Challenge to Externality: A Buddhist Perspective

Submitted By:
Manish kumar Philosophy

Buddhist doctrine of pratityasamutpda holds that everything in this world is dependently originated. Thus, there is nothing that is essentially real. There are a number of factors which come together to give rise to something. For the Vijnnavdins, there is a single reality called vijnapti and thus their position is called vijnaptimtrat. According to them, all that exists is only ideas,

representations, images, imaginations, creations of the mind, to which no real object existing outside the mind corresponds. These ideas are the only object of any cognition. Vijnnavdins pose a strong opposition to the realist Naiyyikas for whom what we are directly aware of in our perception is the physical reality that exists independently of our awareness of it. Vasubandhu, in his Vijnaptimtratsiddhi, attacks the realist position and gives arguments to refute the same.

The paper begins with the meaning of the term externality in the present context i.e. the ontological status of external objects in a realist school. For the

realists, our cognition of an object is same as the object itself. The object exists independent of our perception. Following this, I bring forth the challenge to this externality. This challenge is put forward by Vasubandhu in Vimatik, the first part of his work Vijnaptimtratsiddhi. The task taken up by Vasubandhu here is to prove the hollowness of the claim that external objects are real. With the help of arguments like dream experience, Vasubandhu dissolves the correspondence between a concept and an object of experience.

However,

in his Madhyamakvatra, Candrakrti attacks the Vijnnavdin

notion of cittamtara or consciousness-only. He criticizes the dream-illustration

given by Vasubandhu. There is a brief discussion on the same. After going through Vasubandhus take on realism in Vimatik, the later part of the paper i s an exposition of his theory of consciousness i.e., vijnnaparinma or transformation of consciousness and trisvabhva or the doctrine of three natures of consciousness.

The

primary

texts

for

my

present

study

are:

Vasubandhus

Vijnaptimtratsiddhi.

One of the chief problems of philosophy has been regarding the nature of reality and a number of enquiries have been done into it. Broadly, there are two positions on this issue, one of which is realist and the other is idealist.1 As the present paper aims to bring out challenges charged at externality, I would begin with a brief introduction to the realist position, which advocates that the mind apprehends an external object which exists irrespective of its being apprehended by the mind.2

The term externality, in the present context, represents the realist position on external objects. T.R.V. Murti rightly points out that the Nyya-Vaiesika

is the most intelligible of the Indian Realism. He says that it is nearer to commonsense than any other realist system. There is a surprising comprehensiveness and neatness about its tenets without loss of rigour. This is due in great measure to the close modelling of the categories on every day speech. Hence its great hold upon our empirical mind. Murti thinks that we are all Naiyyikas first and continue to be so unless by a special effort we free ourselves from the empirical habits of our mind.3 This special effort should be credited to the Buddhists who try to

deconstruct or common-sense beliefs.

For the Naiyyikas, each object has an individuality of its own. According to Murti, the independence of the object of all subjective influence logically implies the individuality and distinctness of each object. This is, thus, in contrast

1 2

D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism (Agra University, 1964), 39 Ibid., 39 3 T.R.V. Murti, Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti (Motilal Banrsidass, 1996), 135

to the idealistic tendency to subjectify the object.4 In Nyya, what we are directly aware of in our perception is the physical reality that exists independently of our awareness of it. This reality exists in the external world as a whole.

An object, for the Naiyyikas, is a cluster of atoms (avayavas), consisting of properties (viesana), relations (sambandha) and a structure (viesya). The

avayavas come together to form avayavin or the whole. This individual whole has a class, which is called the universal or smnya. The reason why Naiyyikas believe that there is a whole is that an object, in its atomic condition, cannot be perceived since atoms are beyond the reach of sense-organs. Yet, we have objects of perception in the world. There is a whole because we can hold, pull, push these objects. Had there been no wholes, it would have been impossible to actually experience the objects. The basic principle of Nyya-Vaiesika can be understood as that everything is definable as well as knowable as object.

