General View of Quebec from Point Lvis by Richard Short, 1759, depicting the capital

of New France crouched on its rocky promontory above the St. Lawrence. This view
shows the three waterfront batteries in the Lower Town (the low fortications pierced
by embrasures for artillery). Despite their location, these batteries were unable to
prevent the British eet from ascending the river past the town. (National Archives
of Canada, C-355)
Quebec, :;,,
rui si ici axi rui narrii
c. i. sraci\
evised edition, edited and with new material by
ioxaii i. ciavis
oreword by
xi cuaii noi ii
ioni x nias s s ruii o
ontreal
There would appear in this celebrated
campaign fully as much guid luck
as guid guiding.
ord Selkirks Diary,
Copyright :,,, C.P. Stacey
Copyright estate of C.P. Stacey :cc:
Additional editorial material and bibliography Donald E. Graves :cc:
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be stored in a retrieval
system, translated or reproduced in any form or by any means, photo copying,
electronic or mechanical, without written permission of the publisher.
Quebec, : The Siege and the Battle was rst published in :,,, by the Macmillan
Company of Canada Limited, Toronto. This revised edition includes the complete
text of the original edition and is published by permission of the Master and
Fellows of Massey College in the University of Toronto.
Revised edition edited and with additional material by Donald E. Graves rst
published :cc: by Robin Brass Studio Inc. and reissued in new format :cco by
Robin Brass Studio Inc.
www.rbstudiobooks.com
isnx-:,: ,;-:-,o,:-,c-,
isnx-:c: :-,o,:-,c-
Printed and bound in Canada by Marquis Imprimeur,
Cap-Saint-Ignace, Quebec
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Stacey, C. P. (Charles Perry), :,co-:,,.
Quebec, :;,, : the siege and the battle / C.P. Stacey; edited and with new
material by Donald E. Graves; foreword by Michael Boire. Rev. ed.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isnx ,;-:-,o,:-,c-,
:. Quebec Campaign, :;,,. :. Plains of Abraham, Battle of the, Quebec,
:;,,. I. Graves, Donald E. (Donald Edward). II. Title.
ic,o.s;: :cc; ,;:.c: c:cco-,c;c:;-:
Foreword by Michael Boire vii
Editors Introduction: Charles P. Stacey and the Siege
of Quebec, :;,, xi
Authors Introduction: Two Hundred Years of History xxi
1 Dramatis Personae ,
2 The Fortress :,
3 May and June: Contact ,
4 July: Montmorency o,
5 August: Skirmishing, Cruelty and Devastation ,,
6 The British Change Direction :c,
7 The :,th of September: Approach :,,
8 The :,th of September: Battle :,,
9 The Fall of Canada :;;
ostscript: Generalship at Quebec, :;,, :,
Appendices (see detailed list overleaf ) :c:
Endnotes :o,
Bibliography :;o
Index :,:
Contents
vii
avvrxni crs
A Wolfes Correspondence with the
Brigadiers, August :;,, :c,
B Wolfes Dispatch to Pitt,
: September :;,, :co
C Charles P. Stacey: The Anse au
Foulon, :;,,: Montcalm and
Vaudreuil :::
D Charles P. Stacey: Quebec, :;,,:
Some New Documents ::,
E Order of Battle and Strength,
British Army at Quebec ::
F The Royal Navy at Quebec :,:
G Justice to the Admirals: The Royal
Navy and the Siege of Quebec :,
H Order of Battle and Strength, French
Land and Naval Forces at Quebec :,:
I Military Heritage of the Quebec
Campaign :,,
J Songs of the Siege of Quebec :,o
vi crunr rssavs
British Leadership, :;,, o;
French Leadership, :;,, :::,
The Capital of New France (:) ,,
The Capital of New France (:) c:
The Royal Navy at Quebec, :;,, ,c:
King Georges Army (:) ,,
The Defenders of New France (:) o:,
The City Is Destroyed (:): Gunners,
Weapons and Positions ;o;
The City Is Destroyed (:): The Results :,
Montmorency, ,: July :;,, o;
Skirmishing, Cruelty and Devastation:
The Terrible Summer of :;,, ,o;
Tensions in the British Camp and a
Change of Direction, August :;,, :c,
Above the City, August and
September ::,
King Georges Army (:) ::c:
The Anse au Foulon ::,
The Landing and the Plains :,
The Defenders of New France (:) :,
The Defenders of New France (,) :oc:
The Battle of :, September :;,, (:) :oo;
The Battle of :, September :;,, (:):
Romantic Imagery :;:,
The Fall of the City :c:
The paths of glory lead but to
the grave. :,:,
xavs
The Seven Years War in North America :
The St. Lawrence Theatre of Operations :,
The Quebec Area ,:
The River Operations, JuneSeptember
:;,, ,
The Battle of Montmorency, ,: July :;,, ;
Wolfes Different Plans of Attack,
MaySeptember :;,, :,
The Anse au Foulon, :, September :;,, :c
The Battle of the Plains, :, September
:;,, :,,

Foreword
I
am grateful to Donald E. Graves, the editor of this latest edition of C.P. Staceys
Quebec, : The Siege and the Battle, for the opportunity to contribute a foreword
to this classic work of Canadian military history, justly considered the authoritative
reference on the subject. This book deserves a place in the library of all students, be
they professional or amateur, civilian or military, who wish to fully understand the
complex operations of the French and British armies and navies in the North Ameri-
can theatre during the Seven Years War. Since its appearance nearly fty years ago,
Quebec, has profoundly inuenced all subsequent scholarly examintation of this
landmark battle.
