LIM v.

COURT OF APPEALS (1992) Facts: Juan Sim filed a suit for annulment against Nelly Lim on the ground that the latter has been suffering from schizophrenia before, during or and after the marriage. As an expert witness, Sim announced his intention to present Dr. Acampado, the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital. Lims counsel opposed the introduction of said witness as Dr. Acampado had examined and diagnosed Lim, and hence, was bound b y the physician-patient confidentiality rule. Sims counsel, however, claimed that Dr. Acampado was there as an expert witness and not to testify on any information acquired during Lims examination. The RTC judge allowed Dr. Acampado to testify, but the latter was qualified by Sims counsel as an expert witness and asked h ypothetical questions. Dr. Acampado neither revealed what illness she examined and treated Lim for nor disclosed the results of Lims examinations and t he medicines prescribed. CA denied due course to the petition on the ground that the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified. o Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and had no bearing to whatever information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the patient. o A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient's ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in the hypothetical question. Expert testimony of a physician based on hypothetical question as to cause of illness of a person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while attending to the patient. o The rule on privileged communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from the fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and patient. It might be implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the information given. Issue: Is Dr. Acampados testimony violative of the Physician-Patient Privilege? Held: No. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physicians of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled to safely and efficaciously treat his patient. The requisites of the privilege are that: 1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2) the person against whom said privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3) such person acquired the information while attending to the patient in his professional capacity; 4) said information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5) said information was confidential, and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. The privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical and mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. Dr. Acampado was only presented as an expert witness; she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner. There is nothing specific or concrete offered to show that the information obtained fr om Dr. Acampado would blacken the petitioners reputation/character. Lastly, she makes no claim in any of her proceedings that her counsel had objected to any questions asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the confidentiality privilege. The failure to seasonably object thereto constitutes a waiver thereof. KROHN v. COURT OF APPEALS (1994) FACTS: A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report. Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking doctor-patient confidentiality, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report. June 14, 1964: Edgar Krohn Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in San Marcelino, Manila. In 1971, Paz underwent psychological testing in an effort to ease marital strain; 1973- both separated 1975: Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report signed by Dr. Cornelio Banaag and Baltazar Reyes. November 2, 1978: Edgar obtained a decree from family court nullifying his marriage with Paz. On June 10, 1979, decree was confirmed and pronounced final. July 30, 1982: Pasig CFI granted voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership October 23, 1990: Edgar filed petition for annulment, citing the confidential psychiatric evaluation report May 8, 1991: Edgar testified on the contents of the psych report but was objected due to patient-doctor confidentiality. Petitioner asserted that there is no factual or legal basis for Edgars claims since reports were fabricated. June 4, 1991: RTC admitted confidential psychiatric report as evidence. Petitioner argued pursuant to Sec. 24 (c), Rule 130 ROC<, prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, more so a third person testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with the patient. May 29, 1991: Edgar opposed Pazs motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential psych report as evidence. ISSUE: WON the confidential psychiatric report obtained by Edgar Krohn constitutes as evidence in filing an annulment complaint on the account of psychological incapacity HELD: NO. The person against whom the privilege is being claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics , as he is simply Fernandezs husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. He is therefore not barred by the privilege, and neither can his testimony be deemed a circumvention of the prohibition, as his testimony cannot have the same force and effect as a testimony made by a physician who examined the patient and executed the report. . Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Such testimony then is considered nothing but hearsay. BANCO FILIPINO, vs. MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., (1986) FACTS: It appears that due to the financial troubles of Banco Pilipino, it was placed under conservatorship by the Monetary Board. The Conservator Mr. TIAOQUI tendered his report dated January 19, 1995. To adequately address the contents of the report, Banco Filipino filed a motion for production of certain papers and records invoking Rule 27.1.The documents asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following: (1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino (BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985; 1

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez; Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF; Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19, 1995; Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report; Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela; Schedule of devaluation of CB-premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report; Schedule of BF's assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985; Documents listed in BF's letter to Mr. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.

In issuing the challenged order, the court below took the view that the Supreme Court's resolution referring to it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner from availing of his mode of discovery as an additional means of preparing for the hearing. IT CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED AS NOT PRIVILEGED BECAUSE THESE CONSTITUTE OR CONTAIN EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO THE ISSUE INTO BY THE COURT Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the said order and pray in their petition before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of the same. It opined that the ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in error because the proceedings before it, do not at all deal with either the administrative proceedings conducted by the respondents or the regularity and impartiality of the CB actions on BF; it does so simply upon the charge that no "hearing" was given BF prior to those actions of no "hearing" was given BF prior to those actions of closure and liquidation. However, no such prior hearing had been called as none is required by the law and by the Supreme Court decisions in force to this date (Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs. Arca). It also argued that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.1 ISSUES Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the motion for production of documents. Whether or not the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, are privileged communication that may not be inquired into. HELD 1. NO. RATIO The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books, documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or defense." (General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for Alameda County). "The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness and practicability" (Line Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran). "On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for reproduction and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential and privileged character could not be received in evidence" (27) CJS 224). "In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not documents are relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co. U.S. Dist, Ct.). Likewise, "any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court the case of Marbury vs. Madison. REASONING With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. II (SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were taken into consideration by said respondents in closing petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the petitioner. We, therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the annexes thereto should no withheld. Petitioner cannot adequately study and properly analyze the report without the corresponding annexes. Pertinent and relevant, these could be useful and even necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its comment, objections and exceptions to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports. Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the Monetary Board and to Central Bank Governor Fernandez these appear relevant as petitioner has asserted that the above-named Conservator had in fact to resume normal operations of Banco Filipino but then he was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The latter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner should be allowed to photocopy the same. 2. NO. RATIO The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Section 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the court below. REASONING As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents contend that "it is obvious from the requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the subject matter ( of the deliberations), when resolved . . . shall be made available to the public but the deliberations themselves are not open to disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states: "Section 21. Privilege Communications. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure."

Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. Whenever any member attending a meeting of the Monetary Board has a material personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, said member and must retire from the meeting during the deliberation thereon. The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a member had a personal interest in it, shall be made available to the public. The minutes of the meeting shall note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As amended by PD No. 1827). "Sec. 15. Responsibility. Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the Central Bank who wilfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of a confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act, or about the operation of the Bank, and to the use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the Bank or third parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). mphasis supplied). 2

BUT THIS PRIVILEGE IS INTENDED NOT FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS BUT FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC INTEREST (Vogel vs. Gruaz). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable. "The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. . . .", (Agnew vs. Agnew). In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke fear of disclosure. On the contrary, public interests will be served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well to consider that "Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something ion which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected" (State vs. Crocket). IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce documents dated February 17, 1986 issued by the court below in S.C.-G.R. NO. 70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the copies of the tapes relative to the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are actually no longer available taking into account respondent Monetary Board's manifestations that the tape recording of the deliberations of that Board are, for purposes of economy, used over and over again inasmuch as these tapes are not required to be kept or stored. SENATE V ERMITA (2006) FACTS: A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished. History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously. This is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 464 issued Sept. 28, 2005. Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract. The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have already been completed. On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the President, which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit. ISSUES 1. WON the officials of the executive department may evade the congressional inquiry by virtue of EO 464 (WON EO 464 is valid)

HELD 1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor. Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid. Reasoning Executive Privilege: Schwartz - "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Rozell-"the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." Tribe- while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations." 1.The state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. 2.Informer's privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. 3.A generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. In re Sealed Case: Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x" -This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends 3

not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications. That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. U.S. v. Nixon: In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixon's claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President's general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President's claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information. In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege: "The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for information. In Chavez v. PCGG,the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters." The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information. Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers," by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Validity of Specific EO 464 provisions - Sec. 1 of E.O. 464 Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face. - Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464 It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. - Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464 Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear t he Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, only to the express pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. - Sec. 3 of E.O. 464 Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry. Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID. PEOPLE v. INVENCION (2003) FACTS: Artemio was charged before the RTC with 13 counts of rape. Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case. The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat, Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro. o Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants. o Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro. o Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio testified that one day while he was passing by the house of Artemio, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemios house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. o Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. o Dr. Rosario Fider testified that she examined Cynthia. She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part. 4

Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that Cynthia, accompanied by her mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio. She then executed a written statement, which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Canlas. The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that one day, he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio which was made of sawali. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside. Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the sawali wall. On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children, there was a hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by to fish in a nearby brook. When she went to the place again after she was informed of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were not yet repaired. The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of the small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children, including Cynthia, were living in that house, the huts old sawal i walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint before the NBI, Celes tino made some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin occupied the house. RTC convicted Artemio in one of the 13 cases. Hence, this petition. o Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 RoC. Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wan ted him to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him. o

ISSUE: WON Artemios son Elven is qualified as a witness DECISION: YES. RTC decision AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages. HELD: As to the competency of Elven to testify, the Court rules that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth. Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of Rule 132 RoC expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of tender years like Elven. The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration. Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger o r any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of these witnesses. They are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the credibility of the witnesses. They may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole. Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the crime because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without electricity, Elven could not have been mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio. Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthias loud cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his father. IN THE MATTER OF FARBER (1978) FACTS: In these consolidated appeals, The New York Times Company and Myron Farber, a reporter employed by the newspaper, challenge judgments entered against them in two related matters--one a proceeding in aid of a litigant (civil contempt), the other for criminal contempt of court. The proceedings were instituted in an ongoing murder trial now in its seventh month, as a result of the appellants' failure to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum, directing them to produce certain documents and materials compiled by one or both of these appellants in the course of Farber's investigative reporting of certain allegedly criminal activities. Farber's investigations and reporting are said to have contributed largely to the indictment and prosecution of Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich for murder. Appellants moved unsuccessfully before Judge William J. Arnold, the trial judge in State v. Jascalevich, to quash the two subpoenas; an order was entered directing that the subpoenaed material be produced for in camera inspection by the court.... Impelled by appellants' persistent refusal to produce the subpoenaed materials for in camera inspection, Judge Arnold issued an order returnable before Judge Theodore W. Trautwein, directing appellants to show cause why they should not be deemed in contempt of court. ISSUE: WON the materials and documents of Farber are covered by the newsmans privilege DECISION: NO. The court affirmed that appellants were in contempt of court because the state constitutional guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses prevailed over the state statute granting privilege to newspersons regarding their sources of confidential information. HELD: (1) An otherwise absolute shield law does not provide absolute protection for a reporter in a criminal case, (2) a defendant in a criminal case does not have an absolute right to obtain evidence from a reporter, and (3) a trial court in a criminal case does not have an absolute right to look at a reporters notes in camera. Appellants claim a privilege to refrain from revealing information sought by the subpoenas duces tecum essentially for the reason that were they to divulge this material, confidential sources of such information would be made public. Were this to occur, they argue, newsgathering and the dissemination of news would be seriously impaired, because much information would never be forthcoming to the news media unless the persons who were the sources of such information could be entirely certain that their identities would remain secret. The final result, appellants claim, would be a substantial lessening in the supply of available news on a variety of important and sensitive issues, all to the detriment of the public interest. They contend further that this privilege to remain silent with respect to confidential information and the sources of such information emanates from the "free speech" and "free press" clauses of the First Amendment. The US Supreme Court has clearly rejected this claim and has squarely held that no such First Amendment right exists. In Branzburg v. Hayes (1972), three news media representatives argued that, for the same reason here advanced, they should not be required to appear and testify before grand juries, and that this privilege to refrain from divulging information, asserted to have been received from confidential sources, derived from the First Amendment. 5

Among the many 1st Amendment protections that may be invoked by the press, there is not to be found the privilege of refusing to reveal relevant confidential information and its sources to a grand jury which is engaged in the fundamental governmental function of "fair and effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property of the individual...." The reason this is so is that a majority of the members of the United States Supreme Court have so determined.... o Thus the Court does no weighing or balancing of societal interests in reaching its determination that the First Amendment does not afford appellants the privilege they claim. The weighing and balancing has been done by a higher court. It follows that the obligation to appear at a criminal trial on behalf of a defendant who is enforcing his Sixth Amendment rights is at least as compelling as the duty to appear before a grand jury. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court dealt with a newsman's claim of privilege based solely upon the First Amendment. This claim of privilege failed. In Branzburg no shield law was involved. Here there is a shield law, said to be as strongly worded as any in the country. The legislative intent is present in adopting this statute in its present form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of the press as well as information so obtained by reporters and other news media representatives to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States and that of the State of New Jersey. It is abundantly clear that appellants come fully within the literal language of the enactment.... Appellants insist that they are entitled to a full hearing on the issues of relevance, materiality and overbreadth of the subpoena. o The Court agrees. The trial court recognized its obligation to conduct such a hearing, but the appellants have aborted that hearing by refusing to submit the material subpoenaed for an in camera inspection by the court to assist it in determining the motion to quash. That inspection is no more than a procedural tool, a device to be used to ascertain the relevancy and materiality of that material. Such an in camera inspection is not in itself an invasion of the statutory privilege. Rather it is a preliminary step to determine whether, and if so to what extent, the statutory privilege must yield to the defendant's constitutional rights.