The object is real along with its properties and relations. They are as real as the object itself. As D.N. Shastri says, the formulation of the Nyya-Vaiesika

categories is a clear-cut and sharp differentiation between properties and the substance in which they inhere. The substance and its properties are held to be two distinct and different entities with separate essences and separate set of causes. Properties are subordinate to the substance only in the sense that the former are always found only as inhering in a substance. Thus, the basic principle of the

T.R.V. Murti, Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti, 136

Nyya-Vaiesika metaphysics is the theory of dharma-dharmin-bheda i.e., the differentiation in essence between the substrata and their properties.5

However, the realist theory has created a lot of unrest among the idealists, particularly the Buddhists. Vasubandhu, in his Vijnaptimtrtsiddhi, has attacked the realist position. It is important to understand here that the use of the term idealists for the Yogcrins is done only with reference to their epistemology. That is to say, Yogcrins are not denying the metaphysical reality of an object, but they maintain that the things we believe ourselves to perceive are only the our ideas. In short, as D.N. Shastri says, they hold that there is no objective world independent of the perceiving mind.6 In the following section, I would discuss the objections that Yogcrins have raised against Naiyyikas.

Vasubandhus Vijnaptimatratasiddhi is divided into two sections viz. Vimatik and Trimik. Vimatik is basically an examination of the commonsense view, i.e. the realist view. The fundamental principle of the Yogcra is the non-distinction between subject and object, which is a complete anti-thesis of the realists. Thus, the challenge that Vasubandhu advance towards the realists is based on this issue. The Yogcrin position may be well understood as bhyrthanyat or the denial of a real external object.

The whole idea of Yogcra thesis is contained in the opening krik of Vimatik, which is as follows:
5 6

D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, 77 Ibid., 42

There is a mere concept, because it reflects a substantially non-existent object, like the perception of hair and [double] moon on the part of one afflicted with eye-disease.7

Through this krik, Vasubandhu is trying to demonstrate that to believe that something such exists in the external world which corresponds to our concept is due to a fault in cognition. As erroneous is the vision of a diseased-eye that sees floating hair in the air or a double moon, so is the vision of a substantially nonexistent object. What is meant here is precisely that the outside world does not exist in the structure we impose onto it. Structuring is the doing of the

consciousness; and if we can show that there is no correspondence between the external object and our concept of it, we are left with the concept alone.

Commenting on this krik, Sylvan Levi explains that the possibility of such illusory perceptions is because of the reason that they are conditioned by various factors. Even if one is not afflicted by an eye-disease, one of the most important factors that determine sensory experience is human disposition (samskras or vsans). So, to assume that an object can be known without any distortion and can be known as it is, is to claim too much. It is this over -claim of the metaphysical realist that Vasubandhu criticizes as the non-existent object.8

7 8

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology(Sri Satguru publications, 1992), 173 Ibid., 174

As far as Vasubandhus contention of mere concept is concerned, it can be understood through the very name of his text, Vijnaptimtratsiddhi or as vijnaptimtrat alone i.e., mind-only or consciousness-only. Hence Vasubandhus position can be stated as: All that exists is only ideas, representations, images, imaginations, creations of the mind, to which no real object existing outside the mind corresponds. These ideas are the only object of any cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe. It is similar to a dream, a mirage, a magical illusion, where what we perceive are only products of our mind, without a real external existence.9

This is also the reason that Buddhists do not approve of the realist theory of two-staged perception. As the Naiyayikas believe, perception of an object takes place in two stages, nirvikalpa pratyaksa or indeterminate perception and savikalpa pratyaksa or determinate perception. The first stage involves a mere subject-object contact, while the second stage is the one where the concept of the object is formed. Buddhists like Dignga, who has acutely criticized Nyya theory of perception, would object here that when the conception happens, mental associations are ascribed to the object. The object which came in contact with the sense is no more the same when understood as having qualities, relations etc. that are actually attributed to it by the mind.

