UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: August 1, 2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x IN THE MATTER

OF: ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x OBJECTION, REPLY TO CORPORATE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISSMIS MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, under penalty of perjury, deposes and says: 1. I am the plaintiff in the within action. 2. I make this objection and affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (SAC). ASSERTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3. United States Constitution and Constitution of the State of New York protect individual

constitutional rights to form a contract and conduct commerce. Therefore, All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and void." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.137, 174,176. A law that "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 US 55, 76; Harris v. McRae, 448 US 297,312. 4. A law that improperly infringes on Constitutional Rights is void from its inception and no person can be obligated to obey such a law. 16A Am Jur2d Constitutional Law, Section 203.5 5. "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 6. The Supreme Court has forcefully established that court proceedings must be within Constitutional provisions. Smith v. US, 360 US 1; Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346. 7. "But whenever the judicial power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other authority can intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it." Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S., 414 pg. 468. Violation of Constitutional Rights voids in personam jurisdiction. 8. "A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void." World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 291; National Bank v. Wiley, 195 US 257; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714. 9. "If the Bill of Rights is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment ... pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void ... " Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458,468. 10. . " ... the requirements of due process must be met before the court can properly assert in

personam jurisdiction." Wells Fargo v. Wells Fargo, 556 F2d 406, 416. 11. . "It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged violates due process." Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 US 478. Assertion Of Constitutional Right To Petition Government For Redress Of Grievances 12. Plaintiff, Pro Se for the 2nd time requests the court and its officers to be mindful of his Pro Se status. In cases and precedents that mostly reported, there is a presumption that party represented by trained and licensed attorneys. KRICHEVSKY, however, is none of them. Below are the cases that apply directly to Plaintiffs status: Wright v. SZCZUR, Dist. Court, WD New York 2012 Although pled inartfully and in a rather conclusory fashion, considering the Wrights' pro se status, such allegations state a valid claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court has instructed the district courts to construe pro se complaints liberally and to apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint than they would in reviewing a pleading submitted by counsel."). See also The Erie County Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, which protects officials from 1983 liability if their actions (1) did not violate clearly established law or (2) were objectively reasonable. See Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999). However, if the Wrights establish that these Defendants violated their constitutional right to care

for their children, they are not entitled to this immunity for two reasons. First, this law is clearly established. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (noting Supreme Court's "historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment"). Second, without more facts, this Court cannot conclude that it was objectively reasonable for these Defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate the Wrights' rights. It is alleged that they misrepresented and forged documents and testimony. Such acts are not objectively reasonable; Defendants are therefore not entitled to the protections of qualified immunity at this time. 13. In Harnett v. Barr, 538 F. Supp. 2d 511 (2008) the court stated: Motion to Dismiss A court may not dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir.1994) (citing inter alia Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id. (citing Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 84 S.Ct. 1733, 12 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1964) (per curiam)). In determining whether a complaint states a cause of action, great liberality is afforded to pro se litigants. Platsky v. Central Intelligence Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Amend the Complaint In using its discretion in determining whether to allow a party leave to amend, the court must follow Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) which provides that leave to amend will be granted "freely . . . when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The court may also, "on just terms", grant a party leave to supplement, setting forth transactions, occurrences, or events that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d). A court may allow supplementation even if the original pleading is defective in stating a claim ordefense. Id. The standards for a motion to amend and a motion to supplement are the same. See Smith v. Goord, 04-CV-6432, 2006 WL 2850597, *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74015, *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2006 )(emphasis added) 14. In Kemer v. Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 677 (1995) the court stated: "In order to justify the dismissal of a pro se complaint, it must be `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Platsky, 953 F.2d at 28 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 595). 15. In Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 640 (1994) the court stated: Summary judgment may not be granted unless the submissions of the parties taken together "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. In making this judgment, the

burden is on the moving party, and all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment in discrimination cases in which intent is an issue, the court must exercise extra caution. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). This extra caution is further warranted in cases such as this one in which there has been only limited document discovery. Finally, this Court must construe a pro se complaint more liberally and apply a more flexible standard in determining whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. See Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991). Thus, in determining whether to grant summary judgment, this Court must (i) determine whether a factual dispute exists, and (ii) determine, based on the substantive law at issue, whether the fact in dispute is material. 16. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-421(1995); In re Haines: pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than admitted or licensed bar attorneys. Regardless of the deficiencies in their pleadings, pro se litigants are entitled to the opportunity to submit evidence in support of their claims. 17. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000); In re Anastasoff: litigants' constitutional (guaranteed) rights are violated when courts depart from precedent where

parties are similarly situated. The court stated:Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 177-78, 900*900 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). These principles, which form the doctrine of precedent, were well established and well regarded at the time this nation was founded. See also It is often said among judges that the volume of appeals is so high ... We do not have time to do a decent enough job...the remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each case. 18. In this case, every party except KRICHEVSKY represented by licensed attorneys, and therefore, the parties are not similarly situated and Pro Se standard applied by the court. 19. INTRODUCTION, OPENING STATEMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND 20. AFFIDAVIT OF MATERIAL FACTS 21. If this Honorable court finds any problem with KRICHEVSKYs TAC, KRICHEVSKY particularly objects to defendants attorney BACKGROUND in instant motion as fraudulent and misleading the court. KRICHEVSKY already objected to the so-called facts in his prior frivolous motion to dismiss, exhibit A. Because the defendants failed to rebut KRICHEVSKYs averments in opposition to that motion, it is presumed that they admitted.

22. Plaintiff demands name, address, telephone number of manufacturer which produces meters to measure level of specificity in allegation cause of action for fraud. Plaintiff will rash and buy it in order to manufacture complaint for fraud according to this meter level. 23. KRICHEVSKY avers that SVENSON kept the charade of attending different medical schools and courses. 24. Oceana defendants conspired to obstruct Justice to Plaintiff. They hired Belkin, which without valid retainer and/or written waivers, fraudulently misrepresented facts and law in Bankruptcy Court. After plaintiff filed motion to disqualify Belkin, Oceana defendants hired another law firm to continue obstructing Justice to Plaintiff. This firm has no valid retainer and/or waivers of conflict of interest, and continued the same pattern of delay and obstruction of Justice. That constitutes conspiracy to obstruct justice. 25. It is a manifest injustice to allow Margolis to represent all 4 defendants. 26. OCEANA breached contract with KRICHEVSKY by failing to control individual defendants and protect him from their misconduct. In New York, all contracts imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealings in the course of performance. This covenant embraces a pledge that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of that contract. 27. CAUSE OF ACTION unfair competition 28. Defendants acted illegally Svenson, Edelstein, Oceana etc. Svenson is illegal immigrant. 29. SVENSON committed witness tampering, by telling her sister, Larissa Gaber, not to come to Family Court under subpoena. 30. SVENSON owed a fiduciary duty to KRICHEVSKY as his partner.

31. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION AGAINST OCEANA