It should not be at all surprising that this book continues to be frequently re-
printed. This is clearly the result of its appeal to many different kinds of readers. In
fact, Staceys devotees are everywhere. Many can be found in the ranks of amateur
historians and interested general readers who prefer popular over academic history
and thus appreciate his skill as a storyteller. Staceys precise and gripping style cap-
tures the drama of the bravery and hard ghting in a bloody battle fought long ago.
In doing so, he takes less than sixty thousand words to narrate the entire campaign
of :;,, in the Saint Lawrence estuary, from its initial strategic context to its tactical
conclusion on the Plains of Abraham. This is an outstanding feat of concision, by
any measure.
For the academic reader, Staceys detailed analysis of the generalship of Wolfe and
Montcalm is as nuanced as it is convincing. As the Canadian Armys Chief Historical
Ofcer during the Second World War and afterward, when he was charged with the
preparation and production of the armys ofcial history, Stacey developed a remark-
able talent for deftly evaluating the personalities and decisions of senior military lead-
ers. As a result, his treatment of Wolfe and Montcalm reects a deep understanding of
their talents, experiences and limitations as well as the political, strategic and military
constraints in which they had to function as national commanders. In this respect,
THE 13TH OF SEPTEMBER: BATTLE QUEBEC, 1759: THE SIEGE AND THE BATTLE
158 159
of the French strength also vary widely. Knoxs gure of ;,:c, communicated to
him by an intelligent Frenchman, seems very high. Townshends is only ,c. It
is apparent that, quite apart from the cc men sent away with Lvis and the force of
something less than ,ccc with Bougainville, there had been considerable wastage in
the French army; prisoners told Wolfe early in August that :,cc Canadians had de-
serted.
:c
If we accept the Journal tenu gure of ,cc for the strength on the battleeld,
we shall probably not be far wrong. It seems likely that the two opposing armies were
very similar in strength. But they were very different in quality. Wolfes men were all
regulars; whereas Montcalm had estimated the strength of his ve battalions of troupes
de terre at :,cc at the beginning of the campaign,
::
and large numbers of these had
been detached or had become casualties in the meantime.
It is interesting to attempt to relate the battleeld to the modern topography. The
best means of doing this is by reference to the contemporary plans made by the British
engineers (the French seem to have made no plans whatever). It is worth reminding
the visitor to Quebec that the present Battleelds Park covers only a small portion of
the actual eld; the British and French lines were astride the Grande Alle, and a great
part of the action took place on ground now covered with buildings. It is useless to try
to locate the events to within a few yards; but it is evident that the right of the British
line lay in the close vicinity of the modern Prison.* Montcalms line before his nal
advance was on the high ground then known as the Buttes Neveu (marked today
by the Martello towers built early in the nineteenth century). Only a scant quarter-
mile separated the two armies. When the French attacked, the main clash took place
somewhere in the area of De Salaberry and Cartier Streets.
W
e have so far said nothing about Colonel de Bougainville, except to quote
the peculiar letter sent to him by Vaudreuil. The question of his doings is
important and interesting.