Coming back to the meaning of vijnaptimtrat, when Vasubandhu explains his theory as mere concept, he certainly does not mean that a non-existent
9

Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: Yogcra Philosophy of Buddhism (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2004), xxiii

object is absolutely imagined or false. On the contrary, it is an experience that involves ones depositional tendencies (samskras or vsans) and which is communicated through a concept. Vasubandhu does not mean that truth or reality is beyond description, but that he follows Buddhas own explanation that there are no eternal truths apart from sense-experience and which are communicated through concepts. As sense-experience is dispositionally conditioned and, therefore, liable to change depending upon conditions, the concepts by means of which such experience is communicated could not be incorruptible nor can they represent an object that is completely independent.10

Such a take on objects creates restlessness among the realists. objection to this has been expressed in krik-2 of the Vimatik:

Their

If a concept were to be without a real object, neither the determination of space and time, nor the non-determination of the [perceptual stream] nor fruitful activity would be proper.11

Thomas A. Kochumuttom explains the above krik as: Normally an experience is determined by the place where, and the time when, its object is given; it is not however, determined with regard to the individuals enjoying it, in the sense that anybody present at that place and time inevitably has that experience; finally, it is also observed that a particular experience always prompts the same sort of actions. All this is so, it is argued, because the experience
10 11

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 174-175 Ibid., 175

corresponds to extra-mental objects.12 However, in case this correspondence is denied, there would be no proper determination of space, time, individuals experiencing and actions prompted.

In response to this, Vasubandhu argues:

As in dreams, the determination of space etc., is established. Furthermore, as in case of departed spirits, the non-determination of the [perceptual] stream is established by the perception of the stream of puss etc., by all of them.
13

On this, Sylvan Levi points out a very important feature of Vasubandhus theory that he is least interested in discovering a special intuitive faculty through which a real object, whether it is eternal or not, could be perceived. Levi says that instead of looking for any transcendence, he prefers to deal with the problem of sense-experience itself. Vasubandhu questions, if the determinations of space and time are possible in dream-experience even without the so-called real objects, why is it necessary to posit such an object when one is called upon to explain sense-experience?14

12 13

Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 167 David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 176 14 Ibid., 176

Now the dream of certain objects occurs only at certain places and that too, only at certain times. Thus, dream-experience, too, even though it does not

correspond to extra-mental objects, is determined by space and time. Again, all ghosts are believed to have the same experience of pus-river etc., although the latter are not extra-mental objects. So, experience shared by all individuals present does not necessarily guarantee reference to extra-mental objects.15

With respect to fruitful activity, Vasubandhu argues that certain fixed actions resulting from an experience is not an assurance that there is an external and independent object. He says that even dream-experiences produce certain fixed actions. For example, on seeing a lion in his dream, one wakes up out of fear. Therefore, experience does not guarantee one-to-one correspondence

between concepts and extra-mental objects. Experience starts not with an extramental object but with consciousness, which alone can supply the forms of subjectivity and objectivity.16

However, the dream example of Vasubandhu does not stand good with the Mdhyamikas. In his Madhyamakvatra, Candrakrti refutes this example to be an appropriate one. He explains that while the Cittamtrins or the Yogcrins may sleep in a tiny room and dream about wild elephants, obviously, no elephant is present (there is only mind, devoid of real objects). From the Mdhyamika point of view, in the absence of external referents, consciousness cannot be produced in

15 16

Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 168 Ibid., 170

the aspect of such referents. The Mdhyamikas say that there is no real cognitive subject, just as there is no real elephant as the object.17

The Cittamtrins would say here that if while dreaming, consciousness is not real, it follows that on waking, it would be impossible to recall ones dreams. But as a matter of fact, one does remember them, and this shows that mind is real. To this Mdhyamikas reply that in that case, the object of the dream should be as real as the dreaming-consciousness. For if, having woken up, one remembers and thinks, I dreamed about such and such a thing, this thing must have the same degree of existence as the subject, the dreaming consciousness.18

To this, Cittamtrins would respond by arguing that since the visual sense power is not operative during sleep, there is no corresponding visual consciousness. Therefore, there cannot actually be any extra-mental shapes and colours as objects of perception. The mental consciousness remains, however, and this, altered or affected by the state of sleep, manifests in the form of outer objects. These various aspects of the mental consciousness are taken to be extra-mental phenomena. And what happens in the waking state, is exactly the same as what happens in the dreaming state. Vasubandhu adds here that unless one has roused from the sleep of ignorance, he cannot realise the unreality of the objects.19

17

Candrakrt, Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakris Madhyamakvatra with Commentary by Ju Mipham (Shambhala Publications, 2005), 229-230 18 Ibid., 230 19 Ibid., 231

Vasubandhu then goes on prove that the perceptual evidence of the objective world cannot be trusted. In order to do this, he attacks the Nyya atom-theory:

Atom-wise, an object is neither one nor many.

