Japan BMD Aff

DDI 2010

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Japan BMD..................................................................................................................................................................................................1 Plan Text......................................................................................................................................................................................................4 1AC Inherency.............................................................................................................................................................................................5 1AC Normalization......................................................................................................................................................................................6 1AC Normalization......................................................................................................................................................................................7 1AC Normalization......................................................................................................................................................................................9 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................11 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................12 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................13 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................14 1AC China ASAT......................................................................................................................................................................................15 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................16 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................17 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................18 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................19 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................20 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................21 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................22 1AC Regional Security..............................................................................................................................................................................23 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................24 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................25 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................26 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................27 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................28 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................30 1AC China NFU........................................................................................................................................................................................31 1AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................32 1AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................34 1AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................35 1AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................37 1AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................39 1AC Japanese Spending JET..................................................................................................................................................................40 1AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................41 1AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................43 1AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................45 1AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................47 1AC Japanese Spending Science............................................................................................................................................................48 1AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................49 1AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................50 1AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................51 1AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................53 1AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................54 1AC Europe BMD.....................................................................................................................................................................................56 1AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................58 1AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................59 1AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................61 1AC Weapons Exports...............................................................................................................................................................................63 Article 9 Ext Internal Link......................................................................................................................................................................65 Article 9 Ext Internal Link......................................................................................................................................................................66 Article 9 Impacts.....................................................................................................................................................................................67 Article 9 Good Human Rights................................................................................................................................................................68 Article 9 Good East Asia........................................................................................................................................................................69 Article 9 Good Global Modelling...........................................................................................................................................................70

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Article 9 AT: Disads...............................................................................................................................................................................71 Nuclearization Ext Internal Link............................................................................................................................................................72 Regional Security Impact Ext East Asia..............................................................................................................................................73 Regional Security Impact Ext East Asia..............................................................................................................................................75 Regional Security Impact China .........................................................................................................................................................76 Regional Security Impact China .........................................................................................................................................................78 Regional Security Impact China .........................................................................................................................................................79 Regional Security Impact China/India/Spacemil.................................................................................................................................80 Regional Security AT: South Korea Alt Cause......................................................................................................................................81 Regional Security Irrationality................................................................................................................................................................82 Regional Security China Modernization Internal Link...........................................................................................................................83 Regional Security China Miscalc Frame................................................................................................................................................85 Regional Security AT: BMD Deters Japan.............................................................................................................................................86 China ASAT Impact Miscalc...............................................................................................................................................................87 China ASAT Impact Arms Race..........................................................................................................................................................89 China ASAT Impact Russia War.........................................................................................................................................................90 China ASAT Impact Russia War.........................................................................................................................................................92 China ASAT Ext Internal Link...............................................................................................................................................................93 China ASAT Ext Internal Link...............................................................................................................................................................94 China ASAT AT: Modernization Now...................................................................................................................................................95 China NFU Ext Internal Link.................................................................................................................................................................97 China NFU Ext Internal Link.................................................................................................................................................................99 China NFU Impact Laundry List.......................................................................................................................................................100 JET On the Brink..................................................................................................................................................................................102 JET Impact Ext Soft Power................................................................................................................................................................103 JET Impact Japan/China Relations ...................................................................................................................................................104 Japan Science On the Brink..................................................................................................................................................................106 Japan Science iPS Bank Key................................................................................................................................................................107 Japan Science AT: Stem Cells Bad.......................................................................................................................................................108 Europe BMD Ext Internal Link............................................................................................................................................................109 Europe BMD Ext Internal Link............................................................................................................................................................110 Europe BMD Ext Russia Relations.......................................................................................................................................................112 Europe BMD Ext Russian Relations Iran..........................................................................................................................................113 Europe BMD Impact Accidental Launch..........................................................................................................................................114 Europe BMD Impact INF Withdrawal..............................................................................................................................................116 Europe BMD Impact Ext. INF...........................................................................................................................................................117 INF Good China Deterrence.................................................................................................................................................................118 INF Good Iskander...............................................................................................................................................................................119 INF Good Terror...................................................................................................................................................................................120 INF Good Ext NPT...............................................................................................................................................................................121 NPT Good - General................................................................................................................................................................................122 NPT Good - General................................................................................................................................................................................123 NPT Good AT: Impact Turns..................................................................................................................................................................124 INF Good AT: Withdraw Now.............................................................................................................................................................125 Europe BMD Russian Econ Scenario...................................................................................................................................................126 Weapons Exports Ext Internal Link......................................................................................................................................................128 Weapons Exports Ext Kills US Defense...............................................................................................................................................129 T...............................................................................................................................................................................................................130 T...............................................................................................................................................................................................................131 AT: Relations disad..................................................................................................................................................................................132 AT: Relations Disad.................................................................................................................................................................................133 AT: Relations Disad.................................................................................................................................................................................135 AT: North Korea Disad............................................................................................................................................................................137 AT: Japan BMD Good General............................................................................................................................................................138 AT: Japan BMD Good China...............................................................................................................................................................139 US support key/Japan key........................................................................................................................................................................140

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US support key/Japan key........................................................................................................................................................................142 2AC North Korea Addon.........................................................................................................................................................................143 Ext North Korea Addon...........................................................................................................................................................................145 2AC Relations Addon..............................................................................................................................................................................146 2AC Russia China Addon........................................................................................................................................................................147 Ev Comparison Dates Matter................................................................................................................................................................149 Naval Overstretch Addon........................................................................................................................................................................150 Relations Disad........................................................................................................................................................................................151 AT: China Adv.........................................................................................................................................................................................152 Six Party Talks Disad...............................................................................................................................................................................153 AT: Russia...............................................................................................................................................................................................154 General Defense/little O..........................................................................................................................................................................155 Security Guarantee...................................................................................................................................................................................156 JET stupid................................................................................................................................................................................................157 AT: Japan Soft Power..............................................................................................................................................................................158 Article 9 Revision Inev and Good...........................................................................................................................................................159 Europe BMD Good Russia/Iran............................................................................................................................................................160 Europe BMD Good Iran/North Korea/Modelling.................................................................................................................................161 Prolif No Japan Modeling.....................................................................................................................................................................162 Japan Rearm Disad..................................................................................................................................................................................163 T...............................................................................................................................................................................................................164 Article 9 Revision key to Japanese DIB..................................................................................................................................................165 AT: Science Spending..............................................................................................................................................................................168

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Japan BMD Aff

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Plan: The United States federal government should end its joint missile defense development and deployment programs with Japan.

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Japan BMD Aff

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SS 1AC Inherency
Japan is the key US partner on BMD soon Block IIA missiles will be able to intercept ICBMs Ko Young Dae, contributor to Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea, 5/9/ 10, U.S. Military Strategy on the Korean Peninsula and Missile
Defense in Northeast Asia, http://www.spark946.org/bugsboard/index.php | Suo The United States regards Japan as its most significant international BMD partner. Japans MD system is part of the US MD system. Japans MD system is being constructed through technical and operative cooperation with the United States. Japan has deployed the US FBX(Forward-based X band) Radar, and has interfaced its 28 ground radar networks with U.S. spy satellites. The principal weapons systems of Japans MD are the Aegis BMD system and the PAC-3 system. In January 2008, Japan operationally deployed SM-3 block IA, capable of intercepting long-range missiles. Currently Japan is developing SM-3 block IIA, capable of intercepting ICBMs, and scheduled to debut in 2015. Reversing its previous policy of non-deployment of THAAD, Japan intends to introduce THAAD as a higher tier defense system than a PAC-3. Japan has also deployed its self-developed FPS-XX (L Band) Radar. The FPS-XX Radar is known to have succeeded in detecting and tracking Russian long-range missiles launched from the Sea of Okhotsk.

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Well isolate two scenarios

First, BMD cooperation will cause an Article 9 revision to remove the collective self-defense ban Masako Toki and Sarah Diehl, Fellows at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July Aug 7, Japan Takes Steps to Integrate
with U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I17/I17_EA3_JapanTakesSteps.htm | Suo The move toward deployment of a BMD and greater cooperation and integration with the U.S. heighten the need to answer the question of whether Japans Constitution can be interpreted to allow collective self-defense. Article 9 of Japans Constitution provides the basis for the countrys exclusively defensive posture, and, as currently interpreted, bars collective self-defense. According to the 2006 annual Japanese defense White Paper: the exclusive defense oriented policy means that defensive force may not be employed unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country in which case, it must be limited to the minimum level necessary to defend itself, and furthermore that the extent of the defense forces retained and the use of these forces should be kept to the minimum level necessary for self-defense. This exclusively defense oriented policy thus refers to a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. [17] Adopted in 1981, in a statement by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to the Japanese House of Representatives (the lower house of the Japanese parliament, or Diet) and supported unanimously by successive Cabinets, this policy allows Japan to exercise only the right of individual self-defense. [18] The ruling was applied specifically to bar the use of ballistic missile defenses to protect a third country in a statement of Japans Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuo Fukuda, in 2003, at the time the Japanese government first decided to deploy a BMD system. [19] Since taking office in September 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has worked to revise the interpretation of Article 9 to facilitate closer integration of the U.S. and Japanese BMD systems; eventually he is expected to amend the article. Some security analysts in Japan suspect that Abes eagerness to review the interpretation of collective self-defense was triggered by his firm decision to enhance U.S.-Japan security cooperation through closer integration of the Japanese and U.S. missile defense systems. [20]

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Article 9 is the linchpin of world peace any attempt at revision, specifically of the collective self-defense clause, directly causes global war The Global Article 9 Campaign, project of the United Nations Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Japan-based international NGO Peace Boat, Japan Lawyers' International Solidarity Association and others, Copyright 200 8, Article 9 as a Mechanism of Peace,
http://www.article-9.org/en/what/details2.html | Suo Following the end of the war, Japan acquired its Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Article 9 does not allow the maintenance of any war potential, and thus prohibits Japan to have any military forces. However, the SDF continue to expand, and Japans military expenditure is now one of the highest in the world. Some criticize that the principle of Article 9 is, in effect, not kept. Yet on the other hand, it is also true that Article 9 has acted as a restraint on the further militarization of Japan. Article 9 has also not allowed the SDF waging war outside of Japan. Even during the War in Iraq, despite its dispatch of its SDF to Iraq under US demands, Japan was unable to exercise any military force. Furthermore, many of Japans policies and pacifist principles are based on Article 9. The Three Principles on Arms Export, for example, generally prohibiting the export of arms and weapons, is a progressive principle that does not see any other precedent in the world. The principle of Exclusively Defensive Defense and the interpretation not allowing Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense have also been maintained. Japan, with its experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has also the Non-Nuclear Three Principles, which prohibits the possession, production and introduction into its territory of nuclear weapons. These various principles have played an important role in the establishment of trust relationships between Japan and the people of Asia and the Pacific, and the international society. In other words, Japans Article 9 is not simply a provision of the Japanese law, but is acting as an international peace mechanism by restraining war and an arms race. As its principle, the UN Charter calls for a peaceful resolution to conflicts; and Article 26 stipulates the minimization of the worlds resources to be used for military purposes. Japans Article 9 further strengthens this principle of the UN. Any revision or abandonment of Article 9 is connected to the loss of the above principles, and along with raising serious concerns for the security of the Asia Pacific region, and especially Northeast Asia, entails a grave impact on peace and security of the world. "Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been the foundation for collective security for the entire Asia Pacific region." (From the Global Action Agenda for the Global Partnership on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), submitted to the UN Secretary-General in July 2005) US intentions, policies, and strategies lie behind the current movement towards the revision of Article 9 within Japan. The United States, parallel to continuing its war on terror, is implementing its global reorganization and reallocation of its military bases. Since the late 1990s, the responsibility of the US military forces in Japan has expanded to the whole of Asia Pacific, and post 9.11, has brought the Middle East into range. Despite Article 9, Japans SDF provided support for the US military in its operations against Afghanistan in 2001. In 2003, the SDF were deployed to Iraq. Cooperation in the development of weapons, such as the missile defense system, has also been underway between the United States and Japan. In this context, the Unites States has been pressuring Japan for a more complete military cooperation and partnership. Japan is in a military alliance with the United States, but as a country with a provision renouncing war and the maintenance or use of military force, has maintained a principle prohibiting the exercising of its right to collective self-defense. For those interested in furthering the military collaboration between the US and Japan, they would like to see this principle gone. As a matter of fact, most of the revisionists of Article 9 argue for the elimination of Section 2 of Article 9, and enabling Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense. The corporate sector, with its interest in pursuing joint developments with and weapons export to the United States, also supports the revision of Article 9. Voices Supporting the Amendment of Article 9 in Japan and the United States Japans restrictions on its right to collective self-defense are a constraint on its alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. October 2000, Institute for National Strategic Studies report The US and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership (Armitage Report) The inability to exercise our right to collective self-defense translates into denying supportive activity to our allies, and is acting as a hindrance. January 2005, Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) For Japan to change Article 9 is equivalent to making a country which can wage war alongside the United States. With such developments, how will Japans neighboring countries react? It is not difficult to expect a revamping of their military, as Japan may be seen as a threat. If an arms race should be accelerated in East Asia, it would elicit a security dilemma, and in effect threatening the security of all countries in the region, including Japans own. Maintaining Article 9 and working towards demilitarization through building trust in the whole of the Asia Pacific region is the most realistic and reliable step in ensuring peace and security. Looking Towards Peace Without Dependence on Force The circle of war and violence is an epidemic in todays world. This is precisely why Article 9 has an increasing value to the world. There are continued efforts throughout the world to build peace without the exertion of force. The abolition of nuclear weapons, the abolition of landmines, regulations on arms trade, the establishment of an International Criminal

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Court, peaceful means to conflict resolution and prevention, post-conflict peacebuilding; are only examples where citizens and NGOs are actively continuing their efforts. The United Nations has also been calling on decreasing military expenditure, and reallocating limited resources to solving poverty, epidemics, disasters, and to protecting humans from war and violence. The Japanese Constitution also serves as a foundation for human security over national security, with its preamble recognizes that all people in the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and war. Japans Article 9 is a symbol for a peace without the exertion of force, a sustainable society, the realization of the UN Millennium Development Goals, and a support for efforts by peace aspiring citizens and NGOs of the world. Let us strive to realize a world, a just and fair world without war or poverty, where all countries have a constitution renouncing war. If Japan should renounce Article 9, the world will only take a step back in realizing this vision.

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Now is the key time Block IIA capabilities will spur revision soon Masako Toki, project manager in the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 16 January 2009, Missile defense in Japan, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan | Suo
The Japanese Constitution. Under the current Japanese government's interpretation of Article 9 of its Constitution, Japan's participation in collective self-defense is prohibited, as is using missile defense capabilities to defend a third country--even an ally such as the United States. Therefore, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a strong advocate of changing Article 9, formed the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security in April 2007 to provide recommendations on the right of collective self-defense. "Whether it is appropriate for Japan to use its missile defense to intercept ballistic missiles targeting the United States" was one of four scenarios he tasked the council to answer. The council was supposed to submit recommendations to the Cabinet by September 2007, but after the devastating defeat of Abe's ruling party in the upper house election in July 2007 and his abrupt resignation two months later, the council's members delayed making their recommendations. Abe's successor, Yasuo Fukuda, wasn't as enthusiastic about changing the constitutional interpretation. So even though the council submitted its recommendations stating that Japan should have the right to exercise collective self-defense last June, nothing has changed. Taro Aso, the country's third prime minister in two years, is more supportive of the right to collective self-defense, which might revitalize debate over the issue. Technologically, Japan currently doesn't have the capability to shoot down a missile heading toward the United States even if it legally could. But the two countries are currently developing SM-3 Block II A missiles that could potentially intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. (See "Japan Test Fires Its First Raytheon-Built Standard Missile-3.") As technological capabilities improve to intercept longrange ballistic missiles, the argument that Japan isn't allowed by its constitutional interpretation to shoot down a missile heading toward the United States might be perceived as unacceptable.

Second, missile defense cooperation legitimates Japanese militarization Daniel Twining, the Fulbright/Oxford scholar at Oxford University and a transatlantic fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Summer 2007, Americas Grand Design in Asia, http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-02445.pdf | Suo
Washington legitimizes new Japanese military roles abroad by helping to make Japan a mutual stakeholder in and enforcer of the global balance in a time of rising new challenges. After strong U.S. lobbying, Japan became a founding member of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a global initiative with global reach, and hosted armed interdiction exercises with navies from three continents. 8 Successive U.S. administrations have also successfully lobbied Japan to jointly develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system with the United States. This cooperation has put political and technological pressures on Japan to abandon old norms of military restraint, as TMD development requires Japan to plan for a range of regional and international contingencies unrelated to the defense of Japanese territory. To meet its TMD and ever-expanding security responsibilities within the alliance, Japan possesses, is producing, or is acquiring from the United States weapons systems that give it significant offensive power-projection capabilities, undercutting its postwar pledge never to become a military great power. Tokyo also may have to abandon the principle of limiting defense spending to 1 percent of its gross domestic product. 9 Japan has called its regional security role within the U.S.-Japanese alliance a public good for all the countries of Asia. 10 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called strengthening public support for Japans responsibility to maintain stability and security across Asia the unfinished business of my generation.11 Within the context of Japanese domestic politics, Japans expanded regional, global, and theater defense missions legitimize the expansion of Japans military capabilities and responsibilities in ways that reduce the political costs of future militarization. 12

Specifically, armament will take the form of nuclearization Jonathan Monten is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and Mark Provost is a graduate of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and is a consultant with Booz, Allen, Hamilton. September 200 5,
Theater Missile Defense and Japanese Nuclear Weapons, Asian Security, Volume 1, Issue 3, pages 285 303 | Suo The development of a joint US-Japan theater missile defense system could have significant ramifications beyond the defense of Japan and of American forces in the region. A growing debate within Japan on its international security position, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and questions about the role of the United States in the region conspire to create conditions for significant changes in Japan's conception of its security status and its long-term political-military calculations. By upgrading Japan's strategic responsibilities, theater missile defense could inadvertently induce a

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reassessment of many of its national security policies, perhaps even the decision to forego nuclear weapons.

That leads to nuclear war Interfax, 06, Nuclear Japan Would Trigger Terrible Arms Race in Asia, http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2006-November/063410.html |
Suo The emergence of nuclear weapons in Japan would trigger an arms race in Asia and neighboring regions, Politika Foundation President Vyacheslav Nikonov said. "The situation would take a very dangerous turn should Japan take this path: the nonproliferation regime would be undermined and a terrible arms race would begin in Asia," Nikonov told Interfax on Tuesday. Nikonov made these remarks while commenting on the Japanese government's statement that Japan could legally possess nuclear weapons "however minimal the arsenal might be." "If this happens, South Korea could claim nuclear status and China would no longer put up with the small nuclear arsenal it has. The chain reaction would then entangle India, Pakistan and Iran," the Russian expert said. "This race could ultimately result in the use of such weapons," he said.

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US-Japan cooperation on missile defense triggers an East Asian arms race ICBM interception capability is flashpoint Christopher W. Hughes, Principal Research Fellow & Acting Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, December 2006, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared, http://www.garneteu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1106.pdf | Suo Instead, the principal security dilemma that BMD is likely to exacerbate for Japan is that vis--vis China. Chinese policymakers are concerned that Japans development of a BMD system developed in conjunction with the US could lead to the negation of its nuclear deterrent by providing Japan with both a spear and shield. The spear of the US extended nuclear deterrent would be complemented by a BMD shield, allowing Japan deterrence by both punishment and denial vis--vis China. Chinese fears might in part be justified as the Aegis BMD system may have some residual or break out capabilities to defend against its inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), and certainly the US regards the Aegis/SMD component of its missile defence as part of a defensive shield against ICBMs.25 China in all likelihood though could overcome the negation of its strategic nuclear arsenal through the employment of countermeasures and development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) to overwhelm any BMD system. Chinas concerns extend also to the Japans possible countering of its tactical ballistic missiles and involvement in the Taiwan issue. Chinas worst case scenario would be Japans deployment either individually or in conjunction with the US of its sea-mobile NTWD system to defend Taiwan in a future crisis situation. In particular, China would fear the formation of a quasi-alliance amongst the US, Japan and Taiwan. For if the US were to sell AWS and BMD technology to Taiwan, this could result in all three powers being equipped with fully interoperable equipment, so smoothing the way for three-way military cooperation. Japans reluctance to become embroiled directly in a Taiwan Straits crisis makes this an unlikely scenario except in circumstances of a full scale conflict. Far more likely is that Japan would utilise its BMD system to defend US forces operating in a Taiwan Straits crisis from bases in Japan; an action that would complicate any attempts by China to intimidate US forces in the region short of initiating a war also against Japan. China can ultimately overcome any BMD system through increasing production of its missiles; a process that is relatively cheap and likely to saturate and overcome any defence. Therefore, Japans interest in BMD, although not initiating the process, carries the risk of accelerating Chinas upgrading of its nuclear and conventional ballistic missile capabilities and generating further momentum for a regional arms race.

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Material effects are irrelevant BMD creates the perception a broader shift in US-Japan security policy toward a more hostile stance Jing-dong Yuan, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 200 6, BEIJING CLOSELY WATCHING RECENT U.S.-JAPAN
MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENTS, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I9/I9_EA3_PRCJapan.htm | Suo
For the time being, Beijing

is less concerned with the effectiveness of these emerging missile defense capabilities than with what these developments indicate about the future direction of Japans security policy and U.S. strategic intentions. Chinese Peoples Liberation Army analysts, for example, are taking pains to underscore the advantage, or edge, that offensive ballistic missiles meaning Chinese missiles will hold over missile defenses, even as they seek to gauge the long-term implications of U.S.-Japan missile defense programs and recent deployments. [8] At the same time, Beijing is following the discussion, however speculative, by certain individuals in the Japanese political elite that Japan should consider acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent as a complement to its growing sophistication in the realm of missile defense. Indeed, Chinese analysts point out that Japan has the necessary nuclear technologies, large quantities of plutonium potentially usable in nuclear weapons, and computer simulation techniques to design such weapons, which together would allow Japan to manufacture them at short notice. For many Chinese observers, this is only a matter of time. Recent comments by former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone that Japan needs to consider the nuclear option further reinforce Chinese beliefs. [9] Chinese analysts point out Japan has undergone major changes in its attitude toward missile defense, from a hesitant and lukewarm initial reception of the concept, to active participation and enthusiastic support. [10] They suggest that Japans failure to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2005 reinforced both the need for continued support from the United States and Tokyos view that missile defense is a valuable means of reinforcing alliance cohesion. At the same time, Chinese analysts argue, Japan appreciates that missile defenses can protect it not only from North Korean missiles, but also Russian and Chinese systems. [ 11] Indeed, Chinese analysts argue that Japans core interest in speeding up missile defense deployment is directed toward China, despite Japans claims that its objective is to defend itself against North Korea . Chinese commentators argue that Japan plans to deploy
defenses on Okinawa, noting that this would make them particularly useful in protecting Japanese Self-Defense Forces in their operations in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island area, with China obviously in mind. [12] (In fact, the defensive systems will be

deployed by the United States on U.S. bases on Okinawa, rather than by Japan, although they still could be employed to protect Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the theaters noted by the Chinese commentators.) Japans interest in accelerated missile defense deployments, its growing integration into related U.S. military operations, and its active participation with the United States in joint research and development activities raise serious questions, Chinese analysts say, about Tokyos intentions. They see these actions as reinforcing Japanese reconsideration of the long-standing restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which limits its right to collective self-defense, and as leading Tokyo to reexamine its ban on arms transfers to states that
could become involved in regional conflicts, in particular missile-defense related technology transfers to the United States (which could potentially become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait). Most troubling for Chinese analysts, it appears, is the possibility that Tokyos

missile defense activities could set the stage for Japanese involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan, with Japans seabased missile defense systems deployed to support Taiwans defenses, as a counter to Chinese short-range missiles . [13]

Asia destabilization causes nuclear annihilation Toshimura Ogura, Economics Professor at Toyama University, MONTHLY REVIEW, April 19 97, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._19693242/pg_8
North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

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And, Asia is the most likely scenario for nuclear war stepped up US presence is needed Jonathan Landay, Knight-Ridder National Security and Intelligence senior correspondent, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, 2k, "Top
administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts," Lexis The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the world. Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

Japan sea-based BMD is uniquely destabilizing US ground NMD cant defend Taiwan Brad Roberts, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses with expertise on the proliferation and control of weapons of
mass destruction. Adjunct professor at George Washington University Member of DoDs Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and chairs its panel on implementation of the National Strategy to Combat WMD Advisor to the STRATCOM Senior Advisory Group Member of the board of directors of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, September 200 3, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | Suo There is another possibility for Chinas arms control strategy: that it will become directly concerned with establishing red lines in the U.S. BMD deployment strategies. Chinese experts and policymakers have sometimes suggested that if BMD is inevitable, then the United States should go about it in a way that minimizes its destabilizing implications. For example, the deployment by Japan of sea-based systems is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based systems, as this suggests the possibility that those systems would be deployed to protect Taiwan in time of crisis or war. As another example, the deployment by the United States of space-based boost-phase interceptors is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based interceptors in the continental United States, as the latter can more easily be overwhelmed by Chinese responses. More generally, Chinese experts are keenly aware of the assurances provided Moscow on the limited nature of the defenses that the U.S. will seek to deploy over the period of the Treaty of Moscow (i.e., to 2012) and wonder what assurances Washington is prepared to offer Beijing on a similar score.

And, Taiwan defense is the crucial concern for China Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense of the US Head of the DOD, 200 9, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military Power of the Peoples
Republic of China 2009 Office, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf | Suo Despite a reduction in tensions following the March 2008 election and May 2008 inauguration of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, a potential military confrontation with Taiwan and the prospect of U.S. military intervention remain the PLAs most immediate military concerns. Chinas current strategy toward Taiwan appears to be one of preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence, rather than seeking near-term resolution. A perceived shift in military capabilities or political will on either side, or a change in the internal political landscape on Mainland China or Taiwan, could cause Beijing to calculate its interests, and its preferred course of action differently.

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BMD cooperation with other East Asian countries is irrelevant, only Japan has the will and capability to integrate with the larger US NMD system Wendell Minnick, staff writer for Defense News, 17 November 200 8, China Adopts Russian Anti-BMD Rhetoric,
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3823111 | Suo At a regular press conference the following day, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang said China "always believes that setting up a global missile defense system, including deploying such a system in some regions of the world or conducting cooperation in this field, is detrimental to global strategic balance and stability, undermines mutual trust among countries and affects regional stability." "The recent development of the situation makes it evident that relevant countries should take other countries' concerns seriously," Qin said. The statement suggests China means to "drive a wedge" between the United States and its Asian allies, said Yoichiro Sato of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu. But Sato noted that compared with Russia, China's opposition to regional missile defense has been moderate. "Even there, China refrains from using an overt threat," he said. "Thus, China's broader diplomatic course of maintaining the currently favorable relationship with the United States is toning down its criticism of missile defense." The same day that Lavrov spoke in Tokyo, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced plans to deploy short-range Iskander missiles in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad near Poland in response to U.S. efforts to expand ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Europe. Said Lavrov, "A number of countries of the [Asian-Pacific] region view these plans as nothing but a threat to their national security, let alone global strategic stability being jeopardized - for it is an open secret that the anti-missile system in the APR [Asia Pacific Region] is a part of the global missile defenses being set up by our American colleagues." Lavrov did not single out China as a country that shared its view. "China often enough these days supports Russian criticism of U.S. policy," said Peter Woolley, author of "Japan's Navy: Politics and Paradox." "It saves the leadership the onus of pointing directly at U.S. support for Taiwan or calling attention to its own insouciance over North Korea," he said. "But a regional [anti-missile] system including Japan and Korea is hard to envision given recurring, agitated differences of opinion between the two." Woolley said recent Chinese complaints about regional BMD upgrades remind him of the Cold War. "Some things change so slowly or not at all. Hearing the arguments about ballistic missile defense and new deployments of ballistic missiles is time travel back to the '70s and '80s. Realpolitik was in. And deterrence theory was an academically respectable field," he said. "The recent Chinese statement that missile defense is potentially destabilizing and may simply provoke arms deployments are a point of view that goes back to the Nixon-Kissinger White House years," Woolley said. "Of course, Nixon and Kissinger came to that conclusion based on the assumption that leadership of the Soviet Union was stable and rational." Japan and Taiwan have been moving quickly to expand BMD capabilities, while South Korea has been slower to react. In response to North Korean efforts to develop more ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, Japan and the United States have fielded new Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense systems, Standard Missile-3 (SM3) missile defense systems on ships, and new early warning radar systems in and around Japan. "Japan and its ally see an opponent, in North Korea that is potentially either unstable or irrational or both," Woolley said. "Consequently, missile defense has strong support in Japan." The U.S. Missile Defense Agency will conduct a missile interception exercise with the Japanese Navy off Hawaii later this month or in early December. A Kongo-class destroyer, the DDG-176 Chokai, will intercept one missile fired from the Pacific Range Missile Facility, Kauai. Combined Japan-U.S. BMD tests have raised debates in Japan over the concept of "collective defense," where Japan and U.S. military forces create an overall BMD that protects both forces. However, the concept faces Japanese constitutional restrictions. "Related legal questions about 'collective defense,' especially on the use of SM-3 and data exchanges, were considered by the [former Prime Minister Shinzo] Abe Cabinet, but later shelved by the [Yasuo] Fukuda Cabinet," Sato said. "The answers to the 'collective defense' questions will have implications on the scope of integration between the Japanese assets and U.S. missile defense system." South Korea It appears unlikely that South Korea would participate in a regional missile defense system, Sato said. "Korea's participation beyond ground deployment of PAC-3s for its own defense will likely face two main obstacles: cost and politics," he said. "The Korean Navy lacks platforms to install SM-3s, and building such a Navy would be a major undertaking and possibly complicate the regional power balance by alerting Japan. "Domestically, Korea's preference to be a 'balancer' in Northeast Asia and a degree of anti-Americanism would keep Korea from getting deeply involved in missile defense." Taiwan But if South Korea's participation looks unlikely, it seems impossible for Taiwan. Though Washington supports Taipei with arms and training, neither it nor Tokyo nor Seoul recognize Taiwan as a nation-state. U.S. officials recently announced a Taiwanese purchase of PAC-3 missile defense systems and upgrades for the self-governing island's PAC-2 Plus systems. The United States also is helping Taiwan build a phased array radar system for early warning. China has about 1,300 Dong Feng 11/15 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Taiwan has no ballistic missiles aimed at China, but is preparing to produce the 600-kilometer Hsiung Feng 2E cruise missile.

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China perceives BMD cooperation as attempted space domination theyll respond by modernizing their space weapons arsenal. Eric Hagt, director of the China Program at the World Security Institute, "China's ASAT Test: Strategic Response," 2007, in China Security, Winter,
pp. 31-51 | VP Chinas testing of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon on Jan. 11, 2007, was an unambiguous challenge not to U.S. power in space but to its dominance in space. With little explanation emanating from officialdom in China, their principal motivation has not been made clear. A number of alternative intentions have also been offered up, for example, it was a clumsy maneuver to force the United States to the negotiating table for a space arms control treaty. Or, with a turbulent year expected in the run up to Taiwan elections, it was a grave reminder of Beijings resolve to defend the nations sovereignty at all cost. Or, that it was a raw show of force, a flexing of its growing military muscle. It is possible that all these motivations played a part in Chinas decision to test an ASAT. But behind the test was a simpler message and arguably one more benign to international space security than this spectacular test and the orbital debris cloud it created would suggest. In fact, the test is consistent with both Chinas notion of active defense and its deterrence doctrine, and should not have been a surprise in light of the growing threats that China perceives in space. While the fundamental aim of the test may have been relatively straightforward the process and conflict within Chinas political and military system associated with deciding to conduct the test are far less clear. That process has been marked by 1) diverging domestic influence over Chinas space program and its direction and 2) the differing responses by constituencies within China to the nations perceived security threats in space. Understanding the domestic actors and their objectives does not alter the danger this test poses to the security of space. It can, however, illuminate the critical defects in the present strategic architecture in space and may point a way forward to avoid an arms race in space. ASAT Test as a Response In the past decade, China has derived a number of key conclusions from its observations of U.S. military activities in space that have fundamentally shaped Chinas own strategic posture. The first is the profound implications of space for information and high-tech wars. China witnessed with awe and alarm the power of the U.S. military using satellite communication, reconnaissance, geo-positioning and integration capabilities for an impressive show of force beginning first with the Gulf war in 1991 to the recent campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq.1 The U.S. militarys almost complete dependence on space assets has also not escaped the close examination of Chinese analysts.2 Coupled with a number of key U.S. policy and military documents that call for control in space and the development of space weapons as well as the U.S. refusal to enter into any restrictive space arms control treaty, China has concluded that America is determined to dominate and control space.3 This perceived U.S. intent leads Beijing to assume the inevitable weaponization of space.4 Even more worrisome for China is the direct impact of these developments on Chinas core national interests. The accelerated development of the U.S. ballistic missile system, especially as it is being developed in close cooperation with Japan, has been cited as threatening Chinas homeland and nuclear deterrent.5 The Shriever space war games conducted by the U.S. Air Force in 2001, 2003 and 20056 strongly reinforced the conclusion that U.S. space control sets China as a target.7 Most central to Chinas concerns, however, is the direct affect U.S. space dominance will have on Chinas ability to prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits.8 As U.S. military space developments have evolved, Chinas observations and subsequent conclusions have engendered a fundamental response: we cannot accept this state of affairs. For reasons of defense of national sovereignty as well as Chinas broader interests in space civilian, commercial and military Americas pursuit of space control and dominance and its pursuit to develop ASATs and space weapons pose an intolerable risk to Chinas national security.9 Chinas own ASAT test embodied this message. Attempting to redress what China perceives as a critically imbalanced strategic environment that increasingly endangers its interests, China demonstrated a deterrent to defend against that threat. Its willingness to risk international opprobrium through such a test conveys Chinas grim resolve to send that message .

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Block IIA capabilities allow increased potential anti-satellite functionality even if we dont use it, China will be forced to respond. Brian Weeden, technical advisor for the Secure World Foundation, former US Air Force officer with a background in space surveillance and ICBM operations, "The space security implications of missile defense," September 28, 2009, the Space Review,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1474/1 | VP The same dual-use argument can be made for several technologies being used for BMD. The same kinetic-kill interceptors that can destroy a missile in-flight could also be capable of destroying a satellite in low Earth orbit (and in doing so , effectively become anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs). This was unequivocally demonstrated by the previously mentioned Operation Burnt Frost, which only required minor modifications, reportedly just software, to an existing Aegis SM-3 interceptor to destroy a satellite (USA-193), albeit one that was in the initial stages of atmospheric re-entry. There are limits on the utility of BMD systems as ASATs: the maximum speed of the interceptor limits the maximum altitude at which it can attack satellites. In the case of the SM-3 Block 1A, its maximum velocity is reportedly around 3 km/s. This gives it a maximum ballistic flight range of about 1000 kilometers and a maximum theoretical ASAT altitude of about 500 kilometers, about twice the altitude of 240 kilometers at which it destroyed USA-193. However, the newer Block 1B and 2A of the SM-3 will have a much greater burnout velocity and thus increased ASAT engagement altitude , reportedly around 4.5 km/s for Block 2A. This would allow it to reach satellites throughout low Earth orbit, up to a theoretical altitude of around 2000 kilometers. From this it is clear that as BMD interceptors increase their maximum velocity to be able to intercept ICBMs, they also increase in potential ASAT capability. Capability-based analysis The core of the space security concerns with regard to BMD, and in particular Aegis, is summed up in this question posed to General James Cartwright during the pre-mission press brief for Operation Burnt Frost: QUESTION: General, if this shot is successful, would it be fair for the international community to regard the standard missile now as an antisatellite-capable weapon? And have you dealt with that issue in the international community already? GEN. CARTWRIGHT: A fair question and a good question. One, this is a modification to the SM-3. In other words, this modification can't coexist with the current configuration. So it's a one-time deal. Does it have the kinetic capability? That's why we picked it. But you'd have to go in and do modifications to ships, to missiles, to sensors and they would be significant. This is an extreme measure for this problem. It would not be transferable to a fleet configuration, so to speak. As an ex-military officer who worked under General Cartwright (admittedly, several levels below) I believe he is sincere in his belief that this was a one-time deal. However, if I was another sovereign state and potential adversary of the United States, I do not think I would have that same luxury. Many military planners would argue that the appropriate way to establish threats is to base it off what potential adversaries are capable of doing, and not on what they are likely to do. And in this case, I think it is logical to argue that potential US adversaries with space capabilities, such as Russia and China, would have to assume that the US could reconstitute the sea-based ASAT capability should it want to. More critically, there is no way for any outside entity to independently verify that the US has or has not modified any of the operational SM-3 interceptors for ASAT capability, since there are no external tell-tales or inspections. Lacking such verification, it would be imprudent for these potential adversaries to assume such capability does not exist, and therefore it is logical that they would develop measures to counter such a capability. Interestingly, this same argument could be applied to Chinas SC-19 ballistic missile. Based on a modified version of the CSS-5 MRBM, the SC-19 was used as the booster for the anti-satellite kill vehicle that destroyed a Chinese weather satellite in 2007. Some reports (which have not been fully substantiated) have claimed that the SC-19 is actually part of a Chinese ABM system. Even if untrue, it is clear that the Chinese direct-ascent ASAT program and the US ground- and sea-based missile defense programs are two halves of the same capability, separated only by perspective and policy.

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Specifically, theyll begin asymmetric weapons buildup, including their own anti-satellite weapons. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems, Chinas Nuclear Arms Posture Examined in New Book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, May 16, 2007,
http://www.amacad.org/news/nuclear_china.aspx

Yet United States military policy to develop and deploy space-based missile defense systems threatens Chinas confidence in its ability to deter a nuclear attack, argues arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis in a new book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Minimum Means of Reprisal: Chinas Search for Security in the Nuclear Age documents the history, development and principles behind Chinas nuclear policy, and discusses Chinas concerns about U.S. defense policy. Although internal factors continue to drive Chinas decisions about its nuclear forces, Lewis suggests that the United States is passing up an opportunity to reassure Chinese leaders in favor of preparations for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons that Chinese leaders will find increasingly difficult to ignore. Lewis reasons that while a major buildup of strategic forces in China is possible, China is more likely to acquire asymmetric means of hampering U.S. preemptive capabilities. These means may include countermeasures to defeat U.S. missile defenses, such as antisatellite weapons, which China successfully tested earlier this year. Lewis argues that Chinas longstanding policy of maintaining the minimum nuclear force necessary to deter attack is fundamentally in the interest of the United States, and that U.S. policymakers should, among other measures, commit to a bilateral no-first-use pledge rather than to space-based weapons and defense systems that undermine Chinas security.

Chinese ASAT use eviscerates satellites key to the global economy. Ian Easton, research affiliate at the Project 2049 Institute, MA in China Studies at National Chengchi U in Taipei, BA Int'l Studies at U of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, former translator for the Foundation on Asia Pacific Peace Studies, The Great Game in Space," June 24, 2009, Project 2049
Institute, Scribd Many specialists also argue that aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space, the U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a space faring nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium. War games conducted as part of U.S. national security protocols, such as the Army-After-Next, Navy Global and Air Force Global Engagement series, Space Game 2 and Schriever 1 & 2, as well as the privately conducted DEADSATS war games, conducted from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, confirm this view. According to some space experts who were intimately involved with the war games, the exercises exposed a critical national Achilles heel that politicians, economists and corporate CEOs have largely ignoredlosses in space can quickly affect the economic, social, and national security fabric not only of the United States, but of the entire world. These experts further speculate that large military powers, such as the United States, could be held hostage by the unknowns inherent in a new kind of war.36 These concerns are directly linked with Chinas ASAT weapons and their potential applicability in any future U.S.-Sino conflict. A more recent war game, Pacific Vision, conducted by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) underscored the vulnerability of the unprotected commercial communication satellite channels on which the Air Force relies, as well as its cyber and radar vulnerabilities to Chinese attack.37

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ASAT testing alone puts crucial satellites at risk collisions create destructive debris fields. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, formerly worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, MA - School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins U, Prof. Politics at U of Virginia, and Sam Black, Research Assoc. with Stimson Center's Space Security and South Asia programs, formerly worked as a Research Assistant at the Center for Defense Information, where he focused on Space Security and Missile Defense issues, BA Gov't and MA Public Policy at U of Maryland, "Space Security or Anti-satellite Weapons?" May, 2009, Space Security Project - Stimson, http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/Stimson_Space_Booklet_2009.pdf | VP Crude ASAT weapons are far less expensive to build than sophisticated and vulnerable satellites that usually travel in predictable paths and that are hard to hide. Consequently, major space-faring nations that rely on satellites also have the means to target them. Improved armor can help protect US troops operating in harms way, but heavily-armored satellites are impractical, and armor still cannot protect against high-speed collisions in space. Space Debris Kills Space debris is deadly. Space debris travels at ten times the speed of a rifle bullet in low earth orbit, where a piece of debris the size of a marble could strike a satellite with approximately the same energy as a one-ton safe dropped from a five-story building. The worst debris fields in space can be caused by ASAT tests that pulverize satellites. The Reagan administration carried out a destructive ASAT test in 1985 that generated 300 pieces of trackable debris, one of which came within one mile of the newly launched International Space Station 14 years later. It took 19 years for the debris from the 1985 ASAT test to burn out of the earths atmosphere. China created the worst-ever man-made debris field in space by testing an ASAT in 2007. This test generated approximately 40,000 pieces of lethal debris, and an estimated two million debris fragments overall. Because the Chinese ASAT test was conducted at such a high altitude, its lethal, mutating debris field is likely to remain in low earth orbit for over a century. Even small pieces of debris can be worrisome because they cant be tracked but can still penetrate the thin outer skin that protects satellites. The windows on the US Space Shuttle have needed to be changed more than 70 times because of tiny debris hits. The United States now tracks more than 18,000 pieces of space debris. Debris Mitigation Space debris doesnt recognize US preeminence in space. Because the United States carries out the most space flights and operates as many satellites as the rest of the world combined, it is most likely to be victimized by space debris . Major space-faring nations have belatedly recognized that debris threatens this global commons. A consortium of space-faring nations began discussing voluntary guidelines for debris mitigation in 1992. Voluntary guidelines for debris mitigation were finally endorsed by the United Nations in December 2007. Additional ASAT tests that create debris fields would make a mockery of these guidelines.

That disrupts global financial markets and investment. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, formerly worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, MA - School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins U, Prof. Politics at U of Virginia, and Sam Black, Research Assoc. with Stimson Center's Space Security and South Asia programs, formerly worked as a Research Assistant at the Center for Defense Information, where he focused on Space Security and Missile Defense issues, BA Gov't and MA Public Policy at U of Maryland, "Space Security or Anti-satellite Weapons?" May, 2009, Space Security Project - Stimson, http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/Stimson_Space_Booklet_2009.pdf | VP The US economy and international commerce rely on satellites that enable financial markets and investors to make transactions quickly and securely. Credit card users at gas pumps sometimes use satellites. War in space could disrupt financial markets and create havoc in stock exchanges. Businesses such as delivery services that use satellite communication and tracking devices could be badly disrupted. The use of weapons in space could place these and other services, the revenues they generate , stock markets, and thousands of jobs at risk. Investments in Space From 1959 to 2007, US taxpayers invested over one and a half trillion dollars in space. These sunk costs could be nullified if the use of weapons in space trashes the orbits used by essential satellites .

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And, it ends global commerce and trade transactions. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, formerly worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, MA - School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins U, Prof. Politics at U of Virginia, "Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option," November, 2004, Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon Space warfare would have far-reaching adverse effects for global commerce, especially commercial transactions and telecommunication services that use satellites. Worldwide space industry revenues now total almost $110 billion a year, $40 billion of which go to U.S. companies.[4] These numbers do not begin to illuminate how much disruption would occur in the event of space warfare. For a glimpse of what could transpire, the failure of a Galaxy IV satellite in May 1998 is instructive. Eighty-nine percent of all U.S. pagers used by 45 million customers became inoperative, and direct broadcast transmissions, financial transactions, and gas station pumps were also affected.[5]

Protectionism's resurging globally new barriers to trade threaten reversal of economic recovery. Greg Lindsay, exectuive director of the Centre for Independent Studies, and Roger Bate, Legatum Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, "Protect us from protectionism: keep the doors open," November 8, 2009, National Times, http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/protect-usfrom-protectionism-keep-the-doors-open-20091107-i2ui.html The economy could easily move backwards, though, thanks to the global resurgence of protectionist trade policies. As world leaders deal with the recession, many have been tempted to erect trade barriers in misguided attempts to save domestic jobs. In September, for example, US President Barack Obama imposed a 35 per cent tariff on car tyres imported from China. A month later, China responded with a tariff of up to 36 per cent on some imported nylon products. And China's Commerce Ministry recently predicted that major economies would ''introduce various trade restrictions and protectionist measures'' in 2010. Meanwhile, the European Commission is considering a proposal to extend the tariff on shoes from China and Vietnam.