PASHMAN, J., dissenting.... This case is the first major test of New Jersey's new "Shield Law." There is no reason to accord this statute an unfriendly reception in any court of this State. There should be no eagerness to narrow or circumvent it. The Shield Law is not an irritation. It is an act of the Legislature. The News Media Privilege Act was New Jersey's response to the Court's invitation (of leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas). This Act reflects our Legislature's judgment that an uninhibited news media is more important to the proper functioning of our society than is the ability of either law enforcement agencies, the courts or criminal defendants to gain access to confidential news data.... A reporter's ability to obtain sensitive information depends on his reputation for keeping confidences. Once breached--that reputation is destroyed. Potential sources of information can no longer rest secure that their identities and confidences will remain free from disclosure. Realizing that strict confidentiality is essential to the workings of a free press, our Legislature, through the News Media Privilege Act, has granted reporters an immunity from disclosure which is both absolute and comprehensive. Any person connected with any news media for the purpose of gathering or disseminating news is granted the privilege of refusing to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body, both the source of and any information acquired. Courts are thus given no discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the societal importance of a free and robust press is "outweighed" by other assertedly compelling interests. The Legislature has done the weighing and balancing and has determined that in every case the right to non-disclosure is paramount. If a reporter falls within the ambit of the statute, he has a privilege of non-disclosure. o This privilege exists not only with respect to public disclosures; it encompasses revelations to any legal or quasi-legal body, including "any court." Even forced in camera disclosures are thus prohibited. YAMBOT v. TUQUERO (2011) FACTS: PDI printed an article headlined Judge mauled me, says court employee, carrying the byline of petitioner Contreras. The article reported an alleged mauling incident that took place between RTC Judge Cruz, Jr. and Robert Mendoza, an administrative officer assigned at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Makati RTC. Reckoning the article to be false and malicious, Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint for libel with the City Prosecutor of Makati. Judge Cruz alleged that there was no suit for sexual harassment pending against him before this Court (as written in the article), and attached a certification of the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two administrative cases against him. Contreras filed a counter-affidavit with the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, explaining the supposed factual basis for his article. o It appeared that Atty. Paredes-Garcia had filed with this Court a Petition for Review to question a contempt order issued against her by Judge Cruz. In connection with said Petition for Review, Paredes-Garcia filed a Reply asking this Court to look deeply into allegations of one Talag-Pascual that Judge Cruz made sexual advances to her while she was a member of his staff at the MeTC of Manila. Paredes-Garcia claimed that she suffered similar indignities from Judge Cruz, and prayed that her Petition be treated as an administrative case against said judge. Paredes-Garcia appended an affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who became objects of his fancy. In the meantime, this Court rendered its Decision on the Petition of Paredes-Garcia, granting her prayer to set aside Judge Cruz's contempt order. The prayer in Paredes-Garcia's Reply that the Petition be treated as an administrative case against Judge Cruz was not passed upon by the Court. Subsequently, the City Prosecutor approved Resolution finding probable cause against Mendoza and six PDI employees, namely: Contreras, Isagani Yambot, Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc, Jose Ma. Nolasco, Artemio Engracia, Jr. and Carlos Hidalgo (the PDI Staff). City Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against Mendoza and the PDI Staff. Thereafter, the PDI Staff filed a Motion with the trial court for the deferment of the arraignment to allow them to appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Justice. Then Secretary of Justice Tuquero dismissed the PDI Staffs Petition for Review of the Resolution of the City Prosecutor. o Tuquero rejected the argument of petitioners that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of lack of supporting affidavits from third persons. According to Tuquero, affidavits of third persons are not essential for a libel complaint to prosper, as it is enough that the person defamed can be identified. As regards the factual basis presented by Contreras, Secretary Tuquero noted it cannot be said that Judge Cruz was indeed facing a sexual harassment suit in this Court. The PDI Staff with the exception of Hidalgo (herein petitioners) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to challenge the aforementioned Resolutions of Secretary Tuquero. CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Since the Information had already been filed with the trial court, the primary determination of probable cause is now with the latter.

ISSUE: WON the privileged nature of a publication is a ground for dismissal and that the respondent need not wait until trial to raise the issue of privilege DECISION: YES. Petition GRANTED. HELD: Under exceptional circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of the prosecutor's ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court. In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, this Court held that the acts of a quasi-judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly 6

administration of justice; (c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused. o The Investigating Prosecutor acts without or in excess of his authority under the Rule if the Information is filed against the respondent despite absence of evidence showing probable cause therefor. If the Secretary of Justice reverses the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor who found no probable cause to hold the respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to file the Information despite the absence of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law, without authority and/or in excess of authority. Such resolution may likewise be nullified in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In light of the particular factual context of the present controversy, the Court finds that the need to uphold the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press and crystal clear absence of a prima facie case against the PDI staff justify the resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Consequently, the following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. The glaring absence of maliciousness in the news article subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed by the PDI staff. o The article merely reported the statement of Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz and that said article did not report the existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement. Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part of the PDI Staff by asserting that they did not check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong, pointing to a certification from the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions not mentioning sexual harassment. A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of words. While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate sexual advances in an appeal of a contempt ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual harassment, the Court agrees with petitioners' proposition that the subject news article's author, not having any legal training, cannot be expected, to make the fine distinction between a sexual harassment suit and a suit where there was an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three other newspapers reporting the same incident committed the same mistake: (Manila Times, Philippine Star, Manila Standard). The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza's allegation of a sexual harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of the article: it was a straightforward narration, without any comment from the reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving Judge Cruz. The subject article was, in fact, replete with other allegations by Mendoza of purported misconduct on the part of Judge Cruz. In Borjal v. CA, the Court held that "[a] newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community." o Like fair commentaries on matters of public interest, fair reports on the same should thus be included under the protective mantle of privileged communications, and should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. The concept of privileged communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press, which would be threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to silence the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. v. ANTIGUA BOTICA RAMIREZ (1932)

FACTS:

In case G.R. No. 34686, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants-appellees, Antigua Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, an amount which represents the balance of an overdraft account of the Antigua Botica Ramirez with the plaintiff. J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer were guarantors for the overdraft. In case G.R. No. 34687, plaintiff-appellant sees to collect from defendants, Daniel Boque, Antigua Botica Ramirez, J. J. Dunabar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an amount as balance of a promissory note executed by the defendants, in favor of the plaintiff, whereby the defendant promised, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff. In case G.R. No. 34688, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer, Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, a sum as balance of a promissory note executed by Dunbar Boquer, and Gutierrez Rupide, which was guaranteed by Manuela Reyes y Almeida with a mortgage of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila in favor of the plaintiff. For some time before the complaints were filed the Antigua Botica Ramirez was under the control and management of the plaintiff, and a few months after plaintiff's complaints were filed, and upon plaintiff's petition a receiver of the properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez was appointed. After trial, the court below rendered judgment, dismissing the three complaints, ordering the cancellation of the mortgage of Manuela Reyes' land, discharging the receiver and ordering him to turn over the properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez to plaintiff.

