Sanford Journal of Public Policy - Volume 1 No. 1

Sanford Journal
of Public Policy
Vol. 1, Iss. 1 Spring 2010
ARTICLES
From Welfare-to-Work to Child Wellbeing:
Shifting Focus in the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Program ................................................ 3
Kristy Marynak
Crisis at the Polls: Restoring Democracy in
Zimbabwe ....................................................................... 19
Daniel B. Kobayashi
Alternative Responses to Climate Change: An
Inquiry into Geoengineering ....................................... 35
Aaron Ray
Responding to Teacher Attrition: An Analysis
of Risk Factors in the North Carolina Teaching
Fellows Program ............................................................ 51
Alesha Daughtrey
INTERVIEWS
Bernice Friedlander, President of Chapter 282 of
the National Treasury Employees Union............................ 73
BOOK REVIEWS
Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil & Climate
Change............................................................................... 81
The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can
Thrive as Other Powers Rise .............................................. 85
i
Sanford Journal
of Public Policy
Volume 1 Issue 1 Spring 2010
Mission
The Sanford Journal of Public Policy (SJPP) was created in 2009 as a forum for
public policy students and professionals to contribute to the current policy
discourse through insightful analysis and innovative solutions.
About
The SJPP is run by the graduate students of the Sanford School of Public
Policy at Duke University and is published online on an annual basis. The SJPP
solicits articles across the spectrum of public policy in a variety of formats,
including policy research and position papers, issue briefs, opinion pieces, re-
views of recently published books, and interviews with policy professionals.
The accompanying website is designed to be a place where public policy stu-
dents and practitioners a can stay connected to current policy discussions and
express their own views on todays policy challenges.
Visit us online at: http://sjpp.sanford.duke.edu/
The Sanford Journal of Public Policy is a graduate student-run publication. The views
and opinions expressed in the Journal are the authors own and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Sanford School of Public Policy or Duke University. Articles in this
publication may not be reprinted, reproduced, or retransmitted, in whole or in part, without
the express written consent of the author or SJPP.
ii
Jason Lemons
Lauren Akers
Marjie Patterson
Sarah Cordes
Website Manager
Susan Wunderink
Website Staff
Joel McFarland
Aroha Bahuguna
Jeremy Block
Spencer Gilbert
Jeanie Shattuck
Ben Thomas
Layout Manager
Gwen Tobert
Submissions
Coordinator
Jill Fasching
Anna Birkenbach
Anton Favorini-Csorba
Jackson Miller
Garrett Stiles
Gray Wilson
Editors-in-Chief
Managing Editor
Garth Weintraub
Senior Editors
Senior Online Editor
SoFa Balino
Business Manager
Justin Elswit
Business Staff
Matthew Jentgen
Lee Reiners
Staff Editors
SoFa Balino
Jill Fasching
Megan Kauffmann
Megan Stacy
Gwen Tobert
Faculty Advisors
Elizabeth Frankenberg
Sarah Cohen
Sanford Journal of Public Policy
iii
Contents
Volume 1
Issue 1
Spring 2010
LETTER FROM THE EDITORS .......................................................................iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................ vii
ARTICLES
From Welfare-to-Work to Child Wellbeing: Shifting Focus in
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program .............................3
Kristy Marynak
Crisis at the Polls: Restoring Democracy in Zimbabwe ........................... 19
Daniel B. Kobayashi
Alternative Responses to Climate Change: An Inquiry Into
Geoengineering ............................................................................................... 35
Aaron Ray
Responding to Teacher Attrition: An Analysis of Risk Factors
in the North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program ..................................... 51
Alesha Daughtrey
INTERVIEWS
Bernice Friedlander
President, National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 282 ................. 73
Interviewed by Gwen M. Tobert
BOOK REVIEWS
Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil & Climate Change
by Peter Newman, Timothy Beatly, Heather Boyer ................................... 81
Reviewed by Trey Akers
The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other
Powers Rise
by Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen ........................................................ 85
Reviewed by Meaghan Monfort
iv
Dear Readers:
We are pleased to present the inaugural edition of the Sanford Journal of
Public Policy. The SJPP aims to provide a forum for public policy students and
professionals to share their perspectives on a diverse range of current policy
issues. \e are proud o this Frst issue and the accompanying website, which
we believe provide a unique venue to contribute to todays policy discourse.
Establishing the SJPP has been an especially rewarding experience, and we are
excited to share with you the product of this yearlong endeavor.
We received 32 outstanding submissions from authors around the
world addressing a ariety o important topics. 1hrough a diFcult selection
process, we narrowed the pool to four policy articles, one interview, and two
book reviews. The articles cover a range of policy topics including Child-Only
cases of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program; democracy
and elections in Zimbabwe; issues and challenges associated with geoengi-
neering; and factors affecting teacher attrition among graduates of the North
Carolina Teaching Fellows Program.
We follow these four policy articles with a discussion of policy in prac-
tice with Bernice Friedlander, the President of the National Treasury Employ-
ees Union Chapter 282. The issue concludes with reviews of two new books
in policy, Resilient Cities: Responding to Peak Oil & Climate Change and The Next
American Century: How the US Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise.
lrom start to Fnish, the editors hae been intensely inoled in the
development of the Journal, helping to select and edit articles and guiding au-
thors through the sometimes cumbersome revision process. We want to thank
them and the many other members of the staff who have been quietly but
steadfastly working behind the scenes to make this journal a reality. While our
business team was busy developing budgets, registering our organization, and
publicizing this issue, our website team was developing our website, soliciting
opinion pieces or publication, and Fnding the latest policy news on the web.
Our layout manager formed the Journal from scratch on a tight deadline while
trying to reconcile our wishes with reality. Through the hard work of all our
staff, we believe we have created a comprehensive product that contributes to
the policy discourse and provides an additional outlet to highlight the skills of
Sanford students.
Letter from the Editors
v
We also want to express our immeasurable gratitude to Garth Wein-
traub, our indispensable Managing Editor, for being a devoted teammate, ac-
cepting extra responsibilities when needed, focusing on the big picture, and
never letting a challenge deter us. Without him, the Journal may not have come
to ruition and deFnitely would not be as strong a product as it is today.
Finally, we are very grateful to the Sanford faculty, administration, and
students whose support helped make this endeavor possible. Our acknowledg-
ments section on the following page is dedicated to those who have guided us
through the process of creating this Journal.
We invite you to join us as we continue to develop the SJPP and web-
site as places for thoughtful policy discussion and debate. Happy reading!
Sincerely,
Jason Lemons & Marjie Patterson
Editors-in-Chief
vi
vii
Acknowledgements
W
e owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to Elizabeth Franken-
berg, our Director of Graduate Studies, whose amazing support
made this project possible. Initially more aware than we were of
the commitment required, she has been an invaluable resource to us as our
primary faculty advisor. We thank her for her time and gracious support and
for believing in us when others were skeptical.
We would also like to thank Sarah Cohen for her early and enduring
support. As our web aculty adisor, she has proided signiFcant guidance or
the development of our website and online content.
Many thanks go to Jeremy Cluchey, MPP 09, as well. Creating a jour-
nal was originally his idea, and he kindly connected us with other graduate
journals to jumpstart our progress. We are grateful to the editors of the Gold-
man School of Public Policys PolicyMatters, the Cornell Institute for Public
Affairs The Current, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hills
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation for helping
us overcome the steep learning curve of journal management.
We would also like to express our gratitude to the many Duke Uni-
versity faculty members who have provided guidance, reviewed and critiqued
submissions, and connected us to critical resources: Charles Clotfelter, Philip
Cook, David Guy, Timothy Johnson, Anirudh Krishna, Bruce Kuniholm, Mi-
chael Munger, Jenni Owen, Joel Rosch, David Schanzer, Donald Taylor, Jr.,
Joseph Tham, and Jacob Vigdor.
Many members of the Sanford Schools administration have addition-
ally provided assistance above and beyond their traditional duties. We would
like to thank the following Duke and Sanford staff members for their patience
and support: Adam Barnes, Sarah Danielson, Beth Gettys Sturkey, Deirdre
Gordon, Rita Keating, Karen Kemp, Roger Lewis, Jeff Mac, Helene McAd-
ams, Cheryl Noga, Jackie Ogburn, and Stan Paskoff.
We would also like to thank the graduate students of the Sanford
School who have been supportive of this new venture.
1hanks Fnally to our excellent sta, who took on many responsibilities
as the project evolved. All the members have played critical roles in creating
and orming this Journal. \e appreciate their dedication, nexibility, and quality
o work, no matter how insuFcient the direction or how tight the deadline.
To all of you, thank you.
Articles
Vol. 1, Iss. 1 Spring 2010 Sanford Journal of Public Policy
3
Abstract
This article examines child-only cases within the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) Program, which currently comprise 47 percent of the overall TANF caseload. Child-only
ca.e. ectvae aavtt. frov tbe beveft catcvtatiov, roriaivg aia ovt, to cbitarev, ava eevt aavtt.
from work requirements and time limits. This article reviews the narrow literature on child-only
TANF populations, distinguishing between non-parental cases involving relative caregivers and
arevtat ca.e. ivrotrivg arevt. rbo are ivetigibte for beveft. becav.e of .avctiov., atiev .tatv.,
or SSI receipt. The article then discusses the inadequate communication and collaboration between
TANF agencies and the child welfare system; describes unproven, though innovative, state efforts to
assist child-only populations; and concludes with the recommendation that Congress should expand
the 2011 Presidents Budget request to include competitive grants for programs that address the
child-only populations needs and sponsor third-party studies to test the programs impacts on child
outcomes.
Introduction
T
he years of debate that preceded the 1996 welfare reforms hinged on
a concern for poor children. The ironic result of those child-centered
debates, however, was a welfare-to-work program focused on adult
outcomes such as employment and welfare dependency.
1
Fourteen years af-
ter Congress created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), we
still know little about how the program impacts child wellbeing. Considering
that child-only cases-wherein only children receie a 1ANl cash beneFt and
adults are excluded from the calculationnow constitute almost half of the
oerall 1ANl caseload, it is time to Fnd out how these children are doing and
how best we can address their needs.
FROM WELFARE-TO-WORK
TO CHILD WELLBEING
Shifting Focus in the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Program
Kristy Marynak
Kristy Marynak is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Sanford School of Public Policy,
Duke University. She earned her Bachelors degree from Davidson College. Marynaks experiences
with public agencies at the federal, state, and local levels contribute to her understanding of TANF
and child welfare policy.
Kristy Marynak
4
This article begins with an overview of the politics and empirical re-
search behind welfare reform. It then explains the various origins of child-only
cases, summarizes what researchers know about child wellbeing in these cases,
and outlines the relationship between TANF and the child welfare system.
The article concludes with a discussion of low-cost, politically feasible policy
options to build a knowledge base about evidence-based intervention models
that could be expanded when the economy improves.
Welfare Reform: Introducing the debate
The contentious welfare reform debates of the mid-1990s led Con-
gress to replace Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with TANF.
The old AFDC program became unsustainable for a number of political and
eidence-based reasons. lirst, innuential liberal researchers, such as Daid Lll-
wood, found that welfare reduced work incentives, that welfare dependency
was rising, and that AFDC recipients were able to work or worked covertly.
2

Second, conservatives successfully swayed public opinion so that the majority
of Americans believed welfare was a source of, not a solution to, poverty. Two
o the most innuential conseratie arguments held that welare was an aront
to human dignity and contributed to the rise in single-female headed house-
holds.
3,4
Third, a series of federally funded, independently conducted studies
demonstrated that an education-Frst approach to encouraging work among
the poor was more expensive, but less effective, than programs requiring im-
mediate job search.
5
Finally, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, states experi-
mented with AFDC waiver programs which imposed a number of conditions
of welfare receipt, including work requirements and time limits. These waiver
programs increased states demand for autonomy in welfare program develop-
ment and administration. Waivers also demonstrated the political feasibility
of reform. For example, Wisconsin governor Tommy Thompson boosted his
popularity by piloting the time-limited, work-based Wisconsin Works program
in 1987, which demonstrated success increasing work and reducing welfare
receipt.
6
Responding to these factors, President Clintonand a Republican-
dominated Congresspledged to end welfare as we know it.
As the 1996 welfare laws name suggests, the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) ushered in a work-ori-
ented approach to public assistance. Individuals were no longer automatically
entitled to cash aid; instead, states received broad powers to create their own
welfare programs. States have the authority to set eligibility requirements and
beneFt leels, but all 1ANl programs must impose work requirements and a
60-month lifetime limit on cash assistance.
Although participants in the welfare reform debates predicted mild
reductions in caseloads, no one anticipated that the caseloads would drop so
sharply.
7
Between 1996 and 2000, caseloads reduced by half, shrinking from
5
4.6 million families in 1996 to 2.1 million families in 2002.
8

The composition of the caseload also changed radically; whereas in
1994, more than 80 percent of families on welfare included at least one par-
ent recipient, by 2008 nearly half of all TANF cases were child-only.
9
(See
ligure 1., In child-only cases, adults are excluded rom the beneFt calculation
and only children receive aid, which is not subject to work requirements or
time limits. While child-only cases are not growing in absolute numbers, they
merit heightened attention from researchers and policymakers because they
continue to grow as a proportion of all TANF cases.
10
Indeed, an enduring
irony o welare reorm is that the primary beneFciaries o a program ocused
on personal responsibility and work opportunity are no longer parents caring
for children, but children themselves.
Variations between states complicate task of describing child-only
caseloads
Although both federal and state policy makers are aware of the relative
increase in child-only cases, they lack deFnitie inormation about child-only
cases at the national leel because state 1ANl rules, serices, and beneFts ary
widely.
11
Indeed, the differences between states in terms of demographics and
welfare policies necessitate state-level data collection and analysis. Variations
in child-only caseloads as a proportion of total TANF caseloads illustrate this
point. In 2001, child-only cases constituted at least 45 percent of the TANF
caseload in 15 states.
12
In four states, however, fewer than 20 percent of TANF
cases were child-only.
13
Kristy Marynak
6
Parental child-only cases involve disabled, immigrant, or sanctioned
parents
There are two types of child-only TANF cases, parental and non-
parental. Parental child-only cases involve children whose parents are ineligi-
ble for TANF for three primary reasons. First, the parent may receive Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI).
14
SSI provides cash assistance to disabled, blind,
or elderly individuals who earn little or no income, without imposing work
requirements or time limits.
15
Second, the parent may be an illegal immigrant
or legal alien with a native-born child. Third, the state may sanction a parent
for failure to comply with TANF program rules such as work requirements,
or discontinue the beneFts or parents who reach the 60-month lietime limit
on assistance. It is important to note that not all states permit children whose
parents are sanctioned or reach time limits to continue receiing beneFts. As
of 2002, 36 states employed full-family sanctions.
16

In 2006, half of all child-only cases were parental. Of those, 41 percent
had a parent receiving SSI, 38 percent had a parent with unknown citizenship
status, and 11 percent had a sanctioned parent.
17
Again, howeer, signiFcant
variation exists between states. For example, 69 percent of Californias child-
only cases are parental, the majority of which involve immigrant parents.
18

New York and Texas also have substantial immigration-related child-only cas-
es. In contrast, over 98 percent of Mississippis parental child-only caseload in
2000-2001a total of 5,117 familiesinvolved parents who received SSI. Pa-
rental cases involving SSI parents are similarly predominant in Kentucky (91.5
percent), Massachusetts (82.3 percent), Virginia (86.5 percent), and Wisconsin
(93.7 percent).
19
Non-parental child-only cases involve relative caregivers
Non-parental child-only cases involve children who reside with a rela-
tive or other adult with legal guardianship or custody.
20
Approximately half of
the nations child-only caseload falls into the non-parental category, but state
variation remains considerable.
21
These non-parent caregivers either choose
not to receive TANF assistance, or their income or assets exceed eligibility re-
quirements.
22
Importantly, some kinship caregiers are included in the beneFt
calculation, but their cases do not fall into the child-only category.
23
The Department of Health and Human Services does not publish na-
tional data about the origins of, nor the outcomes generated by, non-parental
caregiver arrangements. However, a limited amount of state-level data pro-
vides clues. Edelhoch, Liu, and Martin survey relative caretakers in South
Carolina child-only cases, and Wood and Strong investigate child-only TANF
cases in New Jersey.
24,25

In South Carolina, non-parental cases compose 34 percent of the
child-only caseload. Ldelhoch et al. Fnd that 80 percent o these caretakers
7
are African American, and 62 percent are over the age of 50.
26
When asked to
disclose the primary reason for non-relative placement, caregivers cite parental
substance abuse (28 percent), parental desertion (20 percent), child maltreat-
ment (16 percent), and parental incarceration (13 percent). Less common rea-
sons include parent death, institutionalization, military service, minor status,
and schooling. South Carolina administrative records reveal that some causes
o relatie placement oerlap. lor example, the authors Fnd that at least 35
percent of relatives care for children who were previously involved with child
protective services, such as foster care.
Reasons for relative caregiver placement in New Jersey resemble those
in South Carolina. Parental substance abuse accounts for the formation of
approximately 60 percent of non-parental child-only cases.
27
Other causes in-
clude parental incarceration, child abuse or neglect, and mental health prob-
lems.
Parental child-only children face fewer emotional needs, but greater
material needs, than non-parental counterparts
From the limited research available on child wellbeing in child-only
TANF cases, we can infer that children in parental child-only cases experience
greater poverty, but have fewer behavioral and emotional needs, than children
in non-parental cases.
28

The New Jersey study provides useful insight with respect to SSI and
immigrant child-only households. SSI recipients who head child-only TANF
households have poor health and/or disabilities.
29
These households also have
higher rates of food insecurity than regular TANF families, perhaps because
parents with disabilities hae diFculty shopping or and preparing ood.
30
Im-
migrant parents who head child-only TANF households have low educational
attainment and little recent work history.
31
Half of immigrant child-only fami-
lies in New Jersey live in deep poverty, meaning that annual income for a family
of four is below $10,000.
32

Although we know little about childrens wellbeing in TANF families
who are sanctioned or reach time limits, the news about their parents wellbe-
ing is not encouraging. Sanctioned TANF families experience serious barriers
to employment, including substance abuse, mental illness, domestic violence,
health diFculties, limited cognitie ability, and diFculty Fnding child care.
33

A U.S. Goernment Accountability OFce study also ound that sanctioned
parents may hae more diFculty understanding program rules and sanction
policies.
34
Sanctioned families also experience greater involvement with the
child welfare system, with higher rates of child placement in state custody.
35

lamilies who reach 1ANl time limits tend to experience diFculties similar to
those facing sanctioned parents; 92 percent of families who reach or are likely
to reach time limits have one or more substantial barriers, including child
Kristy Marynak
8
welfare system involvement, a disability or poor health, and criminal justice
system involvement.
36