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Renewed protectionism and economic nationalism triggers global economic collapse and increased great power tensions. Stewart Patrick, senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Protecting Free Trade," March 13, 2009 National Interest online, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21084
President Obama and his foreign counterparts should reflect on the lessons of the 1930sand the insights of Cordell Hull. The longest-serving secretary of state in American history (19331944), Hull helped guide the United States through the Depression and World War II. He also understood a fundamental truth: When goods move, soldiers dont. In the 1930s, global recession had catastrophic political consequencesin part because policymakers took exactly the wrong approach. Starting with Americas own Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930 , the worlds major trading nations tried to insulate themselves by adopting inward looking protectionist and discriminatory policies. The result was a vicious, self-defeating cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation. As states took refuge in prohibitive tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and competitive devaluations, international commerce devolved into a desperate competition for dwindling markets. Between 1929 and 1933, the value of world trade plummeted from $50 billion to $15 billion. Global economic activity went into a death spiral, exacerbating the depth and length of the Great Depression. The economic consequences of protectionism were bad enough. The political consequences were worse. As Hull recognized, global economic fragmentation lowered standards of living, drove unemployment higher and increased povertyaccentuating social upheaval and leaving destitute populations easy prey to dictators and desperadoes. The rise of Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy and militarism in Japan is impossible to divorce from the economic turmoil, which allowed demagogic leaders to mobilize support among alienated masses nursing nationalist grievances. Open economic warfare poisoned the diplomatic climate and exacerbated great power rivalries, raising , in Hulls view, constant temptation to use force, or threat of force, to obtain what could have been got through normal processes of trade. Assistant Secretary William Clayton agreed: Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table. This is what makes growing protectionism and discrimination among the worlds major trading powers today so alarming. In 2008 world trade declined for the first time since 1982. And despite their pledges, seventeen G-20 members have adopted significant trade restrictions. Buy American provisions in the U.S. stimulus package have been matched by similar measures elsewhere, with the EU ambassador to Washington declaring that Nobody will take this lying down. Brussels has resumed export subsidies to EU dairy farmers and restricted imports from the United States and China. Meanwhile, India is threatening new tariffs on steel imports and cars; Russia has enacted some thirty new tariffs and export subsidies. In a sign of the global mood, WTO antidumping cases are up 40 percent since last year. Even less blatant forms of economic nationalism, such as banks restricting lending to safer domestic companies, risk shutting down global capital flows and exacerbating the current crisis. If unchecked, such economic nationalism could raise diplomatic tensions among the worlds major powers. At particular risk are U.S. relations with China, Washingtons most important bilateral interlocutor in the twenty-first century. China has called the Buy American provisions poisonnot exactly how the Obama administration wants to start off the relationship. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithners illtimed comments about Chinas currency manipulation and his promise of an aggressive U.S. response were not especially helpful either, nor is Congress preoccupation with unfair Chinese trade and currency practices. For its part, Beijing has responded to the global slump by rolling back some of the liberalizing reforms introduced over the past thirty years. Such practices, including state subsidies, collide with the spirit and sometimes the law of open trade. The Obama administration must find common ground with Beijing on a coordinated response, or risk retaliatory protectionism that could severely damage both economies and escalate into political confrontation. A trade war is the last thing the United States needs, given that China holds $1 trillion of our debt and will be critical to solving flashpoints ranging from Iran to North Korea. In the 1930s, authoritarian great-power governments responded to the global downturn by adopting more nationalistic and aggressive policies. Today, the economic crisis may well fuel rising nationalism and regional assertiveness in emerging countries. Russia is a case in point. Although some predict that the economic crisis will temper Moscows international ambitions, evidence for such geopolitical modesty is slim to date. Neither the collapse of its stock market nor the decline in oil prices has kept Russia from flexing its muscles from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. While some expect the economic crisis to challenge Putins grip on power, there is no guarantee that Washington will find any successor regime less nationalistic and aggressive. Beyond generating great power antagonism, misguided protectionism could also exacerbate political upheaval in the developing world. As Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently testified, the downturn has already aggravated political instability in a quarter of the worlds nations. In many emerging countries, including important players like South Africa, Ukraine and Mexico, political stability rests on a precarious balance. Protectionist policies could well push developing economies and emerging market exporters over the edge. In Pakistan, a protracted economic crisis could precipitate the collapse of the regime and fragmentation of the state . No surprise, then, that President Obama is the first U.S. president to receive a daily economic intelligence briefing, distilling the security implications of the global crisis.

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Diversionary foreign policy ensures wars escalate globally. Jeffrey E. Garten, Prof. at the Yale School of Management, held economic- and foreign-policy posts in the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Clinton administrations, "The Dangers of Turning Inwards," February 28, 2009, Wall Street Journal,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123577692593997401.html

The point is, economic nationalism, with its implicit autarchic and save-yourself character, embodies exactly the wrong spirit and runs in precisely the wrong direction from the global system that will be necessary to create the future we all want. As happened in the 1930s, economic nationalism is also sure to poison geopolitics. Governments under economic pressure have far fewer resources to take care of their citizens and to deal with rising anger and social tensions. Whether or not they are democracies, their tenure can be threatened by popular resentment. The temptation for governments to whip up enthusiasm for something that distracts citizens from their economic woes -- a war or a jihad against unpopular minorities, for example -- is great. That's not all. As an economically enfeebled South Korea withdraws foreign aid from North Korea, could we see an even more irrational activity from Pyongyang? As the Pakistani economy goes into the tank, will the government be more likely to compromise with terrorists to alleviate at least one source of pressure? As Ukraine strains under the weight of an IMF bailout, is a civil war with Cold War overtones between Europe and Russia be in the cards? And beyond all that, how will economically embattled and inward-looking governments be able to deal with the critical issues that need global resolution such as control of nuclear weapons, or a treaty to manage climate change, or help to the hundreds of millions of people who are now falling back into poverty?

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Resulting stagnant growth and great power conflict leads to extinction. Michael Panzner, Prof. at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in

New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, 2009, p. 136-138 Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster . But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-thanfriendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace . Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences . Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an intense confrontation between the United States and China is inevitable at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

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China wants to avoid space weaponization but Japanese BMD is uniquely destabilizing ending cooperation sends a powerful signal of restraint. Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, adjunct Prof. Elliott School of Intl Affairs @ George Washington U, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond," September, 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | VP

There is one virtual certainty in Chinas arms control strategy: continued pursuit of restraints on the militarization of outer space . This is a theme that cuts across all phases of Chinas strategic evolution. The conviction that such militarization would be harmful to global stability and detrimental to Chinas national security appears widely and deeply held. Chinas desire for a treaty regime entailing obligations beyond those in the current ban on the permanent deployment of nuclear weapons in space seems to have deeper roots than just the desire to attack U.S. BMD from another rhetorical position. There is another possibility for Chinas arms control strategy: that it will become directly concerned with establishing red lines in the U.S. BMD deployment strategies. Chinese experts and policymakers have sometimes suggested that if BMD is inevitable, then the United States should go about it in a way that minimizes its destabilizing implications. For example, the deployment by Japan of seabased systems is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based systems, as this suggests the possibility that those systems would be deployed to protect Taiwan in time of crisis or war. As another example, the deployment by the United States of space-based boost-phase interceptors is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based interceptors in the continental United States, as the latter can more easily be overwhelmed by Chinese responses. More generally, Chinese experts are keenly aware of the assurances provided Moscow on the limited nature of the defenses that the U.S. will seek to deploy over the period of the Treaty of Moscow (i.e., to 2012) and wonder what assurances Washington is prepared to offer Beijing on a similar score. Formal arms control measures codifying forms of restraint by the United States and/or its East Asian allies seem rather unlikely, not least because it also seems unlikely that Beijing would be willing to codify any parallel restraints on its missile forces. But informal measures may come to be seen as useful, perhaps by providing transparency of a kind that reassures China that certain red lines have not been crossed.153

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Chinas nuclear No First Use is on the brink missile defense pushes it toward the elimination of its declaratory policy. Michael S. Chase, [et al] Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Andrew S. Erickson, Associate Professor in the Strategic

Research Department, and Christopher Yeaw, Associate Professor and Senior Strategic Researcher, U.S. Naval War College, "Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States," February, 2009 in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 32, Iss 1, pp. 67-114 As significant as the wholesale changes in force structure and training are, indications that PRC nuclear doctrine and weapon employment policy may also be changing are potentially even more important. While much remains similar to what is known of historical Chinese nuclear doctrine, particularly as this relates to assured second-strike operations, there seems to be an evolution in thinking regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly in a non-retaliatory manner. In doctrinal discussions of the nuclear counterstrike campaign, the prerequisites, elements, goals, and targets all seem quite in accord with historical doctrine. The principal prerequisite, of course, derives from the no-first-use (NFU) policy: 'According to China's principled position of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear counterattack campaign of the Second Artillery will be conducted under the circumstances when an enemy has launched a nuclear attack on us.' 122 The campaign elements of centralized command at the highest level, rapid response, dedicated protection of strategic assets, and key point targeting all also fit well into China's legacy doctrine.123 While the element of 'rapid response' has the appearance of being a newer feature of the PRC's assured second-strike doctrine, in reality it only reflects the qualitative change in the composition of the force, which itself is a response to enhance survivability in the face of modern precision warfare. Additionally, the goals and targets of the nuclear counterattack campaign do not seem to have deviated much from historical values, driven by the guiding objective 'to implement a nuclear counterattack on the enemy's important strategic and campaign objectives, set back the enemy's strategic intention, shake the enemy's willpower of war, paralyze the enemy's command system, delay the combat movement of the enemy, weaken the enemy's war potential, and contain the escalation of nuclear war'.124 Thus, while most of the doctrinal details that have recently come to light may not have been well understood by Western analysts, nothing in the assured second-strike doctrine has the flavor of representing a novel discontinuity with past doctrine. Assured second-strike retaliation, as a doctrine, seems to have followed a logical evolution along the lines required in going from a small, silo-based, relatively static intercontinental force to a larger, more survivable mobile one. Where the groundwork is possibly being prepared for making substantive modifications to historical PRC nuclear doctrine and nuclear use policy is in the areas of tactical and theater nuclear warfare and the provisos being proposed against NFU. In his recent, extensive treatment of the subject, Zhao Xijun states, much in agreement with established doctrine, that the goal of China's deterrent missile force is to 'shake the enemy psychologically, vacillate the enemy's war volition, weaken the enemy commander's operational determination, disturb the enemy psyche and public psyche, and achieve [the objective of]conquering without fighting'.125 Additionally, however, Zhao states, 'the goal of wartime deterrence is to prevent conventional war from escalating into nuclear war, and to prevent low-intensity nuclear war from further escalating'.126 Thus conceived, credible deterrence imposes stringent requirements on the Chinese nuclear postur e, including an adequate force size and composition, survivability, plausible targeting, and highly reliable (and survivable) nuclear command and control. Moreover, Zhao states that a 'flexible application' of deterrence across all levels of war, from the strategic down to the tactical, is 'indispensable [for] effective and credible deterrence'.127 Similarly, another Chinese doctrinal publication makes a deliberate distinction between a large-scale nuclear and a small-scale nuclear counterattack campaign.128 Such a view approaches a limited view of nuclear warfighting (not minimum deterrence) ,129 particularly since low-intensity nuclear war and de-escalatory measures are mentioned. Indeed, recent articles in Chinese military journals have discussed a wide variety of nuclear deterrence strategies, with some authors using the term 'effective counter-nuclear deterrent to describe the more capable posture required to make nuclear deterrence effective in a missile defense environment. 130 In conceiving of warfighting with nuclear assets, a principal impediment for the PLA would be a strict adherence to its oft-repeated pledge not to use nuclear weapons first at any time, under any circumstances, and not to use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear nations and regions.131 However, not only are certain exceptions to this pledge made from time to time in unofficial remarks, but there is currently an intellectual debate in China as to the damage a policy of NFU inflicts on the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence. Some strategists appear to view the NFU policy as an unnecessary self-imposed strategic constraint: 'China should learn how to maintain necessary flexibility without being fettered by responsibilities and obligations at the level of strategic deterrence. '132 Certainly, the debate within China on 'no first use' is real, with the later generation of officers, diplomats, and scholars leaning significantly farther forward toward modifying or jettisoning such a declaratory policy.133

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Specifically, U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation undermines the credibility of Chinese minimal deterrence that forces a doctrinal shift to aggressive nuclear warfighting. Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, adjunct Prof. Elliott School of Intl Affairs @ George Washington U, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond," September, 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | VP

But China also faces a dilemma as the number of deployed intercontinental systems increases , as recently articulated by one Chinese academic, Zhen Huang: Most likely, [Chinas] program will involve responses to U.S. missile defenses by increasing force levels so as to restore Chinas minimum deterrence. The problem is, this would still make the Chinese nuclear force develop into an embryonic limited deterrent at the strategic levelFor the purpose of reconstructing minimum deterrence, China is not only required to keep improving the survivability of its nuclear forces through measures such as camouflage of deployment sites, development of solid propellant and acquisition of mobile delivery systems as well as improvements in C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. More critically, it is required to develop effective means to penetrate U.S. missile defense structure so as to strike at least some major cities. It is in this connection that Chinas nuclear force is likely to move to an initial limited deterrence capability at the strategic level.138 Thus the deployment of modernized systems could help to precipitate changes in military doctrine and in threat perception that themselves could lead to a further evolution of the PRC-U.S. strategic balance. This analysis already foreshadows some insights into the qualitative as opposed to the quantitative considerations likely to drive Chinese force modernization. The availability of more advanced technologies to Chinas strategic designers and engineers has fueled a general push for higher quality in replacement systems. This in itself will mean some important changes to the operational characteristics of the force. For example, the deployment of road-mobile DF-31 missiles means that warheads will have to be mated to missiles in a way not currently understood to be the case with the silo-based ICBMs, and thus will increase their alert level. Improved C4ISR capabilities would also permit China to move away from a posture premised on absorbing the first blow and to launch on warning or launch under attack , or something analogous. As Paul Godwin has argued, this option would be especially attractive if the SSBN progress was unsuccessful or was cancelled because of costs.139 The need to penetrate ballistic missile defenses suggests in addition increased reliance on penetration aids such as decoys, chaff, and maneuverable warheads. That need points also to the potential utility for China of systems designed to attack the ballistic missile defense system itselfwhether direct attack with ASAT on space-based infrastructure, or direct attack on ground-based radars and/or indirect electronic attack on elements of the C4ISR structure.

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Now is key U.S. BMD encirclement strategy makes doctrinal switch probable. Marko Beljac, PhD - Monash U, former Prof. @ U of Melbourne, focus on science and global security, currently writing a book on nuclear terrorism, "Will China Boost its Nuclear Deterrent in Response to a US Ballistic Missile Defence Ring of Fire in the Pacific?" February 26, 2010, Nuclear
Security and Strategic Analyses, http://scisec.net/?p=238 | VP Now the NTI Global Security Newswire has a potentially most significant small report on the matter ...The United States' expanding missile defense activities might lead China to boost its nuclear arsenal, a former senior Russian military official said yesterday. "At present, China has a very limited nuclear potential, but my recent contacts with Chinese military representatives indicate that if the United States deploys a global missile defense system, in particular in the Far East, China will build up its offensive capability," said former Russian Defense Ministry deputy chief Lt. Gen. Yevgeny Buzhinsky in a RIA Novosti report... These comments follow reports that Beijing feels as if the US is extending a Ballistic Missile Defence "ring of fire" across the Pacific. A number of comments by Chinese strategic analysts, cited by China Daily, caught my eye ...Washington appears determined to surround China with US-built anti-missile systems, military scholars have observed. According to US-based Defense News, Taiwan became the fifth global buyer of the Patriot missile defense system last year following Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Arab Emirates and Germany. Quite a few military experts have noted that Washington's latest proposed weapon deal with Taiwan is the key part of a US strategic encirclement of China in the East Asian region, and that the missiles could soon have a footprint that extends from Japan to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Air force colonel Dai Xu, a renowned military strategist, wrote in an article released this month that "China is in a crescent-shaped ring of encirclement. The ring begins in Japan, stretches through nations in the South China Sea to India, and ends in Afghanistan. Washington's deployment of anti-missile systems around China's periphery forms a crescent-shaped encirclement". Ni Lexiong, an expert on military affairs with the Shanghai Institute of Political Science and Law, told the Guanghzou Daily yesterday, "The US anti-missile system in China's neighborhood is a replica of its strategy in Eastern Europe against Russia. The Obama administration began to plan for such a system around China after its project in Eastern Europe got suspended "... The headline of the NTI GSN report is; "China Might Boost Nuclear Deterrent, Russian Expert Says". We must be careful to keep the above distinction in mind. Boosting nuclear deterrence implies moving a step beyond minimum deterrence, but that does not necessarily follow. China's angry response to the Taiwan arms deal, which included a PAC3 deal, should be seen in this wider context. Now Patriots and the like are not the same as the other more strategic components of BMD. But these comments from the China Daily report are worth citing ...Tang Xiaosong, director of the Center of International Security and Strategy Studies with Guangdong University of Foreign Studies noted that the ring encircling China can also be expanded at any time in other directions. He said that Washington is hoping to sell India and other Southeast Asian countries the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense system... Tang Xiaosong makes a very important point. He is referring to the open architecture provisions of US BMD policy, first enunciated by the Bush administration and now accepted by the Obama administration. He is right of course. Notice that under the framework of "dissuasion" Beijing should now be dissuaded from investing in further enhancing its MRBM and SRBM potential. Somehow I doubt whether this will come to pass. The thing to worry about here is that any US boost, both to the qualitative capacity of its offensive and defensive strategic potential , I think is not necessarily qualitative Chinese modernisation or even a boost in its deterrence construct, but rather a shift towards a strategic posture consistent with Launch on Warning. The interesting link here is growing Chinese space capability. As Beijing develops a mature space program this will give PLA strategic planners the option of creating a space based early warning system, enabling the adoption of something akin to Launch on Warning. That would be bad for strategic stability, and would have the affect of decreasing US national security. Notice that this is the opposite of the pronounced objective of Ballistic Missile Defence.

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ICBM interception capability is the lynchpin Block IIA creates a functional Japan-Taiwan alliance. Christopher W. Hughes, Principal Research Fellow & Acting Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, December 2006, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared, http://www.garneteu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1106.pdf | Suo

Instead, the principal security dilemma that BMD is likely to exacerbate for Japan is that vis--vis China. Chinese policy-makers are concerned that Japans development of a BMD system developed in conjunction with the US could lead to the negation of its nuclear deterrent by providing Japan with both a spear and shield. The spear of the US extended nuclear deterrent would be complemented by a BMD shield, allowing Japan deterrence by both punishment and denial vis--vis China. Chinese fears might in part be justified as the Aegis BMD system may have some residual or break out capabilities to defend against its inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), and certainly the US regards the Aegis/SMD component of its missile defence as part of a defensive shield against ICBMs.25 China in all likelihood though could overcome the negation of its strategic nuclear arsenal through the employment of countermeasures and development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles ( MIRV) to overwhelm any BMD system. Chinas concerns extend also to the Japans possible countering of its tactical ballistic missiles and involvement in the Taiwan issue. Chinas worst case scenario would be Japans deployment either individually or in conjunction with the US of its sea-mobile NTWD system to defend Taiwan in a future crisis situation. In particular, China would fear the formation of a quasi-alliance amongst the US, Japan and Taiwan . For if the US were to sell AWS and BMD technology to Taiwan, this could result in all three powers being equipped with fully interoperable equipment, so smoothing the way for three-way military cooperation. Japans reluctance to become embroiled directly in a Taiwan Straits crisis makes this an unlikely scenario except in circumstances of a full scale conflict. Far more likely is that Japan would utilise its BMD system to defend US forces operating in a Taiwan Straits crisis from bases in Japan; an action that would complicate any attempts by China to intimidate US forces in the region short of initiating a war also against Japan. China can ultimately overcome any BMD system through increasing production of its missiles; a process that is relatively cheap and likely to saturate and overcome any defence. Therefore, Japans interest in BMD, although not initiating the process, carries the risk of accelerating Chinas upgrading of its nuclear and conventional ballistic missile capabilities and generating further momentum for a regional arms race.

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Doctrinal shift leads to aggressive escalation China will invite conflict. Michael S. Chase, [et al] Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Andrew S. Erickson, Associate Professor in the Strategic

Research Department, and Christopher Yeaw, Associate Professor and Senior Strategic Researcher, U.S. Naval War College, "Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States," February, 2009 in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 32, Iss 1, pp. 67-114 At the strategic level, China's nuclear force modernization is focused on improving survivability to make its nuclear deterrence posture more credible, a task that has taken on increased urgency as a result of growing concerns regarding US nuclear preeminence, missile defense plans and conventional precision strike capabilities. China is moving toward a much more survivable, and thus more credible, strategic nuclear posture with the development of the road-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs and the JL-2 SLBM. Indeed, as experts have highlighted, the introduction of road-mobile strategic missiles and SSBNs will allow China to achieve 'a degree of credible minimal deterrence vis-avis the continental United States'.140 The modernization of Chinese nuclear forces and the transition from silo-based to road-mobile nuclear missiles and SSBNs might thus enhance strategic deterrence stability. Indeed, deterrence theory suggests that a more secure second-strike capability should enhance stability by causing both the United States and China to behave much more cautiously. The United States, for its part, should not be tempted to contemplate a preemptive counterforce strike against China's strategic missiles, since US planners and decisionmakers would know that China would still be capable of launching a damaging retaliatory strike against the United States or its allies. At the same time, China's ability to launch a damaging retaliatory blow even after absorbing a preemptive counterforce attack should enable it to avoid becoming trapped in a desperate, 'use it or lose it' situation - one in which the party without a secure second-strike capability would theoretically be tempted to strike first, before an adversary could eliminate its vulnerable nuclear forces. At the same time, however, there are reasons to be concerned that the transition to a more secure second-strike capability will not necessarily translate immediately or automatically into greater stability. Indeed, it is entirely possible that these developments could in fact decrease crisis stability under certain circumstances, particularly if China's growing nuclear and missile capability tempts Beijing to behave more assertively, the undersea environment becomes a point of uncomfortably close approach between US attack submarines and Chinese SSBNs, changes in force posture or technological developments result in heightened insecurity, or the alerting and de-alerting of strategic forces creates a temporary state of increased vulnerability. Some observers have suggested that a more secure second-strike capability will embolden Beijing to act more aggressively. For example, former Taiwan deputy defense minister Lin Chong-pin predicts that China's road-mobile ICBMs will enable its leaders to adopt a more assertive foreign policy stance. According to Lin, 'China's heightened nuclear status, as perceived by the world, will serve as the backbone of what Beijing has announced to be its independent foreign policy: increasingly assertive in an emerging, multipolar world. '141 Some analysts have even speculated that China's more robust nuclear posture could lead to a US-China conflict, possibly by making its leaders overconfident of their ability to achieve intra-war nuclear escalation control, an explicit mission of the Second Artillery,142 and thereby undermine crisis communication and management. This is true, to a lesser extent, at the conventional level where the Second Artillery is charged with 'conducting missile deterrence operations' to 'contain the enemy's sinister strategic intentions or significant military misadventures' with its 'long-range, precise, fast, and powerful' surface-to-surface missiles, thereby 'profoundly influencing the overall situation of political, diplomatic, and military struggles' at the strategic level.143 One proponent of this view is Su Tzu-yun, a former adviser to Taiwan's National Security Council. In Su's words, 'With these new tools, the PLA is like a teenager eager to show off and potentially drag China into a military misadventure with the US.'144 At the same time, however, Beijing would still have good reason for caution, given that it would still be dealing with a vastly more capable nuclear power. An additional aspect of China's evolving nuclear doctrine that bears careful thought relates to the operation of the new Jin-class SSBNs as they come on line. Conventional wisdom holds that the development of such a secure, second-strike, strategic force increases strategic stability, theoretically restraining response options on both sides in the event of a crisis. While such an assumption may hold during peacetime, the movement, maneuver, and alerting of nuclear forces in the transition to crisis holds the threat of grave miscalculation. The alert operation of SSBNs by China during a crisis (to include full or partial sailing of the force out of port) may actually significantly decrease the stability of the situation, since it is unlikely that the United States will forgo the option to conduct trailing and surveillance operations in support of strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against those assets. Depending upon the aggressiveness of the strategic ASW operations and PLAN countermeasures, such a situation has the potential to dramatically and unexpectedly escalate the crisis. In fact, the ensuing undersea battlespace will likely be first and closest point of approach between US forces and PLA nuclear forces. Moreover, the crisis could easily escalate beyond mere conventional or even theater warfare. Thus, this undersea interaction should become a point of intense interest, and perhaps discussion, for both sides. The unintended consequences of interaction between force posture changes and technological developments in the Chinese and US militaries may also contribute to greater instability in the event of a future crisis or conflict. This could happen in at least four different ways. First, China will likely attempt to expand its longer-range conventional theater missile capabilities as the US military strengthens its presence in the Pacific. For example, the more heavily the Pentagon relies on Guam to bolster its presence in the Pacific, the greater the incentive China will have to develop conventional ballistic missiles capable of reaching Guam. Beijing may believe that it needs a

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conventional missile capability with the range to strike targets on Guam to avoid being faced with a choice between crossing the nuclear [CONTINUED]

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[CONTINUED]

threshold or allowing the US military to use Guam as a sanctuary. This could result in the geographic expansion of a conflict over Taiwan or in vertical escalation if China launches missile attacks against US territory. Second, intercontinental conventional strike capabilities could further undermine strategic stability or lead to unintended escalation. China faces a fundamental strategic asymmetry in any conflict with the United States. The US military already has the ability to carry out conventional attacks on Chinese territory, potentially including strikes against strategic targets, but the PLA currently has no ability (except, perhaps, some limited special forces capability) to strike targets in Hawaii, Alaska, or the continental United States without using nuclear weapons. The US may increase its dominance in intercontinental conventional strike capabilities with the potential future deployment of conventionally armed SLBMs or other long-range conventional strike systems. 145 Chinese analysts express concern about such developments, particularly about potential US plans to place conventional warheads on SLBMs. An unidentified author writes that highly accurate conventionally armed SLBMs would give the United States the ability to destroy strategic point targets without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, which might raise the risk of war or escalation.146 In the longer-term, China may want to respond to this imbalance and the associated perceived vulnerabilities by developing longerrange conventional strike capabilities of its own that would allow it to threaten at least a limited number of critical targets in Hawaii, Alaska (i.e., missile defense installations), and the continental United States. Although there has not been any evidence of Chinese interest in pursuing extremely long-range conventional strike capabilities to date, a limited strategic conventional strike capability might prove attractive to the Chinese to fill the gap between conventional theater capabilities and strategic nuclear forces. There would also be possible benefits from accentuating the risks of conventional operations against the Chinese mainland, since conventional retaliation would appear more credible than the threat of a nuclear first strike in response to US conventional attacks on the Chinese homeland.147 This could be destabilizing in a conflict. It is possible that employing conventional intercontinental strike capabilities, or perhaps even simply placing such assets on higher alert levels, would result in miscalculation if either side interpreted such moves as preparations for a nuclear first strike.

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Conflict escalates and causes nuclear war. Chalmers Johnson, journalist, Time to Bring the Troops Home, May 14, 2001, The Nation, Volume 272, Number 19
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that Chinas minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the worlds most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to Chinas sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on Chinas borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

The effects are irreversible doctrine shift makes de-escalation impossible even post-crisis scenarios will invite war. Michael S. Chase, [et al] Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Andrew S. Erickson, Associate Professor in the Strategic
Research Department, and Christopher Yeaw, Associate Professor and Senior Strategic Researcher, U.S. Naval War College, "Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States," February, 2009 in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 32, Iss 1, pp. 67-114 Fourth, the transition to land-mobile and sea-based systems will introduce new C2 challenges for the Second Artillery and PLAN. While the addition of such mobile strategic forces allows for significantly enhanced survivability, thereby assuring second-strike capability, such fully-mated, alert forces are an entirely new command and control challenge for the PLA. The risks during crisis of such C2 nightmares as inadvertent launch, unauthorized launch, and terrorist (or special forces) overrun will become operational concerns for all PLA forces in which alert forces are postured. Both out-of-garrison exercises for road-mobile, nuclear strategic missiles and extended 'deterrent patrols' for Type 094 SSBNs will carry with them risks of accidents, as well. While the United States and Russia have long experience with alert forces and the need for exceedingly reliable C2, China's C2 will now be challenged to cope with an entirely differently postured and composed nuclear force. The possibilities of misstep during the next decade of force posture transition, whether in peacetime or crisis, are much enhanced and the potential ramifications severe. Moreover, though conventional wisdom holds that the CMC would be highly unlikely to pre-delegate release authority of nuclear weapons, similar conventional wisdom was proved wrong in the case of the former Soviet Union. Any such pre-planned operational flexibility or pre-delegation could give rise to an extremely unstable situation in a crisis. Another potential complication could arise following the resolution of a US-China crisis. China would need to return its alert forces to a de-alerted state without making them vulnerable to a US preemptive strike. The de-escalatory transition from an alert posture to a de-alerted state is seen as a window of high vulnerability, particularly for smaller nuclear powers.151

And, it destroys civilization. Ching Cheong, journalist for the Strait Times, China, Will Taiwan Break Away? The Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 2001, p. 7
The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else .

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The DPJ is pushing massive budget cuts across the board but the military remains untouchable Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace

Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo In September 2009, a historic political change occurred in Japan, leading to the formation of a coalition government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with Hatoyama Yukio as prime minister. In the previous month's general election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan consistently since 1955, went down to an overwhelming defeat and was ousted from government. This was the first time in post-World War II Japanese history that a vote by the people brought about a change in government.[1] Resistant to change and with a strong desire to avoid confrontation, the LDP and the governmental bureaucracy had gradually become fused in their management of the nation. While many citizens may have had complaints or been dissatisfied with the status quo, this unified ruling structure also seems to have provided a sense of security. So why did the Japanese public reject the LDP in 2009? The serious economic crisis, the resulting social unease, and the failure of the bureaucratic institutions to deal with these crises all played a part in the political upheaval. From 2001 on, the Koizumi Junichiro administration spent nearly six years pushing neoliberal reform in response to globalization under the name of structural reform. While earlier administrations made certain moves in this direction, the Koizumi reforms clearly signalled the end of the Japanese model whereby the state and corporations jointly provided lifetime security for citizens. With the collapse of this system, one in three workersor, in the case of young or female workers, more than halfbecame irregular employees. At the same time, the media repeatedly reported on cases of bureaucrats wasting money or spending state funds for private purposes. The DPJs success in winning the hearts and minds of the Japanese public stemmed at least in part from its declaration of a de-bureaucratized rule. To verify and reduce unnecessary spending within the administration, the new government established the Government Revitalization Unit under the cabinet. In drafting the 2010 budget, which totalled more than 95 trillion yen ($950 billion), the DPJ government has aimed to cut as much as 3 trillion yen ($30 billion) as part of its public reconsideration of each and every government program. It has specifically targeted inefficient public works projects and governmental corporations in collusive relationships with the bureaucracy. As they suffer through the economic crisis, people are watching with great interest the television programs featuring sensationalist denouncements of wasteful bureaucratic expenditure. But so far, despite all of these efforts to cut spending, the government continues to treat one sector as untouchable. Japans military expenditures remain beyond criticism and serious revision.

Specifically, Japan is willing to sacrifice other fields for development of BMD Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace
Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo The third characteristic requiring attention is expenditures on ballistic missile defense. In 1998, when North Korea conducted a test that sent a long-range rocket over Japan, Japan decided to commence joint research on ballistic missile defense with the United States. Over the next five years, Japan spent around $150 million on this joint research. Then in 2003, Japan decided to introduce both the Aegis ship-based BMD (SM-3) and the PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3) systems, announcing that the high technical feasibility of the systems was confirmed. In announcing the decision to acquire BMD, the cabinet made the following comment in relation to overall defense expenditures: When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organization and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces . . . . in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. This policy of selection and concentration mandates the investment of huge sums into BMD even if this

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requires reductions in expenses in other fields. Since then, Japan's spending on the BMD systems has been $1.1 billion in 2004, $1.2 billion in 2005, $1.4 billion in 2006, $1.8 billion in 2007, $1.1 billion in 2008, and $1.1 billion in 2009. In addition, in a separate category from BMD are closely related key categories that include dealing with developments in military scientific technology ($1.2-1.8 billion per year) and the building of an advanced information communications network ($1.6-2.1 billion per year).

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JET is on the chopping block but its vital to Japanese diplomatic leadership and US-Japan relations Jim Gannon, served as the Executive Director of the Japan Center for International Exchange, fellow with the US-Japan Network for the Future, 7/3/10, JET ROI: JET Program on the Chopping Block, http://jetwit.com/wordpress/2010/07/03/jet-roi-jet-program-on-the-chopping-block-byjames-gannon/ | Suo As part of Japans efforts to grapple with its massive public debt, the JET Program may be cut. Soon after coming into power, the new DPJ government launched a high profile effort to expose and cut wasteful government spending. This has featured jigyo shiwakebudget review panels that were tasked with reviewing government programs and recommending whether they should be continued or cut. (See Stacy Smiths (Kumamoto-ken CIR, 2000-03) May 21 WITLife post that explains jigyou shiwake and touches on the threat to the JET Program.) In May 2010, the JET Program and CLAIR came up for review, and during the course of an hour-long hearing, the 11-member panel criticized the JET scheme, ruling unanimously that a comprehensive examination should be undertaken to see if it should be pared back or eliminated altogether. When the jigyo shiwake panels were launched in November 2009, the intent was to weed out bloated spending and a wide range of government programs were put under review, from government-affiliated think tanks to host nation support for US military bases. Bureaucrats involved with each program were directed to submit a brief report on program activities and testify before panels consisting of a handful of Diet members and roughly a dozen private citizens from different walks of life. The defenders of each program were given five minutes to explain why the program is worthwhile, the finance ministry then laid out the rationale for cutting it, and then the panel held a 40 minute debate before issuing a recommendation whether the program should live or die. This extraordinary spectacle made for great theater, becoming wildly popular with voters disenchanted with a lack of government transparency and critical of recurring bureaucratic scandals. In November 2009, the first round of jigyo shiwake panels dominated the newspapers front pages and the hearings were streamed live by various online news sites. The process even gave rise to a new set of stars, most notably Renho, a 42 year-old Taiwanese-Japanese announcer turned Diet member who relentlessly attacked the bureaucrats who appeared before the panels. Despite this initial success, a backlash eventually began to brew against the jigyo shiwake panels, with detractors labeling them as mindless populism, arguing that panel members without any special expertise were unqualified to evaluate the programs and ridiculing the attempt to pass judgment on complex, long-standing projects with such a cursory review. In one noteworthy development, a group of Japanese Nobel laureates publicly rebuked the Hatoyama Goverment for jigyo shiwake recommendations to gut government funding for basic scientific research. Renho herself met with ridicule for arguing in one budget hearing, Whats wrong with being the worlds number two? On May 21, a diverse set of programs including the JET Program were lumped together in one hourlong session and, during the course of the proceedings, the JET Program was criticized as being ineffective in raising the level of Japans English education. One of the more publicized comments called for the elimination of the Assistant Language Teacher (ALT) portion of JET. The general sense was that the JET Program was being evaluated as an educational program with the exchange component being given short shrift, since its impact is difficult to quantify and assess. (Click here for the ruling on the JET Program in Japanese in PDF format.) A few Japanese intellectual and foreign policy leaders have begun to push back against the attacks on the JET Program, noting how important it is in terms of public diplomacy and in Japans engagement with a range of countries. In its June meeting in Washington, D.C., the US-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange (CULCON), a joint US-Japan wisemens commission scathingly criticized the shortsightedness of any move to cut the JET Program, issuing a statement that CULCON strongly endorses the JET Program, especially against the background of negative assessment expressed by some panelists of the screening process. For its part, the US State Department also seems to be taking the position that the JET Program makes valuable contributions to the long-term underpinnings of US-Japan relations and cutting it will be harmful. Meanwhile, a handful of articles have also started to appear in the Japanese press defending the JET Program, although there have been only limited contributions to the debate so far by current and former JET participants. The number of JET participants has already been cut back by almost 30 percent from the peak in 2002, but this is the most direct threat to its survival that the program has faced in its 23-year history. The pattern that has emerged with the previous round of jigyo shiwake has been that programs receiving this type of verdict will be scaled back significantly, absent any public outcry or political maneuvering by important figures. It appears that the next few months will be decisive in whether and how the JET Program continues.

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Specifically, JET is key to Japans soft power promotes acceptance of Japanese culture Yee-Kuang Heng, professor in the Department of Political Science, Trinity College Lecturer in the School of International Relations at St. Andrews University, and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, June 26, 200 8, Lost in Translation? Why Japan and
Great Power Rivalry remain key to the International Politics of East Asia, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Volume 18 | Suo How the Chinese and Japanese project their soft power to shape the regions perception of them could help determine the balance of power and alliance formation dynamics in the region. Indeed, while the Japanese continue to have a negative image in Korea and China for historical reasons, other parts of Asia, such as South-East Asia, despite having themselves experienced brutal Japanese occupation in the Second World War, tend to view Japan more benignly, as a generous provider of financial investment and aid. Indeed, many South-East Asian states seem to fear the rise of Chinese influence in the region more than that of Japan. Japan is seen, on the other hand, as a model of economic success to emulate, with relatively democratic political norms, dynamic creative populations, social cohesion and low crime rates. Tokyo also very deftly dealt with the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s by creating special funds within the Asian Development Bank and contributing to IMF bail-out packages; it could utilise this economic success and brand itself as the indispensable nation in Asia.39 Tokyos cultural exchange programmes to extend its soft power have also been immensely successful, for example the JET program.40 [40 The Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme aims to promote grass roots internationalisation by inviting young overseas graduates to assist in international exchange and foreign-language education at various levels throughout Japan. The programme has seen significant growth: from its original 848 participants from four countries in 1987 to 5,508 participants from 44 countries in 2006. Details of the programme are available at http://www.jetprogramme.org/ e/introduction/history.html (10 July 2007).] The Foreign Ministry in Japan has set up a Public Diplomacy Department implementing a strategy aimed at citizens of other states. Furthermore, Japan has made the concept of human security very much its own, with active disbursement of sizeable funds to deal with socially vulnerable sections of populations menaced by the downsides of globalisation. Human security is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life and dignity of individual human beings.41 These menaces comprise medium and long-term problems like environmental degradation, sustainable development, drugs, and transnational crime. Japanese initiatives to deal with these issues have been relatively well-received by Asian neighboursin part due to the nature of the issue of human security, which is soft in principle.42 Human security has been adopted as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy and to raise Japans international profile, promoting Japans standing as a responsible member of the international community.43

Japanese leadership and cultural influence is the necessary precondition to solving global warming Nathan Gardels, editor of New Perspectives Quarterly, published on behalf of The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, and contributor to Global Viewpoint, June 19, 2008, Japan Poised to Be the Global Green Leader, Lexis | Suo
TOKYO -- Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's announcement that Japan will cut carbon emissions by 60 to 80 percent by 2050 sets a serious tone for the G-8 summit next month at Lake Toya, Japan. Even if real action remains stymied in the lame duck days of the Bush administration, Japan's leadership sends a signal to the world that the rich industrialized countries -whose emissions accumulated the "stock" of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that are causing global warming -- accept their responsibility. This is the precondition required for developing countries like China and India -- responsible for massive new "flows" of industrial exhaust -- to join any common global program beyond the Kyoto Protocol to stem climate change. The summit comes in advance of the convergence of a major economic and geopolitical shift in the world. Unlike past oil shocks, this current bout of price increases is here to stay. The long-term demand trend for oil is ever upward because of rapid growth of India, China and the "rising rest." Though there will be dips, the price of oil is not likely to go down, only up. And up. The next American president, whether Barack Obama or John McCain, will embrace the spirit of Kyoto, if not the actual protocol. Both of them have made this clear in their campaigns. This in turn will lead ultimately toward a global grand bargain in which the main emitters, including the U.S. and China, agree to curb emissions. In exchange, the rich countries will agree to the transfer of clean technology to the rising "flow" countries. Japan is uniquely positioned to take advantage of this shift. While the world has been focused on the miracle of Chinese growth, the war in Iraq and terrorism, Japan has been engaging in a quiet revolution. It has become the incubator of the energy-efficient technologies of the future. Japan is the leading manufacturer and exporter of hybrid cars, most famously the Toyota Prius, which is selling like hotcakes in the United States. Honda has developed a hydrogen fuel cell car that is being prepared for mass production. Komatsu has just produced the world's first-ever hybrid heavy machinery, a 20-ton excavator used in construction sites all across Asia. Japan is responsible for 50 percent of the world's solar power energy production. Japan

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uses 20 percent less energy to produce a ton of steel than the US; 50 percent less than China. Innovations abound from capturing "ice energy" to more energy-efficient plasma screens. Indeed, the facility that will house the media at the Lake Toya summit will be cooled by snow stored in thermal insulation instead of by air conditioning. As America has moved toward a largely financial economy, exemplified by the sub-prime mortgage crisis, Japan retains the very manufacturing and engineering prowess the world needs to face the daunting challenge of climate change. This fits Japan's historical profile well. Going back centuries, it has had something of a green identity. As Umehara Takeshi, the great Japanese anthropologist, has noted, the Shinto religion, in which man is not considered apart from nature, emerged from ancient Japan's "civilization of the forest."In the 17th century, as Jared Diamond points out in his seminal book, "Collapse," the Tokugawa shogunate reforested Japan, denuded by development, and saved it from the kind of ecological catastrophe that struck the Mayans. Though one of the most densely populated countries in the world, 70 percent of Japan today is covered by healthy forests. And, of course, the namesake of the very protocol that is the first global effort to come to grips with climate change, is Japan's ancient capital, Kyoto. Beneath the surface of Japan's faddish consumer society, the frugal culture of an island nation that must husband limited resources still lives. Today, we recognize that the Earth itself is an island. Taking Japan's lead, the whole planet would be wise to adopt that frugal sensibility, living intelligently instead of wastefully.

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Warming causes extinction Mark Lynas, Journalist, Author & Environmental Activist, "Six Steps to Hell", 4/23/2007, The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,2063234,00.html

Scientists estimate that we have at best 10 years to bring down global carbon emissions if we are to stabilise world temperatures within two degrees of their present levels. The impacts of two degrees warming are bad enough, but far worse is in store if emissions continue to rise. Most importantly, 3C may be the "tipping point" where global warming could run out of control, leaving us powerless to intervene as planetary temperatures soar. The centre of this predicted disaster is the Amazon, where the tropical rainforest, which today extends over millions of square kilometres, would burn down in a firestorm of epic proportions . Computer model projections show worsening droughts making Amazonian trees, which have no evolved resistance to fire, much more susceptible to burning. Once this drying trend passes a critical threshold, any spark could light the firestorm which destroys almost the entire rainforest ecosystem. Once the trees have gone, desert will appear and the carbon released by the forests' burning will be joined by still more from the world's soils. This could boost global temperatures by a further 1.5C - tippping us straight into the four-degree world. Three degrees alone would see increasing areas of the planet being rendered essentially uninhabitable by drought and heat. In southern Africa, a huge expanse centred on Botswana could see a remobilisation of old sand dunes, much as is projected to happen earlier in the US west. This would wipe out agriculture and drive tens of millions of climate refugees out of the area. The same situation could also occur in Australia, where most of the continent will now fall outside the belts of regular rainfall. With extreme weather continuing to bite - hurricanes may increase in power by half a category above today's top-level Category Five - world food supplies will be critically endangered. This could mean hundreds of millions - or even billions - of refugees moving out from areas of famine and drought in the sub-tropics towards the mid-latitudes. In Pakistan, for example, food supplies will crash as the waters of the Indus decline to a trickle because of the melting of the Karakoram glaciers that form the river's source. Conflicts may erupt with neighbouring India over water use from dams on Indus tributaries that cross the border. In northern Europe and the UK, summer drought will alternate with extreme winter flooding as torrential rainstorms sweep in from the Atlantic - perhaps bringing storm surge flooding to vulnerable low-lying coastlines as sea levels continue to rise. Those areas still able to grow crops and feed themselves, however, may become some of the most valuable real estate on the planet, besieged by millions of climate refugees from the south. At four degrees another tipping point is almost certain to be crossed; indeed, it could happen much earlier. (This reinforces the determination of many environmental groups, and indeed the entire EU, to bring us in within the two degrees target.) This moment comes as the hundreds of billions of tonnes of carbon locked up in Arctic permafrost - particularly in Siberia enter the melt zone, releasing globally warming methane and carbon dioxide in immense quantities . No one knows how rapidly this might happen, or what its effect might be on global temperatures, but this scientific uncertainty is surely cause for concern and not complacency. The whole Arctic Ocean ice cap will also disappear, leaving the North Pole as open water for the first time in at least three million years. Extinction for polar bears and other ice-dependent species will now be a certainty. The south polar ice cap may also be badly affected - the West Antarctic ice sheet could lift loose from its bedrock and collapse as warming ocean waters nibble away at its base, much of which is anchored below current sea levels. This would eventually add another 5m to global sea levels - again, the timescale is uncertain, but as sea level rise accelerates coastlines will be in a constant state of flux. Whole areas, and indeed whole island nations, will be submerged. In Europe, new deserts will be spreading in Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey: the Sahara will have effectively leapt the Straits of Gibraltar. In Switzerland, summer temperatures may hit 48C, more reminiscent of Baghdad than Basel. The Alps will be so denuded of snow and ice that they resemble the rocky moonscapes of today's High Atlas glaciers will only persist on the highest peaks such as Mont Blanc. The sort of climate experienced today in Marrakech will be experienced in southern England, with summer temperatures in the home counties reaching a searing 45C. Europe's population may be forced into a "great trek" north. To find out what the planet would look like with five degrees of warming, one must largely abandon the models and venture far back into geological time, to the beginning of a period known as the Eocene. Fossils of sub-tropical species such as crocodiles and turtles have all been found in the Canadian high Arctic dating from the early Eocene, 55 million years ago, when the Earth experienced a sudden and dramatic global warming. These fossils even show that breadfruit trees were growing on the coast of Greenland, while the Arctic Ocean saw water temperatures of 20C within 200km of the North Pole itself. There was no ice at either pole; forests were probably growing in central Antarctica. The Eocene greenhouse event fascinates scientists not just because of its effects, which also saw a major mass extinction in the seas, but also because of its likely cause: methane hydrates. This unlikely substance, a sort of ice-like combination of methane and water that is only stable at low temperatures and high pressure, may have burst into the atmosphere from the seabed in an immense "ocean burp", sparking a surge in global temperatures (methane is even more powerful as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide). Today vast amounts of these same methane hydrates still sit on subsea continental shelves. As the oceans warm, they could be released once more in a terrifying echo of that methane belch of 55 million years ago. In the process, moreover, the seafloor could slump as the gas is released, sparking massive tsunamis that would further devastate the coasts. Again, no one knows how likely this apocalyptic scenario is to unfold in today's world. The good news is that it could take centuries for warmer water to penetrate down to the bottom of the oceans and release the stored methane. The bad news is that it could happen much sooner in shallower seas that see a stronger heating effect (and contain lots of methane hydrate) such as in the Arctic. It is also important to realise that the early Eocene greenhouse took at least 10,000 years to come about. Today we could accomplish the same feat in less than a century. If there is one episode in the Earth's history that we should try above all not to repeat, it is surely the catastrophe that befell the planet at the end of the Permian period, 251 million years ago. By the end of this calamity, up to 95% of species were extinct. The end-Permian wipeout

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is the nearest this planet has ever come to becoming just another lifeless rock drifting through space. The precise cause remains unclear, but what is undeniable is that the end-Permian mass extinction was associated with a super-greenhouse event. Oxygen isotopes in rocks dating from the time suggest that temperatures rose by six degrees, perhaps because of an even bigger methane belch than happened 200 million years later in the Eocene. Sedimentary layers show that most of the world's plant cover was removed in a catastrophic bout of soil erosion. Rocks also show a "fungal spike" as plants and animals rotted in situ. Still more corpses were washed into the oceans, helping to turn them stagnant and anoxic. Deserts invaded central Europe, and may even have reached close to the Arctic Circle. One scientific paper investigating "kill mechanisms" during the end-Permian suggests that methane hydrate explosions "could destroy terrestrial life almost entirely". Acting much like today's fuel-air explosives (or "vacuum bombs"), major oceanic methane eruptions could release energy equivalent to 10,000 times the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons. Whatever happened back then to wipe out 95% of life on Earth must have been pretty serious. And while it would be wrong to imagine that history will ever straightforwardly repeat itself, we should certainly try and learn the lessons of the distant past. If they tell us one thing above all, it is this: that we mess with the climatic thermostat of this planet at our extreme - and growing - peril.

