A Review of the Temporary Shoring Used to

Stabilize the Pentagon After the Terrorist Attacks

of September 11 th, 2001

(L to R: Structural Specialists Leo Titus, VA-TF1, Richard Kahler and Bernie Denke, VA-TF2 discuss monitoring operations)

A Final Scho larly Paper

Submitted by

Leo J. Titus, Jr., P.E.

Structural Specialist
Virginia Task Force One Urban Search & Rescue Team

Principal
ECS, Ltd., Chantilly, Virginia, USA

Submitted to Dr. M. Sherif Aggour, P.E.

University of Maryland, Department of Civil Engineering

May 3, 2002
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

OVERVIEW OF THE FEMA URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE RESPONSE

SYSTEM 2

ROLE OF US&R STRUCTURAL SPECIALISTS 3

DEPLOYMENT OF FEMA TASK FORCES TO THE PENTAGON 6

INITIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND EVALUATION OF THE STRUCTURE 7

OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE 9

MONITORING 15

SHORING OPERATIONS 17

REVIEW OF THE SHORING 20

CRIB SHORES 20
VERTICAL POST SHORES 22
RAKER SHORES 23
COMPLETION OF SHORING 25

CLOSING 26

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 27

REFERENCES 28

APPENDIX 29
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Draping of the flag on September 12th 1

Figure 2. Organizational Chart for the Pentagon Incident 2

Figure 3. Structural Specialists review building plans 4

Figure 4. Approximate location and angle of impact 5

Figure 5. 1:00 p.m. September 11th , 2001. 6

Figure 6. First floor interior damage 8

Figure 7. First floor interior damage 8

Figure 8. Identification of the five Pentagon rings 9

Figure 9. Missing Columns 10

Figure 10. Structural Integrity Plan 11

Figure 11. A&E Drive 12

Figure 12. Internal damage to concrete columns and beams 13

Figure 13. Office in Wedge 2. No sprinklers 14

Figure 14. Office in Wedge 1. Sprinklers recently installed 15

Figure 15. Transit monitoring station 16

Figure 16. Start of shoring operations 17

Figure 17. Lumber Storage 18

Figure 18. 4 Point Crib Shore 21

Figure 19. 9 Point Crib Shore 21

Figure 20. Crib shore at column 11D 21

Figure 21. Vertical Shore 22

Figure 22 Vertical Shores 23

Figure 23. Raker Shore for lateral support 24

Figure 24 Crib Shore Completion 25

Figure 25. VA -TF1 Goodbye 26

Additional figures are provided in Appendix III

Introduction

The attacks of September 11th , 2001 presented new challenges to fire and rescue
personnel and to the engineering community. The nature of the attack was hardly
expected, and the results were devastating. In the hours following the attacks, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed its Urban Search and Rescue teams
to both the World Trade Center in New York City and to the Pentagon in Arlington,
Virginia.

During the deployment at the Pentagon, four FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task
Forces worked together to assess the structural damage and to stabilize the structure to
allow recovery of victims and evidence. A fifth Task Force from New Mexico (NM-
TF1) was brought in during the last few days to relieve the teams that had been there all
week and to finalize shoring operations. This paper is a review of the shoring performed
by the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces during their deployment at the Pentagon.

Figure 1. Members of the United States military, Arlington County Fire Department and
the Fairfax County Fire Department drape a large American flag over the side of the
Pentagon, September 12, 2001.

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Overview of the FEMA Urban Search & Rescue Response System

FEMA established the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) response system in
1989. At present, there are 28 US&R Task Forces in the United States. Each maintains
an inventory of search and rescue equipment and is prepared to deploy within six hours
of activation by FEMA.

When deployed, an US&R Task Force is made up of 62 specialists grouped into four
major areas of expertise: Search, Rescue, Technical and Medical. These groups include
professional firefighters, paramedics, doctors, engineers, heavy rigging specialists, K-9
search dog teams, logistics, communications and planning personnel.