Unanswered questions about parental child-only families persist. First,
how do children who continue to receive TANF payments after parents are
sanctioned or reach time limits fare relative to children in states that employ
full-family sanctions and time limits? Second, how are child-only TANF pay-
ments used to meet childrens needs? For example, do families share child-only
payments among all household members, regardless of whether members are
included in the beneFt calculation Particularly in parental child-only cases,
where poverty appears to be deeper and material needs greater, a reasonable
assumption is that heads of household, not children, decide how to use TANF
cash assistance.
Non-parental child-only households generally receive more income
and deal with fewer material hardships than other TANF households.
37,38
This
may be because TANF agencies often disregard caregiver income in child-only
cases when calculating beneFts. Unortunately, trauma oten precedes a child`s
placement with relatives, which creates additional service needs for both chil-
dren and caregivers.
39
Gibbs et al. Fnd that 1ANl does not proide or these
additional service needs, which include assessment, case management, and col-
laboration between TANF caseworkers and child welfare agencies.
40
Despite
these unmet needs, Gibbs et al. assert that relative care is usually a more de-
sirable option for these children than staying with parents or being placed in
non-relative foster care.
41
The South Carolina study also provides useful insight about what kinds
of services non-parental TANF households demanda subject which should
interest policymakers. In a series of interviews, Edelhoch et al. ask relative
caregivers in South Carolina which services they would like to receive.
42
Re-
spondents consistently request higher 1ANl and ood stamp beneFts, Medic-
aid coverage for adults in the household; mental health services for children in
their care, child care, including ater-school and respite care, and Fnancial help
with school expenses.
43
Child welfare and TANF systems inadequately communicate and col-
laborate
Given that children in non-parental child-only cases have greater ser-
vice needs, we should ask what kinds of services are currently available to
these children. In order to answer this question, we Frst must understand the
variety of non-relative caregiver arrangements that exist. Relative caregiver
arrangements vary along a spectrum.
44
Private kinship care is generally an
informal or temporary arrangement; the relative caregiver may contact the
TANF agency but has no contact with child welfare services.
45
When parents
independently place their children with a relative, but the family receives some
9
child welfare services, the arrangement is called voluntary kinship care.
46
In
kinship foster care (also called formal kinship care), the state maintains
custody of the child, and relatives receive TANF child-only assistance or for-
mal foster care payments.
Ehrle, Geen, and Clark estimate that 72 percent of all children in rela-
tive care (1.3 million children) receive private kinship care; 17 percent (300,000
children) receive voluntary kinship care; and 11 percent (200,000 children)
receive kinship foster care.
47
Thus, the vast majority of relative caregiver ar-
rangements avert child welfare involvement altogether. As a result, children
and relative caregivers do not receive neededand availableservices. Gibbs
et al. observe that for a variety of reasons, including the stigma of child wel-
fare involvement and a lack of knowledge about available services, relative
caregiers oreit access to a range o resources, including additional Fnancial
support, child-focused assessments and services, case management, and per-
manency planning.
48
Instead, caregivers seek assistance from TANF agencies,
which are not oriented towards child wellbeing and instead focus on adult
employment and economic sel-suFciency.
49
TANF workers typically do not
offer assessments for children, and their high caseloads and lack of training in
childrens issues generate missed opportunities for service provision.
A lack of communication and collaboration between child welfare and
TANF agencies further complicates the situation for children, families, and
caseworkers. Respondents in studies of non-parental child-only case manage-
ment in Washington, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Maryland reported little col-
laboration between child welfare and TANF agencies.
50
In interviews with Ad-
ministration for Children and Families (ACF) regional administrators, Gibbs
et al. found that only eight state TANF agencies formally collaborate with the
child welfare system, 36 informally collaborate, and seven collaborate neither
formally nor informally.
51
1he report does not deFne inormal or ormal col-
laboration.
Rob Geen Fnds that, compared to traditional non-relatie oster par-
ents, kinship foster parents tend to receive less information, training, and con-
tact from child welfare workers.
52
Indeed, says Geen, kinship caregivers are
often required to provide the same nurturance and support for children in
their care that non-kin foster parents provide, with fewer resources, greater
stressors, and limited preparation.
53
State programs assist relative caregivers, but efforts are unproven and
may neglect children in parental child-only cases
Some states are addressing the needs of non-parental child-only house-
holds through case management, increased Fnancial support, and reerrals and
support programs. Gibbs et al. Fnd that state programs generally ocus on the
needs of relative caregivers rather than children.
54
However, several child wel-
Kristy Marynak
10
fare agencies view children in non-parental child-only TANF cases as at-risk
and offer case management and services designed to keep them from needing
to be placed in the states custody.
55

Innovative, though unproven, initiatives to better serve non-parental
child-only households exist across the U.S. Efforts generally focus on three
areas: (1) enhancing collaboration between TANF and child welfare agencies;
,2, proiding Fnancial support to relatie caregiers, and ,3, proiding inor-
mation and case management to relative caregivers.
Several localities support collaboration between child welfare and
TANF agencies.
x In most Wisconsin counties, the child welfare agency manages non-
parental child-only TANF cases.
56

x Oklahomas child welfare and TANF programs share a common di-
rector. For child-only cases in formal kinship care, Oklahoma child
welfare workers oversee child safety and services, while TANF case-
workers are responsible or Fnancial and medical assistance.
57

x El Paso County, Colorado, created the Family Support Team (FST),
a special unit within its TANF agency to serve child-only cases. The
FST includes professional social workers, TANF case managers, and a
supervisor.
58

At least ten states or localities proide additional Fnancial support or
relative caregivers.
x California, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada,
New Jersey, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Denver, Colorado, pro-
ide monthly Fnancial support to relatie caregiers in non-parental
child-only cases.
59
The states provide cash assistance similar to, but
generally less than, the payments that traditional foster parents would
receive. Most states use TANF funds for these payments, and some
states (Kentucky and Nevada) make payments regardless of caregiver
income.
x Alabamas Kinship Care (KC) program targets non-parental child-on-
ly cases experiencing diFculties that put them at risk or non-relatie
foster care placement.
60
KC provides tailored services, including coun-
seling, respite care, Fnancial assistance or court costs and emergency
expenses; and a basic needs payment for educational supplies, chil-
drens clothing, and furniture.
x To those deemed income-eligible, New Jersey offers a child care sub-
sidy and up to $1,000 to purchase school supplies or baby furniture.
61

11
Several states or localities provide information, referrals, and support
groups for relative caregivers.
x New Jersey created a Kinship Navigator Program to help caregivers
obtain services including TANF, the Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP, also known as Food Stamps), Medicaid, and
child care.
62
The state also maintains a toll-free phone service staffed
by social workers who provide as much case management as possible
by telephone.
63

x Ohios Statewide Kinship Caregiver Services Program offers subsi-
dized child care, respite care, legal assistance, parenting classes, and a
toll-free phone service offering referrals and information to relative
caregivers.
64

x El Paso County, Colorado, provides support groups and grandpar-
ent advocates to assist caregivers as they navigate bureaucratic agen-
cies.
65

Although individual state efforts are encouraging, no states have rigor-
ously evaluated the effects of these interventions on child outcomes.
66
How-
ever, it is possible to comment on the implementation issues facing these pro-
grams administrators. Charlesworth et al. list the challenges that states and
localities face when trying to develop strategies to assist their child-only case-
load.
67
lirst, states struggle to aord additional Fnancial support or relatie
caregiers. Second, states ace diFculties deeloping culturally appropriate
policies and supportive services for parental child-only cases, especially alien
and SSI cases. Third, they struggle to bridge communication and logistical
gaps between relevant agencies and partner organizations.
Policy recommendations
Congress must reauthorize TANF by September 30, 2010. Consider-
ing that the primary beneFciaries o 1ANl are now children, it is time to
focus federal resources on evaluating child outcomes and identifying effective
strategies to serve poor children in both parental and non-parental child-only
cases. 1he current recession and deFcit-aerse political enironment neces-
sitates budget-neutral or low-cost policies. As such, the following strategies
are low-cost and politically feasible. Properly implemented, these strategies
will establish a Frm oundation o knowledge about what works` to inorm
Congress when the economy improves and TANF is again reauthorized.
Recommendation 1: Expand the 2011 Presidents Budget request to include competitive
grants for programs that address childrens needs in parental and non-parental child-only
cases
The Presidents FY2011 budget requests that Congress eliminate the
Kristy Marynak
12
$500 million Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Grants and in-
stead direct the money to state-initiated Responsible Fatherhood and Family
Sel-suFciency Demonstrations. 1he President requests >45.4 million or
the grants and $20 million to evaluate grantees. The idea behind the grant
programs is to build a stronger evidence base about what service interven-
tion models work that could be replicated within the TANF, Child Support
Enforcement (CSE), and other state and community-based programs.
68

\hile the idea behind the atherhood and sel-suFciency demonstra-
tions may be sound, the Presidents budget request fails to mention child-only
TANF populations, which now constitute almost half of the total TANF case-
load. During budget appropriations, Congress should expand demonstrations
to support and evaluate the following initiatives: (1) child welfare and TANF
agency collaboration, ,2, enhanced Fnancial assistance or relatie caregiers,
(3) case management and referral services for children and relatives in non-
parental cases; and (4) assessments, case management, and other services for
children in parental cases.
Congress should fully fund the Presidents $500 million demonstration
request, but also add $250 million to support child-only service model demon-
strations, $20 million of which should fund rigorous evaluations of programs.
See Recommendation 2 for a discussion of the evaluations.
Bipartisan political support exists for investment in child-only TANF
cases. During the July 2009 conFrmation hearing or ACl Assistant Secretary
for Family Support Carmen Nazario, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) voiced
his concern about the rise in child-only 1ANl cases. SpeciFcally, Grassley
asked whether childrens interests would be better served by a formal arrange-
ment with the child welfare system.
69
As such, grants that support child welfare
and TANF agency collaboration and case management for children could en-
joy political support during budget appropriations. Leading up to the budget
appropriations process, advocacy groups should target Senator Grassley and
House Appropriations committee chair David Obey (D-WI) to request a $250
million expansion of the Presidents request.
Recommendation 2: Conduct a series of third-party studies to test impacts of interventions
on child outcomes
To address acute information gaps, Congress should fund third-party
evaluations of interventions to serve parental and non-parental child-only pop-
ulations. The studies should focus on dependent variables germane to quanti-
tative evaluations of program impacts on child wellbeing, including academic
progress, cognitive development, behavioral and emotional adjustment, and
health and safety.
70
The studies should not only test child-only intervention
models, but also investigate the effectiveness of traditional child-only TANF
cash assistance.
13
Parental Child-Only Study
One study should examine the wellbeing of children whose parents
are ineligible for TANF because of sanctions, time limits, alien status, or SSI
enrollment. The study should observe two treatment groups: one that receives
child-only payments with no enhanced services such as case management, and
a second that receives child-only payments with case management. The con-
trol group would receive no TANF assistance. Both studies should seek to
understand how TANF cash assistance is spent and shared between house-
hold members, how that cash assistance impacts child wellbeing, and whether
enhanced services improve outcomes. In order to avoid ethical questions that
would arise when assigning children to different levels of service, this study
could take advantage of the existing variation between states. Controlling for
dierences between groups and employing state Fxed eects will account or
any variation in outcomes due to geographic differences.
Non-Parental Child-Only Study
Another study should focus on children in relative care, using multiple
treatment groups to test the impacts of the various strategies that states cur-
rently use to serve children and caregivers in non-parental cases. These treat-
ment groups should include: (1) a group that receives basic child-only cash
assistance; (2) a group that receives enhanced payments with no case manage-
ment; (3) a group that receives a combination of payments and case manage-
ment by a child welfare agency; and (4) a group that receives a combination
of payments and case management by the TANF agency. The control group
should include children in relative care who receive no TANF cash assistance
or other services.
The studies should each be implemented over multiple years, begin-
ning with baseline data collection and two follow-up assessments. Third-party
researchers should be required to report on Fndings at baseline and at each
ollow-up and write a Fnal report to ACl and Congress beore 1ANl is reau-
thorized, presumably by 2015.
Social policy experts and advocates would greet these evaluations with
enthusiasm. Innuential adocates at the Brookings Institution, the Center or
Budget and Policy Priorities, and the Center for Law and Social Policy regularly
request that TANF focus more on child outcomes. Gibbs et al. also favor this
type o research and assert that Fndings could help agencies identiy and pri-
oritize services for the most at-risk children.
71

Alternative strategy
Even if Congress does not fund a child-only demonstration project, it
should still support modest investment in evaluating child-only interventions.
Rigorous analysis could be valuable in the absence of a new discretionary
Kristy Marynak
14
grant program because some infrastructure to support non-parental child-only
households already exists in states. Should Congress fail to take action, phil-
anthropic groups interested in child outcomes could Fll the oid by proiding
full or matching funding for state-level research.
Conclusion
Given that child-only cases now constitute nearly half of the total
TANF caseload, our nations cash-assistance program must expand its work-
oriented focus to include child wellbeing. Unless social service providers close
communication gaps between child welfare and family assistance sectors, these
childrens unmet material and service needs will persist. Congress should ad-
dress these needs by funding demonstration projects to implement and test
initiatives to serve child-only populations. Building knowledge about what
works today will facilitate cost-effective, thoughtful program expansions when
the economy improves.
Endnotes
1 Martha J. Zaslow, Kristin A. Moore, Jennifer L. Brooks, Pamela A. Morris, Kathryn
Tout, Zakia A. Redd, and Carol A. Emig, Experimental Studies of Welfare Reform and
Children. The Future of Children, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2002.
2 David T. Ellwood, Poor Support. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988).
3 Ibid.
4 Lawrence Mead, Beyond Entitlement. (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1986).
5 Gayle Hamilton, Moving People from Welfare to Work: Findings from the National
Evaluation of Welfare to Work Strategies. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Serices, OFce o the Assistant Secretary or Planning and Laluation. Manpower
Development Research Corporation. July 2002. http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/NEWWS/
synthesis02/index.htm (accessed February 15, 2010).
6 Steven M. Teles, Whose Welfare? AFDC and Elite Politics. (Lawrence, Kansas: University
Press of Kansas, 1998).
7 David Ellwood and Rebecca Blank, The Clinton Legacy for Americas Poor. (NBER Working
Paper 8437, Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001).
8 The Urban Institute, A Decade of Welfare Reform: Facts and Figures. June 2006.
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900980_welfarereform.pdf (accessed February
15, 2010).
9 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and
Families, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Eighth Annual Report to Congress,
2009. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/annualreport8/chapter01/
chap01.html (accessed October 19, 2009).
15
10 Deborah Gibbs, Jennifer Kasten, Anupa Bir, Sonja Hoover, Dean Duncan and Janet
Mitchell, Children in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Child-only Cases with
Relative Caregivers. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation. June 2004. http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/child-only04/index.htm
(accessed February 19, 2010).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF child-only cases
trends and issues. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for
Children and lamilies, OFce o lamily Assitance, \elare Peer 1echnical Assistance
Network. 2009. http://peerta.acf.hhs.gov/pdf/child_only.pdf (accessed October 12,
2009).
15 Social Security Administration, What is Supplemental Security Income? http://www.
ssa.gov/ssi/ (accessed February 15, 2010).
16 Rutledge Q. Hutson, Child Welfare and TANF Reauthorization. Center for Law and
Social Policy. February 2002. http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications_archive/
Fles,008.pd ,accessed lebruary 19, 2010,.
17 Deborah Gibbs, Jennifer Kasten, Anupa Bir, Dean Duncan, and Sonja Hoover, Between
two systems: Children in TANF child-only cases with relative caregivers. Children and
Youth Services Review, Vol. 28, Is. 4, (2006).
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Leanne Charlesworth, Jenneate Mercick, and Courtney Kakuska, TANF Child-Only
Cases Trends and Issues.
21 Robert G. Strong and Debra A. Wood, The Status of Families on Child-Only TANF
Cases. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 2002.
22 Mary Farrell, Michael Fishman, Stephanie Laud, and Vincena Allen, Understanding the
AFDC/TANF Child-Only Caseload: Policies, Composition, and Characteristics in Three
States. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. February 1, 2000. http://aspe.
hhs.gov/hsp/child-only-caseload00/ (accessed February 15, 2010).
23 Rutledge Q. Hutson, Child Welfare and TANF Reauthorization.
24 Marilyn Edelhoch, Qiduan Liu, and Linda S. Martin, Unsung Heroes: Relative Caretakers
in Child-only Cases. Policy & Practice of Public Human Services, 2002.
25 Robert G.Strong and Debra A. Wood, The Status of Families on Child-Only TANF
Cases.
in Child-only Cases.
Cases.
28 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-only Cases With
Relative Caregivers.
Kristy Marynak
16
Cases.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Jan Kaplan, Sanction Policies and Practices - An Update. Welfare Information Network,
2004.
34 General Accounting OFce, \elare Reorm - States are Restructuring Programs to
Reduce Welfare Dependence. Washington, DC, (1998).
35 Jan Kaplan, Sanction Policies and Practices - An Update.
36 General Accounting OFce. \elare Reorm - States are Restructuring Programs to
Reduce Welfare Dependence.
37 Deborah Gibbs et al., Children in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Child-only
Cases with Relative Caregivers.
38 Robert G. Strong and Debra A. Wood. The Status of Families on Child-Only TANF
Cases.
39 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases With
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
in Child-only Cases.
43 Ibid.
44 Shelley Waters Boots and Rob Geen, Family Care or Foster Care? How State Policies
Affect Kinship Caregivers. The Urban Institute. 1999. http://www.urban.org/
publications/309166.html (accessed February 20, 2010).
46 Robert Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice. The Future of Children
Vol. 14, No. 1, (2004).
47 Jennifer Ehrle Macomber, Rob Geen, and Rebecca L. Clark, Children Cared for by
Relatives: Who are They and How are They Faring? The Urban Institute, Assessing the
New Federalism, Report No. 6. (2001). (Accessed February 20, 2010).
Cases with Relative Caregivers. 5-4.
49 Ibid.
50 Deborah Gibbs et al., Between Two Systems: Children in TANF Child-Only Cases with
52 Robert Geen, The Evolution of Kinship Care Policy and Practice.
53 Ibid., 137.
17
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
68 Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families.
JustiFcation o Lstimates or Appropriations Committees: 1emporary Assistance or
Needy Families. (Washington, DC, 2010). 304. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
opre,ac_perplan,ann_per,2011_per_plan,2011_Fnal.pd.
69 Child Welfare League of America. Carmen Nazario Moves Closer to Final Approval
for HHS Post. Childrens Monitor Online. June 2009. http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/
monitoronline-issueHLasp?ISSUEID=243 (accessed October 1, 2009).
70 Martha J. Zaslow et al., Experimental Studies of Welfare Reform and Children. 81.
19
Abstract
Zimbabwes opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) carried the 2008 elec-
tion by using wireless telecommunications and an elaborate system of poll monitoring to establish
an alternative political narrative. Zimbabwes ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) party, whose complacence allowed MDC to establish this narrative, responded
by violently rigging the presidential runoff. While Zimbabweans had challenged ZANU-PFs elec-
toral authoritarian regime largely without external assistance, ZANU-PFs monopoly on force and
rittivgve.. to v.e riotevce agaiv.t tbe ovtatiov /et Pre.iaevt Robert Mvgabe iv offce. Ove ,ear
into a power sharing agreement that saw ZANU-PF retain control of state security organs, new
elections are under discussion, and ZANU-PF will likely rig them violently. In order for Zimbabwe-
ans votes to have any chance to trump ZANU-PFs guns, the international communityespecially
the African communityand regional civil society must back free elections through a combination
of targeted sanctions, African-led condemnation, and perhaps international criminal charges against
the regime.
Introduction: Votes and Guns, the Inseparable Twins
Our votes must go together with our guns. After all, any vote
we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun. The gun
which produces the ote should remain its security oFcer - its
guarantor. The peoples votes and the peoples guns are always
inseparable twins.
-Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 1976
1
I
n March 2008, Zimbabwe held presidential and parliamentary elections
that tested President Robert Mugabes hypothesis that votes are meaning-
less without guns.
2
The votes in 2008 belonged to the opposition Move-
CRISIS AT THE POLLS
Restoring Democracy in Zimbabwe
Daniel B. Kobayashi
Daniel B. Kobayashi is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Sanford School of Public
Policy, Duke University. He earned his Bachelors degree in Political Science and Public Policy
from Boston University in 1998. Kobayashi has also served as Director of the Workforce Solutions
Crov, av ecovovic aeretovevt vovroft. e cvrrevtt, .erre. a. a cov.vttavt ov ecovovic aereto-
ment in Africa.
Daniel B. Kobayashi
20
ment for Democratic Change (MDC), while the guns belonged to Mugabes
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). An 11-month
stalemate resulted. Today, more than a year after a power sharing cabinet
took oFce, the results o the experiment are still inconclusie. On one hand,
MDCs votes changed the nations political narrative and gave MDC the politi-
cal leverage to take the premiership, the Ministry of Finance, and a number of
other government ministries; from this perch in the government, MDC ended
Zimbabwe`s ruinous hyperinnation. On the other hand, ZANU-Pl retains the
presidency and a legal monopoly on the use of force, allowing them to main-
tain control of most of the nations wealth and potentially win future power
struggles through force of arms.
In his 2003 book Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy
of Zimbabwe, Martin Meredith identiFed strong eidence that guns hae his-
torically trumped votes in Zimbabwe.
3
This article will examine the tension
between Mugabes inseparable twins in the 2008 election and the responses
of the international community. This piece will then discuss recommendations
for action for both Zimbabweans and the international community, as Mugabe
calls for new elections in an effort to reassert his dominance.
4
Dictatorship by another name
Unlike many Arican countries, Zimbabwe has neer oFcially been a
one-party state. Despite ZANU-PFs dominance, the opposition has always
held some seats in parliament, and until 2001, there was a largely independent
judiciary.
5
Instead, Zimbabwe was an electoral authoritarian regime, wherein
the ruling party desires the veneer of political legitimacy provided by man-
aged elections and the appearance of rule of law.
6
In every election, there was
technically a choice of parties, but the ruling party rigged elections through
media manipulation, fraud, or even violence.
Mugabe has made a specialty of sham legality, lots of useless laws,
phony rules that mean nothing, says Foster Dongozi, Secretary General of
the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists. He knows how far to push us. He knows
how to distract us with a veneer of normalcy. He knows how to beat us way
down, but not so far as to embarrass his African neighbors.
7

While opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes typically
have little hope beyond gaining a few seats in parliament, occasionally a regime
can grow oerconFdent and rig a ote incompetently. Under these circum-
stances, an election can become competitive. This situation arose in Zimbabwe
in 2000, when a ZANU-PF referendum on a new constitution failed 55 per-
cent to 45 percent.
8
1he ailed reerendum indicated a suFciently competitie
electoral system in Zimbabwe for the Journal of Democracy to reclassify Zimba-
bwe as a competitive authoritarian state. Competitive authoritarianism dif-
fers from electoral authoritarianism in that there is meaningful parliamentary
21
opposition, even though the ruling party would not allow a transfer of power.
9

Following the 2000 referendum, ZANU-PF restored the electoral au-
thoritarian model by force. First, they encouraged mobs of war veterans to
seize white-owned farms and conducted Operation Murambatsvina, a slum-
clearing campaign that punished urbanites, who were among the new Constitu-
tions strongest opponents.
10
Then, ZANU-PF rigged the presidential election
in 2002 by arresting opposition Fgures, closing polling places in MDC strong-
holds, and detaining international election observers.
11
In 2005, they ended the
era of competitive authoritarianism by denying as much as 30 percent of the
electorate the right to vote in parliamentary elections.
12

By 2008 however, Mugabes government again began to assume that
ictory was ineitable. Despite eight years o hyperinnation that had led to an
annualized innation rate o 355,000 percent, bare shop sheles, and looming
hunger for many Zimbabweans, ZANU-PF leaders continued to believe in
their partys popularity and treated the upcoming election results as a foregone
conclusion.
13

ZANU-PF began to be too relaxed about things, said Ben Moyo, a
long-time Mugabe supporter and former Member of Parliament. We thought
the people would vote for us, as they always do.
14

Many MDC supporters and outside observers shared this expectation.
In December 2007, three months before the election, one Zimbabwean close
to the MDC, whose name has been withheld to protect his safety, told me that
his party was dead and that the opposition needed to be rebuilt completely
from the grassroots. This general complacency, however, created a tiny op-
portunity.