ISSUE: WON the documents presented by the defendant and the witnesses by plaintiff (Ford and Velasquez) should be admitted as evidence DECISION: Judgment REVERSED. HELD: In view of the decision to be rendered by the court, it shall only discuss the assignment of error in connection with the document offered by plaintiff in evidence and rejected by the lower court. Plaintiff's Exhibit EE is a copy of the minutes of a special meeting of the stockholders of the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez, wherein a transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the stockholders' meeting of the same corporation was incorporated. At the said meeting of April 19, 1929, the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer admitted their obligations to the plaintiff bank and such admissions were inserted, without any objection on the part of the said defendants, in the minutes of the special stockholders' meeting of April 26, 1929. Counsel for the defendants objected to the introduction of said Exhibit EE on the ground that it contained certain statements made by the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer; that the latter were not given an opportunity to explain their statements before plaintiff offered the document in evidence; and that this contention is without merit. o Had plaintiff intended to impeach statements made by the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer on another occasion, plaintiff, as claimed by counsel for the defendant, should have laid a foundation for the introduction in evidence of said Exhibit EE by calling the attention of the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer to their former statements, but apparently plaintiff had no such purpose. Plaintiff's purpose in introducing the said Exhibit EE was probably to show certain admissions against interest made by the defendants, and said EE might then be admissible without the necessity of plaintiff's first making the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer explain their statements. o . . . In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by the parties to the action of their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have been admissible without the laying of a foundation and without the witness having testified in the case at bar. . . . (Juan Ysmael & Co. vs. Hashim and Gorayeb)

PEOPLE v. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA (1978) Facts: On July 13, 1971, twelve year-old Mirasol was alone in her parents house, having been told by her mother not to go to school that afternoon so she could l ook after the pigs and cook their feed. While doing so, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and approached Mirasol from behind. Pointing the hunting knife at her breast and threatening to kill her if she shouted, he pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby and raped her. Out of fear, the girl did not put up any resistance whatsoever. Upon hearing Mirasols aunt, Lita Parochel, calling for Mirasol, Paragsa ran to the storeroom upstairs. Parochel, however, saw thr ough the gate Paragsa running away and Mirasol putting on her panties, but the latter did not tell her aunt what happened when asked because she was afraid as Paragsa was still inside the house, nor did she tell her family what happened when they returned. It was Mirasols aunt who told her mother, who confronted Mirasol about the incident. Paragsa denied the rape charges, claiming that he and Mirasol were sweethearts and that it was actually their third sexual intercourse, as corroborrated by two witnesses. Issue: Should Mirasols repeated silence be deemed an admission in silence under the Rules of Court? Held: Yes. The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in this case. Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of Paragsa and his witnesses to the effect that he and Mirasol were actually sweethearts and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971, in the house of Paragsa, where he and Mirasol slept together in the evening of the same day after Paragsas mother and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu. RUFINA PATIS FACTORY v. ALUSITAIN (2004) FACTS: Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and operated by petitioner Lucas. After close to forty three years, Alusitain admittedly tendered his letter of resignation. Alusitain executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from employment and submitted the same on even date to the Pensions Department of the SSS. R.A. 7641 took effect which provided a retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company, having reached the age of 65 and due to poor health, verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas for the payment of his retirement benefits. By his computation, he claimed that he was entitled to P86,710.00 broken down as follows: o Retirement Benefits = month salary for every year of service o One-half month salary = P1,885.00 o Years of Service = 47 years o Retirement Benefits = P86,710.00 Petitioner Lucas, however, refused to pay the retirement benefits of Alusitain, prompting the latter to make a written demand. Lucas, however, remained adamant in his refusal to give in to Alusitains demands. Having failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Alusitain filed a complaint before the NLRC against petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Lucas for non-payment of retirement benefits. Petitioners maintained that Alusitain had resigned from the company per his letter of resignation and the Affidavit of Separation. On the other hand, while respondent admitted having tendered his letter of resignation and executed the Affidavit of Separation, he nevertheless maintained that he continued working for petitioners until the date of actual retirement, due to illness and old age, and that he merely accomplished the foregoing documents in compliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to avail of his retirement benefits. Executive Labor Arbiter Guanio upheld Alusitains position. NLRC affirmed. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the letter of resignation and the Affidavit of Separation can be considered as admission DECISION: YES. Petition GRANTED. HELD: Petitioners assert that the Affidavit of Separation, being a public document, is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and proof is required to assail and controvert the same. Petitioners further assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A. 7641 as said law does not expressly provide for such retroactive application and to do so would defeat the clear intent of Congress. According to various jurisprudence, Republic Act 7641 may be given retroactive effect where: (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits. It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner Rufina Patis Factory, he has to prove that he was its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. In the case at bar, it was incumbent on Alusitain to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and not on February 20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. While these two documents (resignation letter and affidavit of separation) may have facilitated the release of Alusitain's retirement benefits from the SSS, hence, beneficial to him at that time, they may still be considered admissions against interest since the disserving quality of the admission is judged as of the time it is used or offered in evidence and not when such admission is made. o Thus, it matters not that the admission is self-serving when it was made, so long as it is against respondent's present claim. No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant. It bears stressing, however, that Alusitain's Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document, hence, prima facie evidence of the facts expressed therein. In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to contradict the facts stated in a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence. The subsequent notarial documents executed by respondent and his daughter fall short of this standard. o The case of Reyes v. Zaballero is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December 1, 1944 a notarial document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor had already paid his debt. On even date, the creditor subsequently executed an affidavit without the debtor's knowledge stating that he had accepted the payment under protest and "obligado por lascircunstancias actuales." This Court held that the creditor's statement in his affidavit that he received the money "obligado por las circunstancias actuales" is self-serving evidence. o A contrary rule would undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial documents. In Dequito v. Llamas, this Court held: After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made admissions and declarations against his own interest under the solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He cannot, even "with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes to live." Neither is the sworn statement of Alusitain's daughter sufficient to prove that he indeed retired on Alusitain's daughter did not state that her father worked for petitioner Rufina Patis Factory until his alleged retirement on January 31, 1995.All she said was that the last time she brought him food at the factory was in 8