A copy of the September 13th , 2001 VA-TF1 organizational chart from the Pentagon
Incident is shown in Figure 2. The organizational chart was updated and reprinted at the
beginning of each shift. It provides an example of how a Task Force is organized during
a deployment. The four squads that are shown on the chart are made up of mostly
professional fire fighters specially trained for urban search and rescue. During a
deployment, their primary function is search and rescue of live victims. For the majority
of the Pentagon deployment, these four squads operated as "shoring squads", constructing
the shoring that stabilized the structure.

Figure 2. Organizational Chart for the Pentagon Incident, September 13th , 2001

2
The equipment carried by the Task Force includes sensitive listening equipme nt, cutting
and drilling tools, structural monitoring equipment, temporary shoring devices, medical
supplies as well as enough food, water and shelter to supply a 62 person Task Force for
up to 72 hours.

The role of the US&R Task Force is to utilize the skills of the Task Force members and
the specialized equipment to search damaged structures for potential live victims, provide
emergency medical care to victims, evaluate structural hazards for rescue personnel and
stabilize damaged structures during rescue operations.

The Fairfax County FEMA US&R Task Force, Virginia Task Force One (VA- TF1), is
one of the most experienced groups in the FEMA system. VA-TF1 has been deployed by
FEMA to the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and several hurricanes. In addition, VA-
TF1 is one of only two US&R teams authorized by the United States State Department to
deploy overseas. VA-TF1 has been deployed to earthquakes in Armenia, the Philippines,
Taiwan, Turkey and the terrorist bombing in Nairobi, Kenya.

Role of US&R Structural Specialists

Whenever a US&R Task Force is deployed, two Structural Specialists are assigned to the
team. According to the FEMA Field Operations Guide (FOG) for the US&R response
system, Structural Specialists are “…responsible for performing the various structural
assessments for the Task Force during incident operations.” The FOG outlines five major
duties of the Structural Specialist during deployments:

1. Evaluating immediate structural conditions that will be entered by Task Force

personnel during operations.

2. Determining the type and amount of structural hazard mitigation in order to

reduce risks to Task Force personnel.

3. Cooperating and assisting search and rescue workers.

4. Being accountable for all issued equipment.

5. Performing any additional tasks assigned during a mission.

3
The Structural Specialist works closely with the rescue and shoring squads as well as the
Safety Managers, Heavy Rigging Specialists, Hazardous Materials Specialists and
Operations Managers. During the Pentagon deployment, the Structural Specialist's role
was primarily evaluating structural damage, guiding shoring operations and monitoring
movements of the building. The Structural Specialists that were assigned to the Pentagon
incident in September of 2001 are listed below:

VA-TF1: Dean Tills MD-TF1: Mark Tamaro

Tony Beale Tom Stanton (IST)
Leo Titus Victor Hare
Stan Murphy Robert Frances

VA-TF2: Dennis Clark (IST) TN-TF1: Anthony Kirk

Bernie Denke James Chastain
Richard Kahler
NM-TF1: Michael Hessheimer
Gerald Wellman

Figure 3. FEMA Structural Specialists review the building plans and plan shoring operations.

4
Background of the Terrorist Attack at the Pentagon

American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 out of Dulles Airport, flew into the west side
of the Pentagon at approximately 9:38 a.m. There were 64 people on board and the plane
carried 30,000 pounds of fuel intended for the long trip to California.

The Pentagon is divided into five wedges. The area of impact was near the division of
Wedge 1 and Wedge 2. The section known as Wedge 1 had been under renovation and
was scheduled for final completion on Wednesday, September 12th , 2001. The plane
reportedly was flying very low and struck the building at the first and second story levels.
Figure 4 shows the approximate point of impact between Wedges 1 and 2.

Corridor 5
Wedge 2
Corridor 4

Wedge 1

Figure 4. Approximate location and angle of impact

and its relationship to Wedge 1 and Wedge 2 (Tills, 2001)

5
Deployment of FEMA Task Forces to the Pentagon

The Fairfax County FEMA US&R Task Force, Virginia Task Force One (VA-TF1) was
alerted at 10:56 a.m. on the morning of September 11th . Task Force members were
instructed to contact Task Force headquarters and report to Fire Station 18 in Falls
Church, VA as quickly as possible with full gear.