How Sham Elections Become Real Elections
An opposition party can turn a sham multi-party election of an elec-
toral authoritarian state into a real vote if it can develop and disseminate an
alternative political narrativeif it can prove that the will of the people is not
what the ruling party claims. In order to create an alternative narrative, the op-
position needs both facts that support its case and a means to communicate its
narrative to the people and the outside world.
In the case of Zimbabwe, the facts emerged only because an overcon-
Fdent ZANU-Pl, ater arresting and beating MDC presidential nominee Mor-
gan Tsvangirai in March 2007, bowed to regional pressure and consented to
talks on ensuring a fair election in 2008. While the talks eventually crumbled,
ZANU-PF made one minor, seemingly symbolic concession: polling places
would post a tally of local results at the close of the polls.
15

With this small concession, ZANU-PF opened the door to a compet-
ing electoral narrative: that MDC had carried the vote. When polls for the
March 29, 2008, preliminary election closed, the Zimbabwe Election Support
Daniel B. Kobayashi
22
Network (ZESN), a consortium of Zimbabwean civil society organizations,
launched an effort to duplicate an election-monitoring strategy called Sample
Based Observation
16
that had been effective in the 2007 election in Sierra Le-
one.
17
A network of 8,900 trained poll watchers tracked the results posted at
each o a stratiFed sample o 435 polling places and used cell phones, com-
mon even in rural Zimbabwe, to transmit the data to ZESN headquarters in
Harare. With the raw data secured, ZESN discovered that MDC had won a
majority of parliament seats and possibly the presidency itself.
18
Extrapolating
from its sample, ZESN projected 49.4 percent of the vote for Tsvangirai to
41.8 percent or Mugabe. 1he 95 percent conFdence interal or 1sangirai`s
percentage of the vote was 47.0 percent to 51.8 percent. While ZANU-PF
has never revealed a true tally, ZESNs sampling model suggests that there is
a credible chance that a full and proper count of the ballots might have given
Tsvangirai the 50 percent majority required to claim victory.
19
Before ZANU-
PF intimidation could begin, ZESN had already used cell phones to send its
projection throughout Zimbabwe and around the world.
20

This competing narrative stripped ZANU-PF of the ability to tidily
rig the election. There are three options for rigging an election: controlling the
names on the ballot, forbidding or dissuading citizens from voting, and manip-
ulating the tally. ZANU-PF had already allowed MDC candidates on the ballot,
and while it had intimidated voters, the large turnout for MDC suggests that
it had not done nearly enough to frighten away the masses angered by Zim-
babwes economic disaster. Thus, vote counting presented the only remaining
opportunity to rig the election, and with ZESNs projection, that corruption
point quickly evaporated.
Faced with the worldwide wireless distribution of ZESN data show-
ing that it did not have public support, and having also lost its best chances to
cleanly rig the election, ZANU-PF retreated for just over one month, refus-
ing to release oFcial poll numbers. \hen the Zimbabwe Llections Commis-
sion ,ZLC, Fnally released the results on May 1, they were almost certainly
fraudulent, but were nevertheless extraordinary: MDC had won control of
parliament. While ZEC did not award Morgan Tsvangirai the majority needed
to claim the presidency, the ZLSN analysis appears to hae innuenced the o-
Fcial tally. ZLC awarded 1sangirai a plurality o 4.9 percent, a Fgure at the
bottom end o ZLSN`s 95 percent conFdence interal, orcing a presidential
runo election or the Frst time in Zimbabwean history.
21
While MDC had
not taken the presidency, and the true election tally remains unknown, ZESNs
efforts had forced ZANU-PF to make major concessions. Election monitor-
ing had worked. The votes power reached its peak, and then the guns came
into play.
23
How State Power Can Thwart Democracy
With a Presidential runoff looming and MDC supporters exuberant,
Mugabe faced the prospect of losing power in an electoral revolution. How-
ever, ZANU-PF retained a critical weapon: control over the organs of state
power and paramilitary organizations, and a willingness to use them to bru-
talize MDC supporters and innuence the elections. State security orces and
police repeatedly arrested and beat 1sangirai and other top MDC oFcials.
ZANU-PF, war veterans, and the police murdered 180 MDC supporters and
tortured or beat 9,000 others. 28,000 people ned their homes.
22

Five days before the runoff, ZANU-PF accomplished its objective:
Morgan Tsvangirai, who had taken asylum in the Dutch Embassy, announced
his withdrawal from the campaign, saying that he could no longer ask Zimba-
bweans to vote when that vote could cost them their lives.
23
Mugabe won
the newly uncontested presidential election, yet still faced an MDC majority in
parliament and the prospect of a Tsvangirai premiership.
A few African leaders, most notably Patrick Levy Mwanawasa of Zam-
bia and Ian Khama of Botswana, joined Western leaders in condemning the
violence, but far more African leaders declined to condemn Mugabe. South
African President Thabo Mbeki, asked by the South African Development
Community (SADC) to mediate, appeared particularly quiet, ostensibly in the
service of diplomacy.
Whatever the moral dimension of his silence, as the SADC mediator
and President of the regions dominant power, Mbeki was critical to negotiat-
ing a power sharing agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Negotiators
faced formidable questions. Who would wield executive power, the president
or the prime minister More speciFcally, who would control the state security
apparatus? Would MDC get the guns to accompany its votes?
MDC correctly discerned that without possession of at least one
of the ministries controlling the use of force, any power it gained would be
ephemeral. With the once independent judiciary full of ZANU-PF partisans,
and television and radio still under ZANU-PF control, only MDC control
of the police or army could create the checks and balances needed for true
power sharing.
24
Thus, control over at least some of the levers of force became
MDCs central demand.
Ultimately, Mbeki negotiated a deal, signed on September 15, 2008,
that made Mugabe President and Tsvangirai Prime Minister. The deal also gave
15 ministries to ZANU-PF, 13 to Tsvangirais faction of MDC, called MDC-T,
and three to the dissident MDC-M faction controlled by Arthur Mutambara.
Most importantly, while ZANU-PF retained control of the military, MDC
would control the Ministry of the Home Affairs, which includes the police.
25

Despite signing the agreement, Mugabe refused to actually relinquish
control of the police. For six months the agreement remained unimplemented,
Daniel B. Kobayashi
24
as ZANU-PF insisted that control of Home Affairs should be shared by
ZANU-PF and MDC. MDC rejected this proposal and appealed to SADC for
a resolution ordering the implementation of the signed agreement. Stunningly,
SADC sided with ZANU-PF, ruling that there should be shared control of the
Ministry of Home Affairs. This decision led MDC to call for the removal of
Thabo Mbeki from his role as mediator. In a heavily publicized spat, Tsvangirai
called SADC leaders cowards, and MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti sent
a letter to Mbeki condemning the SADC ruling as a nullity. Mbeki responded
with a letter to Tsvangirai scolding MDC for its contempt for the decisions
of its immediate African neighbors and insisting that only shared control of
the police could solve issues of violence and intimidation.
26
In February 2009,
Tsvangirai swore in a new cabinet when MDC, under pressure from SADC,
relented and allowed joint control of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
27
What now? Advancing democracy after government violence
As of early 2010, the power sharing government remains tenuously
in place. Votes have won MDC a seat at the table, but ZANU-PFs guns have
kept Robert Mugabe at its head. While the MDC ministers have enjoyed some
major economic successes, most notably ending hyperinnation, MDC remains
unlikely to displace Mugabe as long as ZANU-PF controls the state security
organs. Even a new election may not improve MDCs position as long as ZA-
NU-PF retains the ability to undermine the vote with state violence. Indeed,
Mugabes recent call for a new election suggests that ZANU-PF believes they
would have the upper hand in a vote.
28
In an environment where organized
violence will likely mar any election, a change of power at the ballot box is
unlikely without support from outside actors. The question is whether these
actors have the will and the tools to bolster Zimbabwean democracy.
Speaking out: International condemnation of the Mugabe regime
Western criticism can be counterproductive
For years, western governments have spoken out against the ZANU-
PF regime. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and his predecessor Tony
Blair have been particularly emphatic in their condemnations, and former
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denounced the sham election and
sham power-sharing talks.
29

While condemnation appears tactically conservative, most Western
criticism of ZANU-PF may be counterproductive. Mugabe uses his victory
over colonialism to bolster his legitimacy. Therefore, when Western leaders
snub Mugabe, they provide fodder for state propaganda portraying him as the
scourge of the colonizers. For instance, one brochure from the runoff asked,
What do the Americans and British want from Zimbabwe? Our Minerals!
30

Inversely, MDCs support from western governments makes it suspect
25
in the eyes of some Zimbabweans. The more vocal Western governments
support for MDC is, the more plausible appear Mugabes claims that MDC
is a puppet of the Western world. Elias Mudzuri, MDCs national organizing
secretary, beliees the good outweighs the harm. \e are isolated here, Fght-
ing for democracy, but we need the West to help us, said Mudzuri. I am not
ashamed to say this. I am not a puppet of the West.
31

A few Western countries have stronger ground from which to criticize
ZANU-PF. In particular, the Nordic countries enjoy credibility with Zimba-
bweans because o their Fnancial support or ZANU-Pl during the reolu-
tionary era.
32
Thus, an EU strategy wherein Nordic countries take the lead in
criticizing Mugabe might be more effective than a campaign led by Britain.
African criticism resonates with Zimbabweans
Criticism from African leaders holds greater credibility because Mugabe
cannot dismiss it as neocolonial. After years of silence, a number of promi-
nent African leaders spoke up when the election turned ugly and the economy
deteriorated. Former South African President Nelson Mandela condemned
Mugabes tragic failure of leadership,
33
and retired Anglican Archbishop of
Cape Town Desmond Tutu accused Mugabe of gross violations of human
rights and demanded that he step down.
34
Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odin-
ga was even more forceful, comparing Mugabe to Idi Amin, former dictator of
Uganda.
35
These condemnations, made by two Nobel-winning heroes of the
struggle against Apartheid and one modernizing prime minister, suggest that
African leaders are increasingly agitated with ZANU-PF.
Western criticism, while generally ineffective on its own, can be valu-
able when linked to these African voices. By joining with credible African
partners, Western leaders can make their condemnations clear while limiting
the taint of colonialism on their remarks. For example, in April 2008, Gordon
Brown issued a joint statement with African National Congress leader Jacob
Zuma denouncing Mugabes sham reelection.
36
Similarly, when MDC agreed
to enter the unity government, the U.S. State Department linked its comments
to African criticisms by saying:
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has agreed to
join a unity government with Robert Mugabe under the condi-
tions called for in the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC) January 27 Communiqu. The success or failure
of such a government will depend on credible and inclusive
power sharing by Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party.
37

Human rights organizations call for condemnation and human rights monitors
Leading human rights organizations endorse speaking out, even by
Daniel B. Kobayashi
26
Western countries. In Amnesty Internationals report Time for Accountabil-
ity, the only recommendation to the international community is that all na-
tions, and particularly those in Africa, should condemn ZANU-PFs human
rights violations.
38
Human Rights Watch (HRW) shares this perspective, but
ocuses its Fre on SADC. lR\ argues that SADC must speak out in order
to avoid losing credibility on human rights, and should even dispatch human
rights monitors to Zimbabwe.
39
Monitors might diminish abuses and would, at
the very least, amplify international condemnations of ZANU-PF.
Refusing to admit monitors would provide further evidence to Zimba-
bweans and their neighbors that ZANU-PF has no intention of holding free
elections. Along these lines, ZANU-PF has been pilloried throughout south-
ern Africa for its refusal to admit a delegation of elders consisting of former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, ormer UN Secretary General KoF Annan, and
Graa Machel, the widow of late Mozambique President Samora Machel and
current wife of Nelson Mandela.
Sanctions: How to punish ZANU-PF without punishing Zimbabweans
Broad sanctions are politically impractical and morally dubious
While broad sanctions are another option, few Zimbabweans at home
or abroad support them, as they would further strain the Zimbabwean people
by cutting off vital economic supplies. Moreover, little chance remains of get-
ting sanctions through the UN Security Council. China, Russia, and South
Africa have repeatedly blocked Security Council efforts to impose sanctions.
40

In fact, Zimbabwe has viewed partnering with China and Russia as an alterna-
tive to cooperation with the West, going so far as to launch an initiative called
Look East.
41

Targeted sanctions punish ZANU-PF
Targeted sanctions aimed at ZANU-PF leadership are more promis-
ing. Individual Western countries have already frozen the assets of Mugabe
and other top ZANU-PF leaders and banned the leaders from their territory.
Former U.S. Ambassador James McGee expressed support for targeted sanc-
tions, saying:
Our sanctions really do work. I meet, with some regularity,
with one of the top leaders here in Zimbabwe. And he has
about $7 million of his funding thats been frozen because of
U.S. sanctions against Zimbabwe. And he starts out each and
every meeting with the same thing: Where is my money?
42
A 2008 expansion of targeted sanctions has increased the pressure on
ZANU-PF. In early December 2008, the U.S. Treasury froze the assets of two
27
white Zimbabwean businessmen, a Malaysian urologist, and a Thai business-
woman-all o whom played major roles in Fnancing the Mugabe regime.
43

If businesspeople believe that working with the Mugabe regime may endanger
their personal assets held in \estern banks, Mugabe may soon Fnd it more
diFcult to Fnance his regime.
While one should not overstate the impact of targeted sanctions, the
attention ZANU-PF has paid to getting them lifted indicates the sanctions
have had an impact. Additionally, sanctions have given MDC leverage. In re-
cent negotiations concerning new elections and the future of the power shar-
ing agreement, ZANU-PF negotiators demands have centered on getting
MDC to persuade the European Union to lift sanctions on ZANU-PF of-
Fcials. \hile it is not clear that MDC has such innuence, the sanctions aord
Western powers, and perhaps MDC, something tangible they can give ZANU-
PF in return for major concessions.
44

Encirclement: An African solution to ZANU-PF intransigence
A blockade may be effective but illegal
Zimbabwe is landlocked, so economically isolating it would require nei-
ther Security Council approval of sanctions nor a SADC endorsement, though
both are desirable. Instead, an agreement among the four countries that bor-
der ZimbabweBotswana, Zambia, South Africa, and Mozambiquecould
strangle the Mugabe regime. While closing borders to all trade might exert a
greater impact on the hungry Zimbabwean population than the elites, closing
borders to traFc in arms, luxury items, and non-essential goods could pres-
sure ZANU-PF without further devastating the population. Also, an alliance
o the our bordering countries could eectiely orbid ZANU-Pl oFcials
from leaving the country, forcing them to live to a greater extent with the
economic consequences of their policies. Archbishop Tutu has endorsed ele-
ments o this plan by urging the our neighbors to impose a night ban.
45
This approach faces two obstacles. First, a blockade of this sort may vi-
olate the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which guarantees landlocked
countries access to the sea and to which all four bordering countries have
agreed.
46
Second, at least one of Zimbabwes neighbors may refuse to close the
borders. While Botswana, whom Zimbabwe has accused of harboring MDC
military training camps,
47
and Zambia may support a blockade, South Africa
and Mozambique likely will hesitate. Any effective action must have South
Arican support because 65 percent o Zimbabwe`s imports now through the
Beitbridge crossing with South Africa.
48
New South African President Jacob
Zuma is far less sympathetic to Mugabe than Thabo Mbeki, saying, We can-
not agree with ZANU-PF. We cannot agree with them on values.
49
However,
Zuma is still unlikely to support a blockade, having recently urged Tsvangirai
to make concessions in power sharing while relaxing pressure on Mugabe.
50
Daniel B. Kobayashi
28
South African labor can close the border
The powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),
which supports fellow trade unionist Tsvangirai, has contemplated forcibly
closing the Beitbridge border for some time.
51
While COSATU could not im-
plement a night ban and probably could not enorce a blockade that allows
food but blocks nonessential items, it could close the border without approval
from the South African government. It is unclear, however, whether COSATU
would be willing to alienate Zuma, a trade unionist and long-time ally, or innict
the pain of a blockade on average Zimbabweans.
Mozambiques porous border remains a challenge
Mozambique provides the greatest obstacle to an effective encircle-
ment policy. Zimbabwes 1,231 kilometer border with Mozambique is its lon-
gest, and Mozambiques governing Frelimo party is a longtime ZANU-PF ally.
However, Mozambique has taken modest measures against Zimbabwe in the
past. In July 2008, Mozambique put strict controls on exports of foodstuffs
and goods to Zimbabwe;
52
and as choleric reugees nooded oer the border
following the runoff election, Mozambique placed all border stations on maxi-
mum alert.
53
While Mozambique would not consider a blockade now that the
cholera epidemic has ended and political violence in Zimbabwe has eased, its
actions in 2008 suggest that, in the event of a renewed crisis, a blockade is a
possibility. However, regardless of will, Mozambiques capacity to seal its vast
border with Zimbabwe is unclear.
Trade union solidarity: Laboring for MDC
In addition to the threatened blockade of Beitbridge, the African labor
movement led the regional civil society response to the Zimbabwean crisis.
During the runoff, longshoremen in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, and
Angola reused to onoad weapons rom a Chinese ship destined or Zimba-
bwe. While some African leaders may have hesitated to challenge a fellow head
o state and hero o the Fght against colonialism, howeer tarnished, Arican
workers appear to have no such qualms. The efforts of trade unionists in
the SADC region have emboldened Zimbabwes own labor movement. Even
as Tsvangirai, the former labor leader, struggled to get the regime to make
concessions, the Zimbabwe Congress o 1rade Unions ,ZC1U, won the Frst
major civil society concession from the government. On November 27, 2008,
ZCTU called for mass action in protest of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwes
limit on cash withdrawals to Z$500,000 (about one-half the cost of a loaf of
bread). In an unprecedented move, bank Governor Gideon Gono bowed to
pressure and raised the caps.
54

Trade unions from across Africa have held meetings to address the
Zimbabwean crisis and coordinate strategy. Because labor has had the greatest
29
success in organizing against ZANU-PF both inside and outside of Zimba-
bwe, President Obama should consider showing support by sending a U.S. del-
egation that includes prominent American labor oFcials to the next Arican
meeting on the subject. One possible member of such a delegation would be
AFL-CIO President John Sweeney, who has already sent a letter to Mugabe
protesting his abuse of labor.
55
War crimes indictments: Criminalizing oppression
Another tactic suggested by Archbishop Tutu is threatening Mugabe
and other ZANU-Pl oFcials with war crimes indictments i they reuse to
step aside. An indictment could further restrict Mugabes movement and might
lead other African leaders to distance themselves from him. Recent experience
provides mixed evidence on this approach. When the International Criminal
Court indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes, the African
Union condemned the move and refused to extradite al-Bashir or restrict his
movement. However, some African countries have broken with this policy and
vowed to arrest al-Bashir if given the chance. For example, al-Bashir cancelled
a planned trip to Uganda after Uganda Internal Affairs Minister Henry Oryem
Okello stated that he would ensure that he [Bashir] is arrested.
56