January 1995. To conclude that Alusitain was still employed on January 1995 from the mere fact that his daughter brought him food at the Rufina PatisFactory is non sequitur. o In the case at bar, Alusitain's retraction is highly suspect. Other than his bare and self-serving allegations and the sworn statement of his daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. He did not produce any documentary evidence such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification card, or any other independent evidence to substantiate his claim. In fine, Alusitain having failed to prove that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect, his claim for retirement benefits thereunder must be disallowed. ESTATE OF JESUS YUJUICO v. REPUBLIC (2007) FACTS: The application for registration by Fermina Castro of a parcel of land was opposed by the OSG on behalf of the Director of Lands, and by Mercedes Dizon, a private party. Both oppositions were stricken from the records since the oppositions were filed after the expiration of the period and after the entry of the order of general default. TC ruled for Castro. The Director and Dizon did not appeal, thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration became final. The land was then sold to Yujuico. TCT was issued in Yujuicos name, who subdivided it into 2 lots. Lot1 was issued in his name, while Lot2 was issued in the name of petitioner Augusto Carpio. o Annotations at the back of TCT show that Yujuico had, at one time or another, mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank. Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor of Private Development Corporation (PDC), RCBC and then PCIB and the DBP to secure various loans. PD 1085 entitled Conveying the Land Reclaimed in the Foreshore and Offshore of the Manila Bay was issued. o Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the properties of the PEA, a government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed lands. The PEA undertook the construction of the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the RTC, a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages against the PEA. The parties entered into a compromise agreement approved by the trial court. The parties executed a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area of 1.7343 hectares. PEA GM Doble, informed the OSG that the new PEA board and management had reviewed the compromise agreement and had decided to defer its implementation and hold it in abeyance following the view of the former PEA GM, Atty. Yulo, Jr., that the compromise agreement did not reflect a condition of the previous PEA Board, requiring the approval of the Office of the President. The new PEA management then filed a petition for relief from the resolution approving the compromise agreement on the ground of mistake and excusable negligence. o The petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it was filed out of time and that the allegation of mistake and excusable negligence lacked basis. CA dismissed for failure to pay docket fees and for lack of merit. In a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Decree and its Derivative Titles, entitled Republic v. Castro, Yujuico, Carpio and the filed with the RTC, Republic, through the OSG, alleged that when the land registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. Obreto and subsequently approved by the LRC, the land was still a portion of Manila Bay. o Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void. RTC dismissed the case. The trial court stated that the matter had already been decided in the LRC, and that after 28 years without being contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. Civil Case No. 01-0222 was thus found barred by prior judgment. CA reversed. The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable. Further, res judicata does not apply to lands of public domain, nor does possession of the land automatically divest the land of its public character.

ISSUES: WON a reversion suit is proper in this case DECISION: NO. Petition GRANTED. Judgment REVERSED. HELD: Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by Fermina Castro in 1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said land is underwater. The only conclusion that can be derived from the admissions of the SolGen and Government Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of the titles of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of the state. Notably, the land in question has been the subject of a compromise agreement upheld by this Court in Public Estates Authority. In that compromise agreement, among other provisions, it was held that the property covered by the subj TCTs, the land subject of the instant case, would be exchanged for PEA property. The fact that PEA signed the May 15, 1998 Compromise Agreement is already a clear admission that it recognized petitioners as true and legal owners of the land subject of this controversy. Moreover, PEA has waived its right to contest the legality and validity of Castros title. Such waiver is clearly within the powers of PEA since it wa s created by PD 1084 as a body corporate which shall have the attribute of perpetual succession and possessed of the powers of the corporations, to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of this Charter [PD 1084]. Thus, the Compromise Agreement and the Deed of Exchange of Real Property sign ed by PEA with the petitioners are legal, valid and binding on PEA. o In the Compromise Agreement, it is provided that it settles in full all the claims/counterclaims of the parties against each other. The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified by the manifestation by PEA in the Joint Motion for J udgment based on Compromise Agreement that the parties waive and abandon any and all other claims and counterclaims which they may have against each other arising from this case or related thereto. Thus, there was a valid waiver of the right of respondent Republic through PEA to challenge petitioners titles. The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowled gment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it stated that: Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA automatically becomes a member thereof. Section 26, Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The admissions of PEA which is the real party -in-interest in this case on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respo ndents claim that the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of petitioners lot.

EL VARADERO DE MANILA v. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY (1924) Facts: El Varadero, pursuant to no express agreement other than an implicit understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, what could be secured from any other company, satifactorily completed certain repairs on a lighter, Tatlo, belonging to the Insular Lumber Company. The Insular Lumber, however, believed that the bill presented to them was grossly exorbitant, and failing to reach a compromise, the matter was taken to court. The CFI of Manila ordering Insular Lumber to pay P5,210.70, plus legal interest. El Varadero appealed, asking for an increase in the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62, which was the amount in the itemized bill presented by El Varadero. During the course of negotiations for compromise, El Varadero had been willing to accept P10,241.37, while Insular Lumber had been willing to pay P8,070.12. Issue: Should compromise be excluded as evidence? Held: Yes. Under the general rules of evidence, the offer of compromise must be excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are relevant. Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be more than P8,070.12. The second point of interest relates to the testimony of Mariano Yengko, inspector of vessels, admittedly a disinterested witness, who in one synopsis of a fair value of the repairs, arrived atP5,134.20, but which, on cross-examination, he raised to between seven and eight thousand pesos. And the third point is that the tacit understanding between the parties was that the cost of the repairs should be approximately the same as what other companies would charge. The defendant admits that El Varadero deNavotas would have done the work for about P8,000. PEOPLE v. DANNY GODOY (1995) Facts: Mia Taha accused Danny Godoy of raping her when she went to the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, near the school where she was studying. Upon entering through the kitchen door, he grabbed her from behind, poked a knife on her neck and dragged her by the hand, telling her not to shout. She was forced to lie down on the floor and raped at knife-point. Although it was dark, Taha recognized her Physicas teacher, Godoy, as her assailant. Godoy threatened her not to tell anyone or else he would kill her and her family. The next day, Godoy arrived at her parents house and asked permission from Tahas parents for her t o accompany him to solicit funds because she was a candidate for Miss PNS Pulot. She was forced to go for fear of getting her parents into trouble. She was taken to Sunset Garden and detained for three days, where she was constantly raped at knife-point. Then, she was taken to the house of Godoys friend, where she was again raped three times. Upon finding that Taha had been reported as a missing person in the police blotter, Taha was released only after her parents agreed to settle the case with Godoy. Godoy denied the allegations, claiming that they were having an affair, and that it was Taha who repeatedly chased after him and who went with him to the Sunset Garden out of fear of her parents because she thought she was pregnant. It was however alleged that Godoys mother gave them P30,000 as settlement in exchange for an affidavit of desistance on the part of Mia Taha. There was also an alleged offer of marriage. Issue: Was the offer of compromise an admission of guilt? Held: No. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a legal maxim that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. However, in such cases, the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. In this case, the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves Godoys innocence of the offense charged. Further, the suppo sed offer of marriage did not come from Godoy, but was actually suggested by an imam who informed him that he could convert into Muslim to be able to marry Taha despite already being married. However, Godoy refused. As for the P30,000 paid by Godys mother, Godoy himself was actually unaware of this, not until the trial proper. The only on es present during the negotiations were Taha, her parents, and Godoys mother. Where the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. No implied admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relation between the parties. PEOPLE v. LAMBID (2003) FACTS: In her two separate Complaints, complainant Lyzel Lambid, accuses Romeo Lambid of raping her. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The prosecution presented three witnesses: Lyzel, the complainant; Mary Ann, a sister of Lyzel; and Dr. Khosravibabadi, the physician who conducted a physical examination on the complainant. Prosecution: 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house together with her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the morning, she woke up and noticed her father lying beside her. Then, her father started removing her panty at the same time warning her not to tell her mother what he was doing. After her father succeeded in removing her panty, he went on top of her and started inserting his penis into her vagina. She initially tried to resist the sexual advances of her father by kicking him and by moving her body from left to right and vice versa. She stopped resisting when her father stared hard at her and threatened to kill her. Her father succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. The same thing happened the next day. However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened while their father was pulling her blanket. Suspicious of their fathers actuation, she kicked him. After kicking him, she laid near the foot of her sister Lyzel. Their father then covered her with a blanket but she peeped through the blanket. She saw their father who was only wearing an underwear place himself on top of Lyzel. Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents she witnessed. Their neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for assistance and on that same day their father was arrested. Dr. Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel and found that Lyzels vagina had new hymenal lacerations. The doctor asserted that Lyzel might have sustained the lacerations within six days prior to her examination. The test for the presence of spermatozoa yielded negative results. The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. He simply stated that if he had committed the crimes of rape against his daughter, he asks for forgiveness because during that time he was drunk. He asked the court to impose upon him a lesser penalty considering that his children are still under his care. RTC found Lambid guilty of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty for death with damages. ISSUE: WON Lambid is guilty of rape DECISION: YES. Decision AFFIRMED with modifications. 10