Two buses were chartered and the Task Force, along with its truck loads of equipment
were escorted by police to the Pentagon. The entire team and the convoy of supplies
arrived at the Pentagon at approximately 1:00 p.m., less than three and a half hours after
the impact. Figure 5 is a photograph taken from one of the Task Force buses at
approximately 1:00 as they first arrived on site. As Figure 5 shows, the Arlington County
Fire Department was still fighting the fire when VA-TF1 arrived at the scene.

Figure 5. 1:00 p.m. September 11th , 2001.

Photo taken by Leo Titus from one of the VA-TF1 buses.

6
FEMA deployed four other US&R Task Forces to the Pentagon. The majority of the
remaining FEMA US&R teams were deployed to the World Trade Center in New York
City. VA-TF1 was the first FEMA team to arrive on site. MD-TF1 out of Montgomery
County, MD arrived later in the afternoon on September 11th . VA-TF2 out of Virginia
Beach arrived later during the night. TN-TF1 arrived from Tennessee during the day on
September 12th . The last FEMA team arrived from New Mexico (NM-TF1) a week later
to assist in finishing the shoring operations. A group of United States Army rescue
specialist from the Military District of Washington (MDW) were also on site assisting in
the shoring operations.

In addition to the US&R Task Forces, FEMA had an Incident Support Team (IST) in
place in the early hours of the incident. The IST is a small group of experienced US&R
veterans that provide logistical and planning support to the Task Forces during the
operation.

On a typical deployment, a Task Force will split into a day shift and a night shift.
However, since there were four Task Forces on site during the Pentagon incident, two
teams worked the day shift and two worked the night shift. The two Virginia Task
Forces were assigned to the night shift, 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., while the Tennessee and
Maryland Task Forces were on the day shift. The IST held daily transitional meetings at
6:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. as the shifts changed to exchange information and update
everyone on the previous shift activities.

Initial Reconnaissance and Evaluation of the Structure

Soon after arriving at the site, two reconnaissance teams were organized by VA-TF1.
The mission of the reconnaissance team was to enter the building and search for live
victims, assess structural damage and identify rescue hazards. Each team was comprised
of a canine search specialist, hazardous materials specialist, structural specialist and
several rescue squad members.

As the reconnaissance teams entered the building, the magnitude of the destruction was
realized. The debris from the impact and explosion extended from the floor to the
ceiling. This made maneuvering very difficult as the team attempted to move through the
building. Figures 6 and 7 are pictures taken on the first floor of the Pentagon in the first
days after the attack. They illustrate the obstacles that the recon teams were faced with.
Other conditions which made the reconnaissance even more difficult were the intense
heat, smoke and scalding water falling from the fire suppression activities on the upper
floors.

7
 Figure 6. First floor interior damage.

Figure 7. First floor interior damage

The reconnaissance quickly determined that it was unlikely there were any survivors in
the building due to the intense fire caused by the jet fuel. The fire had been so intense, it
has been estimated that the heat in some areas exceeded 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Since
it was unlikely that there were any survivors, the mission quickly turned from a rescue
operation into recovery of victims and evidence.

Safe completion of the mission meant that a significant amount of stabilization of the
building would be required. Building plans were provided to the structural specialists by
contractors that were associated with the Pentagon Renovation Program. These
contractors had offices at the Pentagon and were on site at the time of the attack. The
damage was surveyed and mapped by the Structural Specialists and plans for stabilizing
the structure were underway.

8
Overview of the Structural Damage

In order to have a better understanding of the damage caused by the attack, it is necessary
to review the layout of the Pentagon structure. In addition to the five wedges previously
discussed (Wedges 1 through 5), the Pentagon is comprised of five rings (rings A through
E). The “A” ring is the innermost ring, and going outward, B, C, D with E being the
outermost ring. The plane entered E ring at an angle and the force of the explosion
punched through three of the five rings of the Pentagon. A nine foot diameter exit hole
was created in the wall of C ring and the remainder of the debris from the impact ended
up in the alley between C ring and B ring known as A & E Drive. Figure 8 identifies the
rings of the Pentagon and the approximate point of impact.

