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Arms Control Today January/February 2000

Back to Normal

Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear
Tests

by Robert M. Hathaway

[Back to text] Key Legislation

Symington Amendment

Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 669of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as
amended.

Prohibits most U.S. assistance to\any country found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology outside
of international saTeguards^&esitient Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment in 1979
because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uranium enrichment plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible
between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential waivers.

Glenn Amendment

Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
as amended.
—,
s^isJancj to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)
tnat, among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glenn amendment
sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhi broke its self-imposed 24-year moratorium on
nuclear testing. On May 30,1998, Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan, following Islamabad's six
nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.

Pressler Amendment

Adopted 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Originally banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the U.S. president certified, on an annual
basis, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, and that the provision of U.S. aid would significantly
reduce the risk of Pakistan poss^sssing-suGha deyiceJaI3etober 1990, President George Bush was unable to issue
this certification, which triggered ^ftie-eressleramendrnent prohibitions. In 1995, the Brown amendment exempted
most forms of economic assistance from~tTie Pfgsster amondmonr prohibitions.

Brownback I

Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill
(Public Law 105-277).

Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendment
sanctions on India and Pakistan, except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales.

Brownback II

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhchart.asp?print 3/16/2004
 ^^Association: Arms Control Today: Confrontation and Retreat: Page 1 of 10

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^Arms
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Control ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1
Today January/February 2000

Back to Normal

Confrontation and Retreat:

The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests

Robert ML HathawayE

In May 1998 was not a good month for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. On May 11 and 13, India detonated five nuclear
devices, its first nuclear tests in nearly a quarter century. Not to be outdone, its bitter rival Pakistan conducted six
nuclear tests of its own toward the end of the month. These sudden developments, long feared but nonetheless
catching American officials and intelligence analysts by surprise, effectively blew U.S. policy toward the South Asian
subcontinent to smithereens and laid down a direct challenge to the global non-proliferation regime.

Within the U.S. Congress, non-proliferation advocates like Representative Edward Markey (D-MA) and India-bashers
such as Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) voiced outrage and called for the immediate triggering of sanctions under
Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, universally known as the Glenn amendment. New Delhi's actions were
"reckless, shameful and irresponsible," Markey insisted. Burton urged his House colleagues to "stop subsidizing
India's nuclear progress" by cutting U.S. economic assistance to New Delhi. "India took a terrible, terrible step
yesterday," Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) told the Senate the day after India's first round of tests. Paraphrasing Franklin
Roosevelt, the Iowa Democrat declared that "yesterday is a day that will live in infamy for the Nation of lndia."<1>

Of greater interest was the response of those who earlier had been among India's most vocal supporters.
Representative Frank Pallone (D-NJ), perhaps New Delhi's leading champion on Capitol Hill, expressed regret at the
tests but insisted they should not derail the U.S.-India relationship. But other lawmakers usually sympathetic to India
were less supportive. Many of the leading members of the House's India caucus remained noticeably silent, and some
privately suggested that the caucus publicly condemn India. Several legislators, including House Minority Leader
Richard Gephardt (D-MO), canceled plans to visit India. "In light of the nuclear tests," a Gephardt spokesman
explained, "we did not want there to be the appearance of business as usual."<2>

The situation was exacerbated 17 days later, when Pakistan conducted its own tests. Aside from the expected
condemnations of Pakistan and criticism of the Clinton administration for allowing events to get so out of hand, a
number of members voiced anxiety that South Asian tensions could spiral out of control. "This is the most serious
situation since the Cuban missile crisis," Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned, a judgment seconded by Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).<3>

Only days after the tests, President Bill Clinton responded as he was legally obligated under the Glenn amendment,
slapping wide-ranging economic and military sanctions on New Delhi and Islamabad. Yet no sooner had Washington
taken this stand on behalf of global non-proliferation norms than it began to walk back from its position. Within 18
months, the U.S. Congress swung from applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive not only the Glenn
amendment, but also the Pressler and Symington amendments, which mandate further penalties for states engaged in
certain nuclear activity. (For more information on this legislation, see sidebar.) Earlier convinced of the need to
maintain a tough stance as an object lesson for other nuclear threshold states, by the end of 1999 U.S. lawmakers
had completely turned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy. Congressional anger over the
South Asian tests had given way to acceptance, even understanding. Congress, it would appear, had abandoned 25
years of non-proliferation activity.

