G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987 ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. CORTES, J.:FACTS: Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners. Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal. Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to find out what the documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages. In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing the checks by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment. Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.

ISSUES: I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution; II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606; III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code; RULING: 1. The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. We find no variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e). 2. In De Guzman v. People: Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the "Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each" while Section 5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other. As long as a division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan.

3. Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares,

102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-petitioner. G.R. No. 124067 March 27, 1998 PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO, and WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners, vs. The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents. FACTS: A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Ombudsman's Office after which Graft Investigation Officer A.A. Amante submitted a Resolution dated August 2, 1994 2 recommending, among others, that: 1) petitioners Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, Winifredo SM Pangilinan, as well as Gilberto Pastoral and Cecilia Vales be charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for having in "one way or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence;" and 2) the NPC President, NPC Chairman and Members of the Board of Directors be cleared of the . . . complaint as their official actuation of sustaining a failure of bidding and the consequent re-bidding is supported by factual and legal basis. An information was accordingly filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioners Segovia, Santiago, and Pangilinan, as well as Pastoral and Vales, docketed as Criminal Case No. 21711. They were charged with infringement of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: i.e. "causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." Earlier, the People had filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite" dated October 24 1995, invoking Section 13 of RA 3019, as amended, and relevant jurisprudence, and alleging that the "information/s is/are valid." 8 Petitioners opposed the motion. 9 In their pleading dated November 28, 1995, they theorized that the explicit terms of the law notwithstanding, their suspension was not mandatory in the premises. They claimed that the admissions at the pre-trial show that the transactions in question resulted in no unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, or injury, to anyone; that two of the five accused were no longer employees of the NPC. the Sandiganbayan 10 handed down its Resolution suspending them for a period of ninety (90) days. 11 The Sandiganbayan held that the

suspension was mandated under the law upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had been conducted, the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of the crimes specified in the law; and stressed that its "authority and power to suspend the accused had been repeatedly upheld" in several precedents. ISSUE: Petitioners assail their suspension and contend that the issuance of the resolution prescribing it was rendered in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. RULING: In Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 13 the Court held that such suspension was not penal in character but merely a preventive measure before final judgment; hence, the suspension of a public officer charged with one of the crimes listed in the amending law, committed before said amendment, does not violate the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. The purpose of suspension is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence, or from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. 14 Substantially to the same effect was the Court's holding, in 1991, in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 15 that preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty; and a person under preventive suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability must still be established. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions including preventive suspension should be acknowledged as within the competence of the court that has taken cognizance thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment. 16 Imposition of suspension, however, is not automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition therefor is the existence of a valid information, determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law, considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, and the demands of public interest for a speedy determination of the issues involved in the case. 26 The purpose of the pre-suspension hearing is basically to determine the validity of the information and thereby furnish the court with a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. 31

G.R. No. 175457

July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FACTS: The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against petitioners.8 Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr.( police who fetched the Mayor from the jail and brought him to the Governors house) were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. Petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail. At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held. ISSUES: The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr.- (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5)24 of the RPC. Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2)

Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC. RULING: *FOR AMBIL Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26 As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249.28 The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;] xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. xxxx Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan. The second element for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as follows: "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners case beyond the ambit of said law? We believe not.

In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a human being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party. Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.49 Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the provincial jail. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayors life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail. *FOR APELADO In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the first requisite is present in this case. While the order for Adalims transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the RPC. Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.s willful cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order.

G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36). On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992. On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164). On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice. The SC ordered Garchitorena to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court. Issue: Santiago claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 Ruling: In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that: (1) She was a public officer;

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984; (3) Those aliens were disqualified; (4) She was cognizant of such fact; and (5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions." The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held: The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.

G.R. No. 148560 (LADIES:

November 19, 2001

For your convenience, I have included in this digest the following topics: Art. 183, RPC and Illegal use of Alias. P.S.---- It seems however that the Court did not directly dwell on these issues. No bit nor speck of the said topics were discussed in the ruling. If I understand the Ruling right, the offense of plunder is committed by committing a series of acts with a certain goal or purpose. It is as if the acts of perjury and illegal use of alias were a part of the intricate web of the acts of plunder; OR THERE MAY BE ANOTHER CASE for the 183 and alias case. HAHAHAHA!) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder: Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, xxx violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." In passing,these are the contents of the information:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE , did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING

HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows: (a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF; (b) (b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds; (c) (c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000; and (d) (d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS

ISSUE: Petitioner bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad. RULING: Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill. Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. RA 3019 ASPECT- ginamit si RA 3019 to show that words of similar import have been used in other laws but are nonetheless valid and NOT VAGUE; therefore, not unconstitutional. The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted. In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses. The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.