HELD:

Appellant, in support of the first assigned error, attacks the credibility of the complainant. The Court agrees with the contention of the OSG that the failure of complainant to correctly pinpoint the day of the week when she was raped and to recall the exact date of her mothers arrival from Leyte are inconsequential matters. It is a settled rule that discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as the exact time of the commission of the crime, are not grounds for acquittal. To be material, discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. o Moreover, Lyzels testimony is strongly corroborated by her sister Mary Ann and buttressed by physical evidence. The physicians findings on her physical examination indicated the presence of fresh lacerations on her hymen. Laceration of the hymen, whether fresh or healed, is the best physical evidence of defloration. In the present case, the doctor estimated that the lacerations could have been sustained by Lyzel within six days prior to the date of her examination. This estimate is consistent with Lyzels claim. Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through fear, threat or intimidation. o Lyzel very clearly testified that in the first incident, she tried to resist the sexual advances of appellant by kicking him and by trying to move her body but when appellant threatened to kill her, she, who was only fourteen years old, was easily cowed i nto submitting herself to appellants carnal desire. When appellant raped her the following day, her fear of her father and of the previous threat that he would kill her still pervaded causing her to do nothing the second time. Her harrowing experience the day before in the hands of her father coupled with a threat on her life was sufficient to envelop her with fear and paralyze her into submission even if appellant merely stared at her when he raped her again the following morning. Lyzels failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance during the second incident does not demolish her claim that she was raped. Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that he never disowned the acts imputed against him. Appellant merely claimed that he was drunk and he asked for forgiveness from Lyzel, if he had really raped her and for compassion from the trial court. In People vs. Alvero, the Court held that a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise and an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Thus, by asking for forgiveness, appellant has admitted his guilt. ALVIZO et al v SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)

FACTS: Consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by Alvizo et al to annul decision of Sandiganbayan finding them guilty of different counts of violation of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and corrupt practices act). In 1978 a team from COA was organized to verify the alleged issuances of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCs) during the period of 1976-1978 in various Highway Engineering Districts (HEDs) of Region VII. The Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued in the year 1977 leading to irregular disbursements of public funds for the payment of ghost projects. The investigations r esulted in the filing of 397 criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan charging certain officials and employees of the government as well as private contractors with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The subject-matter of herein petitions are 199 of said cases. The officials and employees of the Cebu 2nd HED were charged, together with private contractors/suppliers. All these cases were tried jointly by agreement of the parties (except as to accused private contractor Genson who, upon his motion, was granted a separate trial when it was his turn to present evidence.) During the trial, accused Rolando Mangubat (Region VII Accountant) who signed all the fake LAAs and SACDCs, and co-accused contractors/ suppliers Erasmo Gabison and Feliciano Echavez who delivered the materials and prosecuted the ghost projects, changed their previous pleas of not guilty to guilty to the crimes charged against them. Among the testimonies which the prosecution presented are: [Of the then Supervising COA Auditor Ruth Paredes which established the standard operating procedure in the releases of allotments to fund the highway projects or the maintenance and repair of the existing ones in the different regions of the MPH. Prosecution witness Felicitas Ona, then Auditor V, who was assigned as a member of the team formed by the Performance Audit Office to investigate the extent of the anomaly in the MPH Central and the Regional Offices. Prosecution witness Manuel Dionisio, a Senior Agent of the NBI and member of the Special Task Force of the Cabinet Committee. Accused-turned-state witness, Delia Preagido who testified that she was employed in the MPH, Region VII, holding the position of Accountant III, sometime in the last week of January 1977, accused Mangubat, Chief Accountant of Region VII, asked her to stay after office hours and told her that they could get a big money out of the simulated LAAs by selling them to the Contractors, District Accountant, District Engineer and the Assistant District Engineer. Fe delos Reyes, then Auditing Examiner II at the Cebu 2 nd HED, likewise an accused-turned-state witness, testified that sometime in the first quarter of 1977, she was instructed by petitioner Auditor Efren Coyoca to inspect the delivery of supplies and materials at the project site of the Argao Dalaguete project but she found no deliveries therein. She then reported the non-delivery to petitioner Coyoca who told her that he had to confer the matter with petitioner Engr. Rafael Rabaya, Jr.. She was later called by petitioner Coyoca to his office and told her, in the presence of petitioner Rabaya, to just sign all the prepared tally sheets and inspection reports as Coyoca would assume the responsibility if anything went wrong. Thereafter, she just signed tally sheets and reports without actually going to the jobsites to inspect the deliveries of supplies and materials because she knew that there would be no deliveries to be made. ] The Sandiganbayan convicted the accused under Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC) Rafael Rabaya (Asst Highway District Engr) and Nestor Rabaya (Material Testing Engr) submitted, among others, that the court erred in giving evidentiary value to the pleas of guilty of accused Mangubat, Gabison and Echavez as it violated the hearsay and res inter alios acta rule. ISSUE1: WON the court erred in giving evidentiary value to the pleas of guilty of accused Mangubat, Gabison and Echavez as it violated the hearsay and res inter alios acta rule. NO ISSUE2: WON the confessions were admissible even if not made during existence of conspiracy (Sec. 30). YES.