The U.S. Congress was trying to achieve multiple objectives that were not entirely compatible. Concerned about
proliferation and wanting a voice in foreign policy that would compete with the executive branch, it had mandated the
sanctions. But when faced with post-Cold War national interests, the growing influence of the domestic South Asian-
American community and an increasing interest in the subcontinent by U.S. business, the legislators moved non-
proliferation to the back burner and renounced with dizzying speed the sanctions on India and Pakistan they had so
recently supported. The impact of these steps on the non-proliferation regime is not yet clear. But what is apparent is
that Congress' love-hate relationship with sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is far from over.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01 -02/rhjfOO.asp?print 3/16/2004

 Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian
Nuclear Tests
by Robert M. Hathaway

[Back to text] Key Legislation

<-? /
'j\n Amendment r fl //> ,^>l b® '

Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 as amended.

Prohibits most U.S. assistance to any country found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or
technology outside of international safeguards. President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the
Symington amendment in 1979 because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uranium enrichment
plant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential
waivers.

Glenn Amendment

Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 as amended.

Prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined by the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things, detonates a nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton
imposed Glenn amendment sanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhi broke its
self-imposed 24-year moratorium on nuclear testing. On May 30,1998, Clinton invoked similar sanctions
against Pakistan, following Islamabad's six nuclear teStS Oil May 20 and 30. .

3 Pressler Amendment

Adopted 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Originally banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the U.S. president certified, on
an annual basis, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, and that the provision of U.S. aid
would significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device. In October 1990, President George
Bush was unable to issue this certification, which triggered the Pressler amendment prohibitions. In 1995,
the Brown amendment exempted most forms of economic assistance from the Pressler amendment
prohibitions.

Brownback I
® Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus
appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).

Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn, Symington and Pressler
amendment sanctions on India and Pakistan, except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use
exports and military sales.

Brownback II

Adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defense appropriations bill (Public Law 106-79).

Gives the president indefinite authority to waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions of the
Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments. States that the "broad application" of export controls on Indian
 IS7A

1 of 1 DOCUMENT

Copyright 2002 The Conde Nast Publications, Inc.

The New Yorker

August 12, 2002

SECTION: LETTER FROM PAKISTAN; Pg. 42

LENGTH: 9586 words

HEADLINE: THE GENERAL IN HIS LABYRINTH;

Where will Pervez Musharraf lead his country?

BYLINE: ISABEL HILTON

BODY:
In the early afternoon of June 14th, I stepped out of the Karachi airport into suffocating heat. When there was no
sign of the car that was supposedlo pick me up, I found a taxi; as we entered the city and neared the Marriott Hotel, the
streets seemed to be under military siege. We inched through traffic, trying a succession of approaches to the hotel, but
were turned back each time by grim lines of heavily armed soldiers. Finally, we found a way to the rear entrance. As I
got out of the car, I felt broken glass crunch under my shoes. When I looked up, I saw that almost all the windows had
been blown out of the first five floors.
At eleven that morning, someone had attempted to ram a car packed with explosives into the wall of the United
States Consulate, next door. Twelve Pakistanis had died in the explosion, and some fifty more had been injured. Among
the dead were a group of young women whcThad just passed their driving tests, a man and his niece, who was about to
get married, and two security guards. A row of hotel shops had been destroyed.
In a park opposite the consulate, guards detailed to keep out onlookers were clustered in the shade; the grass was
strewn with debris. Pieces of metal had rained down on the consul's residence, three hundred yards away. People had
rushed out of their rooms at the exclusive Sindh Club to find that an arm had been blown over the roof of the building
and landed in the parking lot. A torso fell into a gas station beyond the park. Pieces of shattered vehicles and shreds of
body parts had lodged in the trees.
Some three weeks later, a group of suspects from one of Pakistan's hard-line Islamist groups confessed to the
bombing, adding one telling detail: the car bomb, they said, had been built for an assassination attempt on Pervez
Musharraf, Pakistan's President and its Chief of Army Staff-the head of the Army-but had failed to detonate. Although
Musharraf this time was nowhere close to the explosion, there was no doubt that the man accused by his enemies of
playing lapdog to the United States-and whose popular nickname is Busharraf-was as much the target as the United
States.
It was no coincidence that this terrorist attack took place in Karachi, a city of around twelve million people. On its
crowded streets one can find most of the problems plaguing Pakistan itself, a nation that seems to combine quasi-
democratic institutions, authoritarian regimes, and anarchic violence. Yet if Musharraf is to fulfill his ambitions, he
must deal with the country's alarmingly high rates of illiteracy, violence, and economic failure, while facing a great
many hostile forces: Islamic fundamentalists who distrust his policies and threaten his life; a political opposition that
would easily control a majority in an elected parliament, although its leaders live in exile; and even much of the middle
class, which has become disillusioned with his military rule. The Army has governed Pakistan for more than half of the
country's fifty-five-year history, and Pervez Musharraf, whom I had come to Pakistan to interview, is, above all, an
Army man.
 Pakistan
Eye of the Storm