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Independently, BMD procurement devastates Japans economy Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, 200 2 JapanU.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf | Suo Acquisition of a BMD capability would present a major a financial challenge to todays Japan, which is struggling with a faltering economy and proportionately the largest public fiscal debt in the industrialized world. Although climbing for most of the 1990s, Japans military budgets began leveling off around 1998. The share of the research and development budget has been shrinking in relation to the procurement budget.62 BMD procurement would have to compete for funds with the planned procurement of such systems as F-2 fighter aircraft, air-refueling tankers, two new AEGIS destroyers (which could serve as platforms for an eventual BMD system), a replacement for Japans fleet of PC-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and information gathering satellites. The costs of Japans participation in research and development related to four parts of the Standard-3 interceptor missile are relatively small, but acquisition of a BMD capability would unquestionably present the Koizumi government and the JDA and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with major defense budget decisions. In both FY2001 and FY2002, the Japanese government allowed less than a 1% increase in defense spending. Japans prolonged economic slump has seriously limited new arms acquisitions. Some analysts estimate that it could cost Japan as much as $50 billion over a number of years to develop and deploy a robust ballistic missile defense.63 Considering that Japans FY2001 budget for procurement for military hardware only totaled 767 billion (about $7.1 billion at then prevailing exchange rates), and that the entire budget was less than $40 billion, the JDA likely will face extremely difficult choices in deciding between BMD and other weapons system modernization programs. Japanese officials say that the current FiveYear Defense Outline that began with FY2001 has sufficient funding for currently planned procurement programs only. Because the five-year plan traditionally does not allow for major revisions, Japanese officials indicate that a procurement decision could not take place until about FY2006.64 A decision by Japan to acquire a BMD capability would have costs and significance far in excess of the U.S. decision to push forward with missile defense, even though the actual monetary cost to Japan would be far less, both in comparative and absolute terms. Practically speaking, in view of other acute spending priorities and budgetary constraints associated with its mountain of bad loans, unfunded liabilities of hundreds of quasi-governmental corporations and pension funds, rising and unprecedented levels of unemployment, and falling tax revenues, Japan cannot opt for acquisition of a BMD capability without jettisoning the informal 1% of GDP limitation on defense spending. To do so, however, would likely generate significant criticism from both Japans neighbors and a large section of the Japanese public.

Japanese economy is key to the world economy monetary shifts [newer] Allan H. Meltzer, Prof. Poli. Econ. And Public Policy @ Carnegie Mellon U, Monetary Policy in the New Global Economy: The Case of Japan, Spring/Summer 2k, Cato Journal | VP
The argument is often made that devaluation of the yen is harmful to Japans neighbors and trading partners. Japan, it is said, should not recover at others expense. Such statements are based on a misunderstanding. The real exchange ratethe quoted exchange rate adjusted for differences in prices at home and abroadmust change to restore Japans competitive position in the world economy. The only issue is not whether the real exchange rate changes, but how. There are three possibilities. First, Japan can use expansive monetary policy to devalue its quoted (or market) exchange rate. Second, it has been doing the opposite recently, so it must in the future let prices and wages fall enough to restore equilibrium. Third, it can hope that the United States, Europe, and others inflate enough to ease the Japanese adjustment. Or, it can rely on a mixture of price and exchange rate changes. Putting aside hopes that principal foreign countries inflate, wage and price deflation is the alternative to devaluation. There are no others. Those who oppose devaluation as too costly for Japans neighbors and trading partners should recognize that Japanese deflation is expensive also, for its trading partners, its neighbors, and its citizens. In my viewsupported by the experience of the past decade devaluation would be a cheaper, and I believe, faster way to restore prosperity to Japan and its neighbors. The Japanese work force is talented and productive. Japanese producers in many industries have been creative and strong competitors. That is why Japan has become the worlds second largest economy. Although there are the much discussed structural problems, there is a sizeable competitive core that would take advantage of the yens devaluation to produce more. As Japan returned to high employment and growth, imports from neighbors and trading partners would increase. The yen would appreciate. Japans growth would help to re- store Asian prosperity and contribute to growth of the world economy.

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Global economic collapse causes nuclear war Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations,
2/4, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d818542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class . The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes . (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness . Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration . The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nucleararmed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse
in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such halfhearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of

. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well

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The DPJ is pushing massive budget cuts across the board but the military remains untouchable Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace

Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo In September 2009, a historic political change occurred in Japan, leading to the formation of a coalition government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with Hatoyama Yukio as prime minister. In the previous month's general election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan consistently since 1955, went down to an overwhelming defeat and was ousted from government. This was the first time in post-World War II Japanese history that a vote by the people brought about a change in government.[1] Resistant to change and with a strong desire to avoid confrontation, the LDP and the governmental bureaucracy had gradually become fused in their management of the nation. While many citizens may have had complaints or been dissatisfied with the status quo, this unified ruling structure also seems to have provided a sense of security. So why did the Japanese public reject the LDP in 2009? The serious economic crisis, the resulting social unease, and the failure of the bureaucratic institutions to deal with these crises all played a part in the political upheaval. From 2001 on, the Koizumi Junichiro administration spent nearly six years pushing neoliberal reform in response to globalization under the name of structural reform. While earlier administrations made certain moves in this direction, the Koizumi reforms clearly signalled the end of the Japanese model whereby the state and corporations jointly provided lifetime security for citizens. With the collapse of this system, one in three workersor, in the case of young or female workers, more than halfbecame irregular employees. At the same time, the media repeatedly reported on cases of bureaucrats wasting money or spending state funds for private purposes. The DPJs success in winning the hearts and minds of the Japanese public stemmed at least in part from its declaration of a de-bureaucratized rule. To verify and reduce unnecessary spending within the administration, the new government established the Government Revitalization Unit under the cabinet. In drafting the 2010 budget, which totalled more than 95 trillion yen ($950 billion), the DPJ government has aimed to cut as much as 3 trillion yen ($30 billion) as part of its public reconsideration of each and every government program. It has specifically targeted inefficient public works projects and governmental corporations in collusive relationships with the bureaucracy. As they suffer through the economic crisis, people are watching with great interest the television programs featuring sensationalist denouncements of wasteful bureaucratic expenditure. But so far, despite all of these efforts to cut spending, the government continues to treat one sector as untouchable. Japans military expenditures remain beyond criticism and serious revision.

Specifically, Japan is willing to sacrifice other fields for development of BMD Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace
Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo The third characteristic requiring attention is expenditures on ballistic missile defense. In 1998, when North Korea conducted a test that sent a long-range rocket over Japan, Japan decided to commence joint research on ballistic missile defense with the United States. Over the next five years, Japan spent around $150 million on this joint research. Then in 2003, Japan decided to introduce both the Aegis ship-based BMD (SM-3) and the PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3) systems, announcing that the high technical feasibility of the systems was confirmed. In announcing the decision to acquire BMD, the cabinet made the following comment in relation to overall defense expenditures: When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organization and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces . . . . in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. This policy of selection and concentration mandates the investment of huge sums into BMD even if this

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requires reductions in expenses in other fields. Since then, Japan's spending on the BMD systems has been $1.1 billion in 2004, $1.2 billion in 2005, $1.4 billion in 2006, $1.8 billion in 2007, $1.1 billion in 2008, and $1.1 billion in 2009. In addition, in a separate category from BMD are closely related key categories that include dealing with developments in military scientific technology ($1.2-1.8 billion per year) and the building of an advanced information communications network ($1.6-2.1 billion per year).

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Japanese science funding on the brink cuts are coming soon David Cyranoski, staff writer for Nature, 26 November 2009, Japanese scientists rally against government cuts,
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091126/full/news.2009.1108.html | Suo At a hastily arranged symposium at the University of Tokyo yesterday, four Japanese Nobel laureates rallied against the budget-slashing policies of their new government. The criticisms come as government-appointed working groups of roughly 20 people with few scientists among them reach the final week of hearings that are recommending budget cuts for 220 government-funded projects, including many major research initiatives. The recommendations form part of the government's effort to trim 3 trillion (US$33.7 billion) off next year's budget. The proposed cuts would hit the SPring-8 synchrotron in Harima and a project to build the world's fastest supercomputer, among others. But they also call for reductions in the grants that form the lifeline for many scientists (see 'Japanese science faces deep cuts'). At the end of the Tokyo meeting, the audience was asked whether they supported a proposed statement by the distinguished scientists, calling for the government to "take into account the opinions of scientists and academics when deciding budgets for universities and allocations for research grants". In response, the audience erupted into applause. Tsunami of protest In the normally staid world of Japanese science policy, the past week has seen a rash of such statements. On 24 November, presidents from Japan's top nine national and private universities issued a declaration saying the government's policies "are moving in the opposite direction from the rest of the world" and called for funding of young-researcher grants and university-operating costs to be maintained. On 25 November, the heads of nine university-related centres that focus on computer and information technology issued a statement calling for support for the threatened supercomputer project. On the same day, the leaders of 17 Centers of Excellence at the University of Tokyo, along with the university's president, released a statement calling for the maintenance of their budgets. Leaders of Japan's five prestigious World Premier International Research Centers are preparing a similar statement, which they hope to bolster with letters of support from their foreign colleagues. Shiro Ishii, an emeritus professor of law at the University of Tokyo, who organized the symposium, says that the sudden outcry reminds him of one of the most turbulent periods in Japanese history: the 1960 anpo demonstrations, when groups of faculty and students protested against the USJapan security treaty (known as anpo in Japanese). The working groups have broken new ground in Japan by opening up the mechanisms of government for all to see the hearings are broadcast on the Internet and by engaging more people in discussions about policy. As of the morning of 26 November, some 14,000 public comments have flooded in to the science and education ministry about the working-group recommendations for science and technology alone (see 'Democratic fallacy'). Standing room only The Tokyo symposium is by far the biggest outpouring of protest against the recommendations to date. Although it was arranged only the night before and announced yesterday morning, about 1,000 students, journalists and faculty members attended. "We didn't expect so many students," says Ishii. Entering a few minutes late, Nobel physicist Reona (Leo) Esaki asked a student where the lecture hall was. "Second floor, but you'll never get in," the student replied. "They can't start until I do," the Nobelist responded. Much of the discussion lamented the Japanese public's lack of appreciation for the value of basic science. "People don't realize how the fruits of basic science are all around them, in their [Global Positioning Systems], their vaccines, their mobile phones," says immunologist and Nobel laureate Susumu Tonegawa. Nobel chemist Ryoji Noyori notes that the funding of graduate students in science is so limited that they often have to find part-time jobs, and that Japan's investment in university education as a percentage of its gross domestic product is lower than that of most other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. "We need more money, not less," Noyori says.

Specifically, the induced pluripotent stem cell bank will be cut David Cyranoski, contributor to Nature, 13 October 2009, Japan to slash huge grant scheme,
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091013/full/461854a.html | Suo In September, 30 research groups in Japan, led by some of the country's biggest scientific names, were celebrating their selection to a new 270-billion (US$3-billion) funding programme. But the programme is now under fire from both politicians and researchers, and its funding may be cut by almost two-thirds. The projects were selected on 4 September five days after the ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost an election in a landslide, and 12 days before it had to yield power to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ needed money to fund campaign promises, such as stipends for families with children (see Nature 460, 938; 2009), and asked all ministries to cut back by at least 3 trillion the 14.7 trillion that had been allocated this spring as part of a government supplemental funding package. On 6 October, the science and education ministry announced that it would cut 21% from its supplementary budget. It has not revealed details of where

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those cuts would be made, but Japan's deputy prime minister Naoto Kan has reportedly laid out a framework by which the Funding Program for World-Leading Innovative R&D on Science and Technology (FIRST) would be reduced from 270 billion to 100 billion. According to the plan, which had not been made official as Nature went to press, 70 billion would be cut altogether and the other 100 billion would be used for smaller grants to other groups or transferred to a scheme for sending young scientists abroad. The 30 groups scheduled to receive FIRST funding span a variety of fields, from mathematics to neurogenetics and nanobiotechnology. The list includes many of Japan's most famous scientists, including Shinya Yamanaka of Kyoto University, who received funding to set up a stem-cell bank for the induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells he created; Shizuo Akira of Osaka University, for a project on manipulating immune responses; and Nobel laureate Koichi Tanaka of Shimadzu Corporation in Kyoto, for a mass-spectrometry project on drug discovery and diagnosis.

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Science cuts kill the Japanese economy Ken-ichi Arai, professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, founding president of the Asia-Pacific International Molecular Biology Network, and president and chief executive officer of SBI Biotech, June 20 10, Japanese Science in a Global World, Science, Vol. 328. no. 5983, p. 1207 | Suo
The beginning of 2010 brought good economic news to Japan, which has seen only lackluster growth for the past two decades. Although the country's debt load and deflation remain serious problems, the world's second largest economy reportedly grew in the last quarter of 2009. But that does not mean that Japan is on a route to long-term recovery. Although the science budget for fiscal year 2011 was not severely cut, a worrisome sign was the government's attempts to freeze investment in Japan's science infrastructure (for example, supercomputing) and reduce spending on earth sciences, cosmology, and other fields. These were avoided through the protests of prominent Japanese scientists. The lack of political interest in bolstering investment in science and technology indicates misguided thinking. There is therefore a growing awareness in the Japanese research community that scientists need to become more involved in formulating the country's science policy and in guiding young scientists into international networks that will support a successful global economy for Japan. After World War II, Japan forged a robust economy by focusing on manufacturing industries. But a sharp decrease in global demand for goods, the collapse of an asset bubble, and a failure to quickly adapt its traditional organizational structure in science, technology, and industry drove Japan into an economic crash in the early 1990s, leaving the country incapable of quickly responding through entrepreneurship and new ventures. In response, the Japanese government led by the Liberal Democratic Party instituted reforms in science and technology to encourage innovation. The goals included increasing the number of Ph.D. students and postdoctoral fellows and promoting goal-oriented projects to create new industries. As a result, the number of graduate students and postdocs and the number of publications by Japanese scientists in prestigious journals increased. However, there has been a downside. The shift to a "big science" view with a "top-down" goal-oriented style has concentrated funding in fewer but bigger projects, thus supporting fewer researchers, rather than funding more individual scientists and small, more focused research endeavors. This has created uncertainty for young researchers today about their career paths in a top-down research environment. This is reflected in a recent decrease in Japanese Ph.D.s going abroad to expand their professional and educational development and to create collaborative relationships. From the 1960s through the 1990s, many Japanese researchers went to North America and Europe for postdoctoral training. Today, young Japanese researchers who face job opportunity challenges may fear not finding a job upon returning home after time abroad. Whatever the precise reasons, the result is an inward-looking attitude of young scientists, which works against establishing strong international scientific networks. In contrast, other Asian countries are energetically nurturing such ties, particularly China, India, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. One of the reform goals of the previous Japanese government, which has not been achieved, was to provide independence to young investigators through an open research system that supports international paths for career development without borders (of nationality, gender, or age). Pursuing this goal in the context of a bottom-up open platform for science and technology that frees scientists to pursue their research interests would create career paths that are interchangeable with those in other countries, particularly other Asian nations. Such a flexible research infrastructure would allow for shared opportunities among many Asian countries and may help them tackle common problems in health care, food, energy, and the environment. After the Democratic Party of Japan was victorious in last year's elections, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's science policy was not initially clear. Today, the good news is that the new government supports genomic and stem cell research, biotech ventures, and green technology programs. But if the economic recovery stalls, science may face severe budget cuts. Scientists must communicate much better with policy-makers about how to direct investments in ways that will put Japan on a path toward sustained growth, including support for a generation of globally integrated and innovative scientists.

Japanese economy key to global economy Allan H. Meltzer, Prof. Poli. Econ. And Public Policy @ Carnegie Mellon U, Monetary Policy in the New Global Economy: The Case of Japan, Spring/Summer 2k, Cato Journal | VP
The argument is often made that devaluation of the yen is harmful to Japans neighbors and trading partners. Japan, it is said, should not recover at others expense. Such statements are based on a misunderstanding. The real exchange ratethe quoted exchange rate adjusted for differences in prices at home and abroadmust change to restore Japans competitive position in the world economy. The only issue is not whether the real exchange rate changes, but how. There are three possibilities. First, Japan can use expansive monetary policy to devalue its quoted (or market) exchange rate. Second, it has been doing the opposite recently, so it must in the future let prices and wages fall enough to restore equilibrium. Third, it

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can hope that the United States, Europe, and others inflate enough to ease the Japanese adjustment. Or, it can rely on a mixture of price and exchange rate changes. Putting aside hopes that principal foreign countries inflate, wage and price deflation is the alternative to devaluation. There are no others. Those who oppose devaluation as too costly for Japans neighbors and trading partners should recognize that Japanese deflation is expensive also, for its trading partners, its neighbors, and its citizens. In my viewsupported by the experience of the past decade devaluation would be a cheaper, and I believe, faster way to restore prosperity to Japan and its neighbors. The Japanese work force is talented and productive. Japanese producers in many industries have been creative and strong competitors. That is why Japan has become the worlds second largest economy. Although there are the much discussed structural problems, there is a sizeable competitive core that would take advantage of the yens devaluation to produce more. As Japan returned to high employment and growth, imports from neighbors and trading partners would increase. The yen would appreciate. Japans growth would help to re- store Asian prosperity and contribute to growth of the world economy.

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Global economic collapse causes nuclear war Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations,
2/4, Only Makes You Stronger, The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d818542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)

The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class . The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes . (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness . Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration . The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions of people in nucleararmed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse
in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such halfhearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of

. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.
which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well

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Independently, the stem cell bank is key to the viability of iPS therapy Erin Podolak, contributor for BioTechniques, citing Yamanaka, contributor for BioTechniques, director of the Center for iPS Cell Research and Application at Kyoto University, 1/22/20 10, Japanese iPS research pioneer Yamanaka speaks at the NIH,
http://www.biotechniques.com/news/Japanese-iPS-research-pioneer-Yamanaka-speaks-at-the-NIH/biotechniques-186896.html | Suo We could not simply try all of the combinations. It was too much even for us, said Yamanaka. Instead, Yamanakas team tested a mixture of all 24 factors to induce pluripotency, then removed them one by one to discern which ones were responsible. This method enabled the researchers to discover that Oct3/4, Klf4, Sox2, and c-Myc have the ability to induce pluripotency in differentiated cells. The groundbreaking results were published in Nov. 2007 in Cell. Currently, Yamanaka is collaborating with researchers from Keio University in Tokyo to study iPS cells as a treatment for spinal cord injuries. If we use patient-specific iPS cells in medicine, we can avoid ethical issues regarding the use of embryos, and we can avoid immune rejection. But this is very expensive and time consuming, said Yamanaka. In the case of spinal cord injuries, we have to transplant the neural cells within 7 to 10 days after the injury. But it takes at least three months to make transplantable iPS cells, so we would never make it. To meet this challenge, Yamanaka told his audience that he hopes to create an iPS cell bank that would mimic the setup of current blood banks. But he expressed concern that he might not be able to raise the necessary funding. We have a new Japanese government, and the new government is not so friendly to scientists. So we are having a little bit of trouble, said Yamanaka. The improvement and refinement of reprogramming techniques is just beginning, according to Yamanaka. In order to realize iPS cellbased therapy, we need to establish uniform and complete reprogramming; we need to determine the best origin of human iPS cells, the best induction method, and the best evaluation method before we apply the technology, he said.

Human immortality wut Michael D. West, Ph.D. from Baylor College of Medicine concentrating on the biology of cellular aging, June 20 10, Immortal Stem Cells for AntiAging Therapies, http://www.lef.org/magazine/mag2010/jun2010_Immortal-Stem-Cells-for-Anti-Aging-Therapies_01.htm | Suo Now, with iPS technology, which is a way of performing the equivalent of cloning without using an egg cell or making an embryo, everyone believed from the start that it would also transport the cell back to immortality, since that is what happens in cloning. But when we looked at telomeres in several widely used iPS cell lines we saw they were all short. In the paper we just published,14 our survey showed that, although all iPS cell lines out there do reactivate telomerase and otherwise look like embryonic stem cells, they do not properly reset the clock of aging because their telomeres remain shorter than they should be. The good news is that we found a way to identify iPS cells that have reset the clock of aging. And so while iPS cell technology is not as efficient as cloning in rapidly and reliably reversing the clock of aging, weve shown in this paper that it can be made to work quite simply. So the ability to reverse the aging of human cells both from the standpoint of embryological development and in terms of the clock of aging and in an ethically non-problematic manner, and to do it on a commercial and affordable scale, makes regenerative medicine an attractive pathway to profoundly intervene in human aging.

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US-Japan cooperation on Block IIA is the foundation for US BMD plans in Europe Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (East Asia), U.S. Department of Defense, March 17, 2010, U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global
Environment Hearing, Lexis | Suo Indeed, today's alliance agenda goes well beyond the formal commitments the United States and Japan have made to each other under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, including the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, in return for Japan's commitment to provide facilities and areas for U.S. forces to use in defending Japan and in maintaining peace and security in the Far East. For example, U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan has become a central element in the defense relationship. Japan's investments in four BMD-capable AEGIS destroyers, and the upgrades of its Patriot battalions to the PAC-3 capability, are going a long way towards augmenting and strengthening the missile defense capability that protects Japan and our forces stationed there. At the same time, the collaboration between the United States and Japan on the Standard Missile 3 Block IIA not only promises both of our countries the opportunity to improve our future capabilities, but will serve as the foundation for land-based missile defense capabilities that the United States aims to deploy in Europe in support of defense requirements for our NATO allies and partners in the Arabian Gulf region.

US missile defense plans cause US-Russian arms race, global proliferation, and the disintegration of START Nikolay Makarov, General of the Army (Russia), Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, First Deputy Minister of Defence, cited by Xinhua General News Service, April 12, 2010, Planned U.S. missile defense in Europe might induce arms race, Lexis | Suo
The U.S. plans to deploy missile defense elements in Europe might induce an arms race, said Chief of Staff of Russia's armed forces Nikolay Makarov on Monday. Such deployment would prompt other countries to "refine their ballistic missiles and other armaments" as counteractions, "which would irrevocably lead to an arms race," said Makarov. If certain nuclear power nations deviate from the path of arms reduction, other countries might also not stay within the framework of nuclear nonproliferation, he added. The new strategic arms reduction treaty (START) signed by Russian and U.S. leaders last week has definitely stated that "the increase of defensive weapons would irreversibly lead to the increase of offensive ones," he said. Russia is closely watching the U.S. missile defense plans, he said. "Russia would back off from the new START treaty if the plans have intimidated Russia's security," he said, adding that Moscow would like to cooperate with Washington in missile defense on an equal base. Makarov meanwhile reiterated Russia's readiness to adopt corresponding measures against the U.S. missile defense plans, because such plans "would again spur incredulity." Only if other members of the nuclear club join the process of strategic arms reduction, would Russia think about further nuclear arsenal cuts, said Makarov. Both Russia and the United States believed other countries might boost their nuclear potential while the two countries reduce it. "Therefore the involvement of all nuclear powers in the nuclear arms reduction process should become the next stage. We need to conclude a treaty that will stop the race of arms in the whole world," said the general as quoted by local media.

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Russia desires cooperation with the US but the missile defense issue poisons relations Lilit Gevorgyan, Russia and CIS, Europe Analyst at IHS Global Insight, February 10, 20 10, Russia Describes NATO, U.S. Anti-Missile Defence
Plans in Eastern Europe as Security Threats, Lexis | Suo On 9 February, the Chief of the Russian National Security Council and former director of the FSB intelligence service, Nikolai Patrushev, stated that NATO represents a serious threat for Russia, a concept also set out in the country's recently released national security doctrine. Patrushev went to say that Russian authorities deeply doubt that the extension of the NATO enlargement will anyway improve Russia's security. His comments were preceded by a statement from the chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, General Nikolai Makarov, who called the emerging missile defence systems in Eastern Europe directed against Russia as aimed to weaken its nuclear deterrence capabilities. Makarov described the U.S. and NATO claims that the missile defence sites are only to counter the threat from Iran as disingenuous. The two comments incited a quick response from NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and U.S. State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley. The former expressed his surprise at naming NATO as Russia's main security threat, while Crowley tried to reassure the Russian government that the anti-missile system is not directed against Russia and that the United States will continue co-operating with Russia on the issue. Significance: While the Russian reaction may come as a surprise to NATO and the United States, Moscow's discontent has been in the making for some time now. Following the new U.S. presidential administration's attempts to reset the strained relations with Russia in 2009, Barack Obama together with his allies in NATO took steps to dispel Moscow's mistrust with the West and reassure that the West saw their future in co-operating with Russia, rather than confronting it. The process gained momentum when the United States announced the abandonment of its previous plans to deploy an anti-missile defence shield in Czech Republic and Poland. This step was followed by a launch of high-level Russia-NATO dialogue which resulted in Russia's greater involvement in supporting the military alliance's campaign in Afghanistan. Russia, for its part, tabled a new Euro-Atlantic security pact to provide a united security framework for NATO and Russia. However soon the first disappointment came as the United States announced the deployment of missile defence shield elements in Eastern Europe, followed by NATO's discarding the Russian security pact proposal. This Russian frustration has been further fuelled by the U.S. refusal to include the issues of the defence missile shields in the ongoing bilateral talks on a new treaty set to replace the expired Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START). Russia would prefer to have pragmatic military co-operation with the West but it remains suspicious of the sincerity of Western friendship offers, and the recent developments do not help to quell this feeling of mistrust.

START failure guarantees extinction John Hallam , Editor of Nuclear Flashpoints, 9, John Burroughs and Marcy Fowler, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, NPT Preparatory
Committee, Steps Toward a Safer World -- APRIL 27 Why did an article in the September 2008 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, entitled 'avoiding human extinction' give a list of measures needed to avoid that, with lowering the operating status of nuclear weapon systems (along with their elimination) topping the rather consequential 'to - do' list, even before climate - change measures and incoming large asteroids? Why over the years has this issue been thought so important at such a high level? The US and Russia undeniably keep a large number (estimated by Blair at 2,654 by Kristensen more recently 2,300) of nuclear warheads (both land - based ICBMs and SLBMs) in a status in which they can be launched at roughly 2 minutes or less notice. This fact is never seriously disputed. The core of the issue is that standard operating procedures envisage extremely short decision making timeframes, and these are imposed by the simple fact of having some missiles on quick - launch status. Careful and measured decision-making in such a situation is simply not possible. Yet the consequences of such decisions are truly apocalyptic. Recent research by US scientists (Toon and Robock 2008/9) on the effects of the use of US and Russian arsenals indicates that even at levels down to 1000 warheads, the use by malice, madness, miscalculation or malfunction of the 'on alert' portions of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces would be essentially terminal for civilization. Maintaining arsenals in an unstable configuration was insanely risky during the Cold War, when there were even larger numbers of warheads on alert and when there were just too many occasions on which it would be fair to say that the world came just too close to ending. There is even less reason, now that the cold - war confrontation has supposedly ended, to maintain nuclear forces in these dangerous configurations. Yet in spite of denials and obfuscations from those who wish to maintain existing postures they are indeed so maintained. President Obama, in his election manifesto, promised to negotiate with Russia to lower the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. It is vital that this promise is not forgotten. The talks between the US and Russia on the successor to the START Treaty are an ideal opportunity to take action to implement Obama's promises to negotiate with Russia to achieve lower operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

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Proliferation causes extinction Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, 2002,
Summer, Survival, p. 87-90 Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the worlds capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the worlds states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponents nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. [The article continues] The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each others cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Russian relations solve the environment, warming, and resource wars Jeffrey Tayler, contributor on Russia to The Atlantic Monthly, November 2008, Medvedev Spoils the Party,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/medvedev-spoils-the-party/7130/1/ Like it or not, the United States cannot solve crucial global problems without Russian participation. Russia commands the largest landmass on earth; possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources; owns huge stockpiles of weapons and plutonium; and still wields a potent brain trust. Given its influence in Iran and North Korea, to say nothing of its potential as a spoiler of international equilibrium elsewhere, Russia is one country with which the United States would do well to reestablish a strong working relationshipa strategic partnership, evenregardless of its feelings about the current Kremlin government. The need to do so trumps expanding NATO or pursuing full-spectrum dominance. Once the world financial crisis passes, we will find ourselves returning to worries about resource depletion, environmental

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degradation, and global warming the greatest challenges facing humanity. No country can confront these problems alone. For the United States, Russia may just prove the indispensable nation with which to face a volatile future arm in arm.

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Environmental degradation causes extinction David Takacs, Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay, 19 96, Philosophies of Paradise,
pg. http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization. 13 Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.14

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Warming causes extinction Mark Lynas, Journalist, Author & Environmental Activist, "Six Steps to Hell", 4/23/2007, The Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,2063234,00.html

Scientists estimate that we have at best 10 years to bring down global carbon emissions if we are to stabilise world temperatures within two degrees of their present levels. The impacts of two degrees warming are bad enough, but far worse is in store if emissions continue to rise. Most importantly, 3C may be the "tipping point" where global warming could run out of control, leaving us powerless to intervene as planetary temperatures soar. The centre of this predicted disaster is the Amazon, where the tropical rainforest, which today extends over millions of square kilometres, would burn down in a firestorm of epic proportions. Computer model projections show worsening droughts making Amazonian trees, which have no evolved resistance to fire, much more susceptible to burning. Once this drying trend passes a critical threshold, any spark could light the firestorm which destroys almost the entire rainforest ecosystem. Once the trees have gone, desert will appear and the carbon released by the forests' burning will be joined by still more from the world's soils. This could boost global temperatures by a further 1.5C - tippping us straight into the four-degree world. Three degrees alone would see increasing areas of the planet being rendered essentially uninhabitable by drought and heat. In southern Africa, a huge expanse centred on Botswana could see a remobilisation of old sand dunes, much as is projected to happen earlier in the US west. This would wipe out agriculture and drive tens of millions of climate refugees out of the area. The same situation could also occur in Australia, where most of the continent will now fall outside the belts of regular rainfall. With extreme weather continuing to bite - hurricanes may increase in power by half a category above today's top-level Category Five world food supplies will be critically endangered. This could mean hundreds of millions - or even billions - of refugees moving out from areas of famine and drought in the sub-tropics towards the mid-latitudes. In Pakistan, for example, food supplies will crash as the waters of the Indus decline to a trickle because of the melting of the Karakoram glaciers that form the river's source. Conflicts may erupt with neighbouring India over water use from dams on Indus tributaries that cross the border. In northern Europe and the UK, summer drought will alternate with extreme winter flooding as torrential rainstorms sweep in from the Atlantic - perhaps bringing storm surge flooding to vulnerable low-lying coastlines as sea levels continue to rise. Those areas still able to grow crops and feed themselves, however, may become some of the most valuable real estate on the planet, besieged by millions of climate refugees from the south. At four degrees another tipping point is almost certain to be crossed; indeed, it could happen much earlier. (This reinforces the determination of many environmental groups, and indeed the entire EU, to bring us in within the two degrees target.) This moment comes as the hundreds of billions of tonnes of carbon locked up in Arctic permafrost - particularly in Siberia - enter the melt zone, releasing globally warming methane and carbon dioxide in immense quantities. No one knows how rapidly this might happen, or what its effect might be on global temperatures, but this scientific uncertainty is surely cause for concern and not complacency. The whole Arctic Ocean ice cap will also disappear, leaving the North Pole as open water for the first time in at least three million years. Extinction for polar bears and other ice-dependent species will now be a certainty. The south polar ice cap may also be badly affected - the West Antarctic ice sheet could lift loose from its bedrock and collapse as warming ocean waters nibble away at its base, much of which is anchored below current sea levels. This would eventually add another 5m to global sea levels - again, the timescale is uncertain, but as sea level rise accelerates coastlines will be in a constant state of flux. Whole areas, and indeed whole island nations, will be submerged. In Europe, new deserts will be spreading in Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey: the Sahara will have effectively leapt the Straits of Gibraltar. In Switzerland, summer temperatures may hit 48C, more reminiscent of Baghdad than Basel. The Alps will be so denuded of snow and ice that they resemble the rocky moonscapes of today's High Atlas - glaciers will only persist on the highest peaks such as Mont Blanc. The sort of climate experienced today in Marrakech will be experienced in southern England, with summer temperatures in the home counties reaching a searing 45C. Europe's population may be forced into a "great trek" north. To find out what the planet would look like with five degrees of warming, one must largely abandon the models and venture far back into geological time, to the beginning of a period known as the Eocene. Fossils of sub-tropical species such as crocodiles and turtles have all been found in the Canadian high Arctic dating from the early Eocene, 55 million years ago, when the Earth experienced a sudden and dramatic global warming. These fossils even show that breadfruit trees were growing on the coast of Greenland, while the Arctic Ocean saw water temperatures of 20C within 200km of the North Pole itself. There was no ice at either pole; forests were probably growing in central Antarctica. The Eocene greenhouse event fascinates scientists not just because of its effects, which also saw a major mass extinction in the seas, but also because of its likely cause: methane hydrates. This unlikely substance, a sort of ice-like combination of methane and water that is only stable at low temperatures and high pressure, may have burst into the atmosphere from the seabed in an immense "ocean burp", sparking a surge in global temperatures (methane is even more powerful as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide). Today vast amounts of these same methane hydrates still sit on subsea continental shelves. As the oceans warm, they could be

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released once more in a terrifying echo of that methane belch of 55 million years ago. In the process, moreover, the seafloor could slump as the gas is released, sparking massive tsunamis that would further devastate the coasts. Again, no one knows how likely this apocalyptic scenario is to unfold in today's world. The good news is that it could take centuries for warmer water to penetrate down to the bottom of the oceans and release the stored methane. The bad news is that it could happen much sooner in shallower seas that see a stronger heating effect (and contain lots of methane hydrate) such as in the Arctic. It is also important to realise that the early Eocene greenhouse took at least 10,000 years to come about. Today we could accomplish the same feat in less than a century. If there is one episode in the Earth's history that we should try above all not to repeat, it is surely the catastrophe that befell the planet at the end of the Permian period, 251 million years ago. By the end of this calamity, up to 95% of species were extinct. The end-Permian wipeout is the nearest this planet has ever come to becoming just another lifeless rock drifting through space. The precise cause remains unclear, but what is undeniable is that the end-Permian mass extinction was associated with a super-greenhouse event. Oxygen isotopes in rocks dating from the time suggest that temperatures rose by six degrees, perhaps because of an even bigger methane belch than happened 200 million years later in the Eocene. Sedimentary layers show that most of the world's plant cover was removed in a catastrophic bout of soil erosion. Rocks also show a "fungal spike" as plants and animals rotted in situ. Still more corpses were washed into the oceans, helping to turn them stagnant and anoxic. Deserts invaded central Europe, and may even have reached close to the Arctic Circle. One scientific paper investigating "kill mechanisms" during the end-Permian suggests that methane hydrate explosions "could destroy terrestrial life almost entirely". Acting much like today's fuel-air explosives (or "vacuum bombs"), major oceanic methane eruptions could release energy equivalent to 10,000 times the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons. Whatever happened back then to wipe out 95% of life on Earth must have been pretty serious. And while it would be wrong to imagine that history will ever straightforwardly repeat itself, we should certainly try and learn the lessons of the distant past. If they tell us one thing above all, it is this: that we mess with the climatic thermostat of this planet at our extreme - and growing - peril.

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Resource wars escalate to nuclear war Frosty Wooldridge, free lance writer, lectured at Cornell University, 2009 Humanity galloping toward its greatest crisis in the 21st century
http://www.australia.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10042:humanity-galloping-toward-its-greatest-crisis-in-the-21stcentury&catid=125:frosty-wooldridge&Itemid=244 It is clear that most politicians and most citizens do not recognize that returning to more of the same is a recipe for promoting the first collapse of a global civilization. The required changes in energy technology, which would benefit not only the environment but also national security, public health, and the economy, would demand a World War II type mobilization -- and even that might not prevent a global climate disaster. Without transitioning away from use of fossil fuels, humanity will move further into an era of resource wars (remember, Africom has been added to the Pentagons structure -- and China has noticed), clearly with intent to protect US interests in petroleum reserves. The consequences of more resource wars, many likely triggered over water supplies stressed by climate disruption, are likely to include increased unrest in poor nations, a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, widening inequity within and between nations, and in the worst (and not unlikely) case, a nuclear war ending civilization.

Russia is only concerned with Block IIA capability means that Japan is the critical factor for backlash Tom Z. Collina, Research Director at the Arms Control Association, has over 20 years of Washington DC experience in arms control and global
security issues. He has held senior leadership positions such as Executive Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, Director of Global Security at the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Senior Research Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists. March 20 10, U.S. Taps Romania for Missile Defense, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/MissileDefense By 2015, about 20 land-based SM-3 Block IB interceptors, known as Aegis-Ashore, would be deployed in Romania with an improved kill vehicle, which is carried by the missile and seeks and collides with the target. By 2018 a second landbased site would be added in Poland with larger and faster (4.5 kilometers per second) SM-3 Block IIA missiles, which are in development and would also be deployed in Romania. The fourth phase, in 2020, would deploy at both sites another SM3 upgrade, Block IIB, with an improved kill vehicle, which, according to the BMD Review, would have some earlyintercept capability against a long-range missile. We are starting the four-phased approach to fielding a capability in Europe against the emerging Iranian threat, initially against the short- and medium-range threat that exists, and hence our initial emphasis will be on southeastern Europe, David Altwegg, executive director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), told Pentagon reporters Feb. 1. The initial SM-3 Block IA and IB deployments at sea and in Romania are not likely by themselves to cause Russia serious concern, according to experts, because these interceptors would not be effective against long-range missiles and, as a result, would not likely derail the ongoing START follow-on talks (see page 40). However, the 2018 and 2020 phases of the Obama administrations plans, during which Block IIA and IIB SM-3 missiles would be deployed at sea and in Romania and Poland, do appear to give Russian leaders reason to worry and could create problems for the current and future U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions talks, sources say. Lavrov told Russia Today TV in October that the revised U.S. plans would not create problems in its first phase, but we would like more details on further stages.

And, US-Japan missile defense cooperation is perceived as pointed toward Russia Andrei Ivanov, contributor to Defense and Security, October 17, 2007, Russia is Concerned About American-Japanese Missile Defense
Cooperation, Lexis | Suo Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has granted an interview to Kyodo Tsushinsha, a Japanese news agency, in the lead-up to his mid-October visit to Tokyo. He spoke of Russia's concern about Japan and the United States cooperating on missile defense system construction. Lavrov said: "Cooperation between Japan and the USA on a missile defense system is a cause of concern for us. We are opposed to building a missile defense system for the purpose of achieving military superiority. Deploying such a system would incite a regional and global arms race." In Lavrov's opinion, a rapid increase in Japan's military might and striking power, based on Japanese technology and US support, would have a negative impact on regional stability. At consultations on this topic, Japan has spoken of a missile threat from North Korea; but Lavrov maintains that this should be resolved by political and diplomatic means. Sergei Lavrov: "Many experts are pointing out that such a system is part of the American global missile defense system, and could be used against Russian and Chinese strategic weapons." Shortly before this interview was publiched, the US Armed Forces Command deployed a mobile antimissile system in northern Japan; it is intended to pick up a satellite signal indicating that a missile has been launched,

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analyze its presumed trajectory, and transmit information to the defense departments of the USA and Japan. Lavrov also criticized the regional alliance formed by the USA, Japan, and Australia, calling it "unproductive and likely to have the reverse effect." Lavrov said: "A closed military-political alliance raises suspicions among neighboring countries: why is such an alliance being formed, and against whom?"

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Further SM-3 development means Japan lifts the arms export ban Tim Johnson, Beijing bureau chief for Knight Ridder and McClatch, July 13, 200 7, U.S. helps Japan deploy missile-defense system, Lexis | Suo
The SM-3 and the PAC-3 missile systems signal a ramping up of cooperative defense spending between Japan and the United States. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan has begun licensed production of the PAC-3 missiles from Lockheed Martin, and also produces the trailer rocket-launching system. Japan also is providing key technological cooperation for the SM-3, including designs for the sensor, a kinetic warhead, the propulsion system and a lightweight nose cone with explosive bolts. One U.S. aerospace consultant, noting the heavy investment by Mitsubishi, said Japan was likely to revise policies that prohibited weapons exports. Washington wants to provide the SM-3s to allies such as Australia and Italy but can't do so without Japanese consent because technology from both nations is going into the weapon system. "It's going to give the Japanese impetus to change the `three principles' to allow the export of military hardware," said Lance Gatling, an aerospace consultant who's been based in Tokyo for more than 20 years. Japan halted most weapons exports after the announcement in 1967 of "three principles" prohibiting sales of military equipment to communist states, nations under U.N.-imposed arms embargoes and countries likely to be involved in international conflicts. That policy broadened in the 1970s into a near-blanket ban on arms exports.

Lifting the ban would make Japan an instant titan in the global defense industry, directly challenging US firms Leo Lewis, Asia Business Correspondent for The Times, May 25, 200 9, Japan's big guns prepare to rejoin global arms industry, Lexis | Suo
The huge engineering and technological might of Japan may be poised for a new lease of life as the country prepares to ditch a self-imposed ban on arms exports that was introduced in the mid-1970s. The controversial decision, which is likely to encounter bitter opposition from the country's mainly pacifist middle classes, could deliver significant economic benefits to Japan and lead to a realignment in the global defence industry. A ruling party MP said that the greatest significance would be the conversion of Japan's robotics industry from civilian to military use as the world's defence spending is directed to remote-control hardware, such as drone aircraft. Lifting or toning-down the 33-year old embargo would unleash some of the world's most advanced heavy engineering companies into the international weapons market, one of the few areas of manufacturing where Japan's immense technical resources have, for purely political reasons, not produced a dominant global player. The expected move, which government insiders said may be announced by Taro Aso, the Prime Minister, before the summer, is likely to begin by relaxing the ban to allow Japanese companies to work on joint projects with American and European defence manufacturers, whose products could then be sold internationally. To date, the single exception to the ban came as a dispensation in 2005 that allowed Japan to work with US companies on a missile defence system viewed as critical while North Korea continues to flex its military muscles. Japan sees itself as a logical target for the nuclear-armed Pyongyang regime and has spent about 5 billion on the missile defence shield jointly developed with the United States. Joint production and the scope to profit from a share of international sales could draw more Japanese companies into the defence industry and, the Government hopes, bring procurement costs down. Yet as the ban loosens further, government defence insiders say that Japan could be propelled into the top ranks of arms manufacturers. Even with their sales limited strictly to the domestic market, several of the country's biggest engineering conglomerates, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), already feature among the world's top 30 biggest military hardware suppliers. MHI already produces a fighter jet and a broad range of naval hardware. Despite being rigidly observed, Japan's 1976 ban on arms exports was never passed as a law. It can, therefore, be reversed or amended by the sitting prime minister, without requiring passage through parliament. Such a process would almost certainly have seen the move blocked by the Democratic Party of Japan, the centre-left opposition. The wording of the new statement is expected to ensure that exports do not end up in the hands of countries that support or sponsor terrorism. The decision to relax the ban is understood to have been under consideration for several years and comes as Japan's mainstay export industries - electronics and automotive - buckle under the pressure of the worldwide spending slump. Mr Aso's Government, meanwhile, is struggling to reverse an unprecedented shrinkage of the economy while the strong yen has made Japanese goods even less pricecompetitive against South Korean and Chinese products. Defence analysts have long maintained that Japanese industry, once freed from its ban, could quickly rival British, American and European players. Japan's prowess in miniaturised motors, robotics and control systems would be especially competitive.