Neither is it a

conglomeration of them. For that reason, an atom is not established.20

In his auto-commentary, Vasubandhu explains the implications of the theory of atoms, as it emerged in the Vaiesika school. According to him, the Vaiesikas believed that spheres like material form (rpa), which holds one-to-one correspondence with the concepts of material form, represent a unity in terms of a molecule, i.e., an entity that consists of parts (avayavrpa). However, in terms of atoms it is a plurality (aneka). Vasubandhu argues that a whole is not perceived apart from its parts. Even so, a molecule is nowhere perceived independent of its constituents. Similarly, the object is not a unity of atoms or parts. Neither is it plurality, for the atoms that go to constitute a molecule are also not perceived, either as individual units (pratyeka) or as an aggregate (samghta).21

Vasubandhu here aims to abandon the whole theory of the Naiyyikas. Levi says that Vasubandhus realization that as a Buddhist he could not argue for an empirical foundation of a theory of atoms, as the Vaiesikas did, compelled him to resort to rational arguments to deny its validity. Therefore, he argues: When an atom has to combine with six others from six directions, it has to possess six facets. For one atom cannot occupy the space of another. However, if each atom were to
20 21

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 182 Ibid., 183

occupy an identical space and, by definition an atom has no magnitude, then the aggregate itself would be a mere atom. In fact, an aggregate would not be perceived if the parts are separate from one another.22

For an atom to aggregate, Levi explains, it should possess at least six different facets or sides. This means that it has parts, and such an assertion would go against the very definition of an atom. To avoid this contradiction, the Kmra Vaibhikas insisted that atoms do not aggregate or do not touch one another. In that case, Vasubandhu argues that samyoga or coalescence of atoms is not possible. This is because to coalese, atoms would not just touch another but mingle with one another completely, which is again impossible if the atoms were to have parts. Thus, aggregation and coalescence involve two anti-nomial

processes. Without parts there could be no aggregation; with parts there could be no coalescence.

After rejecting the realist position, Vasubandhu explains why there is a subject-object duality. He says that it is a creation of consciousness that keeps transforming in the universal flux of time. Conceptualization or upacra, asserts Isshi Yamada, is inherent in our discursive thought and language. As such, conceptualization takes place with regard both to the self (tman) and the elements (dharmas).23 Regarding the same, Vasubandhu says in the very first krik of the Trimik:

22 23

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 183 Isshi Yamada, Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (Cambridge University Press), 158-176

Whatever, indeed, is the variety of ideas of self and elements that prevails, it occurs in the transformation of consciousness. threefold.24 Such transformation is

Through this krik, Vasubandhu tries to explain that in our world of experience, when ones mind is at work, it takes the form of being conscious (vijnna) of something. This something is limited to regarding self or elements. Our consciousness is ever-changing and the transformation (parinma) of vijnna is the change of ones consciousness in temporal sequence. Vijnnaparinma is also based upon the principle of dependent-origination or pratityasamutpda. The vijnna of the present moment is the effect of the vijnna of the past moment, and is the cause of the vijnna of the next moment.

