Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric Author(s): Quirinus Breen Reviewed work(s): Source:

Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jun., 1952), pp. 384-412 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707604 . Accessed: 23/10/2012 04:46
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas.

http://www.jstor.org

DOCUMENT GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA ON THE CONFLICT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC BREEN BY QUIRINUS In April of 1485ErmalaoBarbarowrote to Pico 1 a letter in which he sharply criticizes the scholastic philosophersas being rude, dull, uncultured,barbarians. He did not deny them genius and learning, though his concessionis grudging. But he categoricallydenies them immortalityas authors,for it is a shining and elegant, at least a pure and chaste style, which confers immortal reputation on an author. He did not doubt but they dealt with good subject matter; but this would not save their reputations, unless indeed bad poets should be honoredas Homers and Virgils because they had the same matter of song. Barbaro'scriticismtakes up about a third of his letter-a fact which he had apparentlyforgotten when he wrote his long reply to Pico. In this reply he complains that Pico has pounced on some things he had said, in a mere cornerof his letter, about contemporary barbarianphilosophers. It is, however,quite possiblethat he had not his criticismof the scholasticsan importantpart of his letconsidered ter, and that the heavier burdenof it was a criticismof Pico. While complimentinghim effusively Barbaro drops remarks which betray dissatisfactionwith his style. The attack upon the scholastics may have been a mere elaborationof remarkson the importanceof Greek letters; it may also have been intended as a way of holding up a mirror for Pico to see himself as he will be if he is not careful. I am more inclined to favor the latter view. Thus the letter would declare the scholasticsas passe-despite their matter-because they did not produce a literature in classical form; and Pico is warned that he is headed for oblivion for a similar reason. This would accountfor the nature of Pico's famous letter of June, 1485. On the one hand, its style is in the best literary tradition; it
the letters of Barbaroand Pico on pp. 391-412. On Barbarocf. Barbaro (Venice, 1922); ThomasStickney,De Hermolai Almoro ArnoldoFerriguto, Barbarivita atque ingenio (Paris, 1913); on Pico see E. Garin, GiovanniPico della Mirandola: Vita e Dottrina (Florence, 1937); E. Anagnin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola:Sincretismoreligioso-filosofico (Bari, 1937); L. Dorez and Thuasne,Pic de la Mirandoleen France (Paris, 1897); Avery Dulles, Princeps Concordiae:Pico della Mirandolaand the Scholastic Tradition (Cambridge,Mass., 1941); P. Kibre, The Libraryof Pico della Mirandola(New York, 1936). 384
1 Translationof

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

385

shines with phrases, metaphors, apt historical and literary illustrations; it is warm throughout with sustained eloquence. This document won the unboundedpraise of Politian,2who said it was dashed off in a few morning hours, by Barbaro and later by Melancthon.3 Pico has been spoken of as a vain man; and it were no marvel had he been somewhatconceited; for such were his achievementsin classical learning that he was a recognizederudite when barely past twenty. The gorgeous style of the letter may well have been Pico's answer once for all that in humanisticattainments he could equal if not surpass the best of his contemporaries. On the other hand, Pico defends the scholasticsas philosophersand as immortals. He says that for six years of his life he has been engrossedin the study of Thomas,Scotus, Albert, and Averroes. If these are not immortalsall his lucubrations have been for nothing. The defense is made with such passion as to lead one to think of it as an apologiapro vita sua. Towardsthe end he attempts to climb down from his lofty perchby saying that he has written somewhatsportively,as it were,playing a dialecticalgame like that of Glaucondefendinginjustice not from convictionbut to stimulate Socratesto the praiseof its opposite. I take this to have been an after-thought,feeling perhapsthat he ought not to have talked at the top of his voice to a friend. The letter truly voices his opinion on the subject of the relation of philosophyto eloquence. It is true that he for that of Greekliterastates he has given up study of the barbarians ture, and to an extent that representedthe facts; but the following year (1486) we find him at workon his nine hundred" Conclusiones," whose preface contains these words: "In the detail of these theses, instead of adheringto the rules of classic elegance,he [Pico] has purposely adopted the manner and diction of the most celebratedParisian disputants,the same being in most general use amongst the phi4 losophersof our times." Ferrigutoqueriesif Pico's later mannerof praisingErmolao (in the Preface to the Apologia) may indicate that he considered his letter of 1485 a work of juvenile audacity.5 Whetheror not Pico changedhis view is of little moment in the present discussion; for the letter's line of argumentis as important and interesting as is the position itself which it defends.
2 Cf. W. Greswell,Memoirsof Politian,Picus of Mirandola,etc. (London,1805),

211. 3 CorpusReformatorum, IX, 687f. 4 Greswell,op. cit., 229. 5 A. Ferriguto,op. cit., 321 and note 1. The quotationfrom Pico is interestingand handsome-but not decisive.

386

QUIRINUS

BREEN

Pico nowhere intimates that there is no place for rhetoric. The suspicionthat he might be a foe of rhetoricas such is answeredby the rhetoricalcharacterof the letter. He holds, however, that rhetoric (or eloquence,as he more commonlyspeaksof it) must be kept clearly distinct and separate from philosophy; to join the two is wicked (nefas). It has occasioned much astonishment that so brilliant a young man should be so paradoxicalas to defend such a thesis with such rhetorical elegance. Pico might answer, however, that in the strict sense of the term he was here not philosophizingbut writing about philosophyfor the benefit of rhetoricians. Just so a physicist describingphysics to laymen in that science would perforcehave to use terms known to his readers,and if he would persuadethem of his subject's importancehe must resort to devices which the technician has ever tended to scornin the popularizer. I do not doubt but some paradoxremains. This need not diminish the validity of the arguments for the divorceof philosophyfrom rhetoric. Here are some of the points he makes: 6 First, Pico distinguishes between the subject-matter of rhetoric and philosophy. The formerdeals with words,the latter with things (res). Second,the method of rhetoricdiffersfrom that of philosophy. The orator affects verbal ornaments; he must persuade,and to sucsole business ceed in it he must stoop to deception. The philosopher's is in knowing (cognoscenda) and demonstration of truth. Third, rhetoricand philosophy are thereforeincompatible. Fourth, he deprecates the rhetorician'semphasison expressionin language as such; he intimates the existence of a realm of knowledge in which a man can contemplate wordlessly. Finally, his doctrine of man shines through. Philosophersare more complete as humans. For while he is not cultured (non est humanus) who is alien to polite literature,he that is destitute of philosophyis less than a man (non est homo). Barbaroreplied with two letters.7 In the first, a brief note, he voices his deep regardfor Pico, and also announcesthat a more detailed letter is to follow. This first letter breathesannoyancebecause Pico's attack had become public property, but he tries to keep his good humor by jesting about a barbarousman (a pun on his own name) defendingeloquence,while an eloquent man (Pico) is defending its want. Somewhat later came Barbaro's elaborate answer. He again makes a point of the paradox of Pico's eloquence in defending the
The main burden of the argumentis carried by a fictional representativeof 7 See pp. 402-412, below. scholasticism.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

387

but now adds that Pico had been insincerein his defense. barbarians, Pico is said to have intended to show the barbariansto be defenseless without eloquence-a treacherousdevice, and utterly futile because the defendants cannot appreciatehis dazzling composition. While Pico had created a fictional representativeof Scholasticism to plead his case, Barbarohas (so he says) a living barbarianfrom Padua make the main reply. This Paduan is equally suspicious of Pico's motives and method. He expects him, if victorious,to attribute his victory to his eloquence. What chance has he in this court where judge and witness are the same man? Barbaro'sPaduan is in my opinion something of a ventriloquist's dummy. The Paduan gives up too easily; he praises Pico for saying philosophydeals with things (res) and needs no ornament,but immediately grants the reasonablenessof the very opposite. He says the oratorsdo not depreciatephilosophersbut want eloquent ones, on the theory that two goods are better than one. When to this he poses two alternatives,the oratorscover him with confusion. He argues the question whether orators must deceive. He says not, for oratorypertains to civil affairsand to things natural, moral, and divine. In the latter there need never be any lying; in civil affairs it is permissible,but even here the rule is not that oratorsalways lie or that all oratorslie. His elaborationof this and similarquestions by means of analysisof Pico's rhetoricalsyllogismssharpensthe paradox of Pico's method. The copious quotationsfrom Ciceroare to the point, though they hardly fit the Paduan. His distinction between the philosopheras contemplatorand as man of affairs strikes at the root of the debate and might well have been elaborated. In climax he thrusts against classical, genteel Pico's apparent hatred for the liberal arts. Too much of an argumentis made against words being objects of arbitrarychoice. Pico had made little more of this than to say that if languageis a matter of this kind it is of little moment whether it is classicalor not. But he had also offeredanother alternative, to wit, that words are groundedin the nature of things. If this be so, they are appropriatelyjudged by philosophers. Of this alternative Barbaro makes nothing. Finally, however, Barbaro'sPaduan says he has not granted a single point. If he is defendedat all, let it not be by eloquence; but he says in the same breath that the case might be argued along the lines of accepted commonplacesappropriatethereto. Then he bows to the authority of Plato and Aristotle, masters of both rhetoric and