Owen Bennett Jones

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and fue
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Yale University Press New Haven and Lond \
 Pakistan
or ISI. Mehmood had just completed an official visit to Washington but
his return to Pakistan had been delayed because, following the attackt
all the airspace around New York had been closed. The State Department
called the embassy at 5.00 p.m. Lodhi and Mehmood were asked to
attend a meeting with senior US officials the next morning.
At 8.00 a.m. on 12 September the US deputy secretary of state,
Richard Armitage, told the two Pakistanis that their country had to
make a choice. Islamabad could align itself with the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan or with Washington. 'You are either 100 per cent with us
or 100 per cent against us,' he said. 'There is no grey area.'1 Straight
after the meeting Mehmood called Islamabad and spoke to General
Musharraf. Pakistan's military leader made a snap decision. He told
Mehmood that Washington would get what it wanted. At 3.00 p.m.
Armitage held a second meeting with Lodhi and Mehmood. This time
he had more specific demands. The US would need basic logistical sup-
port and a high degree of intelligence co-operation. Mehmood assured
Armitage that Pakistan would co-operate.
Musharraf may have taken his decision quickly but he abandoned the
Taliban with some reluctance. Before n September he had consistently
supported Mullah Mohammed Omar's Kandahar regime. This was not
because he sympathised with the Taliban's interpretation of Islam (on
the contrary, he clearly rejected their obscurantist outlook) but because
he believed the Taliban served Pakistan's regional interests. For Mushar-
raf the Taliban had two main advantages. First, since most of the Taliban
were ethnic Pukhtoons, they had a natural affinity with Pakistan which
also has a significant Pukhtoon community. Islamabad, Musharraf
argued, had always backed Pukhtoon regimes in Kabul: the alternative
was to have a hostile Afghan administration filled with Tajiks and
Uzbeks. Second, since the Taliban had been created largely in and by
Pakistan, the leadership in Kandahar was relatively sensitive to Pakistan's
interests. With Mullah Omar in charge, Musharraf believed, Pakistan had
strategic depth. His army could concentrate on guarding the border with
India and had no reason to fear an attack from the northwest.
Musharraf realised that once the US had made up its mind to topple
the Taliban there was no point in Pakistan continuing to support them.
But he had not ye1! sold the decision to,the rest of the arrriy leadership.
Musharraf's Challenge 3
&•'.
September, he called a meeting of his corps commanders in the
'high command's nuclear bunker in Chaklala where the top brass
they could talk without the risk of American surveillance. He told
Colleagues that Pakistan faced a choice. It could either align itself
„ the United States or be isolated as a terrorist state. For Musharraf
„ issue was never in doubt but many of his senior commanders, such
fthe deputy chief of army staff Lt. General Usmani, were reluctant to
irn Pakistan's long-standing Afghan policy. They argued that Pak-
_tan should wait to see exactly what Washington would offer in return
for Islamabad's co-operation. But Musharraf insisted there could be no
delay. It took six hours for Pakistan's president to get his way. He
clinched the argument by pointing out that any Pakistani prevarication
would present India with an opportunity to curry favour with the US.
The corps commanders duly fell into line.
Musharraf's decision brought immediate financial benefits to Pakistan.
By January 2002 Pakistan had secured US $3 billion worth of external
assistance in the form of debt relief and the rescheduling of interest pay-
ijjents/ And while the decision helped Pakistan's balance sheet it also
benefited Musharraf's international political standing. Before 11 Septem-
ber he was-perceived as a military dictator who should announce, and
abide by, a road map for the restoration of democracy. After n September
his status was transformed: the Western world had a stake in his survival.
General Musharraf may have won friends in the West but within
Pakistan he had made enemies. Thousands of Islamic radicals, swearing
loyalty to their Jslamic brethren in Afghanistan took to the streets in the
cities of Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi and Islamabad. One of the demon-
strators was a 25-year-old from Peshawar, Mohammed Ali. A student in
a local madrasa, or religious school, Ali was typical of those who
decided to protest. The attack on the United States, he believed, was a
Jewish plot. He had heard that thousands of Jewish employees at the
World Trade Center had not reported for work on n September. 'It was
obviously planned by the Jews,' he said. 'Why else would there have
been a camera there, ready to film it all?'1
It was hardly surprising that Ali had a somewhat unrealistic view of
the world. He had started his religious education when he was six years
old. His parents, landless farmers who could-not afford to send him to
 Airlines Plane Hijack: Pakistani Connection? Page I o f 2