Figure 8. Identification of the five Pentagon rings and the approximate point of impact.

9
The most significant damage was where the building actually collapsed. This area,
referred to as "the collapse zone", actually remained standing for about 20 minutes after
the initial impact. This is important since it allowed time for people to escape. The plane
struck very close to an expansion joint in the building. When the portion of the building
collapsed, it left a clean vertical break along the expansion joint.

The portion of the structure to the north of the collapse zone had significant column
damage and appeared very unstable. Two columns were missing and a third had been
severely damaged. This meant that the corner was now a cantilever spanning 3 column
bays (approximately 80 feet) and it was not known how long it would hold up before
collapsing. Figure 9 shows the missing columns adjacent to the collapse area. This
photograph was taken at approximately 3:00 p.m. on September 11th .

Figure 9. Missing Columns. The corner of the structure adjacent to the collapse was missing
two columns and one was severely damaged. The section cantilevered approximately 80 feet.

10
During the week the FEMA Task Forces were on site, the Structural Specialist devoted a
good deal of time to thoroughly mapping the damage. Figure 10 was created by the
Structural Specialists using plans provided by the Pentagon Renovation contractors. The
damage mapped on the plan reveals the angle of entry of the plane and its path through
the outer three rings of the building.

Figure 10. Structural Integrity Plan. Indicates missing and damaged columns. (Tills, 2001)

11
Figure 11 is a photograph taken in A&E drive showing a 9 foot diameter "exit wound"
where the plane debris exited the C ring. There were very few identifiable plane parts in
the wreckage. Most of the plane disintegrated from the intense heat of the fireball. Other
than some fire and smoke damage, there was a relatively small amount of damage in the
A and B rings.

Figure11. A&E Drive. The plane exited through C ring and left a pile of debris.
The water is from the fire fighting activities. Very few traces of the airplane remained intact.

12
Internal structural damage in Rings C, D and E was significant. Concrete columns were
blown apart and twisted into unrecognizable pieces of rubble. The spiral reinforcing steel
in the columns had an eerie skeletal appearance. Several beams were missing and holes
were blown up through the second floor. Figure 12 is a good example of the internal
damage to the concrete structure. Additional pictures of the structural damage are
included in the appendix.

Figure 12. Internal damage to concrete columns and beams.

In addition to the structural damage from the initial explosion and subsequent fire, there
was a tremendous amount of debris from all of the furnishings, utilities and
miscellaneous interior finishes. The debris created obstacles for the shoring crews during
the operatio ns. Before each shore could be constructed, the debris had to be cleared from
the area where the shore was to be built.

13
Although the damage was significant, analysis of the damage has indicated that the
renovation of the building played a significant role in saving lives. Most casualties in a
blast effected building are caused by flying glass and debris. The force protection
measures installed during the renovation likely reduced the number of casualties by
reducing the amount of debris forced into the building by the explosion (Winston, 2001).
Fortunately, because the renovation was still officially under construction, several offices
were vacant at the time of the incident, so the number of casualties was less that what it
would have been if was occupied at full capacity. (Evey, 2002)

In addition to reduced casualties, it is believed that the newly installed sprinkler system
and force protection reduced the amount of damage that would have likely occurred if the
renovation had not been completed. In Wedge 2, where the renovation had not yet
started, the amount of damage from fire was significantly greater that the Wedge 1
section. Figures 13 and 14 are a comparison of the damage to offices in the renovated
and non-renovated sections.

Figure 13. Office in Wedge 2. No sprinklers

14
 Figure 14. Office in Wedge 1.
Sprinklers recently installed

Monitoring

Throughout the shoring and recovery operations, the building was monitored by the
Structural Specialists and Heavy Rigging Specialists 24 hours per day. Monitoring was
done using transits, binoculars, radios and air horns for emergency signaling. Once
demolition of the collapsed area started, monitoring was also done from the air using a
man basket suspended by a crane. The Structural Specialists took turns going up in the
basket to look at the structure from a different angle and to watch for victims as pieces of
debris were removed.