388

QUIRINUS

BREEN

philosophy. But he ends by demandingdefense by his own kind who have no eloquence. Barbaro then dismisses him, calling him that ape-like Paduan. He ends with a few more darts thrust with a hand gloved in jokes. The reply was clever but it missed some good points on which to join the issue. This may have been felt by Melancthon (1558) who either did not know it or sought to improve upon it in a letter en8 In generalthe titled: Responseto Pico in behalf of E. Barbaro." positions of Pico had not been shaken: 1. Philosophy and rhetoric have each their respective subjectmatters. The formerpertainsto things as they appear to the intelligence or understandingand not immediatelyto action, the latter pertains to things in an aspect under which they are to be acted upon, be it in a deliberative assembly,in a court, or as the objects of approval or disapprovalin occasionaladdresses. 2. Philosophy uses its own peculiar method. The Paduan says that as a philosopherhe wants conclusive proof (apodixis), and is content to leave everything else to the orators. But immediatelyhe becomes doubtful whether apodixis can be attained. Who will decide? he asks. He does not doubt that truth is knowable,but (like a Pyrrhonist) no longer has a sure way of knowing the way. This seems to representBarbaro'sown position. Pico, on the other hand, took his stand in the tradition of Aristotle and scholasticism that truth can be known and that there is a method of knowing it, part of that method being logic. Barbaro'sletter has not shaken this contention. Pico argued in effect that there is a distinction between philosophy as a searchfor truth by its own methodologyand philosproof that Pico ophy as a rhetoricaltopic or commonplace. Barbaro's had used false premisesin some of his rhetoricalsyllogisms has not upset this distinction. True, it is paradoxical,but it seems just to interpret it as a hyperbolicdefense of the distinction as such. 3. Pico defendedthe Latin of the scholasticsfor philosophicaland scientific purposes. Zielinski9 tells of German criticism denouncing humanistic rhetoric as the curse of Germany. He says "a famous philosopherhad defended the position that scholastic Latin, being pithier and preciser, should be preferredto the Ciceronian-humanistic." He does not name this philosopher,but the descriptionfits Pico. However this may be, the fact remainsthat Pico had in mind
8 See note 3. 9 Th. Zielinski,Ciceroim Wandelder Jahrhunderte(Leipzig and Berlin, 1912), 179f.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

389

the contrast between the rhetorical style of humanism (clearness, agreeableness, persuasiveness for the general reader) and the deliberately non-rhetorical style of most scholastics (fidelity to the subject only, technical terms). Barbaro had said that the scholastics had produced no specimens of the latter. In this he exaggerates, which he virtually confesses. Still Pico's thesis is not overthrown, viz., that the scholastic style has proved itself to be a style worthy of philosophy. 4. As to a doctrine of man he seems to hold that it is proper to be humanus; i.e., to be a humanist, not a barbarian; but one must also be homo, that is, a complete human being. If the former is attained by polite letters, the latter is achieved through philosophy. I trust it is not overstraining his meaning to say that he implies a criticism of scholasticism in creating his very eloquent barbarian spokesman, as one who is somewhat more eloquent than his fellows. All in all, however, he does not equate humanus with homo; the latter is more important than the former. He seems to imply the possibility of being homo without humanus (in the Renaissance sense at least); but he was esthete enough not to like it altogether. Neither Pico nor Barbaro had come to full clarity on questions of style. Undoubtedly Pico loved fine literature, and appreciated the good literary taste for which Petrarch and others had contended. His letter itself proves that he knew how to compose in the best literary tradition. But he makes uncritical use of Plato's banishment of poets; and he treats Lucretius with utter lack of sympathy. He is also too thin-skinned about the "grammaticasters " who crow over their etymological discoveries. After all we owe to their kind our lexicons and grammars; their work was on its level as truly a craft or specialty-and as severable from considerations of literary taste-as was the work of the scholastic logician. In their way they were as concerned with truth as were the scholastics; truth for them pertained to what is classical Latin; for the latter truth pertained to philosophy. The disputants might have done well to have recognized this clearly. Pico gives the impression of thinking that wisdom or philosophical truth should lack charm or elegance. In this he is quite mistaken. But of course Barbaro was mistaken in demanding that philosophy must perfect itself through rhetorical discourse. Barbaro was wrong because wisdom has often been expressed without elegance, as say, in Aristotle's Metaphysics; sometimes it cannot be expressed in words at all but only in symbols which may be quite abstract. He was doubly wrong in thinking that rhetorical discourse is the most charming and elegant, that it is truly literary art. As I take it, Pico would have done better to attack the rhetorician's claim to being an artist, of pro-

390

QUIRINUS

BREEN

ducing the most elegant, the most charmingkind of discourse. He may be an artist, as Erasmussometimeswas; but he need not be. For literatureis a productof imagination:throughimaginationthe writer has conceivedof some aspect of the meaning of things; and through imagination he conceives phrases and figures so as to touch and, if possible,delight men. By this test Pico's letter is a workof art, while Barbaro's, though " humanistic,"is not. Pico has reflectedvery much more deeply on the meaning of things; his imaginationcan soar wonderfully; his writing has charm and exquisite elegance. Yet it is remarkablethat he does not praise the eloquenceof Plato. His reference to Scriptureis interesting in that his illustration from it is the languageof the Law, which is flaming,stinging, etc.; there is no mention of Isaiah'smagnificentmetaphorsor of the delightful parablesof Christ. All this points to unclear thinking on the problem of style. Neverthelesshe is headed in a good direction,as artists often are. The subject of the Pico-Barbaroletters is the style appropriateto philosophers. Pico is correctin his belief that wisdomis the true pursuit of philosophy,and he was correctin holding that the scholastics sought certain knowledgethrough contemplationand logic. Pico believed the scholastics to have been right. This belief of Pico had a broadercontext. Pletho, an inauguratorof Fifteenth Century Platonic studies in Italy, had taught that some of Plato's doctrineshad come orally from Zoroaster by way of Pythagoras.10Ficino took over this idea and elaboratedit. Pico developed it as a principle articulated in his studies of all available religions and philosophies.11 He saw in all of them the spirit of truth, the Logos. It was therefore,in his view, truly unspeakableto requirethat philosophybe tied to any one languageor kind of expression. Rhetoricaldiscourseas a vehicle of philosophy to him seemed as such objectionable;but even had it not been objectionable,it would have seemed frivolous to require it for philosophy, seeing there had been other effective ways of transmitting truth. The reference to Pythagoras says in effect that, as Pico sees it, the main tradition of philosophy is suspicious of the power of words to carry the whole freight of wisdom. Wisdom is a possession; it can be communicated,but only to other wise men, for whom rhetoricalarrangement, invention, and agreeablenessare worse than useless.
10J. W. Taylor, Georgius Gemistius Pletho's Criticism of Plato and Aristotle (Menasha,Wis., 1921), 27f. 11E. Garin, op. cit., 57ff.; P. O. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York, 1943), 15, 25ff.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

391

Pico's references to the nature of philosophic discourse seem to favor two kinds: first, the lively, quick, fervid style of Scripture, and second, that of the disputation. He considered both to answer the requirements of philosophy: the former because philosophy is wisdom, to be addressed only to the potentially wise; the second because philosophy is the art of invalidating the false and affirming the true. The former represents Pico's understanding of philosophy as Plato would have it; the latter represents his understanding of the inheritance of Aristotle. To recognize both aspects was one of the paths toward reconciling Plato and Aristotle.l2 University of Oregon.
12 The battle over the literary style appropriate to philosophy was not new, nor has it ever ended. Many humanists demanded that philosophical style be rhetorically clear and agreeable. It stands to reason that they should want Aristotle's authority for this. Georg Voigt, Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums (Berlin, 1893), II, 161-72, has shown that Bruni made his famous translation under the impression that Aristotle's works were rhetorically eloquent. Much reliance was put on Cicero's assurance that the language of Aristotle was a "gold-bearing river." It was not known that Cicero had probably not studied our Aristotelian canon (save the Topica), but works of Aristotle now lost. Cf. G. Grote, Aristotle (London, 1872), 43f. Petrarch's ignorance of this is illustrated by citations in P. O. Kristeller, Un codice Padovano di Aristotele postillato da Francesco e Ermolao Barbaro. II Manoscritto Plimpton 17 della Columbia University Library a New York, Leo S. Olschki, Editore (Firenze, 1948), 164. There was also the belief that Greece, land of the Muses, could scarcely have produced inelegant things. Alongside this desire to recapture the alleged elegance of Aristotle went the desire to show that the scholastics had by their bad latinity and ignorance of Greek corrupted Aristotle's clear and agreeable prose. Bruni had spoken of "endowing Aristotle with good Latin." Such also was Barbaro's attempt; he had hoped to translate all of Aristotle, and had in fact completed the Rhetoric (Ferriguto, op. cit., 1llff.). While Barbaro undoubtedly wanted Aristotle to be on the side of a " better " philosophical style, he also made an effort to broaden knowledge of the commentators. Hence to Averroes and other medievals he added Themistius. In this paper his part in the warfare about style is stressed. The sixteenth century saw a number of scholars championing the same cause. Among them was Melanchthon, especially notable being his Reply to Pico. There was also Nizolius, whose defense of rhetorical philosophical style early influenced Leibniz. Cf. Bruno Tillmann, Leibniz' Verhdltnis zur Renaissance im allgemeinen und zu Nizolius im besonderen (Bonn, 1912); also R. Honigswald, Denker der italienischen Renaissance: Gestalten und Probleme (Basel, 1938), 41-47, "Marius Nizolius." See also Leibniz's "Dissertatio de stilo philosophico Nizolii" in God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera Philosophica, ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin, 1840), 55-71. Incidentally, Leibniz (XXIII) puts Pico among those who battled in behalf of philosophical eloquence. Furthermore, he says that while Barbaro inveighed with great sharpness against the scholastics, Pico sought to soften their vices, which by a not improper piety he tried to cover rather than defend. Leibniz's requirement of claritas as basic for philosophy is by him (XVIII-XXV) considered to be identical with that of the humanists who warred against the scholastic " corrupters " of it.

