MAYER

B K 0 W N
K 0 W E
& M A W

October 20, 2003 Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP

1909 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1101
Ms. Dana Hyde
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the ^ainjel ^ 263-3000
Mam Fax (202) 263-3300
United States www.mayerbrownrowe.com
301 7th Street, S.W., Room 5125
Washington, DC 20407 jjg-J •-*-*
Direct Fax (202) 263-5333
rben-veniste@mayerbrownrowe.com
Dear Dana:

I enclose a letter form David H. Brown. It appears that his reference may have some
relevance to the issue of commercial airline security - the area in which I have recused myself.

I trust you will follow up.

Many thanks.

1 truly yours,

U(
Richard Ben-Veniste

Enclosure

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 RECEIVED
October 18, 2003 Q^ 2

Richard Benveniste
C/o Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw
1909 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Benveniste:

I understand you are a member of the National Commission on Terrorist Acts. Since the
Commission is issuing subpoenas for FAA documents, I would suggest you include one of its
manuals - AM-78-35. This is The Final Report of the FAA's Task Force on Deterrence of
Air Piracy.

I was the press officer/spokesman for the group that developed airport security in 1970. Dr.
John T. Dailey of Culpeper, VA, the team psychologist who developed a "profile" of potential
aircraft hijackers, and I are the last remaining members, as far as I can tell. We are
collaborating on a book to be titled "NINE/ELEVEN" - The FAA Foul-ups That Changed
The Course of History.

That manual is a gold mine of proper procedures that we recommended but were
bureaucratically changed or ignored. We placed the "profile" first, and conducted field tests
at nine airports to prove that the list would apply to no more than 2 percent of the flying
public. In some cases, that dropped to 5-tenths of 1 percent. The value of that conclusion was
that deterrence efforts could be focused on a manageable number of potential hijackers.
Otherwise, we felt that trying to "search" all passengers was unproductive.

Our approach was the subject of an Eastern District of New York court case - United States v.
Lopez. Federal District Court Judge P. Weinstein ruled that the sequence we developed, in
which the "profile" was applied first, was constitutional and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. (An airline employee had unilaterally changed some of the elements of the
"profile" to detain a passenger who was found to be carrying heroin.)

When the Task Force completed its work, the FAA created a permanent office to carry on this
work, but only took on only two of our members. Also, it changed the sequence — screening
all passengers first instead of applying the "profile" first. To this day, passengers who do not
fit the "profile" are searched at random. This has led to a decrease in airline passenger traffic.

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Our team never said it could eliminate all aircraft hijacking, recognizing that fanatics would
go to any lengths to accomplish their mission. However, Dr. Dailey and I feel strongly that
there were enough warnings during the 1990's to reintroduce an adjusted "profile" and
increase the sensitivity of the airport magnetometers. Had that been done, we also feel that
the 19 terrorists may well have been detained for extensive questioning, and may have missed
all or some of the flights.

The manual, issued in 1978, contains predictions of how aircraft hijacking could change from
the late 1960's/early 1970's main purpose of going to Cuba to one of international
motivations. We even looked into air marshals, and did not favor them because there could
not be enough of them to cover every flight from every airport. I would postulate that had air
marshals been on board any of the 9/11 flights, the terrorists could have easily distracted them
before attacking the cockpit. After all, three flights had five terrorists, and one had four.

Our safety expert, the late Lowell Davis, had recommended early on that cockpit doors be
strengthened. We also knew of a cockpit device that would have killed or severely maimed
terrorists without harming the cockpit crew. (To my knowledge, this is still classified as
Secret.)

If there is any way Dr. Dailey or I can assist your investigation, we would be happy to do so.
With the manual in hand, it might be interesting to ask FAA officials why the "profile" was
relegated to second place.

Sincerely yours,

David H. Brown

E-mail: Grumpsmd@aol. com

Telephone: (301)881-8317

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 Page 1 of 1

Lisa Sullivan

From: Dana Hyde [dhyde@9-11commission.gov]

Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2003 4:07 PM
To: 'Lisa Sullivan'
Subject: FW: Letter from David Brown

Original Message
From: Dana Hyde [mailto:dhyde@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2003 4:00 PM
To: Yben-veniste@mayerbrownrowe.com'
Cc: 'team7@9-llcommission.gov1
Subject: Letter from David Brown

Richard -

I received the letter you forwarded to me from David Brown. Because his letter deals with airport security matters,
I have directed the letter to Team 7 for proper response. I am also sending a copy of the letter to Dianna
Campagna. Thanks - Dana.

10/30/2003