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A strong US defense industry is vital to hegemony Mackenzie M. Eaglen is Senior Policy Analyst for National Security and Eric Sayers is a Research Assistant in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. May 22, 2009, Maintaining the Superiority of America's Defense Industrial Base, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Maintaining-the-Superiority-of-Americas-Defense-Industrial-Base | Suo America's military strength remains vital to preserving the nation's interests and sustaining international stability. While much of this strength is derived from the professionalism and skills of America's armed forces, the technologically superior military platforms that the U.S. has developed and fielded since World War II are also vital to ensuring a superior fighting force. In both peace and war, America's defense manufacturing industrial base has allowed the United States to design and build an advanced array of weapons systems and platforms to meet the full spectrum of potential missions the military may be called upon to fulfill. Securing America's military dominance for the decades ahead will require: An industrial base that can retain a highly skilled workforce with critical skill sets and Sustained investment in platforms that offer future commanders and civilian leaders a vital set of core military capabilities and equipment to respond to any threat. America's military may also benefit from a more open international defense market. A 2005 Heritage Foundation study examined the effect of globalization on the defense market and concluded that access to foreign suppliers would play a significant and positive role in helping the Pentagon to access a broader industrial base and meet immediate defense needs more efficiently.[1] These findings still hold true today. While remaining focused on the critical technologies, industries, and skills that are not readily available in the global market, Congress should also support increased foreign military sales to help complement America's domestic defense industrial base. Following the sweeping procurement changes proposed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in President Barack Obama's fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense budget, the decisions awaiting congressional review will directly affect America's defense industrial base for years to come. These funding decisions about what the military will and will not buy are a primary factor in determining whether America will retain its military primacy a decade from now. The critical workforce ingredients in sustaining an industrial base capable of building next-generation systems are specialized design, engineering, and manufacturing skills. The consolidation of the defense industry during the 1990s has placed an increased burden on a small collection of defense companies, and the consolidation of major defense contractors has led to a general reduction in the number of available workers. Already at a turning point, the potential closure of major defense manufacturing lines in the next five years with no additional scheduled production could shrink this national asset even further. While the manufacturing workforce alone should not dictate congressional defense acquisition decisions, the potential defense "brain drain" must be considered when Congress determines whether or not to permanently shut down major production lines--particularly shipbuilding and aerospace. More often than not, once these highly skilled workers exit the federal workforce, they are difficult to recruit back and more expensive to retrain with significant project gaps. Given the inherently unpredictable nature of the international security system, Congress must take a long-term perspective for defense planning. More specifically, Congress should closely examine the national security implications of the pending closure of several major production lines, including the F-22 Raptor, C-17 Globemaster III, F/A-18E/F, F-15E Strike Eagle, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, Airborne Laser, and various rotary-wing programs when crafting the annual defense bills for FY 2010. The Foundation of American Military Strength Since World War II, the United States has benefited from the skills of a robust defense industrial and manufacturing workforce. Over six decades, various U.S. defense strategies have emphasized the benefits of a technologically superior military to help deter and win wars. This "technical overmatch" has been pursued by the U.S. military for decades in an attempt to deter potential enemies from engaging the U.S. in conflict and to reduce risk and the loss of life on the battlefield. The ability to maintain America's military technological edge reflects the superior efficiency of America's defense industry. America's capital-intensive Air Force and Navy operate the world's best fighter aircraft, long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. Similarly, the Army is building a host of next-generation platforms, including tanks and attack helicopters, that will allow it to complete its missions. This is also the case in platform systems and areas such as low-observable and verylow-observable technologies, submarine quieting, acoustic detection, digital-signal processing for a range of applications, active electronically scanned arrays, near-real-time sensor-to-shooter targeting connectivity, and all-weather guided munitions.[2] technology alone has not assured American military superiority, the defense industry has nevertheless been a potent enabler of American military might. The base of this power can be found in a series of core capabilities that the U.S. has been able to maintain and continue to modernize over recent decades. These include, among others, air dominance, strategic lift, the ability to project power throughout and beyond the world's oceans, counterinsurgency proficiency, and the ability to seize and control land. Maintaining these capabilities has enabled the soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine to remain adequately prepared for a full spectrum of potential operations.

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US leadership prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict prefer it to all other alternatives Kagan 7 (Robert 7, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace End of Dreams, Return of History, Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)
Finally, there is the United States itself. As

a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as No. 1 and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back , if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos , of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europes stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But thats not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful
that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the worlds great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War

could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of Chinas neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene even if it remained the worlds most powerful nation could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests

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that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe if it adopted what some call a strategy of offshore balancing this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, offshore role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more even-handed policy toward Israel , which [CONTINUED]

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[CONTINUED]
some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate

the need to come to Israel s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesnt change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasnt changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to normal or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

Now is the key time Block 2A means Japan will lift the ban on weapons exports by the end of the year Kyodo News, 6/25/10, Tokyo to relax export ban, send missiles to third countries, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100725a2.html |
Suo The government is set to allow exports to third countries of a new type of ship-based missile interceptor being jointly developed by Tokyo and Washington, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations said Saturday. Europe is considered a likely destination for the Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missile, an advanced version of the SM-3 series, if it is allowed to be shipped to third countries in a relaxation of Japan's decades-long ban on arms exports, the sources said. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked Tokyo to consider exporting SM-3 Block 2A missiles in a meeting with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa last October. The move followed President Barack Obama's September announcement that Washington was abandoning plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. The United States subsequently decided to base its missile defense strategy around SM-3 interceptors, notably for responding to threats from Iranian missiles. SM-3 interceptors are designed to be launched from warships equipped with the sophisticated Aegis air defense system against intermediate ballistic missiles. The United States recently notified Japan of its plans to begin shipping SM-3 Block 2A missiles in 2018 and asked Tokyo to start preparing soon to strike export deals with third countries. Washington's request also concerns the export of advanced versions of the new interceptors, which can also be deployed on the ground, according to the sources. The U.S. wants Japan to respond by the end of the year a demand that a senior Defense Ministry official said is hard to refuse as Tokyo wishes to continue the joint missile development project. Japan has a policy of not exporting weapons or arms technology in principle. The policy dates back to 1967, when Eisaku Sato, the prime minister at the time, declared a ban on weapons exports to communist states, countries to which the United Nations bans such exports to and parties to international conflicts. But Japan excluded exports of arms technology to the United States, with which it has a bilateral security pact, from the ban in 1983.

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BMD forces clarification on collective self-defense Kent E. Calder, Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, March/April 2006, China and Japans Simmering Rivalry, Foreign Affairs, http://reischauer.jp/pdf/KEC%5B1%5D.ForeignAffairs.Final.pdf
Beijings military buildup has implications for Tokyo: the missiles China has aimed at Taiwan could easily reach Japans main islands as well as Okinawa, where 70 percent of U.S. defense facilities in Japan, including the indispensable Kadena Air Force Base, are located. Both U.S. and Japanese defense specialists thus view neutralizing this potential threat as a vital goal. The United States and Japan will conduct missile tests in Hawaii during the spring of 2006 to establish the efficacy of ballistic missile defenses. If a missile defense system were deployed, the U.S. Japanese alliances capabilities would be enhancedand Beijing would be alarmed by the weakening of its relative position. The issue is therefore emerging as yet another area of controversy in Sino-Japanese relations. As Sino-Japanese tensions increase, it is becoming more and more likely that Japan will revise its constitution in ways that will allow the SDF greater freedom of action, even as other nonmilitary reforms are achieved as well. (The constitution, written in 1947, limits the SDF to a narrowly defensive role.) Beyond the regional tensions themselves, important long-term structural changes in Japanese politics are at work: the combined socialist and communist representation in the Diet has fallen from 14 to 3 percent over the past decade, leaving the conservative LDP and its coalition partner with the two-thirds majority needed to begin amendment of the constitution and leaving the left with only 16 of 480 seats in the Diets dominant lower house. The recent ascendancy of defense hawks in the DPJ has also amplified the lefts collapse. The current LDP draft amendment, published in October 2005, would retain the historic Article 9, which states that the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation. But the proposal would also clearly legitimate the SDF (an institution whose role has been constitutionally ambiguous); clarify Japans prerogative to participate in collective self-defense, the linchpin of the security cooperation between Japan and the United States; and simplify procedures for amending the constitution in the future. This procedural change could further exacerbate Sino-Japanese tensions by increasing uncertainty regarding Japans future rearmament.

BMD use to protect America violates Article 9 Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, 200 2 JapanU.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf | Suo Ban on Collective Defense. Second, any use of Japanese technology for an American NMD system would violate both Japans post-World War II anti-nuclear policy, which forbids participation in U.S. nuclear strategy, and a long-standing legal interpretation that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution forbids participation in collective self-defense. Under this interpretation, formulated by the Cabinet Affairs Legal Office in 1981, it is acknowledged that Japan has such a right under international law, but cannot exercise it because the constitution provides that the exercise of the right of self-defense must be limited to the minimum level necessary to defend Japanese territory.

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Upgraded SM-3s gut the credibility of Japans constitution Cheong Wooksik, representative of the Civil Network for Peaceful Korea, 12/24/0 7, Missile Defense Acts as a Trojan Horse,
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=432927 | Suo Japan, having been participating in the US Missile Defense plans since 1998, initially planned to complete the technical research by 2004, and decide whether to carry out development and deployment based on the feasibility result for the research after 2005. However, after the nuclear standoff between North Korea and the US broke out in October 2002, the US started aggressively pushing Japan to speed up its Missile Defense plans, which include deploying the PAC-3s and the SM-3 tipped Aegis destroyers. Japan changed its course under the US pressure and for fear of the potential nuclear-armed North Korea. The US-Japan Missile Defense cooperation is noteworthy mainly because it plays a key role in making Japan's pacifist constitution powerless. In June 2005, Japan's Upper House passed a bill that would allow the defense minister to order an intercept of the enemy's missile without having to obtain prior approval from the prime minister or the cabinet. This is an indication that the civilians have begun to lose its control over the military authorities. In addition, the Missile Defense system is the main culprit in neutralizing Japan's war-renouncing constitution, which permits self-defense but not collective defense. A vast majority of legal experts have concluded that the US-Japan Missile Defense cooperation, especially sharing intelligence between the two allies, can be used for Missile Defense operations not only in Japan but also on the US mainland, and therefore is against the pacifist constitution. That is why Japan's involvement in the US-led Missile Defense system is considered the precursor of amending its constitution. Despite such legal matters, Washington and Tokyo have considered their Missile Defense intelligence cooperation a done deal since the spring of 2004, then accelerated the Missile Defense system building pace. Japan's defense ministry allowed the US to share technology for its independently developed FPS-XX radar together with data on ballistic missiles installed on Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's Aegis cruiser. In October 2007, the US built a missile tracking base on the Misawa US air base in the northern city of Aomori. On this base, which is called Joint Tactical Ground Station, the target missile's trajectory is tracked and the data is sent to US bases in Japan and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Establishing such an intelligence system and sharing data have enabled the two allies to detect rapidly when neighboring countries like North Korea and China fire their missiles, earning time to knock them out. The US and Japan also plan to set up an intelligence network between Missile Defense components, which means each part of the Missile Defense system such as the Aegis destroyers, the PAC-3 missiles and the early warning radars will share intelligence and not be operated separately, forming a multi-layered intercept system. We also need to pay particular attention to these allies' decision for joint-development of next-generation SM-3 interceptors. Unlike the US-developed SM-3, which can shoot down short-to-mid-range ballistic missiles, the upgraded SM-3 missile reportedly has a longer range, being capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Japan has relaxed its Three Principles on Arms Exports, allowing the US to import the parts of the new version of the SM-3. In this regard, the Missile Defense is acting as a "Trojan horse" to disrupt Japan's pacifist constitution. The ban on collective defense, the Three Principles on Arms Exports, and the administration's control over the military have been restraining Japan from becoming a military superpower and turning to the right. However, the US-Japan Missile Defense ties will neutralize all three means. It is widely known that the hard-liners in the two countries have justified such a move on the grounds of the "North Korea Threat" and the "China Threat."

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Article 9 solves everything The Global Article 9 Campaign, project of the United Nations Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Japan-based international NGO Peace Boat, Japan Lawyers' International Solidarity Association and others, Copyright 200 8, Article 9 as a Mechanism of Peace,
http://www.article-9.org/en/what/details2.html | Suo Indeed, Article 9 is not just a provision of the Japanese law; it also acts as an international peace mechanism towards reductions in military spending, promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, ending violence against women, supporting conflict prevention, and mitigating the negative environmental impact of the military. International civil society organizations have recognized the global impact of Article 9, including its relevance in regards to human rights, disarmament, nuclear weapons abolition, conflict prevention, development, the environment, globalization, UN reform and other global issues. At the regional level, in July 2005, the UN-convened Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) submitted an action agenda for North East Asia that declared that "Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been the foundation for collective security for the entire Asia Pacific region." Likewise, in December 2007, the Asia Inter-Religious Conference on Article 9 and Peace in Asia brought together religious leaders from all over Asia, Europe and the US, and issued a final statement calling on religious circles to support our campaign and encourage participation in the Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War in May. At the international level, a strong international network of individuals and NGOs has formed in support of the campaign. And a growing number of groups continue to join, from the anti-war movement in the US, to organizations working for peace in Africa or the Middle East, NGOs lobbying for disarmament in Europe and women's group acting worldwide. As a major part of this campaign, the large scale Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War was held in Japan from May 4-6, 2008. With the participation of Nobel Peace Laureates, intellectuals, cultural figures and NGO activists from over 40 countries, the three-day conference attracted over 33,000 participants nationwide to discuss and have a dialogue on the role that citizens of the world can play to realize the principles of Article 9, through promoting disarmament, demilitarization and a culture of peace. The world today remains threatened by the continuation of violent conflicts, the proliferation of arms, and environmental destruction. Within this situation, Article 9 paves the way for the adoption of non-violent alternatives to dealing with such international crises. This movement thus demonstrates that Article 9 is not merely a domestic Japanese issue; rather, it is one of immediate international relevance. Objectives This growing international movement of support makes clear that the world does value Article 9 as an ideal to which all people aspire, as a model to follow. In a world where the chain of violence and war continues unbroken and militarization is gathering speed, the existence of Japans Article 9 provides encouragement to those who work towards a peace that does not rely on force. Article 9 gives hope hope that another world is possible.

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Article 9 key to human rights The Global Article 9 Campaign, project of the United Nations Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Japan-based international NGO Peace Boat, Japan Lawyers' International Solidarity Association and others, Copyright 200 8, Article 9 as a Mechanism of Peace,
http://www.article-9.org/en/what/details2.html | Suo Human Rights Japan's constitution provides the right to live in peace a basic human right not only for the Japanese people, but also for the people of the whole world. The Preamble reads as follows: We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship... striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

Extinction Human Rights Web 94 (An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement Created on July 20, 1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997,
http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html)

The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors. Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.

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Article 9 key to East Asia stability Human Rights Web 94 (An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement Created on July 20, 1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997,
http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html)

Disarmament Article 9 has acted as a restraint on the militarization of Japan, which has maintained what it calls an "exclusively defence-oriented policy" and limited Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) capability to the "minimum necessary level." In addition, Article 9 prohibits dispatching SDF to foreign territories to engage or participate in military combat overseas. Japan has also interpreted Article 9 as prohibiting the country from exporting arms, thus preventing the resurgence of Japan's pre-WWII military industry complex. Furthermore, Article 9 prevents development of an arms race and nuclear proliferation in East Asia. Nuclear Weapons Abolition Article 9 was born out of the direct experience of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The devastation and immense suffering that followed these attacks led Japan to commit to the three non-nuclear principles which prohibit the country from possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. The spirit of Article 9 rejects dependence on nuclear weapons in security policies and promotes Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones worldwide - an idea long advocated by hibakusha (the victims of the atomic bombings). It also demands that nuclear weapons be outlawed. Conflict Prevention Article 9 prohibits the threat or use of force as a way of settling international disputes. As such, Japan cannot pose a threat to the security of other countries. This principle has played an important role in establishing trust relationships between Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and has contributed to keeping the peace for more than 60 years. Article 9 is of paramount importance for the prevention of conflict. In July 2005, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)'s Action Agenda declared that "Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been the foundation for collective security for the entire Asia Pacific region."

Asia destabilization causes nuclear annihilation Toshimura Ogura, Economics Professor at Toyama University, MONTHLY REVIEW, April 19 97, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._19693242/pg_8
North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

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Ending BMD cooperation causes a draw down in global military expenditures Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace

Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo It is not easy to predict Japans future path. The outlines of Japans security policythe realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan, BMD, space development, and the demands of the business sectorwere all established during the Bush-Koizumi era. The Obama and Hatoyama administrations might uphold this new status quo, or they might set off in very different directions. The Hatoyama government is, for now, buying time before making any major decisions on basic security policy. Under the previous government of Aso Taro, a report by an advisory panel to the prime minister on Japans future security was presented in June 2008. The key thrust of this panel was to change constitutional interpretation in order to allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. This report was essentially the supreme expression of the defense reform built by the Bush and Koizumi regimes. According to this plan, revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program were also planned for the end of 2009. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama decided to postpone revision of defense policy by one year. He has also announced the establishment of a new panel of experts. Currently, the United States spends 42 percent of the $1.46 trillion dollars of annual global military expenditures, and East Asia is responsible for 13 percent. Furthermore, military expenditure in East Asia is increasing at a speed, which is pronounced even on an international scale. East Asia, home to an enormous U.S. military presence, is becoming the worlds largest weapons market. Japan has considerable latent potential to contribute to the freezing and reduction of regional, and global, military expenditures. Although Japans military expenditures remain quite high by global standards, Japan could set an important example for other countries by not increasing this amount and remaining within a standard of less than 1 percent of the GDP. The key issue is whether Japan will continue to develop high-tech military technology relating to BMD or not. The Japanese government and the Japanese public must answer a set of questions connected to these systems. Do they really function? What exactly is this system trying to protect, and from what? Is Japanese industry and technology just being mobilized in order to assume the place of U.S. defense? Is there a calm, efficient, and alternative method to removing the missile threat other than developing intercepting missiles?

Japan is a global example for a demilitarized state Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace
Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Article 9's Global Impact, http://www.fpif.org/articles/article_9s_global_impact | Suo The Japanese government is on the verge of abandoning its historic commitment to pacifism. The current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, has made constitutional revision a major plank of his reform agenda. Coming to power in September 2006, Abe said that he would aim for a constitutional revision within five to six years. The central focus of attention is Article 9, in which Japan renounces the sovereign right to wage war. In May 2007, with relatively little fanfare, the Japanese Diet passed legislation to hold a national referendum to revise the constitution and amend Article 9. Constitutional revision is not in the immediate offing. The referendum bill establishes a three-year moratorium on the actual referendum. Two-thirds of Diet members would need to initiate such a referendum and a majority of the voters would need to support revision for it to happen. However, the debate in Japan on constitutional revision has rapidly accelerated. Constitutional change will not only affect the size, composition, and mission of the Japanese self defense forces. It will also undermine peaceful relations in the East Asian region. And it will destroy one of the most important models of a demilitarized state that the world has ever seen.

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Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Article 9's Global Impact, http://www.fpif.org/articles/article_9s_global_impact | Suo Those who favor revising the Japanese constitution employ roughly four types of arguments. They argue, first, that the United States forced this peace constitution upon Japan. Second, Japan cannot defend itself without having a sufficient military force of its own. Third, a strengthened alliance with the United States requires a change in Article 9. And finally, Japan must change the constitution in order to contribute to international peace operations through the UN. Among these four categories of arguments, the third is the central driving force behind the current revision agenda. Few within Japan argue for the country to create a military independent of the U.S. alliance. Ironically, a policy pushed by Washington, namely that the revision of Article 9 is necessary for fuller integration with U.S. military strategy, ultimately appeals to a group within Japan who reject the current constitution because it was originally imposed by the United States. Since the late 1990s, U.S. military forces in Japan have expanded their responsibilities to include the whole Asia-Pacific region, and postSeptember 11 even the Middle East has been brought into this ambit. Despite Article 9, Japans SDF provided support for the U.S. military in its operations against Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. Joint development of weapons, such as the missile defense system, has also been underway. Because of the global reorganization of its military bases, the United States has also been pressuring Japan for a more complete military cooperation and partnership. The push to expand U.S.Japanese security cooperation has focused the revision debate on the right of collective self-defense. Japans restrictions on its right to collective self-defense are a constraint on its alliance cooperation, declared the 2000 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (also known as the first Armitage Report). Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. Also problematic in this regard is the section of Article 9 that prohibits Japan from having and using armed force. Changing this section would enable the SDF to work with normal military missions. The new draft constitution put forward by Japans ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in November 2005 did not attempt to change the language on the renunciation of war but proposed to change the name of the Self Defense Force into a Self-Defense Army. This revision attempts to keep Japan's overall peace image while freeing the SDF from its exclusively defense-oriented policy, the non-use of force overseas, and the non-exercise of the right of collective selfdefense. Freed of all these restrictions, Japan could become fully engaged with the expanded U.S. global military posture. The Japanese corporate sector also has an interest in this fuller engagement, particularly connected to joint weapons development and weapons exports. In January 2005, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) presented a set of recommendations for constitutional revision, stating, The inability to exercise our right to collective selfdefense translates into denying supportive activity to our allies, and is acting as a hindrance. The corporate sector is particularly focused on overturning Article 9s ban on arms exports. The constitutional revisionists have adopted a dual strategy. They are pursuing a long-term strategy of revising the constitution within five to six years. But in the short term, they are pushing for concrete steps to widen military integration with the United States. These short-term steps include incorporating overseas activities as a primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces, upgrading the Defense Agency to the Defense Ministry (December 2006), and establishing a panel to study ways to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense without touching the constitution itself (April 2007). Even before revising the constitution itself, the revisionists are pushing Japan into an action-reaction dynamic with its neighbors that generates an arms race in East Asia. This is in turn threatens the security of all countries in the region, including Japan.

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Missile defense demands offensive strike capability means Japan will rearm Japan Economic Newswire, June 9, 2009, LDP proposes Japan obtain ability to hit enemy's missile launch sites, Lexis | Suo
Defense policy-making panels of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on Tuesday proposed that Japan acquire the capacity to strike an enemy's missile launch sites as part of its defensive capabilities under the country's new National Defense Program Guidelines. The controversial proposal comes against the backdrop of growing calls among some LDP lawmakers for a more potent missile defense following North Korea's rocket launch, which Japan sees as a cover to test its ballistic missile technology, and its nuclear test during the past few months. The LDP will submit this and other recommendations to Prime Minister Taro Aso soon in the hope that they will be reflected in the guidelines the Cabinet is to approve in December, according to party officials. It remains unclear, however, if the proposal will make it into the guidelines given strong reservations among some government officials and lawmakers, who say the idea could be taken by other countries as suggesting Japan is headed toward ditching its long-held defense-only posture under its peaceful Constitution. The 21-page paper, jointly approved by the three defense-related panels of the party's Policy Research Council, notes that while Japan maintains a ballistic missile shield within the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, it currently relies on the United States for attack capability. Given the need to improve the potency of its missile defense and cope with "progress in the technology to miniaturize nuclear warheads," the paper says, "Japan should acquire on its own an ability to attack an enemy's missile launch sites."

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BMD cooperation destabilizes cross-Strait relations and triggers east Asian arms race Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, 200 2 JapanU.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf | Suo Others in Japan have registered concerns that the BMD program may destabilize the Mainlands relations with Taiwan, as well as Japan, and trigger a regional arms race. China has been adamantly opposed to the inclusion of Taiwan in the area covered by U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and the BMD. Should the Bush Administration make progress in restraining North Koreas ballistic missile program, the Chinese missile threat will stand out as the most obvious motive for Japanese cooperation on the development of a BMD system a fact that could induce new strains in Sino-Japanese relations. Thus far, however, although North Korea has agreed to suspend tests of its long-range Taepo Dong missiles, Pyongyang has failed to respond to Bush Administration statements of intent to hold unconditional discussions on missile and other issues. Also, since the September 11 attacks, China has tended to downplay its opposition to the U.S. missile defense program in the interests of putting U.S.-China relations on a more cooperative footing. The relaxation of tensions in U.S.-China relations has had the effect of also taking some of the edge off Sino-Japanese relations. Other Foreign Policy Considerations Strains in Japans relations with China are just part of a wider problem of reassuring Asian neighbors about Japans intentions. Regional reaction was muted towards Japans decision to send ships to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to U.S. forces participating in the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, but Japan has not succeeded in putting to rest regional concern that it aspires to play a larger military role. Much of this concern stems from Japans failure to overcome lingering resentment of its colonial role and aggression in World War II.

Feedback effect means US-Japan missile defense sparks East Asian arms race Axel Berkofsky, PhD, is a research fellow and policy analyst for the European Institute for Asian Studies, Sep 12, 200 3, Japanese missile
defense: A matter of timing, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI12Dh01.html | Suo A strong opponent of joint US-Japanese missile-defense projects, China is believed to have increased the number of missiles by 75 per year in an attempt to discourage the United States and Japan from working on a missile-defense system eventually unable to deal with the growing number of Chinese missiles. The opposite is the case, of course. The more the number of Chinese missiles grows, the more the US and Japan want to develop and deploy the system. This looks like the beginning of a new arms race in East Asia to Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, who met with his Japanese counterpart Shigeru Ishiba in Beijing last week. Missile defense, he complained, will lead to a new escalation in Japan's defense spending. And Cao certainly knows about rising military spending, given that China's defense budget has seen twodigit growth per year over at least the past decade. Whereas the Japanese military insists that the budget for regular defense spending will not be affected by missile defense, others suspect that the government will be forced to come up with a supplementary budget before too long given the expense of this technology and hardware. Japanese governments have proved to be quite good at feeding the economy or the armed forces with supplementary or "emergency" budgets over the past decade, and a neighbor such as North Korea will remain reason enough to spend some extra cash on defense.

US-Japan BMD cooperation causes East Asian instability and conflict Masako Toki and Sarah Diehl, Fellows at the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July Aug 7, Japan Takes Steps to Integrate
with U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I17/I17_EA3_JapanTakesSteps.htm | Suo Japans move toward collective self-defense and a BMD system more integrated with the United States has been criticized on the grounds that it could aggravate relations with China. Taku Yamazaki, former Liberal Democratic Party secretary general, criticized the advisory panel studying Japans right to collective defense because it could intensify Japan-China disputes, especially over the Taiwan Strait issue. China has been increasingly disturbed by the accelerated progress of U.S.Japan missile defense systems, which would also provide protection against Chinese missiles, as well as by Japans reviewing the scope of its right to collective self-defense. [37] In June 2007, at the Annual Asian Security Forum organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore, Mr. Zhang Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army, in response to a statement by Japans Defense Minister, highlighted Chinas concern over the intentions of the United States and Japan. He asserted that the deployment of a missile defense system would destabilize Asia and create uncertainty in terms of regional stability and peace. Moreover, he insisted that any bilateral military cooperation should not target a third party or infringe the interest of a third party. [38] Furthermore, on June 5, 2007, Chinas Foreign Ministry emphasized its grave concerns about U.S. and Japanese plans. A Foreign Ministry

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spokeswoman commented that the intensifying U.S.-Japan cooperation in missile defense systems will impact stability and the strategic balance and may also cause new proliferation problems.

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Japan-US development of missile defense sparks regional arms races and causes conflict Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace

Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo Toward Innovative Disarmament Cooperation Japanese and U.S. development of missile defense and related technology is clearly stimulating a backlash from China. This, in turn, helps China justify the modernization of its nuclear missile forces, leading to the promotion of a regional arms race and a worsening of the regional security environment. It is possible, through coordinated regional diplomacy and strengthened transparency and verification measures, to remove the nuclear and missile threats in a cooperative manner. Such an approach would increase confidence within the region, improve the security environment, ensure that regional resources are not being wastefully invested in military purposes, and bring us closer to building a sustainable peace in East Asia. To the extent that the realignment of U.S. forces reinforces U.S. regional and global power projection capabilitiesrather than functioning as a cost-saving mechanism or as a means to enhance collective securitythe backlash in Northeast Asia will be strengthened. If North Korea were to view the realignment of U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea as a threat, it will be less likely to follow through on denuclearization. If the relocation of U.S. bases leads to the construction of new bases within Japan or elsewhere, and increases expenses to that end, a key opportunity will have been lost. In order to serve the purpose of regional peace, the realignment of U.S. bases must be used to close redundant bases and promote their withdrawal. The new Hatoyama government is re-examining and trying to readjust the alliance with the United States in the name of equal partnership while also calling for the creation of an East Asia Community. Japan must not be misunderstood as reviving its early 20th-century ambitions for military hegemony in the region. The military spending issue can be a breakthrough for Japan, a way to show its commitment to peace while contributing to the construction of a new regional order. Japan should initiate negotiations with China and Korea toward a mutually coordinated freeze and reduction in military expenditure. Rather than abandoning its ties with the U.S. military industry, Japan should use the arms-export ban principle to negotiate and establish a regional framework to curb the arms trade and weapons proliferation. In 1967, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku introduced Japans Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. The Diet established these principles as national policy through a resolution in 1971. However, despite the non-introduction provision, considerable evidence indicates the existence of secret deals between the U.S. and Japanese government to allow the transit and port-calls of nuclear-weapons-equipped vessels, even since 1960. The Hatoyama government has established a commission to look into these secret deals. It is important to legalize these three principles to prevent a reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Legalizing the Non-Nuclear Principles will also create momentum for a nuclear weapon free zone in Northeast Asia that would, in turn, strengthen the nonproliferation regime in the region. Despite the advocacy of Keidanren, a concentrated investment in high-tech, military-civilian integrated technology would not lead to overall benefits for the Japanese economy. Such investments would have little economic effect for the vast majority of the Japanese labor force working in small or mid-size business. If Japan were to throw away its reputation as a peaceful nation, which it has maintained throughout the post-war era, the Japanese economy, so dependent on trade with Asia and the Middle East, would necessarily suffer. Instead of viewing the Self-Defense Forces as a way to boost employment, the Japanese government should establish an independent organization with straightforward humanitarian purposes such as disaster relief. Through exchange and humanitarian activities with and in neighboring countries, such an organization could reduce military expenditures and build regional confidence. The development of innovative cooperation for disarmament is now needed. At this critical juncture in history, only a cooperative-security approach can lead the way to the creation of a new order of peace.

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Regional Security Impact China

US-Japan BMD provokes China, destabilizes the region, and triggers a spiraling arms race Brad Roberts, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses with expertise on the proliferation and control of weapons of
mass destruction. Adjunct professor at George Washington University Member of DoDs Threat Reduction Advisory Committee and chairs its panel on implementation of the National Strategy to Combat WMD Advisor to the STRATCOM Senior Advisory Group Member of the board of directors of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, September 200 3, China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf China also intensified its attacks on possible Japanese participation in BMD. Through joint development of theater missile defense with the United States, Japan would acquire significant offensive as well as defensive capabilities, argued some Chinese.101 Of particular concern to several Chinese military analysts was the potential for Japan to apply missile defense technology to the development of offensive ballistic missiles.102 Others warned that the development and deployment of TMD would lead to a resurgence of Japanese militarism.103 Ambassador Sha, for example, asserted that US-Japan cooperation on TMD could become a stepping stone for Japans return to the track of militarismRecently, some politicians in Japan again and again called for changes of Japans military strategy from exclusive defense to preemptive strategy in order to contain aggression. This reminds people of Japans preemptive activities in 1931, 1937 and 1941, which cannot but alert many countries in Asia, including China.104 There were further arguments. Missile defense also offered Japanese leaders a long-sought opportunity to break out of the constraints imposed by the constitution and pursue world power status, one that they would be quick to exploit.105 Japanese participation in TMD would aggravate tensions on the Korean peninsula and increase the likelihood of Japanese intervention in time of crisis.106 By strengthening Japanese military capabilities and fueling Japanese ambitions, BMD could thus have severe consequences for regional security. As one writer warned in Jiefangjun Bao, in US-Japanese cooperation in developing TMD, the United States is under suspicion of rearing a tiger to court calamity.107 Ambassador Sha argued predicted that U.S.-Japanese cooperation on BMD would upgrade the alliance in two ways: 1. The one-way provision of protection by the US to Japan will turn into two-way mutual assistance between the two countries. 2. The bilateral military arrangement will become [a] regional arrangement.108 An enhanced U.S.-Japan alliance would provoke concern not only in China but also in Russia and other countries in the region, it was argued.109 Presidents Jiang and Putin articulated such concern in their July 2000 joint statement on missile defense: Nonstrategic missile defense that is not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, and international cooperation in this field, should not harm the security interests of other countries, should not lead to the establishment or strengthening of closed-type military or political blocs, and should not undermine global or regional stability and security. Based on this position, China and Russia are seriously worried about, and firmly oppose, a certain countrys plan to develop in the Asia-Pacific region a nonstrategic missile defense system that might have the aforesaid negative impacts.110 According to Chinese analysts, cooperation between the United States and Japan and the enhanced alliance it seemed to promise would endanger regional security in several ways. The two countries, it was argued, would seek to establish military superiority in East Asia and launch preemptive wars against various countries in the region.111 The United States would attempt to dominate Asia as it did Europe through NATO.112 Finally, BMD and an upgraded alliance would fuel tension and precipitate a new arms race among countries in the region.113

China war leads to extinction Strait Times 2k (The Straits Times (Singapore), No one gains in war over Taiwan, June 25, 2000, L/N)
The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China . If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it
considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan , each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong

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pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation . There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

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Recent acceleration of BMD cooperation triggers Chinas fears of Japanese aggression causes arms race Masako Toki, project manager in the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 16 January 2009, Missile defense in Japan, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan | Suo
Regionally, China has been disturbed by the accelerated progress of the U.S.-Japanese missile defense cooperative. Specifically, China is worried that U.S.-Japanese missile defense could thwart Beijing's limited nuclear deterrent, encourage Japanese militarization, protect Taiwan, and trigger a regional arms race. Chinese opposition to the U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation isn't as vehement as that of Russia to the U.S. missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe, but if China perceives that the missile shield will shift the balance of power in the region, its opposition will intensify. Future prospects for missile defense in Japan The current security environment in East Asia and the Bush administration's interest in missile defense have helped bring the U.S.-Japanese missile defensive cooperative to where it stands today. That said, President-elect Barack Obama has a different view on missile defense; moreover, he has repeatedly stated that strengthening the nonproliferation regime should be a priority. Thus, it's likely that changes in U.S. security priority will alter Japanese missile defense plans somewhat. Nonetheless, Japan's already scheduled system deployment date of 2011 probably will be met. More generally, a robust Japanese missile defense capability isn't conducive to sustainable peace in East Asia. That's why it's particularly important that Japan and the United States avoid building a structure that looks confrontational to China, which would obviously decrease stability in the region. Therefore, President-elect Obama should shift U.S.-Japanese security cooperation to matters of arms control and nonproliferation while inviting other countries in the region such as China to join in this endeavor.

Japan BMD freaks out China undermines the deterrent, triggers fears of Japanese The Nuclear Threat Initiative, China's Opposition to US Missile Defense Programs, 2007, http://www.nti.org/db/china/mdpos.htm | Suo
China believes that the United States is using North Korea's missile launch as a pretext for developing missile defenses, especially since Japan was reluctant to cooperate with the United States on missile defense for many years. China states that the North Korean threat should not be exaggerated and that TMD for Japan is unnecessary since the United States and Japan did not develop TMD during the cold war when the danger of attack was much greater.19 Officially, China has stated four reasons for opposing US-Japan TMD cooperation. First, TMD and NMD are closely related, so joint development of TMD will assist the US in development of NMD. Second, cooperation on TMD would change the nature of the US-Japan military alliance. At present, US protection of Japan restrains Japanese military ambitions. However, TMD cooperation will place the US-Japan military alliance on a more equal basis. China points to the 1997 revisions of the US-Japan defense guidelines which allow Japan to assist the US military in conflicts around Japan as evidence of this trend. Third, Japan is already a major military power. TMD will not only improve Japan's defense industry, but might also encourage Japan to shift from a defensive to an offensive military strategy. Chinese analysts claim that Japan will first develop missile defenses (a "shield") and then may develop offensive missile forces (a "spear"). A Japan equipped with strong offensive and defensive capabilities might become more aggressive. Japan has a history of conducting sneak attacks and TMD may make this easier. Fourth, China believes that "US-Japan cooperation on TMD will aggravate tension on the Korean peninsula" and that "the nuclear and missile-related problems with Korea can only be settled by political means through dialogue. Military exercises, missile tests, and deployment of TMD will not help solve the problem and will further intensify the conflict."20 China's position on TMD is largely influenced by its profound mistrust of Japan, which dates back to the Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and atrocities committed during World War II. Ambassador Sha has stated, "We are still suffering from our nightmare with Japan since the war. These are a people who even deny the fact that there was something called the Nanking Massacre; some of them feel it didn't happen at all. So how can we have any confidence in a country like that?"21

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Japanese Aegis is uniquely destabilizing can be deployed to protect Taiwan Cheong Wooksik, representative of the Civil Network for Peaceful Korea, 12/24/0 7, Missile Defense Acts as a Trojan Horse,
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=432927 | Suo China, which has been viewing the Missile Defense alliance between the two nations as the biggest threat in the 21st century, also will not sit idle if they push ahead with their Missile Defense plan. Up until now, China has been hesitant to make any diplomatic response, out of concern that a public opposition to the Missile Defense may cause a diplomatic row and spread the "China Threat" concept around the world. At the same time, however, Beijing has been continuously strengthening its military power to neutralize the Missile Defense system; in January 2007, it performed a successful antisatellite weapons test. China is especially concerned about the sea-based Missile Defense program. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is a mobile and transportable system, and therefore is deployable in the Taiwan Strait. In February 2005, the US and Japan agreed to include the Taiwan Strait issues in their "common strategic objectives," which allowed them to deploy armed forces in the area if necessary.

China believes that BMD threatens their nuclear deterrent Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. He has served as a visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, PhD in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 20 10, Chinese Missile
Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Chinese-MissileStrategy_Yoshihara_Toshi_NWCR_2010-Summer.pdf | Suo Intriguingly, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based in Yokosuka could erode Chinas nuclear deterrent. Indeed, analysts see concentrations of sea-based BMD capabilities falling roughly along the three island chains described above. Ren Dexin describes Yokosuka as the first line of defense against ballistic missiles, while Pearl Harbor and San Diego provide additional layers.21 Yokosuka is evocatively portrayed as the forward battlefild position (), the indispensable vanguard for the sea-based BMD architecture.22 For some Chinese, these concentric rings or picket lines of sea power appear tailored specifically to bring down ballistic missiles fired across the Pacific from locations as diverse as the Korean Peninsula, mainland China, India, or even Iran.23 Specifically, Aegis ships in Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego would be positioned to shoot down missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, respectively.24 Chinese observers pay special attention to Aegis deployments along the first island chain. Some believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South China seas would be able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic missile deployed in Chinas interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost phase. Dai Yanli warns, Clearly, if Aegis systems are successfully deployed around Chinas periphery, then there is the possibility that Chinas ballistic missiles would be destroyed over their launch points.25 Ji Yanli, of the Beijing Aerospace Long March Scientific and Technical Information Institute, concurs: If such [seabased BMD] systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the effectiveness of Chinas strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security.26 Somewhat problematically, the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strategic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable Aegis fleet than is technically possible in the near term.

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US-Japan missile defense means Chinese and Indian nuclear buildup and space militarization C. Raja Mohan, professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, April 16, 200 7, Catching up and staying ahead in nuclear race,
Lexis | Suo As the US, Japan and India make progress on missile defence, China is likely to make its own calculation. There has been speculation that Beijing might significantly expand its nuclear arsenal in response to the US missile defence deployments in Asia. That in turn could encourage India to expand its own nuclear arsenal and Japan to intensify its missile defence programme. Until now, Asia had the luxury of treating nuclear issues as background noise that could be ignored amid the region's rapid economic growth and sustained improvement of relations among the major powers. That happy situation might not last. Asia would hope that Washington, Beijing, New Delhi and Tokyo will find ways to engage each other bilaterally and multilaterally to prevent a new nuclear arms race and a potentially dangerous competition for military dominance in outer space.

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South Korea wont cooperate on a regional BMD system Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Meanwhile, South Korea has taken a very different approach from Japan to missile defense. Focusing first on the longstanding threat from the North, South Korean policy makers continue to believe that dealing with the North is as much a matter of negotiated reconciliation as military countermeasures. Korean political and military leaders are also suspicious of all major regional powers especially Japan, where the history issue remains very much alive. 21 Thus South Korea has pointedly refused to join the US and Japan in work on a regional missile defense system. However, recent North Korean missile and nuclear activities have convinced Seoul of the need to take some independent action on missile defense. This has led to the establishment last year of an Air and Missile Defense Command in the ROK military structure. Not surprisingly this group is focused on the threat of short range missiles and artillery rockets from the North. Planned acquisition of sensors and weapons will also provide potential for more expansive missile defense activities, but current Korean defense planning has not yet addressed this issue.

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Regional Security Irrationality

BMD shortcircuits rationality North Korea freakout The Japan Times, May 5, 2007, Alliance transformation, Lexis | Suo
The statement advocates ballistic missile defense as an apparent way to cope with North Korean threats. It calls for efforts to "ensure tactical, operational and strategic coordination" and commits the two sides to "the routine sharing of BMD and related operational information directly with each other on a real-time, continuous basis." As part of BMD efforts, Japan will deploy 16 Patriot interceptor missile units with PAC-3 capabilities by early 2010, and modify one Aegis ship this year and expedite modifications on three others to give them Standard Missile (SM-3) capabilities. But both the U.S. and Japan must consider the possibility that North Korea, which dreads the U.S.' overwhelming military power, may feel threatened by the BMD system and act irrationally. Moreover, in the long run, the strengthening of BMD in and around Japan could give a wrong signal to China and Russia that the U.S. and Japan regard them as untrustworthy nuclear powers. Their reactions could destabilize regional security.

Missile defense merely extends the security dilemma undermines MAD A Vinod Kumar, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. 20 10, The Dragons Shield: Intricacies of Chinas
BMD Capability, http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_ChinasBMDCapability.pdf | Suo Missile defences were initially seen as an ideal way out of the Mutually Assured Destruction trap. While threats of assured destruction and massive retaliation have primarily guided deterrence equations between nuclear powers, the propriety of leaving space for mutual vulnerability is now finding few takers. A nuclear weapon state, backed by a BMD shield, is perceived to have a natural advantage through its ability to offset first-strike from the enemy through its defences, while also ensuring survivability of its assured destruction/massive retaliation capability through a second strike. As a result, instead of creating stability, the shift from offensive to defensive postures through BMDs has produced a contrarian effect, one which postulates competition for interception capabilities that could consequently trigger arms races rather than containment of proliferation. The need for multiple strategies to manage potential arms race and formulate a new BMDdriven deterrence equation is hence imperative a la the ABM Treaty. There could be scope for stability among nuclear weapon states with an offensive-defensive balancing equation through a balanced co-existence of BMD capabilities alongside nuclear forces. This could potentially lead to a zero-sum equation as BMDs would plug mutual vulnerabilities while limiting scope for massive retaliation or even first-use. If executed in a bilateral framework, this could mean a (mutual) defensive deterrence arrangement. Even in the scenario of a nuclear forces reduction, BMDs could act as a stabilizer when such movements are executed. In the long run, balancing of missile defence capabilities might devalue the gains of nuclear deterrence and encourage their timely reduction, potentially leading to total elimination. However, such optimistic scenarios presently seem to have limited possibilities considering that security dilemmas are dynamic, uncontrollable processes being created and influenced by offensive (or even defensive) postures of each other.