11

HELD1: Section 28 allows exceptions, one is Section 30 on admissions by a co-conspirator. The pleas of guilty of some of the accused are admissions of the truth of the accusations that they committed acts of falsifications done during the existence of the conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan merely declared that the pleas of guilty confirmed the issuance and release of fake or simulated LAAs and SACDCs, the irregular, improper and illegal preparation, execution and processing of the general vouchers and their supporting documents, and the non-delivery of materials and non-prosecution of ghost projects. Therefore, the pleas of guilty were merely confirmatory: they confirmed the facts already established by other evidence of the prosecution. Said pleas were not used by the Sandiganbayan to convict petitioners for even if the pleas were completely disregarded, the prosecution had already succeeded in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD2: The said pleas are nonetheless admissible against petitioners as co-conspirators because the pleas were made in open court. In other words, they are judicial confessions. The rule embodied in Sec. 30 that the declaration of a conspirator made after the termination of the conspiracy is inadmissible against his coconspirator applies only to an extra-judicial confession, and not to a plea of guilty, which is a judicial confession. In this very specific instance, the rule of res inter alios acta does not apply because the confessions embodied in the pleas of guilty are judicial confessions, not extra-judicial ones. The Sandiganbayan did not convict petitioners on the basis of the pleas of guilty. The Sandiganbayan merely said that the prosecutions case had been amply supported and strengthened by the pleas of guilty entered by the three. The pleas of guilty are in themselves evidence that the pleaders committed the acts mentioned in the Informations. The pleas certainly have corroborative effect on the evidence-in-chief of the prosecution. There is no rule violated by the Sandiganbayan when it considered the pleas of guilty. ON HEARSAY RULE The rule applies only if Gabison, Mangubat and Echavez admission of guilt was testified to by another person or by means of affidavit. In this case the three co-accused personally confessed their guilt during arraignment where petitioners were likewise present. Assuming that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to consider and refer to the pleas of guilty, this is not reversible error because after disregarding the pleas of guilty there remains sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of petitioners beyond reasonable doubt, and the substantial rights of petitioners were not, therefore, prejudice by its admission. PEOPLE v. GAUDIA (2004) FACTS: PROSECUTION Amalia (mother of Remelyn) testified that, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 yo) and Kimberly (1 yo) at their house to gather pigs food. In the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil ipil trees. Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some 30 meters from their house. She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyns private organ. The following day, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the appellant. The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was raped. At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn. At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle th is, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed. Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials to the police precinct where Amalias statement w as taken. Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center. Dr. Patricio Hernane, the municipal health officer, conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and found lacerations which could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis of a man. Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. Amalia stated that Remelyn had told her Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos. (crazy lendoy he forced me) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees. The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that while he and his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms. He identified the little girl as Remelyn. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees. The policemen came and took appellant for investigation. DEFENSE GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC. With him was Totong Loyola, the brotherin-law of Amalia. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellants aunt, to ask for vinegar for their kinilaw. They found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where Catalina was collecting tuba (fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen. They reached Catalinas place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and appellants parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Ma lon left, after partaking of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning, appellant and Dodo Malon went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated. He claimed that it was Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying. RTC ruled that Gaudia is guilty of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death with damages. ISSUE: WON the offer of compromise by the parents of the appellant may be taken against him DECISION: NO. Judgment MODIFIED. Sentenced to reclusion perpetua with damages. Section 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another and proceedings against one cannot affect another, except as hereinafter provided. Section 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. 12

HELD:

Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia. o However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant. Appellants defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses claim that it was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done. ACENAS, Sps v. SISON, Sps. (1963)

FACTS:

