World" #80, in #120), when the American bishops in 1983 issued The Challenge of Peace they did not speak strongly of the possibility of SCO. They referred (#118 and #233) to their having previously called for legislative recognition of SCO back in 1968 (item 4 above).

Yet the practical pastoral paragraphs of the 1983 letter (303-317), addressed to specific categories of Christians (clergy, educators, parents, youth, people in military service), studiously skirt any explicit reference to the possibility that an individual might need to refuse induction or obedience because of an unjust cause or an unjust order.

Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, chairman of the drafting committee, spoke more strongly in his own right. Lecturing at Fordham University 6 December 1983, he said:

...directly intended [nuclear] attacks on civilian centers are always wrong. The bishops seek to highlight the power of this conclusion by specifying its implications in two ways: first, such attacks would be wrong even if our cities had been hit first; second, anyone asked to execute such attacks should refuse orders. (cit. from Eileen Flynn op. cit. above p. 37 - editor's emphasis).

3) SCO in 1991

When in the face of orders to serve in the Persian Gulf war some hundreds (some estimates approach 2,500 ) of US soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women resisted the assignment (some as integral conscientious objectors, whom this crisis had for the first time led them to understand themselves as such, but more of them on "selective" conscientious grounds), this was not because the church had intensively prepared them to take that position or prepared itself to be

ready to support them.

After the Gulf war, numerous new initiatives of churchmen and legislators picked up again the challenge, (a) calling for speedy and fair processing of the objectors who had been identified as such just before and during the Gulf war, and (b) renewing the demand in justice that the discrimination between "selective" and "integral" objectors be legally removed.

1. I pointed out this paradox in my paper "Response of an Amateur Historian and a Religious Citizen" in Journal of Law and Religion Vol. 7 (1989) pp. 415-432. Exemption claims that are less fundamental (not having to remove a yarmulke in the military, not having to have a photograph on one's driver's license, not having to send one's children to "worldly" secondary education in the city, not wanting a reflective red triangle one one's buggy) tend to get more attention from the courts than does conscientious refusal of military service by Quakers or Mennonites. Accommodations to the latter have generally been made ad hoc by local legislative or administrative arrangements ever since colonial times. Thus a right to conscientious objection has not needed to be won in the courts (op. cit. p. 429, note 25). This is part of the reason that respect for selective objection has so little to appeal to. 2. Negre v. Larsen et al. (US Supreme Court October 1970) ruled that a man who holds a traditional "just war" viewpoint cannot be exempted from service in a particular war even if he believes that war to be unjust. Since the "just war" tradition represents the dominant "religious training and belief" of Catholics, this ruling is intrinsically discriminatory and constitutes a backhanded establishment of religion. We must believe that if competently argued it would be reversed. In 1971 Gillette renewed the denial.