Considering the signicance of the matter, it is extraordinary how little rst-hand
evidence there is concerning the actions of Bougainville on the night of ::-:, Sep-
tember. His biographer is unable to throw any light on them at all.
::
This has not
prevented many authors from writing about them in detail. Notably, Doughty (who
appears to have been able to convince himself of almost anything) assures us chiey,
it seems, on the basis of a muddled reference by Folign, who was in command of
one of the Quebec batteries, and not in a position to have rst-hand knowledge of
the matter that Holmes ships went up to Pointe-aux-Trembles that night, and that
Bougainville followed them there. He adds that even if some of Holmes vessels went
* This institution is no longer in existence.
downstream, it was still Bougainvilles duty to follow the larger vessels west.
:,
But
as we have seen there is very little indication that Holmes made any upstream feint;
while as for the larger vessels, Holmes detailed account and their own logs make it
quite clear that the largest of all, the Sutherland, remained at anchor at Cap Rouge,
while the next in size, the frigates and sloops, dropped down the river carrying troops
for the landing.
The fact is that there is no good evidence of any movement on Bougainvilles
part on the night of ::-:, September. Apart from a brief and uninformative memo-
randum of the campaign as a whole,
:
only one account written by himself seems to
have survived, and none of his apologists is acquainted with it. It is a letter written to
Bourlamaque ve days after the battle, and so short that it is easily quoted:
:,
You know, Monsieur, the details of our unlucky adventure, the loss of our gen-
eral, of the nest position in the world, and I may almost say, of our honour. A
man allowed himself to be surprised at the Anse des Mres; I was at Cap Rouge (je
suis au cap Rouge). The enemy landed at midnight, I was informed only at eight
oclock. M. de Montcalm marched against them and considered himself obliged
to attack without waiting for me; when I got close enough to come into action,
the army had been routed, and all the enemys forces turned on me.
MAP BY C. C. J. BOND
160 161
The Defenders of New France (3)
Illustrations from from the Ordonnance du Roy de 6 May 1755, the regulation manual for both the troupes de terre
and troupes de la marine, depicting movements for loading and ring a musket, and the position of a kneeling
soldier in the front rank of an infantry line. The smoothbore musket was a clumsy weapon with a slow rate of re but
was effective if used in mass by trained soldiers although this required constant drill. The uniform in these plates
is that of the Garde Royale, which never served in Canada. (Courtesy Museum Restoration Service)
Above: In a copy by artist Eugene Leliepvre of a detail from an 18th-century paint-
ing, French gunners man an artillery piece during the Seven Years War. At the siege of
Quebec, the gun detachments in the fortress were provided by two companies of can-
oniers-bombardiers of the troupes de la marine and naval gunners from the warships
trapped in the river. (Courtesy Parks Canada)
Right: The greater part of the troupes de terre and troupes de la
marine in Montcalms army were armed with the .69 calibre Modle
1728 military musket. It red a smaller round than its British counter-
part but was lighter to carry. (Courtesy Parks Canada)
THE 13TH OF SEPTEMBER: BATTLE QUEBEC, 1759: THE SIEGE AND THE BATTLE
162 163
(After this, it is perhaps unkind to quote Doughty: Bougain ville was not at Cap
Rouge. Had Bougainville been at Cap Rouge at this time, it could only have been
by disobedience of orders.)
:o
If Bougainville had really made any movement up the
river, it is incredible that he should not have mentioned it. And it is worth recalling
that the static posts along the river, including those at Samos and the Foulon, were
under Bougain villes command; he is therefore answerable for the failure to make
adequate arrangements for passing information of the attack. He was an able man,
but his military experience was scarcely equal to the high rank he held and the heavy
responsibilities that rested upon him. Vaudreuil says that Bougainville saw the vessels
going down the river, and nevertheless remained at Cap Rouge, although there was
then only one ship anchored there. Bougainville refrained from mentioning the mat-
ter in his letter to Bourlamaque, so we have no real information as to why he failed to
act. One thing is pretty clear: since he evidently had not left his station that day, and
since it appears that there had been little activity by the British ships for some days
past, the traditional explanation, that his men were worn out by constant marching
and counter-marching in pursuit of the squadron, will not hold water.