392

QUIRINUS BREEN

The Correspondence of G. Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro concerningthe Relation of Philosophy and Rhetoric ErmolaoBarbaro1 to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: I certainly cannot but seem to you a barbarianand ingrate; for I have delayed to thank you who so often and in connectionwith so many subjects write and say, and also think, complimentarythings about me. Your letters show that you know me thoroughly. Every letter of yours which has come hither [i.e., Venice], after I became known to you gives me distinguished and respectfulmention. But mark how highly I value your attestation of my worth,whetheryou give it as a professionalopinionor from an inclinationof good will: I who am, for the rest, unassuming,I should rather say shy and diffident-I seem to be somethingbecause you praise me, because you approvemy works, because in my Themistius,accordingto what you write about it, you often pause as in a most delightful lodging-place. Why is it that in your letters I so often see myself? Why? Do you think I can find anything pleasanterthan to descry you no sooner noting than imitating some clause or periphraseor figureof speech of mine? And, aside fromthe fact that in writing to many persons,you apparentlydo this without simulationor purpose,I have many reasonsto believe that you did it out of friendship. To be sure, I could not see why you should spoil that flowingand flowerystyle of yours, why you should resort to me who creep along the groundfollowing a poor and overtenuousthread of discourse. I never aspire,I do not inspire,I do not elaborate,I do not elevate, I do not abase: all of this is contraryto and incompatiblewith my natural abilities. Take away altogethermy habits of hard work and diligence,and nothing is left of me, save when you or a few of your likes commendme or when I notice that you are pleased with my works even to the point of imitating them. 0, Pico, what a distinguishedand clearly divine genius is yours! For while the things you write are the best you expressand imitate the words of others which are the worst, in order that they may seem to be your own, that is, the best. I think it is a greaterthing to lower oneself and to descend than to strive for what is lofty: while the one may be the more virtuous,the other is certainly the more laborious and difficult. Even so, whether you considermy works worthy of the labor of imitating, or whetheryou occupy yourself thus to oblige me-in either case I owe very much to you. I shall
1 V. Branca (Editor), ErmolaoBarbaro:Epistolae, Orationes, et Carmina(FlorMemoirs P. W. 84-87. Vol. of Angelus Greswell, LXVIII, Ep. pp. I, ence, 1943), Politianus, Joannes Picus of Mirandula,etc., Second Edition (London, 1805), has a large part in fact of Pico's famous letter. translatedparts of this correspondence, new and is translation complete. The readerof Greswell'sversion will entirely My detect here and there a borrowingfrom him. I owe much to ProfessorPaul Oskar Kristeller'skind help on the problems of translation. The errors remainingare mine alone.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

393

some time requite you: I would not say when I shall be able to (for I never shall be able) but then when you or your relatives shall consider me able. Indeed, such is the goodness and humanity of your entire family, that you generally impute a kindness where no kindness was. However that be, I will do according to my wont if I leave the manner and time of requitement to you; thus in the straightening of accounts every paralogism and imposture will come from you alone and not from me. What you have written to Scytha 2 concerning the method of your studies pleased us very much. I congratulated this age for having a man of such learning that there is almost nothing he does not know, and of such pains that he seemed to have learned absolutely nothing.3 I envision you as one who are now or will soon be an outstanding poet, a most eminent orator. I consider you a philosopher, formerly an Aristotelian, now also become a Platonist. As to Greek letters, which were your only possible deficiency and without which you would amount to nothing, I see you have not only learned but swallowed them; and that with such ease and speed that you do not remember ever having been ignorant of Greek, nor can you persuade anybody else of it; no less gladly than truly do I make the same declaration about my friend Hieronymus Donatus. I might spur you on to become as fully familiar with the Greek as you are with the Latin; but you do not need goads and, by Hercules, they waste words who undertake to advise men more accomplished than themselves. One thing I know that you know: during many centuries there has not stood out a memorable work in good Latin done by anyone who lacked Greek letters. Nor indeed do I count among the Latin authors those Germans and Teutons who were not really alive in their life-time, much less will they live now they are dead; or if they live, they live in torture and reproach: why, it is common to have them called dull, rude, uncultured, barbarians. Who would not rather be non-existent than have such a reputation? One must admit of course that they said something of use; they were strong in natural endowment, in learning, in a lot of good things. That which I can deny of them I do not deny altogether; however, that which procures for an author immortal reputation is a shining and elegant style, at least pure and chaste, such as, if you will, is evident in the Christian writers, both Greek and Latin. Unless one thinks painters, coppersmiths, sculptors, and other artists are to be praised for the sole reason that the material with which they work is expensive and precious; or unless one thinks that, if Choerilus and Maevius had had the same matter of song as Homer and Virgil, the critics such as Aristarchus then by the consent of all grammarians ought to have put thein first in the ranks of the poets. Is it not truer that, whatever their matter, Choerilus and Maevius will always be Choerilus and Maevius, and that 2 Jo. Bapt. Scytha (Scita) of Feltre, a poet and friend of Pico and of several other scholars. See L. Dorez, "Lettres inedites de Jean Pic de la Mirandole," Giornalestorico della letteraturaitaliana XXV (1895), 356. 3 " Tanta cura, ut nihil omninoscire videatur,"suggests an ironic intention.

394

QUIRINUS

BREEN

Choeriluswould never have written the Iliad or Maevius the Aeneid anymore than Choerilusthe Aeneid or Maevius the Iliad? Well, when I write about ridiculousfellows, do I not have somethingto joke about? But perhaps I have said far too much about those tramps. I returnto my subject. You now embraceGreek letters not as a student but as a professor,and your glory is that about no one can that well-wornsaying be more truly repeated than yourself: throughoutall the arts many students excel their professors; or as a Greekverse puts it morepithily: many students are stronger than their professors. I have been wanting to know your opinion about the FlorentinePlato,4 but decency forbids the boldness of ever asking what you think of him. Give him my best regards. It is kind of you to urge upon me the books and opinionsof Plato. Plato I hold in my hands, and hold him I always shall, being sufficientlyallured by him on my own while also having your faithful and friendly advice. We have the word of Simpliciusfor it that " no one should hold forth about Aristotle,who dissociatesPlato from Aristotle, as if they conflicted." But can Plato agree with Aristotle to one who does not know the books and treatises of both? Of those manuscripts you desire and which we have here I will have copies made for you at once. Farewell. (April 5, 1485. Venice.) Greetingsto Poliziano. (In June, 1485, Pico replied with his famous letter:) 5 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola to his friend Ermolao Barbaro, Greetings: For my part, dear Ermolao, it is impossibleto hide what I think about you, nor can I fail to sense what I ought in one in whom all things are found, as it were, so many individual excellencies. But would that my mind's capacity were such as to think of you according to your merits; would there were the power of speech to express some time what I always think. I know that my thought about you remainsan infinitudebelow the heights of your learning. Even you may know that my words fall short of my thoughts, that words may fail the mind as much as the mind fail of matter. Neverthelessyou believe me to be so bold as to hope to be able to imitate you whose greatnessI cannot assess. Everybody can admire you, but just as few can imitate so no one can censure you. And would that mine were the felicity so to write as to body forth even partially my dear friend Ermolao. To speak of nothing else, there is that style of yours, to which you are devoted even to a fault; it is marveloushow it affects and delights me; it is so learned, grave, orderly, cultured, thoroughly refined, full of invention, in which nothing is common, nothing vulgar, nothing trivial in either words or sentences. I and our friend Poliziano often read whatever letters we have of you, either to others or to ourselves; always do the more recent ones so vie with the earlier,and as we read new delights
4 Ficino. 5 I have used the text found in IX, 678-87. CorpusReformatorum,