Indian Airlines Plane Hijack:

Pakistani Connection?
Four Pakistanis among hijackers
27 December 1999
THE Indian Government today disclosed the names of the hijackers who
include four Pakistanis. They are S A Qazi, Ahmed Sheikh, Ibrahim
Mistry and Sayed Akhtar Syed (all Pakistanis), Gopal Tamrakar, a
Nepali said to be a smuggler and an unidentified Afghan.

Hijackers Came from Pakistan

Use these
buttons to 07001ST, 27 December 1999
navigate to the New Delhi: Preliminary investigations suggest that the hijackers had
other index
pages. Use the arrived at Kathmandu on a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flight
Home button just hours before re-boarding 1C 814. Nepalese inquiry sources earlier
below to get
back to the said in Kathmandu that four of the five armed hijackers of an Indian
SAPRA INDIA
Home Page
plane had arrived in the Nepalese capital on Friday on the PIA flight PK-
806 from Karachi, in Pakistan. The four were allowed to board the
, SAPRA Home
Indian Airlines Airbus A300, which they later hijacked, without
undergoing immigration and security formalities, a source in the
Nepalese investigating committee said. Only the name of the fifth
passenger along with whom the four travelled was listed in the Indian
Airlines manifest.

Pakistan's Airport Security Force on Sunday, 26 December, that: "It is a

false and baseless charge that any weapon reached Kathmandu through
this (PIA) flight. Our security checks are potent and comprehensive, so
there is no possibility that any weapon passed through." The Pakistan
government has also denounced the Indian attempts to implicate
Pakistan. Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar on behalf of the government of
Pakistan read out a statement on 26 December: "The government of
Pakistan has already expressed its deep regret at the tirade of baseless
and malicious allegations launched by the Indian media. Now the Indian
government has taken it upon itself to make such motivated allegations.
The Government of Pakistan wishes to make it clear that it has no
sympathy with desperate individual acts and is completely and
unequivocally opposed to all acts of terrorism, including hijacking and
hostage taking."

Later that day (2350), Pakistan Foreign minister Sattar went a step
further and insinuated that India had cooked up the entire hijacking
drama. The Pakistani government has said that the hijacking of Indian
airlines airbus while on a flight from Kathmandu to New Delhi on Friday

http://www. subcontinent.com/sapra/terrorism/tr_ 1999_ 12_28.html 7/15/03

 T

)
12

Clinton: Living with a Nuclear Pakistan

The election of Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas as president brought

little cheer to Islamabad. To the Pakistanis, the incoming Democratic
administration looked liked warmed-over Jimmy Carter. The new pres-
ident's emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, and
democracy had a familiar ring. And his secretary of state was the same
Warren Christopher who, as the number two official in Jimmy Carter's
State Department, had sternly lectured Islamabad on the dangers of nu-
clear proliferation. To underscore the negative, during Christopher's
January 16,1993, Senate confirmation hearings, the secretary-designate
inexplicably coupled Pakistan with Burma as a country where free
elections and greater human rights were needed.1
Nor did the creation of a Bureau of South Asian Affairs in the State
Department greatly please the Pakistanis. New Delhi had long sought
this reorganization, complaining that the Middle East got all the atten-
tion and South Asia and India were left languishing in the wings of the
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. An influential con-
gressional friend of India, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), took up the
cause and eventually won approval for a separate bureau, over the
opposition of the State Department.2 Clinton's nominee as the new
bureau's assistant secretary was career diplomat Robin Raphel. Junior
in rank for the job, she was serving as political counselor at the New
Delhi embassy when nominated.3 As a result of the lengthy security
clearance and Senate confirmation processes, Raphel did not assume
her new duties until the fall of 1993.
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration took up where its prede-
cessor had left off on the terrorism issue. In the Bush administra-
tion's waning days, renewed reports of the involvement of Pakistan's

321
washingtonpost.com: Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks Page 1 of 10
washingfonpost.com

Broad Effort Launched After '98 Attacks

_,y Barton Gellman
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, December 19, 2001; Page A01 ^J^

First of two articles

Two years ago, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet phoned the White House. The agency had a
lead, he said, on Osama bin Laden.