O
ne of the oft-repeated stories concerning the Battle of the Plains relates to Mont-
calms artillery. He sent, we are told, to the Chevalier de Ramezay, in command
of the Quebec garrison, to ask for twenty-ve eld pieces which were on the Palace
battery; but Ramezay would give him only three. Parkman tells this story, and almost
every author since his time has echoed it; but one searches the contemporary records in
vain for evidence to support it. And one discovers in the process that de Ramezay was
not in Quebec at the time of the battle! He was absent through illness, and returned
to duty only later in the day. The tale about his refusing the guns seems to rest entirely
upon the authority of Johnstones Dialogue in Hades.
:;
This account of the battle in the
form of an imaginary conversation between Wolfe and Montcalm was, one suspects,
written long afterwards, and it scarcely deserves the importance as a source which
many historians have accorded it. There is no hint of any such incident in any of the
accounts by Frenchmen who were there. It is hard to believe that if it had really hap-
pened it would not have been mentioned by Montbeillard, Montcalms diarist, who
was in charge of the guns on the eld of battle; Montcalm would certainly have told
Montbeillard and Montbeillard would certainly have recorded it. But the artilleryman
merely says, They had sent us some [guns] from the city, and goes on to describe how
he placed them. There is no note of complaint here or in any other diarists account.
In any case, the :, eld guns seem to have existed only in Johnstones imagina-
tion. One version of the Dialogue
:
calls them brass guns, another
:,
omits the adjective;
one calls them two or three pounders, another two-pounders. No such group of
guns appears in the detailed statement of guns surrendered with Quebec on : Sep-
tember.
:c
There are only eight brass guns of any sort on the list, and only two brass
:- pounders. There are only two eld carriages for :-pounders; there are also, however,
:, for -pounders and :; for o-pounders, and there are numerous iron guns of these
last calibres. (Nothing is said of the carriages condition.) It might thus have been
possible to get together :, eld guns in Quebec, but not guns of the sort described
by Johnstone; and there is nothing in the contemporary records to suggest that there
were either gunners to man them or teams to draw them. They could of course have
been man-handled.
As it was, the French out-gunned the British on the battleeld, though it is hard
to establish how many guns they had. Montbeillard, the person best able to tell us, is
vague. He says he detached two guns from the left to the right, and later he speaks
of the pieces on the left, which suggests a minimum of four. Folign says there were
ve guns.
::
At any rate, there were more than the British two. Whether they were as
well served is perhaps doubtful.
Another of Johnstones stories, which has been just as widely circulated as the
one about the guns, has just as much, or as little, evidence to support it. He says that
Montcalm assembled a council of war on the battleeld, and that every member of it
favoured attacking at once. No other source mentions any such thing. Montreuil, who
according to Johnstone argued in the council for attacking in columns instead of in
line, makes no reference to it in the letter to Lvis in which he describes the battle.
::

Montcalm doubtless had some informal discussion with the senior ofcers, but it is
almost incredible that he could have called a formal council without its being in some
way recorded. There is nothing to indicate that Montcalm was ever in any doubt as
to what he had to do; the decision to attack, right or wrong, was his own.
W
hile the French force was concentrating and Montcalm was ranging it in
order of battle, erce and sanguinary skirmishing was going on. The French
had pushed parties of colonial regulars and militiamen forward, in the centre as well
as on the anks, and these were exchanging shots with the British. The ghting was
especially erce on the St. Charles side, where the British occupied a couple of houses
which seem to have changed hands at least once. Montbeillards guns came into action
here, and one of the houses was set on re by one side or the other. French and British
alike suffered casualties by artillery re during this phase.
:,
It was a long way from the centre or left of the Beauport lines to the Heights; but
by half-past nine, according to Malartic, all the units mentioned above had arrived
on the ground. About this time Montbeillard passed from the right to the left on one
of his artillery errands. He writes:
THE 13TH OF SEPTEMBER: BATTLE QUEBEC, 1759: THE SIEGE AND THE BATTLE
164 165
I paused a moment with M. le Marquis de Montcalm, who said to me: We can-
not avoid action; the enemy is entrenching, he already has two pieces of cannon.
If we give him time to establish himself, we shall never be able to attack him with
the sort of troops we have. He added with a sort of shiver, Is it possible that
Bougainville doesnt hear all that noise? He left me without giving me time to
say anything in reply, except that we were very thin on the ground.