15
Movement of the building or large pieces of debris being monitored with the transits was
recorded at 15 minute intervals. In the event significant movement was observed, the
Operations and Safety Managers were notified and decisions would be made on whether
or not to evacuate the shoring teams. There was some minor movement observed daily
believed to be associated with fluctuations in temperature. Other than that, there was
relatively little movement of the structure recorded during the shoring operations.
However, it was reported that the building began to show some significant movements
several weeks after the shoring was completed and just prior to the demolition started to
kick off the reconstruction phase.

There were a few occasions where sudden movements of debris and a flash fire required
emergency evacuations of the shoring crews inside. Fortunately, there were no serious
injuries during the entire operation.

Figure 15. Transit monitoring station.

Transits were set up to monitor several points on the building
during the shoring operations.

16
Shoring Operations

As mentioned earlier, the initial reconnaissance discovered that the structure was unstable
and several columns were known to be missing. There were areas inside the building that
were unsafe to enter during the initia l reconnaissance, so it was unclear on the afternoon
of September 11th how many columns would eventually need to be shored.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) publication Urban Search & Rescue
Structural Specialist Training Manual defines shoring as follows: "Shoring for US&R is
the temporary support of only that part of a damaged, collapsed or partly collapsed
structure that is required for conducting search and/or rescue operations at reduced risk to
the victims and US&R forces."

The Structural Specialists on site agreed that the most critical area in need of shoring was
the exterior column line, just to the north of the collapse zone. The plan for this area was
to construct two nine point crib shores and a solid crib shore to support the vertical loads
of the four levels above the damaged area. Figure 16 shows the shoring operations
underway in the early morning hours of September 12th .

Figure 16. Start of shoring operations. Photo taken as the first crib shore is being
completed at approximately 1:00 a.m. the morning of September 12th , 2001.

17
However, before the shoring work could begin, there were several logistical challenges
that had to be overcome:

1. Lumber to construct the shores had to be requested and delivered. The IST worked
with representatives of the Pentagon Renovation Project, the Home Depot and other
contractors to get several loads of lumber delivered to the site.

2. Debris had to be removed from hazardous areas before shoring could begin. The
United States Army brought several units to the site to provide additional manpower
for clearing and removing debris. After stockpiling the debris, it was hauled to a
parking lot on the north side of the building where the FBI spread it out and sorted
through it for evidence. Occasio nally a victim or evidence was found while removing
the debris, which delayed operations even longer as the appropriate agency was called
in for removal.

3. Loose limestone panels on the exterior of the building (known as “widow makers”)
had to be knocked down so there weren’t any overhead dangers while shoring
operations were going on. Several panels were observed located immediately above
the areas that required shoring on the exterior column line. Rescue personnel pried
off several of the loose panels with crowbars.

4. Areas for lumber storage and cutting stations had to be designated. Initially, a large
area of the concrete helicopter pad adjacent to the collapse zone was designated for
storage of lumber and shoring supplies and a cutting station was built. Later in the
week a second storage and cutting area was set up inside of A & E drive.

Figure 17. Lumber storage. Lumber for shoring was delivered to the site by Home Depot and
stored on the concrete helicopter pad.

18
5. Lighting had to be supplied since much of the shoring activity would be done at night
or inside the building which had no lighting. The IST coordinated obtaining lighting
equipment to allow work to continue 24 hours per day. There was enough lighting to
begin shoring the night of the 11th , however, sufficient lighting for the rest of the
operations did not arrive until the second day.

6. Monitoring stations with transits had to be set up for the Structural Specialists to keep
a close eye on potential shifts in the building during the operation. Three transits
were initially set up monitoring the corner of the building adjacent to the collapse
zone and a large concrete parapet that was being held up by only a few pieces of
reinforcing steel. The Structural Specialists and Heavy Rigging Specialists kept
monitoring logs during the entire operation.