While indicting Mugabe is tempting, it is also risky. The threat of an
indictment may be useful, but an actual indictment might increase the resolve
of Mugabe and his allies to cling to power. Although ZANU-PF could con-
ceivably win amnesty from an MDC government as part of a deal to concede
power, they could never win amnesty from the International Criminal Court.
Moreover, little precedent exists for a sitting president to surrender willingly
to an international tribunal. While Charles Taylor of Liberia left power upon
indictment or war crimes, he only ned once his position became militarily
untenable. Al-Bashir, who faces no imminent military threat, remains securely
in power. Perhaps the only example of a head of state or government willingly
turning himself over to an international tribunal is former Kosovo Prime Min-
ister Ramush Haradinaj; he voluntarily left his post to face war crimes charges,
of which he was later acquitted.
57
However, Haradinaj is an unusual case, be-
cause his territory was under UN Administration when he surrendered.
Conclusion: Without guns, votes need external backing
Today, the Zimbabwean crisis has waned and settled onto an uneasy
plateau: hyperinnation has ended and political iolence has slowed. low-
ever, another crisis appears inevitable, though not imminent: the 86-year-old
Mugabe will eentually bow to time, i he does not Frst all to otes or guns.
The events of 2008 offer valuable lessons as to how Zimbabweans, as well as
the Southern African and international communities, can increase the likeli-
hood that the next crisis is less traumatic and the outcomes more promising.
Daniel B. Kobayashi
30
First, while democratic movements cannot peacefully overthrow a re-
gime committed to retaining power, willing to use force, and indifferent to the
fate of the people, they can force a regime to a decision point by creating and
disseminating an alternative political narrative. By gathering and communicat-
ing real election numbers, ZESN revealed the will of the people and forced
ZANU-PF leaders to decide whether they were willing to use large-scale force
against their own people to retain power. Even when ZANU-PF used massive
violence, it could not eliminate the alternative political narrative. Thanks to
ZESN and its text messages and phone calls, Zimbabweans know how they
voted. Despite maintaining control of the police and military, ZANU-PF suf-
fered from a crisis of legitimacy that forced it to make concessions to MDC.
When the next election comes, perhaps the 86-year-old Mugabe will have died,
and the will of the people as revealed by a vote could bring an even marginally
more empathetic regime to heel. Either way, polling station monitoring is es-
sential for establishing an alternative narrative.
Second, when vetoes hamper the Security Council, regional organiza-
tions and individual nations can take actions to shape political outcomes in
neighboring countries. A uniFed eort by SADC, or een just the our na-
tions that border Zimbabwe, would pressure the Mugabe regime and poten-
tially orce ZANU-Pl oFcials to lie with the consequences o their policies.
ZANU-Pl oFcials may be more willing to allow truly ree and air elections
and accept their outcomes if faced with a choice between being trapped in a
country-sized prison or yielding power.
Third, governments and NGOs are not the only actors in international
affairs; regional civil society organizations, and even domestic organizations
in neighboring countries, can innuence a country`s internal aairs. COSA1U
has the ability, independent of the government of South Africa, to blockade
the Beitbridge crossing and innict a seere economic wound on the Mugabe
regime.
linally, while the \est cannot always wield much direct innuence on
events in distant parts of the world, it can support regional efforts to solve
crises by lending technical advice or support to civil society organizations, co-
ordinating statements with regional leaders, and carefully selecting its spokes-
men.
As both the Zimbabwean opposition and the international community
prepare for the as yet unscheduled upcoming election, they would do well to
listen to the words o Robert Mugabe himsel. ReaFrming his 196 com-
ments ollowing the Frst round o the 2008 elections, Mugabe said, \e are
not going to give up our country for a mere X on a ballot. How can a ballpoint
pen Fght with a gun`
58
Perhaps the pen alone is not mightier than the sword.
But when informed Zimbabwean voters wield that pen with the support of
southern African civil society, targeted international sanctions, an observant
31
international criminal court, and compassionate neighboring nations, the bat-
tle between otes and guns may at least become a air Fght.
Endnotes
1 Martin Meredith, Our Votes, our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe. (New York:
Public Affairs, 2008).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Mugabe says Zimbabwe Power sharing has short life; signals new elections, CNN News,
December 12, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/12/12/zimbabwe.
mugabe.elections/index.html (accessed February 18, 2010).
5 Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, Zimbabwes Long Agony, Journal of Democracy
19:4 (2008): 41-55.
6 Ibid., 52.
7 Paul Salopek, Absence of Street Fury in Zimbabwe Puzzles Analysts, Chicago Tribune,
May 1, 2008.
8 Mugabe loses Zimbabwe referendum, CBC News, November 11, 2000, http://cbc.ca/
world/story/2000/02/15/zimbabwe000215.html (accessed December 8, 2008).
9 Larry Diamond. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002): 32.
10 Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, Popular Reactions to State Repression:
Operation Murabatsvina in Zimbabwe, Afrobarometer Working Paper no. 59, April
2006, http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfropaperNo59.pdf (accessed March 21,
2010).
11 Election halted in Zimbabwe, BBC News, March 11, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/1865829.stm (accessed February 18, 2010).
12 Straw condemns Zimbabwe elections, BBC News, April 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4412763.stm (accessed February 18, 2010).
13 Innation hits 355,000 percent,` Zimbabwe Independent, May 15, 2008, http://www.
zimbabwesituation.com/may17_2008.html#Z1 (accessed February 18, 2010).
14 Jon Lee Anderson, The Destroyer, New Yorker, October 27, 2008.
15 Sarah Childress, People Power: In Africa, Democracy Gains Amid Turmoil, Wall Street
Journal, June 18, 2008.
16 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, ZESN poll projections on March 29 presidential
elections, March 31, 2008, http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/ 080331zesn.
asp?sector=CACT&year=0&range_start=181 (accessed December 8, 2008).
17 Sarah Childress, People Power.
elections.
elections.
Daniel B. Kobayashi
32
22 Amnesty International, International Secretariat. Zimbabwe: Time for Accountability, (2008).
23 An Election with Only One Candidate; Zimbabwe, The Economist, June 28, 2008.
24 Human Rights Watch, A Call to Action: The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 2008, http://www.hrw.
org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0807 (accessed December 8, 2008).
25 Zimbabwe Deal: Key points, BBC News, September 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/7617731.stm (accessed December 8, 2008).
26 Mbeki and MDCs Explosive Exchange, The Star, November 2, 2008, http://www.iol.
co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=84&art_id=vn20081128052242195C12
9532 (accessed December 8, 2008).
27 Zimbabwe cabinet sworn in, Al-Jazeera, February 13, 2008, http://english.aljazeera. net/
news/africa/2009/02/2009213151548944420.html (accessed February 18, 2010).
28 Mugabe says Zimbabwe Power sharing has short life. CNN News
29 Sonja Pace, US says well past time for Zimbabwes Mugabe to step down, Voice of
America News, December 6, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-12-05-voa30.
cfm (accessed December 8, 2008).
30 ZANU-PF Campaign Pamphlet, 100 Reasons to Vote for Cme. Robert Mugabe, (2008).
31 Jon Lee Anderson, The Destroyer.
32 International Crisis Group, Negotiating Zimbabwe`s 1ransition, Arica BrieFng No.
51, May 21, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5446 (accessed
December 8, 2008).
33 Mandela condemns Mugabe failure, BBC News, June 25, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7474561.stm (accessed December 8, 2008).
34 Go Mugabe or face arrest - Tutu, BBC News, December 5, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7766657.stm (accessed December 8, 2008).
35 Foster Dongozi, Kenyan Premier Pessimistic about Outcome of Zimbabwes Power-
Sharing Talks, The Standard, November 30, 2008.
36 Brown, Zuma unite on Zimbabwe, The Age, April 24, 2008, http://www.theage.com.
au/news/world/brown-zuma-unite-on-zimbabwe/2008/04/24/1208743150768.html
(accessed December 8, 2008).
37 Robert Wood, Statement on the Zimbabwe unity government, February 3, 2009, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/02/115909.htm (accessed February 18, 2010).
38 Amnesty International, International Secretariat.
39 Human Rights Watch Press Release, SADC: Take Action to End Zimbabwe Rights
Crisis, August 13, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/08/13/sadc-take-action-
end-zimbabwe-rights-crisis (accessed December 8, 2008).
40 Paul Salopek, Absence of Street Fury in Zimbabwe Puzzles Analysts.
41 Bayano Valy, Zimbabwe: Look East Policy Pays Dividends President, The Herald,
March 27, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200803270243.html (accessed November 2,
2008).
33
42 James D. McGee, Special BrieFng on Zimbabwe`s Current State, 2008, http:,,www.state.
gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2008/112126.htm.12/8/2008 (accessed December 8, 2008).
43 US Treasury Freezes Assets of Four Mugabe Insiders, Associated Press, November 25,
2008, http://www.sefermpost.com/sefermpost/2008/11/us-treasury-freezes-assets-of-
four-mugabe-insiders.html (accessed March 20, 2010).
44 Zimbabwe PM Tsvangirais MDC says unity talks deadlocked, looks to region, VOA
News, January 22, 2010, http://www1.voanews.com/zimbabwe/news/politics/zuma-
now-expected-to-intervene-in-harare-as-talks-deadlock-82416597.html.
45 World has Right to Intervene in Zimbabwe Tutu, Reuters, November 27, 2008.
46 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 1982.
47 Godfrey Ganetsang, Botswana-Zimbabwe relations worsen, Sunday Standard, February 15,
2010, http://sundaystandard.info/news/news_item.php?NewsID=6955&GroupID=1
(accessed February 18, 2010).
48 Margaret Coker, Powerful South African Labor Group Ponders how Hard to Press
Mugabe, The Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2008.
49 Miles Larmer, The Zimbabwe Arms Shipment Campaign, Review of African Political
Economy 35:177 (2008): 491.
50 Zimbabwe PM Tsvangirais MDC says unity talks deadlocked, VOA News.
51 Cosatu threatens Zimbabwe border blockade, New Zimbabwe, December 12, 2009.
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/protest13.11821.html (accessed March 20, 2010).
52 Mozambique tightens screws on Zimbabwe, The Zimbabwe Times, July 23, 2008, http://
www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=1263 (accessed December 8, 2008).
53 Zimbabwe: U.S. says well past time for Mugabe to leave, Die Welt Online, December
5, 2008, http://www.welt.de/english-news/article2832757/U-S-says-well-past-time-for-
Mugabe-to-leave.html (accessed December 8, 2008).
54 Breakthrough as ZCTU, RBZ agree, Zim Diaspora, 2008, http://www.zimdiaspora.
com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=350:breakthrough-as-zctu-rbz-
agree&catid=67:art&Itemid=289 (accessed December 8, 2008).
55 James Parks, Zimbabwe Continues Arrests, Assaults Against Union Members, AFL-CIO
Now Blog, December 5, 2008, http:,,blog.ancio.org,2008,12,05,zimbabwe-continues-
arrests-assaults-against-union-members (accessed December 8, 2008).
56 Godfrey Olukya, Uganda willing to arrest al-Bashir for war crimes. Associated Press,
July 13, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009461953_
apafugandasudan.html (accessed February 18, 2010).
57 David Charter, Kosovo guerrilla leader Ramush Haradinaj is set free, The Times Online,
April 4, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3678209.
ece (accessed February 18, 2010).
58 Mugabe I Will Not Give Up Power, The Herald, June 16, 2008.
35
ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
An Inquiry into Geoengineering
Aaron Ray
Abstract
Referevce. to geoevgiveerivg, too.et, aefvea a. tbe v.e of aaravcea tecbvotog, to vitigate
or adapt to the effects of climate change, have emerged in the popular press and academic literature.
Corervvevt., ivtervatiovat orgaviatiov., ava tbe .cievtifc covvvvit, are begivvivg to regara geo-
engineering seriously as a tool against global climate change. This paper examines the ways in which
geoevgiveerivg ba. beev aefvea, eratvate. a vvvber of teaaivg roo.at., cov.iaer. .ove .cievtifc
critiques of geoengineering, and highlights some of the ethical, philosophical, and political implica-
tions of these proposals.
Introduction
H
uman alteration of the environment is not new. Although human
transformation of the natural environment predates the Industrial
Revolution, the potential of human behavior to alter the climate on
a global scale has accelerated with the development of industrial civilization.
1

Within the debate about the veracity and implications of climate change and
the costs and beneFts o potential responses, a new line o argument has
gained prominence. Journalist Graeme Wood articulated the potential of geo-
engineering: What is new is the idea that we might want to deform the Earth
intentionally, as a way to engineer the planet either back into its pre -industrial
state, or into some improved third state.
2
An examination of the implications
of these proposals is necessary.
Aaron Ray is studying Environmental and Regulatory Policy at the Georgetown Public Policy
Institute. He earned a Master of Arts in Secondary Education from the University of New
Meico ava a acbetor of .rt. iv Pbito.ob,, Potiticat cievce ava Retigiov frov ivfeta Cottege.
He taught Philosophy at Dine College, the tribally-controlled college of the Navajo Nation. He
also taught history, government, and economics at Crownpoint High School in New Mexico and
the Csar Chvez Schools for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. His interests include sustainable
development, land and resource management, and the ethics and philosophy of public affairs.
Aaron Ray
36
Dening Geoengineering
Before evaluating various geoengineering proposals, it is essential to es-
tablish an understanding of what is meant by geoengineering. Writing more
than a decade ago, Thomas Schelling observed that geoengineering was such
a new concept that it was lacking a deFnition.
3
le deFned geoengineering as
having three characteristics: global, intentional, and unnatural.
4
This means
that human activities such as building dams and clearing land for agricultural
use, while having potentially profound local or regional impacts on humans
and the environment, should not be considered geoengineering because they
are not global in impact. The second requirement, intentionality, limits what is
included as geoengineering by excluding the burning of fossil fuels and other
activities whose effects are not intended to alter the natural global environ-
ment.
5
David Keith, director of the Energy and Environmental Systems group
at the University of Calgary, agrees, that because it is not intentional, pollution
itself does not constitute geoengineering.
6
1he Fnal requirement that an acti-
ity must meet to be labeled geoengineering is that it must be unnatural. For
instance, adding metallic renectors to the atmosphere, as some suggest, is an
unnatural act and therefore a form of geoengineering.
lor the purposes o this paper, I will use Schelling`s primary deFnition
of geoengineering as something global, intentional, and unnatural.
Evaluating Geoengineering Proposals
Geoengineering proposals can be divided into two major classes: those
that manipulate the amount of carbon in the atmosphere and those that ma-
nipulate insolation, the amount of solar radiation reaching the earth. Proposals
in both classes merit ealuation under Schelling`s deFnition.
Manipulating Carbon
Carbon capture and sequestration has become part of the mainstream
conversation about mitigating climate change. This technique involves captur-
ing carbon dioxide (CO
2
) at the point of combustion and preventing it from
entering the atmosphere, possibly by injecting it into underground geologic
formations. A related proposal is to directly remove CO
2
from the air via car-
bon scrubbers. Such a proposal differs from traditional carbon capture and
sequestration because it captures CO
2
out of the ambient air, not at the point
of combustion.
7
Schelling has expressed support for research into carbon cap-
ture and sequestration, Fnding that, despite its high costs, this technique could
prove valuable to mitigating the negative effects of climate change. He further
stated that carbon capture probably has no adverse effects, [and] will prob-
ably not scare anybody or provoke religious objections. If it works it may be
exceptionally valuable.
8
Physicist Freeman Dyson of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princ-
37
eton has suggests that one way to remove CO
2
from the atmosphere is to plant
ast growing trees on large amounts o marginal land. le qualiFes his proposal
as a temporary way to reduce CO
2
levels, explaining that planting trees will
simply buy time for scientists and policymakers to create a more permanent
solution to shift from fossil to renewable fuels.
9

Another method of manipulating CO
2
levels is ocean fertilization,
which involves the application of iron particles or other substances to the
oceans surface to encourage phytoplankton growth. During their growth cy-
cle, the phytoplankton capture atmospheric CO
2
. When they die, these phyto-
plankton then carry that CO
2
to the ocean noor. 1his proposal could increase
the absorption of carbon by the ocean.
10
Ocean fertilization is already being
tested and commercialized. In addition to a research expedition Bruce Frost
describes in Nature, Kirsten Jerch reports in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
that two technology companies in California are planning to perform ocean
iron fertilization to sell as carbon offsets.
11, 12
Alternately, an Australian compa-
ny, Ocean Nourishment Corporation, is planning to use nitrogen rather than
iron to increase phytoplankton photosynthesis.
13
Manipulating Insolation
The second class of proposals involves manipulating insolation, which
is the amount of solar radiation reaching the earth. Schelling encourages us to
consider that, i climate change is deFned as radiation balance, people may
think the problem is not just too much CO
2
but also too little sulfur aero-
sols, too little renectie cloud coer, too little albedo.`
14
1hus deFned, climate
change could be Fxed,` not only by reducing the amount o CO
2
released
into or present in the atmosphere, but also by reducing the amount of solar
radiation reaching lower levels of the atmosphere.
15
Two potential methods
for manipulating insolation include aerosol injection and the use of solar re-
nectors.
16
The idea for manipulating insolation derives from natural environmen-
tal mechanisms. For example, the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the
Philippines resulted in a reduction in global temperatures by half a degree
Celsius in subsequent years.
17
In theory, it is possible to mimic this effect by
releasing particles into the atmosphere that would renect solar radiation back
into space rather than allowing it to warm the planet. Tom Wigley of the
National Center for Atmospheric Research claims that adding aerosols to the
stratosphere, similar to the Mount Pinatubo eruption, will likely present only
minimal climate risks.
18
Aerosol injection is not the only strategy for reducing incoming so-
lar radiation. An array of mirrors or solar shades could be placed into orbit
around the earth to renect solar radiation back into space. Ldward 1eller o
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory reviewed a variety of methods
Aaron Ray
38
or reducing insolation, including sulur molecules and metallic renectors. le
concluded that modulating insolation is technically feasible and cost effec-
tive.
19
Soviet planners have also considered this proposal and found it to have
the advantage of being adjustable. If mirrors could be controlled, the amount
o radiation could be adjusted oer time and een directed toward speciFc
regions.
20
This element of control might then be used to modulate the differ-
ential effects of reduced insolation on disparate regions.
1able 1 ealuates the preceding proposals using Schelling`s deFnition
of geoengineering as global, intentional, and unnatural.
Table 1: Evaluating Geoengineering (GE) Proposals
21 (a-f)
Climate Control
Strategy
Item
Manipulated
Mechanism Geoengineering?
Carbon capture/
sequestration
at point of
combustion
a

CO
2
levels
Limits emission
of CO
2
NO: Local
Carbon capture/
sequestration from
ambient air
b
CO
2
levels
Reduces
atmospheric
CO
2

concentration
NO: Local
Reforestation with
plants to capture
high levels of CO
2
c
CO
2
levels
Reduces
atmospheric
CO
2

concentration
NO: Natural
Ocean Fertilization
d
CO
2
levels
Reduces
atmospheric
CO
2

concentration
YES: Unnatural
Aerosol Injection
e
Solar radiation
Increase albedo
,solar renection,
YES: Unnatural
Solar shades
f
Solar radiation
Increase albedo
,solar renection,
YES: Unnatural
39
Scientic Critiques of Geoengineering
Geoengineerings skeptics warn of the dangers of these proposals.
These skeptics have two main concerns. First, critics warn that we cannot
foresee geoengineerings consequences and therefore should not risk the unin-
tended negative outcomes. Second, critics argue that there are known negative
consequences of implementing geoengineering proposals.
Unintended Consequences
A primary critique of geoengineering is that it carries the risk of seri-
ous unintended consequences. Jeff Kiehl, senior scientist at the National Cen-
ter for Atmospheric Research, writes, a basic assumption to this approach is
that we, humans, understand the Larth system suFciently to modiy it and
know how the system will respond.
22
The complex nature of the environ-
mental systems being altered makes them diFcult to eectiely manage, een
without considering possible human mistakes that could occur.
23
Robock goes
on to question the ability of scientists to model and evaluate the potential im-
pacts of geoengineering proposals. He warns that scientists cannot understand
the complex interactions or predict the impacts of geoengineering proposals.
24

An editorial in cievtifc .vericav acknowledges that aerosol injection was the
best-studied proposal,` but also identiFed the signiFcant expected dangers o
this method. These included that: sulfates would slow or reverse the recovery
of the ozone layer; they might also reduce global rainfall, and the rain that did
fall would be more acidic, in addition to other potential unforeseeable risks.
25