:
The moment had almost come. As Montbeillard stood by his guns on the left, he
suddenly saw that the French battle-line was in motion, M. de Montcalm at its head
and on horse-back.
Many books assure us that Wolfe had put on a new uniform which rendered him
an obvious mark for enemy sharpshooters; but for this as for so many other stories one
looks in vain for support in the contemporary records. But that he exposed himself
recklessly cannot be doubted. He was active in the forefront as the skirmishing pro-
ceeded. Mackellar says, The general moved about everywhere, but after the action
began kept on a rising ground where our right stood, from whence he had a view of
the whole eld. Townshend in his notes tells how just before the French advance
Wolfe came towards ye left, and nding all well there returned to the centre. The
re of the French skirmishers was deadly enough to lead Wolfe to order his troops
to lie down,
:,
and they doubtless lay on their arms until it became obvious that the
French were about to advance.
I
t was about ten oclock when Montcalm gave the order to march. (Practically all
the ships logs give this as the time when the noise of the general action was heard.)
The ensigns let the big silk colours y; the drums rolled out the charge; across the
intervening space the British heard a deep-throated cheer. No doubt the gayness and
the gilt of the ve French battalions had suffered somewhat during the long summer
of campaigning; yet they must still have been a gallant sight as they moved down the
slope in their white uniforms. De bonne grace so say both Montreuil and Malartic
the mingled array of regulars and militiamen went forward to ght for the colony
and the King.
The French advanced at a run much too fast, Malartic told Bourlamaque. They
paid now for Montcalms error of judgement in incorporating a body of militia in every
regular battalion. The formation began to fall to pieces immediately. We had not gone
twenty paces, writes Malartic, when the left was too far in rear and the centre too far
in front.
:o
At half-musket-shot from the British the shaky line came to a halt to re
an unsteady volley; the same witness says, the Canadians who formed the second rank
and the soldiers of the third red without orders, and according to their [the Canadi-
ans] custom threw themselves on the ground to reload. This false movement broke
all the battalions. (It is not easy to load a muzzle-loader in the prone position; but
Malartic is presumably writing about things he saw.) Montbeillard gives a slightly dif-
ferent account. He says, The French and Canadian front rank had gone down on one
knee [to re] and lay down after the volley. Knoxs version is that the French began to
re when :,c yards from the British. He indicates that they continued ring until they
came within c yards; but the French accounts suggest that many of the troops never
advanced beyond the point where the ring began. Malartics journal says that the men
who lay down went to the right about the moment they picked themselves up.
The scarlet line of British infantry stood impassive. General Wolfe, Quartermas-
ter-Sergeant Johnson recalled many years later, had given positive Orders, not to re
a Shot until the Enemy should be within Forty Yards of the point of our Bayonets.
(There are various accounts of the actual range at which re was opened. and it is
interesting that Townshend said oc yards in the draft of his dispatch,
:;
but changed
this to c in the nal version.) The British guns tore the French formation with their
grape-shot, but the muskets each loaded on Wolfes instructions with an additional
ball remained silent, the disciplined soldiers waiting for the word. Nevertheless, the
schoolbook story of the single crashing volley that nally came the most perfect
volley ever red on battleeld, says Sir John Fortescues History of the British Army
is an oversimplication. The French witnesses do not speak of such a volley; Mont-
beillard says that the British replied to the French discharge with a very lively platoon
re that is, a re by platoons in succession. Knox does tell us, however, that the
British units in the centre, being little affected by the oblique re of the enemy, did
re like a single cannon-shot. There was no way of coordinating the ring of a single
volley across that long line. No doubt each individual battalion commander judged
the distance and gave the word himself. Nor did the British stand fast as long as has
been reported. It seems likely that their rst re was by platoons; that the units after
ring moved a few yards forward to get clear of the smoke; and that the general
volley came then. Here is the version given on the great engineers plan signed by
Mackellar
:
probably as good a short contemporary account as exists:
The French Line began the charge about nine [we have seen that it was probably
about ten] advancing briskly and for some little time in good order, a part of their
Line began to re too soon, which immediately catchd throughout the whole,
then they began to waver but kept advancing with a scattering Fire. When they
had got within about a hundred yards of us our Line movd up regularly with a
steady Fire, and when within twenty or thirty yards of closing gave a general one;
upon which a total route of the Enemy immediately ensued.