Reports linked the al Qaeda leader to a temporary encampment in southern Afghanistan. Overhead photographs
showed a well-equipped caravan of the sort used by hunters, a commanding figure at its center, and an
entourage of escorts bearing arms.

National security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger canvassed the Small Group, as they had come to call
themselves, of Cabinet-rank decision-makers on the most sensitive terrorist matters. President Bill Clinton gave
the go-ahead to begin preparations for cruise missiles to launch.

Amid the urgent engagement of the White House came an unwelcome status call from U.S. Central Command.
One of two submarines designated to fire the missiles, if so ordered, had left its Arabian Sea cruising grounds.
"Well, get it back in the box!" urged a duty officer, according to a person who was present.

Clinton, said people familiar with the episode, waited impatiently as the CIA searched for confirmation. Finally,
pnet called back. The camp was not bin Laden's, he said. It was a falconing expedition of a wealthy sheik from
.e United Arab Emirates — and bin Laden had never been part of it.

Thus dissolved another moment of hope in a covert war of long shots and near misses that most Americans did
not yet know their country was fighting. Unfolding in the last two years of his presidency, long before the
events of Sept. 11, Clinton's war was marked by caution against an enemy that the president and his advisers
knew to be ruthless and bold. Reluctant to risk lives, failure or the wrath of brittle allies in the Islamic world,
Clinton confined planning for lethal force within two significant limits. American troops would use weapons
aimed froni a distance, and their enemy wouIcT be defined as individual terrorists', not the providers I>f Sanctuary
for attacks against the United States. '

Within those boundaries, there was much more to the war than has reached the public record. Beginning on
Aug. 7,1998, the day that al Qaeda destroyed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
Clinton directed a campaign of increasing scope and lethality against bin Laden's network that carried through
hisTinal days in office. ~ ~ k

• In addition to a secret "finding" to authorize covert action, which has been reported before, Clinton signed
three highly classified Memoranda of Notification expanding the available tools. Injuccession, the president
authorized killing instead of capturing bin Laden, then added several of al Qaeda's Senior lieutenants, and
finally approved me shooting down of private tivIHalTalrcraft' on which they flew. *

• The Clinton administration ordered the Navy to maintain two Los Angeles-class attack submarines on
rmanent station in the nearest available waters, enabling the U.S. military to place Tomahawk cruise missiles
any target in Afghanistan within about six hours
._ -—
of receiving the order.

• Three times after Aug. 20,1998, when Clinton ordered the only missile strike of his presidency against bin
Laden's organization, the CIA came close enough to pinpointing bin Laden that Clinton authorized final

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A62725-2001Dec 18?language=printer 6/25/03

r
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Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2003 02:25:47 -0400
From: "" <mhurley@9-11commission.gov>^P
To: "" <team3@9-11 commission.gov>^
Subject: Fwd: FW: Is Pakistan a Friend or Foe?
Part(s): ^Ej 2 unnamed text/html 28.53 KB |
|

TeamSmates,

FYI.

Mike

Forwarded message from Philip Zelikow <pdz6n@virginia.edu>

Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2003 23:10:47 -0400
From: Philip Zelikow <pdz6n@virginia.edu>
Reply-To: "" <pdz6n@virginia.edu>
Subject: FW: Is Pakistan a Friend or Foe?
To: "" <mhurley@9-llcommission.gov>

Mike -

Interesting article.

Philip

Original Message
From: Katsu Furukawa [mailto:katsu.furukawa@miis.edu]
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2003 4:15 AM
To: katsu.furukawa@miis.edu
Subject: Is Pakistan a Friend or Foe?

<http://ar.atwola.com/link/93163658/aol>

Click here to visit our advertiser.