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Regional Security China Modernization Internal Link

Missile defense forces China to modernize its nuclear capability Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. He has served as a visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, PhD in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 20 10, Chinese Missile
Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Chinese-MissileStrategy_Yoshihara_Toshi_NWCR_2010-Summer.pdf | Suo A decade ago, Western analysts would have been on firm ground in dismissing such Chinese discussions about crippling U.S. regional bases as entirely wishful or even illusory. Indeed, they would have been justified in questioning Beijings operational capacity to target U.S. bases in Japan even if it had possessed the will to do so. China simply could not have pulled off long-range, nonnuclear strikes beyond Taiwan. However, recent technical developments in the PLAs ballistic missile forces suggest that China is already in a position to fulfill at least the more limited missions elaborated above. If the pace of Chinese missile acquisitions continues, over the next decade Beijing will likely boast a formidable arsenal to shape events along the entire first island chain. The Pentagons latest annual report to Congress on Chinese military power confirms the doctrinal writings surveyed in this study. According to the Department of Defense, PRC military analysts have also concluded that logistics and mobilization are potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordinating transportation, communications, and logistics networks. To threaten regional bases, logistics, and support infrastructure, China could employ SRBM/MRBMs [short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles], groundlaunched LACMs [land-attack cruise missiles], special operations forces, and computer network attack (CNA). 47 The report identifies the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile as an operational weapon system that could reach any location along the Japanese archipelago. Concurring, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center states that China is . . . acquiring new conventionally-armed MRBMs to conduct precision strikes at longer ranges. These systems are likely intended to hold at risk, or strike, logistics nodes and regional military bases including airfields and ports.48 The exact size of the DF-21 force is not known in the public realm. The Pentagon estimates that there are sixty to eighty DF-21 missiles and from seventy to ninety associated launchers in the PLAs inventory. 49 (The document does not distinguish between missiles armed with nuclear and conventional warheads.) The 2007 issue reports forty to fifty missiles and between thirtyfour and thirty-eight launchers; the most recent report, therefore, represents a roughly 30 percent increase in two years. 50 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat counts conventional DF-21 launchers as numbering fewer than thirty. 51 The International Institute for Strategic Studies claims that thirty-six nonnuclear DF-21s are deployed, in two brigades. 52 Interestingly, this figure is a new entry in the 2010 issue of The Military Balance; the previous tally lists only the nuclear variant, suggesting a much more rapid expansion of the conventional version than previously thought. Since the missiles debut in the 1980s, the PLA has improved its accuracy, extended its range, and diversified the types of warheads it can carry. 53 This emerging arsenal will likely play an important role in holding at risk or attacking U.S. regional bases. 54 Several intervening factors are likely to influence the future size of the DF-21 inventory. First, China needs to build an arsenal large enough to overwhelm the ballistic-missile defenses fielded by the U.S.-Japanese alliance. As noted above, some Chinese analysts forecast a capable sea-based BMD system that could intercept theater ballistic missiles. Chinese strategists would almost certainly have to take into account some level of attrition arising from successful missile interceptions. Second, some of the more destructive coercive options could trigger U.S. horizontal escalation, including conventional counterforce strikes against Chinese missile brigades on the mainland. Thus, strategists in Beijing must anticipate potentially severe losses should the United States expand its target set. These numerical factors suggest that the Second Artillery Corps will almost certainly need a much larger DF-21 missile force to engage in the types of highintensity operations outlined in the doctrinal writings. Observers may object that capabilities do not reflect intent. In other words, missile range, accuracy, payload, and force size by themselves constitute insufficient evidence of exactly what Beijing plans to hit. Some may even find it implausible that China would attack a staunchly anti-nuclear-weapons state bound by a pacifist constitution, even if some of its real estate is occupied by a foreign military power. Nevertheless, the historical pattern of Chinese missile deployments since the Cold War suggests that U.S. bases in Japan have always been primary targets for nuclear strikes. In the 1960s the PLA extended the range of its first operational nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, the DF-2, to ensure that it could reach all American bases in Japan. Beijing deployed the follow-on missile, the DF3, near the North Korean border to cover targets on the Japanese home islands and Okinawa. If China had always intended to violate its negative security assurancesthat is, pledges not to attack nonnuclear third partieswith citybusting warheads, it should not be surprising that Beijing would field conventional missiles for use against Japanese territory. Indeed, the DF-21 may represent a far less blunt instrument than its predecessors did and offer a somewhat surgical option to Chinese defense planners. 55 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE MISSILE DOCTRINE There are compelling reasons for the Chinese to consider vertical and horizontal escalation in coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia. At the same time, the PLAs missile force appears poised to extend its reach far beyond Chinas immediate

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periphery. The alignment of Chinese aspirations and capabilities will complicate crisis management and stability, escalation control, and war termination in the event of conflict. The gaps in Chinese doctrinal writings offer reasons to worry about these complications.

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Regional Security China Miscalc Frame

Chinese nuclear planning ensures miscalculation and escalation Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. He has served as a visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, PhD in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 20 10, Chinese Missile
Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Chinese-MissileStrategy_Yoshihara_Toshi_NWCR_2010-Summer.pdf | Suo Zhao acknowledges that accidents or miscalculations that cross the bounds of intimidation could transform the nature of the conflict, to Chinas detriment. Suffering direct harm could harden an enemys resolve substantially, immunizing him against subsequent attempts at intimidation. Concurring, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns cautions, Commanders should cautiously make decisions, choose the appropriate opportunities, select high-precision missiles for precision strikes against key targets, and prevent missile firepower from deviating from the targets and giving others the excuse to permit the third countrys participation in the military intervention.61 An errant ballistic missile destined for the Yokosuka naval base could very well plummet into densely populated civilian areas surrounding the base or a major city along its flight path. It is conceivable that an aggrieved Japan would punish China by refusing to limit (or even agreeing to expand) U.S. access to military bases on the home islands. Indeed, continued Japanese acquiescence to American use of military facilities might be enough to foil Chinas strategy. But Beijing faces even more daunting challenges than the writings let on. Chinese defense planners seem to assume that the Japanese leadership and the public would make a clear, objective distinction between targeted attacks against strictly military installations and wanton strikes against civilian population centers. Missile launches against Yokosuka would be an act of foreign aggression against the homeland unprecedented since the Second World War. It is hard to imagine the Japanese quibbling about the nature and intent of Chinese missile strikes under such circumstances; the strident Japanese response to North Koreas Taepodong missile launch over the home islands in 1998 is a case in point. In other words, the escalatory pressures are far stronger than the Chinese writings assume. Intimidation warfare will be neither clean nor straightforward. Indeed, it could unleash the forces of passion intrinsic to any war far beyond Chinas control. More broadly, PLA planners seem excessively confident that certain missile tactics would accurately telegraph Beijings intentions. They assume that the precise application of firepower could send clear, discrete signals to the adversary in times of crisis or war. A small dose of well-placed missiles, they seem to believe, might persuade the enemy to back down or to cease and desist. This line of reasoning in part explains the counterintuitive logic that China could engage in escalation in order to compel its opponent to de-escalate. The logic is as beguiling as it is potentially misleading. Missiles are not finely tuned weapons for those on the receiving end. The adversary may perceive what is intended as a warning shot or demonstration of resolve as a prelude to an all-out attack and then overreact rather than pausing or acting with caution. The result for the Chinese could be unanticipated vertical or horizontal escalation, or both. Equally worrisome, operational interactions between Chinese and American forces could prove highly escalatory and destabilizing. As Evan Medeiros and coauthors astutely observe, the operational doctrines on both sides share a proclivity for seizing the initiative at the outset of a conflict through surprise, speed, and attacks against enemy rear echelons. Medeiros further argues: Neither body of doctrine appears to consider how an adversary might react to such operations in a limited warindeed, each seems to assume that it will suppress enemy escalation by dominating the conflict. Consequently a Sino-American confrontation would entail risks of inadvertent escalation if military forces were permitted to operate in keeping with their doctrinal tenets without regard for escalation thresholds.62 It is clear, then, that an attack against regional bases is neither a trump card nor a substantially risk-free option. If plans go awry, as they always do in war, China could find itself in a protracted conflict against more than one implacable, well resourced enemy as intent as the Chinese upon achieving escalation dominance. Whether Beijing would find the stakes over Taiwan or over another dispute sufficiently high to run such a risk is unclear.

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Regional Security AT: BMD Deters Japan

China cant be deterred their DF-21s clown Japanese missile defense Toshi Yoshihara, associate professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. He has served as a visiting professor at the U.S. Air War College, PhD in international relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 20 10, Chinese Missile
Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan, http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Chinese-MissileStrategy_Yoshihara_Toshi_NWCR_2010-Summer.pdf Washington and Tokyo will encounter a more complex geometry of deterrence with the emergence of a robust Chinese theater-strike capability. The actionreaction dynamic in the United StatesJapanChina triangle will be far less straightforward than that of the alliances deterrent posture toward North Korea. The existential threat that U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority poses to Pyongyang is often presumed to be suffi cient to deter the Norths adventurism. Such is not the case with China. Boasting an increasingly survivable retaliatory nuclear strike complex, including a growing road-mobile strategic missile force and a nascent undersea deterrent, Beijing may be confi dent enough to conduct theater-level conventional missile operations under its protective nuclear umbrella. The war scares in the South Asian subcontinent over the past decade suggest that nuclear-armed regional powers, less inhibited by fears of enemy nuclear coercion or punishment, may feel emboldened to escalate a conventional confl ict. Japan and its many lucrative basing targets could well become a conventional, theater-level battlefi eld trapped between two nuclear-armed powers. Assuming that vertical escalation toward nuclear use can be contained, the alliance must still consider efforts at denying attempts to punish Japan. Allied missile defenses, as they are currently confi gured, will have great diffi culty coping with theater ballistic missiles like the DF-21. In the context of a cross-strait scenario, retired rear admiral Eric McVadon observes, Being an MRBM with a much higher reentry velocity than SRBMs, the DF-21C is virtually invulnerable to any missile defenses Taiwan might contemplate .66 While the alliance possesses a far more sophisticated, multilayered missile defense architecture than does Taipei, longer-range missiles pose similar stresses to the defense of Japan. If the missiles were fi red from launch sites in northeastern China, allied response times would be very compressed. Inexpensive techniques and countermeasures by the PLA, such as saturation tactics and decoys, could be employed to overwhelm or defeat missile defenses, which are designed for less sophisticated regional threats from North Korea and Iran. If the Second Artillery Corps launched successive missile salvos against the same strategic site, the alliance could quickly exhaust its ammunition, constraining its ability to defend other targets.

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Chinese ASAT development puts the U.S. on hair-trigger alert leads to miscalc and accidental shootouts. Theresa Hitchens, vice president and director of the Space Security Project at the Center for Defense Information, Worst-Case Mentality Clouds USAF Space Strategy, February 14, 2005, Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm? DocumentID=2885&from_page=../index.cfm

The case being argued by space weapon enthusiasts goes like this: U.S. space assets are vulnerable, potential adversaries have woken up to this fact, therefore, actual threats (enemy systems to attack our satellites based on newly available technologies) will inevitably emerge thus, U.S. space weapons are required to counter those threats. And true to salesmen everywhere, the pitch is often served with a generous helping of hyperbole. However, there comes a time such as when a candidate is actually elected when it is dangerous to fail to see through ones own PR. Proponents of space weapons are in danger of being blinded by their own hype. A recent case in point: Maj. Gen. (select) Daniel Darnell, head of the Air Force Space Commands Space Warfare Center, was quoted in the January 2005 issue of Air Force Magazine as exhorting all satellite operators to not only beware potential attacks, but to assume as a firstcase rather than worst-case scenario that any disruption of a space system is most likely an attack. The first response when something goes wrong, said Darnell, should be "think possible attack." Even if one gives the general the benefit of the doubt as simply playing the campaign game, such a pronouncement is not only based on false premises, but also highly dangerous. Especially if operators really believe it. Careful probing of even the most ardent space weapon proponents reveals that no one seriously believes major threats to on-orbit systems exist today. While Air Force space officials are inordinately (and somewhat disingenuously) fond of pointing to attempts by Iraqi forces to jam the Global Positioning System during the 2003 Gulf War as part of their space-warfare-is-inevitable argument, it is important to recognize that those incidents involved ground-based jammers aimed at ground-based receivers, not any direct attack against on-orbit assets themselves. Indeed, there is no country, not even the United States, that currently has a working anti-satellite system in its arsenal. Direct threats to space assets are possible in the mid- to long term, but do not exist today (outside of the remote chance of someone launching a nuke into space, a threat that has existed since the dawn of the ballistic missile). More worrisome is the fact, subsequently admitted in the Air Force Magazine article , that the Air Force does not have the capability at this time to ascertain on the spot whether any disruption of satellite operations is due to a malfunction, such as faulty software or space weather, or the result of some sort of deliberate interference or attack. Some problems can be pinpointed over time, but not always with complete certainty. Taking Darnells logic at face value, however, these facts dont matter. Any problems encountered by a satellite should be treated as a likely attack an attack that under current Air Force doctrine would be considered an act of war subject to military response. In other words, we will shoot back. But at whom or what? The satellite that happens to be nearest the disabled one? The "rogue state" du jour? The wholesale adoption by the Air Force of such trigger-happy thinking would obviously be a recipe for disaster, raising the likelihood of the United States launching an accidental war. Furthermore, one can be doubly sure that if the United States has expensive space weapons on orbit, trigger fingers will be even itchier due to concerns about losing those assets before they can be used. The upshot will be a "shoot first and let God sort em out" strategy that will no doubt backfire on U.S. security sooner or later. Suffice it to say, there will be a price to pay the first time a U.S. anti-satellite weapon shoots down an innocent Chinese communications satellite because a crucial widget on a U.S. satellite conked out due to faulty manufacturing processes .

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Space war with China risks escalation and war. William C. Martel, Prof. Nat'l Security Affairs at the Naval War College, and Toshi Yoshihara, doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy - Tufts U, research fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, "Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race," Autumn, 2003, The Washington Quarterly, 26:4, pp. 19-35

Strategists in the United States and in China are clearly monitoring the others developments in space. How the United States judges Chinese intentions and capabilities will determine Washingtons response ; of course, the reverse is equally true. As each side eyes the other, the potential for mutual misperceptions can have serious and destabilizing consequences in the long term. In particular, both countries exaggerated views of each other could lead unnecessarily to competitive action-reaction cycles. What exactly does such an action-reaction cycle mean? What would a bilateral space race look like? Hypothetically, in the next 10 years, some critical sectors of Chinas economy and military could become increasingly vulnerable to disruptions in space. During this same period, Sino-U.S. relations may not improve appreciably, and the Taiwan question could remain unresolved. If Washington and Beijing could increasingly hold each others space infrastructure hostage by threatening to use military options in times of crisis, then potentially risky paths to preemption could emerge in the policy planning processes in both capitals. In preparing for a major contingency in the Taiwan Strait, both the United States and China might be compelled to plan for a disabling, blinding attack on the others space systems before the onset of hostilities. The most troubling dimension to this scenario is that some elements of preemption (already evident in U.S. global doctrine) could become a permanent feature of U.S. and Chinese strategies in space. Indeed, Chinese strategic writings today suggest that the leadership in Beijing believes that preemption is the rational way to prevent future U.S. military intervention. If leaders in Beijing and Washington were to position themselves to preempt each other, then the two sides would enter an era of mutual hostility, one that might include destabilizing, hair-trigger defense postures in space where both sides stand ready to launch a first strike on a moments notice. One scenario involves the use of weapons, such as lasers or jammers, which seek to blind sensors on imaging satellites or disable satellites that provide warning of missile launches. Imagine, for example, Washingtons reaction if China disabled U.S. missile warning satellites or vice versa. In that case, Sino-U.S. relations would be highly vulnerable to the misinterpretations and miscalculations that could lead to a conflict in space. Although attacks against space assets would likely be a precursor or a complement to a broader crisis or conflict, and although conflicts in the space theater may not generate many casualties or massive physical destruction, the economic costs of conflict in space alone for both sides, and for the international community, would be extraordinary given that many states depend on satellites for their economic well-being.

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Unregulated Chinese space modernization leads to cross-Pacific arms race itll escalate to global nuclear war. James Carroll, former Shorenstein Fellow at the Kennedy School of Gov't at Harvard U, Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence at Suffolk U, "Bush's battle to dominate in space," October 28, 2003, Boston Globe, http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg108822.html

Two weeks ago China put a man in space, a signal of China's arrival -and of the arrival of this grave question. Beijing has invested heavily in commercial development of space and will become a significant economic competitor in that sphere. But such peaceful competition presumes a framework of stability, and it is inconceivable that China can pursue a mainly nonmilitary space program while feeling vulnerable to American military dominance. China has constructed a minimal deterrent force with a few dozen nuclear-armed ICBMs, but US "global engagement" based on a missile defense, will quickly undercut the deterrence value of such a force. The Chinese nuclear arsenal will have to be hugely expanded. Meanwhile, America's "high frontier" weapons capacity will put Chinese commercial space investments at risk. No nation with the ability to alter it would tolerate such imbalance, and over the coming decades there is no doubt that China will have that capacity. Washington's refusal to negotiate rules while seeking permanent dominance and asserting the right of preemption is forcing China into an arms race it does not want. Here, potentially, is the beginning of a next cold war, with a nightmare repeat of open-ended nuclear escalation.

International satellite conflict triggers a second Cold War between great powers. Flight International, "Space Wars," February 26, 2008, Lexis | VP
Shooting down satellites seems so passe, or at least so very Cold War. After several years of fighting wars against terrorists and insurgents, a proper satellite shootdown recalls such musty strategic terms as "space race" and even "mutually assured destruction". Yet, here we are, with two failed military satellites having been exorcised from their orbits via obliteration within the past 14 months. The first test, on 11 January 2007, shot down China's reportedly crippled Feng Yun 1-C, a polar-orbiting "weather" satellite operated by the military. The newly developed kinetic kill vehicle - lofted presumably by a DF-21 medium range ballistic missile - demonstrated a new level of offensive capability for China's military. The act drew fierce protests by US and European governments, mainly due to the mess of debris in low-earth orbit created by China's unannounced anti-satellite test. However, memories of Cold War-style intrigues may be instructive. US military officials might be excused if they at least wondered which of China's secret cards remained unplayed. In mid-February, another faltering military satellite required immediate destruction, but this time the shooter would be the US Navy, wielding a recently fielded missile defence system - the upgraded Aegis-class destroyer USS Lake Erie. The successful hit last week by a Raytheon SM-3 interceptor may not bear the mark of a true anti-satellite weapon, as the altitude of the descending target - a spy satellite - may have drifted beneath the minimum range for low-earth orbit. Regardless of its true intentions, the test served to re-assert the US military's long-dormant capability to destroy satellites beyond earth's atmosphere. This show of force may or may not trigger a reciprocal response, but one can only guess what may be the next move for an established space power, such as Russia, or even one of the world's aspiring space powers, such as India. One thing is certain: such continued sabre-rattling among major technological powers will accelerate the pace toward the full weaponisation of space. The scale of the technical sophistication required to hold an adversary's space assets at risk - and, not to mention, the size of the consequences at stake - could easily plunge the great powers into a second Cold War. And it could happen faster than you think.

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Space debris puts U.S. and Russia on high alert Jeffrey Lewis, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Study Program Center for Defense Information, previously worked In the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, What if Space Were Weaponized? July, 2004 Center for Defense Information,
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/ scenarios.pdf) What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum , Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russias warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellites failure. Even the United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 moderately serious false alarms between 1977 and 1983 an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable.51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits.52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. 53 News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave.54 If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia. Under these circumstances, the loss of an early-warning satellite would be extremely suspicious. It is any militarys nature during a crisis to interpret events in their worst-case light . For example, consider the coincidences that occurred in early September 1956, during the extraordinarily tense period in international relations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian uprising.55 On one evening the White House received messages indicating: 1. the Turkish Air Force had gone on alert in response to unidentified aircraft penetrating its airspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15s were flying over Syria; 3. a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria, most likely by a MiG; and 4. The Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reported to have worried that the confluence of events might trigger off the NATO operations plan that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Yet, all of these reports were false. The jets over Turkey were a flock of swans; the Soviet MiGs over Syria were a smaller, routine escort returning the president from a state visit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical difficulties; and the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduled exercises. In an important sense, these were not coincidences but rather different manifestations of a common failure human error resulting from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one author noted, The detection and misinterpretation of these events, against the context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez, was the first major example of how the size and complexity of worldwide electronic warning systems could, at certain critical times, create momentum of its own. Perhaps most worrisome, the United States might be blithely unaware of the degree to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertently escalate a crisis. During the early 1980s, the Soviet Union suffered a major war scare during which time its leadership concluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declining. This war scare was driven in part by the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conducted a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet military to raise their alert status. American officials were stunned to learn, after the fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike during this period.56 All of these incidents have a common theme that confidence is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of their own. As in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely on the steady flow of reliable information. When that information flow is disrupted whether by a deliberate attack or an accident confidence collapses and the result is panic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the more dangerous, because such weapons target the elements of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. As a result, the mere presence of such weapons is

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corrosive to the confidence that allows national nuclear forces to operate safely .

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High alert postures elevate to space that makes nuclear strikes inevitable. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, formerly worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, MA - School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins U, Prof. Politics at U of Virginia, "Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option," November, 2004, Arms Control Today, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage U.S. or allied space objects, and to target and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and space-based, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into space. U.S. space warriors now have a doctrine and plans for counterspace operations, but they do not have a credible plan to stop inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation once the shooting starts. Like U.S. war-fighting scenarios, there is a huge chasm between plans and consequences, in which requirements for escalation dominance make uncontrolled escalation far more likely. A pre-emptive strike in space on a nation that possesses nuclear weapons would invite the gravest possible consequences. Attacks on satellites that provide early warning and other critical military support functions would most likely be viewed either as a surrogate or as a prelude to attacks on nuclear forces.

That leads to extinction. Nick Bostrom, Ph.D. Philosophy at Oxford, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 2002, Vol. 9, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21 st century.

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BMD undermines Chinas confidence in deterrence theyll begin asymmetric weapons buildup including ASATs. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, independent policy research center that conducts multidisciplinary studies of complex and emerging problems, Chinas Nuclear Arms Posture Examined in New Book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, May 16, 2007,
http://www.amacad.org/news/nuclear_china.aspx

Yet United States military policy to develop and deploy space-based missile defense systems threatens Chinas confidence in its ability to deter a nuclear attack, argues arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis in a new book from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Minimum Means of Reprisal: Chinas Search for Security in the Nuclear Age documents the history, development and principles behind Chinas nuclear policy, and discusses Chinas concerns about U.S. defense policy. Although internal factors continue to drive Chinas decisions about its nuclear forces, Lewis suggests that the United States is passing up an opportunity to reassure Chinese leaders in favor of preparations for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons that Chinese leaders will find increasingly difficult to ignore. Lewis reasons that while a major buildup of strategic forces in China is possible, China is more likely to acquire asymmetric means of hampering U.S. preemptive capabilities. These means may include countermeasures to defeat U.S. missile defenses, such as antisatellite weapons, which China successfully tested earlier this year. Lewis argues that Chinas longstanding policy of maintaining the minimum nuclear force necessary to deter attack is fundamentally in the interest of the United States, and that U.S. policymakers should, among other measures, commit to a bilateral no-first-use pledge rather than to space-based weapons and defense systems that undermine Chinas security.

Its causal there is a direct relationship between our missile defense capacity and Chinese ASAT development they perceive BMD as battlefield preparation. Wendell Minnick, Asia bureau chief of Defense News, "US and Chinese Nuclear and Missile Development: the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War," May 25, 2007, posted at Japan Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Wendell-Minnick/2428 | VP - [qualifications inserted]
Wortzel [former Director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, formerly served in the office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Pacific Command, and on the Department of the Army Command] believes there is a clear relationship between nuclear force survivability and the ASAT test run by China, and this reinforces arguments in China that foreign surveillance of China from space may constitute battlefield preparation. However, constraining U.S. satellite capabilities would make it nearly impossible to determine what Chinas intentions are. Panic and indecision could force the United States to respond more aggressively or too late to a Chinese nuclear strike. US satellite launch Chinas decision to put nuclear and conventional warheads of the same classes of ballistic missiles near each other in firing units of the Second Artillery Corps also increases the risk of accidental nuclear conflict, Wortzel says. If a country with good surveillance systems, like the United States, detects a missile being launched, it has serious choices to make. It can absorb a first strike, see whether it is hit with a nuclear or conventional weapon, and retaliate in kind; or it can decide to launch a major strike on warning." The U.S. ability to observe and quickly analyze missile launches is greatly diminished by Chinas ASAT capabilities, which risk the potential for a miscalculation that results in a nuclear war.

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BMD forces Chinese nuclear innovation theyll build anti-satellite systems. Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, adjunct Prof. Elliott School of Intl Affairs @ George Washington U, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond," September, 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | VP

But China also faces a dilemma as the number of deployed intercontinental systems increases , as recently articulated by one Chinese academic, Zhen Huang: Most likely, [Chinas] program will involve responses to U.S. missile defenses by increasing force levels so as to restore Chinas minimum deterrence. The problem is, this would still make the Chinese nuclear force develop into an embryonic limited deterrent at the strategic levelFor the purpose of reconstructing minimum deterrence, China is not only required to keep improving the survivability of its nuclear forces through measures such as camouflage of deployment sites, development of solid propellant and acquisition of mobile delivery systems as well as improvements in C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. More critically, it is required to develop effective means to penetrate U.S. missile defense structure so as to strike at least some major cities. It is in this connection that Chinas nuclear force is likely to move to an initial limited deterrence capability at the strategic level.138 Thus the deployment of modernized systems could help to precipitate changes in military doctrine and in threat perception that themselves could lead to a further evolution of the PRC-U.S. strategic balance. This analysis already foreshadows some insights into the qualitative as opposed to the quantitative considerations likely to drive Chinese force modernization. The availability of more advanced technologies to Chinas strategic designers and engineers has fueled a general push for higher quality in replacement systems. This in itself will mean some important changes to the operational characteristics of the force. For example, the deployment of road-mobile DF-31 missiles means that warheads will have to be mated to missiles in a way not currently understood to be the case with the silo-based ICBMs, and thus will increase their alert level. Improved C4ISR capabilities would also permit China to move away from a posture premised on absorbing the first blow and to launch on warning or launch under attack, or something analogous. As Paul Godwin has argued, this option would be especially attractive if the SSBN progress was unsuccessful or was cancelled because of costs.139 The need to penetrate ballistic missile defenses suggests in addition increased reliance on penetration aids such as decoys, chaff, and maneuverable warheads. That need points also to the potential utility for China of systems designed to attack the ballistic missile defense system itselfwhether direct attack with ASAT on space-based infrastructure, or direct attack on ground-based radars and/or indirect electronic attack on elements of the C4ISR structure.

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China has the goods, but its not deploying new weapons now its in a position to quickly ramp up Henry Sokolski, Executive Director The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, China and Nuclear Proliferation: Rethinking the Link May 20, 2008, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission China's Proliferation Practices, and the Development of its
Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities," http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_testimonies/08_05_20_wrts/08_05_20_sokolski_statement.pdf As already noted, it is unclear if China is intent on ramping up its nuclear weapons program or not. It is investing more to modernize its nuclear weapons systems and is modernizing every branch of its strategic nuclear forces. So far, however, China has seems not to have dramatically increased the numbers of weapons it deploys. Whats worrisome is that China is positioning itself technologically and logistically so it can ramp up its strategic weapons deployments rapidly if it chose to do so. China now has between 200 and 400 nuclear weapons, and is also stockpiling as much as 20 metric tons of highly enriched urarnium and 4 metric tons of separated plutonium in its military stockpile. This is enough material conservatively to make one to two thousand additional advanced nuclear weapons.

BMD determines the operational characteristics of their deployments if were not threatening, neither are they. Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, adjunct Prof. Elliott School of Intl Affairs @ George Washington U, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond," September, 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | VP
What then will be the effect of U.S. ballistic missile defenses on Chinese force modernization? It is important to bear in mind that China would certainly be modernizing its forces even in the absence of U.S. BMD, just as it has been modernizing them all along. But the simple shorthand that BMD is unlikely to have little or no effect on that modernization effort is not substantiated by this analysis. As China modernizes its force, its operational characteristics will evolve in the light of improving technical options. Those characteristics are likely to be influenced in significant ways by the requirement to maintain a credible deterrent force as the U.S. deploys defenses. Because uncertainty remains about the future operational characteristics of the eventual defense force, uncertainty undoubtedly remains about specific Chinese responses. But both quantitative and qualitative parameters will be influenced. A middle way has been openly promoted by some Chinese experts that balances efforts to increase the survivability of Chinas ICBM force with the deployment of penetration aids.142 A robust build-up to a paritybased force that is quantitatively and qualitatively capable of an extended competitive campaign of counterforce strategic warfare seems highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. In the words of one recent authoritative Chinese text, the basis of the nuclear strategy of China is the containment of nuclear war, not on winning a nuclear war.143

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China is rethinking its minimal deterrence doctrine now US missile defense is the key driver of Chinese strategy. Michael S. Chase, [et al] Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, Andrew S. Erickson, Associate Professor in the Strategic
Research Department, and Christopher Yeaw, Associate Professor and Senior Strategic Researcher, U.S. Naval War College, "Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States," February, 2009 in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 32, Iss 1, pp. 67-114 The People's Liberation Army (PLA), once widely dismissed as a bloated, poorly trained military with an enormous, but largely antiquated collection of weapons and equipment, is becoming a leaner, more professional, and increasingly operationally capable fighting force. Major increases in Chinese defense spending over the past decade have enabled an accelerating military modernization program. As part of this ongoing transformation, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has clearly prioritized the improvement of its missile capabilities. Although much attention has been focused on China's rapidly growing arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), its theater and strategic conventional and nuclear missile forces are undergoing equally important changes. Many analysts have portrayed Chinese longer-range missile and nuclear forces as modernizing very slowly, but recent developments, including advances in technology, increasingly realistic training, and doctrinal evolution, underscore the necessity of updating the conventional wisdom on China's theater and strategic missile capabilities and the US-China strategic relationship. Indeed, China is currently enhancing the striking power and survivability of its theater and strategic missile forces and rethinking its nuclear doctrine in ways that may pose serious challenges for the United States. The principal drivers of these developments are China's assessment of its changing external security environment, especially vis-a-vis the United States, and its growing concerns about the viability of its traditional deterrent posture, particularly in a missile defense environment. China's transition from its longstanding 'minimalist' strategic posture to one that consists of a much more potent combination of theater and strategic missile and nuclear systems raises several important questions: Most fundamentally , what is the actual composition of China's missile forces at this time and how will this force structure evolve over the next few years? How is the Chinese military training to use the new weapons it is adding to its arsenal? How will Chinese planners and decisionmakers think about using these emerging capabilities? What doctrinal tensions might arise in the future now that China no longer has to make virtue out of necessity? What are the implications for the USChina strategic relationship and deterrence stability in a Taiwan Strait crisis or conflict?

Chinas primary concern is second-strike capacity ending Japanese BMD sends a stabilizing signal of restraint. Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, adjunct Prof. Elliott School of Intl Affairs @ George Washington U, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond," September, 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf | VP
There is another possibility for Chinas arms control strategy: that it will become directly concerned with establishing red lines in the U.S. BMD deployment strategies. Chinese experts and policymakers have sometimes suggested that if BMD is inevitable, then the United States should go about it in a way that minimizes its destabilizing implications. For example, the deployment by Japan of seabased systems is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based systems, as this suggests the possibility that those systems would be deployed to protect Taiwan in time of crisis or war. As another example, the deployment by the United States of space-based boost-phase interceptors is seen in China as more destabilizing than the deployment of ground-based interceptors in the continental United States, as the latter can more easily be overwhelmed by Chinese responses. More generally, Chinese experts are keenly aware of the assurances provided Moscow on the limited nature of the defenses that the U.S. will seek to deploy over the period of the Treaty of Moscow (i.e., to 2012) and wonder what assurances Washington is prepared to offer Beijing on a similar score. Formal arms control measures codifying forms of restraint by the United States and/or its East Asian allies seem rather unlikely, not least because it also seems unlikely that Beijing would be willing to codify any parallel restraints on its missile forces. But informal measures may come to be seen as useful, perhaps by providing transparency of a kind that reassures China that certain red lines have not been crossed.153 The other area of primary Chinese diplomatic interest and focus suggested by this historical review is stability. Chinese analysts appear to have spent a good deal of time and energy worrying about stability in the nuclear era, although their terms of reference are somewhat different from those of their Western counterparts. For Westerners, concerns about stability have focused on the particular dynamics of crises and arms races between nuclear competitors. Chinese analysts appear to have been much less concerned about crisis stability, with the single but important exception of their commitment to preserving a credible second-strike capability. They appear to have been concerned about arms race stability largely in terms of its spin-off effects on the international system more generally , with the argument that the U.S.-Soviet arms race became one of the generators of international tension in the Cold War. In general, Chinese analysts appear to have taken a broader view of stability and its requirements than have American analysts, a view that encompasses not just nuclear relations but political-military relationships more generally. These different perceptions have proven a barrier to the strategic dialogue promised to President

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Bush in his notification to President Jiang that the United States intended to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. This experience stands in sharp contrast to the experience of the strategic dialogue between Washington and Moscow, which was able to pick up quickly given the legacy of shared vocabulary and concepts from decades of prior dialogue.154

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A more offensive force posture is intuitively appealing to Chinese officials theyll abandon No First Use. Andrew S. Erickson, Assoc. Prof. in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, Assoc. in Research at Harvard U Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, "China's BMD Countermeasures," 2005, in China's
Nuclear Force Modernization, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein, Naval War College Newport Papers 22 The most straightforward course of action for China would be to continue to improve and expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems with the goal of saturating defenses. China has already enhanced the prelaunch survivability of its nuclear weapons by shifting to solid propellants; improving C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance see chapter 1 in this volume); using camouflaged, hardened silos; and developing road-, rail-, and bargemobile ICBMs. Possible sub-elements of this process could include increasing missile accuracy, developing a robust submarine-launched second strike (see chapter 2), and even ultimately replacing Russia as the second nuclear power. Chinese strategist Shen Dingli projects that a ninefold increase in Chinese ICBMs capable of hitting U.S. targets would defeat even a BMD system with a 90 percent interception rate, and at the manageable cost of several billion dollars over one or two decades.66 According to Li Bin, Although the costs could be large, the buildup option cannot be ruled out. The reason for this is that the buildup option is so mathematically simple to understand and so certain to work. So, in the Chinese debate this idea would easily win some support from nontechnical people. Another advantage is that the buildup would be visible to the outside and would therefore help discourage any first strike against China. 67 The unclassified version of the U.S. National Intelligence Councils December 2001 report estimates that Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015 and that by that year Beijings . . . ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States . . . will number around 75 to 100 warheads.68 A Chinese missile buildup would facilitate, among other things, wartime launch of strikes incorporating the use of different types of missiles in synchronized launches from a wide range of azimuths in order to stress active missile defenses and associated battle management systems.69 China could also conceivably increase the deterrent power of its current nuclear arsenal, by altering its nuclear doctrine. This might entail placing its forces on a higher state of alert or even abandoning its no-first-use policy in favor of launch on warning. China might seek to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities by slowing or reversing arms control commitments. This could entail continuing production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. China may also fail to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), particularly given the rejection of that treaty by the U.S. Senate, or may even resume nuclear testing in order to develop countermeasures to the NMD system or warheads for multiple-warhead missiles.70

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Even a minor modification to NFU policy leads to regional instability, proliferation, and US-China war. Pan Zhenqiang, Prof. Intl Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Natl Defence University of the Peoples Liberation Army of China, where
he previously served as Director of the Institute, retired Major General of the Peoples Liberation Army, "China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons," Autumn, 2005, in China Security, "Opening the Debate on U.S.-China Nuclear Relations," Iss 1, World Security Institute China Program First, NFU highlights Chinas philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament. Indeed, their extremely large destructive capability renders nuclear weapons the only truly inhumane weapon of mass destruction and are of little other use to China. Faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike. But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose. From the very beginning of acquiring a nuclear capability, Beijing announced that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions; it also pledged unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states. This claim is not merely rhetoric that cannot be verified, as some Western pundits accused. On the contrary, Chinas nuclear rationale has determined the defensive nature of its nuclear force, its posture, size and operational doctrine, which have been highly visible and have stood the test of time. It is in this sense that China is NOT a nuclear weapon state in the Western sense. Unlike all the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China has never intended to use its nuclear capability to make up for the in efficiency of conventional capabilities vis--vis other world powers nor has China an interest in joining a nuclear arms race with other nuclear states. And thanks to the insistence of this policy based on NFU, China succeeds in reducing the nuclear element to the minimum in its relations with other nuclear nations, avoiding a possible nuclear arms race, and contributing to the global strategic stability at large. If this policy serves well its core security interests, why should Beijing change it? Maintaining Strategic Stability Second, if the NFU rationale is to be changed or even vaguely modified as Zhu Chenghu suggests, then the first resultant victim will be the future strategic stability between China and the United States. Zhus reasoning for first-use is understandable as he argued that China must build a credible nuclear deterrent in order to compensate for the imbalance of conventional force with the United States. In that way, he seemed to be saying, China will gain the effect of nuclear deterrence against the United States based on mutual assured destruction (MAD). But this theory is not new.The U.S.S.R.-U.S. type of mutual deterrence in the Cold War is exactly the incarnation of such a nuclear relationship. Zhus suggestion, in essence, advocates that China should indeed follow the old course of the two former superpowers. If this were to occur, the immediate implications would be: 1) bilateral relations between China and the U.S. would likely become confrontational; quickly ending the mutual political trust and confidence that they badly need in order to expand their cooperation; 2) an almost inevitable nuclear arms race between China and the United States; 3) crisis management would become highly difficult, if not impossible, should the two countries head toward a confrontation. In particular, before China and the United States are able to reach such a mutual deterrence status, which may takemany decades, there will be a long period of dangerous uncertainty. In such a scenario, a nuclear exchange may truly be imaginable as either side would be under great pressure to preemptively strike either in a major military conflict or even in a minor military incident, thereby creating an extremely chaotic and ambiguous situation; 4) Chances of a nuclear war could also be triggered as a result of accidental, inadvertent or unauthorized launches on either side. Clearly, none of these are in the best interest of China. International Arms Control The third reason is that a change in Chinas NFU policy would deliver another crushing blow to the international efforts to maintain peace and stability through the arms control approach. The hostility by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush towards any constraints involving international, legally binding documents, including arms control agreements, has mostly paralyzed these efforts. In contrast, China firmly supports the reactivation of arms control efforts, advocating that all nuclear weapon states should honestly undertake their obligations of nuclear disarmament as stipulated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China has consistently stressed that the first step should be the conclusion of a treaty by all nuclear weapon states not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would be a significant confidencebuilding measure among these states to put their subsequent actions on the right track. But if China changes its position on NFU, it would be tantamount to reversing all of Beijings attitudes. China would no longer take interest in any nuclear disarmament measures in its desperate efforts for a nuclear build-up. Nor would Beijing be interested in developing a new international arms control mechanism, aimed at constraining the behavior of nuclear weapon states. In addition, nuclear proliferation could be further fuelled as non-nuclear weapon states would have one more exemplary argument that a nation can opt for nuclear weapons in the name of national interests. Chinas International Reputation Fourth, a change of the NFU policy would also have negative political ramifications, which may tarnish Chinas international image under current circumstances and will not be conducive to its overall strategic goal of building an enduring peaceful and a stable international environment. Remarks like Zhus have already played into the hands of Neocons in Washington, who are only too glad to use them to justify the so-called China threat. Over the years, Chinas NFU policy has been very welcome among nonnuclear weapon states. Consequently, Chinas nuclear weapons have never become a problem in their threat perceptions. Resorting to first-use, on the other hand, would arguably generate misgivings and anxiety in Chinas neighborhood. For if protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity is the ultimate justification with which Beijing is willing to have a nuclear exchange with the United States, the question would

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become, would China not use nuclear weapons in a conflict with a neighboring country for the same purpose, particularly if that country is backed by the United States? Regional and Cross-Strait Relations Last but not the least, a change of the NFU approach would further threaten and complicate rather than stabilize the situation across the Taiwan Straits. To a certain extent, Zhus suggestions have demonstrated a sentiment of indignation over the U.S. intrusion into Chinas internal affairs. He seemed also to wish to convey Chinas determination to achieve national ings are legitimate and widely shared by the Chinese people. But things are just not that simple. True, U.S. intervention could be anticipated should a military conflict develop between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. But the extent of any U.S. intervention may well be conditional on the cause, nature and scope of that conflict. It may also depend on the objective and tactics of the Chinese mainland in the war. In accordance with Chinas Anti-Secession Law, Beijings objective is peaceful unification.If that end is not to be achieved for the foreseeable future, the mainland seems likely to wait rather than take hasty actions. During this process, Beijing seems more willing to take active measures to stabilize the status quo, in the hope of creating more propitious conditions for the eventual coming together of the two sides peacefully in the future. Thus as far as maintaining status quo is concerned, Beijings position offers some overlapping of interests with Washington over the Taiwan question. There is no imminent threat of a war in sight between the two countries. Even if Beijing has to use nonpeaceful means as a last resort, it must be with a most legitimate cause, which will help Beijing act on a moral high ground and hopefully gain international understanding and sympathy for its actions.Under that circumstance, it could be argued that it is Washington who will find itself greatly constrained in making the decision to take military action and the extent to which it is carried out. So, while China must be prepared to fight such a war in the Taiwan Straits with the direct involvement of the United States, it is not necessarily a foregone conclusion that the two countries are destined to fight a protracted and full-fledged war over Taiwan in the end. It can also be argued that even if the situation in the Straits deteriorates, it is still in the best interest of both countries to try to limit U.S. intrusion instead of threat unification whatever the cost. These feeleningto expand the warlet alone to fight a nuclear war. In short, Gen. Zhu has raised the wrong theme at the wrong place and at the wrong time. Zhus problem lies in a failure to see the value of NFU in Chinas nuclear policy as well as the consequences should China dispense with it. Further, of particular concern is the frivolous manner in which he talked about a nuclear exchange between China and the United States as if elimination of hundreds of cities on both sides were just part of a computer game. The cost of millions of lives from any side would make the argument for maintaining world leadership or protecting sovereignty and terri torial integrity pale and meaningless. There is no winner in a nuclear war. This is truly the dilemma for all the nuclear weapons states now and in the future. They continue to modernize and improve their nuclear arsenals, but the only viable way to ensure their security seems to be to avoid their use and eventually eliminate of all these deadly weapons. China has so often criticized the U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, maintaining it as a relic of Cold War mentality. Is it now a wise policy to counter this Cold War mentality in kind?

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JET is on the chopping block due to budget cuts Blake Ellison, Grad Student, Massey University, 7/25/10, JET Program, meet chopping block, http://blakeellison.posterous.com/jet-programmeet-chopping-block | Suo JET Program, meet chopping block The JET Program sent me to Japan. There are many ways to go to Japan these days to do entry-level work like teaching English, but this is the preferred way to go since it's the only one with Japanese government backing. Japan got a new prime minister earlier this summer, and the buzzword of the day is "fiscal responsibility," which led to the extension of a government-wide review of a huge range of government programs. Naturally, JET came under review. There's a really good writeup of events on jetwit.com by a JET alum and Columbia SIPA graduate. I've taken a few bits and added some commentary and things that you should consider if you're a JETwatcher, alum, or prospective participant:

The JET programme is key to cultural interaction but is in trouble Bahia was an Assistant Language Teacher at a girls high school in Gunma Prefecture for 2 years. Now, she works for the Gunma Prefecture Board of Education. July 9, 2010, The JET Programme is in Trouble, http://bahiaportfolio.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/jet_programme_in_trouble/ |
Suo It appears that the JET Programme is in trouble. The JET Programme, which took me to Japan for 3 years (2 on JET, and one year working for the Compulsory Education Division of the Board of Education in Gunma), is a valuable program that gives Japan vital exposure to international people from a large number of countries. It also contributes to the spoken proficiency of English within Japan. Since Japan is a very homogeneous society and has been consistently ranked low in world rankings of English proficiency, both of these contributions are of vital importance. However, as part of a larger government initiative to cut wasteful government spending, this program has been flagged as one for consideration of elimination.

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JET Impact Ext Soft Power

JET key to soft power Yee-Kuang Heng, Lecturer in the School of International Relations, and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, January 27, 2010, Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the softest of them all? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese strategies in the soft
power competition era, http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/10/2/275 | Suo Consistent with Nye's focus on attractive cultures, Chinese leaders, including President Hu (2007), aim to enhance culture as part of the "soft" power of our country. Politburo member Jia Qinglin stressed the importance of national "soft" power with cultural construction as the main task to meet domestic demands and enhance China's competitiveness internationally (cited in Li, 2008, p. 289). Here, Chinese primary sources agree with Nye that its culture is a valuable soft power asset. Some scholars even see cultural competition as an increasingly vital part of international competition (Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 428). Beijing could increase its "soft" power by creating common imagined identities and values for Asians (Cho and Jeong, 2008, 470), emanating Confucian messages of unity, frugality, and the notion of harmony. Perhaps its most significant cultural initiative, Beijing has attached 295 Confucius Institutes to universities worldwide, promoting Chinese civilization to both general publics and elites. While Nye's framework stressed contemporary American pop culture, China emphasizes its traditional culture (Wang and Lu, 2008, p. 431). Recognizing the importance of language, China aggressively sponsors Mandarin in countries like Thailand, training a thousand teachers annually. The state-funded China National Office for teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language has an impressive annual war-chest of $200 million to quadruple the number of foreign learners by 2010 (Gill and Huang, 2006, p. 18). To attract foreign students, Beijing offers scholarships and looser visa rules. The 2006 Planning Guidelines for Cultural Development also propose to cultivate international sales networks for Chinese cultural products and assist overseas-oriented cultural enterprises through pricing or funding support (Li, 2008, p. 303). In terms of elite groups, there is increasing cultural exchange, hosting overseas scholars to maintain academic interest in China. Beijing also cultivates influential diaspora such as ex-Thai PM Thaksin Shinawatra and prominent Filipino businessman Lucio Tan. While they previously provided investment and trade, diaspora Chinese have become vital to Beijing's global charm offensive (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 77). The state-run Overseas Chinese Affairs Office works to boost relations between China and its diaspora. Government-run camps for diaspora children called Travel to China to Find Your Roots aim to enhance China's attractiveness. Beijing also publishes history textbooks for diaspora schools, emphasizing humiliation by foreign powers. Historical narratives are weaved into its cultural strengths, notably through exhibitions and Zheng He3 diplomacy that portray China's rise as mutually beneficial compared with European colonialism (Yoshihara and Holmes, 2008, pp. 127130). However, in a major departure from Nye's analysis, Chinese cultural discourse frequently refers to a domestic context (Li, 2008, pp. 288, 296). Soft power here doubles as a national development strategy to instill cultural pride, consolidate internal coherence against economic inequality, promote regime legitimacy through moral example, and create a harmonious society to resist foreign cultural encroachment (Cho and Jeong, 2008, p. 458). Like Canada and France, Beijing tries to preserve a level of domestic soft power by limiting cultural imports. While neither Japan nor China are historically immigrant cultures, this alone does not limit cultural flows in or out. For Beijing, regime legitimacy matters more. Tokyo, however, does not exhibit the same level of concern about foreign cultural encroachment. Calling for greater cultural and intellectual exchange to share ideas with the world, its chief cultural diplomat, instead, argues that Japanese cultural strength has been its ability to absorb foreign influences, yet maintain traditional ways (Monji, 2009). First, Tokyo seeks to more effectively advocate its traditional culture. Here, there is some symmetry with centrally directed Chinese initiatives. Like the Confucius Institutes, the statefunded Japan Foundation is promoting the Japanese language by inviting 500 foreign teachers on fully paid courses, together with plans to establish 100 Japanese-language hubs globally by 2010. The Japan Exchange and Teaching Program (JET) also provides access to cultural norms, which teachers disseminate on their return home. Mirroring China's moves to increase foreign student intake, Tokyo plans to attract 300,000 foreigners. Just as China's CCTV has gone global in English, with Arabic versions planned, Japan too has launched its NHK 24-hour global news channel in English. But while China promotes its traditional culture, Tokyo also advocates its contemporary pop and sub-culture, through its publicprivate approach.