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

395

bloom so inexhaustibly, that in our perpetual exclamations there is no interval to catch our breath. But it is marvelous how persuasive you are and how you impel the reader's mind to whatever you wish. While all your letters thus impress me, your last one did so particularly-the one in which you sail into those barbaric philosophers; who, you say, are commonly held to be dull, rude, uncultured; who in their lifetime were not really alive, and much less will live now they are dead; and were they now living would live in torture and reproach. Accordingly I am a Hercules enraged; I am so ashamed and disgusted with my studies-for I have spent six years on those barbarians-that I wish nothing more strongly than that I had not strained myself so laboriously in so much ado about nothing. What I am saying is that I have lost in Thomas, John Scotus, Albert, and Averroes the best years of my life, so many sleepless nights, which I could have used to become something in fine letters. The thought has been running through my head, so as to console me, that if some of those barbarians were now to come back to life they might perhaps have some defense to make, and being experts in argument they might take up their cause with some show of reason. At length it occurs to one of them-one of the slightly more eloquent ones-to champion his barbarism as little like a barbarian as possible. He perhaps might do it in this way: "We have lived as famous men, Ermolao, and we shall live in times to come, not in the schools of grammarians and pedagogues, but in the circles of philosophers, in gatherings of sages, where they busy themselves and dispute, not about the mother of Andromache, not about the children of Niobe, and such light nothings, but about the reasons of things human and divine. In meditating on, inquiring into, and unravelling these subjects we have been so subtle, acute and sharp that perchance we seem to have been sometimes over-solicitous and captious and too careful in the search for truth. Besides, if in these things anyone should accuse us of dullness and heaviness, let whoever he be come with us and find out for himself that the barbarians have had the god of eloquence not on the tongue but in the heart, that if eloquence they lacked they did not lack wisdom; (let him find out) that eloquence should not have been joined to wisdom; only their not being joined perhaps is free from fault, so that it were wicked to have joined them. Who will not condemn synthetic beauty, or rouge, in a reputable maiden? Who would not curse it in a Vestal? So great is the conflict between the office of the orator and the philosopher that there can be no conflicting greater than theirs. For what else is the task of the rhetor than to lie, to entrap, to circumvent, to practise sleight-of-hand? For, as you say, it is your business to be able at will to turn black into white, white into black; to be able to elevate, degrade, enlarge, and reduce, by speaking, whatsoever you will; at length you do this to the things themselves by magical arts as it were, for by the powers of eloquence you build them up in such a way that they change to whatever face and costume you please; so that they are not what their own nature but what your will made them;

396

QUIRINUS BREEN

of coursethey may not actually becomewhat you willed, but if they should not it may neverthelessappear so to your audience. All this is nothing at all but sheer mendacity, sheer imposture,sheer trickery; for its nature is either to enlargeby addition or to reduce by subtraction,and putting forth a false harmony of words like so many masks and likenesses it dupes the listeners' minds by insincerities. Will there be any affinity between this and the philosopher,whose entire endeavor is concerned with knowing (cognoscenda)the truth and demonstratingit to others? "Add that no one will have any confidencein us were we to affect vocal splendorsand enticing manners; we would as it were have too little confidence in our subject matter (res) and would not be on solid ground,were we to seek by such coquetriesto induce men to accept our opinion. One reads the sacred stories, written rustically rather than elegantly, for prewith true knowing nothing cisely the reasonthat in every subject concerned is more unseemlyand detrimentalthan all that elaboratedsort of discourse. The latter belongs to questions raised in forums, not to questions about natural and celestial things. It belongs to those whose business is not in wherethings done and things the academybut ratherin that commonwealth said are weighedin a public scale underthe eye of one who to whom flowers weigh much more than fruits. You are not unaware of that, are you? Is there not a commonthread runningthrough it all? Well-spokennessis an elegant thing; we admit it. It is full of allurement and pleasure; but in philosophersit is neither an ornamentor a grace. Who would not approve a delicate step, cunning hands, playful eyes in an actor and dancer? In a fellow-citizen,in a philosopher,who would not disapprove,censure,abominate them? Shouldwe see a young girl of flippety manners,even snippety, we will praise,we will kiss her. The same in a matronwe will condemnand prosecute. Not we, therefore,but they are empty-headedwho carry on like Bacchantes before a Vestal, who dishonorthe dignity of philosophicalsubjects by stylistic finery, as it were dishonoringchastity by low comedy. In fact, what Synesius said about a youth can fittingly be said about a speech: A speech with long locks is always wanton. Wherefore we prefer ours shaggy, globose, troubled,rather than with pretty tresses with their marks or at least suggestionof immodesty. For the rest, the robe of Athena was not properlyan object of display; on the contrary,its profane use was distinctly kept separate from her sacred rites. "And let whatever else I say be of no account, this one thing is most thoroughlytrue: Nothing is more foreignto the way of life of a philosopher, in whatever respect, than a taste for luxury, or for arroganceof any sort. Socrateswas wont to say that Sicyonian shoes were comfortable,and suited to the feet, but were not fit for Socrates. Not at all identical is the manner of the gentleman and of the philosopher,let us say in eating or speaking. The philosopheruses these only by necessity, the gentlemanuses them for graciousliving besides; if the latter neglectedthis he were not a gentleman, and if the formerwere to affect it he were no philosopher. If Pythagoras

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

397

could have lived without food, he would have abstained even from cabbages; if he could have expressed his meaning by looks, or by any means short of the labor of speech, he would not have spoken at all-so far was he from polishing and adorning language. Or again, let us be cautioned against the writer who, fond of an artificial complexion, lets his reader enjoy nothing else; he never sees the real thing, nor the vital flush which we have often perceived beneath the whiting of a powdered face. We have seen, I am saying, in all writers of this sort the practice of busying the reader from the start with a various cadence and harmony, for the very reason that inside they are empty and hollow. Had a philosopher done this, Musonius will exclaim that it is not a philosopher speaking but a flute-player piping. The very fact that we have not done what to have done were a defect ought, therefore, not to be held against us as a defect. We search after the what of writing, we do not search after the how-that the style be without flourish and without flower. We do not want our style delightful, adorned, and graceful; we want it useful, grave, something to be respected; we would have it attain majesty through rudeness (horror) rather than charm through delicateness (mollitudo). We do not expect the applause of the theater because a rounded or a rythmical period has caressed the ear, because this were piquant, or that nice. But we expect the silence which comes rather from astonishment on the part of the few who are looking very deeply into something; either something dug from the inner depths of nature, or something brought to men from the throne of Jove; or, further, something so thoroughly defended that there were no room for refutation. Let them therefore admire us as sharp in searching, thorough in exploring, accurate in observation, in making a judgment serious, thorough in making a synthesis, facile in analysis. Let them admire our style's brevity, pregnant with subject matters many and great. Let them admire how in everyday expressions we put the farthest reaches of our ideas, full of question, full of solutions; how skillful we are, how well-equipped to destroy ambiguities, to dissolve difficulties, to unravel what is involved, by mind-bending syllogisms to weaken the false and confirm the true. " By these marks, Ermolao, we have till now preserved our memory from oblivion and, we do not doubt, will preserve it hereafter. What if, as you say, we are commonly held to be dull, rude, uncultured? To us this is a glory, and is no cause for contempt. For the many we have not written, but for you and your likes. We are not unlike the ancients who by their riddles and by the masks of their fables made uninitiates shun the mysteries; and we have been wont by fright to drive them from our feasts, which they could not but pollute with their even more repulsive make-up of words. Those who wish to conceal treasure not intended for sequestration are wont to cover it with refuse or rubbish, so that only those passers-by may take it who are considered worthy of such a gift. A like endeavor, to wit, that of philosophers to hide their business were fitting for people who not only do not appreciate but also do not even understand them. It cannot possibly be fitting for a philosophical writing to have something theatri-

398

QUIRINUS

BREEN

or popular,precisely because such would give the cal, applause-provoking, appearanceof curryingthe favor of the multitude. "Yet I shall indicate the form of our discourse. It is the same as that of the Sileni of our Alcibiades. Among them were likenesses of a shaggy face, loathsomeand disgusting;but within full of gems, a rare and precious thing, if you looked within you perceived somethingdivine. But, you will say, modern ears do not tolerate here irregular,there disconnected, and always unharmoniousconstructions;they do not tolerate a barbarousnomenclaturewhose very sound almost makes one shudder. Ah, delicate one, when you approachflutists and citharists, be all ears; when you approach philosophers,call yourself away from the senses, returnto your own self in the innermostparts of the soul and the hiding-place of the mind. Adopt those ears of Tyaneus by which, when he was in rapture,he would hear not earthly Marsyas but celestial Apollo compose on a divine cither a cosmic ear you shall have tasted melody in ineffablemodes. If with a philosopher's Nestor. words,their sweetnesswill seem the envy of "But we may be indulgingfar too much these vaulting fancies; it is a simple fact that the revulsion from the less tasteful style of a most subtly disputingphilosophercomes not so much from a delicate stomach as from to philosophicalfare. So it is were one to take offense being unaccustomed at Socrates for instructingin mannerswhile either his shoe were untied or his toga hanging unevenly, and were one to go into a tantrum over a crookedcut of a finger-nail. Cicero does not desire eloquencein a philosopher, but that he be adequate in his subject matter and teaching. Being as learned as he was polished he knew it is more important for us to set in orderthe mind than delivery; to be careful lest what strays be reason, not speech (ratio non oratio); that we attain to the word as thought, not to the word as expression.6 It is praiseworthyto have the Muses in the soul, and not on the lips; for anything in the soul may, when uttered, be rendered feebler either by anger or strong desire. Moreover, let there not be any mannerof discordin that true harmonythroughwhich man is governedas it were by rhythm. Since Plato understoodthat by their theatricals the poets often disrupt this harmony,he excludedall poets from his Republic; who for certainwould in their turn he left it to be governedby philosophers, imitated the poets by luxurihave be soon condemnedto exile should they ance of discourse. "Lucretius will urge to the contrary,that although the commendations of philosophy do not as such need charmingdiscourse,yet its presentation ought to be such as to conceal the austerity of its subject matter. Just so wormwooddrives out sickness, but it is mixed with sweets so as to delude the unsuspecting child into swallowing it. Perhaps, Lucretius, you will have to do it this way if your writings are intended for children; your writings at any rate will have to be sweetenedif they are intended for the tionalsofoundin ecclesiastical writers.
it is a Stoic distinc6 0 Xoyos 'ev 8&aOeeae is contrastedwith 6 Aoyos'ev 7rpoc<opa;