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Sunday, Sep. 21, 2003
Pakistan a Friend or Foe?
Washington has new doubts about one of its most crucial partners in the war
on terrorism
By TIM MCGIRK I ISLAMABAD AND MASSIMO CALABRESI I WASHINGTON

http://Tcinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=101&index=:1540&start=2 9/23/03
 v » ^^^-i 7 j ^OO A^ J \f& kWi?^-'

Only talks can resolve

Kashmir issue: Musharraf
President says ISLMlnws gnvt's po]irips;^rfflies x
civilians^always drag army intojolitioal qnagniirft
ISLAMABAD: President General
Pervez Musharraf said Friday it
was imperative for Pakistan and
India to start dialogue for resolu-
tion of Kashmir dispute and that it
can be solved "if India shows flex-
ibility and pragmatism."
"It's important to start talking
before going further for problem
solution," he told a questioner in
the BBC's World's 'Question Time
Pakistan (QTP)'. "What we are
saying is that let us, first of all,
start talking," the president said,
urging: "we must accept the cen-
trality of the Kashmir issue."
He said when he went to Agra,
his suggestion to Indian leadership
was based on a four-point strategy,
including the one on the need to
start talking, then to accept the
centrality of Kashmir issue that it
was the dispute between the two
neighbours — who have fought
two wars on this dispute.
He agreed to a questioner that
it was not justifiable to spend bil-
lions of rupees on Kashmir issue,
and try to kill each other. "But, we
are not the culprit. It's India,
which is showing intransigence.
They are not even starting to talk."
"I agree with you. It is not prudent
at all on Indian side as weU as our
side," he told the questioner.
Musharraf, to a question, said
Pakistan would follow its own role
model, adding efforts were afoot
to achieve sustainable democracy,
and Pakistan emerging as a mod-
erate, democratic Islamic country.
About foreign policy, the presi-'
dent said we are following national
interest, and our policies are in the
supreme interest of the nation,
"and there is no compromise,
whatsoever."
On Sino-Pak relations, he said
these are cordial and in-depth and
referred to the quotation that "our
relations are deeper than oceans
and higher than the mountains."
About Iraq, he said there could
be no parallel between Afghanistan
and Iraq as the two situations are
altogether different. He said Pak-
istan has nothing to do with the
matter of Iraq, also because there
is no geographic proximity be-
tween Iraq and Pakistan.
Rpsppnding tn ^question, the
president said the 1st follows the
government dictate "piggovern-
s policies and Jeffs
i_hey (ISTfaonot
do on their own, hence, it theT6js
anything wrong, the governmeiSjs
to be blamedjot the^Sl," he cat-
egorically stated.
On defence budget, the presi-
dent said while there has been no
substantive increase in Pakistan's
military budget, India has in-
creased its defence budget by 50
percent. The security and
sovereignty of Pakistan, he said is
foremost and there could be no
compromise on it, whatsoever.
To a question, he said his gov-
ernment has given due priority to
development side, and stated that
this year's allocation on develop-
ment budget amounted Rs 130 bil-
lion rupees, which is being in-
vested on carrying out of mega
projects of the nature of infra-
structure, agriculture, railways,
etc.
Replying to a question, he said
efforts are underway to improve
Continued on Page 8