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JET Impact Japan/China Relations

Soft power key to Japanese credibility and Japan-China relations Weng Kin Kwan, Japan Correspondent for The Strait Times, 2007, Japan keen on Singapore in soft power drive: PM Abe shares his views on
bilateral ties and vision for the region ahead of PM Lee's visit, March 17, lexis JAPAN is keen to explore ways of cooperating with Singapore to boost its cultural presence in South-east Asia, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said yesterday. 'We want to disseminate our pop culture, such as manga, and promote Japaneselanguage education and other cultural fields in the region,' he told Tokyo-based Singapore journalists here. The interview was held ahead of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's official visit here, which starts tomorrow. But Mr Abe was non-committal when asked how Japan planned to achieve its goal. 'As for concrete measures, I would like to discuss this with Mr Lee when he comes, since Singapore is the hub of South-east Asia,' he said. Such cooperation, if realised, is likely to represent a new milestone in the relations between the two countries, which enjoy close and friendly ties. Besides its already huge political and economic presence in the region, Japan is now also seeking to strengthen its influence abroad through cultural and other fields as a way of extending its 'soft power' influence. Since becoming Prime Minister last September, Mr Abe has been touting his 'Asia Gateway' vision, which hopes to disseminate information on Japanese culture and trends to the rest of the world. The vision also calls for a free flow of people, goods, culture, money and information between Asia and the rest of the world using Japan as the gateway. In recent years, Japanese movies, fashion, music and television shows have become very popular throughout East and South-east Asia. But Japan faces competition for cultural influence from other regional powers like China and South Korea. Turning to Japan's relations with Singapore, Mr Abe noted that bilateral ties were 'excellent'. He also pointed out that the two countries shared universal values such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights. 'As two countries that share these values, we must cooperate for the sake of regional peace and stability. I believe such cooperation will be very meaningful,' he said. He added that Japan would like to develop a relationship with Singapore in which each side would consider the other as a 'reliable partner'. Japan and Singapore already cooperate closely at international forums, including the United Nations, the Asean Plus Three, and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Mr Abe said that he intended to have a 'frank' exchange of views on bilateral ties, as well as the future of East Asia, with Mr Lee when they meet on Monday. Asked if he hoped to visit Singapore as Prime Minister, the Japanese leader said he looked forward to visiting the Republic when it hosts the EAS later this year. He praised Singapore for its constant growth and its readiness to take on new challenges. 'Despite the small size of its territory, Singapore is able to absorb the energy of Asia and make full use of it. It is also a window for Western companies venturing into the region,' he noted. 'Singapore is full of vitality and is always changing into the future. I would like to have another look,' said Mr Abe, who visited the Republic many times before becoming Premier. Asked how Japan-China ties would impact on the region, he said both countries had agreed to develop a 'mutually beneficial relationship' based on common strategic interests when he visited Beijing last year. 'We hope to use such relations to urge China to play a responsible role in the region, and believe it will lead to the constructive use of China's potential power for the long-term stability and prosperity of the region,' he said. Asked how Japan intended to boost cooperation with the members of Asean as a whole, he pointed to the implementation of a five-year exchange programme, under which Japan planned to invite 6,000 youths every year from EAS member states. The EAS has 16 member nations: the 10 Asean members, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Japan also planned to step up cooperation with Asean in energy-saving measures and the promotion of bio-energy through the human resources training and financial aid.

Failure of China-Japan relations leads to nuclear World War III Anton La Guardia, The Telegraph, The clouds of nuclear war are still hanging over Hiroshima, March 8 200 5,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2005/08/03/do0301.xml AG In Asia, however, wartime resentments of Japan are still acute. Several anti-Japanese riots broke out in China last spring, tolerated by the authorities, after the publication of new textbooks seen as playing down Japanese atrocities. Even a democratic country such as South Korea harbours a deep resentment of Japan, and there have been protests in Seoul over the status of islands claimed by the two countries. It is difficult to see Asia's leaders standing side by side any time soon to remember the fallen as Europe's leaders do for joint commemorations of the Second World War. The idea of a major new war, seen as unthinkable in Europe, is far from outlandish in Asia. Academics now compare the growing Sino-Japanese competition for natural resources and economic dominance to the contest between Germany and Britain at the start of the war-blighted 20th century. North Korea test-fired ballistic missiles over Japanese territory in 1998. Three years later, the Japanese coastguard chased and sank a North Korean spy ship. Last year Japanese ships and planes tracked a Chinese submarine snooping in territorial waters. As China devotes much of its new wealth to modernising its armed forces, the likeliest flashpoint is Taiwan, a former Japanese colony. China has made no secret of its readiness to resort to force to stop

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the island from seceding formally, and the US is committed to defending Taiwan. It is unlikely that Japan could escape involvement. Indeed, one scenario is that China could emulate Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor with a pre-emptive strike on US forces in Okinawa. Japan has started to flex military muscles atrophied by decades of pacifism. Its forces are developing the ability to operate at greater distances and the war-renouncing constitution has been stretched to the limit with deployments in East Timor, the Indian Ocean and now the "reconstruction" mission in southern Iraq. Japan is demanding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council alongside the victors of the Second World War. Even in Hiroshima, some Japanese have started to talk of the ultimate taboo: developing a nuclear deterrent.

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Budget cuts will devastate Japanese science David Cyranoski, staff writer for Nature, 17 November 2009 Japanese science faces deep cuts,
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091117/full/462258a.html | Suo Japanese researchers are in uproar about the drastic budget cuts being recommended for science projects by a new cabinetlevel government advisory unit. Since 11 November, working groups of the Government Revitalization Unit, created in September and chaired by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, have been re-evaluating 220 government-funded programmes, including dozens of prominent science projects. The drastic shake-up will hit the SPring-8 synchrotron in Harima, a planned supercomputer that was destined to be the world's fastest, ocean drilling projects and basic grant programmes, to name but a few. The recommendations, part of an effort to trim 3 trillion (US$ 33.7 billion) off next year's budget, are the most concrete indication so far that Japan's new government intends to make comprehensive, long-lasting changes to the country's research priorities. Scientists are reacting with frustration and, in some cases, apocalyptic predictions. One prominent crystallographer, who requested anonymity, told Nature: "If this goes on, Japanese scientists, including young scientists, will flow overseas, and Japanese science will die." Hatoyama's government rode into power in August, promising to shift government expenditure from wasteful projects to initiatives that will benefit the average person, such as ending highway tolls. In August, Hatoyama told Nature that he would nonetheless increase support for science1. But since then, his government has been slicing into budgets. In October, the science and education ministry reduced the total grants for 30 of the projects under the Funding Program for World-Leading Innovative R&D on Science and Technology (FIRST) from 270 billion to 100 billion2.

Financial panels put Japanese science on the brink Jim Gannon, served as the Executive Director of the Japan Center for International Exchange, fellow with the US-Japan Network for the Future, 7/3/10, JET ROI: JET Program on the Chopping Block, http://jetwit.com/wordpress/2010/07/03/jet-roi-jet-program-on-the-chopping-block-byjames-gannon/ | Suo Despite this initial success, a backlash eventually began to brew against the jigyo shiwake panels, with detractors labeling them as mindless populism, arguing that panel members without any special expertise were unqualified to evaluate the programs and ridiculing the attempt to pass judgment on complex, long-standing projects with such a cursory review. In one noteworthy development, a group of Japanese Nobel laureates publicly rebuked the Hatoyama Goverment for jigyo shiwake recommendations to gut government funding for basic scientific research. Renho herself met with ridicule for arguing in one budget hearing, Whats wrong with being the worlds number two?

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Japan Science iPS Bank Key

iPS bank key to future research Reuters, Jan 9, 2008, Stem cell bank proposed, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUST33884220080109 | Suo
(Reuters) - Creating a bank to store a new type of stem cell produced from donors' ordinary skin cells could help reduce time and money for treating patients with regenerative medicine in the future, a Japanese researcher said on Wednesday. This would be more practical than tailor-made treatments for individual patients, said Shinya Yamanaka of Kyoto University. Yamanaka led one of two teams that in November unveiled how to transform ordinary human skin cells into cells that look and act like embryonic stem cells, but without using cloning technology or human embryos. Stem cell research has stirred up ethical debate, though the field received a boost when Yamanaka's team and another from the United States reported their findings separately last year. The new cell type, called induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells), have fuelled hopes for regenerative medicine, although researchers say it will take years before such medicine can be used to treat people. "It may be a good idea to make an iPS cell bank," Yamanaka told a news conference. "By making such a bank, we can cut down the cost of treatment and also we can shorten the period which is required for the generation of iPS cells," he said. "In reality, tailor-made medicine using iPS cells is not so ideal." Scientists hope iPS cells will improve disease research and pave the way for treating people with injuries as well as diseases such as Parkinson's and diabetes. But Yamanaka said it takes about three months to transform a patient's skin cells into iPS cells, which is too much time when considering that these cells may be needed within 10 days to treat a spinal cord injury.

iPS bank key to testing expansion makes therapy effective Scientific American, January 9, 2008, Stem Cell Bank Proposed by Japanese Researcher, http://www.cellmedicine.com/news318.asp | Suo
On Wednesday, a Japanese researcher proposed a system that could help reduce the time and money needed for treating patients with regenerative medicine in the future. A new type of stem cell, which is produced from a donor's ordinary skin cells, would be banked much like umbilical cord blood is today. Shinya Yamanaka of Kyoto University said that instead of tailor-made treatments for individual patients, the proposed system would be more practical. In November of 2007, without using human embryos or cloning technology, Yamanaka led one of two teams which were able to transform ordinary human skin cells into cells that look and act like embryonic stem cells. Ethical debates have swarmed stem cell research for years, but Yamanaka's Japanese based team, along with another team from the United States quited many by reporting their research last year. Even though researchers say it will take years before such medicine can be used to treat people, new hopes for regenerative medicine have been kindled by the new type of cell called the induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS cell). "It may be a good idea to make an iPS cell bank," Yamanaka told a news conference. "By making such a bank, we can cut down the cost of treatment and also we can shorten the period which is required for the generation of iPS cells," he said. "In reality, tailor-made medicine using iPS cells is not so ideal." The way to treating people with injuries as well as diseases like diabetes, Alzheimer's, and heart disease may be paved with iPS cells. Scientists expect them to improve disease research considerably. However, cells may be needed within 10 days to treat a spinal cord injury and Yamanaka said it takes about three months to transform a patient's skin cells into iPS cells. The lag in time is the reason for the banking proposal. Before iPS cells can be used to treat humans, more testing is needed. Although he expects iPS cells to be clinically useful within ten years, it could be longer before iPS cells are used to treat some of the more challenging diseases said Yamanaka.

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iPS is the sweet kind of stem cells avoids their impact turns Emily Singer, Biotechnology and Life Science editor at MITs Technology Review, June 18, 20 10, Investing in Banks of Stem Cells,
http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/25632/ | Suo

One of the great benefits of cell reprogramming--converting adult cells into stem cells--is the ability to capture an individual's genetic diversity. Scientists are now using this technology, known as induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cell reprogramming, to create banks of stem cells from different people. The banks will be used to test the toxicity of different drugs using cells from people of different ethnicities, and could potentially supply cells for tissue replacement therapies. Researchers presented details of their efforts at the International Society for Stem Cell Research conference in San Francisco this week. Shinya Yamanaka, a stem cell scientist at the Gladstone Institute, in San Francisco, and Kyoto University, in Japan, first created iPS cells in 2007 by adding just four genes to adult cells that are normally active only in embryos. (James Thomson and Junying Yu at the University of Wisconsin, in Madison, simultaneously published a similar approach.) The cells can reproduce themselves many times over, and they can develop into any cell type in the human body, the two defining characteristics of embryonic stem cells. Furthermore, because they are not made from human embryos, iPS cells bypass the ethical and technical challenges associated with embryonic stem cells.

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Block IIA is key is to European BMD China Daily, 2010-04-22, US says Japan sticks to missile-shield program, http://chinadaily.cn/world/2010-04/22/content_9759308.htm | Suo
WASHINGTON -- Japan remains fully committed to building a linchpin multibillion-dollar missile interceptor with the United States, the head of the US Missile Defense Agency told Congress, even as US-Japanese ties adjust to a new era. Army Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly said he had held several high-levels program reviews with government officials since the Democratic Party of Japan's victory in the August 30, 2009, elections for the legislature's lower house. "They have indicated that they are in full support and their commitments are solid," he told the Senate Appropriations Defense subcommittee, referring to the Standard Missile-3 upgrade program in its fifth year of development. Published reports from Japan have said the coalition government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama that took power in September plans to reduce missile-defense spending. Japan already has spent just over $1 billion to help build a more capable SM-3 version, said Richard Lehner, a US Missile Defense Agency spokesman. It is being co-developed with Waltham, Massachusetts-based Raytheon Co, the world's biggest missile maker. The new version, dubbed SM-3 Block IIA, is key to US plans to be able to defend all of NATO's European territory from a perceived Iranian ballistic missile threat as soon as about 2018. It is designed to improve the antimissile's velocity, range and ability to discriminate among a ballistic missile target and any decoys, and would be deployed on land as well as at sea. A follow-on version, called Block IIB, with yet higher velocity, is intended to help protect the US East Coast from potential long-range Iranian missiles by about 2020. O'Reilly said the United States and the Hatoyama government had identified all steps necessary to successfully integrate the upgraded Block IIA SM-3 interceptor.

Block IIA is central to European BMD deployments Kyodo News, 6/25/10, Tokyo to relax export ban, send missiles to third countries, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100725a2.html |
Suo The government is set to allow exports to third countries of a new type of ship-based missile interceptor being jointly developed by Tokyo and Washington, sources close to Japan-U.S. relations said Saturday. Europe is considered a likely destination for the Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missile, an advanced version of the SM-3 series, if it is allowed to be shipped to third countries in a relaxation of Japan's decades-long ban on arms exports, the sources said. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates asked Tokyo to consider exporting SM-3 Block 2A missiles in a meeting with Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa last October. The move followed President Barack Obama's September announcement that Washington was abandoning plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. The United States subsequently decided to base its missile defense strategy around SM-3 interceptors, notably for responding to threats from Iranian missiles. SM-3 interceptors are designed to be launched from warships equipped with the sophisticated Aegis air defense system against intermediate ballistic missiles. The United States recently notified Japan of its plans to begin shipping SM-3 Block 2A missiles in 2018 and asked Tokyo to start preparing soon to strike export deals with third countries. Washington's request also concerns the export of advanced versions of the new interceptors, which can also be deployed on the ground, according to the sources.

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US-Japan co-development key to larger US missile defense Jeffrey T. Butler, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, August 2007, The Influence of Politics, Technology, and Asia on the Future of Us Missile Defense,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473239&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf | Suo Japan and the United States began missile-defense cooperation in 1999 after North Koreas test firing of a ballistic missile over Japan. The initial agreement focused on research and development with the level of cooperation increasing in recent years to include agreements on fielding new systems. In December 2005, the two countries confirmed plans to build a large tracking radar in Japan to support both Japanese and US missile-defense efforts. 44 The location of a high-power tracking radar in Japan will provide a substantial boost in detection and tracking capabilities for both countries. Japans government also approved a nine-year, $1.2 billion plan to field its own Aegis BMD capability along with Patriot PAC-3 in order to form a layered defense. 45 The first missiles are scheduled to come online in 2007. In addition, Japan is cooperating with the United States on a new sea-based interceptor, improved command and control, and intelligence sharing. Japan is clearly the most significant missile-defense partner in East Asia, and the increasing level of cooperation is essential for success of the US missile-defense program.

Japan-US cooperation on missile defense is a key model for the world Eric Talmadge, Associated Press Writer, January 29, 2008, In shadow of nuclear North Korea, Japan and U.S. rush to erect anti-missile shield,
Lexis | Suo One of only four in the world, the Joint Tactical Ground Station sits in a field of snow behind the high fences of this remote base in northern Japan like a windowless trailer home with a few good satellite dishes out back. It's not impressive. But this is the front line. In a multibillion-dollar experiment, Japan and the United States are erecting the world's most complex ballistic missile defense shield, a project that is changing the security balance in Asia and has deep implications for Washington's efforts to pursue a similar strategy in Europe, where the idea has been stalled by the lack of willing partners. The station here is the newest piece in the shield. "Japan is one of our strongest allies in the ballistic missile defense arena," said Brig. Gen. John E. Seward, the deputy commanding general of operations for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. In a recent mock-up of how it would work, U.S. military satellites detect a flash of heat from a missile range in North Korea, and within seconds computers plot a rough trajectory across the Sea of Japan that ends in an oval splash-zone outlined in red near Japan's main island. In a real-world crisis, the next 10 or 15 minutes could be the beginning of an all-out shooting war. Millions could die. Or, two missiles could collide in mid-air over the ocean. Washington and Tokyo are banking on the idea that early warning of the kind provided by the Joint Tactical Ground Station, or JTAG, and another state-of-the-art "X-band" radar station recently deployed nearby will lead to the latter. They are pouring a huge amount of resources the U.S. Missile Defense Agency is seeking an $8US billion (euro5.40 billion) budget this year into establishing a credible warning and response network. Though Washington's focus, and world attention, has shifted toward Iran, North Korea has over the past several years made major strides in its development of both nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to the shores of other countries. In October 2006, it conducted its first nuclear test a step that Iran has not taken and more than a decade ago shot a multistage ballistic missile over Japan's main island and well into the Pacific, almost reaching Alaska. Japan's concerns are obvious: Its islands arc around the Korean Peninsula, and relations between the communist North and its former colonial ruler have never been good. But the threat to the United States is also pressing. Under a mutual security pact, the United States has about 50,000 troops deployed around Japan all within reach of North Korea's missiles. The U.S. military last year deployed a Patriot missile battalion to Kadena Air Base, on the southern island of Okinawa. The U.S. and Japanese navies have also increased their ability to intercept ballistic missiles from sea-based launchers. In a test off Hawaii in December, Japan became the first country after the United States to shoot a missile out of the air with a ship-launched SM-3 interceptor. Japan hopes to equip its ships with such interceptor missiles over next several years. The sea-based interceptors, which have a longer range than land-based Patriots, are Japan's first line of defense. Seward said he hopes the alliance with Tokyo on ballistic missile defense will serve as a model for the world.

Japanese BMD cooperation is key to larger missile-defense development in Europe Lars Assmann, 2007, Theater missile defense (TMD) in East Asia: implications for Beijing and Tokyo, Google Books, pg. 411)
Speaking of material strength, Japanese forces may in several years already field the most sophisticated MD technology on the market. Though BMD has always been meant to solely protect the Japanese homeland, the fact remains that technically speaking, the system would enable Japan to become an "East Asian pillar" of a world-spawning anti-missile shield

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currently envisioned by the Bush administration. In MD sophistication, Japan could be linked to TMD platform-possessing allies such as the US, Australia, Israel, and Spain, possibly augmented by Korea, India and other NATO countries. The question to be answered in the future is as to what a degree Tokyo will choose to be integrated with other countries. For the time being, BMD is meant to solely protect the Japanese homeland, but even in this task, Japanese forces are still dependant on cooperating closely with US forces in the Pacific. On the other hand, it is also not a given thing that the idea of greater integration with other countries will be an unappealing idea to Tokyo's political pundits some years down the road. Talk in Japan's political and scholarly community about a wider approach to multilateral security frameworks, military cooperation and conflict resolution in Asia already hint into that direction.

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BMD effectiveness irrelevant it only needs to intercept the second strike upgraded tech means it solves Jeffrey Tayler, contributor on Russia to The Atlantic Monthly, November 2008, Medvedev Spoils the Party,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/medvedev-spoils-the-party/7130/1/ | Suo Second, Obama should put a halt to U.S. missile defense plans. He has not been very forthcoming on this subject, though he has stated that he will evaluate the program based on its cost and likely effectiveness. Those two factors alone should doom it, and could serve as adequate reasons for its termination, without reference to Russian objections. For those who dont know: if missile defense sounds innocuous, the systemeven limited to only ten interceptors, as plans have it now in fact would grant the United States potential offensive leeway vis--vis Russia, in that it could conceivably serve to shoot down the few Russian missiles that would survive an American first strike. True, this presupposes that Russia would not launch its rockets upon determining that it was under attack. But what if the technology substantially improves? What would stop the United States from increasing deployment of interceptors in bases already established? In any case, a U.S. missile defense capability would amount to one more aspect of the Pentagons sought-after full-spectrum dominance. Basing this system so close to Russia makes it inherently provocative, especially in view of Russias aging nuclear arsenal and decaying military.

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Europe BMD Ext Russian Relations Iran

BMD deployment in Europe means Russia wont negotiate to halt Iranian nuclearization Japan Economic Newswire, August 23, 2008, Japanese editorial excerpts -3-, Lexis | Suo
Iran has been repeatedly conducting missile tests and enriching uranium in defiance of a United Nations Security Council resolution. It is understandable that Washington is concerned about the security of Europe, which is within range of Iranian missiles. Still, there are many problems concerning the hasty deployment of the missile defense system. First, Russia strongly objects. The United States says the number of interceptor missiles to be deployed is around 10 and stresses they are not targeted at Russia. But Russia worries that if a missile defense network keeps expanding, it could affect its own deterrence capability. Anticipating the deployment, Russia agreed with Belarus, which shares a border with Poland, to build a joint air defense system. If things go awry, the move could trigger an arms race in Europe. Unlike during the Cold War, the United States and Russia today need each other for international security. Russia, together with the United States and Europe, is participating in diplomatic negotiations to press Iran to stop its uranium enrichment. If the rift between Washington and Moscow deepens because of the missile defense system targeting Iran, the diplomatic initiative toward Tehran would be undermined, making it harder to stop that country's nuclear development. This vicious circle would threaten not only the security of Europe but also that of the whole world.

Iranian nuclearization goes nuclear Sokolsky 3 (Henry, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, POLICY REVIEW, October/November, p.
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3447161.html) If nothing is done to shore up U.S. and allied security relations with the Gulf Coordination Council states and with Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, Iran's acquisition of even a nuclear weapons breakout capability could prompt one or more of these states to try to acquire a nuclear weapons option of their own. Similarly, if the U.S. fails to hold Pyongyang accountable for its violation of the NPT or lets Pyongyang hold on to one or more nuclear weapons while appearing to reward its violation with a new deal--one that heeds North Korea's demand for a nonaggression pact and continued construction of the two light water reactors--South Korea and Japan (and later, perhaps, Taiwan) will have powerful cause to question Washington's security commitment to them and their own pledges to stay non-nuclear. In such a world, Washington's worries would not be limited to gauging the military capabilities of a growing number of hostile, nuclear, or near-nuclear-armed nations. In addition, it would have to gauge the reliability of a growing number of nuclear or near-nuclear friends. Washington might still be able to assemble coalitions, but with more nations like France, with nuclear options of their own, it would be much, much more iffy. The amount of international intrigue such a world would generate would also easily exceed what our diplomats and leaders could manage or track. Rather than worry about using force for fear of producing another Vietnam, Washington and its very closest allies are more likely to grow weary of working closely with others and view military options through the rosy lens of their relatively quick victories in Desert Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Just Cause. This would be a world disturbingly similar to that of 1914 but with one big difference: It would be spring-loaded to go nuclear.

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Russias response to BMD would risk accidental launch, miscalc and loose nukes Bruno Tertrais, Lecturer in World Politics at the Institut dEtudes Politiques in Paris, works as Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defence, 2001, US MISSILE DEFENCE Strategically sound,
politically questionable, April, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/cerwp11.pdf | Suo First, a self-fulfilling prophecy would be created if Moscow, in response to US missile defence, placed more nuclear forces on high alert. This would heighten the risks of an accidental or unauthorised launch. As Michael OHanlon of the Brookings Institution has argued: Whatever threat countries like North Korea may pose to the United States in the coming years, the danger of loose Russian nukes is orders of magnitude greater. It would be folly to address the first concern in a way that exacerbated the second.7 Note, however, that if the Russian government were to react in this way, it would still seriously believe that the US could consider a first strike against it. Thus the missile defence controversy would be hiding a much deeper misunderstanding between the two countries, of which it would only be a symptom.

US-Russia miscalc and accidental launch causes extinction in less than 30 minutes Mintz 1 (Morton, February 26, Two Minutes to Launch, The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?
article=two_minutes_to_launch) Hair-trigger alert means this: The missiles carrying those warheads are armed and fueled at all times. Two thousand or so of these warheads are on the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) targeted by Russia at the United States; 1,800 are on the ICBMs targeted by the United States at Russia; and approximately 1,000 are on the submarine-based missiles targeted by the two nations at each other. These missiles would launch on receipt of three computer-delivered messages . Launch crews--on duty every second of every day--are under orders to send the messages on receipt of a single computer-delivered command. In no more than two minutes, if all went according to plan, Russia or the United States could launch missiles at predetermined targets: Washington or New York; Moscow or St. Petersburg. The early-warning systems on which the launch crews rely would detect the other side's missiles within tens of seconds, causing the intended--or accidental--enemy to mount retaliatory strikes. "Within a half-hour, there could be a nuclear war that would extinguish all of us," explains Bruce Blair. "It would be, basically, a nuclear war by checklist, by rote."

Russian loose nukes cause nuclear war Speice 6 (Patrick F, Jr., JD from and Graduate Research Fellow at Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of
William & Mary, February, Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, Lexis, AV) Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. n39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." n40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. n41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. n42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. n43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. n44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. n45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. n46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, n47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. n48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. n49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. n50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. n51

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This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, n52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

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Europe BMD Impact INF Withdrawal

European BMD causes Russia to withdraw from the INF creating global nuclear conflicts, terrorism, and collapse of the NPT, the CAF, and the CTBT Alexei Arbatov, Academician and professor of the Academy of Defense, Security and Police by the President of Russia, Head of the Center for International Security Center of the Institute for International Economy and International Relationships of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 200 7,
RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 5 No. 3 JULY SEPTEMBER Meanwhile, U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in Central and Eastern Europe may cause Russia to withdraw from the INF Treaty and resume programs for producing intermediate-range missiles. Washington may respond by deploying similar missiles in Europe, which would dramatically increase the vulnerability of Russias strategic forces and their control and warning systems. This could make the stage for nuclear confrontation even tenser. Other centers of power would immediately derive benefit from the growing Russia-West standoff, using it in their own interests. China would receive an opportunity to occupy even more advantageous positions in its economic and political relations with Russia, the U.S. and Japan, and would consolidate its influence in Central and South Asia and the Persian Gulf region. India, Pakistan, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and some exalted regimes in Latin America would hardly miss their chance, either. A multipolar world that is not moving toward nuclear disarmament is a world of an expanding Nuclear Club. While Russia and the West continue to argue with each other, states that are capable of developing nuclear weapons of their own will jump at the opportunity. The probability of nuclear weapons being used in a regional conflict will increase significantly. International Islamic extremism and terrorism will increase dramatically; this threat represents the reverse side of globalization. The situation in Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North and East Africa will further destabilize. The wave of militant separatism, trans-border crime and terrorism will also infiltrate Western Europe, Russia, the U.S., and other countries. The surviving disarmament treaties (the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) will collapse. In a worst-case scenario, there is the chance that an adventuresome regime will initiate a missile launch against territories or space satellites of one or several great powers with a view to triggering an exchange of nuclear strikes between them. Another high probability is the threat of a terrorist act with the use of a nuclear device in one or several major capitals of the world.

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Missile defense in Europe causes Russia to leave the INF kills the treaty as a whole Philip Coyle, Senior Advisor to the World Security Institute, recognized expert on U.S. and worldwide military research, development, and testing, on operational military matters, and on national security policy and defense spending, and Victoria Samson, Center for Defense Information, teaches on national security issues at the graduate International Relations program at St. Mary's University, April 23, Missile Defense Malfunction: Why the Proposed U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe Will Not Work, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 22.1 (Spring 200 8),
http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/001.html

Also linked to the proposed U.S. missile defenses are Russia's vague threats over the past several years to pull out of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This treaty banned a whole range of ballistic missiles (those with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles), and has held up even after the Soviet Union dissolved into its separate republics. Again, this is an idea that has been floated by Russian officials for the past several years, but also again, they seem to be latching on to the U.S. missile defense system in Europe as their primary motivating factor. The initial reason for the INF Treaty was that intermediate-range missiles were considered highly destabilizing, as their short flight times meant they could wreak devastation very quickly and made a retaliatory response almost automatic. Because of the specific dangers inherent in intermediate-range ballistic missiles, there has even been talk about internationalizing the INF Treaty and trying to get other countries in unstable parts of the world to sign it as a way of creating confidence-building measures. However, if Russia pulls out of the INF, it would be almost impossible to convince other countries to sign onto the treaty, and the U.S. incentive to continue to follow its provisions would be vastly reduced.

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Russian withdrawal from the INF causes IRBM proliferation and undermines deterrence against China Stephen Blank, Professor of National Security Affairs at US Army War College, 200 7, August, web.bu.edu/iscip/vol17/Blank2.html | Suo
Nevertheless, abundant ironies exist in Russias position. First, it is a sad commentary on Moscows foreign policy that the only powers that can threaten it with missiles, and which are regarded as potential threats, are Russias so-called friends, Iran and China. Second and even worse, Russian technology and assistance has been instrumental in enhancing both countries conventional and missile capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia has long been engaged with Chinas military in talks and cooperation on missile defenses and space activities and has materially assisted Irans space program. (17) At the same time, withdrawal from the INF treaty, another Russian threat, would allow everyone, including these neighbors and America, to produce IRBMs again. Certainly, NATO could then station IRBMs in the Baltic region and Poland. However, Russias capability for producing IRBMs is strained and could only come at the expense of producing ICBMs, the cornerstone of its military deterrent capability. Thus, withdrawal from the INF will not give Russia more security, but will achieve quite the opposite. (18) Indeed, withdrawal from the INF treaty makes no sense unless one believes that Russia is genuinelyand more importantlyimminently threatened by NATO and cannot meet or deter that threat except by returning to the classic Cold War strategy of holding Europe hostage to nuclear attack, so as to deter Washington and NATO. Of course, that would prompt everyone to build IRBMs as fast as possible for deterrence. Thus the argument that there is no IRBM threat is self-evidently non-credible. The concurrent charge that these missile defenses represent a real threat only to Russias deterrent or military capabilities also is a non-starter. Alexei Arbatov already has demolished that argument in public; the many briefings given by the US to Moscow clearly reflect that fact, as Russian scientists and military-political figures well know. (19) Indeed, in typical Soviet style, the charges regarding American threats simultaneously are mixed with ominous statements by generals and other figures that if these missile defenses are installed, Moscow will have to take adequate measures, among them targeting those defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. (20) Indeed, one almost wishes that they would do so, for it is precisely Russias irresponsibility in regard to arms sales and missile proliferation that has helped to create this threat. Adequate measures against Iranian, North Korean, Pakistani, and Chinese proliferation are definitely to be encouraged.

Extinction Sharavin 1 Alexander Sharavin, 10-3-2001, Defense and Security

Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

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INF withdrawal causes Iskander deployment that makes BMD useless Alexei Arbatov, Director of the center of international security in the institute of world economy and international relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, March 2009, www.icnnd.org/research/Arbatov_INF_Paper.pdf
One of the possible responses to missile defense in Europe being discussed at the official level is the deployment of a division of new OTR Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad Special Military District and two or three in the North Caucasus Military District. Unlike the Iskander-E export version, a ballistic missile with a range of 280 km, Russia plans to bring into service the Iskander-M cruise missile version. This missile system, tested in May 2007 at a range of 500 km, can have its range increased to up to 1,000 km at little cost, but its deployment would require Russia to withdraw from the INF Treaty. One Russian military commander, Col-General Vladimir Zaritsky, said, If a political decision is made to withdraw from this treaty, we will enhance the systems military characteristics, including its flight range12. These missiles would then be able to strike missile defense targets in Poland, the Czech Republic, and perhaps Georgia, and not just with nuclear warheads but also probably with the particularly attractive option of conventional precision-guided warheads13. Europes anti-missile and air defenses are not able to intercept cruise missiles.

Extinction RIA Novosti 8 (10/11, The Iskander: a story of a new face-off, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081110/118218596.html)
In addition, the Iskander can be equipped with more than ballistic missiles. The system can also launch long-range cruise missiles - R-500s have already been test-fired from the Iskander. Potentially, the range of a cruise-missile system can exceed 2,000 kilometers, making it possible to hit targets across Western Europe. Iskander mobile launchers, deployed in Kaliningrad and, potentially, in Belarus, will be capable of delivering a sudden strike, including nuclear warheads, at most of Poland even in standard configuration. Rapid deployment - which takes a few minutes - and the characteristics of the missile itself - increase the probability of engaging targets, especially in view of the fact that main targets - GBI interceptor missile launchers - are fixed. The deployment of Iskanders and electronic countermeasures in Kaliningrad is certain to produce a response from the United States. Its first step will be to hand Patriot ground-to-air missile systems to Poland - an agreement to pass a Patriot battery (12 launchers) with an ammunition load of 96 missiles to the Wojsko Polskie has already been achieved. However, Patriots do not guarantee the safety of GBI missile launchers, and to make them more secure the U.S. might reinforce Poland's Air Force with modern strike aircraft able to destroy Iskanders before they launch their missiles. U.S. Air Force units and formations are likely to be deployed in Poland directly. Russia understands the likelihood of such a development of events. So, in addition to deploying Iskander missile systems and electronic countermeasures in the Kaliningrad Region, it can strengthen its grouping of ground, air force and air defense troops in the area, both by bringing up existing units to scale and by sending in reserves from inside districts. Undoubtedly, such an escalation will increase tensions in Eastern Europe. We are currently observing a reopening of the Cold War's European front, which is now moved several hundred kilometers eastwards. Russia started warning of the undesirability and danger of deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system in Europe many years ago. Its statements have gradually intensified in expression, from regrets over the lack of a normal dialogue to a direct threat to suppress the system with force. The U.S. has meanwhile only chanted the mantra of the anti-Iranian purpose in its European missile shield. The question of "why a missile defense system cannot be deployed in Turkey" has never been completely answered. To sum up, we have the following picture: an "anti-Iranian" missile defense system will be deployed in the next two to three years in an area clearly beyond the reach of Iran's existing and projected missiles, but very convenient for intercepting missiles launched from European Russia in a northern and a north-western direction. The immediate targets of this system are the 28th, 54th, 60th and other Strategic Missile divisions deployed west of the Urals. A simple look at the numbers shows that although there are several Topols and UR-100s for each American interceptor, this ratio would only stand until the first nuclear strike. The concern is that it could be tempting to initiate a strike when you have a system that protects against retaliation. It is only to be hoped that a new U.S. administration will hear Russia's case and agree to develop a mechanism of collective security in Europe. If not, development could be hard to predict.

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Withdrawal from the INF kills Comprehensive Threat Reduction Stephen J. Blank, Professor of National Security Affairs at US Army War College, May 08, 200 6, Is Eurasias Security Order at Risk?,
https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub711.pdf | Suo Moreover, the efforts to withdraw from the INF and CFE treaties are connected to Russian fears that Western militarypolitical pressure will be used to consolidate post Soviet states membership in NATO and/or the European Union (EU) or to compel democratizing reforms in Russia, or elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) where Moscow supports the reigning authoritarians. Since Russia cannot compete militarily with the United States, let alone with NATO, it has discussed openly using its strategic and/or tactical (or so called nonstrategic) nuclear weapons in a first strike mode in the event of a threat by either of those parties against it or its interests in the CIS. Indeed, it long ago gratuitously extended its nuclear umbrella to the CIS even though none of those states invited it to do so. But such contingency planning truly could only be taken to its logical culmination if Moscow frees itself from these two treaties that are pillars of arms control and security in Europe and renounces its interest in European security. Ironically, Russia actually depends for its security on the restraints imposed by those treaties upon NATOs members, including Washington. Moreover, it depends on them for subsidies through the Nunn-Lugar Act or Comprehensive Threat Reduction program to gain control over its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons arsenals. Without that funding, it is quite likely that the recent visible regeneration of the Russian armed forces would have been impeded greatly because at least some of those funds would have had to go to maintain or destroy decaying nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Russia also needs Western, and especially American, help against terrorism emanating from Afghanistan or Iranian and North Korean nuclearization. Therefore, these efforts to withdraw from the relevant treaties are quite misguided, even though Moscows legal right to withdraw from a treaty is obvious. But if Moscow persists in these attempts to weaken, eviscerate, or even leave these treaties, what does that signify concerning its goals, and what, then, is the future of European and Eurasian security?

CTR key to solve nuclear terror Charles Pena, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a former senior fellow with the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project, June 20, 200 7, Cooperative
Threat Reduction Is Worth the Cost, http://www.antiwar.com/pena/?articleid=11161 | Suo Therefore, the best way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to keep nuclear weapons (and the nuclear material to create a weapon) out of the hands of terrorists in the first place that is, dealing with the problem at its source, which is the focus of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Toward that end, perhaps the single-most important U.S. nonproliferation effort is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which seeks to stop proliferation by assisting Russia and the former Soviet countries to destroy or secure nuclear weapons and materials. CTR programs conducted by the Department of Defense include: # The Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) Program to oversee the destruction of strategic weapons and their infrastructure in Russia, in order to reduce the opportunities for their proliferation or use. # The Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS) Program to increase the security of nuclear weapons stored in Russia. # The Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) Program to enhance the security of nuclear weapons during shipment. # The Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) Program to provide centralized, safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage for fissile material removed from nuclear weapons in Russia.

Extinction Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, political analyst, Extinction! August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

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INF withdrawal collapses the nuclear nonproliferation regime Rose Gottemoeller, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 5/4/07, Reading Russia Right,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/opinion/04gottemoeller.html | Suo Another issue he left unaddressed was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Russian military spokesmen have been threatening to withdraw from this treaty, often as a response to United States missile defenses but sometimes to bring Russian missile deployments in line with those of neighboring countries. Mr. Putin might have launched another attack on the missile treaty; he might even have announced Russias full withdrawal. Instead, he took a swipe at the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty but left the door open for talks to solve a long standoff with NATO, which wants Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. This can be resolved without dealing a major blow to security in Europe. Not so withdrawal from the missile treaty: here Russia would begin a slide toward ruining the nuclear arms control system put in place in the closing decade of the cold war. This outcome would encourage countries eager to break out of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It would also ensure that Russia could post no claim to leadership in the world of international law and diplomacy.

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The nonproliferation regime is crucial to prevent nuclear terror and Armageddon

Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, Jan/Feb 2010, Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats, Foreign Affairs, 89 no. 1, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19819/nuclear_disorder.html | Suo In 2004, the secretary-general of the UN created a panel to review future threats to international peace and security. It identified nuclear Armageddon as the prime threat, warning, "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation. " Developments since 2004 have only magnified the risks of an irreversible cascade. The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, and the three most urgent challenges to it are North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. If North Korea and Iran become established nuclear weapons states over the next several years, the nonproliferation regime will have been hollowed out. If Pakistan were to lose control of even one nuclear weapon that was ultimately used by terrorists, that would change the world. It would transform life in cities, shrink what are now regarded as essential civil liberties, and alter conceptions of a viable nuclear order. Henry Kissinger has noted that the defining challenge for statesmen is to recognize "a change in the international environment so likely to undermine a nation's security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears. " The collapse of the existing nuclear order would constitute just such a change -- and the consequences would make nuclear terrorism and nuclear war so imminent that prudent statesmen must do everything feasible to prevent it.

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NPT prevents runaway global proliferation Dunn 9 Senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp [Lewis A, Former assistant director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and ambassador for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the Reagan administration), THE NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009, AV]

Metric: Does NPT adherence provide a leverage point for outside influence and action to prevent proliferation? NPT adherence clearly provides a point of leverage, although the nature of that leverage* and its likely effectiveness*could vary depending on the country. In Irans case, its adherence to the NPT has been most useful as a rallying point for outside efforts to pressure Iranian leaders to think anew about their goals. UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) all reaffirmed the councils support for the NPT, while Resolutions 1747 and 1803 both emphasized the need for all States Parties to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations. Moreover, some key European countries support for actions to stop Irans uranium enrichment activities has been linked to a belief*accurate or not*that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would put at risk the overall NPT structure.19 Amid continuing tensions between the George W. Bush administration and other countries, Irans NPT obligations provided a ready basis to argue that the issue was not simply one of the United States versus Iran. To use a hypothetical example, let us imagine that due to some combination of the most recent North Korean volte-face on giving up its nuclear weapons, tensions with China, and uncertainty about the U.S. security link, pressures grow in Japan to pursue nuclear weapons. In this case, outside powers could use Japans NPT adherence as a leverage point to urge the Japanese leadership to think carefully about whether to take that step. Japans NPT adherence*and the need for it to go through procedures to withdraw from the NPT*would also help buy time for new initiatives to deal with future Japanese security concerns. Still another example of the leverage provided by NPT membership concerns possible action to be taken after a country has violated its obligations and broken out of the NPT. Iran may yet be a future case in point. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, the international community will need to take many actions to contain the regional and global spillovers.20 Those actions could well include measures to make Iran pay a price for violating the NPT*to signal resolve to Iran, to its threatened neighbors, and to the wider NPT community. The fact that Iran would have violated its legal obligations under the NPT would provide a stronger foundation for any such international punitive actions. Metric: Did widespread NPT adherence help reverse the perception that runaway proliferation was unavoidable? In the early 1960s, there was a growing fear that widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons was possibly unavoidable. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that a world with many dozens of nuclear weapon states might emerge. This fear of runaway proliferation gave urgency to the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, not least because of the belief that growing worldwide use of nuclear power would place access to nuclear weapons material in the hands of many countries.21 Such warnings of runaway proliferation, however, could well have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearful of a world of nuclear powers, many countries might have sought nuclear weapons lest they be left behind. Responding to such fears, the United States took actions to enhance the nuclear security of its European non-nuclear allies. In parallel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries joined together to create what became the nonproliferation regime. The NPT was and remains a key part of that regime. Steadily growing membership in the NPT after its opening for signature in 1968*including critical countries in Europe and Asia*provided a valuable symbol that demonstrated to many countries that runaway proliferation was not the wave of the future. So did the prospect of an international system of nuclear safeguards*run by a then-new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*to prevent diversion of nuclear weapon materials from peaceful nuclear uses. In effect, partly because of more traditional security mechanisms and partly due to the growing NPT membership, early fears of a world of runaway global proliferation became a self-denying prophecy. Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a tipping point, that there is a danger of cascading proliferation, and that we could be entering a new nuclear age.22 In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPTs contribution to countering fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations. Article II Net Assessment. The direct impact of Article II in preventing proliferation is mixed. Negotiation of the NPT with its no manufacture, no acquisition obligation forced a number of countries to decide whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. Faced with that decision, important countries chose to renounce nuclear weapons. In deciding, states were motivated by a mix of considerations, and the NPT helped crystallize their decisions. By contrast, some prominent NPT parties have stayed in the NPT while pursuing nuclear weapons: North Korea, Iraq, and Libya*and quite possibly Iran. The indirect impact of Article II may be more compelling. The no acquisition, no manufacture obligation provides a nonproliferation leverage point for rallying outsiders, for engaging in dialogue with countries rethinking their nonproliferation commitment, and for taking action after NPT breakout. Successful negotiation of the NPT and Article II contributed significantly to reversing earlier fears of runaway worldwide proliferation. Today, adherence to Article II still provides a potentially valuable means to counter renewed fears of such a world*assuming there is compliance with NPT obligations.

