G.R. No.

L-20867

September 3, 1966 MODOC petitioners-appellants,

SALVADOR APRUEBA and ASUNCION vs. HON. RODOLFO GANZON, respondent-appellee.

FACTS: On October 24, 1960, petitioners Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for mandamus against respondent City Mayor of Iloilo City, alleging among others, that they are owners and operators of a cafeteria located in Stall 17-C of the city market since 1950 to October 1, 1960 when respondent city mayor ordered his policemen to close it for alleged violation of city ordinance.
on October 3, 1960, he was informed by the respondent that the store could only be reopened if petitioners paid all their back accounts; after paying the back accounts, respondent still refused to allow reopening of the store. respondent filed an answer with counterclaim on November 3, 1960, that respondent's refusal to allow the opening of the cafeteria was in accordance with Section 10(m) of the city charter. Respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed and, on the counterclaim, judgment be rendered ordering petitioner to pay respondent P5,500.00 as moral damages. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT IT IS MINISTERIAL OR DICRETIONARY POWERS OF THE CITY MAYOR TO GRANT AND REFUSE MUNICIPAL LICENCES? HELD: the refusal of respondent to allow reopening of the cafeteria is predicated on the provision of Section 10 (m) of the City Charter which states: SEC. 10. General duties and powers of the Mayor.The mayor shall have immediate control over the executive functions of the several departments of the City, and shall have the following general duties and powers: To grant and refuse municipal licenses and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried out, or for any other good reason of general interest. the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the permit (after the implied lease contract expired) rested on the sound discretion of respondent and refusal on his part to grant the continuance of the privilege (especially after petitioner Aprueba's alleged violation of city ordinance by allowing copetitioner Modoc to operate business in stall 17-C) cannot be the subject of an action for mandamus.

A.M. No. 95-1-01-MTCC January 5, 1998 FRANCISCO L. MARASIGAN and FRANCISCO T. DELA vs. LILIA S. BUENA as Clerk of Court, MTCC, Naga City, respondent. VINA, complainants,

FACTS: This administrative case arose from a letter-recommendation 1 dated June 9, 1994 of Francisco L. Marasigan, Director IV, Commission on Audit, Regional Office No. V, Legaspi City, addressed to the court administrator recommending that, on the basis of a report and documents pertaining to the examination of the cash and accounts of Lilia S. Buena, clerk of court and ex oficio sheriff, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC), Naga City, which found respondent short in her accountabilities in the amount of P81,650.00, appropriate administrative action be instituted against her. Mrs. Buena promptly responded to the demand letter of State Auditor Dela Via, confirming the audit findings and admitting fault and error therefor. She explained that the malversation was resorted to when her son was hospitalized and had to undergo a major operation after having been accidentally hit by a stray bullet of a policeman during a hold-up incident in Manila, making her incur so much expense beyond her means. She had hoped to be recompensed by the NAPOLCOM, but had to give up her claim since postponements of the scheduled conferences with NAPOLCOM in Manila resulted in additional (travel) expenses. She manifested willingness to restitute the missing amount, expressing her wholehearted repentance and further pleading for utmost consideration and leniency.

HELD: "public office is a public trust" cannot be imprudently undermined for it is constitutionally enshrined. Public officers and employees are at all times accountable to the people; must serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; and must lead modest lives. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713) additionally provides that every public servant shall uphold public interest over his or her personal interest at all times. 11 Court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, are further required to conduct themselves always beyond reproach, circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to free them from any suspicion that may taint the good image of the judiciary. he nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and oft-repeated in our case law are not mere rhetorical words. Not to be taken as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds." respondent is clerk of a court of justice, an officer described as essential to the judicial system, whose office is the core of activities, both adjudicative and administrative. She occupies a position of great importance and responsibility in the framework of judicial administration. Clerks of court are thus required to be persons of competence, honesty and probity since they are specifically imbued with the mandate of safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn and preserve respect therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as superior officer, to maintain the

authenticity and correctness of court records and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. 14 Respondent's acts of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being in the nature of grave offenses, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal on the first offense.