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

399

multitude,for your potions are not only wormwoodbut purest poison. But a far differentmethoddo we pursuewho, as we said before, do not endeavor to entice the multitudebut to frightenthem off; and besides,we do not give them wormwoodbut nectar to drink. But Lactantius will assert that the truth is well enoughestablishedto influencemore strongly the mind of even aged hearers when it is arrayed in its native force and at the same time adornedwith the lights of eloquence. Well, Firmian [Lactantius], had you concernedyourself as muchwith the holy scripturesas you have with imaginary disputations, you might not have said this and, besides, you might perhapshave establishedour case as effectively as you broke down that of the opponents. Pray, tell what is more moving, more persuasivethan reading the holy scriptures? The words of the Law do not move and persuade but compel, stir up, convey force; they are rough and rustic, but alive, breathing,flaming, stinging, penetrating down to the depths of the spirit, transformingwith marvelous power the whole man. Alcibiades said that Pericles' carefully elaboratedspeeches did not move him at all; but Socrates' bare and simple words, even when they were foolish, enrapturedhim, entrancedhim, and that willy-nilly he performedwhatever Socratesordered. But why do I waste words on so manifest a case? If the hearer is not a fool, what else may he expect from colored language but treachery? By three things will he be best persuaded:the life of the speaker,the truth of his matter, and sobernessof discourse. These things, Lactantius,win a philosopher'sconfidence;that is, if he has been a good man, if truth-loving,if desirousof that kind of discoursewhich issues, not fromthe Muses'pleasant groves, but from the horrendouscave in which Heracleitus said the truth lies hidden. "But someonewill say: Come, my friend, let us examinethese propositions without contentiousness. Wisdom is somethingto be reverenced;it is somethingin itself divine. It needs no added adornment;but what odium would attach to adding it? Who would deny that what is in itself fitting would becomemore fitting by adornment? " I, my friend,I deny this with respectto many things. There are many things whose splendoryou would dim and not brighten by adding something to them. In fact, they are so much at their best in their natural condition that they cannot be changed in any respect without becoming inferior. Unless you first plaster, you cannot put paint on the walls of a marble house; in either case you would diminish its dignity and beauty. Not otherwiseis it with wisdom and philosophers'teachings; they are not brightenedbut obscuredby word-painting. What more shall I say? It is that good features are by paint disfigured? In general, not a commonplace whatever of beauty we may keep putting on, it hides what it covers: for the overlay shows only the overlay itself. Wherefore,if what before had been foreignto the thing is now conspicuous,it will have caused a loss, not a gain. For this reasonalone philosophypresentsherself everywherein full for from whatview, wholly visible; she eagerly invites cross-questioning,

400

QUIRINUS

BREEN

ever side it may please to come she knows how to maintain herself. Should you wish but a part of her, by so much you would diminish her glory; she wants to keep herself clean and pure; whatever you were to add would give her a taint, render her impure, make her something else. Like a mathematical point, she is indivisible and unsharable. Wherefore, let there be no playing with tropes and words or luxuriating in excesses, such as wantoning in figures or attempting bold inventions; in a matter so serious, so crucial, it were disgraceful to lessen, add, or change. " But you will say, come, we grant you that your discourse ought not be ornate; nevertheless, though you make no pretensions about the matter, your discourse certainly is at least in Latin; so that while you do not use flowery words you do explain things in Latin words. I do not require your discourse to be elegant, but I do not want it filthy, I do not want it perfumed, yet not of bad smell either; not exquisite and not neglected either; it should not please, but not offend either. "It is well; now in fact you are weakening in our favor. But both of us should know what is that good Latin, which you say is the only debt philosophers owe but fail to pay when it comes to using it in speech. For example, instead of ' a sole hominem produci 'our colleagues will say ' causari hominem.' Forthwith you shout: That is not Latin; and so far you are right. More right you are when you say: It is not the Roman way of speaking. But you are wrong when you say: Therefore it is not correct. An Arabian and an Egyptian will say the same thing, but not in Latin; but still they will speak correctly. For the names of things are established either by arbitrary convention (arbitrium) or by nature. It may happen that a society of men agree on a word's meaning; if so, for each thing that word is among them the right one to use for the meaning agreed on. That being the case, what will prohibit those philosophers you call barbarians from agreeing together on a common norm of speaking? And let it enjoy with them the same respect as does the Roman among you. There is no sense in saying that the one standard is wrong and yours right, if this business of name-making is altogether arbitrary. What of it, if you do not wish to dignify our standard by calling it Roman? You may call it French, British, Spanish, or even what the vulgar are accustomed to call Parisian. When they speak to us they will for many things be laughed at and to a great extent will not be understood. The same will happen to you when you speak to them. Remember the saying: Anacharsis commits a solecism among the Athenians, the Athenians do so among the Scythians. " But if the rightness of names depends on the nature of things, is it the rhetorician we ought to consult about this rightness, or is it the philosopher who alone contemplates and explores the nature of everything? And perhaps while the ears reject the names as harsh, reason accepts them as more cognate to the things.7 But why introduce these innovations and use a 7Forteque aures respuunt utpote asperula, acceptat ratio utpote rebus cognatiora.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

401

non-Latin language, although they were born among Latins? The simple fact is, Ermolao, they could not have done it; for while in the heavens they were reading the laws of destiny, the order of the universe, and in the elements the vicissitudes of birth and death, the potencies of simple and the composition of mixed substances; they could not at the same time, I say, mark with exactness the peculiarities, rules, and proprieties of the Roman language in Cicero, in Pliny, in Apuleius. Their inquiry concerned what is accepted, what is rejected in nature; meanwhile they are not concerned with what is accepted or rejected by the Romans. " But for the moment I will consider your position as the stronger, and grant you that eloquence and wisdom may be closely connected. It is the philosophers who have separated wisdom from eloquence; and the historians, rhetoricians, and poets who have separated eloquence from wisdom, which in Philostratus' opinion is regrettable. You have no doubt whatever but the latter will survive in great renown, the former only in torture and reproach. But be careful: Cicero prefers sagacity though halting in speech to stupid loquacity. In the case of money, we do not ask how it was minted but what is its material. There is no one but prefers pure gold bearing a Teutonic stamp to counterfeit with a Roman symbol on it. They are wrong who separate good sense (cor) from language (lingua) yet why are they so lacking in sense about language? Are not words, as Cato says, merely the vocabularies of the dead? We can live without a tongue, though not conveniently; but we cannot live at all without a heart. He is not cultured (humanus) who were alien to polite letters; he is not a man (homo) who were destitute of philosophy. The most inarticulate wisdom can be of use. Unwise eloquence, like a sword in a madman's hand, cannot but be most dangerous. " You will counter that therefore statues are praised for their material, not their workmanship; that had Choerilus sung the same themes as Homer, and Maevius those of Virgil, the ones as well as the others should be ranked equally among the poets. Do you not see the irrelevance of the comparison? We also make that very point: judge a thing by its appearance, not by its matter. For a thing is what it is by its appearance. But one is the appearance marking a philosopher, another is that marking a poet. Let Lucretius write about nature, about God, about providence; let anyone of us write about the same subjects;-in fact let John Scotus write about them in verse, so as to make him the more awkward. Lucretius will say that the principles of things are atoms and the void, that God is corporeal and ignorant of our affairs, that everything comes about blindly, by a chance combination of bits of matter: but he will say these things in good Latin, elegantly. John Scotus will say that what constitutes nature is to be determined by its matter and form, that God is a mind distinct from nature, knowing all things, governing all things; and yet the fact that he sees everything even down to the least does not disturb his tranquility, but rather as the saying has it: he descends without stepping down.8 But Scotus will say
KaTL'eVat. KaC L'rLOV'T7) 8KaTovra t . jl Ka'