Once all of these issues were resolved, the shoring process could begin. According to
monitoring logs recorded by the Structural Specialists, shoring began at approximately
11:45 p.m. on the night of September 11th , 2001. A copy of the first monitoring log is
included in the appendix of this paper and notes the status of the shoring activity
throughout the night. (Titus, 2001)

The US&R teams are trained to construct several different types of shores that may be
necessary during a rescue operation. The US Army Corps of Engineers has published a
manual titled “Urban Search and Rescue Structural Specialist Field Operations Guide”.
This guide provides step-by-step instructions on how to build the shores and provides
detailed sketches of the shoring systems. Copies of the shoring diagrams that were used
at the Pentagon the week of September 11th are included in the appendix.

Several types of shores were used during the shoring operations:

1. Crib Shores
2. Vertical Post Shores
3. Steel Raker Shores

Three crib shores and one vertical shore was constructed on the exterior column line.
According to the monitoring log, these shores were completed at approximately 5:45 a.m.
the morning of September 12th .

19
Review of the Shoring

The following discussion covers a brief description of the types of shoring systems that
were used during the deployment. Copies of the standard shoring diagrams from the US
Army Corps of Engineers “Urban Search & Rescue Structural Specialist Field Operations
Guide” (FOG) are included in the appendix.

Crib Shores

Crib shores were the most common type of shore used for two primary reasons. First,
they have the highest capacity of all the shoring systems in the FOG. Second, and
possibly just as important, there are relatively simple and quick to build. Once debris
was removed, a crib shore took approximately one hour to complete.

Crib shore capacities are dependent on the size of the lumber used and the configuration
of the lumber. At the Pentagon, 6” x 6” lumber was used for most of the cribbing. The
height of the crib shores ranged from approximately 14 feet (floor to beam) to 15.5 feet
(floor to slab). There were three different crib configurations used:

1. 4 Point Crib : Two by two member layout, yielding four points of contact.
Approximate capacity: 60,000 lbs. (30 tons).

2. 9 Point Crib : Three by three member layout, yielding nine points of contact.
Approximate capacity: 136,000 lbs. (68 tons).

3. Solid Crib : Eight by eight layout, yielding one large point of contact
approximately 48” x 48”. Estimated capacity: 1.1 million lbs. (576 tons).
Only one solid crib was used. It was located at the corner of the cantilevered
section of the building, immediately north of the collapse zone. The rescue
workers decided to build a solid crib at this location because it was thought
that it would be more stable in the event debris broke away from the collapsed
area and slid into the shoring. (Tills, 2001).

In general, one crib shore was enough to support damaged columns. However there were
six locations where the damage was so significant to the columns and beams that two or
three crib shores were required to adequately transfer the load from the upper floors.
Figures 18, 19 and 20 are examples of some of the crib shores used to support interior
columns. Additional shoring pictures are included in the appendix.

20
 Figure 18. 4 point crib shore. Figure 19. 9 point crib shore.
Used to support damaged columns still Used where columns were severely
carrying loads. damaged or missing completely.

Figure 20. Crib shore at column 11D. Shoring Squad builds a 4 point crib shore around
damaged column 11D.

21
Vertical Post Shores

Vertical post shores were also a common shoring system used during the Pentagon
deployment. Vertical post shoring systems are generally used for support of vertical
loads. However, many systems have some limited lateral bracing for increased stability.
(USACE, 2001). A disadvantage of vertical post shores is that they are more labor
intensive. While crib shores are constructed by simply stacking lumber and shimming
into place, vertical shores require more measuring and cutting.

There are several types of vertical post shores in the FOG used by US&R Task Forces.
Post systems can be as simple as a single post with a header beam and a footer. More
complicated post systems include multiple vertical posts with lateral bracing. All
systems collect loads with a header beam and transfer the load to the base. Several
examples of the different vertical shores are included in Appendix I.

Vertical post shores do not have as high a capacity as the crib shores and are used to
support smaller loads. The capacity of a system depends on its configuration, height and
materials used. Vertical post systems can support a wide range of loads from 3,000 to
8,000 pounds for simple post shores, up to 80,000 pounds for laced post shores.

During the Pentagon deployment vertical post sys tems were used to support beams, floor
slabs and overhead debris. They were placed strategically to reduce the risk for the
shoring squads as they approached the more critical areas that required the higher
capacity crib shores. Figures 21 and 22 are photographs of the different vertical shores
built by the US&R Task Forces the week of September 11th .