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Nonproliferation tools are the only way to avert nuclear war all other methods fail Daryl G Kimball, President of Arms Control Association, 2003, The New Nuclear Proliferation Crisis,
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1422 | Suo Even as the nonproliferation system has become more sophisticated, the challenges it confronts have become more complex. Over the last decade, the NPT has endured successive crises involving Iraqi and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Iran now appears to be on the verge of a nuclear weapons capability. Non-NPT member states India, Pakistan, and Israel have advanced their nuclear weapons programs with relative impunity. The possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons has added a new layer of risk. In the face of these problems, it has become fashionable for many U.S. policymakers to dismiss arms control and nonproliferation as ineffective. Instead, they emphasize the role of pre-emptive military action and the pursuit of new nuclear-weapon capabilities to dissuade and destroy adversaries seeking weapons of mass destruction. Such an approach would forfeit essential nonproliferation tools and provide a false sense of security. In practical terms, military pre-emption is no substitute for a comprehensive and consistent preventive approach. As the recent U.S. experience in Iraq shows, wars cost lives and money and lead to unintended consequences; nonmilitary solutions should not be undervalued. Iraqs nuclear program was actually dismantled through special international weapons inspections, which likely could have contained the Iraqi weapons threat if they had been allowed to continue. Proliferation problems in North Korea and Iran defy easy military solutions. In both cases, multilateral diplomacy aimed at the verifiable halt of dangerous nuclear activities is the preferred course. Nuclear proliferation must be met with firm resolve but not in a way that creates an even more uncertain and dangerous future. Rather, the United States must strengthen and adaptnot abandonpreventive diplomacy and arms control. Nonproliferation efforts have succeeded when U.S. leadership has been consistent and steadfast. The NPT security framework has led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. The NPT is so broadly supported that, in addition to the original five nuclear-weapon states, only three clearly have nuclear arsenals and they are outside the NPT. Cooperation with international inspections and safeguards against proliferation are now a standard expectation of all states. U.S.-Soviet agreements corralled their nuclear arms competition and increased transparency, thereby reducing instability and the risk of nuclear war.

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Russia not withdrawing from the INF now political and military opposition Nikolai Sokov, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 200 6, Russia Military Debates Withdrawal from the Inf Treaty,
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I9/I9_R1_RussianMilitary.htm It is difficult to assess the likelihood of Russia withdrawing from the INF Treaty. It is clear that there are proponents of such a step both among parts of the uniformed military and in some sectors of the defense industry. Opposition is also strong and opponents have raised a number of powerful objections. Some influential parts of the military (in particular the Air Force and the Navy), as well as a significant part of the defense industry, may have an additional concern -- they stand to lose if still-scarce funding is reoriented toward missile production. The fact that Defense Minister Ivanov has repeatedly endorsed the idea also appears significant, although it is unclear whether he genuinely favors this option or is simply using it as a bargaining chip vis--vis the United States and NATO to gain concessions on other issues. Ultimately, this decision will be made by Russias political leadership, not the military, and it does not seem likely that the current political leadership will seriously entertain a step that could reduce the predictability of the international system and could potentially lead to considerable political and security costs.

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US-Japan missile defense cooperation causes Russian modernization, economic collapse, and global proliferation Stephen J. Blank, Professor of Russian Studies at the U.S. Army War College, March 200 9, Russia and Arms Control: are There Opportunities for
the Obama Administration?, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf | Suo As McDonough showed above, U.S. force deployments in the Pacific theater definitely threaten Russian nuclear assets and infrastructure as well as its territory and conventional forces. 243 A second major Russian concern is the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the twin forms of joint missile defenses and the apparent consolidation of a tripartite or possibly quadripartite alliance including Australia and South Korea, if not India. In that context, both Moscow and Beijing worry that North Korean nuclearization might lead Japan to build nuclear weapons. But beyond that, for both Russia and China, one of the most visible negative consequences of the DPRKs nuclear and missile tests has been the strengthened impetus it gave to U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense. The issue of missile defense in Asia had been in a kind of abeyance until the North Korean nuclear tests of 2006. These tests, taken in defiance of Chinese warnings against nuclearization and testing, intensified and accelerated U.S.-Japanese collaboration on missile defenses as the justification for them had now been incontrovertibly demonstrated. But such programs always entail checking Chinas nuclear capabilities and even, according to Beijing, threatening it with a first strike. Naturally those developments greatly annoy China. 244 Therefore China continues publicly to criticize U.S.-Japan collaboration on missile defenses. 245 Perhaps this issue was on Chinese President Hu Jintaos agenda in September 2007 when he called for greater Russo-Chinese cooperation in Asia-Pacific security. 246 His remarks may have prompted Russia to act or speak out against these trends in Asia for Russia, having hitherto been publicly reticent to comment on this missile defense cooperation or to attack the U.S. alliance system in Asia, reacted quite strongly. 247 During Lavrovs visit to Japan in October 2007 and despite his strong pitch for Russo-Japanese economic cooperation, he publicly warned that Russia fears that this missile defense system represents an effort to ensure American military superiority and that the development and deployment of such systems could spur regional and global arms races. Lavrov also noted that Russia pays close attention to the U.S.-Japan alliance and was worried by the strengthening of the triangle comprising both these states and Australia. 248 He observed that a closed format for military and political alliances does not facilitate peace and will not be able to increase mutual trust in the region, thereby triggering reactions contrary to the expectations of Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra. 249 More recently, at the 2008 annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) in Singapore, Lavrov again inveighed against narrow military alliances, claiming that Asian-Pacific security should be all-inclusive and indivisible, the work of all interested parties, not blocs. Any such activity must enhance strategic balance and take account of everyones interests and be based on international law, i.e., the Security Council where Moscow has a veto. 250 Lavrovs complaints show what happens when bilateral cooperation breaks down and, as a result of proliferation, overall regional tensions increase, in this case in Northeast Asia. Russia has responded to the U.S. missile defense program in both Europe and Asia by MIRVing its existing and older ICBMs, (that is, putting so called MIRVs [missiles] onto its missiles in silos) leaving the START-2 treaty, creating hypersonic missiles that allegedly can break through any American missile defense system, introducing new Topol-Ms mobile ICBMs that also allegedly can break those defenses, and testing the Bulava SLBM with similar characteristics. Still Moscow apparently thought this was not enough, and only 6 weeks after Lavrovs public complaints in Japan, Vice-Premier Sergei Ivanov called for nuclear parity with Washington, even though the quest for such parity would undoubtedly undermine Russias economy unless he meant the retention of strategic stability, albeit at unequal numbers of missiles. Nevertheless, the real threat for Moscow here is the U.S. policy to build missile defenses and an alliance excluding Russia and China, not Japanese missile defenses. Those defenses are mainly directed formally against North Korean missiles and in reality the threat of Chinese missiles, not Russia.

Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war Filger 9 (Sheldon, 5/10, Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis_b_201147.html)
In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been

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forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

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Block 2A forces a lift of the ban economic pressures PanOrient News, 6/25/10, Tokyo's Weapons Export Ban Breaking Down, http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=223 | Suo
Tokyo -- This weekend brings strong confirmation that diplomatic and business interests are slowly winning out against the long-term Japanese ban on weapons exports. The ban has remained largely intact since 1967. Reports have emerged that Tokyo has given the nod to the idea of exporting a new type of ship-based missile interceptor to countries other than the United States. The Standard Missile-3 Block 2A missile is being jointly developed by the United States and Japan - and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates demanded approval to eventually export this missile abroad. Tokyo's weapons export ban is based on the principles of the nation's pacifist constitution and expresses, as the Foreign Ministry has put it, "Japan's position as a peace-loving nation." The goal of the ban is "to avoid any possible aggravation of international conflicts." Then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the initial ban in the Diet in April 1967, and it was further strengthened in February 1976. Since the 1980s, however, the export ban has gradually weakened under political pressures from the Pentagon as well as from Japan's own business lobbies. In 1983, exports of arms technology to the United States were excluded from the ban. Other "dual use" items have also been exported through the creative use of classification systems. Moreover, Keidanren - the leading business lobby - has been making a concerted push in recent months for the ban to be eased, arguing that the weapons export ban is "putting the country in the state of technological isolation" at a time in which it faces threats from North Korea and China. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa showed sympathy with this view in January when he told a meeting of the Japan Association of Defense Industry that "the time may have come to review our fundamental thinking [on the weapons export ban]." The whole issue shows similarity to Tokyo's recent decision to begin civilian nuclear energy negotiations with non-NPT nation India. The same coalition of US diplomatic demands and Japanese big business pressures is overcoming the long-held, principled positions of the past. With Japan unable to find vibrant new sources for economic growth, it is now trying its hand at the exports of nuclear technologies and, perhaps soon enough, weapons systems.

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Weapons Exports Ext Kills US Defense

Japan defense growth means it directly competes with US industry Gregory P. Corning, candidate in the Masters Program, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, March 19 89, U.S.Japan Security Cooperation in the 1990s: The Promise of High-Tech Defense, Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 3, JSTOR | Lexis Criticism of a U.S. emphasis on military-related, high-tech cooperation with Japan centers upon three concerns: the possible emergence of Japan as a competitor to the Western arms industry, the question of whether Japan can be trusted with classified technologies, and the reaction of major Asian-Pacific actors to such a development in U.S.-Japan relations. The possible emergence of Japan as a competitor to the American and European arms industries is a legitimate worry. The private sector, which it is hoped will see a marked increase in industry-to-industry cooperation, views high-tech cooperation in terms of potential profit and not as an opportunity to increase the political, social, and economic stability of U.S.Japan relations. There is also disagreement among defense specialists as to the threat posed by Japan. William Tow warns that without policy consensus between Tokyo and Washington on how technology transfers should work, Japan might well accelerate the buildup of its own defense production [capabilities outside of U.S. controls.27 Indeed, the Defense Science Board predicts that there eventually will be competition from Japanese industry on defense exports. Looking after bureaucratic interests in potential defense gains, however, the Pentagon study team concluded that the strategic benefits outweigh any risks of cooperation. France and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, are more concerned with the threat of Japanese competition. In 1981 the two countries sent a joint note to the Japanese government warning against arms exports.28 I

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BMD is part of our presence realignment strategy interceptors are deployed at US bases and we cooperate on response. International Kyodo News, "2ND LD: U.S. to deploy PAC-3 missile interceptors in Okinawa from August," July 20, 2006, The Free Library
Farlex | VP

In an agreement reached between Japan and the United States in May on the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan, the U.S. government said it would deploy PAC-3 missile interceptors at U.S. military facilities in Japan and make them operational at the earliest possible time. The PAC-3 system is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in their final phase , after they have reentered the Earth's atmosphere and have descended to altitudes of just over a dozen kilometers and before they reach their targets on the ground, the officials said. The interceptors, which are said to have a firing range of around 20 kilometers, would destroy their targets by impact and carry no explosives, they said. As part of efforts to build ballistic missile defense capabilities in Japan with the cooperation of the United States, Japan's Defense Agency also plans to deploy the Self-Defense Forces' first PAC-3 missile interceptors by next March, the officials said. Tokyo and Washington are proceeding with setting up a two-step missile defense system in Japan in which an incoming ballistic missile is dealt with by first firing a Standard Missile-3 interceptor from a destroyer at sea when the missile is still outside the atmosphere, and if that fails, firing the PAC-3 interceptor .

Presence includes all overseas military assets engaged in routine, non-combat functions, including interoperability missions James S. Thomason, Project Leader with Institute for Defense Analyses, "Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD," July 2002, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954 | VP
WHAT IS OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE? Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities or functions.1 By this definition, forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are engaging in combat (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be engaged in presence activities, may or may not be doing presence. We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in negative termswhat they are not. In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing? Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the umbrella concept of military presence. These include but are not limited to US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries; to improve interoperability of US and friendly forces; to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency should call for them.2

That includes funding and co-production of military equipment. James S. Thomason, Project Leader with Institute for Defense Analyses, "Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD," July 2002, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954 | VP
This is generally consistent, for example, with B. Dismukes formulation: Overseas presence encompasses a variety of activities. In addition to permanent and rotational forces forward on the ground, forces deployed at sea, and prepositioned equipment, overseas presence includes: exercises and training of US forces with those of friends and allies; unilateral training by US forces on foreign soil; US C3I systems, especially in their bilateral and multilateral roles; arrangements for access by US forces to facilities overseas; stationing and visits abroad by senior US military and defense officials; visits to port and airfields by US naval and air forces; public shows by demonstration teams such as Thunderbirds and a host of public affairs activities, including military musical groups; staff-to-staff talks and studies with foreign military organizations and analytical groups; exchanges of military people between the US and friends and allies; military training of foreign personnel in the US and in their home countries; training of military officers of former totalitarian and some developing states in the roles of the military in a civil society; foreign military sales and funding and co-production of military equipment with other nations. [pp. 1314]

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BMD cooperation is an interoperability mission Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Operations: Cooperation between Japan and the US on BMD operations in Northeast Asia will require a level of coordination between US and Japanese defense forces that gives unprecedented meaning to the term interoperability. Issues of concern here include timely sharing of critical intelligence data, development of an effective command, control, and communications (C3) infrastructure, and revision of outdated polices that obstruct joint response to imminent missile threats.

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Japan doesnt care about BMD Monterey Institute, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 20 10, BMD and Japan, http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2d3_4.html
| Suo Despite these efforts in missile defense, the issue of missile defense in Japan continues to be controversial. Many Japanese are reluctant to embrace U.S. BMD plans fully because of concerns about costs, technological effectiveness, and the negative regional security and arms control implications of such a system. In December 2009 the Japanese government decided to "de-fund" the deployment of its PAC-3 interceptors based on land, and moved the expected date for redeployment to 2011. The decision was reportedly influenced by contingents in the Japanese government critical of missile defense.

Japan dislikes BMD costs Masako Toki, Fellow at the Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 200 8, Under Fukuda, Japan Accelerates
Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation with the United States, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I22/I22_EA5_JapanAcceleratesBMD.htm | Suo Opposition to BMD in Japan remains significant, based primarily on the considerable cost of the system. [8] According to the Ministry of Defense, the missile defense program is estimated to cost between 800 billion yen ($7.4 billion) and one trillion yen ($8.9 billion) through 2012. However, since Japan plans to continue to pursue still more advanced technologies, costs are likely to increase well beyond this amount. [9] According to the Ministry of Defense, fiscal year 2007, because it was the first year of actual deployment, is expected to mark the greatest annual expenditure for missile defense to date 186.3 billion yen ($1.7 billion). [10] The total budget allocated for missile defense for fiscal year 2008 is 171.4 billion yen ($1.6 billion), only slightly lower than 2007. [11] Some Japanese defense industry officials assert that the domestic defense industry does not benefit from the governments spending on BMD, because U.S.-developed and built SM-3s are used for flight tests. [12] In response to such criticism, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has insisted, We cant talk about how much money should be spent when human lives are at stake. [13]

Public doesnt care about BMD Masako Toki, project manager in the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 16 January 2009, Missile defense in Japan, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan | Suo
The Japanese people. The socio-cultural reticence in Japan to any military engagement hasn't made the country's populace fully tolerant of missile defense. Nevertheless, the recent threats from North Korea have dimmed opposition. A 2006 public opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office indicated that 56.6 percent of respondents supported missile defense; similarly, a Yomiuri-Gallup public opinion poll [in Japanese] conducted in December 2006 showed that 60 percent of respondents supported it. For those against it, cost seems to be a primary reason why. According to the Ministry of Defense, the missile defense program is estimated to cost Japan $7.4 billion to $8.9 billion through 2012. And since Tokyo plans to pursue still more advanced technologies, costs are likely to increase.

Japan dislikes BMD fears diplomatic entrapment Christopher W. Hughes, Principal Research Fellow & Acting Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, December 2006, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared, http://www.garneteu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1106.pdf | Suo Japans principal fear, though, as always, has been the risks of entrapment resulting from close bilateral cooperation with the US on BMD, especially due to the fashion in which BMD closes down many of its traditional hedging strategies against this eventuality. In turn, Japans alliance dilemmas vis--vis the US generated by BMD, are themselves compounded by BMDs generation of security dilemmas in East Asia which force ever greater reliance on the US-Japan alliance. Japans existing security dilemma vis--vis North Korea is well known. Japans participation in BMD, although not likely to stimulate the Norths already on-going missile programme which is so vital to its diplomatic and military campaign to break out of its international isolation, is also unlikely to curb the Norths build-up of its missile forces, and this is despite opinions which see BMD as a means to convince the North of the futility of threatening Japan and the US.

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BMD cooperation kills Japans mobility within the alliance poisons long term relations Christopher W. Hughes, Principal Research Fellow & Acting Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, December 2006, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared, http://www.garneteu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1106.pdf | Suo Japans participation in BMD, although adding a degree of defensive capability, at the same time looks set to complicate its security dilemmas with North Korea and especially China, and emphasises for Japanese policy-makers the extreme caution needed in managing the project and entrapment risks with the US. However, BMD by the very nature of the technological and political-military decisions that it imposes on Japan undercuts hedging options to manage these risks. Firstly, Japans ability to evade and temporise is a limited option under participation in BMD. Japan during the uncertainties of the Clinton administration certainly practiced a type of wait and see option before committing itself to any specific project or architecture that might mean it entering into BMD on terms that overly strategically disadvantaged it against the US. Japanese policy-makers held to their scheme of breaking decisions about BMD into the stages of research, development, production and deployment, contrasting with the US two-stage process of development and deployment, thus attempting to reserve the right to work to Japans own schedule and take considered political decisions at stage. Japan has persevered with this scheme during the Bush administration as wellfor instance, still insisting, despite agreeing to joint development with the US of the SM-3 interceptor in 2006, that a further decision is still necessary on actual production. Nevertheless, despite Japans subtle hedging to buy time in the BMD project, in the end, as seen above, it was effectively bounced into the project by the US unilateral decision to move ahead with MD deployment, obliging Japan to follow. Moreover, once the BMD system is actually deployed, there will clearly be no opportunity for temporisation in its operation. In past regional and global contingencies, Japan has been able to work through its convoluted decision-making processes to take a decision on the necessary action. In certain cases, this has taken weeks or months, and even Koizumis unprecedented swift response to 9/11 took a matter of days. By contrast, BMDs timeframe of less than ten minutes being available to launch missile interceptors, means that Japanese policy-makers and military commanders will have to respond in real-time and nearly instantaneously to missile attacks and participation in a conflict that may spell an active commitment to military cooperation with the US. Secondly, Japans capacity to emphasise domestic political and constitutional restrictions will be severely hampered by BMD. Clearly the tight timeframes of BMD mean there is no scope to plead the need for consultation with domestic opinion in responding to a launch. Japanese policy-makers also face increasing pressure resulting from BMD for the breach on the prohibition on collective self-defence. BMD systems demand the free flow of sensor information not only from the US side, but also reverse flows from the Japanese to US side, in order to function effectively. The US, for instance, in April 2004, requesting that Japan make available sensor information from its FPS-3UG radar stations for US Navy missile defence assets.26 From 2005 onwards Japan and the US began joint training for the exchange of information on missile tracking between their respective AWS ships.27 Japan and the US carried out a similar exercise in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises in July 2004. The agreement in the SCC Joint Statement of May 2006 to establish BJOCC is further designed to promote bilateral information sharing. Japans government maintains that this information exchange will not necessarily conflict with existing prohibitions on collective self-defence as it may be classified as routine information-gathering that is not directed specifically for the exercise of the use of force in support of an ally.28 Its policymakers also hope that a technological solution can be worked out which means that, even though Japanese and US command functions will be physically collocated at BJOCC, personnel will be housed in separate facilities and that any data which conflicts with the collective self defence interpretation can be sifted out of the exchange system. This demonstrates the extraordinary lengths that Japan is prepared to go to in order to preserve its collective self-defence option, but as they admit the operation of such a system and its technological components are still under study.29 Moreover, Japan will also find it increasingly hard to hold the line on collective self defence due to the changed nature of US missile defence programmes. The Bush administrations incorporation of all missile systems into one multi-layered global system raises questions as to whether Japans Aegis system with its possible break out capabilities against ICBMS launched from East Asia against the US could thus be viewed as functioning for purposes of collective self-defence. If Japan were to engage in BPI missile defences, then this would further strengthen the collective self defence argument, as it would be near impossible to determine if missiles shot down over their launch sites were targeted at Japan or the US. Thirdly, Japans ability to obfuscate and delimit is thrown into doubt by BMD. As noted above, Japan will be highly dependent on the US for space-based sensor information to maximise the effectiveness of the BMD system, or it will be left with a highly weapons system that will only sub-optimally without the cooperation of its ally. Japans dependency was first shown by the Taepodong-1 test of 1998, when, in spite of its Aegis destroyers managing to detect part of the flight path of the missile, ultimately it had to rely on information passed from US satellites on the final impact point. The JDA was again embarrassed in July 2006, when the US reportedly used its satellite information to point out to the Japanese government

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that the Taepondong-2 exploded only 1.5 kilometres from its launch pad over North Koreas own territorial waters 400-600 kilometres away in the Sea of Japan as originally estimated by Japanese officials.30 Japans continued dependence on US ascendancy in sensor information for BMD, its major weapons project this decade, therefore means that its entire security strategy must be geared even further to the general appeasement of its US ally if it wishes to defend itself.31 Moreover, BMDs technological nature means that Japans policy-makers will no longer be able to employ the type of ambiguity found in the revised Defence Guidelines in order to obfuscate the true extent of their military support for the US. The short time frame involved for a BMD system to respond to a missile launch means that there will no time for Japans political leaders to debate decisions on interceptor launches. [CONTINUED]

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[CONTINUED] Instead, Japans government will have to provide JSDF commanders in the field with clear rules of engagement to deal with a range of pre-planned scenarios that would commit Japan to a conflict. All of this necessitates increased Japanese planning for regional contingencies, much of which will inevitably involve closer coordination with the US and revealing to it in more definite terms the types of scenarios that would trigger Japanese military support for its ally. Japans preparation for these rules of engagement has already involved softening of the principle of civilian control over the military with the February 2005 legislation to amend the Defence Agency Establishment Law. This legislation enables the Director General of the JDA to mobilise the JSDF to launch interceptors only with the approval of the Prime Minister (rather than in consultation with the Cabinets National Security Council as mandated under the present law). In other situations, where there is no time to consult even with the Prime Minister, the Director General is entitled to mobilise JSDF interceptor launches in accordance with preplanned scenarios.32 This thus gives a more free-ranging role to commanders in the field, and greater potential for them to offer support to the US. BMD also threatens to transgress Japans previous attempts to limit the geographical scope of its commitments to the US under the security treaty to the defence of Japan and the Far East. The US Navys Aegis cruisers have been engaged in a pattern of patrols that suggests their principal role is to gather data to support US MD systems for homeland defence.33 Similarly, the US has made it apparent that the deployment of an X-Band radar in Shakiri is part of a range of forward-deployed sensors that are integrated with ground-based terminal phase MD for defence of the US mainland.34 In this way, Japan has further lost its ability to delimit the scope of the security treaty, it functioning now not only for global contingencies as far as the Middle East but also for the defence of US territory. Fourthly, Japans ability to withhold or add capability to hedge against entrapment looks to be increasingly denuded by the technological demands of BMD. In the past, as noted earlier in the paper, Japan has denied the US the opportunity to seek to integrate it into international or collective self-defence coalitions simply by avoiding the procurement of suitable or interoperable expeditionary capabilities that would make it an object of such a request or expose it to highly risky conflicts. BMD threatens to change this calculation as Japan now possesses a sea-mobile weapons system which has a range of defensive power of close to 2,000 kilometres. It is thus likely to face increasing calls for the US to add this weaponry to the inventory of ad hoc coalitions. The enhanced possibility for demands for deployment in contingencies involving Taiwan has already been discussed. Japan has also been given warnings of the shape of things to come through the USs pressure for it to deploy the fully interoperable Aegis destroyers in the Indian Ocean post-9/11, and may face calls in the future for projecting a defensive shield over US offensive power projection in other theatres such as the Middle East. Hence, the simple lesson for Japan is that possession of capability spells expanded US demands and the possibility of entrapment.35 Japanese policy-makers lack as well the ability to hedge against entrapment through adding autonomous capacity that would counter-balance dependence on the US in BMD. Japan has plumped in the first instance to purchase an off-the-shelf interceptor system from the US with black-boxed technology. Japans early disadvantage in BMD technologies will thus be further entrenched. The joint programme with the US for the upgrade to the SM-3 interceptor missile offers some prospect for Japan to maintain indigenous capabilities to contribute to BMD, especially in infrared sensors and rocket technology. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries eventually managed also to secure agreement for licensed production of the upgraded PAC-3 interceptor missile from Lockheed-Martin, despite the Japanese government having initially gone ahead and agreed to procure the system without such an agreement.36 Upgrades to the JADGE system will further provide technological upgrade possibilities for Japanese defence contractors.37 Japanese policy-makers have also struggled to try to strengthen sensor capabilities. Japans indigenous optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite capabilities, introduced after the Taepodong-1 test, will assist Japan to detect preparations for North Korean missile launches. The new FPS-XX radar should also assist in supplementing Aegis radars, and Japan since September 2005 has also been working on the development of IRST systems with the US. All the same, as the July missile tests demonstrated, Japan remains dependent on US infrared technologies and is unlikely to be able to add these to its capabilities in the future. Hence, the general prognosis is that Japans defence industry, already under pressure due to declining defence budgets and economies of scale to develop leading edge military technologies, is most likely to be end up as the sub-contractor in BMD for US corporations. Clearly, Japans participation in BMD offers opportunities for technological innovation that would have been unavailable if it stepped aside from the project. Indeed, many Japanese defence contractors are relatively content with this situation as it offers the prospects of some technology transfer from the US, an increase in orders and practice in joint production. The breach on the arms export rules to the US for the BMD also offer an opening to the further weakening of restrictions in the future that might pave the way to greater international cooperation with US and non-European contracts.38 But Japans participation in BMD is far from providing it with an autonomous set of BMD technologies and only increases its need to depend on the US for the functioning of its largest defensive system. Finally, Japan looks barred

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from exercising any type of commit and partially retract option. Japan has already pledged itself to the deployment of BMD and restructured its entire procurement budget and JSDF operational system to accommodate this new weapons system. Once in operation, moreover, as pointed out before, the decision-making process on the systems use will be so rapid and so devolved as to make retraction impractical in the onset of conflict.

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BMD precludes diplomatic efforts thats the only way to solve North Korean nukes and they would never attack anyway Sam Roggeveen, a former intelligence analyst, is the editor of the Lowy Institute's blog, March 27, 200 9, Long-range view of eccentric regime,
Lexis | Suo Yet those curly questions pale against the true significance of an Australian missile defence capability in this scenario. Our air warfare destroyers could not intercept a long-range North Korean missile but they could help track one using their powerful radars. In missile defence, fast and accurate information is critical, and the US and Japan have deployed a suite of radars and satellites to help them shoot down a missile aimed at them. If Australia had a missile defence capability on its destroyers today, we could sail north to form part of that network, and thus help defend Japan and the US. Put yourself in Kim Jong-il's shoes. If you are intent on raining nuclear destruction down on your enemies and you have only one missile on the launchpad, would you take the risk of trying to get through those defences? Perhaps, but it might also cross your mind to fire the missile at a less-defended target. A US ally, perhaps, with widely dispersed cities that are big targets for your highly inaccurate missile. There's the rub: by sending our ship north to help protect our allies, we would strengthen their defences, making it more likely that North Korea would fire its missile at us instead. Talk about an own goal. None of this is likely to happen. First of all, North Korea's technology is primitive, and it may never develop a truly long-range missile. Second, Australia is just not that important to North Korea. There would be plenty of other undefended targets to hit. And third, Kim Jong-il knows that if he ever tried a nuclear sneak attack, the US would retaliate, and then some. The Pyongyang regime may be eccentric, but it shows no sign of being suicidal. Ballistic missile defence is seductive because it promises a neat technological fix to a problem - the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction - for which we currently only have messy diplomatic solutions. But missile defence cannot solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons. At best, it buys America and Japan some time in negotiations with North Korea and gives them a useful tool for managing tensions such as those we are now experiencing as a result of Pyongyang's latest piece of brinkmanship. Unfortunately, missile defence could have the perverse effect of increasing the North Korea threat for Australia. Were we to invest in missile defence, we might actually contribute to that deterioration in our security. That is why the "messiness" of a diplomatic solution will continue to be the best hope for Australia and its friends and allies who want to disarm North Korea. Collectively, there is simply nothing for it but to hold our noses, sit down and talk to Pyongyang.

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AT: Japan BMD Good General

Japan BMD is useless Sachiko Sakamaki and Takashi Hirokawa, staff writers for Bloomberg, citing Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, former deputy defense spokesman for the DPJ, Ph.D. in international politics from Johns Hopkins University, 11 Sep 200 9, Japans New Government to Seek Missile Defense Budget Cut,
Yamaguchi Says, http://www.hedgehogs.net/pg/newsfeeds/keny/item/845616/japans-new-government-to-seek-missile-defense-budget-cutyamaguchi-says Japans new government will likely cut missile defense spending because it isnt effective in thwarting attacks from countries such as North Korea, a senior Democratic Party of Japan official said. Missile defense is almost totally useless, said Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi , a Lower House lawmaker who served as the partys deputy defense spokesman prior to its Aug. 30 election victory. Only one or two out of 100 are ever effective. Even in shooting down a normal bomber, the odds are maybe 20 or 30 percent, he said yesterday in an interview in his Tokyo office. Reducing missile defense would come as North Korea, Japans closest military threat, boosts its nuclear and missile capability. Yamaguchi, the author of a book on the U.S.-Japan defense alliance, said trimming military expenditures is necessary to offset prime minister-designate Yukio Hatoyamas plans to increase social welfare spending and tuition aid. Well probably cut the defense budget, said Yamaguchi, who holds a Ph.D. in international politics from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. Theres so much else we have to do, such as child-care allowance, education, health care and pensions. Japans defense ministry is requesting a 58 percent increase to 176.1 billion yen ($1.9 billion) on missile defense in next years budget, as part of 4.85 trillion yen in spending, up three percent from this year. The ministry is developing a missile shield using the land-based Patriot PAC-3 system and the Standard Missile-3 used on Aegis-equipped destroyers. LDP Policy Any reduction in missile defense development would contrast with the outgoing administration of the Liberal Democratic Party, which has governed Japan for all but 10 months since 1955. The party in June suggested Japan consider possessing the capability to attack enemy bases after North Korea fired a ballistic missile that flew over Japan in April. North Korea, which in May tested a second nuclear device, last week said its in the final stages of weaponizing plutonium and can either engage in negotiations or accelerate its program. The communist country has also tested several short and medium- range missiles this year, and in April walked out of disarmament talks involving the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. Regardless of the threat from North Korea, defense specialists must know that no number of SM3s or PAC3s can directly protect us, Yamaguchi said.

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AT: Japan BMD Good China

Chinese MIRVs could easily overwhelm BMD William Choong, Senior Writer for The Strait Times, July 11, 200 8, What China fears: Sword behind samurai, Lexis | Suo
Japan's growing BMD capability - boosted by so-called ground-based mid-course defence capabilities in Alaska and California - will have a significant impact on China's nuclear arsenal. According to the US-based intelligence consultancy Strategic Forecasting, China has about 100 missiles capable of reaching Tokyo and fewer than 50 able to hit Washington. But Chinese development of its nuclear deterrent will easily overwhelm such nascent BMD capability. For instance, the Chinese are installing multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles on its long-range missiles which will put three warheads on a long-range missile instead of one. This puts Beijing well ahead of current Japanese-American BMD efforts. (Moreover, some analysts note that China has consistently declared that it has a 'no-first use' nuclear policy; in this case, why should it worry about its nuclear arsenal being nullified when its missiles are 'defensive' and not aimed at anyone? The Chinese could, of course, argue that they plan to employ their nuclear deterrent only - and only after - a first strike by either Japan or the US.) A weightier concern is that Japanese BMD will accelerate arms races in Asia. Analysts call this the 'action-reaction' cycle - that defences spur the build-up of offensive weapons. In a widely quoted speech in 2001, former French president Jacques Chirac said that in the 'struggle between sword and shield, there is no instance in which the shield has won'.

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US cooperation is crucial to Japanese BMD The Daily Yomiuri, July 24, 2005, Editorial: Japan, U.S. cooperation vital to missile defense, Lexis | Suo
The issue is how to use the system most effectively. We think enhancement of coordination between Japanese and U.S. forces is most important. In the first phase of the missile defense system, a ballistic missile flying toward Japan would be intercepted with a Standard Missile 3 (SM3), fired from a Maritime Self-Defense Force Aegis destroyer. If the SM3 misses, the enemy missile would be intercepted with a surface-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC3) missile system to be deployed in the metropolitan and other areas. It would only take 10 minutes for a missile fired from North Korea to reach Japan. In order to detect the launch of a ballistic missile, and to accurately track and destroy it, Japan and the United States need to share data from SDF radars and a U.S. early warning satellite. The missile defense system will not function properly without a unified effort by the two countries. The organization and operation of the SDF must be changed, too. Along with the SDF law, the Defense Agency Law also has been revised to enhance joint operations of air, ground and maritime forces. The Chief of the Joint Staff, under the director general of the Defense Agency, will command the three forces. Japan is behind North American and European countries in terms of joint operation of military forces. SDF troops must be trained quickly to realize efficient joint operations. The capability of interceptor missiles also must be improved. More than one threat North Korea is not the only country that poses a threat to Japan. According to an annual report by the U.S. Defense Department, China is enhancing its deployment of mid-range nuclear missiles, which can reach any part of Japan, and trying to improve their capability. According to the Defense Agency, results of an experiment conducted in Hawaii by the U.S. military showed that an SM3 could intercept six out of seven missiles, and PAC3 missiles successfully intercepted 10 out of 12 attempts. In reality, however, if even one missile is not shot down, it will cause tremendous damage to the lives and assets of Japanese people. Accuracy of interception has to be further improved. Japan and the United States have been jointly developing a sea-based interceptor missile that has better capabilities and a longer range than SM3. Japan and the United States also should enhance mutual cooperation in developing missile technology.

Japan BMD is entirely reliant on US support and its key Tomohiko Taniguchi, staff writer for Asia Times Online, Apr 29, 2004, Why Japan went ballistic,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FD29Dh01.html | Suo TOKYO - It has gone largely unnoticed that Japan now occupies a premier seat within a unique American defense club, a club of two - Washington and Tokyo. The reason for this is not because Japan is the second largest economy still committed to having its armed forces deployed in Iraq, but rather because Japan has decided to do what few other allies of the United States could. That is to follow the US in its controversial missile defense program. At present, practically no other nation is in a position to follow suit. It is only the US and Japan that constitute an exclusive club of ballistic missile defense (BMD). On March 26, top military brass as well as civilian officials at Japan's Defense Agency (JDA) rejoiced to see the Diet (Japan's parliament) pass the budget for the fiscal year 2004 that starts in April. They were happy as the government-proposed budget went into effect unscathed and uncut. And therein was the plan for Japan to deliver its first round of BMD programs. In fiscal 2004, the JDA will spend a gross total of 4.9 trillion yen (US$45 billion), which is, as usual, about a hundredth of the nation's economy. Out of the defense budget, 2 percent or 106.8 billion yen ($981 million) will cover the cost for BMD. Divided into three parts, 34 billion yen ($312 million) will go to Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force to be used to equip one Aegis-type destroyer with the "Standard" missile system SM-3; 58.2 billion yen ($534 million) to the Air Defense Force to procure a ground-to-air missile system known as Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3); and 14.6 billion yen ($134 million) will be spent to upgrade the relevant BADGE (Base Air Defense Ground Environment) systems. The Aegis system is a precious commodity for the US as it has kept its core technologies secret. It is also costly both in economic and political terms. True, Spain does have some Aegis capability, but it has only one Aegistype destroyer, making it largely irrelevant, for in order to operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, three is the minimum number required. Israel, South Korea and Taiwan all aspire to have at least one Aegis-type destroyer, but currently have none. Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force by contrast currently has four, and will soon have six such vessels, all homebuilt with loaned Aegis technologies, enabling Japan to make the first entry into the BMD club by equipping itself with a sea-based mid-course defense (SMD) capability. It aims at hitting enemy missiles mid-course. The entry fee, as it were, goes in large part to the US defense industry: Raytheon (Waltham, Massachusetts) doubtless being the clearest winner as it manufactures both SM-3 and PAC-3. Lockheed Martin (Bethesda, Maryland) will also benefit as the sole provider of radar and missile systems that make up the core of the Aegis system. While this could be a boon to the Bush campaign to secure votes from the military-industry complex, that is not the only reason why Howard Baker Jr, US ambassador to Japan, on

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March 1 boasted about the nation's move, saying that Japan's decision to go BMD along with the US was simply great, a sign that Japan has now "matured". More to the point, Japan's action is hardly an isolated one. Saying that it goes hand-inhand with the US will not even suffice. It is closely embedded into, and makes part of, the overall BMD that the US has just started this year. Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 200 5, The Revival of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, http://www.aei.org/outlook/22027 | Suo Japan's decision to acquire the "made in America" ballistic missile defense has even greater strategic than operational significance. To make the BMD system effective, Japan and the United States will have to take a number of measures to harmonize plans and procedures at both the strategic and operational levels. Defense-industrial cooperation on laser technologies for Boost Phase Intercept systems will require Japan to relax its prohibition on exporting arms. The move from a categorical ban to a case-by-case review process will open the door to further U.S.-Japanese defense industry cooperation. Moreover, as Japan expert Christopher Hughes points out, because the Japanese BMD system will rely heavily on the U.S. Defense Support system of satellites and the U.S. Space Based Infrared System for detection of missile launches, the United States and Japan will have to enter into closer command and control arrangements and develop interoperable systems through which intelligence can flow.[4]

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US cooperation is key to Japanese missile defense Masako Toki, project manager in the Nonproliferation Education Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, where she studies Japan's nonproliferation and disarmament policy, February 2008, Under Fukuda, Japan
Accelerates Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation with the United States, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I22/I22_EA5_JapanAcceleratesBMD.htm | Suo The successful December 2007 SM-3 test provided some encouragement to the Japanese Ministry of Defense at a time when it is suffering from major bribery scandals involving defense contractors and from the leak of classified data related to the BMD system. On November 28, former Administrative Vice Defense Minister Takamasa Moriya, the most influential figure in the Defense Ministrys procurement branch, was arrested on suspicion of taking bribes from defense contractor, Yamada Corporation. This incident exposed the lack of transparency in the equipment-procurement process at the Ministry of Defense. [30] In a more damaging development for BMD cooperation, on December 28, MSDF Lieutenant Commander Sumitaka Matsuuchi was indicted for distributing classified information on the Aegis system. Matsuuchi allegedly received a CD containing confidential Aegis data from his superior; he allegedly sent the information to the First Service School in Etajima, Hiroshima Prefecture, where it was circulated to various MSDF members. [31] The leakage of Aegis system data came to light when police investigators found a hard disk containing the confidential data at the home of an MSDF member during a January 2007 search in connection with his Chinese wife, who was alleged to have overstayed her visa. The highly classified information related to the Aegis system could directly affect the U.S.-Japan joint development of missile defense systems. Based on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed in 1954, Japans Secret Protection Law prohibits release of such sensitive information. The arrested MSDF lieutenant commander was alleged to have violated this stricture. This is the first time the law has been invoked since its adoption in 1954. [32] Due to the potentially serious damage caused by this leak, the United States has conditioned further BMD cooperation on the Japanese Ministry of Defense establishing a more effective system to protect highly sensitive information. Japan has procured much of its BMD equipment from the United States, including the Aegis and PAC-3 systems, and is dependent on U.S. early warning satellites to obtain vital information on when and where a ballistic missile is launched. [33] This makes it essential for the Japanese government to retain Washingtons trust.

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US-Japan missile defense forces North Korean nuclear buildup Cheong Wooksik, representative of the Civil Network for Peaceful Korea, 12/24/0 7, Missile Defense Acts as a Trojan Horse,
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=432927 | Suo What is of more concern is that the development of the US-Japan Missile Defense system is fueling an arms race in northeast Asia. The military budget of the US, Japan, China, Russia and the two Koreas together accounts for 70 percent of the global total. These nations, which happen to be the participants of the six-party talks, are heavily concentrating with their own military buildup. One of the primary concerns in this situation at the moment is the possible negative impact on resolving North Korea's nuclear issues. Pyongyang may begin to harbor misgivings about the intention of Washington and Tokyo, which are rushing to establish the Missile Defense system amid continuing progress in resolving its nuclear problem. The two allies' military alliance only makes it harder for Kim Jong-il's regime to abandon its nuclear ambition for strategic reasons.

Extinction Hayes and Hamel-Green 9 (Peter, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Director,
Nautilus Institute, and Michael, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development, Victoria University, The path not taken, the way still open: Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, http://gc.nautilus.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/reports/2009/hayes-hamel-green.pdf) The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range . Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a
limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a

The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use . Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers , especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12 nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium
range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). enrichment program - having announced publicly that it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 2009 7 in a communication with the UN Security Council - it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons.

Although some may dismiss Korean Peninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result of its own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggest that this is imminent . If this were to happen, there would be the risk of nuclear weapons falling into hands of non-state actors in the disorder and chaos that would ensue. Even without the outbreak of nuclear hostilities on the Korean Peninsula in either the near or longer term, North Korea has every financial incentive under current economic sanctions and the needs of its military command
economy to export its nuclear and missile technologies to other states. Indeed, it has already been doing this for some time. The Proliferation Security Initiative may conceivably prove effective in intercepting ship-borne nuclear exports, but it is by no

North Korean proliferation, if unaddressed and unreversed, has the potential to destabilize the whole East Asian region and beyond. Even if a nuclear exchange does not occur in the short term, the acute sense of nuclear threat that has been experienced for over five decades by North Koreans as a result of US strategic deterrence is now likely to be keenly felt by fellow Koreans south of the 38th Parallel and Japanese across the waters of the Sea of Japan. China, too, must surely feel itself to be at risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, or from escalation that might ensue from next-use in the Korean Peninsula resulting not only in the environmental consequences noted above, but in regime collapse and massive refugee flows. South Korea and Japan appear willing to rely on their respective bilateral security pacts with the United States to deter North Korean nuclear attack for the time being. However, should South Korea and/or Japan acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be destabilizing, especially if this resulted from rupture of their alliance relationships with the United States. Both
means clear how airtransported materials could similarly be intercepted. Given the high stakes involved, have the technical capability to do so very rapidly. South Korea has previously engaged in nuclear weapons research but desisted after US pressure. Japan still proclaims its adherence to the three NonNuclear Principles although recent confirmation that the United States routinely transited nuclear weapons through Japan and retains the right of emergency reintroduction of nuclear weapons has tarnished Japans non-nuclear image. Moreover, it has large stockpiles of plutonium that could

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rapidly be used to produce nuclear warheads.

Such responses, already advocated by conservative and nationalist groups within South Korea and Japan, could trigger a regional nuclear arms race involving the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan, and China, with incalculable wider consequences for Southeast Asia, South Asia and the whole Pacific and beyond. These developments would spell the demise of the current global nonproliferation regime as underpinned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Failure to reverse the DPRKs nuclear breakout is also an important factor driving a general malaise in the exercise of American power which one of the authors has characterized elsewhere as the end of American nuclear hegemony.

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Japanese BMD causes North Korean proliferation Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami, Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at RAND, 2001, Japan and Ballistic missile
defense, Google Books, pg 8) Fourth, a Japanese BMD system would likely aggravate Japan's relations with China and North Korea and possibly prompt one or both countries to increase the size and sophistication of their missile forces capable of reaching Japan. Fifth, an extensive BMD system under Japanese control could in- crease fears among some Asian nations that Tokyo would use such a system to strengthen its offensive military capabilities, e.g., in the area of offensive missiles, and more generally to greatly improve its overall defense industrial base.7

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BMD poisons US-Japanese relations Christopher W. Hughes, Principal Research Fellow & Acting Co-Director at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, December 2006, Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared, http://www.garneteu.org/fileadmin/documents/working_papers/1106.pdf | Suo Japans involvement in BMD is thus to set to project major changes in its own national defence policy, and has been intertwined with and occupies an increasingly central position in the evolution of US-Japan alliance cooperation. Japan in fact is perhaps the most advanced of any of the USs formal or informal alliance partners in its commitment to developing a full range of BMD systems: other bilateral partners such as Germany and Italy (Medium Extended Air Defence System, MEADS), and Israel (Arrow), engaged only in cooperation with the US for terminal phase systems; or the UK, Denmark and Australia, only hosting sensor components of US Missile Defence (MD); and the multilateral North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) still investigating the feasibility of both terminal and mid-course systems. Given Japans relatively advanced status in BMD and its increasing centrality to the future shape of the US-Japan alliance, the objective of this paper is to examine what type of dynamic BMD exerts on Japans traditional design of its security policy and managing alliance ties. In particular it seeks to ask how BMD, when inserted into the context of US-Japan alliance, impacts upon Japans various devices for attempting to strengthen alliance ties whilst simultaneously hedging against the alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment. In turn, the paper seeks to ask what type of impact BMD as a new weapons system, accompanied by range of technological imperatives and impending political-military decisions, is likely to have on the overall trajectory of Japans security policy and how it may pull the US-Japan alliance in potentially radically new directions. The papers essential argument is that BMD poses challenges to Japans standard practices for managing the US that are unique in the history of post-war Japanese security policy and of the alliance, and that may in the final calculation prove insurmountable. The introduction of BMD, first off, exacerbates Japans existing strategic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and most especially entrapment, However, BMDs challenge is made especially intense because the technological demands of the system establish political-military parameters for alliance cooperation that make it difficult for Japan to exercise, or shut down entirely, its traditional hedging options. The final outcome is that, despite the most ingenious efforts of Japans defence policy-making community to find means to maintain strategic leeway, Japans perceived strategic vulnerabilities and the non-efficacy of its usual hedging options, mean that BMD is working to corral Japanese security policy onto a trajectory that points to ever enhanced and exclusive dependence on the US.