402

QUIRINUS

BREEN

these things without taste, crudely, in non-Latin words. I ask if any would doubt that Scotus philosophizes better than that other man who speaks more elegantly. But just see how they differ! The one has a tasteless mouth (os insipidum), the other a foolish head (mens insipiens), the one does not know the decrees of the grammarians, nor (I may say) of the poets; the other does not know the decrees of God and of nature. The one who is most inarticulate in speech senses those things which cannot be praised enough in speech; the other, most voluble in eloquent language, utters blasphemies." Well, dear Ermolao, the above is perhaps what those philosophers might present in defense of their barbarism; if they got subtle, their arguments might be a lot better. I do not fully agree with their opinions, nor do I think their case will set on fire a candid and liberal mind. But I have given freely of myself in this matter, as in something of ill-repute; so that, like those who praise the quartan fever, I might test my abilities. My special aim was like that of Plato's Glaucon, who praised injustice, not seriously, but to goad Socrates to the praise of justice. Likewise, so that I may hear you defend eloquence I have attacked it rather violently, for a little while even over the protest of my feelings and natural disposition. Had I thought the Barbarians right in their neglect of eloquence I should not almost wholly have left off studying them; I should not a short time ago have taken up Greek letters and your never sufficiently praised " Themistius." However, let me freely express my feeling: Certain grammaticasters turn my stomach, who when they have made a couple of etymological discoveries become such show-offs, so tout themselves, so boastfully strut around, that as compared with themselves they would have philosophers esteemed as nothing. They say, We do not want these philosophies of yours. Well, small wonder. Neither do dogs care for Falernian. Let me close my letter with this last remark: if those Barbarians have earned any honor and reputation only for their knowledge of things; it is not easy to say what rank, what praises are yours to boast, who among philosophers are the most eloquent, among the eloquent the most philosophical. Florence, June 3, 1485. (Barbaro replied with two letters, the first a brief, the second a long one.) Ermolao Barbaro to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: 9 But thou, Minerva, why dost thou stir up bitterness? Yet what a ridiculous thing it is: a barbarous man defends eloquence, while you, an eloquent man, defend its want. Still, I have long been in doubt about replying, for I feared we might become the gossip of ignoramuses who would take [our conversation] not as what it is but as that which it is not, namely, grudge and discord. Though I should not make reply, there are many disagreeable aspects of the matter, especially the fact of my knowing your attack has 9 V. Branca,op. cit., Ep. LXXX, Vol. I, pp. 100-101.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

403

wandered into the hands of a good many people. Of course, if this happened with your consent or knowledge, I cannot but approve because you have approved; but if it was without your consent, I do not see how I can keep silent. Accordingly I have in this matter preserved moderation: nobody will read my answer before you read it, and it will not be published before you agree and write me to that effect.10 Never do I cease, never shall I cease to say, yet never can I be satisfied enough in saying how much I esteem, how much I admire you. I am uneasy about giving you offense, not only because I love you too much but especially because in the heat of disputation many inconsiderate things slip out. Would that this did not happen to me! Eloquence itself, which I defend, is not worth such a price. Venice. Farewell. Ermolao Barbaro to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: 1 I have been expecting you to pay usury on the letters you get from me, particularly on the most recent ones. But such is your liberality that you reckoned your payment at a rate beyond what the law allows and excessively high. You have not written a letter, but pretty near a volume. As was fitting, I have been unbelievably delighted in seeing how you, extremely busy as you are, take pleasure in reading my letters with such care that you do not skip over and leave unexplored even the smallest and slightest details in them. This I readily noticed in your last letter; for in a certain corner of my writing, as it were in connection with something else and by brief mention only, I had slashed into our modern barbarian philosophers. Though you also have turned against them and declined further intercourse with them, you have taken my words as an occasion of reviving the old contention and controversy between us and them concerning the kind of discourse appropriate to philosophers. The bulk of this dispute already has grown to many thousands of lines. And now you have sent me an opus, both elegant, polished, thoroughly wrought; it was completed so rapidly that, did I not keep in mind the thoroughly proved gifts of your genius, I should have believed you had prepared your case before this so as to have it ready for the earliest suitable occasion. But for me this turns out to be an event the gayer and jollier, because you-the most finished, the most cultured (humanissimus) of men, the best of Latinists-you defend the barbarians against Barbaro; consequently you give yourself the appearance of an enemy who champions the enemy, of an ally standing against an ally, of yourself opposing yourself. This gives me the most exquisite pleasure, because under the guise of defending you utterly kill off those you defend. First, because the foes of eloquence cannot maintain their cause save by eloquent men; in this respect they are like slaves, like women, like brutes. A second reason is that, if they cannot escape by of the longer one, was either intended as an announcement or it may not have been sent off. 11 V. Branca, op. cit., Ep. LXXXI, Vol. I, pp. 101-109.
10 This short letter

404

QUIRINUS

BREEN

the help of you as protector, of you as champion, of you as advocate, they could not make a further struggle or even turn a foot. In line with this I am informed by friends of mine in Padua that your defense-which is already being given the title of Concerning Scythians and Teutons, in other words, Laudation of Typhon and the Furies-has mightily annoyed the majority of those you defend, while in other groups your deed is differently interpreted. So at least in our circles, with whom you quarrel in word but agree at heart, the thing you did is to everybody most gratifying, because we understand where you are leading and what you mean. One thing says Leukon, another Leukon's son. For the rest we should call you a deserter, if your writing expresses your true sentiments. Allow me this jest: if you are not a deserter, you must be a double-dealer; you are carrying water on both shoulders when by your method of defense you break down the case you have taken up. It does not matter by what method you betray the barbarians, your clients. But what more cunning scheme could you have hit upon than to try by the highest eloquence to defend the accused who confess themselves injurious to eloquence? You have used methods which, so to say, your clients may very easily expose, provided someone of that crowd can understand the things you have said;-things with so great splendor endowed, with so many lights, so many ornaments caressing the eyes of approachers! Add the many tantalizing little sentences, the many examples and historical allusions of far-found learning-all like so many flowerets! It is absolutely an ocean of good things; hearing which, some of your clients-who are a little less like asses, I have been wanting to say bereft of the Muses (atoovot)--can barely move their ears; the rest of them fly out of hearing, they spew out, they abjure them. One of these 12 (I am inventing nothing, Pico; it is an utterly ridiculous true story that I tell), some one in the gymnasium of Padua spoke to me; he is a forward and arrogant fellow, of the sort almost all are who hate and sneer at the more humane letters. Said he: "This Pico-I take him to be a grammarian-but whoever he is, for a man with a small foot he wears big shoes. Indeed, what need is there for so many rhetoricians? Or have they come to drinking healths to the frogs? " Seriphian frogs, for example? " I said.13 Is anyone," he went on, "so stupid and senseless as not to understand that this extraordinary champion is in a sly game with someone else, some impious professor of grammar? He affects me as much as a mourner at the tomb of a stepmother; I take no stock in the man. It turns out that I cannot follow him in either beginning or middle or end of his tune; by Hercules, he might as
12 Barbaro has a contemporary barbarian carry the argument,-the counterpart of Pico's. 13 In the margin (1) of this letter as preserved in the Codex of Lucca are found the words " Ranae seriphiae dicuntur esse mutae." These marginal notes are given in Branca, op. cit., I, 110-16; see ibid., p. LXVII for Branca's remark that they reveal the forma mentis of Barbaro. Marginal notes will hereafter be indicated by M.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

405

well be defending us in Greek or Egyptian, for he is absolutely orating to the sea-shores. But picture to yourself his defense to be faithful: if we are beaten it will be black, but it will be blackest if we win: to wit, in the future we will be said to have been saved not by our own right but by the powers of eloquence, to which we are and always want to be most hostile. What greater annoyance, in fact, can befall a freeman than to owe life and safety to one whom he wishes to suffer disgrace and ruin? And if this unexpected and great champion of ours is beaten, he will in reality be considered beaten by reason and truth, since they say he cannot be beaten in eloquence: but if he wins, which I execrate, this glory will instantly belong to his likes, and he will attribute his victory to his eloquence. I prefer not to be defended to being defended at such peril: to me this kind of man is to be mistrusted, as a dog loving a rabbit. Unseasonable benevolence, I do not know what poet 14 said it, does not differ from hostility. Now who ever in such a way defended a man that only the prosecutor understands what is said? Or who ever permitted his case to be handled thus that one who will give adverse sentence was elected to serve as judge and arbitrator? Thus there could be no occasion for even challenging [the judge], so that we should be in a far worse condition than work-people, than tenants of shops and slave-dealers and hawkers. " But I hear he uses examples, stories, yarns, and proofs from the poets: to be sure, I do not understand what he has written in our behalf. But if this is correct, to what a pass have we wretches come! Has our cause been reduced to the point where we maintain our rights by yarns and fables? Most certainly there is a place for hypothetical syllogisms, for inductions and enthymemes. And why not? I am a philosopher, I want conclusive proof (apodixis), the rest I leave to the orators. But you say that everything cannot be shown by apodixis,15 that sometimes there is occasion for probability. Therefore the matter is called back to uncertainty: Many probabilities against us, likewise many in our favor.
14 M (2) names Euripides.
15

M (3) has this representation:

a&roScets evidens

non indiget cultu

probatio per se pollens quod est

philosophia

The Margin has many of these double crescents, once a triple one. Other figures are isosceles triangles, upright and inverted. Information pertaining to these representations is available in C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Leipzig, 1927), II, 283. Economy makes it inexpedient to put in these notes all the figures. However, I have found them to interest historians of logic; therefore I will at least indicate the kind of figures used in the margin.