Figure 21. Vertical Shore.

This vertical shore is supporting a beam which allowed the shoring squads to work with
reduced risk while building the adjacent crib shore.

22
 Figure 22. Vertical shores.

Raker Shores

Raker shores are designed to laterally brace walls that have the potential for leaning away
from a building. Their capacity range significantly based on the type of system, the
height and the angle.

On Thursday, September 13th , the crib shore shims along the exterior wall were over
tightened which caused the concrete beam to shift slightly. The Structural Specialists
decided that it would be prudent to add a raker shore on the cantileve red section to reduce
the possibility of the building wall shifting laterally and possibly collapsing.

23
At the request of the IST, the contractor on site obtained some steel sections (W6 x 25
and W8 x 24) and some miscellaneous plate sections. The US&R Heavy Rigging
Specialists and shoring squads completed the fabrication and installation of the raker
shore. This raker shore was approximately 14 feet high with a raker angle of about 45
degrees. Adhesive anchors were used for securing the top of the rake to the concrete
(Tills, 2001). Figure 23 is a photograph of the raker shore installed. After the raker was
installed, no significant lateral movement was observed during the deployment.

Figure 23. Raker Shore for lateral support. Notice the 3 crib shores and 2 vertical post shores
for vertical support. The shims at the top of the crib shore were over-tightened causing the
concrete beam to shift slightly. VA-TF1 Structural Specialist section leader, Dean Tills, is
standing to the left of the raker shore.

24
Completion of Shoring

Four US&R Task Forces and the team from the Military District of Washington worked
24 hours per day for over a week to stabilize the structure. A fifth Task Force was
brought in to relieve the others on the final days of the deployment.

By the end of the deployment, 42 columns required shoring on the first floor using 49
box crib shores. Thirty- five beams were shored on the first floor using T-shores and
vertical post shores. On the second floor, six columns were shored with box cribs and
five beams were shored with vertical post shores. No shoring was required above the
second floor (Stanton, 2001). Other than some minor cuts, bruises and sore feet there
were no serious injuries during the operation.

Spreadsheets are included in Appendix II that present a summary of all the shores that
were constructed during the deployment.

Figure 24.
Miscellaneous debris is cleaned up in an area where crib shores have been completed.

25
Closing

VA-TF1 was the first US&R Task Force on site on September 11th . Therefore, they were
the first to leave on September 18th . After paying final respects to the victims of the
tragedy, the Task Force loaded up all of it's equipment and personnel and headed home to
a large group of very excited family members and friends.

By September 14th , 2001, plans were already underway for the rebuilding of the
Pentagon. The initial goal is to have the building reconstructed and people occupying the
outermost offices by September 11th , 2002. By the time all of the recovery had been
completed, there were only eleven months left to accomplish this difficult task that is
now known as “Project Phoenix”.

Demolition of the damaged portion of the structure, approximately 400,000 square feet of
office space, was completed on November 19th , 2001 (Evey, 2002). Construction crews
worked day and night, seven days a week. On April 5th , 2002, the last concrete
placement for the rebuilt structure was completed and a “Topping Out” party was held to
celebrate this important milestone. As of May 1, 2002, Project Phoenix is at least six
weeks ahead of schedule. There is no doubt in the minds of the workers that they will
exceed their goal. They are dedicated to honoring the memory of the lives lost by
showing the world what Americans can accomplish in times of crisis. As the rebuilding
continues, the FEMA National Urban Search and Rescue Response System is preparing
for the next deployment.

Figure 25. VA-TF1 Goodbye. Members of Virginia Task Force One pay final respects before
leaving the Pentagon on September 18 th , 2001.

26
Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals who provided
information and photographs that aided in the preparation of this paper: From VA-TF1:
Dean Tills, P.E., Tony Beale, P.E., Stan Murphy, P.E., and Scotty Boatright. From MD-
TF1, Victor Hare and Tom Stanton.