Fears over unintended consequences of geoengineering are also being raised
for proposals aimed at reducing incoming solar radiation.
26
Despite these concerns, some scientists argue that the risk of unin-
tended consequences must be evaluated relative to the risks of doing nothing.
Michael MacCracken, chief scientist at the Climate Institute, insists that geo-
engineering is far less risky than proceeding ahead to a 4-6 C global warming
as we seem to be likely to experience if negotiations keep going as they are.
27
In short, any consideration of geoengineering proposals must occur within a
wider context that includes the potential costs and beneFts o multiple alterna-
tives.
Known Risks
The known risks of geoengineering are numerous, according to its
critics. For example, the Pinatubo eruption played an important role in the
record decline in land precipitation and discharge, and the associated drought
conditions in 1992.
28
Hydrological effects and reduced precipitation are not
the only risks. According to Alan Robock, aerosol particles in the stratosphere
serve as surfaces for chemical reactions that destroy ozone; and therefore,
adding aerosol to the atmosphere could exacerbate the ozone depletion caused
Aaron Ray
40
by the release o chloronuorocarbons.
29
Concerns about the risks of geoengi-
neering led the American Geophysical Union to release a position statement
on geoengineering that recommends caution because any manipulation of the
Earths environment could result in unpredictable and potentially damaging
outcomes.
30
Critics also worry that a single-minded focus on temperature obscures
other negative environmental effects of fossil fuel combustion. Climate change
is only one environmental consequence of current patterns of energy produc-
tion and consumption. For example, the ocean is currently 30 percent more
acidic than it was beore the Industrial Reolution.` I this acidiFcation con-
tinues, it will endanger the entire oceanic biological chain, from coral reefs to
humans.
31
Supporters for emissions reductions instead of geoengineering con-
clude that changing production and consumption choices can address many
environmental challenges, while geoengineering proposals are limited solely to
manipulating temperature.
Ethical and Philosophical Dimensions of Implementing Geoengineer-
ing Solutions
In addition to the scientiFc and political questions surrounding geo-
engineering, there are ethical and philosophical issues that require some con-
templation to inform decisions about whether and how to utilize technology
to alter the environment globally. In this section I explore concerns about
distributive and procedural justice, human attitudes toward technology, and
the relationship between humans and nature. Each of these issues has impacts
on the implementation of geoengineering as policy.
Ethical Considerations
One ethical dimension of this debate is the asymmetrical impact of
climate change and geoengineering on nations and individuals. Martin Bunzl,
a climate change policy expert at Rutgers University, notes that like climate
change itself, geoengineering projects could cause shifts in climate that would
be distributed unevenly across the globe. He warns roughly 10% of the
Worlds population might be worse off even if the other 90% was better off.
32

This asymmetry raises questions of both distributive and procedural justice.
1he distributie question concerns who should bear the costs and beneFts
of geoengineering. Addressing this question requires a procedural mechanism
through which the nations o the world can decide how to apportion beneFts
and harms. However, at the moment, we lack a credible means of deciding
global questions of distributive justice. Dean suggests that scientists and en-
gineers may be able to predict some of the consequences of geoengineering
proposals, but do not have the authority to decide whether those risks are
acceptable.
33
Identiying who does hae this authority is exceedingly diFcult.
41
Dean thus concludes that it would be better to preempt these problems by
reducing emissions caused by heat-trapping gasses and thereby avoid having
to utilize geoengineering techniques.
34
While that may indeed be the best ap-
proach, it has thus far proved to be all but politically infeasible at the pace and
scale that may be necessary. The lack of a binding international agreement to
reduce GHG emissions calls into question the willingness or ability of national
governments to achieve the reductions Dean proposes.
Philosophical Considerations
One of the philosophical elements of the debate over geoengineering
is the way in which the debate reveals human attitudes toward technology. The
editors of cievtifc .vericav frame the issue as one of a fundamental belief in
the promise of technology: If technology got us into this mess, maybe tech-
nology can get us out of it.
35
This argument posits that GHG emissions are
the consequence of a progression of technological developments involving
the utilization of the energy stored in fossil fuels to drive economic develop-
ment and improvements in standards of living. Surely, continued technological
advancement can allow for continued economic development even while miti-
gating the negative consequences of growth. Keith suggests geoengineering
implies a counterailing measure or a technical Fx`, an expedient solution that
uses additional technology to counteract unwanted effects without eliminating
their root cause.
36
The view that continued technological advancement will allow for un-
checked energy consumption is found not only among proponents of geo-
engineering, but also among those who favor the use of renewable energy
technologies that permit continued energy consumption with fewer known en-
vironmental costs. The hope is that the right technology can enable us to con-
tinue to consume in our current fashionor even increase aggregate energy
consumption as developing nations modernizewithout incurring the nega-
tive environmental consequences of the past. A similar argument was made
at the dawn of the nuclear age. Looking back on his attitude toward nuclear
energy, Alvin Weinberg, former head of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
recalled that ...you had uranium in the rocks, in principle, an inexhaustible
source of energyenough to keep you going for hundreds of millions of
years. I got very, very excited about that, because here was an embodiment of a
way to save mankind.
37
Nuclear energy turned out to have monetary costs and
concerns about safety and waste that have since tarnished its promise. That
nuclear energy does not provide clean and free energy might be a warning to
those who believe that any technological innovation can deliver humans from
the fundamental economic condition of scarcity.
\e oten Fnd hope in the promise o technological innoation to re-
lease us from the limits of scarcity or mitigate the effects of previous techno-
Aaron Ray
42
logical developments. Reliance on this transformational power of technology
may have much in common with systems of religious belief. Writer David
Noble argues that technological development is a religious endeavor involving
the merging of technology and faith.
38
Noble summarizes the historical arc of
faith in technology from steam power to geoengineering with this observation:
We demand deliverance. This is apparent in our virtual obsession with tech-
nological development, in our extravagant anticipations of every new technical
advance however much each fails to deliver on its promise.
39
It may be that
geoengineering represents only the latest technological development that we
have adopted due to faith in its promise, without a guarantee to deliver.
A Fnal philosophical implication o geoengineering relates to the re-
lationship between humans and the planet we inhabit. Keith debates one of
the undamental questions o philosophy: should we maximize the beneFts
to mankind by exploiting all the tools at our disposal or should we preserve
nature by minimizing our interference with it?
40
1he Frst position is one o
actie management, the drie to extract the most utility rom a set o Fnite re-
sources. The second position is that of minimal impact, to use as few of those
resources as necessary to satisfy our basic needs.
The promise of technological development is integral to the active
management position, that we can use technological innovations to extract
more utility rom the Fnite resources aailable to us while minimizing the en-
vironmental costs. Geoengineering proposals clearly tend toward the active
management position. We have tools to manipulate the environment so as to
maintain or create the optimal conditions for human growth and development.
Active management is a fundamentally human-centric proposition: the value
of any natural resource stems from its capacity to provide for human welfare.
Keith addresses this point by asking: Is human welfare the sole consider-
ation, or do we have a duty to protect natural systems independent of their
utility to us?
41
It is not at all clear whether in fact we have such a duty or, even
from where such a duty might emanate.
Some of the opposition to both continued GHG emissions and geo-
engineering proposals is rooted in the minimal impact position. This view ar-
gues not for new technology that allows for continued energy consumption,
but rather for changes in behavior to reduce consumption. Burning fossil fuels
alters the natural state of the planet, as do aerosol injection and ocean fertiliza-
tion. Schelling`s inclusion o the dimension o naturalness in his deFnition o
geoengineering comes into play here. Opponents of geoengineering see active
management as inherently unnatural. Lest the critics of geoengineering get
too comfortable, Keith reminds us that the Earth is already so transformed
by human actions that it is, in effect, a human artifact.
42
How can one distin-
guish now between what is natural and unnatural? This challenge rises often in
relation to environmental issues, including questions of habitat management
43
and invasive species. We are unlikely to come to a resolution regarding this is-
sue, but being aware of the question serves to inform this and other debates
involving human choices that impact the environment.
Political Implications of Geoengineering
There are important political questions that arise when considering
whether and how geoengineering proposals should be implemented. First,
from where does the authority to experiment with or implement geoengineer-
ing proposals emanate? Second, what is the relationship between geoengineer-
ing projects and emissions reduction efforts? Third, what are the costs of geo-
engineering proposals relative to emissions reduction? And fourth, how and
by whom would the application of geoengineering technology be controlled?
I will examine each of these questions in the hope of identifying the political
implications of developing this capability.
Authority to Experiment and/or Implement
One of the questions raised by the prospect of geoengineering is that
of authority: Who has the authority to manipulate the climate and from where
is that authority derived? Current international negotiations leave control for
regulating emissions with individual nations. As a result, no international body
currently exists that has the authority to govern and control geoengineering.
43

loweer, since geoengineering is, by deFnition, global in impact, it does not
Ft in the present nation-centric ramework. Schelling argues it is essential to
identify or create an authority to approve the experimentation needed to ex-
plore the potential consequences o these proposals. le Fnds the creation o
this body to be even more important than actually conducting geoengineer-
ing experiments, because having an international body is critical for establish-
ing parameters by which any future geoengineering program be judged and
implemented.
44
Whether or not one supports continued research into geo-
engineering projects, there is a clear need for some authorizing body to be
responsible for regulating both experimentation and possible implementation.
Keith concurs with the other experts in seeing the need for an international
body to provide a forum for democratic debate on the potential global impacts
of geoengineering projects.
45
Implicit in Keiths analysis is the view that, for
decisions that have global consequences, there should be a global, democratic
process of adjudication.
Geoengineering and Emissions Reductions
The second political element at issue is the relationship between geo-
engineering projects and emissions reductions efforts. One of the primary
arguments for geoengineering is its simplicity relative to the political complex-
ity of negotiating and enforcing GHG emissions reductions. Schelling writes
Aaron Ray
44
that pursuing geoengineering has the potential to transform GHG policy from
its current complicated state, replete with regulations, to a simpler approach
based on balancing costs among nations.
46
Because geoengineering schemes
do not require nations to reduce emissions or economic output, they would
allow the debate to focus only on how to pay for the technology. This process
may be urther simpliFed i the proposals turn out to be as cost eectie as
their proponents suggest.
Schelling argues that one of the virtues of geoengineering is its ability to
mitigate climate change while not depending on the behavior of populations,
not requiring national regulations or incentives, [and] not [being] dependent on
universal participation.
47
This is in contrast to reducing CO
2
emissions, which
involves a decentralized regulatory approach that requires changing behavior
in many realms, including personal energy consumption, transportation, and
energy production. He also suggests that emissions reduction depends upon
the implementation of policies that governments are incapable of due to a
lack of expertise, resources, or political will.
48
Geoengineering would alleviate
the need for national governments to undertake the interventions necessary to
achieve emissions reductions.
1eller agrees that, despite concerns about Fnding an acceptable means
of authorizing their use, geoengineering proposals present a much simpler so-
lution to the threat of global warming than the current practice of developing
international consensus on how to quickly and dramatically reduce usage of
fossil fuels.
49
Given the lack of progress thus far toward a binding international
agreement to cut emissions, and the diFculty o adopting national programs
that change personal behavior, a simple solution is attractive.
However, the ease of implementation of geoengineering projects
presents a concern with regard to the relationship between geoengineering and
emissions reductions. Critics of geoengineering have argued that just having
geoengineering as an option could weaken the commitment to limit emissions
in time to avert the most serious warming. Kerr reminds us that, if serious
efforts to cut back greenhouse gas emissions were failing, a stopgap approach
would become more attractive.
50
If emissions reductions fail to materialize,
the prospect of having an alternative method to prevent the worst effects of
climate change seems prudent. Yet, geoengineering represents exactly the type
o stopgap measure that would likely denate political will to change interna-
tional consumption patterns or make the energy infrastructure more sustain-
able.
51

Schelling advocates for further research to determine the feasibility
and effectiveness of geoengineering proposals. At the same time, he acknowl-
edges the risk of undermining mitigation efforts when he warns that geoen-
gineering proposals may be so attractive that they steal the focus away from
emissions reductions, and that this change in focus could have serious negative
45
repercussions.
52
It is this prospect that critics of geoengineering are concerned
about when they warn of the harmful environmental consequences of con-
tinuing GHG emissions that could occur even if geoengineering projects con-
trol global temperature change. MacCracken also supports research into geo-
engineering proposals, but cautions scientists and policymakers to never view
geoengineering as a replacement for actual efforts to mitigate the negative
impacts of climate change, particularly because no nation has the appropriate
information to change its entire focus to implementation of geoengineering
proposals.
53
Relative Cost of Geoengineering and Emissions Reduction
Schelling contends that one advantage of geoengineering projects is
that unlike mitigation, they only require us to decide what to do and how to
pay for it.
54
In fact, low cost is one positive aspect of geoengineering often
cited by its proponents. 1eller, in sureying solar renection enhancement pro-
posals, Fnds that the total cost would probably be no more than >1 billion per
yearan expenditure that is two orders of magnitude smaller in economic
terms than those underlying currently proposed limitations on ossil-Fred en-
ergy production.
55
This can be compared to the Stern Reviews conserva-
tive approximation of the costs of mitigation, which was estimated at 1% of
global GDP.
56
Skeptics, however, do not accept this analysis. Robock argues
that the costs of geoengineering projects are much higher than what the in-
ternational community currently spends on renewable energy.
57
Robock also
criticizes the multibilliondollar subsidies given by the U.S. government to the
coal, oil, gas, and nuclear industries, while providing little support to alterna-
tive energy producers.
58
He implies that if funds planned for geoengineering
were directed toward the development of renewable energy generation tech-
nology, we could reduce emissions and avoid global warming without the risks
of geoengineering.
Schelling suggests that the low cost of geoengineering proposals
means that we can dispense with national and international negotiations al-
together because some geoengineering projects can be performed by exo-
national` programs-programs not conFned to national borders.
59
The idea
is that wealthy individuals, corporations, or foundations have the resources to
implement geoengineering proposals without the need for national or interna-
tional agreement. Wood is more skeptical of the desirability of exo-national
implementation of geoengineering proposals. He suggests that the scariest
thing about geoengineering, as it happens, is also the thing that makes it
such a game changer in the global warming debate: its incredibly cheap.
He is concerned by the number of multibillionaires in the world who could
potentially take immediate action to singlehandedly reverse climate change.
60
Geoengineering projects may in fact be easier and cheaper to implement than
Aaron Ray
46
national and international emissions reductions. But the relative ease of imple-
mentation and the risk of adverse consequences of geoengineering lead to a
greater concern for the need to regulate its use.
Regulating Use of Geoengineering Technology
The development of geoengineering technology means that nations
and international organizations must now consider whether and how to restrict
individuals and nations from implementing unauthorized projects. MacCrack-
en suggests that the international community needs to establish a consensus
on policy. One where individual countries are not allowed to implement solar
management programs without authorization from an international body.
61
Yet
even an international agreement reached through democratic means is unlikely
to produce unanimity. If a decision is made at the national or international
level that geoengineering projects, particularly those with the greatest risk of
adverse consequences, should not be implemented, how can rogue nations,
corporations, or individuals be prevented from going ahead with programs on
their own? One can imagine a low-lying nation facing inundation and frustrat-
ed with the lack of international progress on emissions reductions sponsoring
a program of aerosol injection without international approval.
This scenario introduces the risk of global negative consequences that
stem from the actions of a single individual, corporation, or nation. Wood
argues that governments would need to step in to prevent a rogue entity from
taking independent action, either by enforcing current regulations or develop-
ing new ones.
62
The challenge though, is how to regulate this technology that
is, according to its proponents, so economically and technologically feasible.
Wood foresees some international effort to monopolize the technology and
prevent others from deploying it, through diplomatic and military means
Such a system might resemble the way the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy (IAEA) now regulates nuclear technology.
63

The example of the IAEA may be an unfortunate one, at least from
the perspective of those concerned about the misuse of geoengineering tech-
nology. International attempts by this agency to regulate the spread of nuclear
weapons technology have failed. The nuclear club has grown since its birth
at the end of World War II. International efforts at arms control have been
unable to prevent India, Pakistan, or North Korea from developing nuclear
weapons technology. Wood explains that the challenge faced when attempting
to regulate geoengineering technology may be een more diFcult than that
faced when regulating nuclear technology because it is much easier and cheap-
er to implement many geoengineering proposals than it is to develop nuclear
weapons.
64
Furthermore, one could argue that the global scale of geoengineer-
ing projects means that their potential adverse consequences are potentially
greater than the threat of a single nuclear device.
47
Conclusion
As the debate over whether, how, and how much to reduce GHG
emissions develops, geoengineering proposals are likely to draw increasing
interest due to their technical, political, and economic feasibility. The consid-
eration o these proposals is a necessary part o the scientiFc and political
process regarding global warming. Experimentation into various mechanisms
for manipulating climate may enrich our understanding of the complex inter-
actions driving global climate change. Much more needs to be known about
the potential adverse environmental consequences of these proposals before
they are implemented. The political challenges presented by geoengineering
may outweigh the environmental risks. Some legitimate international means of
authorizing implementation, adjudicating costs and risks, and regulating and
controlling the use of this technology would have to be developed. The most
immediate political risk for those advocating for emissions reductions, is the
possibility that the existence of geoengineering alternatives could reduce the
willingness of nations to agree to binding emissions targets. Finally, exploring
our attitudes toward geoengineering can help elucidate our complicated rela-
tionship with technology and the environment.
Endnotes
1 David Keith, Engineering the Planet. Forthcoming, in Climate Change Science and Policy,
ed. S. Schneider and M. Mastrandrea, (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2009).
2 Graeme Wood, Re-Engineering the Earth, The Atlantic Online, http://www.theatlantic.
com/doc/200907/climate-engineering.
3 Thomas Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of Geoengineering, Climatic Change,
33(1996): 303.
4 Ibid., 303.
5 Ibid., 304.
6 David Keith, 1.
7 David Keith, Minh Ha-Duong, and Joshuah K. Stolaroff, Climate Strategy with CO
2

Capture from the Air, Climatic Change, 74(2005): 17-45.
8 Thomas Schelling, email message to author, November 12, 2009.
9 Freeman J. Dyson, Can We Control the Carbon Dioxide in the Atomsphere?, http://
adamant.typepad.com,seitz,Fles,Dyson_Lnergy_19.pd.
10 Bruce W. Frost, Phytoplankton Bloom on Iron Rations, Nature, 383(1996): 475.
11 Ibid., 475.
12 Kirsten Jerch, Capitalizing on Carbon, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 64(2008): 16.
13 Ibid., 16.
Aaron Ray
48
14 Thomas Schelling, The Economic Diplomacy of Geogengineering, 305.
15 Ibid., 305.
16 Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 64(2008):14-18.
17 Graeme Wood, Re-Engineering the Earth, 2.
18 T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate
Stabilization, Science, 314(2006): 452.
19 Edward Teller, Lowell Wood, and Roderick Hyde, Global Warming and Ice Ages: I.
Prospects for Physics-Based Modulation of Global Change, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (presented at 22nd International Seminar on Planetary Emergencies,
Erice, Italy), 16.
20 Richard A. Kerr, Pollute the Planet for Climates Sake?, Science, 314(2006): 401-403.
21 a Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 64(2008):14-18;
b Graeme Wood, email message to author, November 6, 2009;
c Freeman J. Dyson, Can We Control the Carbon Dioxide in the Atomsphere?,
http:,,adamant.typepad.com,seitz,Fles,Dyson_Lnergy_19.pd,
d T.M.L. Wigley, A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate
Stabilization, Science, 314(2006): 452-474;
e Bruce W. Frost, Phytoplankton Bloom on Iron Rations, Nature, 383(1996): 475;
f Edward Teller, Lowell Wood, and Roderick Hyde, Global Warming and Ice Ages: I.
Prospects for Physics-Based Modulation of Global Change.
22 Jeffrey T. Kiehl, Geoengineering Climate Change: Treating the Symptom Over the
Cause?, Climatic Change, 77(2006): 227.
23 Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, 17.
24 Ibid., 17.
25 Oershadowing DiFculties,` cievtifc .vericav, November 2008, 38.
26 Richard A. Kerr, Pollute the Planet for Climates Sake?, 403.
27 Michael C. MacCracken, email message to author, November 6, 2009.
28 Keven E. Trenberth, and Aiguo Dai,Effects of Mount Pinatubo Volcanic Eruption
on the Hydrological Cycle as an Analog of Geoengineering, Geophysical Research Letters,
34(2007): L15702, doi:10.1029/2007GL030524, 4.
29 Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, 15
30 American Geophysical Union, Position Statement on Geoengineering the Climate
System, http://www.agu.org/sci_pol/positions/geoengineering.shtml.
32 Martin Bunzl, comment on Geoengineering and Equity, Bunzls Blog, comment posted
May 12, 2008, http://ccspp.blogspot.com/2008/05/geoengineering-and-equity.html,
comment posted May 12, 2008.
33 Cornelia Dean, Engineering a Climate Solution, The New York Times, September 1, 2009,
from http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/engineering-a-climate-solution/
34 Ibid.
49
35 Oershadowing DiFculties,` 38.
36 David Keith, 1.
37 Arjun Makhijani and Scott Saleska, The Nuclear Power Deception, Institute for Energy
and Environmental Research, http://www.ieer.org/reports/npd.html.
38 David F. Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New
York: Penguin, 1999), 4.
39 Ibid., 6.
40 David Keith, Minh Ha-Duong, and Joshuah K. Stolaroff, Climate Strategy with CO
2

