CALALANG VS.

WILLIAMS Facts: The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality. Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice Held: The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

Chavez vs Bonto-Perez
on June 23, 2011

Labor Standards Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers Laches

Chavez is a dancer who was contracted by Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation to perform in Japan for 6 months. The contract was for $1.5k a month, which was approved by POEA. After the approval of said contract, Chavez entered into a side contract reducing her salary with her Japanese employer through her local manager-agency (Jaz Talents Promotion). The salary was reduced to $500 and $750 was to go to Jaz Talents. In February 1991 (two years after the expiration of her contract), Chavez sued Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents for underpayment of wages before the POEA. The POEA ruled against her. POEA stated that the side agreement entered into by Chavez with her Japanese employer superseded the Standard Employment Contract; that POEA had no knowledge of such side agreement being entered into; that Chavez is barred by laches for sleeping on her right for two years. ISSUE: Whether or not Chavez is entitled to relief.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that the managerial commission agreement executed by Chavez to authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct her salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment contract approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:

It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void;
The side agreement which reduced Chavezs basic wage is null and void for violating the POEAs minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the POEA. Here, both Centrum Placement and Jaz Talents are solidarily liable. Laches does not apply in the case at bar. In this case, Chavez filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. For this reason, laches is not applicable.

Marsaman Manning and Diamantides Maritime vs NLRC and Cajeras

on June 21, 2011

Labor Standards Standard Employment Contract POEA Mutual Consent Migrant Workers Act
Marsaman Manning was the local agency of Diamantides Maritime. In June 1995, Marsaman contracted Cajeras to be a cook in one of the ships operated by Diamantides (MV Prigipos). The contract was for 10 months. But less than 2 months later, Cajeras was sent back home. The captain of the shop, in his entry to the Deck Log, said that the dismissal of Cajeras was of mutual consent; that a certain Dr. Hoed diagnosed Cajeras to be having some sort of a mental disorder. Cajeras subsequently sued Marsaman for illegal dismissal. NLRC ruled in favor of Cajeras. Marsaman assailed the NLRC decision. Marsaman further alleged that in awarding backpays to workers, the law applicable should be Sec. 10 or RA 8042 (or 3 months salary for every year of service). ISSUE: Whether or not Cajeras was illegally dismissed. HELD: Yes. There was no proof of the mutual consent between the captain and Cajeras. Under the Standard Employment Contract by the POEA, mutual consent of leaving overseas

employment should be reduced in writing. There was no showing that Cajeras reduced his consent to writing. The captains entry in the Deck Log is a mere unilateral act which does not bind Cajeras. Further, the Deck Log was not properly produced and authenticated (unlike in a previous case Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC). On the other hand, Dr. Hoed was not shown to be qualified to be making such diagnosis. The court cannot take judicial notice of his findings without competent proof as to his qualification. Neither did Dr. Hoed elaborate his findings which were mere sweeping statements as to Cajeras illness. It did not show how such illness affected Cajeras function. In fact, as per the last rating of Cajeras, he was rated as a Very Good cook. Section 10 of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) is indeed applicable but the assertion of Marsaman to pay only 3 months of Cajerass salary is untenable. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one year or more (Cajeras was contracted for 10 months only). This is evident from the words for every year of the unexpired term which follows the words salaries x x x for three months. To follow Marsamans thinking that Cajeras is entitled to three months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days. Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042. Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts; 2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector. HELD: On the first issue. The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable. The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and wellbeing of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

On the second issue. The answer is in the affirmative. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment; The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection. The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila

on November 22, 2010

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,

hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

Estrada vs. Escritor Case Digest

Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a lettercomplaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Pias learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband. Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that shes been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct. Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

LABOR REL: WENPHIL SERRANO AGABON DOCTRINE Distinguished THE DISMISSAL IS FOR A JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE BUT DUE PROCESS WAS NOT OBSERVED. Due Process to be Observed by The Employer - For termination of the employment based on the any of the just causes for termination, the requirements of due process that an employer must comply with are: (TWIN NOTICES) 1. Written notice should be served to the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination and giving the said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain; 2. A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel, if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence and present the evidence presented against him; 3. A written notice of termination, if termination is the decision of the employer, should be served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. For termination of employment based on authorized causes, the requirements of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional office of the Department of Labor and employment at least thirty days before the effectivity of the termination specifying the grounds for termination. NOTE: Under the so-called WENPHIL DOCTRINE if the services of the employee was terminated due to a just or authorized cause but the affected employees right to due

process has been violated, the dismissal is legal but the employee is entitled to damages by way of indemnification for the violation of the right. SERRANO vs. ISETANN et. al. abandoned the WENPHIL DOCTRINE and ruled that if the employee is dismissed under just or authorized cause but the affected employees right to due process has been violated, his dismissal becomes ineffectual. Therefore, the employee is entitled to backwages from the time he was dismissed until the determination of the justness of the cause of the dismissal. AGABON vs. NLRC (Nov. 17, 2004) abandoned the Serrano doctrine and REINSTATED THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE. The sanctions, however must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.

Synopsis on the developments in the law.

In the last couple of decades, the Supreme Court has grappled with the legal effect and the corresponding sanction in cases where there exists a just and valid ground to justify the dismissal but the employer fails to comply with the due process requirement of the law. Prior to the promulgation in 1989 of Wenphil v. NLRC, [170 SCRA 69, February 8, 1989], the prevailing doctrine held that dismissing employees without giving them proper notices and an opportunity to be heard was illegal and that, as a consequence thereof, they were entitled to reinstatement plus full backwages. Wenphil abandoned this jurisprudence and ruled that if the dismissal was for a just or an authorized cause but done without due process, the termination was valid but the employer should be sanctioned with the payment of indemnity ranging from P1,000.00 to P10,000.00.

In 2000, the Supreme Court promulgated Serrano v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 117040, January 27,

2000], which modified Wenphil. It considered such termination ineffectual (not illegal) and
sanctioned the employer with payment of full backwages plus nominal and moral damages, if

warranted by the evidence. In case the dismissal was for an authorized cause, separation pay in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code should be awarded.

In 2004, the Supreme Court in Agabon v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004], abandoned Serrano and effectively reverted to Wenphil (known also as the Belated Due Process Rule) and held that a dismissal due to abandonment - a just cause - was not illegal or ineffectual, even if done without due process; but the employer should indemnify the employee with nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process. (Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc. v. Nagkakaisang Empleyado ng Wellcome-DFA, G.R. No. 149349, March 11, 2005).