There are too many individuals on the shoring squads to list by name. However, the
author would like to acknowledge the tremendous effo rt by all of the individuals on the
shoring squads, the Heavy Rigging Specialists, the other Structural Specialists and all of
the other FEMA US&R Task Forces and Military District of Washington members that
worked together as a team to accomplish the mission. Specifically, the author would like
to express gratitude for the guidance and mentoring during the deployment offered by
Rescue Squad Officer, Kent Watts and Structural Specialists, Dean Tills, Tony Beale and
Stan Murphy. Their sharing of knowledge and experience was invaluable.

Mr. Allyn Kilsheimer, P.E. of KCE Structural Engineers, PC, was also a valuable source
of knowledge during and after the deployment. The author met Mr. Kilsheimer on site
the evening of September 11th . He was a part of the Pentagon Renovation team during
the recovery operation and since has taken over the oversight of the Phoenix Project.

Some of the contractors that provided materials, equipment and skilled operators included
Facchina Construction Co., AMEC Contracting, The Home Depot, Potts & Callahan,
Bovis, Dominion Crane, Springfield Crane Rental, Singleton Electric, Rentals Unlimited,
National Wrecking, Union Wrecking and the Pentagon Renovation Team

Other Agencies that worked closely with the FEMA Task Forces included the United
States Army, the FBI, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Arlington County Fire
Department and Fairfax County Fire Department.

Finally, all of the volunteers and organizations that donated food, supplies and support
deserve special recognition. The Salvation Army, The American Red Cross,
McDonald's, Wal-Mart, Burger King, the staff at the Crystal City Marriott and many
others helped to make the mission a little more comfortable. The cards, letters, emails,
flowers and banners sent by school children, teachers, family members and citizens from
across the country and the world were read and appreciated by all.

27
REFERENCES

Begley, S., (2001), “The Rescue at the Pentagon”, Newsweek Commemorative Issue,
The Spirit of America, Fall, 2001, pp. 36-39.

Evey, W. L., (2002), "Pentagon Renovation and Rebuilding Briefing" United States
Department of Defense News Transcript, March 7, 2002, 11:00 a.m.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, (September, 1993) “Urban Search and Rescue
Response System Field Operations Guide”.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, (September 17, 2001), “The Pentagon

Operational Action Plan, Operational Periods #11 & #12, Monday 9/17/01 0600 –
Tuesday 9/18/01 0600”.

Martinette, B. (2002), “USAR Activities at the Pentagon”, JEMS, April, 2002, pp. 28-30.

Stanton, T., (2001), Shoring Tables compiled by Tom Stanton, MD-TF1

Tills, D., (2001), “Attack on The Pentagon – 9.11.01”, Shoreline Supplement, Winter,
2001/02, The Rescue Engineering Council, Inc., Germantown, MD, Vol. 2 No. 2,
pp. 1-6.

Titus, L. (2001), Personal Mission Log, September 11th – September 18th , 2001

Titus, L. (2001), Building Stability Monitoring Log, September 11th , 2001

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), (August 1999). “Urban Search & Rescue
Structures Specialist Field Operations Guide”, 2nd Edition, San Francisco, CA.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Readiness Support Center, (August 2001). “Urban Search
& Rescue Structures Specialist Training Manual”

Winston, S. (2001), "Pentagon Renovation's Safety Enhancements Helped Save Lives,

Officials Say", Engineering New Record, enr.com, September 14, 2001 online news
article. http://www.enr.com/news/enrbld_91401.asp

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APPENDIX

I. Monitoring Log from September 11, 2001 and Shoring Diagrams

from the US Army Corps of Engineers “Urban Search & Rescue
Structural Specialist Training Manual."

II. Pentagon Incident Shoring Tables - Compiled by Tom Stanton,

MD-TF1

• First Floor Box Crib Shore Table – Tom Stanton, MD-TF1 (IST)

• First Floor Beam Vertical Shore Table – Tom Stanton, MD-TF1 (IST)

• Second Floor Box Crib Shore Table – Tom Stanton, MD-TF1 (IST)

• Second Floor Beam Vertical Shore Table – Tom Stanton, MD- TF1 (IST)

III. Additional Photographs

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