Vasubandhu,

in

the

above

krik,

speaks

of

three

modes

of

vijnnaparinma. Let us now have a glimpse of these modes:

1) Repository-consciousness or laya-vijanna: laya-vijnna is also known as vipka or resultant. With respect to this, David J. Kalupahana explains that laya-vijanna is not the primordial consciousness (as seems to be, when called repository consciousness), but a resultant. It eliminates a substantialist interpretation of consciousness and is in conformity with the Buddhas own explanation of consciousness as being dependently arisen. The laya does not imply a metaphysical storehouse or an unconscious process, but carries the
24

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 192

same implication as laya in the Buddhas discourse where it means anchoring or obsession. With such attachment or obsession function ing in the consciousness, the laya-vijnna is not a passive recipient of sensory impressions, a sort of tabula rasa.25 2) Mentation or mano-vijnna: At this stage, the ideas of self and elements emerge. The conceptualization of an object, though based upon the experiential flux, involves reflection. Such reflection inevitably brings about the feeling of I (aham). This stage is represented by manas. According to Vasubandhu, the concepts (vijnapti) of objects (vijnna) are dependent upon the manas. It is the coordinating activity of manas that gives rise to the notion of a self.26

3) Object manifestation or visaya-vijnna:

Here, the emphasis is on the

acquisition (upalabdhih) of the object of experience unlike mano- vijnna where the acquisition is directed at oneself. Kalupahana says that this is the only consciousness that matters in empirical discourse. as can be presented before the empirical consciousness.27 For all practical

purposes this constitutes our universe, since it includes everything whatsoever

Isshi Yamada explains that wherever there is consciousness, it manifests itself with the dichotomizing mental fabrication (vikalpa) inherent in our conceptualizing discursive thought (upacra), bringing forth the notion of entity into atman and dharma. According to Vasubandhu, however, the vijnna as gahaka and the
25 26

David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Thought and Ritual (Motilala Banrsidass, 2001),29 David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 197 27 Ibid., 199

vijneya as grhya (both are called vijnapti) are different in their degree of existence. Conceptualization of these two kinds takes place only in the vijnnaparinma, but not in the real atman and dharma, since dharmas and tman do not exist apart from the vijnnaparinma.28

However, Kalupahana wants us to understand here is that the vijnnaparinma is not from a primordial substance like prakrtiparinma in Smkhya. It is a transformation of consciousness involving the laya, the manas and the visaya-vijnapti all acting together, and it is this process that gives rise to the beliefs in self and elements. Vasubandhu maintains in Trimik, what he began with in Vimatik:

Thus, thought involves this transformation of consciousness. mere concept.29

For that

reason, what has thus been thought of does not exist. Therefore, all this is

Through this krik, Vasubandhu wants to again clarify his position that there is no refutation of an object here. That which is denied here is the existence of a real object that is reflected as it is in consciousness. Kalupahana explains this by saying that the fact that consciousness, while reflecting the object, has passed through several transformations makes it possible for the object to be

28

Isshi Yamada, Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (Cambridge University Press), 158-176
29

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 203

known as it is. For this reason, all that is available is a concept (vijnapti), not an ultimate reality or substance, either in oneself or in the world of experience.

Richard King interprets Vasubandhus position in terms of nyat. He says that the imagination of the unreal is the discrimination between the duality of grasped and grasper and emptiness is explained as "the imagination of the unreal that is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus, for the Yogcrin, nyat is primarily the emptiness of grasper (i.e., subject) and grasped (i.e., object) (grhaka-grhya). Since our entire range of experiences is characterized by a dichotomy between subject and object (with the possible exception of some higher states of samdhi), this amounts to a universal application of 'emptiness' (nyat). However, the Yogcrin stresses that the range of 'fictive' perceptions that does occur, although not corresponding to an independently existing world of subjects and objects, nevertheless does occur.30

However, without getting carried away with the term nyat here, I would once again like to clarify Vasubandhus argument. Vasubandhu has been

maintaining that when our cognitions are influenced by our dispositions and our sensory knowledge is carried beyond its confines, we tend to form beliefs in either a metaphysical self or in metaphysical elements. However, this does not mean that either knowledge (grha) and the known (grhya) or knowledge (grha) and the knower (grhaka) have to be denied. What is denied is a knower that is

independent of knowing, a metaphysical cogito, or an object that is independent of

30

Richard King, Early Yogcra and its Relationship with Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East and West (University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 659-683

knowing, which is implied in substantial elements. These metaphysical beliefs are determined, not by the available experiences, but by ones dispositions.31

On the note of subject-object duality, Thomas A. Kochumuttom says that the entire doctrine of trisvabhva or three natures of the consciousness hinges on the same32:

(1) Parinispanna-svabhva (the absolutely accomplished nature) is that state of existence in which the individual is characterized neither as a subject nor as an object; (2) Paratantra-svabhva (the other dependent nature) is that state of existence in which the individual is bound to see things as distinguished into subjects and objects of experience; (3) Parikalpita-svabhva (the imagined nature) is that state of existence in which the individual is seen as an object or subject of experience.