Only talks, can resolve Kashmir issue: Musharraf

Continued from Page 1
law and order in the country,
which certainly requires im-
provement, and referred to mea-
sures being adopted to make it
effective on counter-terrorism.
Referendum, he stated had "a
purpose, which was correct." He
said, he wanted to create an ef-
fect so that he should not remain
hostage to political manoeuvring.
"I went to the people to give me
the mandate so that I draw
strength from them. So that
whatever I do, I have the stamp
of the authority of the people of
Pakistan. That was the purpose
for which I went for the referen-
dum."
1 The president said the army
h)as always been dragged into po-
litical problems, "not because
they wanted to. I was chief of
a£my staff for one year and I
klhow how many people used to
cfome to me at that time and
a^ked me why are you not acting
^•hen Pakistan is going down."
He said: "Civilians reached
the army and dragged them into
these situations. So, the army
chief has two choices — either to
sit back and be quiet and do
nothing, or to move and take
over. What is the third choice
that he has?." Now with the Na-
tional Security Council in place,
he said: He (army chief) has a
choice. He cannot take over, he
will go to the NSC and will raise
his problem."
He said: "I will not pick up the
prime minister. It will be going to
the people who will get elected to
the assembly who will pick up the
prime minister." "I can assure, it
will be a level-playing field in the
elections," he said, adding people
should vote for the right people
irrespective of the fact to which
party they belonged.
He said the perception that
we are intervening and that a lot
of the so-called pre-poll rigging is
going "is being created by some
people." "Pre-poll rigging or rig-
ging during polls is not possible,
at all, due to presence of agents
of political parties," he added.
He said 'Nazims' have politi-
cal affiliations with one group or
the other and they certainty have
an inclination towards one side
or the other. He assured that he
would guarantee that "the polls
are absolutely free and fair."
The president said mis-per-
ceptions are being created
through pumping of a lot of
money and political manoeuvring.
He said he was not at all in con-
tact with the Chief Election Com-
missioner, "I'm not in contact
with the Election Commission."
He said he has nothing to do
with Returning Officers who are
taking decisions about accep-
tance or rejection of nomination
papers. He said it is entirely the
personal decision of the Return-
ing Officers to reject or accept
the nomination papers of Nawaz
Sharif or Benazir Bhutto, adding:
"The decision, in no way, is not
guided by the government."
He said he did draw the line
between pro-reform and anti-re-
form people during the referen-
dum. However, that does not
mean I want to create a Kii|j ,'s
party. "I request vote for anyp ic
who is good and right man ir e-
spective of his party," he statei 1.
To another question, he ss id
Pakistan has a feudal strucji re
and in three years time nobo iy
can change the basic social stfi c-
ture. He said he has attempted to
change the environment of the is-
sembly by introducing the gnu u-
ation condition, which will eBi u-
nate 41 percent of the fprii er
members of the assembly. He £ id
sons and relatives of the forn er
assembly members are enli|£ it-
ened and broad-minded becai se
of their education abroad. 3
The president said about 60 to
75 women will also come int» t ne
new assemblies. The old ones!v ill
only be hundred in number ;& \
even many of them will stand •dis-
qualified, or will not contest afid
some will get defeated. So tWre
will be new faces and it •'will
change the (next) assembly? He
said the future governmental
look into the issue of land re-
forms. —APP
f

ISLAMIST JOINT VENTURE

CHINA
Uighur Muslims trained in
Afghanistan since 1986; 10
Uighur Liberation Front
operatives arrested in Bishkek,
7/7/00.
SAM! ARABIA
Ultra-conservative
Wahhabism with discreet UZBEKjSTAN
SAG support; private Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
individuals, organizations (IMU). Juma Namangani.
(World Muslim League) and Tahir Yuidashev.
. mosques donate funds.

NORTHERN CAUCASUS
Especially Chechnya,
TAJIKISTAN
Elements of
Islamic Revival Party.
Islamist Joint Venture
Elements of Joint Venture active in all
world regions. Principal goal is to
create Islamist Strategic Depth against
India by "liberating" and uniting Sunni
Muslims in South-Central Eurasia,
including Kashmir. Anti-West, anti-Shia.
Participants: ISI, the Taliban, Usama bin FARGANA VALLEY
Ladin, a medley of other foreign Muslim Hizbi Tahreer.
Extremists. ISI loosely coordinates Hizbuilah.
operations of Joint Venture elements,
which move along parallel tracks.

PAKISTAN
Military Intelligence — AFGHANISTAN
Interservices Agency (ISI) Taliban give sanctuary, training
Religious Parties: Jamiyati Ulimaayi to Arab, Centra! Asian, Xinjiang,
isiami (JUI), Jamaati Islami. Chechen, Muslim extremists. Only
Sipaahi Saahibaa. regime to recognize the
Harakatui Ansar, Chechen Emirate.

INDIAN KASHMIR
IS! coordinated anti-Indian
insurgency.
Mail ::INBOX: Saudi task lJ £ Page 1 of 2

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Date: ffrflTzl Aug pnna ng^pg^Q -0400
From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>4f'
To: "" <wbass @ 9-11 commission .gov> 9
Cc: "" <team3@9-11commission.gov>4P'
Subject: Saudi task

^ 1.2 unnamed text/html 0.36 KB @

All,

FYI, here is the br/ef writeup on the Saudi effort I did for coordination with other teams.

Warren: a point or two may be of interest for adding to the outline.

Best,
Dan

@ 2 Proposed Division of Labor on Saudi Arabia 081503.doc application/msword 15.76 KB ^

Proposed Division of Labor on Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is a vital topic for our Commission. In addition to its obvious importance in the 9-11 story itself, it is also an important
"Partner in the war on terrorism as well as a possible source of violence and radical ideology. Excluding the compartmented work, the
Commission final report should address three topics with regard to Saudi Arabia:

The priority of counterterrorism in the overall bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, both before and after 9-11. What was the
quality of counterterrorism cooperation from Saudi Arabia, both before and after 9-11 ? It would examine cooperation on past
investigations, such as Khobar Towers and OPM/SANG. In addition to intelligence, what other forms of assistance did the
Saudis provide to the United States (e.g. on oil production, basing for Operation Southern Watch, and so on)? What issues, if
any, prevented a stronger relationship on counterterrorism? [ [Team 3 lead, with support from Team 2]

1.

The treatment of Saudi citizens by U.S. authorities. Were the activities of Saudis of appropriate interest to U.S. intelligence and
consular officials? Was proper direction given if intelligence indicated Saudis might be a threat? This section may be
extremely short. [Team 6 lead, with support from teams 3, 5, and 7]

1.

The threat emanating from Saudi Arabia, both before and after 9-11. Assessing the threat would include al-Qa'ida's ability to
recruit, raise money, and enjoy a haven in the Kingdom. In addition, it would include Saudi efforts to spread Wahhabism
beyond the Kingdom and the effects of this campaign. [Team 1 lead, with Team 4 handling the financing issue]

Team 3 will take the lead on integrating the various sections into an overall report. In addition to handling much of the drafting, this
may involve asking various teams to contribute to short pieces on narrow topics (e.g. the spread of Wahhabism, which Team 1 is
already working on) and passing on questions related to Saudi Arabia for other teams to ask in their interviews.

^^
:ither a staff member or team leader with the knowledge of the compartmented investigation should read the report over to ensure
that there are no gaps and that the two reports inform each other.
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Mail:: INBOX: Saudi workplan _ \O U i Pa8e l of 2
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Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2003 12:06:07-0400
From: Daniel Byman <dlb32@georgetown.edu>4F
To: "" <mhurley@9-11commission.gov>4|,"" <sallan@9-11commission.gov>4|
Subject: Saudi workplan
Mike,

Attached is a slightly revised version of the Saudi workplan. My

attempts to coordinate with other staff members had a bit of progress,
but I don't think anyone read it over too carefully. (Some key folks
are on vacation, which doesn't help.)

Given the importance of Saudi Arabia, we may want to run this by the
Front Office. If we do, I think it would be appropriate to coordinate
this with various team leaders, as in essence I've signed up almost
every team for some aspect of this.

An alternative -- one that may be easier -- is simply to begin the work

and get fairly far down the road before we attempt further coordination.

My initial plan was that we'd coordinate first, research second. But it
may be good to do a good chunk of our work before bothering with the
coordination process internally, which seems a bit cumbersome.

Best,
Dan

I»P] 2 Division of labor proposal 080503.doc application/msword 30.15 KB H

Proposed Division of Labor on Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is a vital topic for our Commission. In addition to its obvious importance in the 9-11 story itself, it is also an important
partner in the war on terrorism as well as a possible source of violence and radical ideology. Excluding the compartmented work, the
Commission final report should address at least four topics with regard to Saudi Arabia:

1. The priority of counterterrorism in the overall bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, both before and after 9-11. What issues,
if any, prevented a stronger relationship on counterterrorism? [Team 3 lead]

2. The treatment of Saudi citizens by U.S. authorities. Were the activities of Saudis of appropriate interest to U.S. intelligence
and consular officials? Was proper direction given if intelligence indicated Saudis might be a threat? [Team 6 lead, with
support from teams 3, 5, and 7]

3. The quality of counterterrorism cooperation from Saudi Arabia, both before and after 9-11. This would include intelligence
cooperation in particular, but also other means of support. [Team 2 lead, with support from Team 3]

"^ 4. The threat emanating from Saudi Arabia, both before and after 9-11. This would include al-Qa'ida's ability to recruit, raise
money, and enjoy a haven in the Kingdom. In addition, it would include Saudi efforts to spread Wahhabism beyond the
Kingdom and the effects of this campaign. [Team 1 lead, with Team 4 handling the financing issue]

Team 3 is willing to take the lead on integrating the various sections into an overall report, if appropriate.

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?index=896 8/5/03