406

QUIRINUS

BREEN

" Who will decide? Picture the thing said by that fellow, that philosophy accordswith things (res), and does not at all need the ostentation of words: this I certainly believe to be the sum of all things which may be said in our behalf. The contraryis held by those who say that philosophy ought to be approached religiouslysince it is a gift divine, holy, and associated with religion; it is not to be handled with unwashedhands but clean, even well-cared for, and with speech that is pure, not base and muddied. Either of these views is provable,the former:things which stand upon their own feet do not need crutches,as well as the latter: a noble and excellent subject ought not to be approachedwith low languagenor fouled, contaminated, defiledwith words of base origin. This is perhapsthe more acceptable, not because philosophy16 without the choice of beautiful and shining words ceases to be the highest good; but because philosophy is like the divine beings who have no need of human treasuresyet wish to be reverenced and given presents. That is why philosophynot only permits herself to be adornedbut even loves it, they say, and labors at it. Nothing is more perfect and complete than God; yet nowhere are there more gold, more silver, more marble, more expensive cloths, more jewels to be seen than in temples and on altars. Hence, they say, it cannot be permitted to honor the gods, yet forbiddento honorphilosophy. "You see, also orators have been acquaintedwith the locus of contradictions and contraries,and they very frequentlyuse it. This locus consists of a double negative 7 proposition;they claim that of all propositionsit is the most importuning (instantissimus) and the most incisive (acerrimus).
But why this proposition should be vrepawroaTcK, why the language should

be importuningand incisive,18of all that they teach nothing but send us back to Ciceroand Aristotle whom we have never and will never look up on these things. Now not even they esteem the philosophersbelow men of eloquence: they are too modest for that; but they prefer eloquentphilosophers to such as are devoid of eloquence,and for the very reason that a man is more gifted when possessingtwo goods than one. Indeed, this conclusion19 is said to be drawnfromthe whole; a thing Themistiusteaches them, whom they boast to have translated from Greek into Latin; well, say they, the whole is a matter of quantity, and they regard quantity sometimes as of number,sometimesas of measure. " Now on this I often cross swordswith professorsof grammarand like wretches,and my usual responseis with the argumentof two alternatives:
16M (4) Primum epicherema pro philosophis eloquentibus contra barbaros. Double crescent.
17M (5)
v7rEpa7roaTmKc,

id est superabdicativa: sic enim argumentum a repug-

nantibusfirmatur,ut inquit Cicero (Topica XII, 53: IV, 21; cf. Prantl, op. cit., I, 444). 18M (6) SpeLav de quo in Sophisticis(Soph. Elench. 33, 5). XAoyos 19M (7) Secundumepicheremapro eloquentibus philosophis. Double crescent.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

407

(a) either eloquence is not a good or it is a good, (b) that for the rest it has nothing to do with philosophy, in any case no more than with the art of a cobbler, a statuary, or a bronze-worker; thereupon they proceed with the most prolonged and immoderate laughter to pick up each of the alternative propositions and rebut and resolve them in the following manner. They begin 20 by contending that all philosophy is a good, that furthermore almost all the peripatetics hold rhetoric to be a part of philosophy. To Aristotle rhetoric was a species of social science (civilis scientia) which [civilis scientia], they say, he called interpellatio; conceived generaliter this pertains to the first syllogistic figure only, conceived particulariter it pertains to the last figure and no other. "I do not know whether this or the contrary is true; nor can I find where Aristotle said it. But the argument a genere is well enough understood, although-and whether Aristotle might or might not say these portentous things-we ourselves do not care; inasmuch as almost all the books of this philosopher are obscure we neglect them, while they [sc. rhetorici] say they constantly are busy in the study of them. Therefore, as men who eat solid steaks of beef and pork we readily allow delicate and idle men to make away with what to us are pomenta. We keep away from this contest over Aristotle as from a precipice, though in other respects we are steadfast and unafraid. "We are further made sport of with respect to the second alternative,21 in this manner: if philosophy does not at all pertain to rhetoric, neither does animal to man. But animal does pertain to man; who does not see that? To rhetoric therefore philosophy does pertain, be it as to a part or as to a form and species: this they also demonstrate more extensively. I answered that it [rhetoric] is the part of that philosophy that we call practical, and that it does not belong to philosophy as theory. That, they say, is what we have been trying to express to you: you want philosophers cut in two, halfperfect, mutilated. You have granted that rhetoric is part of philosophy, and yet you hold it to be foul and unseemly that the philosopher hold on to rhetoric, without which no one will ever be a perfect and complete philosopher: for whatever might be wanting in something it cannot be perfect and consummate. Otherwise, if all philosophy pertains to the perfection of our mind,22 and if rhetoric does not so pertain to it, then a syllogism of the second figure would result, which is deceptive, that some philosophy is not philosophy: they say this argument was first called ex contrapositis by Aristotle. But if the mind is perfected by eloquence, what ill-will is it to contend that the same person should not be both a philosopher and eloquent? "All this they as it were top off with their crowning argument, to wit, the authority and example of the ancients,23 Plato and Aristotle, whose doc20 M 21 M 22 M 23 M

(8) Contraprimamsolutionem. Double crescent. (9) Contrasolutionemsecundam. ex contra positis. Upright triangle. (10) Syllogismus (11) Epicherematertium pro philosophiselegantibus.

408

QUIRINUS

BREEN

trines and opinions we profess, who (say they) were men of such surpassing eloquence that there is nothing more charming, more pure, more distinguished than their discourse. Accordingly, to say that philosophy conflicts with eloquence because the orator's business is but to deceive and lie 24 is clear calumny, savors not at all of the peripatetic and appears to ignore that there is a difference between an orator and a sophist, a difference which Aristotle made in his Topics and Rhetoric, they say. Demosthenes employed falsehood when he denied he had sent delegates at the same time to king Philip in behalf of peace and against Philip to the allies in behalf of the league. But to argue from a story of Demosthenes or of anyone else that this conclusion must be strictly held as a universal rule, that all orators lie,26 is to miss the mark doubly: on the one hand, because they do not know that one cannot base a conclusion on individual propositions, and on the other because they think that by the third figure a universal conclusion can be reached. Neither, so they say, do they perceive that syllogisms 'from signs,' according to the third as well as the second figure, seemed to Aristotle weak and loose, or that which also Fabius Quintilian noted: if it is permissible to lie in civil affairs is it perhaps also permissible in things belonging to nature, in moral affairs, in things divine? For the rules of civil discourse and those of philosophical discourse are different. "Equally spirited twitting comes from those who say that the discourse of a philosopher 26 must not be soft and delicate (mollem et delicatam), as if there were anyone who would demand in a philosopher what in an orator would not even be tolerated. But just as discourse which is excessively loose and broken, so discourse which is stiff, dirty, muddy, and foul diminishes the dignity and majesty of philosophy. They approve a tenor and style of speaking which holds to the mean: they want it Attic, not Asiatic, not Germanic, as they want their food. The Cynic's food displeases, so does the Persian: the latter is extravagant, the former foul. A frugal meal pleases. The same holds for discourse. Therefore,27 those ought to be laughed at as lying about a well-known fact who say that the coarse-haired, stiff, bristling style which philosophers now use is full of a certain reverence and majesty.28 "Now here I am compelled to speak the truth (for even in a defender and advocate we do not suffer a bold falsehood): if our speech is not foul, I do not see what kind of speaking can be foul; or at least if our speech has this rudeness and majesty, that of artisans and rustics will have the same qualities. We ourselves do not really speak more elegantly than laborers and common folk; thus we would speak the vernacular better than the
24 M et solutionesad ea (12) Hic incipiunt argumentabarbarephilosophantium nostrae. Ad primum. Upright triangle. 25M (13) presents an inverted triangle to show that nothing can be concluded from the propositionthat Demostheneslied and was an orator. 26M (14) Ad secundum. Upright triangle. 27M (15) Ad tertium. 28 M (16) Double crescent.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

409

Latin. Do farmers, priests and pedagogues, notaries and hack-lawyers (formularii) speak otherwise than we? Yet who ever detected in their talk aught of sanctity and majesty? " There are those 29 who just as intemperately endeavor, contrary to their own interest, to use a bit of evidence in Cicero who writes: 'And yet if a philosopher affects eloquence I should not hold him in contempt; if he does not have it I should not importune him.' 30 And indeed the best of orators, who wanted to refute the doctrine of Epicurus, could not have replied otherwise to Lucius Torquatus, who had said as follows: 'But I think that like our Triarius you will be less charmed by him [Epicurus] because he has neglected those ornaments of discourse found in Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. For I can hardly be brought to the point of assuming that the things he observed should to you appear not to be true.' Then Cicero said. 'See how mistaken you are, Torquatus: the discourse of that philosopher does not offend me, for it represents in words what he wants to say and says clearly what he wants me to understand. And yet if a philosopher affects eloquence I should not hold him in contempt; if he does not have it I should not importune him. I am not so well satisfied with his doctrine.' They argue that he did not say this as his true opinion but as an argument ad hominem: for in disputation many things are not so much said as one's real opinions as for the sake of either charming or pleasing or instructing; for the rest there are in Cicero many passages where this is shown. First, in the same book of De Finibus: 31 'But I take it some shun Latin works because they happen upon uncouth and boorish books which taken from bad Greek are worse when translated in Latin: I raise no objection against these if only they have no intention of reading on the same subjects in Greek works. Who would not read really good things done in choice language with dignity and ornament?' Elsewhere to the same effect: 32 ' Philosophy, which we must brighten and enliven, has till this era been in the doldrums and has not enjoyed the light of Latin letters. ... At this task we ought to work hard, the more so seeing that right now many books are spoken of as Latin but are written rashly by men who are certainly very fine but not particularly polished. It can happen that a man who is a good thinker cannot express his ideas in polished language; but if he writes out his ideas without being able to organize or explain them accurately or by any delight attract the reader, he is man who intemperately abuses both leisure and letters. And consequently that kind read their own books to their own kind; and nobody touches those books except the men who want the same license of writing accorded to themselves.' A thousand other passages exhibit this, such as the one where Cicero admonishes to avoid the novelty of an inappropriate work as well as the one in which he contends that felicity in speaking must not be neglected. 'I rather would not use the forms speciebus and specierum, unless it can be said in Latin.' 33
29
31 33 30 M (18) Cicero,De Finibus (I, 5, 14 sq.). M (17) Ad quartum. 32 M (21) In Tusculanisquaestionibus. De FinibusI, 3, 8. M (22) Ciceroin Topicis (7, 30).