In other words, Kochumuttom explains, every individual in his absolutely accomplished state of existence (parinispanna-svabhva) is neither a subject nor an object of experience, but is reality as such (tathat); then he slips into the unfortunate situation called samsra, where he is led to find himself as the subject enjoying all else as objects of experience: this state of being conditioned by the forces of ones own past deeds and hab its, is called the other-dependent (paratantra-svabhva); the forms of subjectivity and objectivity that are projected
31 32

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 212 Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 90

on to the things by the individual in the other-dependent state of existence, are the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhva). Of the three natures, only parinispanna and parikalpita have ontological pretensions. The former is the absolute state of existence, while the latter is the samsric (phenomenal) state of existence. The paratantra-svabhva, on the other hand, refers essentially to the very act of projecting the forms of subjectivity and objectivity.33

The above discussions about the nature of Yogcrin consciousness bring out clearly the non- existence of an ultimate reality, whether subjective or objective. The chief characteristic of Vasubandhus theory is that it never wavers or deviates from its focus i.e., epistemological issues. He constantly avoids the interference of any metaphysical and mysterious something in his arguments, and suggests us to get rid of our vsans in order to reach the world- transcending knowledge.

In the end, I would like to sum up the paper with krik-16 of Vimatik:

Immediate knowledge is as in dream, etc. when that occurs, then that object is not perceived. How, the, can immediacy be conceived. 34

Vasubandhu, here, makes a very important point. He says that immediate knowledge is like as in a dream. According to him, though human beings perceive

33 34

Thomas A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 90-91 David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 186

and continue to perceive objects, at the time of perception of the object, there certainly is no awareness that one is perceiving that object. When awareness arises that one is perceiving an object, then at that very moment the object is no more perceived. Vasubandhu, here, is making an extremely subtle epistemological distinction between perceiving an object and being aware of the perceiving of an object. For him, what is generally understood as immediate perception is the former, nor that latter. Thus by the time the awareness of perception arises, the object perceived is already in the past is non-existent.

This account of perception, which can be traced back to Buddha himself, is utilized by Vasubandhu who was keen on rejecting the nave realism of the Sarvstivdins that an object that impinges on the senses can be perceived in its real form without distortions. Instead of assuming that one can perceive a real object, Vasubandhu is emphasizing the variety of conditions that affects every act of perception.35

Thus we see that Vasubandhu, with his theory of vijnaptimtrat, attempted to highlight the psychological factors like samskras that have an influence on our perception of objects. What is important to understand is that there is no denial of an immediate experience. Throughout his analysis of realist position, Vasubandhu has the same question - if our experience reflects a real and substantial object or not. In fact, Vasubandhu did not present even consciousness as the Absolute Reality, for that would be to reintroduce some aspects of the Brahmanical notion of a self (tman).
35

David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 186

References:

Kalupahana, David J. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology. Sri Satguru Publications, 1992 Candrakrti, Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakrtis Madhyamakvatra with Commentary by Ju Publications, 2005 Kochumuttom, Thomas A. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Motilal Banarsidass, 1982 Shastri, D.N. Critique of Indian Realism: a Study of Conflict between Nyya-Vaiesika and Buddhist Dignga School. Agra University, 1964 Murti, T.R.V. Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti. Motilal Banarsidass, 1996 Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. Being as Consciousness: Yogacara Mipham. Shambhala

Philosophy of Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2004

Articles:

Yamada, Isshi. Vijnaptimtrat of Vasubandhu, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Cambridge University Press, Date of publishing not available (Cited at

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25210883 )

 King, Richard. Early Yogcra and Its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East and West. University of Hawaii Press, 1994 (Cited at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757 ) .)