Capture from the Air, 6.
41 David Keith, 6.
42 Ibid., 7.
45 David Keith, 8.
47 Ibid., 303.
48 Ibid., 306.
Prospects for Physics-Based Modulation of Global Change, 17.
50 Richard A. Kerr, Pollute the Planet for Climates Sake?, 403.
54 Thomas Schelling,The Economic Diplomacy of Geogengineering, 303.
Prospects for Physics-Based Modulation of Global Change, 2-3.
56 Nicholas Stern, 1he Stern Reiew on the Lconomics o Climate Change,` OFce o
Climate Change. http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm, xvi
58 Ibid., 18.
60 Graeme Wood, Re-Engineering the Earth, 4.
62 Graeme Wood, email message to author, November 6, 2009.
63 Graeme Wood, Re-Engineering the Earth, 4-5.
64 Graeme Wood, email message to author, November 6, 2009.
51
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are more likely than other teacher candidates to enter and remain in the classroom. Access to a profes-
.iovat vevtor i. a..ociatea ritb targe ava .igvifcavt reavctiov. iv attritiov ri./ for ettor.. actor.
such as teaching in a high needs school and teaching in districts geographically proximate to Fellows
bove ai.trict. rere at.o a..ociatea ritb a .vatter, bvt .igvifcavt, aecrea.e iv attritiov ri./. 1be.e
re.vtt. .vgge.t vevtorivg ava otber iv.trvctiovat .vort., a. rett a. attevtiov to tacevevt iv fr.t
teaching positions, are critical to improving retention of Fellowsparticularly in high-needs schools.
Introduction
P
ublic schools in every state, including North Carolina, struggle with
problems of inadequate teacher supply. North Carolina needs more
than 10,000 new teachers each year due to enrollment growth, class size
reduction initiatives, retirements, and high teacher attrition rates.
1
Attrition is a
particular problem for novice teachers. Sixty percent of all teacher candidates
choose not to enter the classroom at all after completing their professional
training.
2
By the Fth year o teaching, about hal o noice teachers hae let
the profession.
3
Shortages o well-qualiFed teachers could put school quality
at risk and push schools afoul of federal and state requirements to place prop-
erly credentialed and effective teachers in every classroom. If most leavers
depart from high-needs schools with large concentrations of economically
disadvantaged or minority students, attrition might also contribute to educa-
RESPONDING TO TEACHER ATTRITION
An Analysis of Risk Factors in the North Carolina Teaching
Fellows Program
Alesha Daughtrey
Alesha Daughtrey received her Master of Public Policy in 2009 from the Sanford School of Public
Policy, Duke University and her Bachelors degree in English (with secondary teaching licensure)
from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in 1997. Daughtrey currently leads research
ivitiatire. at tbe Cevter for 1eacbivg Qvatit,, a vatiovat vovroft focv.ea ov otic,, re.earcb, ava
teacher leadership to improve student learning and advance the teaching profession.
Alesha Daughtrey
52
tional inequities within districts. 1his study is a Frst attempt to quantiy attri-
tion rates for participants in the North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program
and to identify risk factors for attrition.
Background
The North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program (NCTFP) was estab-
lished by the states General Assembly in 1986 to recruit talented high school
students into the teaching profession and provide them with intensive prepa-
ration for school-based leadership and success in the classroom. In exchange,
Fellows must repay their scholarships with four years of full-time teaching
service in the North Carolina public schools. This arrangement is designed to
provide the state with a more stable and well-prepared supply of public school
teachers. The NCTFP, then, could be an effective response to teacher supply
challengesif Fellows are more resistant to attrition risks than other novice
teachers.
The problem of teacher attrition and turnover
Schools` struggles to Fnd well-qualiFed teachers hae popularly been
described as a teacher shortage,` but this phrase renects an inaccurate depic-
tion o the staFng problems experienced by public schools. In act, prepara-
tion programs nationwide train more than enough teachers annually to Fll cur-
rent positions. 1hrough the 1980s and 1990s, traditional certiFcation programs
multiplied, with an accompanying jump of about 50 percent in the number of
teachers trained.
4
As of 2000, there were six million trained teachers in the
United States-about double the number needed to Fll positions nationwide.
5

The teacher shortage problem, then, is based not just on the low numbers of
teachers prepared to enter classrooms, but in large part on the high number of
teachers leaving them. North Carolinas teacher attrition rate has averaged 12.8
percent over recent years.
6
Although this rate is well below the national rate
of 16.8 percent,
7
it is still problematic for a state in one of the fastest-growing
parts of the country.
Highest attrition rates in early and late career teachers
Changes in teacher labor markets have contributed to the teacher
shortage. Well-educated women and minorities once had few employment op-
portunities aside from teaching. However, as more prestigious and high-paying
careers have opened to these groups, many of these teachers have opted away
from the profession.
8

Typically, teacher attrition patterns follow a U-shaped distribution,
with most departures coming either early or late in teachers careers.
9
Almost
a quarter of North Carolinas public school teachers have 20 or more years of
experience, presaging a teacher bust as these individuals reach eligibility for
53
retirement.
10
Yet retirements are still outpaced by all other reasons for leaving
the proession by Fe to one.
11
Indeed, attrition is most common for early
career teachers.
12, 13, 14
Finding ways to retain the best-prepared and most effec-
tive novices could be a critical component of solving the challenges of teacher
supply, especially in high-needs schools and districts or hard-to-staff positions.
Causes of attrition among novice teachers
Reducing high novice attrition rates may be one means of assuring a
greater supply of well-prepared teachers in high-needs schools, but doing so
requires an understanding of why novices leave. Several studies in other states
have indicated that in general, teachers prefer to teach in schools with fewer
high-needs students (i.e., students who are low-performing, have special needs,
or are low-income or minority).
15, 16
North Carolina does not gather data from
exiting teachers about whether issues related to school composition or other
school-based factors impacted their career decisions. However, novices may
have to wait several years before becoming eligible for a preferred school or
position; or may even be displaced to a less-desirable school by more senior
teachers because transfers among schools and teaching assignments within
schools are commonly granted on the basis of seniority. Some novices, then,
might choose to leave teaching altogether rather than remaining in an espe-
cially diFcult position.
Teacher labor markets also tend to be highly localized, with most
teachers preferring to teach in schools and districts close to where they grew
up.
17
Even when teachers choose to locate farther from home geographically,
the pull of home manifests itself in other ways; they predominantly choose
areas that are similar to the areas in which they grew up.
18
School-level supports may be among the most important factors in
retaining novice teachers. Novices often feel overwhelmed by and underpre-
pared for the demands of real classrooms, especially in high-needs schools.
19

Prior research suggests that high-needs schools exhibit higher transiency and
attrition rates for teachers of all experience levels.
20, 21
Where novices are pro-
vided with access to induction programs or mentors to ease their transition
into the proession, they are ar more likely to remain beyond their Frst year
22

and to generate achievement gains among their students.
23
North Carolina
novices are supposed to receive an Initial Licensure Program (ILP) mentor to
guide them through their Frst three years in the classroom,
24
but since each dis-
trict oversees its own ILP, quality and availability of mentors may vary widely.
National sureys o teachers also show that poor leadership and insuFcient
support from school administrators are central reasons why many teachers
leave their schools.
25, 26, 27
Low teacher salaries are often cited as the cause for departure from the
proession. loweer, poor school conditions and insuFcient teacher support
Alesha Daughtrey
54
seem more important in teachers decisions to leave high-needs schools than
their compensation.
28
Even so, teacher pay in North Carolina remains about
four percent under the national average and well below that of state employees
in other Felds with equialent experience and education leels, despite recent
modest increases in teacher salary schedules.
29, 30

Financial and educational costs of teacher attrition
Attrition is a particular problem for high-needs schools. These schools
oten hae diFculty attracting qualiFed candidates to begin with, since they
are perceived as having the least support and the most problems with stu-
dent behavior and violence.
31
Once hired, teachers are twice as likely to leave
high-poverty schools as compared to low-poverty schools and equally likely to
leave schools with relatively high proportions of minority students.
32, 33
The
less-experienced teachers, which these schools are typically forced to hire as
replacements, generate lower value-added gains for their students.
34, 35
Thus,
teacher attrition can undercut educational quality, particularly in schools that
most need well-qualiFed, eectie teachers.
Beyond the intangible costs in educational quality and equity, attrition
is also a costly problem rom a Fnancial perspectie. liring and retraining
expenses are estimated at a national total of between $2.6 billion
36
and $7.3
billion
37
annually. Since high-needs schools have more severe attrition prob-
lems, these costs fall disproportionately on the districts that can least afford
them. Given the scope of the problems triggered by attrition in the profession,
minimizing teacher attrition could be a cost-effective way for public schools to
resolve both a human resources and an educational quality challenge.
The role of the North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program
The North Carolina Teaching Fellows Program was primarily designed
to increase the number of well-trained teachers entering the classroom, but
elements of the program also correspond with research-based best practices
for reducing attrition. State-allocated resources provide Fellows with more in-
tensive clinical preparation for the real world of teaching than their peers in
the state`s traditional or alternate-route certiFcation programs. lellows also
receive additional support, mentoring, and professional development through
all four years of undergraduate study.
38
The intensity of Fellows preparation
and the programs emphasis on classroom experience should theoretically ren-
der participants more immune than their peers to the real-world stresses of
novice teaching.
lellows are not guaranteed speciFc teaching placements or assignments
that might further cushion any entry shocks to the demands of the profes-
sion. However, because of the NCTFPs rigorous academic requirements and
selection process, it is considered a prestigious program and its graduates are
55
highly sought-after by districts statewide. Thus, NCTFPs alumni are likely to
be a special group of novices, with a greater deal of control over where and
what they teach than most early-career teachers.
linally, lellows hae a strong Fnancial disincentie to leae prior to
completing a fourth year of teaching, since they must otherwise pay back their
scholarship loan. This factor should provide additional motivation to remain
in the teaching profession, at least for as long as their service payback period
lasts.
Data and methods
Data sources and key variables
The primary data source used was the North Carolina Teaching Fellows
Program master Fle, which proides inormation on lellows` demographic
and personal characteristics, as well as data about their academic prepared-
ness and participation in professional development opportunities. Informa-
tion about the schools and districts in which particular Fellows taught during
their serice payback period comes rom a second NC1lP data Fle on lel-
lows teaching career records. All NCTFP data are based on self-reports given
as part of the students applications to the program, or on written responses to
annual audit surveys of Fellows academic status (during college) and teaching
status (during their payback periods). Data on the test scores and demographic
composition of schools where Fellows either taught or attended, as well as
current statistics on statewide teacher attrition, were publicly available from
various reports produced annually by the North Carolina Department of Pub-
lic Instruction.
Methods
Non-licensure rates for each cohort (1987-2004) were calculated and
compared to test for variation over time in the NCTFPs success in fully pre-
paring Fellows to enter the classroom. In order to focus attrition analyses on
only those Fellows who completed their professional preparation for teaching,
attrition was deFned as haing occurred only among lellows who success-
fully completed their undergraduate education, received teaching licensure,
and went on to completefully or partiallya teaching service or monetary
payback to the NCTFP. Thus, Fellows who failed to complete all program or
degree requirements while in college, who were deceased before completing
their payback periods, or for whom full personal, high school or college data
were not available were not included in the analyses. The study also excluded
cohorts graduating after 2000 because they did not have time to complete their
service payback by 2004 (the last year of available data). To avoid any distor-
tions in the program data due to NC1lP start-up issues, the Frst three cohorts
were also dropped. This yielded a smaller sample of 3,440 Fellows, or about 51
Alesha Daughtrey
56
percent of the full sample.
Constructing a life table for a pooled group of all ten cohorts provides
a general picture of the timing of attrition problems within the NCTFP and
controls for any distorting variations in attrition rates among the cohorts. Life
tables are assembled for each cohort separately to indicate any changes or
trends in the timing of attrition that have occurred across cohorts.
To test whether particular personal and school characteristics may be
correlated with attrition, the Cox proportional hazards regression model was
used,
H
j
(t) = h
0
(t) exp (x
j
,
where H
j
(t) is the likelihood that a given Fellow j will terminate her service
payback (H
j
) at time t. This probability is based on the fact that she has not
failed (that is, continued active participation in service payback) up to that
point (h
0
(t)), and on a vector of independent variables x
j
that are likely to af-
fect the Fellows decision to leave. These variables include the proportion of
low-income students in the school in which she teaches; the proportion of mi-
nority students in the school; the schools test scores; her own test scores; her
GPAs in both high school and college; her college or university; her ethnicity;
the socioeconomic status of her own family of origin; and the presence of a
mentor during her initial years in the classroom.
To discover the extent to which known risk factors for novice attri-
tion were associated with actual attrition among Fellows, a series of dummy
variables indicating presence of these factors were added to the dataset. These
included variables for high concentrations of students who exhibited low per-
formance on state standardized tests, who received free or reduced lunch (used
as a proxy for socioeconomic status), or who were non-white minorities. A
dummy variable for proximity to home indicated whether students taught in
their home county or adjoining ones. Finally, to test whether Fellows decisions
to leave the classroom might operate differently over time, a logistic regression
function using the same variables as in the Cox model was also estimated.
Limitations of the data
The lack of school-level and classroom-level information about Fel-
lows teaching experiences does not allow for controls for variation in teaching
experiences within individual schools. The omission of controls for classroom-
level effects may bias estimates, although the direction of this potential bias is
unclear. Data about the quality of ILP mentors assigned is also not available.
Importantly, because of omitted variables, none of the results of the
models can demonstrate a causal relationship between Fellows attrition and
the characteristics of Fellows or the schools in which they teach and learn. Fel-
lows` career decisions, like those o other noice teachers, are innuenced by a
57
number o other ariables omitted in this data ,e.g., nuctuations in the oerall
economy, perceied career opportunities in other Felds, withdrawals rom the
labor force, childbearing, or other changes to family structure). However, as-
sociatie links between attrition and speciFc characteristics o lellows or their
schools can still be useful to the NCTFP and other teacher preparation pro-
grams, in terms of identifying the best leverage points for reducing attrition
among graduates.
Results
Prearivg ettor. to evter tbe cta..roov: ^ovcertifcatiov treva.
Comparison o non-certiFcation rates or the entering lellows co-
horts of 1987 through 2004 show that among 6,704 graduated Fellows, 1,080
of themor 16.1 percentdid not successfully complete their teaching licen-
sure. loweer, about 10 percent o these non-certiFed` lellows ,111 in to-
tal) did go on to complete at least one year of service payback to the NCTFP.
This fact suggests that these Fellows may have entered the classroom without
haing completed all licensure requirements ,such as passing Praxis certiFca-
tion exams) or with licensure applications still pending with the state, and did
become licensed soon thereafter. The timing of licensure for some Fellows
may thereore hae biased these non-certiFcation numbers upward.
Iigure J: NC1IP non-certication rates, by cohort (J987-2004)
Source: Authors tabulation of NCTFP data
Alesha Daughtrey
58
As shown in ligure 1, non-certiFcation rates or lellows hae declined
over time, from a high of nearly 23 percent to just over 13 percent for the
most recently graduated cohort. Each of the past six cohorts has had a non-
certiFcation rate under the mean rate or the program. Since the ery highest
non-certiFcation rates occurred in the early years o the program, it is possible
that start-up issues or the program contributed substantially to non-certiF-
cation rates, proiding urther justiFcation or the exclusion o these cohorts
from the models.
Attrition trends
Life table analysis (see Table 1) illustrates attrition patterns among Fel-
lows over their four years of teaching experience. The point at which Fellows
have graduated, been licensed, and are preparing to enter the classroom is con-
sidered Year 0 in this analysis. Approximately 73 percent of licensed Fellows
complete four years of teaching service payback. While an overall attrition
rate of 27 percent might seem high, it is important to note that the greatest
attrition occurs in Year 0, before Fellows have even entered the classroom.
National estimates of teacher attrition prior to entering the classroom are ap-
proximately 60 percent, with which the NCTFP Year 0 attrition rate of 11.5
percent compares very favorably.
1able J: Life table analysis for overall attrition among Iellows (J990-
2000 pooled cohorts)
Year of
teaching
experience
Number
of Fellows
starting the
year
Proportion
of Fellows
starting the
year
Number of
departing
Fellows
Proportion of
Fellows who
depart
0 3440 1 395 0.115
1 3045 0.885 124 0.041
2 2921 0.849 166 0.057
3 2755 0.801 234 0.085
4 2521 0.733 - -
The average overall attrition rate across cohorts drops considerably, to
16.1 percent, if we consider only those Fellows who leave after having entered
the classroom i.e., only attrition in Years 1 through 3 as the state of North
Carolina does in calculating its attrition rates. (See Figure 2.)
59
Figure 2: NCTFP attrition rates after entrance to the classroom, by
cohort (J987-2000)
Figure 2 also shows some variation in attrition rates across cohorts. A
certain amount of variability can be expected purely as a matter of chance. It
is also important to note that the data for more recent cohorts (1998 and later)
are right-censored due to the structure of the program. Fellows have seven
years after graduation to complete their four years of service payback, so these
recent cohorts are still inside the seven-year window and may complete service
paybacks at a later date. Attrition rates for these cohorts are thus likely to be
biased upward.
Attrition rates among Fellows also vary by the year of teaching experi-
ence, as shown previously in Table 1 and again in Figure 3 below. As previously
discussed, attrition is highest in Year 0, before Fellows entry into teaching,
then drops during Years 1 and 2 before rising again in Year 3. This pattern of
upticks in Year 3 departs from what the literature suggests should be a rela-
tively steady decline in attrition across all years, as the novice Fellows acclimate
to their careers in the classroom and near completion of service paybacks to
discharge their debts to the state.
Alesha Daughtrey
60
Figure 3: NCTFP attrition rates, by year in which departure occurred
(J990-2000 cohorts)
Factors associated with Fellows decisions to leave the classroom
A number of personal and school characteristics are demonstrated to
impact attrition among novice teachers in general. The Cox proportional haz-
ard regression model is used here to test whether and to what degree these fac-
tors may innuence a lellow`s decision to leae the proession. 1able 2 shows
results from the full model. These results are discussed in greater detail below.
Table 2: Change in the hazard ratio of attrition among Fellows
Variable
Coefcient
estimate
Standard
error
Hazard
ratio
Demographic/family variables:
Whether Fellow is female -.084 (.049) .920
Whether Fellow is white (reference
category)
Whether African-American
Whether another ethnic minority
.107
.230
(.378)
(.325)
1.113
1.259
Income level in family of origin (proxy
for Fellows SES)
.016 (.018) 1.016
Mothers education level
Fathers education level
0
.003
(.011)
(.011)
.998
1.003
Whether there is a teacher in the
Fellows family
-.060 (.047) .937
61
Variable
Coefcient
estimate
Standard
error
Hazard
ratio
Achievement variables:
High school class rank
High school GPA
0
-.041
(.002)
(.076)
1.000
.960
SAT composite score 0 (0) 1.000
College GPAs:
1
st
semester
2
nd
semester
Cumulative
.002
.069
-.192*
(.054)
(.055)
(.084)
1.002
1.071
.826
Motivational variables:
Reason for being a teacher
Whether planning to teach before
NCTFP scholarship
Whether had other scholarships
-.003
.057
-.017
(.006)
(.082)
(.043)
.997
1.059
.983
Professional variables:
Whether previously employed
Whether had a mentor
-.004
-3.226**
(.063)
(.136)
.996
.040
Characteristics of school taught in:
Whether a high-poverty school
Whether low-achieving school
Whether a high-minority school
-.082
-.188**
-.313**
(.060)
(.063)
(.053)
.921
.829
.732
Whether school taught in matches the
Fellows high school in terms of:
Concentration of poverty
Mean student achievement level
Concentration of minorities
School proximate to home district
.042
.008
-.001
-.243**
(.048)
(.052)
(.048)
(.048)
1.043
1.008
.732
.785
SigniFcant at the p 0.05 leel, SigniFcant at the p 0.01 leel
Hazard ratios on the far right of Table 2 indicate the extent to which each covariate in the
model affects the risk of attrition. Ratios equal to one indicate a covariate that has no impact
on the risk of attrition, ratios greater than one indicate increased risk, and ratios less than
one indicate decreased attrition risk. For example, reading across the top row of Table 2,
re fva tbat ettor. rbo are fevate are .1 te.. ti/et, tbav vate. to .vffer attritiov iv
av, girev ,ear, a fairt, voae.t ava iv.igvifcavt ercevtage. 1be baara ratio ivaicate. tbat
fevate ettor. bare 2 of tbe attritiov ri./ of tbeir vate covvterart..
Alesha Daughtrey
62
Presence of mentors
The variable exhibiting the highest correlation with Fellows attrition
is whether they were mentored. Fellows who reported having an ILP mentor
assigned to them had 97 percent less risk of attrition than Fellows who did
not receive a mentor. Although substantial effects for mentoring might be ex-
pected in light of prior research on novices generally, this is still a large effect.
The presence of a mentor also appears to be functioning independently of all
other ariables, estimates change in magnitude but not in sign or signiFcance
when the mentor variable is isolated.
Effects of high-needs schools
Contrary to what would be expected from prior research on teacher at-
trition, teaching in high-needs schools appears to be associated with decreased
risk of attrition for Fellows. High concentrations of economically disadvan-
taged students did not signiFcantly impact attrition risk. 1eaching in low-per-
forming schools is associated with a 17 percent decrease in attrition hazard and
teaching in high-minority schools with a 27 percent decrease, both of which
are signiFcant at the p.01 leel.
Preferences for proximity to home or familiar environments
A possible explanation for Fellows resilience in high-needs environ-
ments is that they may have attended similar schools themselves as high school
students. They may therefore have a preference to match characteristics of the
schools in which they teach with those of their hometown schools. However,
controlling for whether Fellows attended high-needs schools themselves did
not signiFcantly aect their rates o attrition.
\hile lellows do not seem to hae a speciFc preerence or matching
characteristics of their teaching environments with those they experienced as
students, they do exhibit a preference for returning to their hometowns. Fel-
lows who taught in the same county where they had attended high school,
or in an adjoining county, showed a 22 percent decrease in attrition hazard.
1his Fnding was robust to controls or returning to the same high school they
had attended as students, and for whether they taught in school environments
similar to that of their own high schools. In this respect, Fellows preferences
or home renect the preerences o noice teachers oerall.
Other factors related to attrition risk
In general, individual and family characteristics of Fellows were not
associated with their attrition hazard. Interestingly, a Fellows own socioeco-
nomic status and race showed no signiFcant correlation with hazard o attri-
tion when teaching in schools with high concentrations of economically dis-
adantaged and minority students. 1his Fnding reinorces the likelihood that
63
Fellows are not matching their preferences for teaching environments with
those of their home high schools, which are likely to serve students of similar
backgrounds as the Fellows.
Prior research suggests that teachers own cognitive abilities or aca-
demic achievements do not correspond with their level of success in the class-
room, except at the secondary level, but there is currently no information on
how these factors might affect their persistence in the profession. Fellows aca-
demic proFles appear not to correlate signiFcantly with any change in hazard
of attrition, except for their cumulative college GPAs. Each .10 point increase
in GPA was associated with a 18 percent decrease in attrition risk, when con-
trolling for Fellows prior academic performance.
Changes in effects over time
Results of logistic models were roughly equivalent to those for the
Cox model presented in Table 2. The few detectable differences in magnitude
were extremely modest and not signiFcant. 1hus, the correlations between the
above factors and Fellows attrition decisions appear not to differ in any mean-
ingful way from year to year over the span of their service payback period.
Discussion
No data are aailable to indicate deFnitiely why so many lellows
would not hae ulFlled the certiFcation requirement o the NC1lP. 1he
most likely explanationapart from issues related to timing of licensureis
that some Fellows realized during their training that the teaching profession
was not a good career Ft or them. It is hard to argue that any teacher prepa-
ration program should seek to place unwilling or under-motivated teachers in
classrooms. Thus, this could be viewed as good attrition that may in fact im-
prove efforts to train and place committed, effective teachers in public school
classrooms.
The patterns of rising and falling attrition rates across cohorts also
suggest Fellows responsiveness to changing economic conditions. Recall that
there is a four-year lag between a cohorts entrance into the NCTFP and its
entry into the workforce. Reduced attrition among Fellows appears to follow
a slightly countercyclical pattern, with more Fellows opting to complete ser-
vice payback when the economy is less robust and the security of a teaching
position is attractive in comparison with other opportunities for recent gradu-
ates. Conversely, in good economic times, Fellows attrition might increase
because they perceie more, and better paid, opportunities in other Felds. 1his
explanation would account for relatively lower attrition among Fellows in the
1990-1991 cohorts, who entered the workforce when the economy was still in
recovery from the recession of the early 1990s, and the relatively higher attri-
tion among cohorts a few years later, graduating in the midst of the technol-
Alesha Daughtrey
64
ogy boom. However, until the most recent cohorts have had time to complete
their serice requirements, it will be diFcult to know whether this pattern is
borne out by the data.
The fact that Fellows attrition risk does not decline in a linear fashion
between Year 0 and Year 4 of service payback appears counterintuitive. One
possible explanation is that the year-by-year accrual of service payback, cou-
pled with the fact that initial teaching licenses must be renewed after the third
year,
39
offers a perverse incentive. If Fellows can pay down the bulk of their
debts through teaching during their initial licensure period, they could then opt
to make a cash payoff of the much-reduced balancewithout going to the
additional trouble of renewing their teaching licenses and with the possibility
o higher earnings in another Feld.
Another reasonable explanation is that starting salaries or Frst-year
teacherscurrently around $30,000are similar to or higher than those of
other Frst-year proessionals. loweer, because teachers` salaries rise more
slowly in the Frst ew years and do not peak until teachers are mid-career, the
marginal Fnancial beneFt or remaining in the proession erodes airly quickly.
The fact that Fellows have higher than average achievement may make them
attractive candidates for entry-level positions outside education, and therefore
more susceptible than other novice teachers to leave the teaching profession
or Fnancial reasons.
It is likely that effects observed for presence of an ILP mentor in these
models are not attributable to mentoring alone. Mentoring programs, though
mandated by the state of North Carolina for novice teachers, are implemented
at the local level. District administrators, and sometimes even school-level ad-
ministrators, are responsible for identifying and training master teachers to
become mentors, matching them with novice teachers and ensuring the suc-
cess o those relationships. 1he quality and eFcacy o mentoring programs
and relationships is therefore highly dependent on a variety of district- and
school-level factors. Districts and schools with strong leadership, an emphasis
on cooperation and collaboration among staff, and experienced teachers who
are eager to assist new colleagues (formally or informally) are more likely to
be able to Fnd appropriate mentor,mentee matches or lellows and other
novices.
Furthermore, the same qualities that foster strong mentoring programs
may also be associated with working conditions that are conducive to retain-
ing novice teachers, even in the absence of any mentoring programs. Thus,
estimates of hazard reduction as a result of access to mentors are probably
overstated. Data on school or district leadership styles, working conditions in
the schools in which Fellows teach, and how well formal and informal profes-
sional supports function are not included in the currently available data, and
thus cannot be controlled or here. Still, gien the signiFcance and magnitude
65
of these effects, it is reasonable to conclude that mentoring relationships are a
highly important factor in the retention of Fellows and other novice teachers.
These results provide evidence in favor of providing all novice teachers with
ready and regular access to mentors of consistent and high quality.
The reversal of usual attrition risk factors for novice Fellows teaching
in high-needs schools is somewhat puzzling. It is possible that Fellows might
have primarily low-needs students in their classrooms, even if they are teach-
ing in schools with predominantly high-needs students. However, at least in
the middle and upper grades, it is common practice to assign more advanced
(and therefore often lower-needs) classes to the most senior teachers. There-
fore Fellows, as novice teachers, are more likely to receive higher proportions
of high-needs students than the average for their schools. This would tend,
if anything, to bias hazard estimates negatively. Actual attrition risk based on
these factors might thus be even lower than indicated here, if we were able to
examine classroom rather than school composition.
It is also possible that Fellows differ from most other teachers and
novices, either in their motivations as teachers or in their preparation for (and
thus satisfaction with) more challenging teaching positions. Because the NCT-
FP requires a commitment to teaching in the public schools, Fellows are well
aware that they are not likely to teach predominantly advantaged students. The
NCTFP emphasizes in-school preparation for Fellows, starting with classroom
obserations and school isits in their Frst year o college, so they are likely to
be better-acclimated than most other novice teachers for the realities of chal-
lenging public school environments. As a result, Fellows may have more peda-
gogical and classroom management tools that are appropriate to high-needs
schools than other novice teachers.
Individuals drawn to the NCTFP may also have a preference for teach-
ing in high-needs schools, hoping to make a difference in the educational out-
comes of the least-advantaged students. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot
be tested with aailable data. Nonetheless, these Fndings suggest that careul
attention to motivations for entering teaching during recruitment of candi-
dates, as well as thorough preparation for teaching in high-needs schools, may
be likely to serve any teacher preparation program well in terms of reducing
attrition among its graduates.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Strengthening support systems for novices: a key to teacher retention
1his study Fnds that the primary actors associated with successully
retaining novice teachers are those related to positive and supportive working
conditions within schools, including the presence of formal mentors. Fellows
relatively low rates of attrition in comparison to other novice teachers also
suggest that the level of additional preparation that Fellows receivewhether
Alesha Daughtrey
66
as part of experiences in schools during their four years of college or in extra
professional development and enrichment programsmay render them more
resilient as they face the pressures of full-time teaching and thereby could
improve their retention. The results presented here are in line with those of
previous studies examining novice teachers, suggesting that policies and prac-
tices that enhance school-level support systems for Fellows and other novices
could substantially reduce attrition in the Frst ew years o their careers.
40,