410

QUIRINUS

BREEN

" Ho there, whoever you are, where is your promise of help? 34 Is this a defense or a betrayal, to reveal us to a witness who would slay us? Did you know what he was going to say? Then it was perfidy. Did you not know it? Then it was rash to cite an opponent's witness who would have authority not only to argue [against you] but also to make a confession [on your behalf]. Who but an orator would have made such an error.35 But, of course, a word is an arbitrary symbol, not produced by nature but as it were by an understanding or agreement among men. Nobody denies this. We speak of a cap and a cloak, yet no one puts a cloak around his feet or wraps his body in a cap.36 Everything does not depend for correctness upon one's good pleasure. Maecenas in trousers up to his mouth as if he were a Sarmatian, could sit on the judge's bench, because it was an arbitrary thing, but there was nobody who did not criticize him. As we must ask and learn about shoes from cobblers and about clothes from shop-keepers, so we must find out about a method of speaking from orators. What is there so arbitrary as laws, as rights, as ceremonies? Yet who would suffer them to be made over or changed according to the desires of a philosopher, no matter how outstanding or how near to God? This is particularly so for us who speak of a contemplator only and keep separate from him the practical knowledge without which, so they say, a man as man is not a philosopher, but a monster. " Therefore their first rhetorical syllogism (aggressio) 37 consists of both syllogism and prosyllogism,38 with true propositions and false assumptions, according to the first figure; or it consists of a single syllogism, using the second figure; as they desire to be taught by the rules of the Analytics, and they say this is altogether a paralogism of the kind called per aliquid et simpliciter: for example, as on the one hand to assume 39 that not some but all eloquent men lie because some do, so on the other hand to assign this vice to eloquence and not to man as man. By means of the second figure they say there results the following sophism, of which one assertion is thoroughly false: 40 the discourse of an eloquent man cannot but be soft and dainty (mollis et delicatus). Whoever says this is ignorant of either of two things, that is, either what softness in discourse means or how many forms of speech there are. The snare he falls into here consists either in words that differ but slightly: for example, when that which is spoken 'ornately' or ' elegantly,' seems to be spoken 'softly' or 'effeminately '; this may be called metalepsis, which is the eighth topic in the second book of the [Aristotle's] Topics, which is appropriate for declarative, as stated first by Cicero and later by Quintilian.4 Or the snare consists in what they call vitium consequentis: let us grant (they say) that soft and dainty discourse pertains
84 M (23) Dilemmaton. 35M (24) Ad quintum. 36M (25) Double crescent. 37 M (26) Repetitio rationumadversarii:in quo quaeque earumpeccarevideatur.
38 M (27) A triple crescent. 39M (28) An uprighttriangle. 40M (29) Ad secundum. Upright triangle. 41Cicero,Topica,XXI, 79, 30; Quintilian,Institutio Oratoria,III, V, 7.

MIRANDOLA ON PHILOSOPHY

VS. RHETORIC

411

wholly to orators and eloquent men, yet it is not valid, conversely, that whatever discourse the orator uses must always be soft and dainty.42 The fallacies described above, to wit, the one committed per aliquid et simpliciter as well as the one in the case of words that differ but slightly carry with them as a kind of error also the loose syllogism (epicherema), as if all mean and rude discourse carries majesty before it, or as if there were no difference between rude and mean discourse. But a man who says things like that appears not to understand what is majesty in speech, what is highness, gravity, dignity, sanctity, sharpness, meanness, rudeness. Of rules concerning these subjects the books of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Dionysius, Cicero, Quintilian, and more recently Hermogenes, Alexander Minutianus are full.43 They say that the same ruin and desolation comes from the final trick resulting from the arbitrariness of introducing words, as if there were no distinction between arbitrariness and that which one is permitted to do. " Consequently they [sc. rhetors] declare all this a crafty sort of argu44 ment, smelling not at all of dialectical skill; its bad deductions from nonessentials and consequents are as like as possible to the reasonings of Parmenides and Melissus: with this difference, however, that in the more stupid of those arguments there is antistrophe where there is anastrophe-in fact,45 this is the sore point of these who incur faults and fallacies of inference. They [the rhetors] say that those rhetorical syllogisms (epicheremata) of ours which may be urged against themselves are a tissue of most impudent propositions, seeing they take into account neither anastrophe nor antistrophe. So when Pico says that an orator lies 46 it is called false on every count, for it is not manifest that all orators lie, nor that everybody who lies must be an orator. When he says,47 'The discourse of an orator is soft and dainty': it is called false in every part, for there is neither regression (Quintilian IX, 3, 35) nor transposition (nec commeat), that is,48 there is neither antistrophe nor anastrophe. When he says, 'Rude and mean discourse is full of majesty,' it is called wholly false because 49 it is neither invertible (nec revertitur: Quint. VIII, 6, 65) nor convertible (nec convertitur: Quint. IX, 1, 33 sq., X, 1, 29). When he says, 'Acts of free will are identical with permissible acts,' it is called false in every part,50 for all things permissible are not all acts of free will, nor does it necessarily follow that acts of free will are permissible. " These are their words, perhaps not true, but certainly probable; yet I have not admitted my defeat at once. In fact it is our custom in debate always to stand firm, never to give an inch, never to yield, always to have some safe ground or hiding place from which not even Aristotle himself, (30) Ad tertium. A doublecrescent. (31) Ad ultimum. Double crescent. (32) Alia repetitiorationumadversarii:in quo peccent omnisin universum, id est in uno. 45M (33) Upright triangle. 46 M (34) Double crescent. 47 M (35) Upright triangle. 48 M (36) Double crescent. 49M (37) Double crescent. 50M (38) Double crescent.
43 M 44 M 42 M

412

QUIRINUS

BREEN

were he to come back to life, could tear us away; yet also for this they berate us, calling it boorishnessand impudenceborn from our very contempt of polite letters. A remarkablething it is that to professorsof the liberal arts it is not enoughto lack noble letters but they must hate them and make all kinds of attacks upon them; so that none are more hostile to the liberal studies than those wanting to be known as doctors of the liberal arts. 0 droll ambition of some people, who would boast of the name but scorn the thing!" So then, he [the Paduan] said, " Here is the sum total: either they have a clear and compellingcase for us, or they do not. If they have, let them bring it forth at once, and I will be satisfied; but I do not want the protection of an eloquentman. If they have no solid argument,it is nothing but common and customary topics (loci communeset transpositii) that may perhapsbe arguedagainst us as much as for us, both because,all things being equal, suitable discourseis more persuasivethan the opposite kind, and becausewe are refutedby the precedentsof illustriousmen, Plato and Aristotle and all the ancientswho, it is agreed,were leaders and masters of philosophy not only but also of eloquence. Accordingly,either let the matter lie or let it be taken up by men who have no art of speaking,that is, men, who with heart and tongue are our partisans. To use a medical saying: You, whoever you are, do not stir this stinking bean-trefoil: we prefer to lose utterly ratherthan be saved by you. For it is more satisfactory to be manfully beaten than to win by a foul, seeing it will be less annoyingto be beaten fairly, and besides a victory soughtwith enemy help cannot be sweet and good to look upon." So much said that ape-like Paduan. Everything he said I have written you cheerfullyso you might realize that, as to popularity,you gained nothing of it amonghis kind but a great deal amongus. For the rest, you have undertakena thing that is not only, as you write, forced but (I would add) impossible. For what else is this desire to defend a barbarousand stupid methodof philosophizing than wanting to whiten an Ethiopian? What else, I say, is it but attempting to make a grindstonegrow, for you to expect favor from fellows whom the divine Graces never knew? Let me openly jest with you on this amusingsubject: if you failed to prove your case not only to us against whom you filed your brief but not even to those whom you defended,it is no wonderthat you may be verifying the saying: A wonderful speech but an unconvincingspeaker. You (for I do not stop joking) really believed you could extort by your discourse from those barbarians that trite saying, Man to man is a god, since they were saved by you, and quite unexpectedly. You shouldrecall the saying about the fishing line that caught nothing. You have put up nets to catch the wind. WhereforeI advise you, my Pico, being a land-lubber,do not put out to sea; not being a Syrian do not play the syrinx; and in making new friends,my good friend, do not forget the old ones. Otherwiseyou have done accordingto the wont of the generous and wealthy. Since he has lots of pepper, he puts some Venice. even in the salad. Farewell.