Angela Sison executed a promissory note, promising to pay Emma Acenas in 26 installments, the first falling due on November 30, 1956 and the last on November 30, 1960. The note provided that failure to pay two consecutive installments would make the balance due and demandable. Mrs. Sison was able to pay up to August 31, 1957 only. Upon her failure to pay the balance of the note, alleged to be in the sum of P8,391.60, she was sued. Her husband, Teofilo Sison, was joined as a defendant pursuant to Article 113 of the Civil Code. In their answer, Mr. Sison denied liability on the ground that he had not signed the promissory note. When the case was called for hearing, counsel for the defendants moved for the postponement of the hearing in view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time within which to confer with them for the purpose of amicably settling this case. Counsel for the plaintiffs objected on the ground that the defendants have been given sufficient time within which to settle this case but failed to do so. On the other hand, when the court indicated to the defendant's counsel that there seems to be no defense on the part of the defendants in this case, and that it would be for the best interest of the latter if the case is terminated by way of judgment on the pleadings or confession of judgment, counsel for defendants offered no objection and asked that confession of judgment by the defendants may be entered in this case provided that the corresponding writ of execution thereof should not be issued until June 30, 1960, to which counsel for the plaintiffs agreed. Hence, this appeal. Appellant Teofilo Sison contends that his lawyer agreed to a judgment on the pleadings but not to a confession of judgment; that he never authorized his lawyer to confess judgment for him and that at any rate he was not liable on the note of his wife. ISSUE: WON the appellant agreed to a confession of judgment DECISION: NO. Decision MODIFIED. Only wife is liable. HELD: The records do not show that Atty. Sison had authority to confess judgment. On the contrary, the decision of states that Atty. Sison "moved for the postponement of the hearing hereof in view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time within which to confer with them for the purpose of amicably settling this case." This indicates that Atty. Sison lacked authority to confess judgment, otw, there would have been no need for him to confer with his clients. This circumstance should have put the trial court on an inquiry as to counsel's authority. o In Natividad v. Natividad, and Anduiza v. Quirona, the Court held that the compromise of causes and confession of judgments appear to stand upon the same footing and that since the compromise may not be effected by counsel without special authority, so may not an agreement to permit judgment to be entered against his client be authorized except with the knowledge and at the instance of the client. Such judgment may be set aside or reopened. Appellees cite decisions of the courts of Georgia which hold that where a settlement of a suit is made by an attorney accepting less than the full amount of the claim in cash, the agreement binds the client if the settlement is carried out by a consent verdict and judgment and the settlement was made without fraud on the part of the attorney or any instruction of the client to the contrary. (Coweta Fertilizer Co. v. Johnson) o As the Court noted in the Natividad case, these cases do not apply here because the Georgia statute is different from our law. In the present case the attorney of the defendant was not endeavoring to collect or enforce his client's claim, but was resisting a suit or claim against his client and consented to the credit in favor of his client. . . . In contrast, Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly requires that attorneys have special authority not only to receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash but also to compromise their client's litigation. Appellees also rely on Holker and others v. Parker, but that case does not support appellees' position, for it was held there that Although an attorney at law, merely as such has strictly speaking no right to make a compromise, yet a court would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be exclaimed against by all, and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been imposed on, or not fairly exercised in the case. But where the sacrifice is such as to leave it scarcely possible that, with a full knowledge of every circumstance, such a compromise could be fairly made, there can be no hesitation in saying that the compromise, being unauthorized and being therefore itself void, ought not to bind the injured party. Though it may assume the form of an award or of a judgment at law, the injured party, if his own conduct has been perfectly blameless, ought to be relieved against it. . . . The Court holds therefore that it was error for the trial court to accept the confession made by counsel without ascertaining his authority to do so, at least with respect to Teofilo Sison. With respect to Angela Sison, however, the judgment will be maintained, there being no claim in this appeal that the confession of judgment made in her behalf was unauthorized. In fact her liability is admitted here. The law requires the joinder of the husband not because he is thereby bound with his wife but because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership which might be held liable in the action. To make the husband solidarily liable with his wife simply because his joinder is required would be to subvert the basic rule that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. (Art. 172, Civil Code.) The only exceptions are when the husband consents; when the wife spends for the usual daily needs of the family (Art. 115); or when she is given the management of the partnership (Arts. 157, 168, 178 and 196). There is no allegation in the complaint that Mrs. Sison incurred her obligation to Mrs. Acenas under any of these exceptions so as to bind the conjugal partnership. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS v. NLRC (2006) FACTS: In NLRCs Resolution dated May 31, 2001, petitioner Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI) was adjudged liable in the total amount of P6,447,008.57 for illegally dismissing 31 complainants-employees and that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioner's retrenchment program. Thereafter, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement dated July 9, 2001, where PJI undertook to reinstate the 31 complainant-employees effective July 1, 2001 without loss of seniority rights and benefits; 17 of them who were previously retrenched were agreed to be given full and complete payment of their respective monetary claims, while 14 others would be paid their monetary claims minus what they received by way of separation pay. 13

The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC for approval. All the employees mentioned in the agreement and in the NLRC Resolution affixed their signatures thereon. They likewise signed the Joint Manifesto and Declaration of Mutual Support and Cooperation which had also been submitted for the consideration of the labor tribunal. The NLRC forthwith issued another Resolution on July 25, 2002, which among others declared that Thus, the compromise agreement was approved and NCMB-NCR-NS-03087-00 was deemed closed and terminated. In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice of Strike on July 1, 2002. In an Order dated September 16, 2002, the DOLE Secretary certified the case to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as NCMB-NCR- NS-07-251-02. In its Resolution dated July 31, 2003, the NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. The May 31, 2001 Resolution declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not attain finality as "it had been academically mooted by the compromise agreement entered into between both parties on July 9, 2001." The Union assailed the ruling of the NLRC before the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision dated August 17, 2004, the appellate court held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling for PJI. The compromise agreement referred only to the award given by the NLRC to the complainants in the said case, that is, the obligation of the employer to the complainants. Petitioners claim that the letter of Atty. Adolfo Romero dated March 20, 2000 was never presented as evidence. Moreover, since the CA is not a trier of facts, it was error on its part to "admit material evidence that was never presented in the instant case (or to lift findings of facts from the abandoned and mooted resolution dated 31 May 2001)." Thus, the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it found that the retrenchment was legal as stated in the appealed decision dated July 31, 2003. Such use of the admissions contained in the said letter dated March 20, 2000 denied them due process as they were not given the opportunity to contest or deny its validity or existence. Petitioners further point out that while the instant petition was filed only by 29 complainants, the dispositive portion of the assailed decision was extended to cover 50 other persons. They insist that the said letter, as well as the findings of a "mooted decision," were used as evidence to support the erroneous decision of the CA; in so doing, the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement served as waiver of an appeal DECISION: YES. Petition DENIED. Judgment AFFIRMED. HELD: The nature of a compromise is spelled out in Article 2028 CC: it is "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Parties to a compromise are motivated by "the hope of gaining, balanced by the dangers of losing." Article 227 LC authorizes compromise agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes." o Thus, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is not appealable, and is immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress, in which case an appeal may be taken against the order denying the motion. Under Article 2037 of the Civil Code, "a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata," even when effected without judicial approval; and under the principle of res judicata, an issue which had already been laid to rest by the parties themselves can no longer be relitigated. When both parties so enter into the agreement, it would only be "natural to presume that such action constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to appeal" against that decision. The order approving the compromise agreement thus becomes a final act, and it forms part and parcel of the judgment that can be enforced by a writ of execution unless otherwise enjoined by a restraining order. Thus, contrary to the allegation of petitioners, the execution and subsequent approval by the NLRC of the agreement forged between it and the respondent Union did not render the NLRC resolution ineffectual, nor rendered it "moot and academic." The agreement becomes part of the judgment of the court or tribunal, and as a logical consequence, there is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal. o In any event, the compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take part in the settlement itself and gave specific individual consent. It must be remembered that a compromise agreement is also a contract; it requires the consent of the parties, and it is only then that the agreement may be considered as voluntarily entered into. A careful perusal of the wordings of the compromise agreement will show that the parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was the question of the monetary claim of several employees. o The agreement was later approved by the NLRC. The case was considered closed and terminated and the Resolution fully implemented insofar as the employees "mentioned in paragraphs 2c and 2d of the compromise agreement" were concerned. Hence, the CA was correct in holding that the compromise agreement pertained only to the "monetary obligation" of the employer to the dismissed employees, and in no way affected the Resolution in NCMB-NCR-NS-03-087-00 dated May 31, 2001 where the NLRC made the pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioners' retrenchment program. To reiterate, the rule is that when judgment is rendered based on a compromise agreement, the judgment becomes immediately executory, there being an implied waiver of the parties' right to appeal from the decision.The judgment having become final, the Court can no longer reverse, much less modify it.

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