41

Managing preferences to teach close to home
Like other noices, lellows exhibit a signiFcant preerence or teaching
close to home. Such preferences among teachers may pose challenges for plac-
ing novice teachers in districts with a particularly high demand for new teach-
ers. Targeting Fellows teaching service placements for high-demand districts
may therefore require unique strategies. In particular, program administrators
should consider: 1) advocating for pay incentives to shift Fellows preferences
towards teaching in high-demand districts; 2) intensifying recruitment for the
Fellows program in the districts or geographic areas with the greatest project-
ed demand for new teachers; or 3) ensuring, at a minimum, an even geographic
distribution of students selected for the Fellows program.
Predicting retention for individual Fellows
1his study Fnds that among the numerous characteristics o lellows
and their amilies o origin examined, only one is associated with signiFcant
changes in attrition hazard: cumulative college GPA. Based on prior research
among novice teachers, it seems fair to surmise that GPA is functioning as
an indicator of increased cognitive ability or preparedness in the subject area
(especially at the secondary level), either of which might increase retention
of Fellows. However, no other element of Fellows academic records, in high
school or early in college, is similarly associated with attrition. This suggests
that such characteristics might not prove useful for identifying and targeting
those Fellows most likely to complete teaching service payback.
Conclusion
1he aboe Fndings regarding the importance o mentoring and prox-
imity to home for Fellows are very much in line with what is known about
novice teacher retention generally; any teacher preparation program would be
well served by attending to these concerns. More interesting and unusual is
that lellows seem to be signiFcantly more resilient in high-needs, hard-to-sta
schools than other teachers, particularly early-career teachers. In this regard,
the implications for other preparation programs are less clear. However, re-
search on urban teacher residency (UTR) programs in Boston, Chicago and
elsewhere suggests that their graduates are also more immune to these risk
67
factors for attrition than other novices.
42, 43
These programs share NCTFPs
ties to a speciFc geographic region ,in the case o U1Rs, speciFc metropolitan
areas) and an intensively clinical focus that is paired with one to two years of
high-quality coursework on content, methods, and classroom management. It
seems possible that these elements constitute best practices for preparing not
only high-quality but attrition-resistant teachers. Additional study of these
issues would be helpful to identify which program elements are most impor-
tant to reduce attrition, but these preliminary Fndings proide a promising
avenue for future policies and practices to combat novice attrition.
Endnotes
1 North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, DPI teacher employment, http://
www.ncpublicschools.org/work4ncschools/employment/.
2 American Council on Education (ACE), To Touch the Future: Transforming the Way
Teachers Are Taught, (Washington, DC: ACE, 1999).
3 Barnett Berry and Eric Hirsch, Recruiting and Retaining Teachers for Hard-to-Staff
Schools, (Washington, DC: National Governors Association Center for Best Practices,
2005).
4 C. Emily Feistritzer, The Making of a Teacher, National Center for Alternative
CertiFcation website, http:,,www.teach-now.org,supply.htm.
5 National Governors Association (NGA), Teacher Supply and Demand: Is There a
Shortage? Issue Brief, (Washington, DC: NGA, 2000).
6 North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI), Annual Report on the
Reasons Teachers Leave the Profession, 2007-2008 (Raleigh, NC: NCDPI, 2008).
7 The National Commission on Teaching and Americas Future (NCTAF), Unraveling the
Teacher Shortage Problem: Teacher Retention Is the Key, (Washington, DC: NCTAF,
2002).
8 North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI), North Carolina Public
Schools Statistical ProFle 200,` ,Raleigh, NC: NCDPI, 200,.
9 NCDPI, Annual Report on the Reasons Teachers Leave the Profession, 2007-2008.
10 NCDPI, North Carolina Public Schools Statistical ProFle 200.`
12 American Council on Education (ACE), Tapping the Potential: Retaining and Developing
lighly QualiFed New 1eachers,` ,\ashington, DC: ACL, 2004,.
14 Barnett Berry and Eric Hirsch. Recruiting and Retaining Teachers for Hard-to-Staff
Schools,
15 Benjamin ScaFdi, Daid L. Sjoquist, and 1odd R. Stinebrickner, Race, Poerty, and
Teacher Mobility, Economics of Education Review, 26(2002): 145-159.
Alesha Daughtrey
68
16 Eric A. Hanushek, Joel F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin, Why Public Schools Lose Teachers,
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003).
17 Donald Boyd, et al, The Draw of Home: How Teachers Preferences for Proximity
Disadvantage Urban Schools, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24:1(2005): 113-
132.
18 Benjamin ScaFdi, Daid L. Sjoquist, and 1odd R. Stinebrickner, Race, Poerty, and
Teacher Mobility.
19 Linda Darling-lammond, 1he Challenge o StaFng Our Schools,` Educational Leadership,
58:8(May 2001): 12-17.
20 Hamilton Lankford, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff, Teacher Sorting and the Plight
of Urban Schools: A Descriptive Analysis, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 24.1
(Spring 2002): 37-62.
21 Wake Education Partnership, Striking a Balance: In Support of Diversity in the Wake
County Public School System, (Raleigh, NC: Wake Education Partnership, 2008).
22 Kathleen Fulton, Irene Yoon, and Christine Lee, Induction into Learning Communities,
(Washington, DC: The National Commission on Teaching and Americas Future, 2005).
23 The National Commission on Teaching and Americas Future. Unraveling the Teacher
Shortage Problem: Teacher Retention Is the Key.
24 North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI), Teacher recruitment,
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/recruitment/materials/preparingmonitoringvisit.
pdf .
25 John Marvel, et al, Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results of the Teacher Follow-Up
Survey, 2004-2005, (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).
26 American Federation of Teachers (AFT), Meeting the Challenge: Recruiting and Retaining
Teachers in Hard-to-Staff Schools, http://www.aft.org/pubs-reports.
27 Robert J. Quinn, and Byllie DAmato Andrews, The Struggles of First-Year Teachers:
Investigating Support Mechanisms, The Clearing House 77:4(Mar./Apr. 2004): 164-168.
28 American Federation of Teachers, Meeting the Challenge: Recruiting and Retaining
Teachers in Hard-to-Staff Schools.
29 NCDPI, Salary guides,` http:,,www.ncpublicschools.org,bs,Fnance,salary.
30 North Carolina Association of Educators (NCAE). 2008 Legislative Session Wins,
http://www.ncae.org/Images/Users/6/Wins%20Flyer.pdf.
31 American Federation of Teachers (AFT), Meeting the Challenge: Recruiting and Retaining
Teachers in Hard-to-Staff Schools, http://www.aft.org/pubs-reports.
32 Richard M. Ingersoll, Teacher Turnover and Teacher Shortages: An Organizational
Analysis, American Education Research Journal 38:3(2001): 499-534.
33 John Marvel, et Al, Teacher Attrition and Mobility: Results of the Teacher Follow-Up
Survey, 2004-2005, (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).
34 National Governors Association, Teacher Supply and Demand: Is There a Shortage?
Issue Brief.
35 Helen F. Ladd, Charles Clotfelter, and Jacob Vigdor, So School Accountability Systems
Make It More DiFcult or Low Perorming Schools to Attract and Retain ligh Quality
69
Teachers? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 23:2(2004): 251-271.
36 Alliance for Excellent Education. Tapping the Potential: Retaining and Developing High
Quality New 1eachers.` 2004:18. http:,,www.all4ed.org,Fles,archie,publications,
TappingThePotential/TappingThePotential.pdf.
37 The National Commission on Teaching and Americas Future (NCATF), The High Cost
of Teacher Turnover, (Washington, DC: NCATF, 2007).
38 Gladys Graves, interview by author, 29 July 2008.
39 North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI), Steps to a NC License,
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/licensure/steps.
40 Kathleen Fulton, Irene Yoon, and Christine Lee, Induction into Learning Communities,
2005.
41 The National Commission on Teaching and Americas Future.
42 Barnett Berry et al., Creating and Sustaining Urban Teacher Residencies: A New Way
to Recruit, Prepare and Retain Effective Teachers in High-needs Districts, (Washington,
DC: Aspen Institute, 2008).
43 Linda Darling-Hammond, A Future Worthy of Teaching for America, Phi Delta Kappan,
89:10(2008): 730-733.
Interviews
73
FIFTY YEARS IN GOVERNMENT
B
ernice Friedlander is currently the President of Chapter 282 of the
National Treasury Employees Union, representing employees at the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. She began her career in Washing-
ton on Capitol Hill in 1965, and over the next seventeen years held a variety of
positions including Chief of Staff, Legislative Director, and Press Secretary. In
between her stints on the Hill, Ms. Friedlander worked as a lobbyist for Action
on Smoking and Health, advocating for the 1970 Cigarette Labeling Act, and
for the Autism Society of America, conducting autism education and research.
In 1974, she ran for Congress in the New Jersey Democratic Primary, but lost.
She went on to join the Executive Branch of the federal government, becom-
ing Director of Public Affairs for the Womens Bureau in the U.S. Department
of Labor from 1987-1994. She then became acting Director of the U.S. Of-
Fce o Consumer Aairs and was appointed by President Clinton as the U.S.
Delegate to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developments
Commissions on Consumer Issues and Credit Issues. In 1998, she joined the
Presidents Food Safety Initiative at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
as a policy analyst, promoting the Farm to Table program. Ms. Friedlander
holds an MPA from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
* * * * *
I recently spoke to Ms. Friedlander about her extensive experience in
public affairs and public policy. The following excerpts regard pressing policy
issues that she has seen evolve from her unique perspective, including those
related to modern media and government communication, health reform, and
consumer regulation.
An Interview with Bernice Friedlander
Interviewed by Gwen M. Tobert
Gwen M. Tobert is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Sanford School of Public Policy,
Duke University. She earned her Bachelors degree in Anthropology from Washington University in
St. Louis in 2008. Tobert has also been a long-time friend of Ms. Friedlander and is proud to have
such an accomplished mentor.
Gwen M. Tobert
74
---Media and Government Communication---
GT: How does the existence of bloggers and other decentralized, amateur
journalists who form a 24/7 media presence impact your ability to get out the
governments message?
BF: The government has a much greater potential to reach consumers.
There are a lot of consumer organizations that have blogs and I think that can
be helpful, but theres also a lot of misinformation out there. The government
has to be careful when it posts items on blogs or puts out information. In
the old days, you put a press release out and a reporter called you to clarify
but now it goes directly to consumers, so you really have to make sure you get
it right the Frst time.. I think the goernment hasn`t permeated all o the
new channels yet and Im not sure if thats good or bad. In areas such as
health and safety, and education, these new tools are so powerful and can be
so beneFcial to people. But only i we deelop them right.
---Health Reform---
GT: What strategies did you use to successfully counter such a powerful and
wealthy opposition lobby during the passage of the 1970 Cigarette Labeling
Act?
BF: There was so much tension about the tobacco issue, its hard to explain
it in todays environment. Its a major industry in a number of states and
congressmen and senators wanted to defend their turf, jobs, and funds they
received from tobacco and broadcasting interests. Some of the nations most
prestigious health organizations received money from the Tobacco Institute,
so they werent in a hurry to sign onto a bill that would in any way limit smok-
ing, even though they were using the Tobacco Institute funding to do research
on the health effects of tobacco.
In all negotiations and all lobbying, you have to use leverage. We had some
of the most outstanding medical people in the United States who were will-
ing to lend their names and their innuence to getting this legislation looked
at and adopted. The coalition of anti-smoking organizationsincluding
educational, religious, consumer, and health professionalsrelied on local
grassroots organizational tactics. For example, we had a couple of busloads
of young peoplethey were high school ageand they went on the Hill and
presented at each congressional and Senate oFce what we called the Lung
Ashtray [which turned black as people smoked around it]. When a tobacco
state Congressman tried to have the youngsters arrested, it made the front
75
page of the Washington Evening Star. We had a great ally in [small media
companies and churches]. When you leveraged everybodys little bit of power
and added all the little bits up, it certainly helped.
The whole process of getting that legislation enacted really took a push from
peoplefrom consumers, from parents, from educators, and especially from
medical professionals.
GT: In the health reform debates today, there are obviously some very pow-
erful lobbies who have vested interests in continuing the status quo. Do you
think any of the strategies that worked for you back in 1970 with the Cigarette
Labeling Act could be leveraged today?
BF: Lobbying for issues, especially the things that are health, safety, and edu-
cation related, just takes a lot of effort. Democracy is from the bottom-up,
and governance is usually from the top-down and somewhere in the middle
the people have to hear each other. And I think that thats not been clear
enough. There are a lot of people, for example, who want health reform, but
it means something different to each person. A clearly understood reform
package well, thats what we need. One of the strategies seems to be, Lets
not be too speciFc and then we can pull people in and get enough otes or
passage. I think it wasnt the best strategy because it seems today that no two
people think the same way about what they believe is contained in that health-
care bill. Its a huge bill with all kinds of implications. People are fed up
because they`re not sure what speciFcally it`s going to do or them, except they
know its going to make government bigger and, many believe, more intrusive.
GT: So you think the problem is really less about the lobbying parties and
more about how the legislation is presented? That its just too confusing, the
way the Clinton package was?
BF: Yes. Government is big, but Medicare is big! Government can handle
large programs and handle them well. What I am saying is if you presented
one or two or several alternatives for how youre going to pay for this new pro-
gram, then you can discuss A versus B and everybody will know what were
talking about. Instead we have a lot of contradictions, numbers being thrown
around, and one wonders if anyone really knows what is contained in this huge
piece of legislation, which is an attempt to pull as many interests together in
order to reach 60 votes in the Senate.
GT: So do you think we need to be more incremental?
Gwen M. Tobert
76
BF: Two things: the legislation has to be understandable and it needs to be
aordable.. I you can`t summarize it in a page and a hal-the beneFts as
well as the funding mechanismsthen its not going to go anyplace. People
are not going to swallow something they dont understand. And its very
easy to scare people about the unknown. Disinformation and scare tactics
have been used throughout history to try to beat back progressive legislation.
It was tried during the Fght or the Voting Rights Act. 1here were so-called
intelligent people serving in the Congress saying this was the end of America
if Negroes received their just right to vote if the States werent allowed to
discriminate through poll taxes, [etc.]. And in the end all we did was make
America better. There are always some people who will propagandize to try to
win you over by making you fearful.
GT: Do you think it would be more acceptable to people if it were the States
who were reforming healthcare?
BF: I really think its a federal issue. Right now, just too many people fall
between the cracks. In a federal bill, you might leave parts of it open to the in-
dividual states what additional options can be offered, if they want to offer
more than another state you can build that into the legislation. But the basic
framework of a truly national health insurance reform has to come from the
federal government, be universally available and guaranteed.
GT: Do you think Obamacare will pass?
**
BF: Well, I dont know if it will be Obamacare, but I do believe there will be
reform. When it will pass, I dont know. It will probably be some scaled down
version of pending legislation. But thats okay. Perhaps weve bitten off a little
more than we can chew right now due to current economic times. We have to
put a stop to the escalating costs of healthcare before it devastates us; plus,
we have to make healthcare a reality for millions of Americans so they can go
forward and pursue the American dream. It is an important step we, America,
need to take if we are going to thrive in the 21st Century.
---Consumer Regulation---
GT: Could you tell me a little bit about the FDA Farm to Table program
and where were going now in terms of consumer regulation?
BF: In the late 1990s, President Clinton wanted to see stronger and more
** This interview was conducted in February 2010.
77
consistent regulation of imported and domestic produce. The nation was hav-
ing problems due to the presence of pathogens such as e. coli and salmonella
popping up in the food supply and making people sick. Both the President
and Congress, together with a vigilant and assertive consumer voice, sought
to clean up the marketplace. The makeup of produce in the American mar-
ketplace was changing. For example, in 1998, 40 percent of the produce for
purchase in your neighborhood grocery store came from outside the United
States. Now that number is 60 percent. The Presidents Food Safety Initia-
tive and the Presidents Produce Initiative sought to create a culture of safety
from farm to table that is to say, from the time produce is planted and
harvested, transported, processed, and packaged, until you open it up to have
dinner tonight, Americas policy was to have a safer, better process Ag-
riculture, food processors, food importers, and food stores were invited to
work with the government in order to promote a cleaner, healthier, and more
eFcient marketplace or all. 1he Department o Agriculture, the lood and
Drug Administration, the State Department, and other agencies also worked
with other countries to ensure that foreign exports would be safe and meet
Americas standards.
. Ater President Bush came to oFce, the program continued.. I beliee
the program was funded for another year or two. But then, basically, it was gut-
ted. In the next our or Fe years, United States producers suered because o
an increase in food recalls [and] a reduction in Congressional appropriations
for enforcement. We simply didnt have the resources to enforce the laws. In
2007, Congress changed, and so did the attitude about funding food inspectors
here and in foreign venues. In the last two years of President Bushs adminis-
tration, or the Frst time in history, the lDA established three oFces in China,
an oFce in India, and one in the Middle Last to work with those countries to
ensure that products coming into American markets are safe. Unfortunately,
more problems arose mostly due to the lack o suFcient numbers o trained
inspectors to enforce the laws.
By the time President Obama came to oFce, he was greeted by a near crisis
in this area. He doubled the FDA budget it went from approximately $600
million to $1 billion. We have more inspectors now, more consumer safety
oFcers, more people in the labs, and are working with the states and other
countries. They are able to intervene early if theres a problem with imports at
the source. FDA is today able to deploy cadres of investigators and train oth-
ers around the country to help both industry and consumers build and sustain
conFdence in our ood saety processes and products.. I just hope they keep
the funding.
Gwen M. Tobert
78
---A Piece of Advice---
GT: What advice do you have for the next generation of policymakers?
BF: I think its important to know whats real. Before you look at the black
marks on white paper its important to involve yourself in the commu-
nity in the subject that youre working with. Be sure you really know whats
going on, and that it isnt just an intellectual exercise. Policy is as much about
everyday, How do we live? How do we survive? How do we do it with grace
and integrity? You need to question. You need to never be afraid to ques-
tion the eFcacy o something.. \ou hae to think things out, talk to people,
and not be afraid to be criticized. The policy that youre working on is going
to affect millions of people. So its important to check your ego at the door.
And never be afraid to say the other guys got a good idea or even a better idea,
if that is the case. The role of integrity and ethics and truth in policymaking
cant be overstated.
Book Reviews
81
RESILIENT CITIES
Policy, Practice, & Innovation
by Peter Newman, Timothy Beatley, and Heather Boyer
Reviewed by Trey Akers
A
cademic colleagues Peter Newman (Curtin University, Australia) and
Timothy Beatley (University of Virginia) team with Island Press Se-
nior Editor Heather Boyer to share personal experiences of sustain-
able urban policy as a response to risks posed by peak oil and climate change.
lor the Frst two authors, this work emerges out o crucial eents surrounding
the 1970s oil crisis, circumstances that shocked each as social disarray and a
loss of individual freedom that transformed economic, political, and social
relationships across society. Along with Boyer, a 2005 Loeb Fellow at Har-
vard University, the authors draw upon direct encounters with innovations in
city design. More than sustainable design solutions, however, a desire to cre-
ate placessettlements that strengthen human connectedness and bonds to
the natural landscapedrives the authors impetus to restructure cities. They
believe transformative progress will be locally- and regionally-based, but will
entail global implications regarding energy use, ecosystem management, and
social prosperity. As such, the authors eschew any sweeping policy recommen-
dations in favor of identifying and promoting best practices for incorporation
in community and metropolitan-wide planning.
These are not simple changes, however, and there is little question that
tbe trav.itiov ritt be aiffcvtt. 1bi. trav.itiov ba. beev referrea to a. tbe
Sixth Wave of industrialism because it is a complete reorientation of
industrial society to a different set of technologies and a rethinking of how
we organize cities (52).
Trey Akers holds a Master of City and Regional Planning degree from UNC-Chapel Hill. He
earned his Bachelors degree from Davidson College in 2006. Akers currently works as a transit-
oriented development planner with the Triangle J Council of Governments in Research Triangle
Park. Akers previously served as an urban designer implementing sustainable design principles in the
Daria.ov, ^C, offce of tbe 1be arrevce Crov.
Trey Akers
82
1he 1956 National Interstate & Deense lighways Act redeFned the
modern industrial era, providing a federal framework that responded to the
threats of the day (Cold War security concerns), expanded the scope of new
technological advancements (the internal combustion engine), and indelibly al-
tered settlement patterns for the next 60 years (bolstered suburbs at city center
expense,. Most strikingly, the legislation deliered a coherent, deFning public
policy. Yet today, we face risks born of this system and unprecedented chal-
lenges related to energy and climate. We need tools to address these issues as
well as a means to enact the desired changes. Resilient Cities offers a compelling
review of practices both current and future that will enable the fundamental
reordering of urban areas in response to increasing uncertainty surrounding
climate patterns and energy production. By understanding the implications
of our actions, the authors believe we can devise and implement alternative
economic, transport, and land use patterns that will establish vibrant, endur-
ing cities in spite of energy constraints. Resiliency, the term employed by the
authors to describe the necessary sociopolitical resolve and adaptable infra-
structure of new cities, provides the basis for this re-constitution. While strong
on vision, the work proves short on an explicit policy framework to guide
implementation. Nevertheless, the book catalogues innovative practices from
around the world, often reading like an encyclopedic narrative.
Before surveying these practices, the authors provide an overview of
the need for dynamic, long-term urban policies through a look at the current
and projected state of metropolitan affairs. They examine resource consump-
tion habits, land use patterns, and forecasted energy trends while detailing the
unsustainable nature of conventional energy development and use. Compar-
isons such as the annual per capita gasoline needs in Atlanta (782 gallons)
versus Barcelona (64 gallons) highlight the importance of land use and trans-
portation policies in driving energy demand (7). Similarly, detailed analysis of
energy production, anticipated declines, and unbridgeable supply gaps all lend
credibility to the need for revamped policies, but passing shots at political ac-
tors minimally support their argument (36, 111). Overall, the evidence is clear:
conentional energy will become more expensie and diFcult to access, and
even full-scale incorporation of alternative fuels will not compensate for rising
demand.
As a response, the authors offer four potential scenarios of the future
decline or renewal of urban areas: Collapsed, Ruralized, Divided, or Resilient
Cities. Collective fear and lack of resources characterize both Collapsed and
Divided City scenarios, resulting in an ungovernable state or restricting eco-
nomic prosperity to a few. The Ruralized City, based on individual farmsteads
akin to Thomas Jeffersons agrarian vision for the colonies, proves equally
unsustainable, the authors conclude. Importantly, though, this model empha-
sizes that the metropolitan connection to adjacent agricultural lands and the
83
selective cultivation of peri-urban areas (abandoned and peripheral city spaces)
are critical components of the Resilient City. But the authors contend that
agriculture is not the chief function of the city (44) and instead envision Resil-
ient Cities of technological advances, business innovations, distributed energy
systems, and sustainable transport that will foster prosperity for all.
Against this backdrop, the authors propose seven paradigm-shifting
principles to remake cities (56). The measures range from renewable energy
and photosynthetic capabilities to sustainable transport, carbon neutrality, and
place-based community design. Ambitious and broad, the authors support
each proposal with speciFc international practices already underway. 1hese ci-
tations survey a range of policy initiatives, enlightening readers as well as pro-
voking ideas related to transferability and local application. In different spots,
the authors establish connections to policy, identifying possible indicators of
resilient city progress (98, 118). Examples include an urban Chicago farmers
co-op; community-based social marketing programs in Perth, Australia; and
realigning subsidies to compare more equitably renewable energy sources with
conventional top-up supplies (127). The distance of a development from
the city center; the density; the fuel consumed; the quality of transit service;
and the miles of roadway converted from auto-use to pedestrian/green spaces
represent worthwhile urban sustainability indexes but not direct policy prac-
tices. Most examples remain in the realm of neat ideas, meant to inspire action
but steer clear o speciFc recommendations. \hat the discussion lacks is a
path to implementing such practices in each community.
However, such ambiguity may strengthen the books scope. As the au-
thors assert, the really important initiatives have to begin at the city level
because there is great variation in how cities cope within any nation (5). The
authors discuss scores of novel local initiatives: distributed-renewable energy
systems, horticultural districts, and place-based development principles (see 5
percent social infrastructure policy, 99). There are many exciting tools being
tested, reFned, and implemented at arious scales, and this book showcases a
number of them. In this regard, its ideas serve as a launch pad, a point from
which to depart and seek greater information.
The book concludes with Ten Strategic Steps for implementation, it-
erative learning, and the targeting of public assets as archetypes to drive sus-
tainable growth. For example, cities could use public parking decks with veg-
etative roofs and ground-level retail shops to reduce the number of surface-lot
parking spaces needed at transit stops (targeting public assets). This practice
frees more land for higher-intensity development; improves water quality and
concurrently lessens energy demand through green roof design; reduces pri-
vate sector parking costs, creating an incentive that supports transit-oriented
development; and encourages walking by limiting parking supply and concen-
trating uses. Designing a strategy to assess parking capacity, prioritizing sites,
Trey Akers
84
and establishing a unding stream or inrastructure Fnancing represent imple-
mentation steps, while constructing a metric to gauge the strategys effect on
walkability (and revising the approach based on the results) demonstrates it-
erative policy learning. As this case illustrates, the Sixth Wave comprises many
tools and practices ready to meet the most pressing challenges. In fact, the
Sixth Wave might most appropriately be described as the reconstitution of
new technological capacities towards sustainable community aims. Widespread
construction of green roofs, enhanced multi-modal transit opportunities, and
distributed energy systems will no doubt change the shape of the metropolitan
landscape. But unlike the federally-mandated 1956 Highways Act, the differ-
ence will be the scale of implementationwith the greatest innovations oc-
curring at the local level. And while this book does not convey a comprehen-
sive framework for policy formation and execution, it provides a compendium
of useful elements to inform public policy and assist readers, practitioners, and
leaders in crafting a robust, adaptive plan to guide their city toward prosperity
in a new energy future.
85
THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY
How the U.S. can Thrive as Other Powers Rise
by Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen
N
ina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen met while colleagues at the Na-
tional Security Council under the Clinton Administration. Hachigian
is currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress spe-
cializing in U.S. foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and international institu-
tions. She received her B.S. from Yale University and her J.D. from Stanford
University. Sutphen, a former U.S. diplomat, is now serving in the Obama Ad-
ministration as Deputy Chief of Staff. She earned a B.A. from Mount Holyoke
College and her M.Sc. from the London School of Economics. With such di-
verse experience in and exposure to foreign affairs, these authors are especially
qualiFed to recommend policies or the U.S. to thrie in the 21
st
century.
Hachigian and Sutphen wrote The Next American Century from 2006-
200 during the Fnal years o the Bush Administration. 1he 2010 paperback
edition includes a preface by Hachigian, in light of the election of President
Obama in 2008. Eight chapters guide the reader through the challenges facing
the U.S. in an age of rising powers.
Hachigian and Sutphen challenge a growing tendency in U.S. foreign
policy discourse to view the rise of other global powers as a threat to Ameri-
can power and interests. O speciFc interest are China, Russia, India, Japan,
and Europe, which the authors refer to as the pivotal powers (10). These
pivotal powers have the resources to support or thwart U.S. aims, to build
the world order or disrupt it (10). South Africa, Brazil, and Iran do not make
the list because, the authors argue, they do not meet this deFnition. South
Arica`s military is modest and its innuence lies mainly on the Arican conti-
nent, Brazils aims are not yet global despite its impressive resources, and Irans
Reviewed by Meaghan Monfort
Meaghan Monfort is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Sanford School of Public Policy,
Duke University. She earned her Bachelors degree in International Relations and Religion from
Syracuse University in 2008. As a Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellow, Monfort has worked at the
Department of State in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and in the Political Section of
U.S. Embassy Moscow, Russia.
Meaghan Monfort
86
economy is too small. These states, however, could make the list in the future.
\hile all Fe piotal powers are attended to in the text, the authors
discuss at great length concerns oer the growing innuence o piotal power
number one-China. lachigian and Sutphen also distinguish among the Fe
powers in terms of their mentalities. China, Russia, and India believe in their
historical destiny as great powers, yet are simultaneously preoccupied with a
raft of daunting internal challenges (132). On the other hand, Japan and Eu-
rope are set apart because they are already major global powers cooperating
with the U.S., and both are also less enamored with the trappings of tradi-
tional demonstrations of power, which sets them apart from the other three
(133).
Gien the timing o the book and the authors` political aFliations,
one might have expected a more scathing denouncement of the Bush Ad-
ministrations foreign policies. Instead, their work is refreshingly prescriptive
and future-oriented. The authors outline how the U.S. can grow its innovative
economy, maintain its role as a global leader, protect American lives, and ad-
vance the liberal world order. They direct our attention away from nebulous
and indirect dangers and toward a focus on the threat of international terror-
ism. In a persuasive table, the authors compare the threats presented by China
and radical Islamic terrorists as evidenced by: (1) number of Americans they
have killed on U.S. soil; (2) belief in free trade and capitalism; (3) level of ideo-
logical expansionism; and (4) announced policy toward liberal world order,
among others. They conclude that China is a much more ambiguous poten-
tial foe than are terrorists, the true threat of today (17). The U.S. should, as a
result, focus on improving capabilities to target international terrorism instead
of building up weapons systems and capabilities for highly unlikely, large-scale
ground wars of the past.
The Next American Century successfully tackles the most common argu-
ments for why the U.S. should feel threatened by the rise of pivotal powers.
In its full form, the book is an encyclopedia of talking points on why global
power is not a zero-sum game: international trade is good and should be
encouraged; China is at least 40 years away from being a real military threat;
dependency on foreign oil is not exceedingly dangerous; and it does not mat-
ter i oreign Frms own American ones. 1he U.S., they argue, cannot insist on
keeping other powers poor and weak in the name of self-preservation. Hachi-
gian and Sutphen now have a likeminded leader in Washington, evidencing a
trend toward agreement with the ideas and aims of this book. They aptly quote
President Obamas inaugural address when he proclaimed, Our power alone
cannot protect us (xiii).
Perhaps the biggest criticism of this work is that it appears a bit unre-
alistic at times and too quickly dismisses the challenges of ideological differ-
ences. Illiberal politics in Russia and China are real roadblocks for the United
87
States. Market transactions, which will no doubt drive our collaboration with
the pivotal powers, are not immune to ideological battles. And cooperation
in the market cannot be a cure-all or U.S. oreign policy. Google`s diFculties
with Chinese internet censorship laws are a case in point. Additionally, while
most agree on the need to keep and create jobs in the U.S. and attract invest-
ment from abroad, doing so is all the more challenging when other states can-
not or do not regulate wages or adequately enforce tax laws.
Hachigian and Sutphen have created an impressive manual of policy
prescriptions for the U.S., both domestically and internationally. Their policy
recommendationsmanage the national debt; construct collaborative relation-
ships with the pivotal powers; revamp the education system to maintain leader-
ship in innovation; put additional protections in place for workers; foil terrorist
plots with smart technology and international cooperation; reduce greenhouse
gas emissions; and promote liberal norms and democracy abroadwill not be
easy to accomplish. But Hachigian and Sutphen are optimistic, and they have
outlined a coherent and sensible strategy for moving forward.

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