Extinction National Defense University 2k (The study group consisted of Richard L. Armitage, Armitage and Associates; Dan E. Bob, Office of Senator
William V. Roth, Jr.; Kurt M. Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Michael J. Green, Council on Foreign Relations; Kent M. Harrington, Harrington Group LLC; Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; James A. Kelly, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Edward J. Lincoln, Brookings Institution; Robert A. Manning, Council on Foreign Relations; Kevin G. Nealer, Scowcroft Group; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., JFK School of Government, Harvard University; Torkel L. Patterson, GeoInSight; James J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Robin H. Sakoda, Sakoda Associates; Barbara P. Wanner, French and Company; and Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.. (NDU, INSS, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_JAPAN.HTM )) Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the worlds largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclearcapable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moments notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the worlds fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the regions de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the worlds second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to Americas global security strategy.

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SS 2AC Russia China Addon

US-Japan missile defense cooperation causes a Russia-China counterbalancing coalition Cheong Wooksik, representative of the Civil Network for Peaceful Korea, 12/24/0 7, Missile Defense Acts as a Trojan Horse,
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=432927 | Suo The responses of China and Russia are also very important. They have perceived the Missile Defense cooperation as a way to enhance the two partners' military hegemonism. Russia has been engaging in a Second Cold War-like controversy with the US over building a Missile Defense base in Eastern Europe, and publicly opposed Japan's involvement in the US Missile Defense plans. In October, Russia criticized the two nations' military alliance saying that the Missile Defense system's goal is to sharpen their military competitive edge and that Russia strongly opposes US-Japan defense ties. Given that such a strong response from the Kremlin was unusual, Moscow is highly likely to seek to counter the US-led Missile Defense system by strengthening its military cooperation with neighboring China and its military strength in northeast Asia, if Washington and Tokyo continue to ignore its opposition.

Extinction Blank 9 Dr. Stephen Blank , Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College,
March 2009, Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?, online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf Consequently, the danger is that this ideological-strategic rivalry will harden, leading to a polarized, bilateral, and hostile division of Asia into blocs based on a Sino-Russian bloc confronting a U.S. alliance system led by alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Some Western writers have already opined that Sino- Russian relations appear to be tending towards an anti- American alliance in both Northeast and Central Asia.235 But more recently both Asian and Western writers have begun to argue that such a polarization in Asia could be taking shape. The shared interest of perceiving America as an ideological and geopolitical threat has also united Moscow and Beijing in a common cause.236 Already in the 1990s, prominent analysts of world politics like Richard Betts and Robert Jervis, and then subsequent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) studies, postulated that the greatest security threat to American interests would be a RussianChinese alliance.237 Arguably, that is happening now and occurs under conditions of the energy crisis that magnifies Russias importance to China beyond providing diplomatic support, cover for Chinas strategic rear, and arms sales.238 That alliance would encompass the following points of friction with Washington: strategic resistance to U.S. interests in Central and Northeast Asia, resistance to antiproliferation and pressures upon the regimes in Iran and North Korea, an energy alliance, an ideological counteroffensive against U.S. support for democratization abroad, and the rearming of both Russia and China, if not their proxies and allies, with a view towards conflict with America.239 One South Korean columnist, Kim Yong Hui, wrote in 2005 that, China and Russia are reviving their past strategic partnership to face their strongest rival, the United States. A structure of strategic competition and confrontation between the United States and India on the one side, and Russia and China on the other is unfolding in the eastern half of the Eurasian continent including the Korean peninsula. Such a situation will definitely bring a huge wave of shock to the Korean peninsula, directly dealing with the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. If China and Russia train their military forces together in the sea off the coast of Chinas Liaodong Peninsula, it will also have an effect on the 21st century strategic plan of Korea. We will now need to think of Northeast Asia on a much broader scale. The eastern half of Eurasia, including Central Asia, has to be included in our strategic plan for the future.240 Since then, Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev have similarly written that. If the Kremlin favors Beijing, the resulting Sino-Russian energy nexusjoining the worlds fastest growing energy consumer with one of the worlds fastest growing producerswould support Chinas growing claim to regional preeminence. From Beijings point of view, this relationship would promise a relatively secure and stable foundation for one of historys most extraordinary economic transformations. At stake are energy reserves in eastern Russia that far exceed those in the entire Caspian basin. Moreover, according to Chinese strategists, robust Sino-Russian energy links would decrease the vulnerability of Beijings sea lines of communication to forms of external pressure in case of a crisis concerning Taiwan or the South China Sea. From the standpoint of global politics, the formation of the Sino-Russian energy nexus would represent a strong consolidation of an emergent bipolar structure in East Asia, with one pole led by China (and including Russia) and one led by the United States (and including Japan).241 Russias tie to China certainly expresses a deep strategic identity or congruence of interests on a host of issues from Korea to Central Asia and could have significant military implications. Those implications are not just due to Russian arms sales to China, which are clearly tied to an anti-American military scenario, most probably connected with Taiwan. They also include the possibility of joint military action in response to a regime crisis in the DPRK.242

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Dates matter in the missile defense debate Lars Assmann, 2007, Theater missile defense (TMD) in East Asia: implications for Beijing and Tokyo, Google Books, pg. 411)

Peculiarity of this Work The research subject of this work is mainly a thing of the present, not of the past. The issue of missile defense is borne out of the constantly evolving security situation in East Asia. As the security situation evolves, so do viewpoint, significance and implications of missile defense. This brings about the peculiarity encountered in this research that, firstly, the overwhelming majority of literature appropriate and accurate on the issue is available only on the internet. Secondly, due to the cxplosivcness of the subjects, only a few experts are comfortable to talk openly about the issue.

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SS Naval Overstretch Addon

Christopher P. Cavas, staff writer for DefenseNews, 4 January 2010, U.S. Navy Juggles Ships To Fill BMD Demands, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4441026 | Suo

No sooner did the Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) system become operational in 2008 than U.S. combatant commanders started asking for BMD-equipped ships to begin patrolling their areas. Central Command needed a "shooter" in the northern Arabian Gulf. European Command wanted one in the eastern Mediterranean. Pacific Command already had Aegis ships with limited BMD capabilities on guard around Japan for a potential launch from North Korea. The demand for BMD ships is only expected to increase, driven in part by rising concerns about Iran's intentions and the U.S. decision in September to cancel an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic and rely instead on Aegis. But the Navy has a relatively small number of such ships, and those destroyers and cruisers are designed to carry out a wide range of war-fighting tasks. As a result, while Navy commanders are pleased with the expanding capabilities of their Aegis ships, they're also somewhat guarded about trumpeting the advances. "We can't constrain assets to one mission," a senior officer said last month. "They need to do a variety of other missions." Worries that valuable Aegis ships might be locked into the BMD mission were discussed in December at a two-day seminar at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington. Reporters were allowed to quote comments made at the seminar under the condition that no speaker be identified. "Seabased ballistic missile defense is a necessary component of any theater defense," said the senior officer. "We need to find ways to get folks to use the ships in ways consistent with their being a ship - to realize they are not a point-defense asset." One analyst added, "The demand signal is ahead of the pot of ships." U.S. Navy spokesman Lt. Tommy Buck said the service is working to manage the demand. "Combatant commanders need to understand BMD-capable ships are multimission-capable. BMD is one available asset," Buck said Dec. 18. The Navy is also working on how to respond, said Vice Adm. Samuel Locklear, director of the Navy Staff. "We have a small Navy today - the smallest since 1916 - yet we have a growing global demand for maritime forces, maritime security operations. And now we have a growing demand for maritime ballistic missile defense. Our ships and our crews and our systems are up to the challenge, but it's a capacity issue for us," Locklear said to a reporter during the NDU seminar. "As the capacity grows faster than we can grow the number of ships we have - which is always difficult, particularly in the demanding fiscal environment we're in - we have to look at ways to deploy these ships so that we can get the job done and still have a reasonable expectation that we can take care of the ship and the crew," Locklear said. "So we're looking at a lot of different options as to how we'll do that as this demand grows. But we are limited in capacity." Locklear said that despite meeting demands from joint commanders, the Navy has "to some degree preserved the command and control. Navy component commanders still command and control these ships." But, he added, "What we've had to do is to spread these multimission platforms more thinly across a growing number of demands globally." 27 BMD SHIPS BY 2013 Twenty-one cruisers and destroyers will have been upgraded with the Aegis BMD capability by early 2010, and six more destroyers are to receive the upgrade in 2012 and 2013. But at least one senior officer at the seminar noted "there will be no more new ships for missile defense." The demand has already affected deployments. Early in 2009, for example, The Sullivans, a Florida-based destroyer on deployment with a carrier group, moved to Japan for a few weeks to pick up the exercise schedule of a Japan-based BMD destroyer that was called on by Central Command to guard the northern Arabian Gulf. This fall, a San Diego-based ship, the destroyer Higgins, deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to provide BMD defense for European Command and take part in exercises. Both moves are unusual, as it's rare for an Atlantic Fleet ship to visit Japan or for a Pacific ship to patrol the Mediterranean. Such cross-deployments require more coordination by fleet planners. "Effective global force management requires global visibility on requirements," Buck said. "U.S. Fleet Forces Command [headquartered in Norfolk, Va.] and Pacific Fleet [headquartered in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii] collaborate, coordinate and communicate to have more complete knowledge of location and status of fleet capabilities and work to best employ those capabilities to meet global combatant commander requirements to include BMD." The senior officer said one way to manage demand is to encourage combatant commanders to give "sufficient warning to have ships on station. We need to remind [combantant commanders] that these are multimission ships." The BMD cruisers and destroyers are also equipped to handle anti-submarine, land-attack, air-defense and other tasks. OTHER ISSUES Other sea-based BMD issues discussed during the NDU conference included the need to expand fire-control networks to catch up to the expanded reach of the Standard Missile-3 [SM-3] BMD missiles. "Our missiles are good; the missiles can outfly the radars," a senior officer said. "We need fire-control networks to carry out long-range engagements." A consideration in the use of sea-based BMD is the need to keep the systems at a very high state of readiness. Naval systems, the senior officer pointed out, are built to continue functioning even after some battle damage. "Most systems on a ship are still effective even when they're degraded," he said, holding his hand out about shoulder-high. "But the readiness of the ballistic defense missiles and their radars needs to be up here," he said, raising his hand high above his head.

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BMD cooperation is critical to the US-Japan alliance Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Development of missile defense cooperation has been critical to a process of alliance transformation that ranges from an updated concept of roles missions and capabilities for defense cooperation, to a realignment of the US force structure in Japan. 8 BMD matters have had significant impact on key areas of alliance activity: Policy: Moving from agreement on the need for missile defense to implementing BMD cooperation has brought policy planners on both sides into closer consultation on regional security strategy, arms control/non-proliferation policy, and an expanding scope of bilateral cooperation. The US government has been obliged to rethink its positions on alliance participation in US missile defense programs, as well as the release of sensitive defense technologies to key allies. Similarly, development of BMD activities will compel the Japanese government to reconsider long-standing positions on such policy-sensitive matters as Japans selfimposed ban on collective defense operations, and its inflexible approach to arms export controls (see below). Operations: Cooperation between Japan and the US on BMD operations in Northeast Asia will require a level of coordination between US and Japanese defense forces that gives unprecedented meaning to the term interoperability. Issues of concern here include timely sharing of critical intelligence data, development of an effective command, control, and communications (C3) infrastructure, and revision of outdated polices that obstruct joint response to imminent missile threats. Acquisitions: The SCD project initiated last year is also unprecedented in being the first effort to jointly develop a defense system for use by both countries and probably third country allies as well. While this effort may not seem remarkable to those familiar with multinational defense projects in NATO or the EU, implementing SCD has required substantial adjustments in interaction among program management bureaucracies and defense industries on both sides. Here too BMD cooperation has brought both sides beyond the limits of long-established practices and attitudes. Missile defense cooperation points to a critical influence on US-Japan alliance evolution often overlooked in discussion of political leaders or key administration officials the growth of institutional interaction between the US and Japanese defense establishments. Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Can missile defense continue to lead the way on defense cooperation between the US and Japan? There can be little question that US-Japan interaction on BMD has been critical to transition from a relatively passive security relationship to a more proactive alliance. From the perspective of capabilities development and operational activities, missile defense has energized engagement between US and Japanese defense institutions to the point where it is almost self-sustaining. Only a major shift in alliance relations would derail the process of BMD cooperation now established. Still, the degree of US-Japan interaction as summarized in the integrated and default paths described above remains uncertain as both countries continue to seek their way through untravelled territory.

Cooperation outweighs differences on BMD Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo All talk of alliance harmony not withstanding, engagement on missile defense programs will thus encounter significant areas of tension for the foreseeable future.So far US and Japanese officials have managed to reconcile changing and sometimes conflicting agendas in efforts to develop BMD capabilities. Common interests should continue to outweigh differences in advancing missile programs, but US and Japanese policy makers can never take such an assumption for granted. Success in implementation of missile defense cooperation will continue to require close engagement on all levels of concerned government and industry participants.

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SS AT: China Adv

Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo China: While both US and Japanese officials are careful to focus on North Korea as the object of current missile defense activities, it is widely understood that Chinas missile force is the more serious, longer-term concern. From US-Japan TMD dialogue in the 1990s through the Shangri-la security conference last June 14 China has repeatedly attacked US-Japan missile defense activities as threatening to regional stability in: Providing Japan an offensive military capability; Encouraging Japanese militarization; Being used to protect Taiwan; Triggering a regional arms race. Such arguments have varied little over the years, as have their lack of credibility given the steady build-up of both nuclear and conventional Chinese forces. 15 Contrary to its usually cautious approach toward China on any matter concerning defense, the Japanese government has shown little concern for Chinese objections to its pursuit of missile defense capabilities a good indication of the importance Japan attaches to BMD. 16 How will planned US-Japan BMD deployments affect Chinese missile capabilities? Current PAC-3/SM-3 forces will be effective against the short-medium range Chinese missiles similar to those developed by North Korea, while upgraded SM-3s will also have capability against intermediate-range (IRBM) Chinese missiles. 17 All of this could be relevant to Taiwan but, as argued below, the likelihood of US-Japan BMD becoming a direct factor in the defense of Taiwan appears overstated. Taiwan: Chinas military option is key to its leverage over Taiwan. Pre-emptive attack on critical Taiwanese infrastructure is in turn essential to this military option. Deployment of short range ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait has become Chinas primary instrument for pre-emptive strike. Chinese defense planners also see tactical missiles, perhaps including retargettable ballistic missiles, as obstructing US intervention in an attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwans response to its growing vulnerability to preemptive attack rests on: BMD measures (PAC-3 missiles, early warning radar, hardened infrastructure); Counterforce actions (strikes on Chinese strategic infrastructure); Trilateral ties with the US and Japan. 18 There has been political support for US-JapanTaiwan security cooperation in both Washington and Tokyo, as well as unofficial trilateral dialogue on such matters. However, it seems unlikely that such exchanges will have substantive effect, especially on missile defense, due to concerns with: Internal constraints in Taiwan: Taiwan remains both inadequately equipped and institutionally unprepared to collaborate on BMD matters; Interaction with the US: Unease in Washington over Taiwanese posturing on independence and problems with arms programs have seriously strained political and defense cooperation; Japanese policy: Considerations of collective defense and arms transfer restrictions, as well as reluctance to confront China on Taiwan matters, all weigh against tangible Japan-Taiwan defense ties.

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SS Six Party Talks Disad

Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Korea: North Korean missile launches and nuclear weapons testing last year have given Japan further reason to emphasize BMD operations and acquisition programs. 20 Current and planned US-Japan activities are likely to offset the regional threat posed by Nodong and Taepodong missiles, but do not directly address North Korean nuclear programs or the problem of weapons and missile proliferation. At best, BMD developments can provide leverage for current Six-Party talks on North Korean nuclear capabilities and, eventually, general resolution of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

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SS AT: Russia

Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Russia: Russia has been at odds with US on missile defense measures since announcement early in the Bush administration of its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and develop a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. 23 Like China, Russia has never accepted the argument that a limited NMD capability against accidental or rogue-state/terrorist missile launches has no impact on strategic deterrence. Russia has been even more disturbed by US efforts to bring forward elements of a missile defense shield to Europe, especially in the territory of former Warsaw Pact allies thus its fierce resistance to proposed BMD deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, Russia has had little to say on US-Japan missile defense activities. Russian officials have occasionally joined Chinese counterparts in voicing concern over BMD cooperation as a tool for extending US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Otherwise Russian dialogue with Japan has raised missile defense in the context of defusing problems with North Korea. 24

Russia isnt threatened by Japan BMD Agence France Presse, April 14 2008, Japan reassures Russia over missile defence, Lexis |Suo
Japan on Monday reassured Moscow that an anti-missile shield planned with the US military was no threat to Russia and was aimed only at North Korea. Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura told his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Moscow that the missile shield was needed in response to communist North Korea's missile and nuclear programmes. "Concerning cooperation with the United States on an anti-missile defence system, it must be said that Japan's situation forced this on us," Komura told journalists. "It is in no way aimed at Russia." Russia has expressed strong opposition to US anti-missile plans, particularly a system of 10 interceptors and a radar based in Poland and the Czech Republic. Lavrov said Moscow "accepted the explanation" of Japan.

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SS General Defense/little O

Gregg A. Rubinstein, Consultant on Security, Trade and Technology at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 5, 200 7, USJapan Missile Defense Cooperation: Current Status, Future Prospects, http://www.japanconsidered.com/OccasionalPapers/Rubinstein%20USJA %20BMD%20article%20090507.pdf | Suo Summary: So far developments in US-Japan missile defense cooperation have not had the destabilizing effect on regional security forecast by various critics. Current and projected work on regional BMD systems by the US and Japan will impact the threat of short to medium range ballistic missile deployments by China and North Korea, but there is no serious evidence to support fears that BMD is feeding a more aggressive military posture by either country. Even in the case of Taiwan US-Japan missile defense programs are unlikely to have a serious effect on current tensions. On the other hand, joint BMD activity can contribute to regional security as a complement to arms control/non-proliferation efforts per nuclear dialogue with North Korea and a promoter of multilateral engagement in defense planning and operations.

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SS Security Guarantee
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian Affairs and Mary Beth Nikitin, Analyst in Nonproliferation, Congressional Research Service, 2/19/09, Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Lexis Congress | Suo

U.S.-Japanese joint development of a theater missile defense system reinforces the U.S. security commitment to Japan, both psychologically and practically. The test-launch of several missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated existing plans to jointly deploy Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air interceptors as well as a sea-based system on Aegis destroyers. If successfully operationalized, confidence in the ability to intercept incoming missiles may help assuage Japan's fear of foreign attacks. This reassurance may discourage any potential consideration of developing a deterrent nuclear force. In addition, the joint effort would more closely intertwine U.S. and Japan security, although obstacles still remain for a seamless integration.

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JET stupid The limits of state direction too plague Japanese efforts. The state-funded Japan Foundation faces hurdles, because being identified with the state ... its ability to tap into the "soft" power of wider Japanese culture may be limited (Vyas, 2008). Vyas U. The Japan Foundation in China: an agent of Japan's soft power? Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies (2008) 15 August. McConnell (2008) McConnell D. Japan's image problem and the soft power solution. In: Soft Power Superpowers: The Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the USWatanabe Y., McConnell D., eds. (2008) New York: M.E. Sharpe. also harbors doubts over the much-touted JET program, as participants separate their interest in Japanese culture from the state. Furthermore, unresolved debates remain between the Japan Foundation and MOFA regarding which image of Japan to promote.7 Ancient ikebana or contemporary manga? Bureaucratic turf wars have similarly hampered the JET program in the past (McConnell, 2008).

Brian J. McVeigh, visiting assistant professor at the University of Arizona, Summer 20 10, Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States (review), The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 36, Number 2, MUSE | Suo In the next chapter, David L. McConnell explores how the Japanese state's "flagship program," the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program, is used to "open up" Japan and to improve its image abroad. The statistics of this program are impressive: it has a half-billion dollar annual budget (eclipsing better-known programs, such as the Fulbright Program and the Peace Corps). But McConnell warns that size does not necessarily equal positive impact and asks if such a program really promotes an attractive image of the country. Also, how do participants interpret their own experiences? What do JET alumni do after they return home? McConnell investigates other relevant issues, such as the problems and possibilities of [End Page 379] top-down state intervention to shape overseas perceptions and the nature of the state: since different ministries supervise JET, the potential for turf wars is strong and competing interests at the national and local levels complicate policy coordination. He concludes by noting that the JET Program is not necessarily teaching people to like Japan (winning the hearts and minds of foreign youth, we might say). However, it socializes them to be able to communicate with the Japanese.

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SS AT: Japan Soft Power

Roland Kelts, lecturer at Temple University, June 11, 2010, SOFT POWER HARD TRUTHS; Soft power useful, but Japan needs to find smarter approach, Lexis | Suo

"The Politics of Pop Culture" was the title and theme of an academic conference hosted by Temple University's Tokyo campus last weekend and featuring an international roster of scholars and authors. Topics included video games, otaku culture, anime and manga--and especially, the still nebulous concept of "soft power." Most participants were dubious about the idea at best, poking at the phrase all day until it practically deflated. (One Japanese professor went so far as to call it "rubbish.") Joseph S. Nye's original coinage in the late 1980s referred to the power of political persuasion derived from a culture's attractiveness to others. Nye has addressed this notion several times since then, notably in 2005, when he argued that American soft power was on the decline during the George W. Bush administration, and warned that the global coalitions necessary to fight the socalled "war on terrorism" would be at great risk without it. But it was the use of the term in reference to Japan, published in a 2002 article cited in this column last month, that seemed to change everything, at least on this side of the Pacific. Prof. Kukhee Choo from the National University of Singapore presented ample evidence of how the phrase suddenly ignited governmental efforts to exploit soft power. The number of meetings and proposals related to those efforts spiked dramatically, starting in the early years of the 21st century. The bureaucrats' catchall term of focus, Prof. Choo noted, has just recently shifted from "content" to "brand." Political support for pop culture appeared to peak last year under the short-lived prime ministership of avowed manga fan Taro Aso, whose much ballyhooed plans for a national anime and manga museum were scuttled as soon as he was. But Choo told of her encounter with even shorter-lived former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who scoffed defensively at her suggestion that his props for pop might be lacking. The scheduling of the conference turned out to be auspicious: Only a few days earlier, Hatoyama's humiliating resignation after less than a year in office provided a convincing backdrop for talk of lacking leadership--a softening of power, indeed. Amid the flurry of activity in Nagatacho aimed at buttressing Japan's pop culture industries, what's most striking, of course, is how badly they seem to be sagging, particularly in the market the government is targeting: the United States. Successive years of declining sales in anime and manga merchandise (what keynote speaker, author and translator Frederik L. Schodt called a "cratering" market) has resulted in the severe layoffs reported last month at major U.S.-based anime and manga distributors, producers and publishers, and the outright collapse of others. Even so, as Schodt and I both demonstrated during our presentations, attendance at U.S. conventions, expos and festivals celebrating Japan's pop culture continues to climb, in some cases at a dizzying rate. Seattle's Sakuracon, for example, has more than tripled its numbers in the span of five years. And in another scheduling coincidence: on the same Saturday of the Tokyo conference, organizers in New York were staging the fourth annual "Japan Day @ Central Park," the largest celebration of Japanese culture in my other hometown. Over 45,000 are estimated to have attended last year's event. Sadly, this disparity points to what's really soft: the quality of the ideas and strategies for promoting Japan's cultural attractiveness, and their execution. Two years ago, I watched from the front row as a Japanese ambassador strolled onstage during the opening ceremonies of a massive anime festival. He held one hand behind his back, and as he greeted the tens of thousands from the podium, he revealed and quickly donned a Doraemon mask. Some tittered and applauded, a few shouted out the character's name. But Doraemon, while enormously popular and immediately recognizable in Japan and many Asian nations, is a virtual unknown to most Americans, where the anime has never received a proper airing. Here he was, the magic blue cat, selected by the Japanese government as its "anime ambassador" to the world, greeting many who had probably never seen his show. The fumbling persists. As Prof. Dan White of Rice University recounted, Japan's kawaii taishi, or cute ambassadors, are three young models plucked by the government last year, dressed up in infantilizing lolita-style, street fashion and schoolgirl outfits--and, in one instance at least, spun around onstage for audiences to observe. It's worth noting that Nye, Obama's first choice for ambassador to Japan, recently revised his soft power phrase, and now advocates the use of "smart power," a hybrid employment of soft and hard (military/financial) strengths. While that may be equally vague, the importance of using power of any kind smartly definitely isn't.

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SS Article 9 Revision Inev and Good

Richard Lowry, editor of National Review, a conservative American news magazine, and a syndicated columnist, July 4, 200 5, Time for the Sun to Rise, Lexis | Suo Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is the main obstacle to a fuller U.S.-Japanese alliance. The constitution -- and the interpretations and policies arising from it -- bans a standing army, collective self-defense, and arms exports. Japan has a military, but it's called a Self-Defense Force, and it's supposed to be limited to territorial defense. Japan has one of the largest military budgets in the world, but much of the budget goes to personnel costs. It was long the contention of the Socialist party that the SDF was unconstitutional root and branch. Japan constantly has talmudic debates about what defense capabilities are permitted. For a long time, it denied itself refueling capacity for its F-4 fighters, since that was considered too "offensive" in nature. The prohibition on collective self-defense means that Japan cannot come to the aid of an ally -- i.e., the United States -- when attacked. The interpretation of this prohibition over the years has been a stumbling block to even routine U.S.-Japanese cooperation. But the restrictions have been loosening. Japan has sent the SDF to participate in peacekeeping missions in places like Cambodia and East Timor. Koizumi in particular has helped make the constitution very much what Justice Stephen Breyer calls "a living document." He has gone through extraordinary contortions to make activities that once would have been thought forbidden pass constitutional muster. Now, the long, difficult process of officially changing the constitution is underway. Koizumi has scored several key victories in the wake of 9/11. Legislation was passed allowing the prime minister to act in the event of a crisis without approval from the legislature and authorizing the Self-Defense Force to stray beyond East Asia. Koizumi sent ships to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, where the Japanese supported the coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. "They were really battle groups," an administration official says of the Japanese forces, although, of course, they weren't used for that purpose. The Japanese patrolled, refueled coalition ships, and provided intelligence, since AEGIS destroyers -- the Japanese have four of them -- sop up a lot of information. "Their navy is superb," says the administration official. Then Koizumi sent 600 ground troops to relatively peaceful southern Iraq to help with the post-invasion rebuilding. Those troops are not allowed to protect themselves. They're behind security cordons, with almost no chance of being fired on. At first, the troops' security was being provided by the Dutch. (One wonders: Who was protecting the Dutch?) Now it is provided by the Australians. As Dan Blumenthal of the American Enterprise Institute points out, these actions had a twofold purpose. In Afghanistan, Japan showed it was ready to be a key international player and, eventually, a member of the U.N. Security Council. In Iraq, it showed it was willing to stand with the U.S. even when much of the rest of the world balked. A Japanese nationalist wrote in 1989 a popular book called The Japan That Can Say No. Koizumi has been forging a Japan that can say yes -- yes to international responsibilities and yes to the United States. The geopolitical math is simple. Since we have a rough congruence of interests, whenever Japan steps up, we have to do a little less, whether in the Indian Ocean or Iraq. The trajectory seems clear. A few years from now, Japan's constitution will likely be amended and its ability to contribute to the alliance and its own defense boosted further. "Soon they will be deploying to places like Afghanistan," says an administration official. "I don't think that's far down the road." And one day the Japanese will allow themselves the possibility of, say, dropping precision bombs on North Korean targets. "The ability to drop some bombs is very useful," the official says. "And it sends a signal to the Chinese."

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SS Europe BMD Good Russia/Iran

Frank Gaffney Jr., president of the Center for Security Policy, February 10, 200 9, Counting the consequences, Lexis | Suo

Team Obama has vowed not to support ballistic missile defenses unless they "work and are cost-effective." It is an article of faith for the left that neither is true, no matter how many successful tests are conducted of our anti-missile systems. And over the weekend, Vice President Joe Biden left the impression with NATO allies that such a standard would preclude the previously approved U.S. deployment of radars and interceptors in Eastern Europe. (Mr. Levin has already said he would "love to cut missile defense." ) Likely consequence: Friendly governments reliant on American protection from Russian revanchism will be undercut, the Kremlin will be emboldened and the Iranian mullahs - who just demonstrated long-range missile capabilities - will have in the future a free ride in threatening, or even attacking, Europe with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

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SS Europe BMD Good Iran/North Korea/Modelling

Howard Berman, Democratic member of the United States House of Representatives, Chairman of House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 24, 2009, The July Summit and Beyond: Prospects for U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Reductions, Hearing of The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lexis | Suo The U.S. has already indicated that our planned deployment of ground-based missile defense components in Europe is on the table, but a retreat on missile defense in Europe would set a dangerous precedent for similar restrictions worldwide and would ensure that the American people remain vulnerable to nuclear ambitions by others. In fact, North Korea is believed to be planning to launch its next missile at Hawaii. This possibility is regarded by the Pentagon as sufficiently serious that Secretary Gates has quickly beefed up our missile defenses there. This retreat from European missile defense would also put our forces abroad and other critical allies, such as Israel and Japan, in peril from countries such as Iran and North Korea, whose increasingly capable missiles are being prepared to carry nuclear and other unconventional weapon payloads.

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SS Prolif No Japan Modeling

Sheila A. Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, April 15, 20 10, Japan's missed opportunity, Lexis | Suo

The change in government last September made obvious Japan's inability to reconcile itself to today's proliferation dynamics. On the one hand, Tokyo relied on U.S. nuclear superiority while publicly rejecting the use of these weapons on Japan's behalf. A recent Japanese government investigation into the existence of "secret agreements" between Tokyo and Washington on the transit of nuclear weaponry brought this deep postwar controversy back into the headlines. After months of government deliberation, Mr. Okada was confronted in Parliament by a fundamental question what would the government do if Japan was threatened? He pointed out that Japan's three nonnuclear principles - not to possess, manufacture or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons - were designed to keep its citizens safe from the threat of nuclear use. But he had to acknowledge that the government would have to make its best judgment should Japan be threatened based on the need to protect its citizens. Continuing nuclear proliferation now poses an added risk. Fear that fissile material and nuclear technology could be acquired by terrorist groups was what motivated the nuclear summit here. New commitments to action now make it imperative that Japan confront its postwar ambivalence over its security choices while making clear that it will translate its anti-nuclear principles into policy practice. Up to now, Japan has sought to lead by example. Nuclear disarmament has been a consistent goal for the Japanese since their country suffered two atomic attacks in 1945. Japan forswore its own nuclear option in the mid-1970s, and joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime. Japan's own sophisticated scientific expertise in nuclear energy production demonstrates the benefits of this technology for peaceful purpose. But the world now demands a more active effort to contain nuclear proliferation, particularly because of the threat from non-state actors. Deciding not to pursue nuclear weapons is not in and of itself a compelling diplomatic tool for persuading others to abandon their use. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty presents a collective and voluntary effort to police those who would be policed. Japan has played a key role in allowing full access to its own nuclear facilities, and in generating the technical expertise that will be valuable as the inspection and verification mechanisms for the International Atomic Energy Agency develop. Today, a Japanese expert, Amano Yukiya, heads the I.A.E.A. His leadership has already helped to dissipate the political fog surrounding the U.N. Security Council's role. And, next month, the NTP Review will mark the next step in an effort to confront systematically those who seek to proliferate. Japan must leave its ambivalence at home. The country has deep convictions and a singular voice in the global effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Tokyo must translate these convictions into policy innovation and actively seek to be a catalyst for collective action.

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SS Japan Rearm Disad

Missile defense key to Japanese assurance without theyll develop their own nuclear capability Keith B. Payne, Ph.D., Ceo and President, National Institute of Public Policy, and Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy and Commissioner on the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, June 24, 200 9, The July Summit and Beyond: Prospects for U.S.-Russia
Nuclear Arms Reductions, Hearing of The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lexis | Suo A number of our key allies, including Japan, have indicated and some have said explicitly that the combination of missile defense capabilities and our extended nuclear umbrella is what allows them to feel assured so that they don't need to move into alternative ways for security, which could include their own nuclear capability.

Cutting missile defense causes Japan nuclearization William S. Cohen, chairman of the Cohen Group, served as secretary of defense from 1997 to 2001 and is a former Republican senator from Maine. May 28, 2009, No time to cut missile defense, Lexis | Suo
Cutting missile-defense funding at this critical juncture sends the wrong signal to both our adversaries and our allies. It would embolden North Korea, Iran and other rogue states to pursue missiles of increasing range. It would also confuse our allies and undermine their trust in America's security guarantees. If the United States is vulnerable to the threat of a missile attack by a rogue state, allies could lose confidence in America's nuclear deterrent - which could lead nations such as Japan to pursue a nuclear deterrent of their own.

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US presence and posture are distinct BMD is posture Timothy J. Keating, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, US Navy, March 12, 200 8, Fiscal 2009 Defense Authorization, Capitol Hill Hearing
Testimony, Lexis | Suo U.S. force presence and posture - in Japan, Korea, and across the Asia-Pacific AOR - has long been a guarantor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. We will continue to position our forces in theater to optimize agility and flexibility, ensure rapid response to crises, and provide the force presence that both assures allies and partners and dissuades and deters threats to security. We will remain a force ready and a force present. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with their Japanese counterparts in December 2002, serves as the framework to manage U.S.-Japan alliance transformation and posture realignment. Major elements of DPRI include plans to relocate the functions of two U.S. air bases from urbanized to rural areas; relocate over 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam; co-locate U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploy U.S. missile defense capabilities in Japan, in conjunction with Japan's own deployments; and improve operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. These activities will strengthen capabilities and maintain deterrence in the region while reducing impacts of U.S. presence on local communities in Japan.

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SS Article 9 Revision key to Japanese DIB

Akira Kawasaki, contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, member of the Executive Committee of Peace Boat and NGO Adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament co-chairs, originally published in a special issue of Asian Perspective on the arms race in Northeast Asia, edited by John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, has been a Writing Fellow at Provisions Library in Washington, DC and a PanTech fellow in Korean Studies at Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal. He has worked as an international affairs representative in Eastern Europe and East Asia for the American Friends Service Committee, has taught a graduate level course on international conflict at Sungkonghoe University in Seoul, May 10 2010, Japan's Military Spending at a Crossroads, http://www.fpif.org/articles/japans_military_spending_at_a_crossroads | Suo Lobbying for Military-Civilian Scientific Integration In 2005, at the height of the Koizumi reforms, the Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) announced a collection of recommendations entitled Looking to Japan's Future: Keidanren's Perspectives on Constitutional Policy Issues. This paper argued that: In Japan, there has been a tendency to distinguish, from a pacifistic perspective, defense- related scientific technology from other scientific technologies. From now on, Japan should promote efforts to ensure its citizens' safety and security and to help realize international peace, breaking down the barrier separating defense and civilian purposes in scientific technology. In relation to this, the principle of the peaceful use of outer space that has restricted utilization of most advanced technologies for defense purposes and the Three Principles on Arms Export should be reviewed and further relaxed, with a view toward the development of advanced scientific technologies. Within this paper, Keidanren proposed amending Article 9 of the Japanese constitutionparticularly the second clause that prohibits the maintenance of armed forcesand clarifying the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces as well as making clear that Japan can cooperate with activities that contribute to international peace, in partnership with the international community.At the same time, it proposed a change in the current interpretation of the constitution whereby Japan cannot exercise the right to collective self-defense, as this denies activities to support allies, and is holding back steps towards the realization of Japan as a state which can be trusted and respected by the international community. These positions of Japans business community must be understood within the contemporary context of global developments in the military industry. In this age, integration of the military industry beyond national borders is accelerating. Within the high-tech and information and communication fields, the boundary between military and civil technology is becoming more and more ambiguous. Demands for the amendment of Article 9 of Japans constitution led by the business community are not a revival of militaristic rhetoric but rather a strategy to develop a competitive industry within the global economy. The two substantive demands are for the promotion of military-civil integrated space development and an end to the ban on arms exports. Central to these demands is the removal of laws and legal interpretations limiting the Self-Defense Forces international activitiesto be more specific, integrated operations with the U.S. military and this includes legalizing the right to exercise collective self-defense. Keidanren not only repeatedly lobbied for the legislation of the Basic Law of Outer Space but also, after the laws enactment, actively lobbied for the formulation of a Basic Plan for Space Policy based on the new law. Subsequently formulated in June 2009, the Basic Plan for Space Policy included the promotion of new space development uses in the security field, such as information-gathering and warning and surveillance, positioning the space industry as a 21st Century strategic industry, and calling for the industrys strengthened international competitiveness. It also provides an adequate budget for this purpose. However, in its current difficult financial situation, the government has been careful to stress the need for balance and streamlining with other state policies.

Arms export restrictions crush the Japanese defense industrial base. Ryota Ishida, Lieutenant, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, B.S., Nagasaki University, 1992, "An Analysis of Political and Economic Factors that Impact Sustainment of the Japanese Defense Industry," June, 2002, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey | VP
There is a conflict between pursuing international peace and sustaining the JDIB. In reference to the former, the Japanese government has used the TPAE and strictly [37] controlled arms exports. The Japanese government has also utilized the kokusanka strategy for further indigenous weapons development and production capabilities. When considering how to sustain the JDIB, it is essential to clearly state how the Japanese government applies the TPAE to technology transfer to the United States. In other words, the JDIB will not survive without reconsidering the application of the TPAE. The JDIB has been nurtured with the kokusanka strategy, so that Japan is able to keep the importation of defense equipment to a minimum, based on defense industry being critical to the security of the country. Thus, the Japanese government has accepted expensive and lower quality weapons systems made in Japan. However, the JDIB currently must face tighten constraints caused by shrinking defense budgets. The Japanese government has given fiscal reform first priority, and has not made any efforts to sustain the JDIB. The JDA, rather, decided to consider commercially available substitutes for equipment designed specifically for defense use. Thus, the importance of the JDIB in the defense market is declining. If companies in the JDIB are not able to make enough profit, the possibility exists that the incentive to have defense divisions may disappear. At this stage, obviously the TPAE constraints, while asking the JDIB to produce almost all the requirements, has caused considerable concern. Thus, the current downturn of the Japanese economy might serve as a catalyst to revise the TPAE. The TPAE prevents Japanese companies from exporting weapons and components, and eliminates economies of scale in defense production. However, these principles reflect Japan's position as a peace-loving nation. [Ref. 4] Put differently, the TPAE is likely to be applied based on political reasoning, not economic considerations.

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Although no one in the Japanese government or industry wants to completely eliminate the three principles governing weapons exports, there is a movement that calls for the Japanese government to be flexible concerning the application of the TPAE. The Defense Production Council (DPC) of the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), a private and non-profit economic organization representing virtually all branches of economic activities in Japan, proposed making Japan's arms export restrictions more flexible. [Ref. 15] [38] An interesting fact representing the state of current technology can be demonstrated. North Koreas "Yugo" class submarine, which the Korean navy captured off the coast of Korea, consisted of over 1,958 items, and 287 of these were made in Japan. All of the electronic items, which constituted essential parts of the submarine, were made in Japan, and were diverted from non-military Japanese products. [Ref. 36] This example proves that some products designed for commercial markets can easily be modified as components for a weapon system with minor modifications. Thus, the distinction between commercial and military components is nebulous. Japanese companies have many advanced technologies, which are applicable to both commercial and defense products, and even electronic appliances contain such technologies. Therefore, Keidanren, considered to be representing the JDIB, fears that once the Japanese government strictly applies the TPAE, their businesses will suffer severely, since it will no longer be possible to export products containing advanced technologies to any country. In addition, Japanese policymakers worry that U.S. transfers of systems to third countries based in part on Japanese technologies constitute arms exports by Japan as defined by the TPAE. [Ref. 15] Thus, Japanese firms are prevented from attempting to transfer technologies. The TPAE also works as a barrier to the development of a company-based technology cooperation framework while the Japanese government admits the transfer of defense technology to the United States. Under the current interpretation of the TPAE, it appears to violate those principles of exporting products produced by U.S. firms that incorporate technologies developed by Japanese companies. In this case, Japanese companies are not able to expect any benefit from co-development with the United States. The METI uses a particular definition for arms: specifically designed parts, accessories and finished products used by military forces and directly employed in combat. Those items are listed in the export trade control order [Ref. 4] In addition, when using the TPAE, all products exported from Japan not to be used as commercial products are considered to be arms, which are likely to include commercial items modified for defense applications. It is forbidden, on account of this, to export them to the United States unless a security treaty is concluded. Items in question, whether they fall under [39] such arms categories or not, will be judged objectively based on shape, features and other technical aspects regardless of end use. [Ref. 4] In this sense, to facilitate the continuance of the JDIB, the Japanese government is required to provide certain considerations. Given the strong pacifist sentiment among the Japanese people, it is hard to expect the Japanese government to lift the TPAE or revise it in the near future. Therefore, flexible interpretation of the TPAE would be the most practical approach. If Japanese companies are allowed to export defense-related products more openly, they would be able to freely conduct business with U.S. counterparts. Consequently, it is possible that the costs of products manufactured by the JDIB would decrease due to economies of scale.

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Eric B. Garretty, Major, United States Marine Corps, B.A., University of Mississippi, 1990, "An Economic Analysis of Acquisition Opportunities for the United States Department of Defense within the Japanese Defense Industrial Base," December, 2002, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey | VP The Japanese government is also concerned with the issues of export controls and technology transfer primarily as they relate to the restrictions imposed on its defense industry by the "Three Principles." Many in the Japanese government and the Japanese defense industry see the "Three Principles" as an inhibitor of defense trade, but not an insurmountable roadblock. Re-evaluation of the "Three Principles" is seen as necessary by many in Japanese industry, but eliminating them altogether is not necessarily viewed as being in the country's best interests. There is growing sentiment in the United States that expanded cooperation can be achieved by retaining but reinterpreting the Three Principles selectively, in accordance with Japanese political sensibilities. [Ibid p. 8]. In essence, the Japanese defense industrys ability to engage in "equitable" technology transfer is restrained by the Three Principles, but the restraints might be relaxed for the U.S., given the proper incentives. The second key governmental issue that affects the JDIB is also similar to the current U.S environment. This issue is quite simply, money. The Report of the Twelfth Annual U.S.- Japan Technology Forum framed this issue very succinctly: Japan's "traditional" defense industry remains constrained by barely increasing procurement budgets and broader controversies surrounding the new Mid-Term Defense Plan (MTDP). Research and development budgets in the new plan imply much more substantial and long-term commitments in the future, particularly as regarding missile defense systems. There are doubts about whether these programs will be able to move forward given these political disagreements regarding funding uncertainty in the future. [Ibid p. 3]. The JDIB faces a fiscally constrained environment that is likely to continue in the short run. This environment further demonstrates that the JDIB is incentivized to interact with the USDIB. The JDIB needs to expand its market base in order to survive and must do so in the face of government restriction. The JDIB must [25] explore areas that hold growth potential. A potential area for defense industry expansion is entry into markets that have dual-use (i.e. commercial and military use) applications. The next section begins with an examination of potential dual-use markets for the JDIB.

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SS AT: Science Spending

Dennis Normile, contributor to ScienceInsider, December 28, 200 9, Japan's Science Budget Not as Bad as Feared, http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/12/japans-science.html | Suo

Japan's researchers let loose a sigh of relief on 25 December when the new administration's first budget revealed only minor changes in science and technology priorities. Overall spending on S&T won't be known for some time. But "the overall total has probably not decreased," says Koichi Kitazawa, president of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, which administers government grants and promotes technology transfers. He adds that new funding for emerging fields probably makes up for those areas being cut. The winners, given in a Japanese summary of major budget items by the Ministry of Education, include a near tripling of funding, to $107 million, for several new and expanded "green initiatives" intended to make Japan a low-carbon society and grants for basic research by academics, up 1.7% to $3 billion. One of the biggest losers is the $1.3 billion, 7year Next-Generation Supercomputer project. The previous administration had earmarked $290 million for the effort; the new government will provide $230 million. "It will delay development and affect users," says Tadashi Watanabe, who heads the project for RIKEN, a network of national labs headquartered near Tokyo. It is due to be completed in 2012. The Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) is facing a 6% cut in its roughly $400 million annual budget. Asahiko Taira, a JAMSTEC executive director, says that with their high fixed costs, "reductions will come out of pure research-related money," though they will try to minimize the impact on the drill ship Chikyu, Japan's contribution to the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program. The SPring-8 synchrotron, near Kobe, will have to get by on 2% less than this year, or about $93 million. "It's not a big cut, but it will have some effect," says Koki Sorimachi, head of planning for the RIKEN Harima Institute, which operates SPring-8. At one point, scientists feared much worse. When the Democratic Party took power last August it announced it would rewrite the rules for preparing budgets, starting with the budget for fiscal 2010 proposed by the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party just 2 days before its historic electoral defeat. In November, a task force set up to identify fat in the budget recommended freezing spending on the supercomputer pending a review, shrinking JAMSTEC's budget 10% to 20%, and slashing funding for SPring-8 by one- to two-thirds. The ensuing storm of protests from scientistsincluding most of Japan's living Nobel laureatesgot most of the funding restored. But scientists are taking it as a wake-up call and pondering strategies for future budgets. "If scientists can't explain their work to policymakers, they are going to see their budgets go down," warns Kitazawa. The cabinet approved the budget on 25 December and it will go to the legislature in January, where few changes are expected. It takes effect on 1 April.

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