G.R. No. 177011

June 5, 2009

JOSEPH PETER SISON, ROSEMARIE SIOTING, FE P. VALENZUELA, ROBERTO L. BAUTISTA, MARIO P. ESCOBER, ARLENE PUZON, DANILO G. GERONA, NECITAS B. CLEMENTE, RAMON MACATANGAY and NEOFITO HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. ROGELIO TABLANG, Director IV, Commission on Audit; ELIZABETH S. ZOSA, Assistant Commissioner - Legal Adjudication and Settlement Board Chairperson; EMMA M. ESPINA, JAIME P. NARANJO, AMORSONIA B. ESCARDA and CARMELA S. PEREZ, Members of the Commission on Audit Legal Adjudication and Settlement Board, Respondents. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the decision1 of the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit (COA) dated March 5, 2007, which affirmed the Notices of Disallowance (ND) issued by the Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate (LAO-C), disallowing the payment of honoraria in the amount ofP364,299.31 made by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to petitioners, as members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) and the Technical Working Group (TWG). Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Act,12 provides that: Section 15. Honoraria of BAC Members. The Procuring Entity may grant payment of honoraria to the BAC members in an amount not to exceed twenty five percent (25%) of their respective basic monthly salary subject to availability of funds. For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) shall promulgate the necessary guidelines. Section 15 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9184, issued on October 8, 2003, reads as follows: Section 15. Honoraria of BAC and TWG Members The procuring entity may grant payment of honoraria to the BAC members in an amount not to exceed twenty five percent (25%) of their respective basic monthly salary subject to availability of funds. For this purpose, the [Department of Budget and Management] DBM shall promulgate the necessary guidelines. The procuring entity may also grant payment of honoraria to the TWG members, subject to the relevant rules of the DBM. There is no dispute that petitioners can be paid honoraria for the services they rendered as BAC and TWG members. However, the payment of honoraria is subject to the availability of funds and shall follow the guidelines and relevant rules which are promulgated by the DBM ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS IS ENTITLED FOR HONORARIUM?

HELD An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation

in money.16 Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184 uses the word "may" which signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right.17 The government is not unmindful of the tasks that may be required of government employees outside of their regular functions. It agrees that they ought to be compensated; thus, honoraria are given as a recompense for their efforts and performance of substantially similar duties, with substantially similar degrees of responsibility and accountability.18 However, the payment of honoraria to the members of the BAC and the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and guidelines prescribed by the DBM, as provided by law. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is explicit as it states: "For this purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the necessary guidelines." The word "shall" has always been deemed mandatory, and not merely directory. Thus, in this case, petitioners should have first waited for the rules and guidelines of the DBM before payment of the honoraria. As the rules and guidelines were still forthcoming, petitioners could not just award themselves the straight amount of 25% of their monthly basic salaries as honoraria. This is not the intendment of the law. No interpretation is needed for a law that is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. Now, the DBM has already set the guidelines for the payment of honoraria as required by law. Since the payment of honoraria to petitioners did not comply with the law and the applicable rules and guidelines of the DBM, the notices of disallowance are hereby upheld.

G.R. No. 103578 January 29, 1993 JUDGE RODOLFO vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT MUNTINLUPA, respondents. T. and the MUNICIPAL ALLARDE, petitioner, TREASURER OF

FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo T. Allarde was the Presiding Judge of Branch LXXX, Metropolitan Trial Court in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, until his courtesy resignation was accepted on January 13, 1987. He applied for retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1438, which this Court approved on July 11, 1989. In computing his total retirement pay, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) included the amount of P240,000.00 representing the five-year lump sum of the P4,000.00-monthly allowance which he had been receiving from the Municipality of Muntinlupa during his incumbency therein as judge, provided said lump sum of P240,000.00 should be charged to the funds of the municipality pursuant to Section 30 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 866, and subject to the availability of funds. On April 16, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, by Resolution No. 90-145, appropriated and awarded the amount of P240,000.00 in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner's claim for payment of that additional retirement benefit, Petitioner's claim is anchored on Section 3 of Republic Act No. 910. An Act Providing For The Retirement of Justices and All Judges in the Judiciary, as amended by P.D. No. 1438 which provides: Sec. 3. Upon retirement, a justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances he was receiving on the date of his retirement; Provided, however, that if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent to ten years' salary and allowances aforementioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retiree's natural life. ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF COA?

HELD: NO
The petitioner failed to prove that the P4,000.00 additional monthly allowance that he was receiving from the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa was a representation, living or transportation allowance, for as indicated in the sample disbursement voucher that he used to fill up whenever he claimed such allowance, the amount was in the nature of reimbursement for expenses which Judge Allarde certified "were incurred by me while performing my duties."

Letter of Instruction No.1418 which authorizes local governments to pay additional allowances to judges of the courts within their territorial jurisdiction, limits the amount of such allowance and does not provide that it shall be treated as part of the judge's remuneration in computing the retirement benefits. As observed by the Solicitor General the use of the word "may" signifies that the allowance may not be demanded as a matter of right, but is entirely dependent on the will of the municipality concerned (p. 43, Rollo). It should be treated as an honorarium, an amount that is "given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration for services which admit of no compensation in money" (Santiago vs. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 128, 130). As the Solicitor General aptly observed: such additional allowance does not constitute an integral part of the judge's remuneration for it may or may not be given by the local government and it is dependent on the liberality of the latter.