Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3 The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision. The Facts Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8 Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9 On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13 Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17 Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order. Ruling of the Trial Court The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual. Hence, this Petition.18 Issues Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration: "I The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner. "2 The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent. "3 The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case. "4 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19 The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest. The Court's Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious. First Issue: Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements. Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed. At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27 A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Divorce as a Question of Fact Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows: "ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx

xxx

xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x. "ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons." Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34 The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38 Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion. We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. Second Issue: Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio. Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46 Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47 On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws. Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50 As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60 Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994. WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents. x-------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187. In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca. The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case. Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases. The Facts Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by

counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11 Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved13and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage. Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Support Pendente Lite On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows: Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition. SO ORDERED.19 The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant

of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support. Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187. Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00. SO ORDERED.23 Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion. The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635. Ruling of the CA Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.26 To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises: (1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage. (2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father. (4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996. (5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce. Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979. The Issues In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094. In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows: I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO. II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT. III THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635. Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32 Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects? The Court's Ruling The petition is bereft of merit. Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33 And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen. It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza. For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778: To Whom It May Concern: This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows: Place of Birth: Sex: female Guam, USA Date of Birth: Civil Status: March 5, 1953 married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes:

brown

Distinguishing marks on face:

none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000. Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes. Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995 (SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA ASSO. COMMISSIONER Official Receipt No. 5939988 issued at Manila dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000 From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988. What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious. Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required. Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides: The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.) Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It

may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic. The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case? As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778. At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later. Validity of Divorce Decree Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid. First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared: IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this

court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.) Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid. To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez: Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit: SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41 As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42 Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43 Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44 The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 26. x x x x Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227) In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus: x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45 Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings. Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus: 9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained

at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.) This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47 Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48 No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus: A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the followingelements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49 One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified. The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education. Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support

hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 179474 FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CAG.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio. The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.7 On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed: WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the aboveentitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9 The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that: Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.] [Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister. When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10 Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus: That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible

opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12 Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13 The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner: Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15 Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage. Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false. The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.

Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19 In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that: In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: "x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21 Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion. Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23 The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit: I RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA. II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT. III RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24 Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability. For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa. The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife. The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order. It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.) Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34 The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36 It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the

law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.47 It is already wellsettled that: The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48 Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question. We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions. In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration

of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws. Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55 The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in. This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time. Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58 WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION

OSCAR P. MALLION, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 141528

Present: - versus PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Respondent.

EDITHA ALCANTARA,

Promulgated: October 31, 2006 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license? The facts are not disputed: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition[1] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision[2] dated November 11, 1997upon the finding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.[3] The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution[4] dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage

license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss[6] dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. In an order[7] dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.[8] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order[9] dated January 21, 2000. Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows: A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFES PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.[10]

B.

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of

nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. The petition lacks merit. The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys psychological incapac ity under Article 36 of the Family Code? Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata. The contention is untenable. Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.[11] This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.[12] In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus: SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the

judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and, (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.[13] Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by verdict, which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as conclusiveness of judgment or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.[14] Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case. Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[15] Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.[16] Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. [17] In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage. Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.[18] It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. [19] As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:[20] x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)

In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and

relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.[21]

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.: Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity. It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent. A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court). On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence. On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3 Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4 The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit. Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts: . . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated. The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx Art. 36. . . . (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations. Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations. Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally." Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency. Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction. Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured. Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not. On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest." Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent. Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage. xxx xxx xxx Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage. xxx xxx xxx On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage. Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured. Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help. Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5 xxx xxx xxx Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest. Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6 xxx xxx xxx Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows: Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization. Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse. Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent. Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting: "On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage. Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law. Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively. Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application. Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases. Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved. The members voted as follows: (1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity. (2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity. (3) Prof. Baviera abstained. Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7 It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8 The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads: Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage: 1. who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision. One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states: The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first: Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus); then a broader one followed: . . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049); then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3); finally, a new version was promulgated: because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae). So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage. Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears: This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder

which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties. Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Our Constitution is no less emphatic: Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution). The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to. The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila SECOND DIVISION CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 184063 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: January 24, 2011

- versus -

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is yet another tale of marital woe. Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision[1] dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CA affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied petitioners Petition[4] for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao (respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition[6] before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[7]
[5]

In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life.[8]

Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several business ventures, which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever money would come his way. Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.[9] Later, respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him.[10] She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[11] In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with petitioners relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.[12] Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he would not have the funds for such activity. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City. As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is the duty of the household help.[13] Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.[14] He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.[15] On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[16] dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that respondent was totally una ware of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for

over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.[17] The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.[18] The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly horrible married life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties with hardly any help from respondent.[19] The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.[20] Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner.[21] Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might have indeed entered into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage did not exist, given the 30 years they remained together through the various ups and downs of their volatile relationship.[22] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007.[23] Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal,[24] which was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007.[25] She then appealed to the CA. In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be considered psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law.

The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and that respondent failed to keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held that the fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity. The CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but merely constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.[27] The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[28] The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed the purported threats to kill petitioner as emotional immaturity and not psychological incapacity.[29] Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony established that respondents psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.[30] Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 4, 2008.[31] Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to respondent. In her petition for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE

II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTER TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE (sic)[32]

Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently established by her testimony and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible considering that they have personal knowledge of the circumstances prior to and during the parties marriage. On the other hand, respondents evidence consisted merely of his sole testimony, which were self-serving and full of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner points out that what the CA characterized as respondents efforts in finding jobs were merely the result of short-lived bursts of industry, failing to note that the jobs were few and very far between.[34] The rest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat, sleep, and party with his friends. [35] Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the opportunity to finish his studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner herself, but he never took up these offers.[36] Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in household chores, or take care of their children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help and contribute to all the needs of the family, whether the same be in the form of material or physical support.[37] Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely refusing to attend to his familys needs. She insists that respondents inability is due to a psychological affliction, i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested to by the expert witness she presented during trial.[38] Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is respondents jealous tendencies, which the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity.[39] Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and dependence could not be characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner contends that she has complied with the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the Family Code never intended to give such a suppressed definition of psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a restrictive definition would limit the applicability of the provision.[40] Moreover, she asserts that she has proven that respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent Personality Disorder manifested themselves even before the marriage of the parties, although not in the same degree as when they were already married.[41]

The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied. Article 36 of the Family Code states: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43] While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.[46]What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.[47] Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners evidenc e establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage? The Court holds that it does not. The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]

In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity. Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. [52] It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.[53] That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In his psychological report,[55] Dr. Tolentino merely said, [b]ecause ones personality or character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individuals culture,[56] without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never explained how the alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same was affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without any major parenting problems.[57] Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties marriage is a nullity. Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.

To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and void. Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: