RELATIONS

MAHTAB AKBAR RASHDI

e
Pakistan Study Centre
University of Si nd/Jamshoro, Sind,Pakistan
.INDO-PAK.
RLATIONS
1
MIHTIB 1KBIR RISHDI
Pakistan Study Centre
Uni'ersity of Sind, Jamshoro, Sind, Pakistan
Dedicated
with all my love to
Mother and Father
Price PB Rs. 90.00
Price HBRs. 120.00
[
All rights reserved
First Edition 1988
Printed at Mars Printing Servics
Designed & Produced by Lydia Prints Karachi.
PUBLI SHER'S NOTE
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JUy 1988
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C
ONTENTS
Chapter Page
1.
2.
3.
4.
Publisher's Note
Foreword
Preface
INTRODUCTION: The Background of Indo-Pakistan Tension
MAJOR DISPUTE BEWEEN INDIA AND PAKISAN
v
ix
xi
11
Kashmir Dispute and the First War in Kashmir 1948-49 13
Importance of Kashmir 16
Rann .of Kutch Dispute 17
The War of 1965 20
The 1971 War and Disintegration of Pakistan 23
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League and the
National

Movement in East Pakistan 26

Deterioration of the relations between India and Pakistan 30
AIUDE OF BIG POWERS TOWARDS INDIA AND
PAKISAN
.
I
. India's and Pakistan's Relations with the United States
U.S Policy towards the subcon.tinent( 195-5)
Relations of Soviet Russia with India and Pakistan
Soviet Policy towards India and Pakistan in 1960s

Soviet Re!ations with India and Pakistan in the 1970s
Relations of China with India and Pkistan
China's Relations with India and Pakistan upto 1959
Relations in 1960s
China's Relations with India and Pakistan in the 1970s
Relations in the 1970s
Analysis of the Attitude and Interests of the Big
Powers in the Region
BEFORE SIMLA: Pakistan People's Party Comes into Power
Formation of People's Party
The elections of 1970 and emergence of the PPP as
41
42
42
47
49
52
52
53
54
58
60
61
67
68
a majority party in the West Wing 71
Yahya Khan resigns and Bhutto becomes President 72
The Question of the Pakistani Territories at the Western
Front and the Question of POWs for Bhutto 74
5.
6.
7.
SHIF IN POLICY: Mr.Bhutto's Traditional St1nd and His
New Stand after 1971 towards India
Indian and Pakistani statements on negotiations
Preliminary moves for India-Pakistan Summit Meeting
Mr.Bhutto's Pre-cqnference Diplomacy
1 Simla Meeting: Demands and Expectations of India
and Pakistan in the Simla Summit
The Simla Accord--text of the agreement-comparison
of the Tashkent and. Simla Agreements
Text of the Agreement
Analysis of the Agreement and its comparison with
the Tashkent Accord
Normalization of relations
Bilateralism
The Principle of non-interference
Renunciation of force
Return of POWs
Withdrawals of troops
Kashmir
IMLEMNTATION OF THE SIMLA AGREEMNT: Withdrawal
of Forces from each other's territories and Readjustment of
the Ceasefire Line in Kashmir

Return of the POWs
81
8.
"85
86
88
91
93
95
97
98
99
100
100
102
103
109
112
Issue of War Crimes 113
Recognition of Bangladesh 116
Opposition to the recognition 117
Role of te Islamic Summit in recognition of Bangladesh 118
Establishment of diplomatit relations, resumption of Trade
and Travel Facilities 19
Trade and Communication 119
Restoration of airlinks and overflights
RELATIONS' I 70's
Prospects of relations between India and Pakistan
Bibliography
121
125
128
131
135
IX
FOREWRD
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X
Indo-Pak Relations
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XI
PREFACE
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XI I
Indo-Pak Relations
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CHAPTE R I
I NTRODUCTI ON
The Background of I ndo-Paki stan Tensi on
5outh ^sI a contaIns a tremend

us assort ment of racIa|

groups and subgroups, theIr dIstrbutIons appearIng to bear | I t1!e

re|ati on to present natIona| boundarI es. 1he whO| e regIon Is

the
c|us|r of dIfferent countrIes, dlferent In cu| ture, tradItIons and
|anguages, but sha;Ing a common past , ai hIstorIca| experIence
of co| onIa| ru|e.
1he regIon Is comprIsed ol FakIstan, IndIa, Cey|on, Mepa| ,
5IkkIm, Hhutan, Hang| adesh, and, accordIng to some, even Hurma
and ^fghanIstan. Indeed some ol the countrIes In the area have
serIous Inter-racIa| prob| ems wIthn themse|ves, but the majorI ty
of the peop|e of 5outh ^sI a can be broad|y dIvIded Into the

Io| | ow-

Ing major groups. the Mongo|OI d races whIcn spread sou1hvards lrom
ChIna, ^ryans, Vho fIrst entered JndIa Irom the northwest and sprcd
southwards ann eastwaros, the

OravIdIans, whom the ^ryans

dIsp| d and drove southwards.1
Ihe hIstory of the area nas been one of contInuous soCI a|
movement and conquest, the genera| tendency havIng been

Ior
northen races to sp
|
ad iarther and farther southwards. Jhe
^r}an conquerors carrIed the Hndu re| IgIon from the HIndu Kush
to Indo-!hIna and MaIysIa. UuddhI sm spread southwards and
oastVards

1rom IndIa and | ater

Is| am swept Into IndIa, Ma| ajsIa

and I ndonesIa, wIth

the voyaes of ^rab and IndIan traders. lI na| |y

ChrIs1IanIty entered the regIon, wIth the Catho|Ic Fortuguese
and Irencn, tgether wIth the Frotestant

Lng|Ish, 5cots and

Outch .
2
lndo-Pak Relations
oouth ^sIa has seen the rIs and fa|| of many great
empIres. IndIa came under varIous nvasons--Greek, Fers an,
Nongo|, 1urkIsh, ^fghan, and more recent| y HrItIsh. 1he ChInese
In th ear|y fIfteenth century sent nava| expedItIons throughout
^sIa, exactIng trIbute from Cey|on and Ma| aysI a and reachIng
even to the FersIan Gu|1.
In the specI fI c case of the 5outh ^sIan countrIes many
crcumstances have combJned to make ther present-day mutua|
re|atIons fee!|- Fehaps the stronges1 thread that bInds them
Is the hstorIca| experIence they have shared and ts subsequent
effects on theIr vIew of po|tIca| prob| ems and process. 1he perods
of co|onIa| ru|e, though of varyIng |ength, were of such du:atIon
and IntensIty as to | eave a defInte I mprInt on a| most every aspect
of ther exIstence. 1he recent |IberatIon of these countrIes has
been of great Importance to theIr entIre natIona| |He. Hut In
a|| of them Independence was brought about b members of the
sma| | artIcu|ate e|te groups wIthIn the "educated. "
2
InIt1a!|y a|| these countrIes dec|ared theIr IntentIons to
buI |d ther consti tutIona| and cvIc structure on the |nes of
Far| amentary democracy, based on free e|ectIons and adu| t
suffrage for men and women. Hut I n none of the 5outh ^san
countrIes has the experI ment wIth the u| tra-modern po| tca|
democracy been anythIng |ke a comp| ete success, many of them
have come under authorI tarIan ru|e of one shape or another.
5outh ^sIan countrIes are s mI | ar In theIr basIc economIc

condItIons. 1he majorIty of the peop|e are poor. 5ocI a| and economI c
Inequa|ItIes are theIr common feature, the reason beIng a |ong
d f
. . 3
peto o economic stagnation.
1he fIrst major breach In the wa| |s of co|onIa| domInatIon
came wIth the peacefu| endIng of HrItIsh rIe In IndIa n ! D47
and the creatIon of the LnIon of IndIa and .he Is| amc Repub|Ic
of FakIstan as successor states. Fo|I tIca| Inu. pendence of Hurma
and Cey|on fo| | owed In
Independence untI| ! D4D.
and 5Ingapore In ! D5D.
! D48. I ndonesIa d not achIeve fu||
Ma|aysI a became In pendent n ! D57
lndo-Pak Relations 3
In retrospect It Is dIffIcu| t to voId the conc|usIon that
the dIsso|utIon of co|onIa| ru|e In 5outh ^sIa was InevItab|e. Hut
In the co|onIes, the arrIva| of Independence was a traumatIc
experIence and one that justI fIes the common descrIptIon of It
as a po|I tIca| revo|utIon. ^| | of the new states had to face the
fact that Independence dId not automatIca| | y brIng about a
condItIon of natIona| conso| IdatIon. Instead, each new state faced
the I mmedIate task of assertIng Its authorIty over Its terrItorIa|
InherI tance.
1he subcontInent--ro|e of re| IgIon. 1he IndIan subcontInent Is
fu| | of varIety and contrast. WIthIn Its vast area are a|| types
of terraI n. In the north are the HI ma| ayas, wI th theIr perennIa|
snowcapped peaks and deso| ate, never-endIng ranges of the
mountaIns that form the roof-top of the wor| d. In the west are
the

bar:cn Rajasthan and

Ha|uchIstanI deserts, wIth theIr bI tIng

wInter cold and ferocIous summer heat. In the west, above th
Rajasthan desert, are the fertI | e wheat-growIng p| aIns of the
|and of the fIve rIvers, the Funj ab. ^|so In the north, from t
]
e
unj ab In

the west to Henga| In

the east, stretches the Indo-

GangetIc p|aIn, hundreds of mI| es of f|at farm|and. I t was here,
besIde the Ganges
,
that ear|y kIngdoms f|ourIshed. HInduIsm
deve|oped here and | ater Mus|Im cu!ture put down Its roots
and adapted Itse|f to the new IndIan envIronment.
1he peop|e of tnIs vast subscontInent are as dIverse as
Its topography. Lach part, each regIon, has a dIstInctIve f|avour
of Its own. Mot on|y does the north dIffer from the south and
the east from the west, but so do regIons adjacent to one another.
Lach has Its own regIona| | anguage, Its own

set of customs, food

habI ts and dress and each has Its own separate regIona| hIstory
wIth Its |oca| heroes and moments of trIumph, just as each Is
a|so a part of the overa| | hIstory of the su!contInent and of
Its wIder hIstorIca| processes.
IndIan socIety Is partIcu|ar|y comp|ex, and can be vIewed
from many ang|es. Re|IgIon Is one of them. It provIded a ratIona|e
of socIa| organI zatIon, I t bound IndIvIdua|s together In certaIn
ways,
IdentIfIed them In dIstInct groups and set them apart from
othet IndIvIdua|s. It Is responsIb|e for brIngIng Into exIstence
4 Indo-Pak Relations
certan knds of soca| groups and determnng ther re| atonshps
wth others. Hy the nneteenth century there

were twO

ma n
re| gons on the subcontnent, Hndusm and Is|am.

Is|am frst came to Inda about the eghth century and

for some tme was | m ted to the area around the Indus Rver.
1he estab| shment of a Mus|m Kngdom n the north around Oe|h
n the

e|eventh centurV brought ths nto the heart of the sub-

contnent. Hy the end of the eghteenth century Is| am had become
estab|shed as the second | argest re|gon n the area. On a
country-wde bass, Mus| ms were outnumbere0 by Hndus rough|y
n the proporton of fve to one. I n some regons, however, they
were n a maj or ty--n Henga|, n 5nd, and n the northwest
fronter provnce. In the Funj ab they consttuted the |argest
cammunty fo| |owed by Hndus and 5khs.
It s argued that the Mus| ms of Inda asa who|e were
a dstnct communty, that they possessed a sense of ndentty
resu| tng from ther common re|gon whch not on|y set them
apart from Hndus, but gave them a postve ndent fcaton wth
one another as Mus| ms. 1he fact that they were a| | fo| |owers
of Muhammad was used n the twenteth century n an attempt
to btng them together on one po| tca| p| atform as one communty
.
P8 the formaton of Fakstan

demonstrates, the attempt to

emphas ze an Is| amc rather than an Inoan natona| ty proved
succssfu| .
1he breakup of the Mugha| empre and the defeat of the
Marhatas, who had hoped to fa|1 hers of t, happened to co.coe
w th the emergence of the Hrtsh as the uncha| | enged Luropean
tradng power n I nda. Hy the end of the seventeenth century,
the Last Inda Company was estab| shed n Hombay, Madras ano
Ca|cutta, and was becomng not on|y a tradng corporaton but
a m | tary power n ts own rght.
1he pre-ndependence bacground of Hndu-Mus| m tenson. T. W.
Wa| |bank descrbes the p|ura| socet of Inda as the basc factor
nvo|ved n the process of part ton.
4
|.5. FurnvaJ
|
vews t as
"a soCety comprsng two or more e|ements or soca| orders whch
|ve sde by sde, yet wthout mng| ng n one po|tca| unt.
11
5
Indo-Pak Relations
5
Wal |bank adds that a shaed histoy noma! |y ca! | s fo
lnceasing coopeati on and even fo foms of integation between
V
dffeent po| i tica! units, but the contempoay wo| d, he says,
pesents distubing evidence of a contay tendency, vaious societies
and po| i tica| units have been o ae beng ton apa t by iva|
goups made antagonistic by thei di ffeences. 1he Indi an sub-
continent is the most outst anding case of tLat sot of p!ua!
soci et\, wich has fai!ed to compose ethnic and cu| tua! diffeences .
1he pat i tion of the po| i tica! uni t

ceated unde Hi tish u|e is

one of the most significant ovents in the twenti eth centuy ^si an
histoy. 1his division was fo| |owed by vio|ent sti fe in which
thousands of Mus! i ms, 5ikhs, an0 Hindus |ost thei |i ves. Hetween
India and Fakistan it ceated a constant!y buning fie of hated
and discod symb| i:ed by the Kashmi issue.
In the centuies that mak ! ndian histoy fom its ea | iest
civi | i zation in the Indus va||ey | 2600 to I 500 H.C. l up to the
Gupta empie, the subconti nent eXpeienced numeous invasions.
1he in1udes, howeve, wee usual|y absobed by Hinduism and
had no difficu! ty in fi nding a p| ace fo themse|ves in the Hindu
caste system. 1hee was, howeve , one goup of invades who
wee not absobed. 1he vaious Mus| i m peop|e who enteed India
emained a distinct ent!ty in the soci a| and po| i ti ca| fabic of
ldian ! i fe. 1hey voshipped Cod, and accepted Muhammad as
His . pophet , thei bonds wi tn one anothe wee c|ose tha
those wi th Hindus. 5oci a| |), this was rei nfoced by a ange of
customs and pactices which maked off the adheents of one
el igion fom the othe.
Lui ng the n:neteen1h centuy, Mus| i ms began to deve|op
the pol i ti cal sense of bei ng a sepaate community, distl nct f:om

the Hi ndus. 1he Hi ndus quikl y esponded to the Wes

ten i mpact
tnaJ bought new oppo tuni t ies in business, the pofessions, and
government sevice. Musli ms had not ecovered fom thei !oss
of po! i tical powe when they wee supp! anted as u|es of the
subontient by the Hi ti sh and they | i ved in the past, in a

nosta| gic
worl d of {o me gl o:i es. They wee hcnce pedisposed not to accep1
the al ien ideas, methods, and l an_uage o| the new over n+ent.
6 Indo-Pak Relations
Whle Hndus were takng to some aspects oI modern zaton,
Muslms were not. For several decades after the War of Indepen-
dence
_
f ! 87, they remaned apathetc, fal lng behnd the Hndus
n the new Inda that was emergng.
^fter the War of. Independence of ! 87, the poston of

Muslms worsened. Jhey were held responsble for the outbreak

and the

Hrtsh, as a result, dscrmnated aganst them.

b
Jhe
overall pcture presented was a communty n decay, economcally
backward and deprved of access to pos tons n government servce
by a rval Hndu communty. Mot only were Muslms demoral zed,
they were becomng ncreasngly mpovershed. I t becqme evdent
even before ! 87 when Englsh replaced Iersan as the offcal
language of the bureaucracy and the law courts. Consequently,
Musl ms were gradual ly replaced by Hndus who were qucker to
learn Englsh.
Jhe ! 870s wtnessed movements for the promoton of
Western educaton among Muslms. Jhe most sgnfcant personalty
of ths t me was 5r 5ayyed Ahmed Khan | ! 8 ! 7-D8} . In the I8b0s,
he opposed the replacement of Irdu by Hnd n the L.F. He
became convnced that

he nterests of Hndus and Musl ms were

opposed that they were vrtual ly two searate natons. He was
a great modern zer among Musl
_
s, an educat

nalst, who founded

the Muslm un versty at ^lgarh, and a socal reformer who waged
war aganst non-ratonal dogma.
Emergence of natonalsm: Formaton of the Congress. Jhe Indan
scene form ! 87 to ! D ! ? was character zed by the expanson of
modern communcatons, the growth of Englsh, the establshment
of Western educaton and the rse of a professonal and busness
m ddle class. Jhese trends hel ped to str a sprt of natonalsm
whch appeared by the foundng of the

Matonal Congress n I 88.

In theory a trul y natona
]
and secular party, the Congress
was atuall
/
much more a Hndu than a Muslm organ zaton n
its i
"
embershp. ^ Hndu rel gous and deologcal renassance that
tended to be ant -Muslm as well as ant-Hr tsh and whch was
_ closely ted wth the rse of poltcal natonal sm, represented
by the Congress, alenated

many Musl ms, ncludng 5r 5ayyed

! `
Indo-Pak Relations
7
^hmed Khan. Hy the I 8D0s, such Mus| i m support as the Congress
enj oyed was diminshng. ^t the I 8D1 Madras session, there
were

on|y 23 Mus| i m de|egates as aganst I I G3 Hindus and at

loona i n I 8D5, the comparatve numbers were 25 and I 584.
7
Communa| differences between Hndus and Mus|i ms and formation
of the Mus| i m League. I n various parts of the country,
Mus| i ms and Hindus were gradua| | y being divi ded and antagon zed.
1he process was intensifed in the ' nineties wth the growth
of Hindu m | tancy, the emergence of cow protecton movements,
and the outbreak of a rash of Hndu-Mus|i m riots. 1he other side
of the con was the deve| opment of a Mus| i m cu|tura| revva| ist
movement i n the north after the ear|y I 880s. 1he effect of
a| | these factors was to promote the idea of a separate Mus| m
community. IncreasngIy, the re|gious communty was being vewed
as a soci a| and po| itica| entty, one which cou| d undertake
actvty i n ts own right as a distinct uni t. It s often maintained
that Mus| i m separation was engneered by interfering Hrit sh
offcia|s who were app|yng a po|icy of divi de and ru|e in an
attempt to set one communty aganst the other. In any case,

the sum effect was to i ntensify communa| awareness and to

segregate further the two comg uni ties. Out of such an
environment emerged the ^| |-Indiq Mu| m League. ^s it appeared
that representat ve and democ

tc I nsti tutons might advance

in India, the Mus| i ms, fearfu| that they wou|d be overwhe| med
by the much | arger Hindu majorty in a democratic po| tica|
system, demanded safeguards and a system of separate communa|
representation in |egis| ative bodes. On October I , I D0G, a Mus| i m
deputation ca| | ed on the Viceroy, Lord Mi nto, and made these
demands. Mnto proved unexpected|y sympathetc, he acknow|edged
their asprations and assuted the de|egation that ther "po| i tica|
rights and interests as a community wi | | be safeguarded by
any administrati ve organi zaton wth which I am concerned. "
8
1he "Mnto-Mor|ey Reforms" in I D0D nc|uded a provison
for separate Mus| i m e| ectorates. Jhe rghts of the Mus| ms as
a distinct communty were recogni zed and guaranteed. 1his
recognition nstitutona|i zed Mus| i m separati sm.
Leaders of the
8
Indo-Pak Relations
new|y formed Mus|l m League increasing|y spo!e of the two
separate nati ons in India | the Hindus and the Mus| i msI , c| ai med
to represent the Mus| i m nati on, and cha| |enged the Congress
larty's c| aim to represent a| | of India. From now on, two, not
one, nationa|isms began to deve|op i n Indian po| i tics and this
tendency wou| d intensi fy in the years to come and cu| minate
in a Mus| i m demand for a separate home| and to be ca| |ed la!i stan.
Ouri ng and fo| |owing Wor|d War I, Hindu and Mus|i m
|eaders cooperated brief| y. I n the "Luc!now lact" of 1916 between
the Conress and the League, the former accepted separate
e|ectorates for Mus| ims. ^t the end of the war, IndianMus| i ms
\ere great| y disturbed

over the danger to the insti tuti on of

"Khi | afat" | Ca|iphateI in Tur!ey fo| |owing that nations' s defeat
in the war and |oss of terri toy. 1he Congress under Gandhi ' s
|eadership, |aunched a ciVi | disobedience movement to press the
Hri tish to gi ve I ndia independence and to support the Mus| i m
demand that the ^| | ies treat 1urkey fair|y at the laris leace
Conference. Hut soon the movement became vi o| ent. Hesi des,
there were terri b|e Hindu-Mus| i m riots in Kera| a and e| sewhere.
^nd, thus, a bief attempt to fo:ge Hindu-Mus| i m uni ty ended
in fai |ure.
Growing Mus|i m dissatisfacti on and demund or a separate home|uno
for Mus| i ms: Re| ations between the Congress and the Mus|im
League went from bad to worse. 1he Congress won |egi s| ati ve
majori ties in most provinci a| elections he|d in 1937 under Lhe
Government of India ^ct, 1935. 1he resu| ti ng Conress govenments
in these provinces \ere seen by Mus| i m as suppressing Mus1 i m
| anguage |'rduI , cu| ture, and re|igion i n aeas uder |hei: contro|.
Mus| i ms became convinced, more than ever be1ore, that thei:
cu| tura| and re|igiDus ident i t\

\ou|d be destroyed in a uni ted

independent India ru|ed b\ the pemanent Hindu ma|ori ty. ln
a meeting in Lahore in M-rch !U4U the Mus|l m League passed
a reso| ution demanding the part i t ibn of India and the const i t ut ion
of contiguous Musl i m majori ty a:eas in the nor th\es1ern and
eastern parts of Ind! a as independent Musli m states. Thls is
!nown as the "laki stan Reso| ut i on."
Indo-Pak Relations
9
Ini t i a| |y the Congress and the Hritish both denounced
the demand for lakistan as absurd. Hut thc legis| ati ve e|ecti ons
to the centra| and provinci a| |egis| atures i n I D45 and I D4G showed
the Mus| i m League, which was contesting on the lakistan pIaftorm,
win virtua|!y a| | Mus| im consti tuencies. 1he Mus| im League victory
was a .victory for the demand for lakistan. 1Le demand became
so irresisti b|e that u| ti mate|y both the Hrit ish and the Congress
accepted it. On ugust I 4, I D47, India was parti tioned and lakistan
came into being. Lut lt did not happen without a great deal of
, b|oodshed and a massive transfer of popu| ations.
References
I . ngus Maude, 5outh sia. Hack_round Hook | London.
1he Hod|ey Head Ltd. , I DGGI , pp. I 2- I G.
2. In the speci a| sense, the term in 5outh comprises on|y a
a sma| | percentage of the total popu| ation.
3. Gunnar Myrda| , si an Orama. n Inquir inlo the loverty
of lations | lew York. lantheon Hooks, I 97 I I , pp. 20-27.
4. 1. W. Wa|!bank, ed., 1he larti tion of India. Causes and
Responsi bi | i ti es |Hoston: O. C. Heath & Company, IDGGI , p. I .
5. |.5. lurni va| |, India, quoted i n Ibid. , p . 44G | Engl and:
Cambridge Lniversity lress, I D3DI.
G. Wal | bank, pp. 5-20; see also | im Masse|os, lationa|ism on te
Indian 5ubcontinent |ust ra| i a. 1homas le|son, I D72) , p].
I 0-40.
7. Masse| os, pp. DD- I 04.
8. R. C. Maju1dar, Histor of the Ireeoom Movement in India
| Ca| cutta, I DG3I , p. 223.
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CHAPTE R II
MAJOR DISPUTES BETWEEN
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Hakistan came into existence under qui te unfavourab|e
cbndltlons. Geographica| | y awkard, i t remained as a uni que examp|e
b| dua

| boundaries, composed of two wings divided by hosti| e

lndla for a thousand mi |es. ^s the background of the partition
re\ea|s the deep-rooted i|l f

e|ins of the two nation

, it wasn' t
unexpected that born i n b|oodshed and strife Hakistan wou|d not
be to|erated easi |y by its imedia1e neighbour, India, as it had
spoi|ed the Indian dream of an independent and united subconti nent.
Circumstances that created the fee| ings of mistrust between
lndia and Hakistan were most|y due to the events which took
place l mmediately after the parti ti o. lndia's atti tude towards
Hakistan remained harsh and unsympathetic. 1hey not on|y withhel d
1akistan's share of mi | i tary supp|ies, but a|so denied Hakistan
lls share of cash ba| ances.
1
1he | atter was rel eased when Gandhi
threatened to go on an indefini te fast.
/
^nother i mmediate and most explosive probl em Hakistan
faced was re|ated to the question of sharing the waters of the
lndus basin. India cut off the supp| y of water from the two head
works under its contro| i n ^pri | U4o when a joint commi ttee
of the officia|s fai|ed to sett |e the questions re|ating to division
bf joint assets. ^ Hakistani de|egat ion had to rush to Oe|hi and
sign an agreement at Indi a' s bi dding before the f|ow was resumed.
Hoth the governments agreed to negotiate in order to
find the so|ution of the prob|em in 1Ub/, but the negotiations
were not fina| i zed unti | 5eptember 1U,1UbU, when Hresident ^yub
3
Khan and Hri me Minister lehru signed the Indus Waters 1reaty.
1 2
Indo-Pak Relations
Relations between India and Pakistan became tense in
1949 when following the devaluation of the British pound sterling
vis-a-vis the American dollar, India similarly devalued her rupee
and Pakistan did not. India was shocked with this decision of
Pakistan and refused ! pay the 3U percent higher price for
Pakistan jt!te, cotton and food grains. Along with that the urgently
11eeded supply of coal to Pakistan was stopped by India. Thus,
by the end of 1949, trade between India and Pakistan reached
an almost complete standstill. Later on Pakistan started trading
with China, which bought cotton from Pakistan and supplied coal
which was badly needed for running the railways.
4
" A recurring pattern in the relations between Asian states
can be found in their acceptance or rejection of borders and
frontier zones initially drawn up by the former colonial powers."
5
The tensions which grow out of disputed boundaries have played
a major part in the life of nearly every nation, especially
where a nation's frontier area includes people of different customs,
social structure and ethnic background. Wherever boundaries have
been arbitrarily demarcated by outside powers decades or centuries
ago, deep-rooted national resentments and distrust continue to
simmer and affect present-day national attitudes .
. \long with some other disputes on the Western fr\ ,1liers
of India and Pakistan, the problems on the Eastern borders were
largely clue to the unnatural Radcliffe Boundary Award. Conflicts
also arose due to the confusion about- the names of rivers I
changes in their courses. The enclaves posed another
,
problem
which came under the category of boundary disputes. The enclave
of Berubari union situated on the Rangpur (East Pakistan) and
.J alp:iguri ( West Bengal was one of them. In September 19
5
8,
the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, Firoze Khan Noon
and J awaharlal Nehru, signed an agreement whereby India agreed
to cede the Berubari enclave. But the agreement became an issue
of constitutional controversy in India and the subject of a tussle
between the central government of India and the provincial
goverment of West Bengal. In its ruling of March 1960, the
Suprenc Court of India declared the agreement illegal, thus ;he
/
Noon-0-ihru agreement was never implernemc j_
Indo-Pak Relations
The Farakka Barrage d.
7
Ispute
1 3
was also a matter of
profound concer for Pakistan. India decided to construct Farakka
Barrage in 'Nest Bengal, about eleven .,1iles from East Pakistan's
border. This would stop between a th:, d and a half of the peak
flow of the Ganges into East Pakistan and divert it into Hoogly-
an Indian river-- in order to improve navigation in the Calcutta
port. This would, among other things, cause a serious shortage
of water for irrigation in East Pakistan. The dispute remainet
unsettled until recently, when Bangladesh and India reached an
agreement.
Many of the contemporary issues dividing the Asian nations
pertain to boundaries and frontiers between neighbouring states.
Disputes initially arising from territorial questions often tend
to transcend their specific focus and assume ideological dimen
sions ' determined by a nations general diplomacy with others.
The Q'larrel between India and Pakistan over political and legal
control of Kashmir represents a major obstacle to South Asian
regional cooperation efforts,
Kashmir Disputes and the First War
in Kashmir, 1948- 'l949
Of al! the issues dividing India and Pakistan, the Kashmir
dispute bas proved to be the most tenacious. "Plebiscite partition,
internationalization, political settlement: all the text book solution s
for territorial dispute have been proposed for Kashmir and
ail have been fruitlesso"
8
Kashmir has prompted three wars between
the two countries and still remains the major obstacle to a
peace settlement in the subcontinenL
When Pakistan and India achieved their freedom under
the Independeng& Act of India in 1947, many of the subcontinent's
variously located princely states became technically independent
as well. The rulers of these state. could choose, under the terms
of the statute, whether to join India or Pakistan. The most
difficult case VU' that of the states of ] ammu and Kashmir,
predominantly IVhslir, but with c Hindu ruler. The IVI&lmrcj&
vacillated in his JecisiGn to join dther of the ' W' states. His
motives remain O H\\.1L: of speculallon, lt: i no,: clear whethei"
14 Indo-Pak Relations
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Indo-Pak Relations
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1 6
Indo-Pak Relations
by a true demarcation line, an agreement to demilitarize Kashmir,
and a decision to hold a free and impartial plebiscite to be
conducted by a United Nations appointed administrator.
I
There is very little agreement by Pakistanis and Indians
as to the meaning or even intent of the various United Nations
resolutions. In defending their version of the United Nation's
deliberations and decisions both India and Pakistan tend to stress
different parts of the relevant I DA- I DAD documents. Since the
resolutons commit both nations on specific matters, various
conditions have to be met by both of the interested parties
before the conflict can be settled.
Importance of Kashmir for both India and Paki stan
The interest of Pakistan in Kashmir is not oniy ideological.
It has other interests too, one of

which is economic. In I'A7,

Pakistan looked at Kashmir in view of its ideological perspective,
according to the basis of the two-nation theory. Kashmir with
its Muslim majority should have become a part of Pakistan, but
for India, Kashmir has become the symbol of secularism and unity.
Economi_ cally speaking, Pakistan depends on the waters
of the Indus for its irrigation. The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab
rivers flow through Kashmiri territory before entering the Punjab
It has been a constant fear to Pakistani leaders that India
would exploit this potential and their fears were confirmed in
the times of crisis in I DA and I DG5. Reli gious and cultural affinity
is also one of the factors that has injected a strong feeling of
emotionalism among the people.
Another equally important factor is the strategic position
of Kashir for Pkistan in its relations with Inia, Afganistan a 01ina.
lring th first "ar in Kslmir, Pakisan fogt dsp.ately to
retain the northern areas in order to prevent India from gaining
,
territory which would provide a link with Afghanistan.
The Chinese title to Kashmir's remote section of eastern
Ladakh has centered on the acquisition of Aksai Chin crucial
!I China's strategic needs for < all-weather military road linking
Sinkiang to Tibet.
Chine:e have kep::
Despite the Sino-Indian conflict of I'G?, the
.
14
this terntory. ln this confl'ct, the United
Indo-Pak Relations
17
States supported the India_n position. This move was to have regiona 1
repercussions. Pakistan, disturbed by its ally's attitude, which was
acting in opposition to her national interests, began to change
her national policies in favour of China. Fearing that both the
U. S.S. R and U. S would support India's political and military needs
while underminig her own, Pakistan
to northern Ladakh. In return, sh
recognized Chinese claims
received from China the
acknowledgement that the other parts of Kashmir rightfully belonged
to Pakistm._
A comprehensive and formal settlement between Pakistan
a Chin sere transfer of a prt of Pkistani -mtrol le Kshni r
to Peking and a part of the territory under Chinese control to
Pakistan. The settlement enabled the Chinese to reach the vital
I5
approaches to the Kara Karam pass. However, neither Chinese
nor Pakistani rights to any parts of Kashmir have been formally
accepted by the Indian government.
Thus political forces within and outside of India, Pakistan
and the United Nations have made any legal \I political settlement
of the manifold Kashmir dispute even more dificult to realize.
No less than three major wars( I DA{, I DG5, I D7 I l involving Kashmir
and innumerable skirmishes and ceasefire violations have kept alive
the Pakistani-Indian hostilities. India and Pakistan have tried to
settle the dispute through negotiations but these failed, too.
Rann of Kutch Dispute
The Indo-Pakistan War of |G5 was preceded by various
incidents in April IDG5 in the Rann of Kutch, on the frontier
between the Indian state of Gujrat and West Pakistan, and continued
at intervals until the end of the month .. The Rann (desert), which
covers an area of about ,A00 square miles, is vast expanse of
tidal mud flats, flooded during the monsoon season. Uninhabited,
it has some sllght economic value as a source of salt, and it
provides some areas of rather poor grazing. In Bri tisil t: mes,
the status of the Rann was unsettled. At that time, the Rann
was the bone of contention between the princely state of Kutch
'nd the British Indian Province of Sind. The majority of British
maps showed the Kutch-Sind border as running along the edge
18
Indo-Pak Relations
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Indo-Pak Relati ons
19
on ^pr| D, I DG5, and as usua| each sde b| amed other for provokng
the c| ash. 1he fght contnued unt | the end of ^pr| when a
cease1 re ca+e nto effect. Uefore that t seemed that the c|ashes
mi ght deve|op nto fu| | f|edged conf|agraton. I ndan lrme Mnster
5hastr sad on ^pr | 2D that, f fghtng contnued, "the army
w | | decde ls own strategy and dep|oy ts manpower and
equpment n the way t deems best. "
20
I t was nterpreted to
mean that Inda mght attack Lahore. Oue to tns tense stuaton,
the need for medaton was expresse) by many Western countres.
lresdent | ohnson expres
.
sed hs anxety over the

troub|e and
2 I
str0ssed the need for a peacefu| sett| ement. Uut the L.5. cou|d
not offer ts good offces to medate due to the embarrassng
decson by lresdent ] ohnson to cance| vsts to Washngton of
Indan and lakstan |eaders. Moscow was a|so tryng to be neutfa|
n the matter but she a|so showed her concern and appea|ed
to both the countres to fnd a peacefu| so|uton to the prob|em.
Ur tan, however, undertook the task of drect medaton between
Inda and lakstan. It was due to the Urtsh efforts that a cease-
fre was agreed upon on ^pr| 0, I DG5. ^fter that, wh |e
attendng the Commonwea|th lr me Mnsters Conference,
lresdent ^yuh Khan and lr me Mnster 5hastr `were persuaded
by lr me Mnster Haro|d W |son to sgn an agreement on | une
0,

I DG5 to reso|ve the dspute peacefu||y.

In the ag:eement Inda and lakstan agreed to refer the
mat ter to a trbuna| f they cou1d not reach any agreement through
b|atera| dscussons. 1hey a|so agreed further that the decson
of the trbuna| "sha| | be bndng" on both governments, and that
the trbuna| sha|1 rema n n force unt| ts fndngs have been
mp|

mented n fu| |.
22
In so|vn

th s mat ter, both lakstan and I nd a showed

ther ut most sncerty, though ther re| atons have deterorated
so much that they entered nto a fu| | -f|edged war n 5eptember
I DG5, but both fa thfu| |y acted accordng to the terms

of the
| une 0, I DG5 agreement. 1he meetng between the Foregn Mnsters
to be he|d at Oe|h n ^ugust was cance| | ed due to the tenson,
and the mat ter was automatca||y referred to a trbuna|. lakstan
20
Indo-Pak Relations
nomit1ated Nasrul lah Entezam, an Iranian diplomat, and India
nominated Alex Bebler, a Yougoslav judge. Gunnar Lagergem of
Sweden was the Chairman of this tribunal.
The tribunal worked seriously to solve the dispute, and
its verdict came on February 1 9 , 1 9 69. As a result, about 350
square mile in the northern part of the disputed territory was
awarded to Pakistan, and the rest went to India. India's share
was much larger but i t was mostl y sea-marsh, often under water,
while Pakistan' s included some crucial elevation oints. 23 Neither
side got what it actual l y wanted, and thi s decision came under
severe criticism by some Indian factions. 2
4
The end of the
tispute came by the signing of the Rann of Kutch Agreement
at Islamabad on J uly
4
, 1 969 by Indian

and Pakistani rpresen

tatives.
Before we conclude this topic, another interesting point
worth noticing is about the
India was more vocal about
weapons used by Pakistan
correspondent of the New
weapons used by both
her complaint against
during the clash,
York Times pointed
sides. Though
the American
the New Delhi
out that both
sides had used the American-supplied war material against each
other.
The War of 1 965
After the agreement in j une 1 965 that the Kutch dispute
would be set tled by negotiations or arbitration, hopes were
expressed that this might be j precedent which would direct the
. future relationship of the t wo countries. President Ayub Khan
described the agreement "a turning point" in the future relations
of India and Pakistan. 2
5
But all these high hopes proved to
be short-lived as tension increased immediately after that
and took the shape of an all-out war, started on September
6, 1 965.
I n the armed clash i n Rann of Kutch, India was certainly
outfought by
.
2
6
Pakistan, something that most Indians were
unwilli ng to accept. Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri ,
came under increasing pressure t o redress the Kutch defeat.
Indo-Pak Relations
' 2 1
1he 1 mes of I nda warned about the stuaton, and urged Inda
to be cautous as after testng her strength n Rann of Kutch,
lakstan wou| d try to repeat the same thng n Kashmr.
27
On the other hand, lakstan emphas zed the mportance
of fndng a so|uton to the Kashmr prob| em. ^fter the
conc|uson of the agreement, wh | e exp|anng the fut | ty of
a war over Kutch, lakstan' s Foregn Mnster, Z. ^. Uhuttq, to|d
lakstan' s Matona| ^ssemb|y that f lakstan were to fght,
"then t s not n Oharmsa|a or

Chad Uet or Uiarbet that we

have to fght, we have to f ght where the prob|em |es, .e. ,
n ] ammu and Kashmr, " and that lakstan "can never be
comp|ete wthout the peop|e of | ammu and Kashmr. "
2
1he number of c|ashes between the Indans and lakstans
on the cease1 re |ne n Kashmr had great| y ncreased durng ! Db4,
and st | | more durng the frst ha| f of ! Db5. Fna||y, a serog
crss n Indo-lakstan re| atons, resu| tng n |arge-sca|e fghtng
between ther armed forces, was precptated. I t was a| |eged by
the Internatona| lress that on ^ugust 5, ! Db5, armed nf|trators
from ^zad Kashmr began enterng Inda-he|d Kashmr n an un-
successfu| attempt to foment revo| t. 1he L. M. observers attrbuted
the responsb| ty to both sdes. Exchange of fre a| |

a|ong the
cease fre |ne became ` ncreasng| y frequent aft er ^ugust 8, and
on ^ugust ! b, Indan troops crossed the | ne and occuped some
lakstan posts. 1hese moves from both sdes were expected as
^yub Khan, overconfdent due to lakstan successes n Rann of
Kutch, tred o repeat the acton n Kashmr. Inda, embrassed
by the defeat nf|cted on her by Chna n ! Db2, was no more
ready to take another defeat--espec al | y from lakstan.
On 5eptember 5, the Indan Oefence Mnstry announced
that lakstan arcraft had attacked an Indan ^r Force ground

^

h

d
2D
h

umt near

mrtsar, wit out causmg any amage, t e operation

was the frst reported to have occurred outsde Kashmr. On the
fo| |owng day, Indan troops, wthout a dec| araton of war, |aunched
an offensve across the lunj ab fronter nto West lakstan. 1he
Indan Oefence Mnster c|a med that the Indan attack had been
|aunched n order to foresta| | an at tack by lakstan on Indan
2 2
Indo-Pak Relations
lunj ab.
30
Uut actua| |y ths Indan move was to reduce and ha| t
the lakstan advance nto southern Kashmr, lakstan forces had
advanced so rapd|y that they threatened the vta| road |nkng
5rnagar wth the p|ans of Inda. I f lakstan captured ths road,
Indan forces n Kashm r wou| d be encrc|ed. Jhus Inda was | eft
wth the choce of ye|dng or expandng the war. 5he decded
to esca| ate the war.
Fghtng contnued on three fronts unt | 5eptember 23,
both sdes havng fought each other to a vrtua| standst | | . Jhe
L. M. 5ecurty Counc| adopted ear|y on 5eptember 20 a draft
demandng a ceasefre and subsequent wthdrawa| of a|| armed
personne| back to the postons he| d by them before ^ugust 5,
! DG5.
3 !
^t lakstan' s request a speca| meetng of the 5ecur ty
Couhc | was he|d on 5eptember 22, at whch Mr.Uhutto announced
lakstan' s decson to order a ceasefre but warned the counc |
that "f t dd not brng about a sett|ement of the Kashmr queston
wthn a | m ted tme lakstan wou|d |eave the Ln ted Natons."
32
1he ceasefre came nto effect as ordered, but was
jeopard zed from the outset by a seres of vo|atons by both
sdes and by ther refusa| to w thdraw from the postons whch
they he|d n each other ' s terrtores. Jhe Indan government a|Ieged
'that after the ceasefre strong lakstan forces had nt

udeq
nto both the Faz | ka area and many border areas of Rajasthan
whch

the

had not prevous| y occuped.

33
In an emergency meetng ,
the L. M. 5ecur ty Counc | adopted U reso| uton demandng that
both Inda and lakstan shou|d "urgent|y honour ther comm tments
to the counc | , " and ca| | ed upon them "prompt| y to
wthdraw
a|| armed personne|.
"
3
+
In a note of October ! , the Indan Foregn Mnster, 5waran
5ngh, to|d the L. N. 5ecretary Genera| that " Inda was not
prepared to |nk the ceasefre or wthdrawa| of forces wth any
po| tca| queston, as Kashm r was an ntegra| part of Inda and
therefore not

negotab|e.
"
35
Jhe arguments were fna| |y ended through the efforts of
lremer ^|ekse Kosygn of the 5ovet Lnon, who nvted both
Indo-Pak Relations
23
partes t o come t o Jashkent t o sett| e ther dfferences. Reasonng
that a contnued conf|ct between Inda and lakstan wou|d probab|y
beneft Chna, the 5ovet | eader decded to assume the ro|e of
a peacemaker.
^nd so the wor|d was treated to the strange spectac|e
of a Communst state success fashonng a truce between two
bourgeos natons. Jhe Kashm r prob| em was not reso|ved, of course.
Hoth sdes mere|y set forth ther "respectve pos tons" on the
ssue.
3b
Mor were the deeper anmostes removed, or even
m tgated. Jashkent mere|y sgnfed a pause n a protracted
conf|ct that, so far, had proveo nc|usve. Jhe decsve encounter
was to come ha| f a decade | ater when the f|ames of war burst
forth once more wth terrb|e ferocty.
The "1 971 " War and the Di si ntegrati on of Paki stan
lakstan dffers from most other ^san states whch
attaned ndependence after the 5econd Wor|d War n that t s
not mere|y a co|ona| successor state but the porton of a co|ona|
successor state. Other countres, |ke Inda, Hurma, Cey|on and
Indones a nherted the who|e apparatus of government and had
a contnu ty of thought and tradtons. In the case of lakstan,
t was torn from the co|ona| successor state, and | aunched wth
| tt|e admnstratve or

offca| nhertance. I t was born n fact

from what was rea||y a revo|utonary movement wIthn the state.
Its strength had therefore to come from the nner dynamc or
conscousness of that movement at the tme of ts brth. Lnque
n the regons of modern ^s a, rather n the who|e wor| d, ts
umts were defned exp|c t| y by relgous crter|a. Hrta n' s Indan

mp re was parttond n such a way that the Mus| m majorty

areas n and contguous to lunjab and Henga| were joned together
n one po|tca| entty, lakstan. In some ways, ths was a strange
match. West lakstan and East lakstan, apart from Is|am, had
very | tt| e n common wth each other, as one observer put t,
"the

n|y bonds between the dverse and dstant wngs of ther

Mos|em naton were the Is| amc fa th and lakstan Internatona|
^r|nes. "
37
Jhere were major ethnc and cu| tura| dfferences
24
Indo-Pak Relations
between the two regons. "Indeed on|y modern communcatons,
wre|ess, power-drven shp and aerop|anes had made possb|e the
po|tca| un fcaton of two such wde|y separated tracts as the

"38
West and East wngs of the Is| amc state of lakstan.
Grevances of East lakstan. Jhe unon bet ween the two parts
was an uneasy one from the begnnng. Lnfortunate|y, the founder
of |akstan, Mohammad ^| | nnah, ded one year after the
-~
creaton of the state, and lrme M nster Laquat ^| Khan was a|so
k||ed two years |ater. Jhe |oss of these two |eaders |eft a serous
vod and contrbuted to the dec| nng popu| arty of the Mus|m
League that had provded a semb|ance of un ty throughout lakstan .
Jhe East lakstans had comp|ants about the unequa|
dstrbut on of economc resources between the two wngs of
lakstan. Jhey accused the West lakstans of exp| o taton.

Jhe
cap ta| of the country was n the western part. Most government
offca|s came from the west. Jhe army was made up of West
lakstans, the major porton comprsed of the lunjabs.
3D
Yet
a major ty of lakstans ( 55 percent } |ved n the East.
Jhe cv | -m | tary bureaucracy and other professons were
domnated by the lunj abs and the mgrants from northern and
western I nda. Jhough ethnca||y and |ngustca||y a mnor ty,
t)ey became the natona| e|te of lakstan from the start.

Henga|s
found themse|ves |eft far behnd n the process of state bu|dng
and economc deve|opment, and fe| t that they were not adequate|y

40
represented.
Jhe |anguage ssue came as a b|ow to the un ty o .ir
naton and deep|y a|enated East lakstans. lroud of ther |anguage
and ts rch | terary hertage, they were great|y shocked when
the lakstan po|cy makers nta| |y rejected Henga| ' s c|am for
recognton as a n
atona| |anguage and attempted
to make Lrdu-
a mnor ty |anguage-- the on|y natona| |anguage. 1hs decs on
aroused n ntense resentment n East

lakstan.
4 !
5 tudents came
out on the strcets and demonstrated aganst ths decson. 1here
was ri oti ng, po| ce fi rng, and b|oodshed. 5ubsequent|v, the
government of lakstan revsed ts decson and both Henga| and
Urdu were recogn zed as nat ona| | anguages. Hut the two |anguages
hard|y ganed any substanta| acceptance n the other wng.
Indo-Pak Relations 2 5
Lconomica| |y, West lakIstan appeared better off In compa-
rIson to the eastern part. From the ^merIcan mI | I tary and oconomIc
aId, the west remaIned the maIn benefcary. IntIa| | y, the Henga|
jute and tea supp| Ied between 50 and 70 percent of the natIon' s
foreIgn exchange earnIngs, but t he Henga|s receIved on|y 25 to
30 percent of lakIstan' s tota| Income.
42
Jhe west had a vrtua|
monopo|y of lakIstan' s power e| te. 85 percent of a| | government
posItIons were he|d by West lakIstans, two-thIrds of the naton' s
Industry and four-fIfths of I ts tnkIng and Insurance assets were
contro| |ed by West lakIstan.
43
Lven the re|IgIous tIe cou| dn' t keep the two parts together.
Not a|| Last lakIstanIs were Mus| I ms, about ! 0 m| |on out of
80 mI| | Ion were HIndus. Jo some extent the two parts of lakIstan
were he|d together by a common fear of IndIa. Hut ths fear was
not so great In the east. Jhe Henga|Is were |ess concerned wt|
the KashmIr Issue, they seemed more wI| |Ing to seek a peacefu|
sett |ement wI th IndIa. In part, Henga|Is fe|t thIs way because
|arge num0ers of ethnIca| | y sI mI | ar Indan ctI zens | ved across
the border from Last lakIstan In the IndIan state of Henga|.
5harng |anguage and cu| ture, they found It hard to see each o|her
as permanent enemIes.
OespIte these dIfferences, the fragI | e unIon contInued untI |
! DGD when the government of Genera| ^yub Khan co| | apsed as
a resu|t of a mass movement seekIng hs overthrow and restoratIon
o| democracy. ^yub Khan handed over power to another m | I tary

genera| , Yahya Khan.

Genera| e|ectIons n lakIstan. Yahya Khan got power n a

stuatq
In whIch he cou|d not maIntaIn the status quo wIthout grantng
concessIons to the counter e| Ite. For that he had to seek a new
po| ItIca| order. KnowIng the mood of the peop|e and sensIng the
vo| atI |e po|ItIca| sItuatIon he fIrst trIed to p|acate the angry masses
by announcI ng nw educationa| and wage po|IcIes for meetIng the
demands

of students and |abour. He emphasI zed the transItIona|

nature of hIs reIme and promIsed the transfer of power to the
( :opl e' s representatIves e|ected free|y and I mpartI a| |y on the
basIs of adu| t franchIse.
44
In preparatIon for the e|ectIon, fu| | -
2 6 Indo-Pak Relations
sca|e po| I tIca| actIvItIes In lakIstan--IncludIng the | I ftIng of a| |
restrIct Ions Q p| Ic mt Ings a pross Ios--vere restm Q |ary ! ,
! D70. Yahya Khan returned West lakIstan to Its former four
provInces and decreed that West and Last lakIstan wou| d be
represented In the future MatIona| ^ssemb|y on the basIs of
popu|atIon, thus ensurIng Last lakIstan' s majorI ty.
45
Jhe measure
of provIncI a| autonomy that Last lakIstan mIght have was |eft
for peop|e' s representatIves to decIde.
Jhe autonomy tor the federatIng unIts was

a very I mportant
and controversIa| po|ItIca| Issue whIch needed serIous consIderatIon
as maxI mum |egIs| atIve, admInIstratIve and fInancIa| powers wele
demanded for the provInces.

lrovInces were promIsed the maxImum

|egIs|atIon, admInIstratIve and fInancIa| powers, but the poInt
was made c|ear that the federaI government a|so shou| d have
adequate powers to dIscharge I ts responsIbI|I tIes In re|atIon to
externa| affaIrs and to preserve the Independence and terrItorIa|
IntegrIty of the country.
Jhe ! D70 genera| e|ectIons were the fIrst ever he|d In
lakIstan on the basIs of unIversa| adu|t franchIse. Jhese e|ectIons
showed that none of the po|I tIca| partIes was popu| ar In both
wIngs of lakIstan. Jhe ^wamI League had mass support In Last
Ha

Istan and the lakIstan leop| e' s larty had strong support In
the west. Hoth were regIona| partIes. Jhe e|ectIons a|so showed
the c|ear-cut confrontatIon of the east and west. In the MatIona|
^ssemb|y, the ^wamI League emerged as a majorI ty party by
gettIng a|| the seats from Last lakIstan and the lakIstan leop|e' s
larty got the majorIty In the lunj ab and 5Ind provInces.
Shei kh Muj i bur Rahman, the Awami League,
and the Nati onal Movement i n East Paki stan
From the very begInnIng the ^wamI League had been
predomInant an Last lakIstanI party In Its programme, |eadershIp,
and base of support. ^fter 5uharwardy' s death, none of Its |eaders
was natIona||y known and equa| | y acceptab|e to both the wIngs.
Indo-Pak Relations
2 7
5o whatever attempts were made to make t an a| | -lakstan party
were not successfu| . I ts powerfu| secretary, 5hekh Muj bur Rahman ,
was natona| | y known, but due to hs strong comm tment to Last
lakIstan' s autonomy he got very | tt| e sympathy and support
n West lakIstan. Hesdes, the Last lakstan ^wam League had
been the champon of the Henga| rghts and advocated fu| |
regIona| autonomy--a goa| whch the |eaders of the party from
West !akstan cou|d hard|y endorse who|ehearted|y.
Last lakstan |eaders decded agaInst tryng to be a
natIona| party and opted

to work on

a regIona| leve| .
4G
1he ! DG5
War wth Inda renforced ths decson as Hengals saw that they
were defence|ess In case IndIa decI ded to nvade Last lakstan.
Short|y after 1he War, In

the sprng of ! DGG, 5hekh Mu] bur Rahman

1aunched hIs famous 5Ix-lont Movement. 1he 5x ponts were
as fo| |ow,s.
! . ^ federa| form of government wou|d be estab|shed.
2. 1he Federa| Goverment wou| d contro| on|y defence

and foregn po|Icy, a|| other sub]ects beng vested n

the federatng states.
3. 1wo separate free| y convertb|e currences wou| d be
ntroduced for Last ano West lakstan, o

If a sng|e
currerncy was maI nta ned const tutona| provsons wou| d
be made t o stop the f|ght of cap ta| from Last t o West
lakstan. 1here wou| d be a separate bankng reserve and
a separate fsca| and m

onetary po|Icy for Last lakstan.

4. 1he states wou|d have exc|usve author ty to |evy taxes,
federa| expenses beng met from a unform percentage
of a|| states' taxes.
. 5eparate externa| trade accounts wou| d be mantaned
for each of the states, and foregn exchange earned from
external trade wou| d be a ther dsposa|. Federa| foregn
exchange requrements wou| d be met by the states on
the bass of an equa| percentage rate. IndIgenous commo-
dI tes wou| d move between the states free of taxaton
or tarI ffs. 1he states wou|d be a| |owed to mantan trade
representatIves abroad and to negotate trade agreements
wth

other countres.
G. ^ mI|tIa or param | tary forces, an ordnance factory,
a | tary academy and the Mavy headquarters wou| d be
set up n Last lakIstan.
1he party a|so advocated natona| zaton of the banks,
nsurance companes, heavy ndustres, foregn trade, | ransport,
2 8 Indo-Pak Relation
shIppIng and other key I ndustrIes, deve|opment of cooperatIve
enterprIse, workers ' partIcIpatIon In the management of Industry,
exemptIon from | and revenue tax on ho|dIngs up to 8 . acres,
and cance| |atIon of tax arrears on such ho|dIngs. Fundamenta|
rIghts shou|d be guaranteed by the constItutIon and shou|d be
| I mIted on| y In war tI me. lakIstan shou|d pursue an Independent
foreIgn po|Icy, and shou|d wIthdraw from 5L^JO, CLNJO and
47
other mI | Itary pacts.
JhIs programme

of the ^wamI League, whIch got massIve

support In Last lakIstan, was severe| y crI tIcI zed by many West
lakIstan |eaders.
48
Jhe ^wamI League thus became comp|ete|y
Iso| ated from other partIes of the West WIng wIth no hope for
any cooperatIon In the future.
Jhe e|ectIon resu| ts turned out to be an unp|easant surprIse
for the mI |I tary |eadershIp as

we|| as for the othr po| I tIca| partIes.

^|thot|h It had been genera| | y antIcIpated that the ^wamI League
wou| d wIn a majorIty of the seats In Last lakIstan, Its success
in securIng 75 percent of the votes and a|| but two of the seats
was tota||y unexpected. Lven greater surprIse was caused
by the success In West lakIstan of the lakIstan leop| e' s lar

y
yhIch had been expected to wIn at the most forty seats.
Jhe western |eadershIp . found thIs outcome of the e|ectIon
resu|ts sI mp| y unacceptab|e.
4D
I t was feared that the ^wamI League,
wI th Its abso|ute maj orIty In the
Itse| f a programme for vIrtua|
Last lakIstan from the contro|
NatIona| ^ssemb| y, wou|d vote
50
se|f-government, thus removIng
of the centra| government. Jhe
weeks foI | owIng the e|ectIon were marked by a

feverIsh contest
of power that fIna||y erupted Into b|oody conf|Ict.
Jhe Last lakIstan CIvI| War. Jhe post e|ectIon perIod In lakIstan
brought three major powers to the forefront whIch had to dIctate
the course of the events In I ts hIstory. Jhe Yahya regI me, the
^wamI League, and the leop| e' s larty were to fInd a so|utIon
of the prob|em whIch became dIffIcu| t due to the dIvergent and
conf|IctIng nature of theIr po|I cIes. lresIdent Yahya Khan trIggered

the crIsIs when he announced the postponement of the NatIona|

^ssemb| y' s sessIon to be convened In Oacca. Jhe ^wamI League,
lndo-Pak Relations
29
perceIvIng thIs as a delIberate attempt
mandate for HengalI autonomy, |aunched
dIsobedIence.
to dIsregard popular
a campaIgn of cIvI|
WIth the sItuatIon In Last lakIstan deterIoratIng

lresIdent
Yahya Khan

on March 3 InvIted a| | the leaders of the partIes and

groups represented In the new|y e|ected NatIona| ^ssemb|y to meet
hI m In Oacca on March ! 0. JhIs proposal was promptl y rejected
by Muj Ib, who al| eged that the army was shootI ng down unarmed
HengalIs In the streets of

Oacca.
2
In response to thIs pressure,

Yahya Khan schedu|ed the date of the assemb|y sessIon for March
2G,
3
but at the same tIme made arrangements for a massIve

4
aIr|Ift of West lakIstanI troops to Last lakIstan.
5heIkh Muj Ib at thI s poInt was under great pressure from
h 1 d

H the redIca|s of Is own party to dec are mdepen ence. e

resIsted that pressure 1or the tIme beIng and decIded to adopt
a mIddle course. He | aunched a nonvIo|ent non-cooperatIon movemen t
whIch gave hI m t'ie oportunIty to force the regI me to accept
hIs terms. Hut whI |e the regI me was offerIng negotIatIng terms,
vIolent c| ashes were goIng on between the army and the pep| e I n
parts of Last lakIstan, whIch made the acceptance of these terms
dIffIcult. Lnder thIs sItuatIon, Muj Ib got complete contro| of Last
lakIstan. "Jhe who|e of Last lakIstanI admInIstratIon, even the
Henga|Is servIng In centra| government agencIes and In the cIvI| Ian
branch of the armed forces, complIed wIth Muj Ib' s call for non-

G
cooperation.
Faced wi th Muj Ib' s de facto assumptIon of power, Yahya
Khan came to Oacca to tal k wIth hI m In order to fInd the so| uti on
of the crIsIs.
^t thIs poInt negotIatI ons were not easy to |aunch.
^fter fIve days of contInuous talks, Yahya Khan and the ^wamI
League agreed on a draft proclamatIon to be Issued by Yahya
Khan for an InterI m arrangement for a transfer of power.
1he
proposed proc| amatIon was accordIng to the Muj Ib' s four condItIons.
the I mmedIate cessatIon of martIa| | aw and transfer of power
to the fIve provInces, wIthout such a transfer In the centre. It
a|so provIded for the dIvIsI on of the NatIonal ^ssemb| y Into two
commIttees to draft separate reports on the basIs of whIch the
30
Indo-Pak Relations
57
constItutIon wou| d be formed. ^utonomy was granted to Last
lakIstan on the basIs of the sIx poInts whI | e the amount of
autonomy for the four other provInces was |eft to mutua|
agreement. 1hIs was not approved by the leop| e' s larty and Hhutto
Issued very strong statements agaInst thIs arrangement and
consIdered It a great betraya| of West lakIstan.
58
Hhutto suggested dIrect negotIaIons wIth 5heIkh Muj Ib
but hIs request dId not get any attentIon from the ^wamI League
whIch was now under heavy pressure to dec|are ndependence
as the non-cooperatIon movement had comp|eted Its one month.
1he ^wamI League pressed the governmen for quIck acceptance
of Its draft proposa| and warned that If It was not accepted
wIthIn forty-eIght hours It wou| d be too |ate to brIng peace

by
5D
.
any other means. Lvents durIng the |ast day or so

of Yahya
Khan' s stay In Oacca are stI | | not quIte known. Lach sIde offered
dIfferent vOrsIons of who betrayed whom. On the afternoon of
March 25, lresIdent Yahya Khan f|ew back to West lakIstan.
Lpon hIs return to Is| amabad, he denounced 5heIkh Mu} I b' s
actIvItIes as "acts of treason."
G0
He ordered the I mmedIate arrest
of ^wamI League |eaders and dIrected the army to crush the
secessIonIst movement and restore fu| | authorIty to the centra|
government. 1hus was begun the cIvI| war whIch |ed to the end
of a unI ted lakIstan. On March 2G,

! D7 ! , a c|andestI ne radIo
broadcast announced the proc| amatIon by 5heIkh Muj Ibur Rahman
and the ^wamI League of the "5overeIgn Independent leop| e' s

G !
Repub|Ic of Hang| adesh. "
Deteri orati on of the rel ati ons between
I ndia and Pakistan
Re|atIons between IndIa and 1akIstan, a|ready tense,
esca|ated sharp|y as a resu| t of the cIvI| war In Last lakIstan.
It started wIth acrImonIous exchange of notes bet ween the two
countrIes and to numerous charges and counter-charges by each
sIde. 1he IndIan government' s concern at the events In Last
lakIstan was fIrst expressed In the Lok 5abha on March 2G, I D7 I ,
Indo-Pak Relations
3 1
by 5ardar 5waran 5ngh, the Foregn MInster, and Mrs. Gandh,
the lrme MnIster. 5ardar 5waran 5ngh accused the lakIstan
^rmy of "suppressng the peop|e of Last lakstan.
"
G2
1he lakstan government |odged a strong protest descrIbng
t as "hgh| y exaggerated ma| IcIous and provocatve storIes about
the stuaton n Last lakstan.
"
G3
^ Congress larty reso|uton
supportng the peop|e of Last lakstan
G4
caused a lot of resentment
n lakstan and a strong note of protest was de|vered to L. N.
5ecretary Genera| L. 1hant, chargng Inda wth harbourng desgns
to underm ne the so| darty and natonal Integrty of lakIstan.
G5
1he actua| frctIon between IndIa and lakstan was
heghtened by a| | eged ncdents on ther borders and by the defec-
ton of the lakIstan Oeputy Hgh CommIssIoner n Ca|cutta,
GG
whch was fo| |owed by the c|osIng of the lakstan Oeputy Hgh
Commsson In that cIty and of the Indan Oeputy Hgh Commsson
In that cIty and of the IndIan Oeputy Hgh CommIsson In Oacca.
G7
1he mmedate aftermath of the cIv| war In Last lakstan
was mass nf|ux of refugees Into IndIa from Last lakIstan
'
'on
a sca|e unprecedented n any part of wor|d snce the 5econd Wor|d
War. "
G8
1hs |arge nf|ux of refugees was one of the reasons that
drew Inda Into the cvI| conf|Ict and |ed to the war. Inda could
not very we|| have stopped

the f|ow of refugees across Its borders

even if It had wanted to, for po|Itcal as we| | as sheer physIca|
reasons. Hut the cost to the Indan government of mantaInng
these refugees was enorous.
GD
1he Wor|d Hank estImated that
t wou| d run at about $ ! . 2 bI | | on Ior a fu| | year. 1he refugees

would a|so use up Ind a' s food reserves and admInstratIve ta|ent
woud have to be dIverted to carng for a sudden addtIon of ten
mI | | Ion peop| e.
Hy mId-| u|y, Mrs. GandhI had evIdene that a war wIth
lakstan wou|d be cheaper than the economIc burden of copIng
wIth the refugee prob| em for a sng|e year. 1hs evIdence was
supplIed by the InstItute for Oefence 5tudes and ^nalyss n New
Oe|h. 1he IndIans conc|uded that the refugees wou|d cost ther
country $D00 m | | Ion wthIn a year or more than the cost o| the
entre KashmIr war wIth lakstan In I DG5. 1hs report was wi del v
32 Indo-Pak Relations
cIrcu|ated and resu| ted In a wave of popu| ar emotIon In favour
of war. Jhe IndIan |eadershIp had to respond forcefu| | y In order
to a| |evIate thIs economIc pressure.
IndI a' s preparatIon for war. FacIng thIs sItuatIon, the most
desIrab|e foreIgn po| Icy goa| for IndIa was to create a separate
state In Last lakIstan. 5uch a state wou|d be ab|e to take back
the mI | | Ions of refugees, re|Ievng the economIc and admInIstratIve
burden they I mposed on IndIa. 5uch a state wou|d have the

addItIona| benefIt for IndIa by reducIng lakIstan ' s power and thus
Its abI| I ty to threaten IndIan securI ty.
1he goa| of a new state of Hang|adesh cou|d be achIeved
I n a number of ways. 1he lakIstanI government Itse|f cou|d grant
Last lakIstan Independence out of en| Ightened seIf Interest. FaI |Ing
thIs, the IndIan government cou|d app|y dIp|omatIc pressure. If
dIp|omatIc InItIatIves faI |ed, the IndIans cou|d resort to mI| I tary
actIon. War was by no means ar unthInkab|e or IrratIona| po|Icy
optIon for IndIa. 1he on|y constraInts

were those I mposed by

the great powers and the LnI ted NatIons. WIth proper prepara-
tIon the IndIans cou| d avoI d great power Interference. If the
war were swIft and decIsIve, the LnIted NatIons wou|d not have
tI me to act.
IndIa began a serIes of dIp|omatIc and mI | I tary moves
that by themse|ves mIght have persuaded the lakIstanls to a| | ow
Hang|adesh I ts Independence, but, If not, wou|d a|so serve as
preparatIons for a war agaInst lakIstan to accomp|Ish the same
goa|. IndIa Improved Its tIes wIth the 5ovIet LnIon, goIng so far
as to sIgn a " frIendshIp treaty. "
70
1hIs twenty-fIve year treaty had
a|| the sIgns of a mI |Itary a| |Iance. Ref|ectIng the popu| ar mood
the IndIan lar| Iament haI|ed the new "rea|Ism" In IndI a' s foreIgn
polIcy and praIsed Mrs. GandhI for havIng "put some meat In
our vegeterIan dIet of non-a| Ignment. "7 1
Jhen lrIme MInIster IndIra GandhI set off on a wor|d
tour72 to get countrIes to cut off or

reduce aId to lakIstan.
Hy presentIng the case

agaInst lakIstan on the Issue of the

Benga|Is, she coul d make It easIer for these countrIes to remaIn
neutral If not actua||y to support IndIa In the event of war.
Indo-Pak Relations
33
IndIa a|so began mI| I tary preparatIons, some of which
cou| d be Interpreted as more severe forms of "dIp| omatIc pressure. "
^t the same tI me IndIa began to supp|y arms and trai nIng |or
MuktI HahInI. JhIs support to G, 000 or 7, 000 MuktI HahInI forces was
kept hI dden from foreIgn observers, Inc|udIng L. N. observers.
Jhe

guerrI| | a raIds
73
provIded provocatIons to whIch the Ha| | s| ani
army responded, provI dIng the IndIan army wIth excuses for "probes"
and "IncursIons" and "protectIve reactIons" across the border i nto
lakIstan.
War between IndIa and lakIstan. Hoth IndIa and lakIstan made
repeated a| |egatIons In 5eptember and October that theIr terrItory
had been she||ed from eI ther sIde of the Last lakIstan border.
OurIng October the IndIan press c| aImed that the lakIstan ^rmy
was concentrated near the West lakIstan frontIer, that new defence
| Ines were beIng costructed on the border, and that the cIvIhan
popu| atI on had been evacuated from a 500 mI|e stretch to the
frontIer opposIte the IndIan 5tate of Rajastan. lresIdent Yahya
Khan, on the other hand, stated that a | arge number of IndIan
^Ir Force unIts and ^rmy formatIons had been brought forward
towards the West lakIstanI border.
74
Jhe IndIan maIn attack evI dent| y was de|Iberate|y de| ayed
untI | |ate fa| | , when preparatIons were comp| eted and the wInter
snow had c|osed the HIma|ayan passes, preventIng any ChInese
assIstance to lakIstan. Jhe IIghtIng on the Last lakIstan border
was great|y IntensIfIed after November 2 ! .
75
Jhe war Itse| f bee an
on Oecember 3, ! D7 ! ,
7G
and |asted two weeks untI| the ceaseflre
on Oecember ! 7, ! D7 ! . InItIa| | y, IndIa | ImIted the war to the sIng|e
goa| of creatIng a new state I n Last lakIstan. IndIan att acks were
Intended on|y to defeat the lakIstanI ^rmy, but the IndIan ^rmy,
however, was prepared to take the offensIve In KashmI r and West
lakIstan i lakIstan decIded to wIden the war. On Oecember 4,
IndIa | aunched an Integrated ground.
,
aIr, and nava| offensIve
agaInst Last lakIstan. Jhe IndIan ^rmy, a|ong wIth the MuktI
HahInI, entered Last lakIstan from fIve maIn dIrectIons, the aIm
beI ng to dIvIde the lakIstanI unIts statIoned around the border
and to prevent them from unItIng I n defence of Oacca, whIch,
.
34 Indo-Pak Relations
as the provIncI a| capI ta| , occupIed a strong strategIc posI tIon.
Jwo days | ater war came to West lakIstan a|so.
IndIan recogmtmn of Hang|aoesh' s provIsIona| government
came on Oecember G. 77 Jhe lakIstan government reacted by
breakIng off dIp| omatI c re|atIons wIth IndIa and descrIbed IndIa' s
actIon as eIdence of I t s "deep hatre

d" of lakIstan and of Its

determInatIon to break up the country.
Hy thIs tI me the sItuatIon was
the IndIan ^rmy. Jhe IndIan ^rmy
entIrely In the hands of
ChIef of

5taff, Genera|
Manekshaw, on Oecember
7
asked

the lakIstanI

^rmy In Last
lakIstan to surrender "before I t was too | ate. " 5Ince Last lakIstan
was cut off from West lakIstan there was no way of communIcatIon
|eft for Genera| NIazI, the lakIstanI mI | I tary commander, to
consu| t or communIcate wIth the hIgh command In west wIng.
On Oecember ! 5, as the IndIan forces c|osed In on Oacca
from a|| sIdes

Genera| MIazI sent a message to Genera|

Manekshaw through the L. 5. Consu| ate In Oacca, proposIng a
ceasefIre. He asked for facI | I tIes for regroupIng hIs forces wIth
theIr weapons In desIgnated areas pendIng theIr repatrIatIon to
West lakIstan, a guarantee of safety for the paramI | I tary forces
and for a| | those who had sett|ed In Last lakIstan sInce ! D4
7
,
and an assurance that there wou| d be no re,prIsa|s agaInst those
who had co|| aborated wIth the martIa| |aw authorItIes. In hIs
rep| y, however, Genera| Manekshaw InsIsted on the uncondItIona|
surrender of the lakIstanI forces.78
FIna||y, on the mornI ng of Oecember ! G, Genera| NI azI
accepted the lndIan terms of surrender. Jhose provIded that a| |
lakIstanI regu| ar, paramI |Itary and cIvI| Ian armed forces wouId
|ay down theIr arms, and guaranteed that they wou|d be treated
In accordance wIth the Geneva ConventIon, and that foreIgn
natIona|s, ethnIc mInorI tIes and personne| of West lakIstanI orIgIn
wou|d be protected.
7D
In a broadcast on Oecember ! G, lresI dent
Yohya Khan admI tted defeat In Last lakIstan, though wI thout
mentIonIng that the ^rmy had surrendered and dec|ared that the
war wou|d go on. Jhe next day, IndIa dec| ared a unI | atera|
ceasefIre on the western front, whIch Yahya Khan recIprocated.
Indo-Pak Relations
Volent demonstratons aganst

the mI | tary regI me n West

lakstan, begnnng on Oecember ! 8, |ed to the resIgnatIon of
lresdent Yahya Khan. 1hereupon, Mr. Hhutto was sworn n as
lakstan' s new lresdent on Oecember 20, ! D7 ! .
Jhe war b

ought complete success for Inda due to carefu|

preparaton, both dplomatc and m l tary, and favourab|e crcums-
tances. Inda was bet ter armed, gettIng arms from both Russa
and Its own arms ndustry. lakstan suffered from a Lnted 5tates
embargo on arms that had

been I mposed agaInst both Inda and

lakIstan after ther last war In ! DG5. lakstan was gettng
on|y | mIted arms from Chna and France.
lakstan fought from a dsadvantageous strategc posIton.
Forces In Last lakIstan were cut off and could not be reInforced.
Jhe Indans outnumberod the lakstanIs In the east, ! G0, 000 to
D3, 000. Jhe lakstanIs a|so had to fIght n the mIdst o| a hosti l e
popu| atIon, Inc|udIng by ths tI me as many as 50, 000 Mu|t | Bahi n i .
When the f ghtng began, the LnIted Nati ons General ^ssembly

had condemned IndIa by U vote of ! 04 to I ! , wi th I0 abstenti ons.

Hut wi th Indian vi ctory, world opInIon rapd|y sh fted. No more
reso| uti ons were brought before the ^ssembly condemnIng IndIa
or askng her to stop. Inda not only won the war but won the
support of the wor| d for ts po| Icy by doIng so.
References
I . ^t the begInnng o
|
Oecember ! D47, Inda and lakstan
mutua|ly came to an agreement that lakstan wou| d get Rs.750
as her share.
2. 5. M. Hurke, lakstan' s Fore_n lolcy: ^n HIstorca| ^na|_sIs
| London. Oxford Lnvers ty lress, ! D73} , p. ! 3.
3. IbId. , pp. ! ! - ! 2.
4. IbId. , pp. ! 4- ! 5.
5. Rene lerI t z, Chan_n_ lo|I tIcs of Modern ^sa |Mew York.
O. Van Nostrand Co. , ! D73} , p. 4.
G. For the detaI| s, see Muj taba RazvI, Jhe Fronters of lakstan.
^ 5tud_ of Fronter lroblems In lakstan' s Fore_n lo|Icy
| KarachI . Natonal lublshng House LJO. , ! D7 ! } , pp. 45-G0.
36
Indo-Pak Relations
7. Hurke, pp. 38 ! -384, aIso IbI d. , pp. ,G0-GD.
8. G. W. Choudhury, lakstan' s Re|atons wth Inda | Meerut.
Meenaksh lrakashan, ! D7 ! } , p. ! 03.
9. "lakIstan-KashmIr 5tandst | | ^greement, " ^ugust
duced

n Jhe Kashm r QuestIon, ed. K. 5arwar

Zubeda Hassan | KarachI . lakstan Insttute of
^ffaIrs, ! DGG} , p. 43.
! 0. IbId. , pp. 55-57.
I 947, repro- '
Hassan and
InternatIona|
! ! . "lress CommunIque" by the lakstan Government on October
30, ! D47, cted n Keesn_' s Re_ort, p. 45.
! 2. IbId. , pp. 55-57.
! 3 . Jext of the reso|utIons may be found I n Jhe Kashmr QuestIon,
ed.
T(. 5arwar Hassan and ZubeIda Hassan, pp. ! 80- ! 83 and 2 ! 2-
2 ! 5.
I 4. For ChI na' s IndIan hostI |I tIes and Chnese gaIns i' KashmIr,
see Ference A. Va| , lo| tcs of Indan Ocean le_Ion. Jhe
Ha|ance of lower | New York. Free lress, ! D7G} , pp. 88-D ! .
! 5. For the detaI|ed sludy on the Chnese Interests In the regIon
and Its border agreements wIth lakIstan, see ^nwar 5yed,
ChIna and lakIstan. OI_| omacy of an Lntente CordIa|e
|^mherst , Mass. . LnIversI ty of Massachusetts, ! D74} .
I G. ^| astaIr Lamb, Jhe ^s an FrontIers | London. la| | Ma| | lress,
! DG8} , p. ! 0D.
I 7. For more detaI | s on the Rann of Kutch dIspute, see O. C.
| ha, Indo-lakIstan Re|atIons |! DG0- ! DG5} | latna. HhartI Hhawan ,
I D72l , pp. ! 87- I D0.
I 8. lakIstanI note of ^prI | D, ! D5G, quoted In IbI d. , p. ! 88.
I D. | oInt communIque of October 23, ! D5G I n IndIa.
20. HIndu Week| y, May 3, ! DG5.
2 ! . New York TImes, ^prI| 25, ! DG5, and ^pr| 28, ! DG5.
?2. Text of the agreement n lak stan HorI zon, thI rd quarter,! DG5.
23. Hurke, pp. 325-32G.
24. Ibd.
25. "Jext of the lresdent ' s 5tatement, '' Oawn, | u| y ! , ! Db5.
2G. | hon G. 5toessnger, Wh_ Natons Go to War | New York.
5t. MartI n' s lress, Inc. , ! D74} , p. ! 55.
27. Jhe J mes of Inda, | u| y ! 8, ! DG5.
28. "5peech I n the Matona| ^ssemb|y, | u| y ! 3, ! DG5" pub| shed
by the lakIstan Insttute of InternatIona| ^ffaIrs, KarachI ,
! DGG, p. 45.
2D. Jhe JImes of I ndI a, 5eptember G, ! DG5.
30. IbId. , 5eptember 7, ! DG5.
Indo-Pak Relations
37
3! . "Jhe L. M. 5ecur ty Counc | ' s Reso|uton, " reproduced n
Oawn, 5eptember 2! , ! DG5.
32. "Mr, Hhutto' s ^ddress to the 5ecur ty Counc | , " Oawn,
5eptember 23, ! DG5.
33. "5waran 5ngh Informs L. 1hant, " Jhe 5tatesman, October
2, ! DG5.
34. Jhe 5ecurty Counc | ' s Reso|uton

of eptember 27, ! DG5.

35. "5waran 5ngh Informs L Jhant,

Jhe 5tatesman,
October 2, ! DG5.
3G. Jhe Jashkent Oec|araton s dscussed n Chapter III.
37. Oan Coggn, "lakIstan. Jhe Ravagng ol Go|den Henga|, "
Jm |^ugust 2, ! D7 ! } , P 2G.
38. Lamb, p. D4

3D. On|y 5 percent of lak stan' s 275, 000-an army were Benga|s.

40. Rounaq |ahan, lakstan. Ia | ure n Matona| Inte_raton| Mew

York. Co| umba Lnversty lress, ! D72} , pp. 4-8.
4 ! . Ibd. , pp. ! 2- ! 4.
42. Ibd. , pp. G8-8D.
43. Ibd. , pp. D ! - ! 08.
44. "Yahya Khan' s ^ddress to the Maton," Oawn, ^pr| ! , ! DGD.
45. ^ pres dent a| order was ssued n ^pr| dsso|vng the one-
unt structure n West lakstan and revvng the four

former
provnces of the lun]ab, 5nd, Ha|uchstan and the Morthwest
Ironter

lrovnce. Lnder the order, Hahawa|pur went to

the lun] ab, Karach to 5nd, and Las He|a to Ha|uchstan.
4G. Rounaq | ahan, pp. ! 38- ! 40.
47. Jhe text of 5hekh Mu] bur Rahman' s 5x lonts s reproduced
n Kessn_s' s Contem_orary ^rchves | London. Kess ng' s
lub|caton Ltd. , Vo|. XIII, ! DGG} , p. 232 ! 7.
48. "CrItcsm b_ | amat-e-Is| am, M zam--Is| am, M^l, " Oawn
Iebruary ! 5, ! 7, ! 8, ! DGG.
4D. Mr. Hhutt' sad on Oecember ! 5 that he wou| d do everythng
possb|e to frame an agreed consttuton, but not at the
cost of lakstan' s unty, so|darty

and ntegrty, a| though he

was prepared to negotate on certan ad]ustments here and
there. In Oawn , Oecember ! G, ! D70.
50. 5hekh Mu] bur Rahman dec| ared on Oecember 20 that
the consttuton wou|d be based on the 5x lont formu| a
and there cou| d be no compromse on ths ssue. 5ee Oawn,
December 2 ! , ! D70, Mew York Jmes, Oecember 2 ! , ! D70,
and a| so 5hekh Mu]bur Rahman' s address to a pub|c
meetng n Oacca on | anuary 3, ! D7 ! , n whch he threatened
that he wou|d | aunch a strong mass movement f anyone
opposed the framng of the consttuton, n Jhe Guardan,
| anuary 7, ! D7 ! .
38
Indo-Pak Relations
5 ! . lresIdent Yahya Khan' s broadcast to the natIon, ci ted In
Oawn , March 2, ! D7 ! .
52. "5heIkh Muj I b' s 5tatement, " New York JImes, March
5, ! D7 ! . Mr. Nuru| -^mI n, |eader of the lakIsta

OemocratIc larty, the on| y Last lakIstan larty,

other than the ^wamI League, wIth on|y two seats
In the NatIona| +ssemb| y,

a|so dec|Ined lresIdent

Yahya' s InvI tatIon.
53. lresIdent Yahya' s br
_
adcast to the natIon on March
G, ! D7 ! .
54. Yahya Khan IndIcated I n the March G broadcast,
"No matter what happens,

as |ong as I am I n
command of the lakIsta

^rmed Fores and Head

of the 5tate I wI|| ensure the comp|ete and abso|ute
IntegrIty of lakIstan | and that ) l wI| | not a||ow
a handful of peop| e to destroy the home| and of
mI | | Ions of Innocent lakIstanIs. It Is the duty of
the lakIstan ^rmed Forces to ensure the IntegrIty,
so| IdarIty and securIty of lakIstan, a duty In whIch
they have ` never faI|ed. " Jhe fu| | text Is In Oawn
March
7,
! D7 ! .
55. Jhe HhashanI group was the fIrst group to ca|| for
a dec| aratIon of Independence. ^ p|ede of fu| |
support for 5heIkh MujIb was inade on March
D
by
Mau| ana HhashanI | lro-Mus| I m factIon of the ^wami
LeagueI at a ra| | y In Oacca. Mau| ana HhashanI
dec| ared that lakIstan cou|d no |onger remaIn a
unI ted country, that Henga|Is mIght have to resort
to vIo|ent methods to acheve theIr aIms, and that
he was not a be|Iever I n non-vIo|ence, reca|| Ing
that he had saId as much to GandhI . 5ee the New
York JI mes, March ! 0, ! D7 ! , and Rounaq | ahan,
pp. ! D4- ! D7.
5G. Rounaq |ahan, p. ! D5.
57. Jhe account of the ta|ks Is In Oawn, March ! G-
20, ! D70. ^|so see Z.^. Hhutto, J
_
reat Jra_edy
| KarachI , ! D7 ! I .
58. Dawn, March 20, ! D7 ! .
5D. WhIte la_er on the

crIsIs of Last lakIstan, pp. ! 8-20.

G0. Yahya Khan' s broadcast to the natIon, March 2G,
! D7 ! .
G ! . On ^prI | ! ! a c|andestIne radIo broadcast announced
the formatIon "somewhere In Hang| adesh. " Hut Its
forma| proc| amatIon came on ^prI| ! 7. Jhe
Hang|adesh "government" set up Its headquarters
In the vI| |age of Chuadanga, on|y a few hundred
yards

from the IndIan frontIer. ^ fu| | report Is In

Jhe New York JImes, ^prI | ! 2 and ! 8, ! U7 ! .
lndo-Pak Relations
39
G2. Jhe 5tatesman, March 27 and ^prI | ! , ! D7 ! .
G3. "NotI fIcatIon of

the MInIstry of ForeI gn

pub|Ished n Oawn, March 28, ! D7L .
^ffaIrs, "
G4. Jhe 5tatesman, ^prIl 5, ! D7 ! .
G5. Oawn, ^prI | D, ! D7 ! .
6. 0 [rII !8, th HkI stanI Oty Hg OI ssIonr In C|ct ta
Mr. M. V. HussaIn

l I, announced hIs al | egIance rw. that

o| other HenguI) memDe)s of hIs staf!

to
he "5oe;eIn
Oemocra tIc Repub|Ic of Bangl adesh, " hosted the Hangl adesh
f|ag over the mIssIon, and stated that the | atter would
henceforth be known as the "OIp|omatIc MIssIon of Hang|a-

desh. " 5ee New York JImes, ^prI l ! D, ! D7 ! .

p7. It was stated In New OelhI that the Government of IndIa

had acceded to demands of lakIstan to close Its mIssIon,
In Oacca wIth I mmedIate effect, though an offIcIa| spokes-
man "deep|y deplored" lakIstan' s decIsIon to close her Oeputy
HIgh CommIssIon In Ca|cutta and

asserted that thIs was

a "calculated and studIed dIplomatIc esca|atIon on the part
of the lakIstan Government. " 5ee lhe 5tatesman, ^prI l 25,
! D7 ! .
G8. JImes | LondonI , May ! 2, ! D7 ! .
GD. Mrs. GandhI ' s statement on May 2 4 to the Lok 5abha Is
reported In the 5tatesman, May 25, ! D? ! . Mrs. GandhI told
the Lok 5abha that the estI mates on re|Ief a|one may
exceed Rs. ! , 800, 000, 000 for a perIod of sIx months.
70. Jhe Jreaty of leace, FrIendshIp and CooperatIon, sIgned
on ^ugust D, ! D7 ! , conc|uded I n the fIrst Instance for twentyyears
and was automat Ically renewab|e thereafter for fIve year
perIods. 5Igned by Mr. Gromyko and Mr. 5waran 5Ingh, the
treaty cont aIned cl auses whIch provIded for the I mmedIate
consu| tatIons bptween IndIa a{id the L.5.5. R In the ovent
of eI ther country beIng subject to attack or threat of attack
by a thIrd country. 5ee Jhe 5tatesman, ^ugust ! 0, ! D7 ! .
7 ! . Quoted by 5ydne

y H. 5chanberg, "lact 5aId to Hury IndI a' s

Non-^|Ignment , " Jhe New York JI mes, ^ugust ! 4, ! D7 ! .
72. llrs. GandhI vI sI ted the Western capIta|s of Hrussel s, VIenna,
London, WashIngton, larIs, and Bonn. She demanded the
re|ease o| 5heIkh Muj Ibur Rahman whIch she hoped wou|d
resu| t i n Henga|I autonomy and the return o| the re|ugees '
to theIr former homes.
73. For the guerrI | | a actIvItIes by MuktI HahInI, and Inci dents
on the border between IndIa and lakIstan, see the reports
In. Jhe Oawn, Jhe 5tatesman, Jhe JImes | Londonl and thc
OaI|_ Je|e_ra_h of | uly 20 throug) 2G ^ugust 22, Jhe New
York JImes , 5eptember 2 ! , ! D7 ! , and Jhe Oawn, 5eptember
2G, October G through ! 2, October 20, and November !
through 20, ! D7 ! .
40
lndo-Pak Relations
74. lresdent Yahya Khan' s broadcast on October ! 2.
75. On November 2 ! , MuktI HahIn |aunched an offensIve agaInst
1 esore, reported|y wth IndIan support. Western correspondents
n the area agreed that the Indan ^rmy was supportIng
the guerr| las. Report by C|are Ho| Ingworth In Jhe Oaly
Je|e_ra_h, November 2D, !

D7 ! , and Jhe JImesLondun Report,

Oecember 2, I D7 ! .
7G. Jhough the state o emergency was procla med by lresdent
Yahya Khan on November 23, dec| arng that "a

most crItcal
stuatIon has been created because lakstan Is faced wIth
externa| aggresson, " ^rmy reservs1s were ca| led up on
November 24 ` and ^r Force reservIsts on November 2D.
77: Mrs. Gandh ' s address to the Lok abha on Oecember G,
! D7 ! .
78. Genera| Manekshaw' s reply to Genera| ^.^. K. NI az pub|Ished
In Jhe 5tatesman, Oecember I G, ! D7 ! .
7D. For the text of the Instrument of surrender sgned by General
^urora and Genera l azI , see Jhe New York JImes, Oecmber
! 7, ! D7 ! .
CHAPTE R I l l
ATTI TUDE OF BI G POWERS TOWARDS
I NDI A AND PAKI STAN
^fter the partton n ! D47, the subcontnent was frst
consdered as an area where Hr tsh responsb| tes and capab l tes
were paramount. Hut soon afterwards the atmosphere of
suspcon, quarre| and conf| ct between Inda and lakstan drew
the attenton of non-regona| countres to these deve|opments.
Jhe reg

na| co|d war was, of course, not conducted n a vacuum.

Llements of gl oba| pol tcs, partcu|arly thosethat re| ated to the
three domnant sets of conf| ct n the nternatona| system--the
5ovet--^mercan, the 5no-5ovet and 5no-^mercan--d rectly
or ndrect|y nterfered n the regonal confhtcs.
Gven the geo-strategc |ocaton of the subcontnent
borderng on two of the three great powers, wth an outlet
nto the Indan Ocean and contguous to the lersan Gul f, the
ntruson of g|oba| and extra-regona| conf| cts nto the subcontnent
was perhaps nev table.
!
Jhe externa| major powers' nvo|vement
n 5outh ^san regon was sometmes re|ated drectly to ther
regona| nterests n the subcontnent, but more often they were
re|ated to ther larger

goa| s of nternatonal compet ton and

domnaton. I n ths game 5outh ^sa became merely another
chessboard on whch pawns cou| d be moved one way or another.
Jher nterests and re| ated moves were further comp|cated by
Indo-lakstan re| atons and often made the regona| co| d war
very btter and severe.
. 42
Indo-Pak Relations
I ndi a's and Paki stan's Rel ations
with the United States
^fter the |I quIdatIon ol HrI tIsh ru|e In ! D47, IndIa and
lakIstan

emerge
_
as two Independent countrIes In 5outh ^sIa.
In the begInnIng both countrIes got nothIng more than a warm
greetIng from the LnI ted 5tates, as new members of the wor| d
communI ty. ^t that tI me, the L. 5. , | I ke the L. 5.5. R. , was pre-
occupIed wIth more urgent prob|ems In Lurope and the Far Last.
However, thIngs changed due to the deve|opIng co|d war.
WashIngton now turned Its at tentIon towards 5outh ^sIa, whIch
seemed as an Idea| regIon for the Imp|ementatIon of New L. 5.
po|Icy. FrIend| y gestures of good wI l | and modest amounts of
economIc aId were fIrst contemp|ated wI thout any major po| It Ica|
and mI | I tary Invo|vement.
Hetween IndIa and lakIstan the former got greater at tcntIon
from WashIngton, because of Its sIze, popu|ari ty of Its |eaders,
|Ike Nehru, who was quIte we|| known In the Western wor|d and
was emergIng as the |eader of ^fro-^sI an count rIes. But when
the LnIted 5tates started formu| atIng Its new po|icy towards the
MIdd|e Last and gave serIous thought to regIona| defence arrange-
ments for the MIdd|e Last as we|| as 5outh ^sIa, lakIstan' s
geographIca| posI tIon gave It a specIa| strategIc mportance. West
lakIstan

bordered on the regon surroundIng the lersi an Gu|f

and Last lakIstan cou| d become as out|et to the countrIes of
5outheast ' ^sIa. From these strategIc |ocatIons, the LnIted 5tates
cou| d dea| wIth the prob|em of InternatIona| CommunIsm from
a "posI tIon of strength. "
U. S. Pol i cy towards the subconti nent ( 1 954-59)
Jhe rea| IncentIve In thI s regard came when the West
was confronted wIth the Korean War. 5outheas| ^sIa and the
'lI dd|e Fast became strategIca||y and economIca||y Important
Indo-Pak Relation
43
areas, whch needed

to be defended from the "threats of aggresson'

from communsts. | ohn Foster Ou||es, the 5ecretary of 5tate
under the LIsenhower ^dmInnstration, set out on a fact-fIndng
mssIon to countres of the Mdd|e Last and 5outh ^sa on May
D, I D3, durng whch he vsted Inda and lakstan. Ou||es' ta|ks
wI th Nehru were unsuccesfu|, the Indan lr me Mnster had
fundamenta| d fferences on the ssue of regona| m | tary pacts,
and | ke most ^san and ^rab countres, was not convnced of
"any mmnent Communst threat. " 5econd|y, Nehru was not prepa1ed
to gIve up hs po|cy of non-a|gnment whch had earned for hs
country hgh prestge and a favourab|e mage In the JhIrd Wo|d.2
In lakstan, the atmosphere was qute dfferent and of
course favourab| e to the L. 5. lakstan n her quost for securty
In the face of unendIng Indo-lakstan tensons, was eager to f nd
an a| |y. Jhe p| ans for regIona| pacts whIch the L. 5. was ready
to sponsor had great attracton for lakstan. Jhe Lnted 5tates
was happy to get the support of an ^san country, wIth ts sg-
nfcant geo-po| tca| |ocaton, at a t+me when non-a|gnment
was on the domnatng theme among Ihe ^sian countres. On
the other hand, lakstan was de| ghted to get the he|p of a super
power to ncrease her m |tary strength to meet the threats of
aggresson from Inda.
lakstan became a member of 5L^JO as we| | @_ the
Haghdad lact | CLNJO} after enterng Into a b|atera| m | tary
agreement wIth the L.5. n I D4 and sbsequet| y an addtona|
one n ! DD.
3
Inda reacted vo|ent |y to the L.5. decson to nc|ude
lakIstan n her g|oba| strategy, thus Indo-L.5. re| at ons were
put to severe strans and stresses n the md- ! D0s.
New L.5. po|cy towards the subcontnent In the ! DG0s. Wth
the comng of the Kennedy admnIstraton n ! DG ! , great changes
were brought n L.5. po|cy towards the subcontnent. Jhe keynote
of the new po|cy was favourab|e to neutra| sts |ke IndIa, but
It worked to the dsadvantage of a| | es | ke lakstan.
4
1he Indo-
L.5. re|atIon had a|ready taken a turn

for the better durIng

I DD-G0 because of the growng tensons between Inda and Chna.
lresdent Kennedy wanted to take advantage of the stuaton.
Other factors | ke the 5ovet-Chnese deo|ogca| conf|ct and
prospect for an Last-West detente a|so nf|uenced a| gnment and
44
Indo-Pak Relations
non-a| Ignment In the po|IcIes of IndIa and lakIstan. 1he most
I mportant factor affectIng L. 5. po| Icy towards the subcontInent
was the common ob] ectIve of both the L. 5. and L. 5.5. R. concernIng
ChIna In the ! Db0s and the ro|e that IndIa was expected to pa|y
In theIr g|oba| po| Icy for the contaInment of ChIna.
Kennedy enuncIated a " new a| | I ance fOr progress" In |Ieu
of mI |I tary a| | Iances for the deve|opIng countrIes, emphasIs beIng
on economIc aId. IndIa was very much de| I ghted wIth thI s change
In L. 5. po| Icy, whereas lakIstan was worrIed. Kennedy seemed
to make extraordInary efforts to maIntaIn good re| atIons sImu|-
taneous|y wIth IndIa and lakIstan. Hut the task was not easy,
rather, I t was dIffIcu|t and comp|ex |Ike havIng good re|atIons
at the same Ume wIth the ^rab countrIes and Israe|. Hoth ^yub
and Nehru were I
p
vIted to the LnIted 5tates In ! Db ! . ^s a resu| t
of Kennedy' s meetIngs wI th the |eaders of IndIa and lakIstan,
the L. 5. was successfu| In maIntaInIng a po|Icy of equa| treat ment
wIth both IndIa and lakIstan. IndIa, satIsfIed wIth thIs move,
had new hopes and was optI mIstIc.
Hut the sItuatIon changed

when the Indo-ChIna armed

conf|I ct started In October ! Db2. Oue to the hostI|e attI tude then
prevaI | Ing towards ChIna, the Western countrIes reacted In favour
of IndIa, whIch was supposed to be the vIctIm of "naked aggressIon "
by ChIna. 1hIs was the most approprIate moment for the LnIted
5tates, whIch showed Its great favour by rushIng arms and supp|Ies
to IndIa. 1hIs contInued even after ChIna' s uni |atera| dec|aratIon
of a ceasefI re.
IndIa embarked upon a huge mI | I tary buI | d-up wI th the
mI| I tary supp|Ies not on|y from the LnIted 5tates but from the
5ovIet LnIon as we| |. 1he Indo-ChInese conf|Ict not on|y brought
IndIa c|oser to the LnIted 5tates but a|so the 5Ino-5ovIet rIft
was further wIdened as a resu| t of the 5ovIet support to IndIa.
5o the po|I cy of strengthenIng IndI a' s mI | I tary strength suIted

the objectIves of L.5. foreIgn po|Icy.

b
lakIstan made protests agaInst L.5. po|Icy of armIng IndIa
whIch great| y upset the ba| ance of power In the subcont Inent.
1he LnI ted 5tates trIed to remove lakIstan' s fears and anxIetIes
over the IndIan arms buI|d-up but It dId not he|p much. Rather,
Indo-Pak Relations 45
the ten

Ion between IndIa and lakIst an |whICh had never dImInIshedI

| ncreased, whIch fInaI|y cu| mInated In the Indo-lakIstan War of
I Db. ^t that tIme the LnIted 5tates suspended mI | I tary assIstance
to
g
oth !na and lakIstan. GratIs mIIItary supp|I es to lakIstan
were nevet resumed , 5a|es were subsequent |y | I mI ted to spare
parts for weapons a|ready supp!Ied and these too were treated
on a "case-by-case" basIs. In the ! D70s, a few sa|es of who| e
unIts, notab|y fIghters, were negotiated but not actua| |y executed.
DIsheartened by the unfortunate events of the subcontInent,
partIcu| ar|y Indan wars wIth lakIstan and ChIna, the LnI ted 5tates
was convInced that there was no hope of buI | dIng up IndIa agaInst
ChIna In ^sIan affaIrs. I n the case of lakIstan, the specI a| re| atIon
were forma| | y broken when lakIstan gave notIce to c| ose the
I mportant L.5. strategI c communIcatIon centre at Hedaber near
leshawar from where the L-2 p|ane had once taken off and was
shot down In RussIa. DurIng the | ohnson admInIstratIon, the LnI ted
5tates began a process of dIsengagement from mI | I tary commI tments
I n the subcontInent. lresIdent | ohnson wanted to make It c|ear
to both IndIa and lakIstan that the L.5. mI |Itary assIstance to
them was not meant for theIr fI ghtIng agaInst each other.
1he changed attI tude of the LnIted 5tates was most| y
due to her mI | Itary venture In VIetnam. Due to thIs Invo|vement,
5outheast ^sIa became a top prIorIty area. ^t the same tIme,
the LnIted 5tates paId attentIon to the MIdd|e Last, where the
5ovIet LnIon was rapId|y expandIng her I nf|uence by takIng
advantage of the regIona| conf|Icts between the ^rabs and
Israe|

7
1he L.5.
and the subcontI nent In the ! D70s. Hy the tIme RIchard
NIxon became the lresI dent of the LnIted 5tates In 1 anuary ! DGD,
L. 5. po| Icy towards the subcontInent

had undergone great changes

sInce the days of hIs vIce presIdency In the mId- ! D50s. 1hough
lresIdent NIxon, due to the po| ItIca| Importance of the sub-
contI nent, cou| d not a| togethe
'
Ignore It whI |e evo| vIng the ne\\
L.5. foreIgn po| Icy, he certaIn|y decIded to operate It wIth a
|ow profI | e. NIxon was rather anxous to deve|op better understandIn
and detente wIth the two communIst ma]or powers. the L.5.5. R.
and ChIna.
46 Indo-Pak Relations
^
sIgnIfIcant deve|opment in U.5. po| Icy wIth regard t o
t he subcontinent took p| ace when an unexpected assIgnment was
gIven to Yahya Khan | then the lresIdent of lakIstan} by MIxon
to act as a mIdd| eman between WashIngton and lekIng In the
context of MIxon' s new ChIna po|icy. Yahya dId thIs j ob wIth
utmost secrecy and responsibI | i ty and hIs services were great| y
apprecI ated by both countrIes. MIxon' s new ChIna po|icy gave
lakIstan a good opportunIty |whIch at that tI me was Invo|ved
in the Hang| adcsh crIsIs} of renewing better re|atIons wIth the
UnI ted 5tates, partIcu|ar|y wIth a sympathetIc lresIdent at the
WhI te House. 1he better re| atIonshIp was dramatI zed by the L. 5.
government ' s decIsIon to | I ft the embargo on U. 5. mI| I tary
equI pment to both IndIa and lakIstan, whIch had been banned
sInce the Indo-lakIstan War of ! DG5. Mo doubt, lakIstan was
p|eased wIth thIs decIsIon. I t had been the naIn |oser fro
_
the
U.5. embargo sInce }ndIa contInued to get massive mI | i t ary supp|Ies
from the 5ovIet UnIon, thereby causIng a gr

ve threat to lakIstan' s
security. Durng the Uang|adesh crIsIs, Indo-U. 5. re| atIons were
correct but not entIre|y cordi a|. IndIa was suspIcIous of MI xon' s
persona| Inc|Inat Ions towards lakIstan.8
MIxon' s po|Icy towards the subcont Inent In ! D7 ! -72 raIsed
many angry voIces both InsIde and outsIde the UnIted 5tates.
1he wor| d press had f| ashed atrocI tIes of the lakIsan ^rmy In
Last lakIstan, and the Mixon admInIstratIon was charged wIth
sIding wIth the mI | Itary junta In lak

stan. ^ c|oser ana|ysIs o|

the U. 5. ro| e durIng

he crIsIs In Hang| desh revea|s that lresIdent

MIxon dId not condone the atrocItIes of the lakIstan ^rmy In
Last lakIstan, and he dId not approve of IndI a' s grand and wel |
p| anned strategy to dIsmember lakIstan wIth RussI a' s dIp| omatIc
and mI |I tary he|p. MIxon trIed to encourage a po| ItIca|

sett | ement
between the Last and West wIngs f lakIstan, but had no success
in that. ^s regards IndI a' s ro| e, the MIxon admInIstratIon branded
IndIa "as an aggressor In the war.
"
D
^fter the secessIon of Hang|adesf, lakIstan was desperat c
to preserve her terrI torIa| IntegrI ty I n the context of separat i |
tendencIes I n the Morthwest Iront

er rovine| MWFl} and Ha|u-

chIstan, whIch appeared to have the 5ovIet LnI on' s b|essIngs.
Indo-Pak Relations 47
lakIstan looked towards WashIngton for "protectIon. " I t had already
revIved I ts Interest In CLM1O. , a reversal of Uhutto' s earl i t
demands of wIthdrawal from 5L^1O
! 0
and CLM1O.
1he UnIted 5tates stIll seemed to be Interested In tht
maIntenance of lakIstan' s terrItorIal IntegrIty. WashIngton would
not

lIke to see a further dIsmemberment of lakIstan by the

combIned 5ovIet and IndIan moves. Uut one thIng Is certaI n.
the heyday of U. 5. -lakIstan relatIonshIps of the mId- ! D0s I s
over for good. 1he new relatIonshp Is lIkely to be merely pragmatI c
and based on realI tIes In 5outh ^sIa. UesIdes, after the ouster
of Mr. Uhutto by a mI l I tary general, lakIstan once aga|n Is facI ng
a dI ffIcul t Internal crIsIs. he Carter admInIstratIon' s attI tude
has been quIte cold--to the extent of IgnorIng lakIstan. Carter

made a tour of ^sIa and ^frIca In the wInter of ! D7B. He vIsI ted
IndIa, a

nd showed an Interest In the new government led by

Morar] DesaI |Installed after the

defeat of IndIra GandhI and

Congress} , but dId not vIsIt lakIstan.
Rel ati ons of Sovi et Russia with I ndia and Paki stan
1he RussIans often accuse the so-called "I mperIalIst powers,'
and recentl y ChIna, of exploItIng regIonal tensIons to advance
theIr natIonal Interest. ^n analysIs of the 5ovI et' s polIcy and
actIons towards the subcontI nent wIll, however, show that the
RussIans, more than any other power, sought to utI l I ze the tensIons
between IndIa and lakIstan In achIevIng theIr obj ectIves In 5outh
^sIa.
IndI a' s struggle for power and the Musl I m demand for
a separate state based on relIgIon, was denounced and condemned
by RussIa, " as a set of new ImperI alIst devIces to retaIn UrI tIsh
polI tIcal, economIc and strategIc Influence In 5outh ^sIa. "
! !
1hroughout the 5talIn era, RussIan comments on IndIa
and
lakIstan were harsh and theIr attI tude remaIned hostIle. 1hrough
that early perI od 5ovIet RussIa showed no Incl InatIon to establIsh
any frIendly relatIons wIth IndIa or lakIstan. Uut landI t Mehru,
beIng a great admIrer of the socIal wel fare and econom| c develop-
ment pol IcIes of RussIa, had fel t the necessI ty of maIntaInIng
48
Indo-Pak Relat ions

good relatons wth the 5ovet Unon, a neghbour, wth whom,

he sa d, "we shalI have t o undertake many common tasks and
have much to do. "
! ?
5tal n, lke Dul |es, dd not apprecate Mehru' s non-algnment ,
because he saw the worl d as sharply dv ded nto two camps
and thought there was no room for the m ddle-of-the-roaders.
Mehru' s frst trp to the Unted 5tates n ! D4D, at the nvtaton
of lresdent Jruman, 1ad drawn further 5ovet cr tc sm, and
most of hs speeches brought harsh comments from the 5ove
press. He was ca| | ed an "^mercan 5tooge. ''
! 3
Jhe 5ovet Unon,
by sensng lakstan' s dscomfort wth the Western power ' s
woo ng of Mehru, tr ed to take advantage of lakstan' s frustraton.
^n nvtaton to vs t Russ

a was sent to lakstan' s lr me Mnster

Laquat ^l Khan n ! D4D. ^t that stage, lakstan cou|d not be
nfluenced by the 5ovet Unon, because t desperately needed
economc and m | tary assstance, ne ther of whch the 5ovet Unon
was n a poston to supp|y. Jhus, lakstan turned down 5ta| n' s
nvtaton and became more frend| y th the Un ted 5tates n
the m d- ! D0s. the Krem| n |eaders recogn zed that the best way
to pena| ze lakstan was to support her advers

ary, Inda.
! 4
Durng the Korean War, I nda p| ayed her f rst major ro|e
n nternatonal affars, and her polcy was found favourab|e to
Russa. Mehru' s speeches and statements gave the mpresson that
Inda agreed more wth the 5ovet Unon than wth the Un ted 5tates
on matters re|ated to the Korean War. On another occasor , when
the | apanese leace 1reaty becamO a controvers a| mat ter Inda
sded wth the 5ovet b|oc. Mehru' s open crtcsm of the po| ces
of the West began to gan 5ta|n' s apprec aton. Re|atons between
Inda and the U. 5. 5. R. showed some mprovement, s mu| taneous|y
ths was the end of Moscow' s softer po|cy towards

lakstan
| manfested by the ear| er nvtaton to Laquat }.
Mehru' s condemnaton of the Western m | tary pacts n
the 1hrd Wor| d brought prases from the 5ovet press, and 5tal n' s
successors va| ued h s ndependent foregn po|cy. 1hey tt| ed towards
the Ind an government and took advantage of the tensons between
Inda and lakstan. 1hey saw that antpathy to lakstan was the
pvot of Indan foregn po|cy.
Indo-Pak Relations 49
1he whole decade of ! D0 to ! Db0 and onwards Is remarkab| e
In Indo-5ovI

et re|atIonshIps. Moscow and Mew De|hI entered Into

numerous trade agreements from ! D3 to ! DD whIch not on|y
Improved theIr rel atIonshIp, but also enhanced the economIc develop-
ment of IndIa. 5ovIet RussIa helped IndIa In constructIon and
`
deve|opment of heavy Industry. Hetween ! D7 and ! 9b ! the U. 5.5. R.
extended credIt t o IndIa tota|Ing $b70 ml|Ion.
!
^t the same tIme,
IndIa obtaIned |arge amounts of economIc assistance from both
th UnIted 5tates and other Western countrIes.
On polItIcal Issues, lndIa and the 5ovIet UnIon suported
each other' s p

osItIon. WIth respect to the RussIan atrocItIes in

Hungary, IndIa was not at al| voca| as compared to her severe
condemnaton of the ^nglo-French-IsraelI actIon In Lgypt. IndIa
was the only non-communIst country whIch voted wIth the 5ovIet
b|oc agaInst a U.M. resolutIon ca|1n for |ree electIonsIn Hungary
IndI a' s support for the U. 5.5. R was compensated by 5ovIet support
of IndI a' s

posItIon on the KashmIr Issue. OurIng ! D54- ! Db?, the

5ovIet UnIon dropped Its neutralIty on the KashmI r Issue and openly
supported IndIa. I t not only gave unequIvocal support to IndIa on
the matter, but a|so went to the extent of exercIsIng Its veto
when the U. M. 5ecurIty CouncII reso|utIons regardIng Kash mI r were
dIspleasIng to IndIa.
Svi et Pol i cy towards I ndi a and Paki stan
i n the 1 960s
^fter the 5Ino-IndIan War of ! Db?, 5ovet RussIa began
to take note of "new trends" In lakistan' s polIcy. lakIstan had
shown Its dIspleasure wIth the ^merIcan decIsIon to supply arms
to IndIa.^long wth that, the 5ovIet LnIon a|so watched wI th concem
lakIstan' s growIng frIendshIsp and c|o.ser lInks wI th ChIna. WIt

h
the twIn ob] ectIves to exploI t lakIstan' s dissatIsfactIon wIth the
UnIted 5tates and prevent the growIng relatIonshIp between ChIna
and lakIstan, the 5ovIet UnIon began a new phase of Its

polIcy
towards the subcontInent. 1he new po| Icy contInued the specIal
re|atonshIp wIth IndIa but attempts were now made to cul tivate
better re|atIonshIps wIth lakIstan.
5 0
lndo-Pak Relations
^s a rsul t of RussI a' s new po|Icy, a serIes of dIalogues
began on ambassadorIal and then hIgher offIcI a| |evels. DurIng
these dIalogues I t was clear that the 5ovIet UnI on wanted to
dIscuss secondary Issues |Ike a cultura| agreement and trade,
whereas lakIstan was eager to dIscuss the more I mportant Issue,
such as 5ovIet support of IndIa on KashmIr, ^fghanIstan' s stand
on "lakhtoonIstan" and 5ovIet arms supp|Ies to IndIa whIch were
causIng great anxIetIes In lakIstan.
! G
DurIng lresI dent ^yub' s vIsI t to the U. 5. 5. R. I n ^prI |
! DG5, Moscow appeared to press lakIstan to wIthdraw from the
Western sponsored pacts, partIcularly CLM1O,

and to close the

U.5. communIcatIon centre at Hedaber base. lakIstan urged Moscow
to modIfy the 5ovIet stand

on KashmIr and to reduce arms supplIes

to IndIa. MeIther sI de showed any flexIbI | Ity In theIr respectIve
posItIons, however. KeepIng asIde these I mportant pol I tIca| Issues,
lakIstan had a|ready sIgned a cu| tura| agreement In | une ! DG4,
a cIvIl avIatIon agreement In ! DG3, and a barter trade agreement

In ! DG3.
5Ince ^yub' s fIrst state vIsIt to the U. 5. 5. R. , the 5ovIet-
lakI stan relatIonshIp had been re|axed consIderably though no
major step was taken by eI ther sI de on :.portant po| ItIca| Issues
affectIng the re| atIonshIp. 1he 5ovIet UnIon began to maIntaIn
a osture of neutra| I ty In the I ndo-lakIstan dIspute. I t, however,
dId not take any posItIve step In that dIrectIon whIch wou|d
serIous|y jeopardI ze I ts re|atIons wIth IndIa. 1hIs softness In Its
attItude was shown on|y to weaken lakIstan' s o|d tIes wIth the
UnI ted 5tates and those emergIng wIth ChIna. 1hat Is how the
5ovIet UnIon maIntaInd a facade of neutralIty In Indo-lakIstan
affaIrs.
l 7
Whatever the motIves behInd 5ovIet po|Icy, I t was ab|e
to brIng some changes In lakIstan' s polIcy. Its fIrst success was
seen In ! DG5, when after the Indo-lakIstan War In 5eptember
! DG5, ^yub, despIte the warnIngs of lakIstan' s al | y ChIna, accepted the
5ovIet ro|e of medIatIon at the 1ashkent Conference In ! DGG.
1hI s conference cou| d achIeve very | I tt|e, If anythIng at a| | , to
I mprove Indo-lakIstan rel atIons. Yet, for the 5ovIet UnIon, I t
Indo-Pak Relations
5 1
was a great dIp| omatIc achIevement as It p|ayed , for the fIrst
tI me, the ro|e of a peacemaker In a major conf|Ict In ^sIan affaIrs.
^fter the l Db War, the mI | I tary ba|ance of power was
changIng fast to the detrI ment of lakIstan and favourab|y for
IndIa because the UnIted 5tates, on whIch lakIstan depended tota| |y
for mI | I tary

supp|Ies, put an embargo on mI | I tary supp|Ies for

!
both IndIa and lakIstan. The_ L. 5. embargo dId not hIt IndIa
as

hard as It dId akIstan, because the 5ovIet UnIon contInued

to gIve massIve mI | I tary aId to IndIa. lakIstan got mI | I tary sup| I
from ChIna, but they were no match for the RussIan weapons
pourIng Into IndIa. Hence lakIstan a| so trIed to get 5ovIet arms,
of whIch It receIved a modest amount after agreeIng to c|ose
down the U. 5. communIcatIon centre at Hedaber.
1he IndIan reactIon to the 5ovI et' s decIsIon to supp|y
arms to lakIstan was predIctab| e. However, KosygI n' s vIsIt to
Mew De|hI, after a vIsI t to lakIstan, convInced Mrs. GandhI that
the arms sa|es to lakIstan neIther harmed IndI a' s vIta| natIona|
Interests nor vItI ated Its tIes wIth Moscow. IndIa offIcIa| |y protestO
! b h 5
. ! 8
the arms s a es, ut I t seemed t o accept t e oviet assurances.
^fter the arms sa|es, RussIan pressures were further
IntensIfIed, when lakIstan was "advIsed" to joIn KosygI n' s p|an
for a regIonu| economIc

groupIng, comprIsIng ^fghanIstan, lndIa,

Iran, lakIstan and the 5ovIet UnIon, and Hrezhnev' s scheme o|

l D
an ^sIan Co| |ectI ve 5ecurIty arrangement.
lakIstan saw that the RussIan motIves behInd these schemes

of regIona| cooperation agaInst "ImperIa| Ist" aggressIon and "neo-

co|onIa| I sm" were to contaIn Chnese Inf| uence In the area, and
a|so to j eopardI ze Its frIendshIp wIth ChIna on whom It re|Ied 1
hevI|y In case of a threat from IndIa. ^ccordIng|y, It rejected
these varIous RussIan proposa|s. I t tefused to pay the heavy
po|ItIca| prIce f
P
r the RussIan arms, uncertaIn In quantIty and
poor In qua| I ty. lakIstan' s rejectI on of the new 5ovIet proposa|s
In ^sIa agaInst ChIna put an end to the short-|Ived perIod

of
so-ca||ed frnd|y re| atIons between Moscow and Is| amabad ( ! Db-
70} .
5 2
Indo-Pak Relations
Sovi et rel ati ons wi th I ndia and Paki stan i n the 1 970s
Hy refusng to comply wth the crude

ussan pressures,
lakstan had to pay a heavy prce. 5ovet Russ a' s rel atons wth
Inda grew stronger day by day. Hy sgnng the 20-year treaty
of peace, frendshp, and cooperaton n ^ugust l D7 l wth Inda,
the 5ovet Unon gave al most a bl ank cheque to Mew Delh.
20
5ovet good wl l for lakstan had now evaporated. Further, lakstan' s
rOle n arrangng the 5no-^mercan dalogue was greatly resented
n Moscow.
1hs was the back

round of the 5ovet att tude to lakstan

at the begnnng of the cvl war n East lakstan n ! D7 ! . 1he
5ovet support for the Hangladesh movement coul d only be explanO

n terms of these developments n the lakstan-5ovet relatonshp

n the precedng two years, ! DbD-70. Sovet host l ty cont nued
even after East lakstan' s secesson. ^fter becom ng lresdent,
Mr. Hhutto vsted Moscow n ! D72, but the rel atonshp dd not
mprove muCh. 1he poltca| unrest n the MWFl and Haluchstan
provnces was greatly due to 5ovet encouragement. 1h

se zure
of 5ovet arms smuggled nto lakstan through the Iraq Embassy
n Isl amabad, the coup n ^fghanistan and lresdent Daud' s
2 !
threats to revve the old ssue of "lakhtoonstan" wer
p

nterpreted
n lakstan as ndcatons of contnued 5ovet pressure to brng
lakstan nto te ^san Lollectve 5ecurity 5ystem.
Rel ati ons of Chi na with I ndia and Pakistan
1he other great power that has been nterested n the
recent past n the affars of the subcontnent s

Chna. ^|ter
the protracted wars wth foregn powers, Mao 1se-tung' s Chi na
emered as H un ted naton, whch was to play an important ro| e
n ^san affars. Chna was consdered by many ^si ans as a great
symbol of ^s an natonal sm. Its emergence was enthusastcal ly
greeted by Inda, because workng together they could form a
|
strong force n the area.

Indo-Pak Relations
5 3

1he perod from l D4D to l DD was an era of frendshp

and cooperaton between the two large countres of ^s a. Inda
and Chna.
??
Inda was the second non-communst country after
Hurma to recogn ze the leopl e' s Republc of Chna. ^fter the
exchange of ambassadors, relatons between the two mproved
a great deal. On the other hand, Ch na' s relatons wth lakstan
were not as warm, one reason beng that lakstan had shown
no specal enthusasm about the new Chna. 1hough the two
cOuntres were not close to each other, there was not any hostI ty
between them, ether. Dplomatc mtsstons had been exchanged
and other lnks were establ shed.
?3
When Indo-lakstan trade came
to a complete stop n ! D4D, lakstan n ts search for new markets
sold ]ute an? cotton to Chna n return for coal under a barter
agreement. Chna, on ts part, hoped to cultvate rel atons wth
the Muslm countres of the Mddle East through lakstan.
J4
Chi na's rel ati ons wi th I ndi a and Paki stan up to 1 959
1hs was the perod of a decade of extremely nti mate
rel atonshp n 5no-Indan relatons. 5ome complcatons arose
durng that perod, but those were solved wth a sprt of good
wl l and frendshp. 1he frst ma]or complcatng factor n ther
relatons arose over 1bet, whose nternatonal status was omewhat
ambvalent. Chna, vewng 1bet as part of ts own terr tory,
sought to end ts autonomy and ntegrate t wth the rest of
the country by force. Inda was dsmayed by Chna' s use of force
n 1bet but l acked the m l tary strength to challenge Chna.
Mehru could have opposed Chna by acceptng m l tary support
from the Western powers, but at that tme he was also nterested
n establshing hs polcy of non-algnment.
5no-Indan !elatons survved 1bet. 1he dspute was solved
by ther sgnng the 1bet ^greement on Apr l ?4, l D4, on the
bass of "lanch 5heel"--fve prncples of peaceful coexstence.
?
More-
over, Inda vgorously champoned the cause of Chna durng the
Korean War. 1hs perod marks strong expressons of frendshp,
the most popular slogan n Inda durng ths perod beng "Hnd-
54
lndo-Pak Relations
Chn Hha Hha"--the Indans and Chnese are brothers. Leaders
of bth otries eUgO v s ts a rve W mthus ast c w| O frm
the peop|e of the host country. Inda and Chna worked together i n
the po| t ca| sphere. Inda and severa| other countres sponspored
the ^fro-^san Conference n l D at Handug where Chou-en-
1
l ai demonstrated hs dp|omatc sk||s and statesmanshp n dea|ng
wth a |arge number of ^san and ^frcan countres.
?b
1owards
the end of the l D0s, 5no-Indan frendshp experenced stran.
Chnese maps nc|uded the terrtory n the H ma| ayas whch Inda
c| amed as ts own.
Meanwh | e Chna' s re|atons w th lakstan remaned coo| ,
but correct. lakstan' s entry nto 5E^1O was regretted by Chna
but t was not made a speca| propaganda ssue by the Chnese
|eaders, who showed consderab|e restrant n dea|ng wth lakstan
at the heght of ts assocaton wth the West.
?7
Un|ke the 5ovet
Unon and the Eastern European countres, Chna refused to regard
Kashmr as "an ntegra| part of Inda. " In l Db0, dur n the meetngs
of the Chnese and Indan offca|s regardng boundary demarcatons ,
when the Indans tred to nc|ude n the ta|ks the border between
lakstan and Indan-he|d Kashmr, Chna refused to dscuss ths
part of the boundary. lakstan reacted favourab|y to Chna' s
decson and sent a dp| omatc note to the Chnese Government
suggestng a boundary agreement between the two countres.
Rel ations i n the 1 960s
1he l Db0s brought the mstrust and suspcon n 5no-1ndan
re| at ons to the surface, and the go|den era of ther frendshp
came to an end n ear|y l Db0. 1her re|atons deterorated n
l DD when ncdent occurred a|ong ther Hma|ayan borders--one
n the Morth East Fronter ^gency l M^F^} and the other n the
Ladakh area of northeast Kashmr. Other factors, whch produced
a drft between these two countres, nc|uded lresdent Kennedy' s
new po|cy towards 5outh ^s a, whch regarded Inda as a counter-
pose to Chna. ^s Inda turned away from Chna, lakstan turned
towards 1t.
Indo-Pak Relations
In late l Db?,
j
nda and Chna had a l ttle war n the
Hmalaya mountans. 1he ntatve was taken by Inda when t
?d
attacked Chna' s border posts. 1he massve counterattack launchO
by the Chnese overpowered the Indan forces. Inda suffered ts
greatest m l tary setback snce ndependence. Chna, by announcng
a unlateral ceasefre, left Inda along wth the rest of the wor|d
bewldered, but one thng was then clear. Chna had proved i ts
superor power.
1he 5no-Indan war put an end to the "two thousand years
of frendshp
,

?D
and had a great mpact on the 5outh ^si an tr anglc.
It brought Chna' s dfferences wth the 5ovet Unon to the surface
Dsapponted wth the Unted 5tates' atttude, lakstan started
ts polcy of b lateralsm--whch not only resulted n

closer lnks
l
wth Chna, but also normalzed ts relatons wth the U.5.5. R.
^nother repercusson of the 5no-Indan war was the strengthenng
of Inda aganst lakstan. ^fter the death of Meru, lr me Mnster
5

astr found hs country weak, and took steps to consoldate

ts poston n Kashmr and to renovat
p

s armed fo

rces.
1he l Db0s brought lakstan and Chna, two countres
wth completely dvergent socal, economc, and pol tcal orders,
closer. Inda consdered these new Chnese dplomatc moves
towards lakstan as antpathy to Inda. Chna cla med to base
ts relatonshp wth lakstan n the l Db0s on the fve prncples
of coexstence, whch gu ded ts relatons wth Inda n the l D0s,
whle lakstan' s nterpretaton was referred to as mutual natonal
nterests.
J0
^s ponted

out earler, lakstan n ts quest for

securty turned to new frends and new alles n the changed
crcumstances n the l Db0s. Of all ma]or powers, Chna seemed
more sympathetc to lakstan' s anxety over Inda, and ths
provded the bg ncentve to lakstan' s nclnaton towards lekng.
1he boundary pact between Chna a
_
d lakstan was the
frst ma]or step n the 5no-lakstan frendshp wU s grO steadly
for the last ffteen years. In l DD, lresdent ^yub had already
shown hs wllngness to approach Chna for a peaceful settl ement
of the boundary between the two countries. 1he cease fre lne
n Kashmr n l D4d resulted n entrustng lakstan the respon-
5 6
lndo-Pak Relations
sb| ty of defence of the areas contguous to Chna' s prOnce
of 5nkang from the Karakoram pass n the northeast to the
farthest pont n the northwest. 1he border regon comprses two
dstnct areas, Ha| tstan and Hunza, and n ths regon |es one
of the greatest mountan comp|exes, the Karakoram range of
hgh mountans, deep va| |eys, and turbu|ent rvers. Mo boundary
| ne had ever been shown n the sector west of the Karakoram
pass on any lakstan map.
On lakstan' s ntatve, both countres agreed to have
ta|ks on the mat ter to demarcate the boundares. Megotatons
started n 5eptember ! Db2 between the foregn mnsters and
the boundary agreement was fna| |y sgned on March 2, ! Db3.
3 !
^ccordng to the agreement, Chna actua| | y ceded some 70
square m| es of terrtory. In dong so, Ch na' s man obj ectve
was to demonstrate ts w| | ngness to sett|e the boundares n
a peacefu| manner wth ts neghbours, such as ^fghanstan,
l r : r nw, Mongol i a, and Mepa|. 1his was U bLU III ul cmbarrassment
i I wel l as annoyance to Mew Oe|hi . I t was a tri umph for Chna,
parti cularly among the ^fro-^san countries.
^s for i nternati ona| mp| catons, the agreement had
worsened the Indo-lakistan re|atons. In Washi ngton, the
agreement was resented not so much because of the actua| |ne
of demarcaton or i ts contents but for the new trends n laki stan' s
foreign po|cy |eanng towards leking. laki stan' s forei gn polcy
began to move more to the p|easure of lekng resu| tng n
annoyance and dsp|easure by the } ohnson admnistraton n
Washington, worries i n Mew Oe|hi , and uneasness n Moscow.
^ series of agreements between Chna and lakstan
fo| |owed the sgning of me border agreement. More sgnfcant,
however, were the po| ti ca| , di p|omati c, and m | tary cooperaton
and di a| ogues. Uetween ! Db3 and ! Dbb there were a number
of exchange vsi ts between top Chnese and lakistan |eaders
cu| mi nati ng n ^yub' s state vst n March ! Db. 1here was a
wi de range of discussions in a much more re|axed and frend|er
atmosphere than what ^yub had i n Moscow n ^pri | ! Db. Mao
and other Chi nese |eaders assured lak istan of Chna' s fu| | support
i n the event of any externa| aggressi on.
Indo-Pak Relations 57
Ourng the Indo-lakstan War of ! DG5, Chna gave open
and unequi vocal support to lakstan. Hetween 5eptember ! G, when
Chna ssued an ul tmatum to Inda,
3?
and

te Chnese troops
began to move along the 5kkm border, and 5eptember ??, when
lakstan accepted the ceasefre reso| uton, the wor|d remaned
suspended by the cruc a| queston of whether the war wou|d
esca|ate nto a wder, |onger and grver conf|ct between Inda,
Chna and lakstan wth the potenta| nvo|vement of the two
super powers drect|y or ndrect| y.
Hy ths t me, due to the pressure both from the L. 5.
and from the L.S.5. R. , lresdent ^yub agreed to accept the cease-
fre. 1he Ch nese |eaders a|so showed ther statesmanshp and
understandng of lakstan' s dffcu| tes. 1hey were qute ready
to come to lakstan' s rescue and agreed to provde any assstance
Fakstan needed at that tme. Wh|e the Chnese apprecated
lakstan' s dffcu|tes and seemed to recogn ze that lakstan
had no opton but to accept the ceasefre, they were certan|y
not happy to see the

ro|e of the 5ovet Lnon as peacemaker

n 5outh ^sa at the 1ashkent Conference. When Lu 5hao-Ch
came to lakstan n March ! DGG, ^yub had to make great efforts
to reassure the Chnese |eaders about the 1ashkent Dec|araton.
33
^ter th Wr of !U5, ^yb |oO tords n for wate h|p
in a fast deteroratng stuaton for lakstan' s securty and defence
prob|ems. Chna assured lakstan of a|| types of he|p n the case
of another war wth Inda. In the meant me, Chna began to gve
lakstan the much-needed m | tary supp|es. lakstan receved
substanta| m | tary ad after ! Db5, n fact , Chna proved to be
the prncpa| arms supp| er to lakstan n the year ! DG5-70'
4
lakstan' s moves n the drecton of the 5ovet Lnon durng
lresdent ^yub' s vst to Moscow n ! Db7 and Kosygn' s vst
to lakstan n ear|y ! DG8, cu| mnatng n the Russan decson
to gve lakstan some m| tary supp|es,
3
rased suq. cons n
lekng. ^yub was a|so dsturbed by the news of the nterna|
upheava| caused by the Cu| tura| Revo|uton n Cn na. He probab|y
thought that a change of |eadershp n Chna mght affect hs
country' s spec a| | nks wth t. Chna' s re| atons wth lakstan,
5 8
Indo-Pak Relations
however, remaned unchanged durng the Cultural Revoluton.
1here was apparently no sgn of a crack n Ch na' s att tude towards
lakstan. Hut before the fal l of ^yub n l DbD, Chna seemed
to have some "second thoughts" on lakstan.
Chi na's rel ati ons wi th I ndia and Pakistan i n the 1 970s
When Yahya Khan became lres dent n March l DbD, lakstan
was nvolved n serous nternal problems. Durng ths perod
lakstan had hardly any foregn polcy. Hut then came the un-
expected but most sgnfcant assgnment for Yahya, to act as
a "messenger" between Washngton and lekng.
3b
1hs gave
lakstan a good opportun ty to further develop

better rel atons

wth Chna and also wth the U. 5. under Mxon.
In ths stuaton, Yahya Khan vsted Chna n Movember
l D70 and had lengthy and exclusve talks wth Chou En-La and
also a meetng wth Cha rman Mao. 1he dscussons were not
confned to Chna-lakstan relatons but sgn fcant|y a good part
of the dalogue was spent on 5no-^mercan relatons n whch
Yahya had been playng a role.
Durng that t me, Chna and lakstan agreed to bu l d
the frst road l nkng the two countres, an a| l -weather route, three
mles hgh, through the H mal ayas. It fol|ows the trace of an
ancent mu| e track, known as the "5lk Road" more than ! , 000
years ago.
37
1he new road s regarded as havng l more pol tca|
than m| tary or economc sgnfcance. Inda, however, was
concerned over ts constructon. 1hough the road has no sgnfcant
potental of beng used as an "nvason route, " ths s the on|y
road between the two countres sharng a common boundary in
Kashmr. I t runs from remote Kashgar to the Mntaka lass,
n 5kang lrovnce of Chna, ! , 40 feet above the sea level ,
on the lakstanI sde t runs 80 m |es down to G| gt n lakstan-
he|d Kashmr. 1he road was ceremonous|y naugurated n February
! D7 ! and referred to as the "Hghway of Frendshp. "
Yahya Khan' s vst contrbuted to a better understandng
between the two countres. Chna promsed substanta| economc
lndo-Pak Relations
59
ad t o lakstan for her fourth fve-year p|an. M | tary assstance
from Chna was a|so dscussed. lakstan' s open support at the
U. M. for Ch na' s entry n October l D70 was great|y apprecated.
Hut t was a perod of great change and uncertanty n
lakstan. Chna, | ke any other country, cou| d see the mpendng
crss n lakstan. 1he ru|ng amy ]unta' s unwse hand| ng of
the stuaton n the Last wng as we| | as the uncompromsng
atttudes of the two prncpa| |eaders of Last and West lakstan,
Mu] b and Hhutto, had added to that confused stuaton. Chna
was watchng the stuaton wth concern and sympathy. In such
an uncertan stuat on, C
_
na seemed supportve of lakstan' s
we|| beng. When the tragc happenngs over the crss n Last
lakstan began, Chna was caught n a d|emma:
?d
whether to
support a frend|y m | tary regme or a popu| ar movement. ^s
a ma]or power, Chna cou|d not watch wth equan mty the ds-
ntegraton of lakstan, ts c|osest a||y n 5outh ^sa,
_
nd the
brth of a new country whch was destned to be frend|y to
Mew De|h and Moscow, both havng a host| e atttude towards
Chna.
When the troub|e fna||y started n Last lakstan n March
l D7 l , the Chnese press and government dd not make any hasty
comment. Jhe frst reacton was expressed n the leo_|e' s Da|y
on ^pr| l l , l D7l . I t nether supported lakstan' s m | tary acton
n

r attacked the

Henga| movement n Last lakstan. Its man

attack was aganst "open nterference n the nterna| matters
of lakstan by the Indan Government. " 1he Russan ro|e,
partcu| ar|y lodgorny' s | etter to Yahya, was a|so cr tc zed as
an "nterference" n lakstan' s nterna| affars.
Chna, |ke the Unted 5tates, was very carefu| of not
gettng nvo|ved n the crss. 1he Chnese dd not

re|sh the
prospect of supportng a m | tary reme of West lakstan aganst
the e|ected representatves of Last lakstan. Chna had a|ways
supported |beraton movements a| | over the wor|d and t cou| d
not sudden|y gve up that ro|e for ru|ng e| te of West lakstan. ^t
the same t me, t cou|d not see the prospect of a ma]or dp| omtIc
60 lndo-Pak Relations
trumph of the 5ovet Unon and Inda n 5outh ^sa where she
had an mportant ro|e to p| ay. These dp|omatc rea|tes n 5outh
| ^sa, partcu|ar|y 5no- 5ovet rva|ry n the area, put t n an
awkward pos ton.
Under these crcumstances, Chna stood wth lakstan
n those dffcu|t t mes,

but t was unhappy over the m| tary

atroctes n East lakstan. When Hhutto vsted lekng n Movember
l D7l as Yahya' s speca| emssary, Chna pub| ca| |y demanded
that a "ratona| soI uton" shou| d be found for East Henga|. ^s
regards the Chnese he|p and cooperaton n the case of war wth
Inda, the Ch nese | eft Hhutto wth no doubt that lakstan shou|d
not expect any such he|p of nterventon as Chna had promsed
and provded durng the l Db War.
lakstan got a "dec|araton
of support" from lekng, but Chna made no specfc comm t ments
and assurances to lakstan.
When the war fna| | y broke out as a resu| t of Indan
m | tary nterventon, Chna supported lakstan n the 5ecur ty
Counc| but ts support was confned to words and ts rea| anger
was expressed aganst Russa and Inda Ch na' s ro| e dur ng the
war revea|ed the btter rva|ry between the two communst gants
n 5outh ^sa. I t was b tter over the success of Russan dp| omat c
gans n the area but not over the emergence of a new naton
n the subcontnent.
Rel ations i n the 1 970s
In the ! D70s as n the |ast ! years, lakstan contnues to
ma ntan a speca| re| atonsh p wth Chna. ^fter becomng
lresdent, the frst great power Hhutto vsted was Chna. lekng
reaffrmed ts frendshp and support to lakstan n the jont
communque ssued after Hhutto' s vst--Chna condemned "Inda' s
naked aggresson" and re terated ts "frm support to the lakstan
government and peop|e n ther ]ust strugg|e to preserve ther
state soveregnty and terrtora| ntegr ty aganst outsde aggre-
sson. " 1he c| ose re|atons of Chna and lakstan are |ke|y to
Indo-Pak Relations
6 1
be contnued as the re|atonshp s based on mutua|
advantages
and dentty of nterests n the affars of the subcontnent. Hefore
Hhu

to' s ouster by the m | tary reg me n |u| y ! D77, he vIs ted

Chna a coup|e of tmes, and every t me the ]ont commun ques
ndcated "openng of new vgorous phas

s" n bI | ateral tIes. Chna

a|so supp|ed lakstan wth m| tary equpment. Ch na' s total
m | tary ad s sad to be equa| to the sum of U. 5. arms provIded
to lakstan dur ng the perod ! D54- ! Db5.
^fter Hang|adesh' s emergence, 5no-Indan rel atons have
a|so taken a new turn. 1hs was confrmed when a decade after
the IndIa-Chna War, Chna offered to reestablsh fu|l dp| omatc

re| atons wth Inda n ! D73, as noted by Indan Deputy Foregn

Mnster 5.l. 5ngh n lar|ament.
3D
1hs Chnese move was a|so
apprecated by Inda and ndcat ons were found that Inda wou|d
a|so respond to these "gestures of rea| sm. " In ths regard Inda
has preferred a step by step approach durng the |ast fve years
and the at mosphere has been qute favourable to the norma| zaton
40
of re| atons between the

two countres. In ear|y February ! D78,

a non-offca| good w | | de|egaton from Chna vsted Mew De|h.
1hs ndcated that Chna was nterested n nI tatng the process
of 5Ino-Indan norma| zaton. Hefore that a ChInese trade team
had a|ready vsted Inda to exp|ore the possb | tes of trade
between the two countres. 1hs trp was consdered as a pos tve
f s 1 d` 1
4 !
new stgn o i mprovmg mo- n ian r e atmns.
On the other hand, t s c|ear a|so that Inda s not lIke|y
to move towards frend|y re| atons wth lekng f ths would
endanger ts re| atonshp wth Moscow, and lekng w|l probab|y
not seek Mew De|h ' s frendshp at the expense of that wth
Is| amabad.
Anal ysis of the Atti tude and I nterests of
the Big Powers i n the Regi on
1he cr tca| factor n the Internatona| pol I tIcs of 5outh
^sa has been the power ba|ance and the genera| relatIonshIp
between Inda and lakstan. In ! D7 ! , lakIstan broke In hal f and
62
lndo-Pak Rc| ations
wth that the power ba|ance n the subcontnent tt|ed sharp|y
n favour of Inda, whch en]oyed comparatve po| tca| stab | ty
and superor natona| power. lakstan' s capacty to cha||enge
and attempt to reverse the 5outh ^san status quo wth the
m | tary and po|tca| support from the Unted 5tates and Chna
has been reduced great|y after the events of l D70-7 ! . 1he
^mercan decson to restore arms ad and other supp|es n
February l D7 had very | tt|e to do wth ts Indo-lakstan po|cy.
It s rather attrbuted to ^mercan approaches towards Chna
and ts strategc poston n the o| -rch lersan Gu|f. he effect
of such ^mercan support for lakstan on Indo-lakstan re|at ons
remans a moot quest on. ^mercan o|ces towards 5outh ^sa
n the post- I D7 l perod have been of re|atve|y |ow prof|e. Mow
the ^mercan strateges pr mar|y are re| ated to other regons, e.g. ,
the M dd|e East, Chna or the Indan Ocean.
Washngton has a|so

rea| zed that t cannot curta| 5ovet

|nf|uence n 5outh ^sa by pttng a host|e lakstan aganst
Inda. 5uch an ^mercan strategy wou|d on|y resu| t, as t hal
done n the past, n drvng Inda further towards the 5ovet Unon
i n an attempt to restore any Indo-lakstan ba|ance upset by
^mercan actons.
1herefore, n the fna| ana|yss, wh|e ^mercan po|cy
towards lakstan wou|d n part be shaped by the |atter' s prox m ty
to the o| -rch Gu|f and ts capacty to enhance ^mercan nterests
n that strategc regon, ths ^mercan nterest n lakstan s
bound to be |mted by cons deraton of the advere effects t
mght have on ^mercan nterests n Inda and the restof ^sa .
In the |ght of these events, one can safe|y assume that the U.5.
wou|d not be so comm tted on lakstan' s beha| f as to encourage
that country once agan to have a confrontatonst atttude towards
Inda.
Chna has been the man supp| er of arms to lakstan
after ! D7 ! . In addton to that, ts po|tca| support to Is|amabad
s not a secret. Hut Chna wou|d a|so be cautous n encouragng
Fakstan' s ant-Indan sent meDts beyond a certan | mt, because
ths wou|d on|y push Inda further nto the 5ovet "orb t. " 1hs
Indo-Pak Relations
63
would be counterproductive as far as China' s own long-tcrm interests
are concerned. 5oviet influence i n the contiguous state of ^fgha-
nistan, which supports lathan and Halochi autonomists, continues
to be high and China would, therefore, be apprehensive of the
fact that such a dismemberment of lakistan would ensure for
the 5oviet Union an outlet to the ^rabian 5ea. 1his would result
in increasi ng 5oviet naval strategies in the !ndian Ocean region.
1herefore, on this count alone, China is bound to have a vital
stake in lakistan' s terri torial integrity as well as its political
stability. For this it would seem essential for leking that Indo-
lakistani tensions be kept within li mi t

, especially since China' s

capaci ty to come to the ai d of lakistan physically is very much
limited .

^s far as the third ma] or power, the U.5.5. R. , is concerned

,
it has, since the mid- ! D0s, traditionally adopted a pro-Indian
stance. I t has no reason to prevent the emergence of good rel a tions
between India and lakistan. In fact, 1oscow woul d welcome the
idea since it may help to wean away lakistan from China and
the Un ted 5tates.
References

! . For the detailed study of the Hig lower interests in the

region, see Ference ^. Vali, lolitics of the Indian Ocean
Re_ion l Mew York. Free lress, ! D7b} .
?. G.W. Choudhury, India, lakistan, Han_|adesh and t_he Ma]or
lowers l Mew York: Free lress, l D7} , pp.

77-dJ.
J
. Ibid. , pp. d4-D0, see also, 5ukhbir Choudhry, Indo-lak War
and Hi_ lowers lMew Delhi: 1ri murti lublications, ! D7?} ,
pp. ! - ! 7.
4. Hugh 1inker, India and lakistan: ^ loli tical ^nalysis
l London: lall Mal l , ! Db7} , p. ?.
. Choudhury, Chapter .
b. Ibid. , pp. l 0d- ! l d.
64
lndo-Pak Relations
7. For the mportant factors n changng ^mercan foreIgn
po|cy n the subcontnent durng that perod, see Choudhury,
Chapter b.
d. Choudhury, pp. D- l 0 l .
D. 1he Mew York 1 mes, December d, ! D7 l .
! 0. lakIstan has wthdrawn
|oss of the East wng,
wou|d be untenab|e.
l l . Choudhury, p. 7.
from 5E^1O, because after Its
lakstan' s membershp n 5E^1O
! ?. In a speech of Mehru n ! D4b, as the Mnster of Externa|
^ffars of the Interm Government. Cted by Choudhury,
p. ! 0.
l
J
For 5ovet Russa' s hard att tude towards Inda and lakstan
n the ear|y ! D0s, see Hhaban 5en Gupta, 1he Fu|crum
of ^s a. Re|atons amon_ Chna, IndIa, lakIstan, and the
L55R l Mew York: legasus, l D70} , pp. 4 ! -?.
l 4. Choudhury, pp. D- l d.
l . Ibd. , pp. lb-?4.
l b. IbId. , pp.
JJ
-44. 5ee a|so, 5. M. Hurke, lakstan' s Fore_n
lo|cy l London: Oxford Lnversty lress, l D7
J
}.
l 7. Gupta, pp. ! 4 ! -?40.
l d. "Mrs. Gandh ' s lrotest ^gaInst Russ an ^rms 5a|es, " 1he
5tatesman, | u|y l0, ! Dbd.
l D. Choudhury, pp. b
J
-bd, a|so ^nwar H. 5yed, pp. 4d- ! .
?0. 1he text of ths agreement s n the Kessn_' s Contem_orary
^rchves l London}, l^ugust ? ! -?d, l D7 l } , p. ?477
J
.
? ! . lresdent Daud has been k | |ed n another coup. 1he mI |tary
proc| amed marta| |aw In ^fghanIstan on ^prI| ?d, l D7d.
??. For 5no-Indan re|atIons n ear|y ! D0, see Gupta, pp. DJ
-
l 0d.
?J
. Choudhury, pp. ! D- l b4.
?4. IbId., p. !
J
.
?. FIve lrncIp|es of leacefu| Coexstence are as fo| | ows.
l l } respect for each other ' s terr torIa| IntegrIty and soverI -
gnty, l ?} mutua| non-aggrossIon, l
J
} nonInterference In each
other' s Interna| affaIrs, l4} equa|ty and mutua| benefIt,
and l } peacefu| coexIstence.
?b. Choudhury, pp. ! 0- ! D.
?7. 5ee ^nwar H. 5yed, pp. 4-b0.
,?d. 1he grand desIgns of IndIan expanson have been dIscussed
n detaI| by Choudhury, chapter d.
?D. For detaI|ed dIscussons on the factors why ChIna chose
confrontatIon wIth IndIa, see Gupta, pp. ! bb- ! 7.
Indo-Pak Relations
J
0. Ib d. , pp. l DJ- l D7.
J
l .

5ee ^nwar H. 5yed, pp. d l -d.

65
J
?. For fact

rs behnd Chna' s u|tmatum and the happen`ngs

on the nternatona| scene durng that perod, see Gupta,
pp. ? l ?? l d.
JJ
. Cted by Choudhury, pp. l dD- l D l .
J
4. For economc and m| tary assstance from Chna to lak sta ,
see 5yed, pp. l
J
D- l 44.
J
. Russa so|d MIG-?l and MIG-?
J
fIghters. 1he 5ovet arms
supp|y was qute modest n quantty.
Jb. 5ee Choudhury, pp. l 40- l 4.
J
7. 5yed, pp. l
J
4- l
J
D.
J
d. For the Chnese ro| e durng the Hang| adesh crss, see
Choudhury, pp. ? l 0-? l 4.
J
D. 1he Guardan, ^ugust l 0, l D7
J
.
40. 1he Hndu-Internatona| , February l d, l D7d.
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CHAPTE R I V
BEFORE SI MLA
Paki stan Peopl es's Party comes i nto Power
N| neteen seventy-one was the worst year n the hstory
of lakstan as t not on|y suffered defeat n a war wth Inda
but ths Mus| m naton, carved out of the Indan subcontnent
under the |eadershp of Mohammad ^| J nnah and hs Mus| m
League, |ost t s credb | ty by the |oss of the Eastern v; i ng. I n
l D7 l , lakstan was a shamb| es. I t |ost approx mate| y 54 rnccnt
of ts popu|aton, and economca||y t was shattered. ' Mnety- 1 1 ree
thousand of ts so|ders, compe| | ed to surrender, were no\ i n
the hands o f the enemy whereas | arge tracts o f ts | and re
n Indan possesson.
1he frst po| tca| effect of |osng the l D7l War to Inda
was the change of government n lakstan. He ng poI tca| | y ds-
credted by ts excesses n East Henga| and ts defeat, the ^rmy
cou|d not stay |onger n power n that crtca| stuaton. Hhutto,
the ma]orty party |eadOr n the West

wng, was the on|y choce

and he assumed power

on

December ?0, l D7 l . He remaned

vu|nerab|e to potenta| remova| by the ^rmy, but the preva| ng
po| tca| c| mate made ths un| ke|y l at that t me } as |ong as
he dd not perm t a further breakup of the country fo| |owng
the |oss of the East.
l
Hhutto nherted a demora| zed and defeated country:
a naton wthout any sense of drecti on, purpose, or destny. He
had before h m the mmedate task of put tng the scattered peces
68
Indo-Pak Relations
together, rasng the |ost mora|e, stab| zng the shattered economy,
and tack|ng the most dffcu|t prob|ems of recoverng lakstan' s
so|ders and terrtory from Inda. He ng an ab| e and energetc
man, he set out to perform these tasks n a most remarkab|e
fashon. A word on hs po|tca| background and experence shou|d
be approprate.
Formati on of Reopl e's Party
Zu|fqar ^| Hhut to ] oned ^yub' s re me as the mnster
for natura| resources, but was |ater gven the portfo|o of foregn
mnster. He was a promnent member of Ayub' s cab

et, and
en]oyed hs confdence an

favour. He radua||y appeared on the

po|tca| scene of lakstan as a brI|ant foregn mnster. He
was often credted wth havng pIayed a ma]or ro| e n refashonng
Chna-lakstan re|atons. 1hs move was a departure from an
unpopuIar pro-Western orentaton n lakstan foren po|cy.
^ graduate of Herke|ey and Oxfo
j
d, Hhutto had an uncha| |enged
g ft of oraton and rhetorc, whch brouht hm recognton not
on|y at home but ab

oad as we| |. ^s foren mnster of lakstan,

<ue to the ant-Inda sentments, he became a symbo| of resurent
natona|sm. Hs youth dynamsm he|ped hm to enhance hs
charsmatc appea|.
l
Durn hs tenure as foregn mnster, Hhutto supported
^yub' s po|tca| systcm who|e-hearted|y, and strong|y supported
^yub' s canddacy durng the l Db lresdenta| e|ectons.
?
I t s
worth mentonn that n sp te of that

c|ose assocaton wth

^yub Khan, he was ab|e to mantan hs own dentty. It was
due to hs persona|ty and f| amboyance that he was |ater ab|e
to mob| ze pub|c opposton so successfu| | y aanst ^yub Khan.
1he 1ashkent Dec|araton brouht up the dsagreement
and dvergence between Ayub and Hhutto over foregn po|cy
matters. Meetng under 5ovet auspces l opposed by Uhutto }
at 1ashkent n | anuary I 9bb, Inda and lakstan areed n effect
to a return to the status guo ante bellum.
J
lakstan ga ned
nether a p|ebscte n Kashmr nor anythn e|se; far from
strengthenng hs po|tca| poston, ^yub had mpared t.
Indo-Pak Relations
69
1he events whIch took place after the Jashkent OeclaratIon
demonstrated c|ear|y to Hhutto that the ^yu,b era was In Its |ast
days. Hhutto |et It be known that he had been opposed to the
accord made at 1ashkent and thIs persuaded ^yub Khan to

get
rId of hIs foreIgn mInIste

.
4
^fter leavIng the government, Hhutto
consIdered whether to joIn lready establIshed partIes or to form
a "forward bl oc" wIthIn the rul Ing party l^yub' s ConventIon Mus| Im
League}. Hut the latter step cou|d not materI alI ze, as ^yub Khan
had a very strong ho|d on the party, and other members would
not cooperate wIth Dhut to for fear of dIspleasIng ^yub, who would
have consIdered thIs move as a revo| t agaInst hIm. HIs alIgnment
wIth other partIes dId not seem feasIble as they were "reac-
tIonarIes" In theIr out|ook. 1hey offered very l Itt|e to the people
In the |nce o| rapIdly changIng cI rcumstances. They contInued
to cl Ing to abstractIon f Ideol

gy and persIsted In InvokIng

Islam as the only panacea for a|l Il|s. "
G
In thIs sItuatIon,
Hhutto dId not want hImself to be IdentIfIed wIth any of these
po|I tIcal partIes. HesIdes, durIng hIs tenure In the cabInt as foreIg

mInIster, he had crItIcI zed the opposItIon partIes quIte often, whIch
made cooperatIon wIth them dIffIcu| t. ^|ong wIth these facts,
Hhutto was aware of a new change whIch was arIsIng among people,
especIa||y the young generatIon, In response to exp|oItatIon and
economIc dIsparItIes. He wanted to make thIs upcomIng generatIon
as hIs power base, by makIng hImse|f the champIon of theIr cause.
1he tIme was rIpe for any change whIch could be brought about
by a dIfferent approach. Lnder these cIrcumstances, Hhutto decIded
to form a party of hIs own. 1o judge the peop| e' s mood, he travel|
a|l over the country. He got a posItIve response especI a|ly from
students and |abour. OurIng hIs tour of the dIfferent parts of lakIstan
he came out wIth open and harsh crI tIcIsm of ^yub Khan. In the
meantI me, he had found a base among lower-Income groups, and
as hIs followers grew in number, he decIded to form a party of
hIs own.
1he announcement was made at Lahore, on Oecember ! ,
! DG7. |ts Ideology was descrIbed In four slogans--"Is|am Is our
FaI th, " "Oemocracy Is our PolIty," "5ocIalIsm Is our Econo my,"
70 Indo-Pak Relations
and "^| | lower to the leople. "
7
In the autumn of I Db8, Hhutto
began gvng effectve po|tcal |eadershp to an ant-^yub movement
centerng on student demonstratons, strkes, and other forms of
dsorder n the ctes of West lakstan. 1he man purpose of tbs
movement was to prevent ^yub' s re-electon as lresdent n l D70.
It a|| started n October l Db8 when students began ag tatng
for educatona| reforms, demandng the repeal of the Unversty
ordnance,
8
the reducton n tuton fees and changes n the
examnaton systcm. 1her ag taton,

whch began wth sporadc

strkes at Karach Unversty, was at frst peacefu| but became
ncreasngly volent as t merged wth Hhutto' s propaganda campagn
aganst the regme. He was tourng West lakstan at that tme
and was delverng many harsh speeches.
Mr. Hhutto was arrested under the emergency regulatons
on Movember I 3,

! Db8 on a charge of nctng the students to

rot. Hs arrest came as a b|essng for the lakstan leople' s larty
|Plf} as t enhanced the status and popu|arty of the party. It
also helped n estab|shng Hhutto as a dedcated crusader aganst
the General.
D
1he reacton aganst Mr. Hhut to' s arrest was ntense,
and rots occurred in many ctes of West lakstan.
^long with West lakstan, rotng and mass strkes a|so
started n the East wng, where the demand bascally was for
regona| autonomy. 5trkes n East lakstan were more volent
and more w despread and resulted n a vrtua|b)aaKdown of
all author ty.
^fter hs release, Mr. Hhutto speeded the task of the
removal of ^yub Khan by addressng publc meetngs. Under the
lll' s flag varous ral | es and processons were organ zed. In fact,
lll was the only party whch observed the "1ashkent Day, " n
all the mportant ctes of lakstan.
l 0
I n comparson t o other pol tca| partes, the lll proved
to be more successfu| as t got popu| ar support n the shortest
perod of t me. I ts |eader, Z. ^. Hhutto, was more effectve and
much more popu|ar wth the masses, as he not only had the
charsma, but he was able to communcate wth the masses by
comng down to ther |eve| and by usng ther language, the
language a common person could easly understand.
l !
Indo-Pak . Relations
7 1
5evera| socIa| rea|I tIes contrIbuted to ^yub' s fal l . lakIstan' s
a|Ieged|y remarkab|e economIc growth under hI s po| ItIca| l eader-
shIp was based on a capI ta|Ist economIc system whIch brought
benefIts on|y to a | I mI ted number of |amIl Ies
! ?
and fIrms,
whIch
grew dIsproportIonately rIch. 1hIs obvIously created dIscontent
among the poor and

mI dd|e c|asses of lakIstan. ^fter the I 9G5

War wIth IndIa, thIs dIscontent and growIng dIsenchant ment was
manIfested In the form of student demonstratIons whIch gaIned
momentum when Hhutto' s lll emerged and presented Itself as
the champIon of theIr cause.
Lnder these mountIng pressures, ^yub exp|ored the possIbI-
| I tIes of hIs remanIng In power, but beIng dIscouraged wIth the
exIstIng uncontro| | ab|e sItuatIon, he trIed to pacI fy the people
by showIng

hIs consent to a restoratIon of par| I amentary govern-

ment and announced that he wou|d not be a candIdate for the
lresIdency I n ! D70.
! 3
OespIte thIs decIsIon, whIch came on
February ? ! , ! DbD, vIo|ence contInued In East
! 4
and West lakIstan.
Faced wIth thIs breakdown of |aw and order In many parts
of the country, lresIdent ^yub Khan announced hIs resIgnatIon
on M
[
rch ?, ! DbD. MartI a| Law was proc| aI med and order was
restored wI thout dIffIcul ty. General Yahya Khan | the Commander-
In-ChIef of the ^rmy}, who had been appoI nted ChIef Marti a|
Law ^dmInIstrator, assumed the lresIdency on March 3 I , wIth
the exp|anatIon that It was necessary to assume the of li ce of
Head of 5tate untI l a new ConstItutIon was framed.
I 5
The el ections of 1 970 and emergence of the
PPP as a maj ority party i n the West Wi ng
CIrcumstances under whIch the fIrst general electIons
were held on Oecember 7, I 970, brought Muj Ibur Rahman and
Hhutto to the forefront of lakIstanI polItIcs. 1he ^wamI League
swept ! ! seats In the NatIonal ^ssembly, all from East
lakIst
an,
and the lll got d ! seats, G? from the lunjab, !d from 5Ind,
and I from MWFF. Jhe lll dId not contest seats In East lakIstan,
7 2
Indo-Pak Relations
and had | i tt| e success in MWFl and Ua|uchistan.
! b
Its victory
in the lunjab and 5ind was at tributed to its combination of
economic radica|ism, anti-Indian
-
1
!7
d M natmnai sm, an r. Uhutto's
dynamic persona| i ty that was appea|ing especia| | y to younger
voters.
! d
1he e| ection returns proved most of the pre-e|ection
predictions wrong.
! D
1his succOss of

the lll cou| d be attributed
to various reasons. 1he lIl obvous|y benefited

from the various

factions which appeared within te rightist e|ements |ike the
M I L h I

2 0
us im eague and re|igiuous parties during t e e ectun campaign.
1hese parties found i t difficu|t to cooperate with each other,
thus their interna| conf|icts weakened their posi tions and strength-
ened the lll position. Factions were . foud even in the |eftist
M^l between Wa| i Khan and ^chakzai groups.
Whi| e these par1ies were

busy confronting their interna|

prob|ems, Hhut to' s supporters increased day by day, since the
lll presented itse| f as refreshing| y di fferent from the rightist
parties.

5ome of the independent candidates received support

from the lll in consti tuencies where it was not strong enouh
to put up its own candidate. 5uch

candidates j oined the lll

after the e|ection.
2 !
Yahya Khan resi gns and Bhutto becomes Pres ident
1he unconditiona| surrender of the lakistan ^rmy in East
lakistan on December ! b, ! D7 ! and lresident Yahya Khan' s
acceptance on the fo| |owing day of the Indian offer of a ceasefire
on the Western front aroused intense anger and bi tteress in West
lakistan. 1he shock caused by the disaster in East lakis|an was
a|| the greater because officia| statements on the progress o|
the war had comp|ete|y cancea|ed the tr e situation there. I n
conseguence, when lakistan' s defeat cou|d no |onger be concea|ed,
the press and po|itici ans united in deman
g
ing lresident Yahya
Kh
- 22
an s resignatton.
Indo-Pak Relat ions 7 3
Oemonstratons aganst the m | tary reg me began n the
man towns on Oecember ! 8. 1he most vo|ent one was in
|
eshawar, where

a crowd at tempted to burn down Fresdent Yahya

Khan' s house.
23
In Lahore, severa| thousand peop|e took part
n a processon, shoutng such s|ogans as "Qut or be 5hot, " and
in

Rawa|pn

cv| servants paraded wth p|acards sayng, "We

24
demand a fu| | account" and "Gve U cv | an government. " Jhe
demonstratons contnued untI! Oecember 20, when they threatened
to degenerate nto rots. In Karach , where a genera| strke was
dec| ared, demonstrators stormed the 5ovet ^ir|nes offce, and
set fre to |quor stores n both Karach and Is| amabad as a protest

ganst the a| |eged drunkenness of thc ru|ng m| tary junta.

lresdent Yahya Khan's pos ton dur ng this perod remai ned
obscure. He made hs |ast broadcast n the evenng of Oecember
! b, when he dec|ared tha1 the war H thO Western front wou|d

contnue, and dd not hmse| f broadcast the statement announcng
the ceasefre. He ssued a stateme
_
t n the evenng of Oecember
! 7, out| nng the new consttuton whch ha had promsed to pub|sh

25
before Oecember 20, but t was w1hdrawn wthout exp| anation.
I t was off

ca| |y announced on Oecember !8 that Mr.

Hhutto had been asked to return from New York mmedate| y,
?G
and that on hs arr va| "

ower w|| be transferred to a represen-

tatve government to bo forme

under the new Consttuton. "

On Oecember ! D came the announcement of lresdent Yahya
Khan' s "dec son" to resgn hs offce as soon as he had handed
over the government to the representatves of the peop|e.
Mr. Hhutto arrved n Rawa|pnd on the mornng of
Oecember 20 and drove mmedate|y to the lresdent' s house
amd the cheers of thousands of hs supporters. ^bout two hours
|ater t was announced that he had been sworn n as lresdent
and Chef Mart a| Law ^dmnstrator. On the same day, Oecember
20, Hhutto addressed the naon. In a broadcast |astng near|y
an hour he promsed revenge for lakstan' s "temporary humi | ati on, "
and a|so p|edged hmse|f to restore democracy and to ntroduce
po|tca| and soca| reforms.
?7
74
Indo-Pak Relations
Zu|fIqar ^|I Hhutto became the mI | I tary estab| Ishment'
choIce to head a new government. For the tIme

beIng, at | east,
the mI | I tary had had Its fI| | of po|ItIcs. Hhut to had demonstrated
that he was the outstandIng po|ItIcIan of West lakIstan and the
|eader of Its majorIty party. He had a|so cu| tIva

ted strong ties

wIth

. mI | I tary e|I te. !t was,therefore, no surprIse that the

mI | I tary turned to hI m to |ead the country in the aftermath o|
I ts worst defeat.
Hhutto had before hIm the enormous

ks of stabI | I zIng
the Interna|

po|I tIca| sItuatIon, sa|vagIng a battered economy,

and restorIng a sense of confIdence and purpose to peop|e whose
mora|e had been severe|y shaken. ! n addI tIon, on the Wester
front akIstanI terrItory was under !ndIa' s possessIon and D3, 000
of her so| dIers were In !ndIa as

lWs. Jhe securIty of what remaIned

of the country had to be safeguarded, and Its bad|y tarnIshed
I mage renovated. 1o a|| these prob|ems, Hhutto app| Ied hImse| f
wIth enormous persona| energy.

Hy frequent dramatIc pub|Ic appearances, he ra1| Ied popu| ar

support for hIs |eadershIp and programmes. Jhe most Important
po| ItIca| decIsIon whIch he took by gettIng the consent of the
peop|e at a pub|Ic meetIng was the re|ease of 5heIkh Muj Ibur
Rahman
8
!t had been Hhutto' s sty|e seemIng|y to dramatI ze the
demands and desIres of the lakIstanI natIon. He a| ways wanted
It to appear as If he was on|y carryIng out the dIctates of hIs
peop|e. 5ome form of pub|Ic sanctIon was sought prIor to vIrtua| |y
a| | de|Icate negotIatIons. JhIs had been partIcu|ar|y true In re|atIon
wIth !ndIa and Hang| adesh. Hhutto used hIs Inte| |Igence and
popu|arIty to good advantage In dea|Ing wIth lrIme MInIster !ndIra
GandhI In the summer of I D72.

The Question of the Pakistani Territories

at the Western Front and the Questi on of
POWS for Bhutto
^fter becomIng the FresIdent of lakIstan, Hhutto' s InI ti al
foreIgn pol I cy moves were desIgned to revIve mora| e at home
-
.
Indo-Pak Rclat ions 7 5
as we| l as t o obtan external acceptance and support before
begnnng the nevtably dffcul t negot atons wth !nda. He
appeared genunely to accept the verdct of ! D7 ! and adopted
a relatvaly conc| atory lne towards !nda and Hang|adesh, except
for a probably rtualstc revval of propaganda on the Kashmi r
queston. Jhe ^rmy tself had surrendered n Last Fakstan, so
there was not the queston of ther not accepti ng the verdi ct.
Hy way of nsurance, Hhutto was carefu| not to antagoni ze
the ^rmy and publc opnon by movng too rapdly towards
reconc laton wIth !nda.
Hhut to' s past rhetorc and hs tradtona| stand against
compromsng wth !nda, was the bggest handcap in negot i ati ng
for peace n the subcontnent. Jhe changed stuati on and tragic
crcumstances had compe||ed hm to show some f|exbi l i ty i n hi s
we| l -known an mosty towards !nda. ^fter assumng the responsi bi | i ty
he had two major tasks n front of hm. return of the POWs
and gett ng back the tertory n West Fakstan which was then
n !ndan possesson.
Jhe famles of the FOWs were gettng mpatent. Funj ab
was the most badly affected area as the grat number of tht
army personne| came from ths provInce. Feelngs were conv
eyed by arrangng demonstratons, and sendng memoranda to
the government.
2D
Jhat was

.
not on|y the most mportant but
very touchy problem because a great many fam | es n the Funj ab
were affected by t. Jhe spate of demonstratons by relatves
of FOWs greeted Hhutto as he went round the country after
takng over as Fres dent. It s possble that at that tme these
demonstratons were engneered by hs poltcal opponents. Jo
undermne hs polularty, ths was a very approprate and tme| y
move on ther part. Hut these demonstratons coo| ed down as
tme passed, and also hs threat to qut un|ess the ag taton stoppe
had some effect. 5ome newspapers also came out wth crtcsm
of these actv tes and they wrote edtorals about the sens tvi ty
of the matter. Jhe Fakstan Jmes sad.
7 6 Indo-Pak Relations
Jhose who are pressng the present reg me to secure instant
repatraton of lOWs and cI vi | ans shou| d not shut their
eyes to the vta| ssues at stake. Mo patrotic lakstani
w
_
u| d ant Mr. Hhutto !o go to :P n hand to Mew Oe|hi
to secure the re|ease of prsoners.
.
5gnng a peace wth India was not the on|y prob| em
facng Hhut to, but the strngs attached to t were worth consderng
too. Inda nssted on Fakstan' s recogn ton of Hang| adesh before
3 l
any ta|ks cou| d start. Lven the return of the lOWs was based
on ths condton.
Jhe queston of Hang|adesh was a

hgh|y emotona| one

in lakstan. It was the common understandng among the masses
that the recogn ton of Hang|adesh meant the repudaton of the
"Jwo Maton Jheory. " It Was a very hard fact to be accepted ,
as lakstan was founded on the bass of ths theory. ^t the same
t me, most other countres had a|ready recognzed Hang| adesh,
thus pressurng lakstan to do the same.
Hhutto, though

very much under nterna| and externa|

pressure to seek peace wth Inda n order to get the lOWs bac|,
tenacous|y refused to gve n. He persona| |y was n favour o|
recogn zng Hang| adesh but cou|d not do so unti | he was surc
that pub| i c opinion wou|d accept t.
Hhutto made many speeches a| | over the country making
peop|e

understand the rea| ty of the evenIs, but at the same

t me he p|edged that he wou|d not compromse natona| honour
n the process. 1he on|y course to fo| |ow was to seek an acco-
mmodaton with Inda on the basis of a "just and honourab|e
32
set t| ement . " He prepared peop| e gradua| | y for the move he
was about to make, peace w th Inda. ^t Lahore, at a b g pub|ic
ra| |y, he made a p|ea for peace n order to obtain the peop| e' s
approva| . Hut at the same ti me he a|so sa d.
^ strong Fakistan wi| | emerge. Our naton has not been
defeated. I sha| | not forget the words of Jpu 5u|tan,
that one day of
33
a | on' s exstence is worth a hundred
years of a j acka|.
Whi | e Hhutto was faci ng the pressure for and aganst the
peace efforts, Mrs. Gandh was a|so under a d fferent sort of
pressure. ^ decisve mi | i tary vctory had raised expectations that
Indo-Pak Reatiohs 7 7
!nda cou|d at |ast sett| e to ts satsfacton a| | dsputes wth
lakstan. Hbth |eaders tred to gu de pub|c opnon towards greater
rea| Ism. !n the begnnng | tt| e success was seen, as the pou| ar
atttudes had so hardened over years of po|tca| confrontaton
that It was mpossb|e to dampen mutua| nost|ty In

the short
run.
^ change was fe| t among the masses n lakstan as the
newspapOrs carred edtora|s and artc|es n favour of a detente.
^n artO|e pub|shed n

Oawn by Mazhar ^| Khan urged the need

for norma| zaton of re| atIons wth !nda so that"the grm past
can bO forgotten and we can |earn to | ve together on the bass
of mutua| he|p and trust. "
34
^nother we|| -known po| tca| observer,
_
. R. Ghour, argued that "even f the dea of confederaton was
unacceptab| e, !nda and lakstan cou| d cooperate n the economc
ahd po| tca| fe| ds."
35
Jhe | eft st po| t ' a| |eaders, espec a| | y of M^l, spoke
n favour of peace wth !nda. ^mong those, Wa| Khan' s opnion
s worth mentonng. He, n an ntervew wth the !ndan Lx_ress
correspondent, B. K. Jwar, sad that "!nda has a sgnfcant ro|e
to p|ay n the subcontnent--t shou|d make a magnan mous and
generous contrbuton towards peace."
3b
^|| these opposton |eaders
whI|e

ta|kng n favour of the peace ta|ks, asked Inda to take

the ntatve because, as they sad, "vctory puts t i n a posi ti on
to set the pace. "
References
! . Jhe m | tary cou| d not keep away from comng nto power
for |ong. Hhutto was ousted through a m | t ary coup on | u|y
b, ! D77, on the pretext of "savng the country" from the chaos
resu| tng after the a| |eged rggng of the natona| electons
he|d n March ! D77, by the ru| ng party. Mr. Hhutto is faci ng
a death sentence now.
2. ^fter |eavng the government n ! DGG, Hhut to denounced ^yub' s
ru|e as "a dctatorshp under the |abe| of democracy. "
3. Jhe Jashkent Oec| araton s dscussed n Chapter !V.
7 8 Indo-Pak Relations
4. hutto was re| Ieved of hIs responsIbI| I tIes as the foreIgn mimster
on Move
g
ber 30, l Dbb. Hhutto c|aI med |ater that he had offered
hIs resIgnatIon on three occasIons fo||owIng the Jashkent
Oec| aratIon, but was to|d not to desert lakIstan at the tI me
of a serIous crIsIs.
. ^nwar H. 5yed, "Jhe lakIstan leop| e' s larty. lhases One
and Jwo, " I n laki stan. Jhe Lon_ VIew, ed. ZIrI ng, HraIbantI
and WrIggIns |Ourham, M. C. . Ouke UnIversIty lress, l D77} ,
p. 7b.
b. MeenakshI GopInath, lakIstan In JransIton. lo| ItIca| Oeve|og-
ment and

the RIse of lakIstan leo_|e' s larty

|Oe|hI . Manoher,
l D75} , p. 22.
7.

For the detaI|s on the formatIon of the lll, see OI| Ip

Muker]ee, Z. ^. Hhutto. Jl.e Quest for lower |Oe|hI. VIkas,
l D72} , GopInath, lakIstan In JransItIon. lo|tIca| Oeve|
_
_ment
and the RIse of lakIstan leo_| e' s larty, and 5yed, "Jhe
lakIstan leop|e' s Farty. lhases One and Jwo. "
8. Jhe unIversIty ordInance restrIcted student po| I tIca| actIvIty
and provIded for the forfeI ture of theIr degrees by graduates
accused of subversve actIvItIes.
D. Mr. Hhutto was re|eased on Iebruary l 7, l DbD.
l 0. Jashkent Oay was ce|ebrated on | anuary l l , l D70, by lll
as reported In Jhe Oawn, 1 anuary l 2, l D70. I t was an opportune
move by the lll to exp|oI t the antI-Jashkent fee|Ings In the
West.
l l . 5yed, pp. 74-7.
l 2. Jhese 22 rIch famI | Ies of lakIstan were frequent|y mentIoned
by Hhutto In speeches durIng hIs e|ectIon campaIgn, un-
successfu| actIons were taken agaInst them when Hhutto came
Into power In l D7 l .
l 3 . For the events durIng these days, see Jhe Oawn, February
l, l 7, 2 l , and 2b, and March l 3, l DbD.
l 4. Jhe sItuati on in Last lakIstan was more vIo| ent. 5tudents
I n Oacca got vIrtua| contro| of the sItuatIon. On March 3,
they demanded the resIgnatIon of 40, 000 HasIc Oemocrats,
who formed the e|ctora| co| |ege. Jwo HasIc Oemocrat members
were kI | | ed In the process, and harassment contI nued durIng
these days.
.
.
l . "Yahya Khan' s Hroadcast on March 3 l , " reported In Jhe Oawn,
^prI| l, l DbD.
! b. Jhe lll got one set from Ha|uchIstan and one from NWFl.
I 7. !n hIs e|ection campaIgn, he advocated natIonal i z atIon of
bankIng and basIc IndustrIes, Inc|udIng gas, natural resources,
shIppIng, paper and cement, | I mI tatIon of |and ho|dIngs, dIstrI
butIon of state |ands to |and|ess peasants. !n foreIgn po|Icy,
he advocated wIthdrawa| from 5L^JO and CLMJO. HIs
po| Icy dIffered I n two fundamenta| :espects from that o|
Indo-Pak Relations
79
5heikh Muj ibur Rahman: he supported the est ab| Ish ment of
a strong centra| government and demanded the intensi fiatIon
of the confrontation with I ndIa over the KashmI r question,
ca||ing for "a ! , 000

year war" If necessary.

! d. Hhutto described hi mse| f as "a democratic socI a| ist who
be|ieves i n socia| i sm on the WI| | y Hrandt or HrItish pattern. "
Jhe Oawn, Oecember ! ?, l D70.
l D. Yerner ^dam, writing i n the Far Lastern Lconomic RevIew,
Hong Kong, Oecember , l D70, predicted that on|y ! to
?0 percent of Hhutto' s ! ! 7 candidates wou|d win In the
Western wing.
?0. For the detai|ed discussion on the causes of fai |ure of
rightist partIes and theIr wrong strategy i n the e|ectIon
campaIgn, see GopInath, pp. ! 03- ! ! 0, and Muker]ee, pp. b7-
bd.
? ! . !n 5ind, for 5ukkur constItuency ^|I Hasan Mangi contested
as an !ndepndent candidate, but had fu| | support from the
lll, he announced to j oi n the lll right after he won the
MatIona| ^ssemb| y seat.
??. ^ statement Issued on Oecember ! d by the Uni ted Coa| i tion
larty, and ^sghar Khan' s statement on Oecember ! D. !n
Jhe Oawn, Oecember ! D and ?0, ! D7 ! .
?3. Jhe Oawn, Oecember ! D, ! D7 ! .
?4. !bi d. , Oecember ! D and `?0, l D7 ! .
?. Jhe ConstI tutIon was |arge|y concerned with provistons for
autonomy for Last lakistan and was therefore al ready out
of date.
?b. Mr. Hhutto was representing lakistan i n the U. M. Genera|
^ssemb| y as the Oeputy lrI me Minister and ForeIgn Minister
appoInted by Yahya

Khan during the crisis situation In East

lakistan.
?7. "lresIdent Hhutto' s Hroadcast to the MatIon, in Jhe Oawn,
Oecember ? ! , ! D7 ! .
?d. lresident Hhut to announced his decision to re|ease hI m at
a pub|ic meeting i n Karachi ' s Mishter lark on | anuary 3,
! D7?. Hhutto' s decisIon was haI| ed by the Oawn I n an editori a|
enti t|ed "Great Lxpectations, " | anuary , ! D7?. Muj i b' s uncon-
dItIona| re|ease was wide|y acc| aImed by Wa|I Khan| lresi dent ,
M^lI , ^j ma| Khetak | M^l | oInt 5ecretaryI, Mau| ana Mufti
Mahmoud |Genera| 5ecretary, |.U. I. I , HI zanjo |Ha|uchIstan N^FI ,
^kbar Hugti , 5ardar 5haukat Hayat | lresIdent, lunj ab Musl im
LeagueI . !n addi tion, the Guardian, the

Oai |y Je| e_ra_h,

the Oai|y Mai | wrote edItorIa|s, praIsIng Hhutto for hIs
wise move. U. 5. Oepartment of 5tate termed the rel ease
of 5heIkh Muj ib an act of statesmanshIp.
?D. lOWs repatriation ra| | y In lindI, see the report In Jhe Oawn,
February , ! D7?.
80 In
do-
Pak R
elations
30. 1he HakIstan 1I mes, February ! 0, ! D7?.
3 ! . I ndIa' s 1erms for 1al ks, " 1he Oawn, } anuary ! 4, ! D7?.
Mrs. GandhI saI d whI l e addressIng a publIc meetIng In Mew
OelhI that lakIstan shoul d hold dIrect peace negot IatIons
bt she IndIcated they must be based on recognItIon of an
Independent Hangladesh. IndIan ForeI gn MInIster 5waran 5Ingh
told a ral l y In | ul l undhar that IndIa was ready to resume
dIpl omatIc rel atIons wIth lakIstan, provIded lresIdent Hhutto
adopted a realIstIc attItude towards the new realItIes

of the
subcontInent, IncludIng the emergence of an Independent
Hangladesh. 1he Oawn, | anuary 3, ! D7?.
3?. 1he address to the lll workers at Larkana on J anuap 7,
! D7?, and t he address t o the MatIonal ^ssembly on ^prII
! 4, ! D7?.
33. 1he Oawn, ^prIl ? ! , ! D7?.
34. IbId. , March ! 4, ! D7?, also, 5. R. GhourI ' s artIcle of | anuary
b, ! D7?: " IndIa-lakIStan ConIlIct. InternatIonal OImensIons. "
3. IbI d. , March 3, ! D7?.
3G.
" Yl I Khan' s IntervIew wIth H. K. 1IwarI, " 1he IndIan
Ex_ress, March ?, ! D7?.
CHAPTE R V
SHI FT I N POL I CY
Mr. Bhuto's Tradi ti onal Stand and Hi s New Stand
after 1 971 Towards I ndi a
When Mr. Hhutto took over as lresdent he descrbed
the s tuaton as a " total crss. " lakstan tseIf had been reduced
from one-f fth of the. s ze of Inda to one-tenth. I t had lost 54
percent of ts populaton.

I t was no longer the "largest Isl amc

power" n the worl d. I

t was a smaller Muslm country than Hangla-

desh. I t had fewer Musl ms than Inda had.
Hhutto had to pass through the hardest experence of
hs country' s hstory. He was heJr

to partton, dsntegraton,
opportunsm, rel g ously clostered outlooks of largO parts of the
communty, socal njustce and mountng economc problems.
Consderng ths stuaton, t was not wthout some sgn fcance
that Mr. Hhutto stated that confrontaton wth Inda was no longer
a vable polcy. 1hs statement by Mr. Hhut to not only marks
a change n hs polcy of confrontaton wth Inda, but also reveals
an a| tered structural change n geopolItcal rel atonshp wthn
the subcontnent.
Hhutto, for many years, had passonately advocated a
polcy of vgorous confrontaton aganst Inda.
l
He fell out wth
Fres dent ^yub Khan precsel y on ths pont, as he felt that 7yub
had thrown away the ntatve at 1ashkent by abandonng confron-
taton n favour of

moderaton. He had been very consstent,

and argued that he stood for

confrontaton because

n hs judgement
that was practcal pol tcs n terms of the m l tary balance. He
bel eved lakstan could have walked nto Kashm r n ! Db? when
82 Indo-Pak Relations
IndIa was engaged I n hostI l I tIes wIth ChIna. 1he balance was stI l l
In lakIstan' s favour In ! Db.
?
1he events of ! D7 ! resulted In
a decIsIve mI l Itary verdIct In IndI a' s favour. 1hIs compel|ed Hhutto
to brIng a change In hIs past I deas of confrontatIon wIth IndIa,
as In the face of superIor mI lI tary strength of 1ndIa, lakIstan
coul d no longer ho
P
e for a successful mIlI tary settlement.
He proved hImself a realIst before the world when he
adopted a realIstIc attI tude wI th the changIng realIty of the
subcontInent. Hy a study of the events, one reaches the conclusons
that Hhutto' s pol Icy of abandonment of confrontatIon was based
on careful consI deratIon of the obj ectIve real Ity. lossessIon of
the large tracts of land and a bIg number of sol dIers In I ndIan
prIson camps dId not allow lakIstan any, bargaInIng leverage. It
was obvIous that If steps were not taken In proper dIrectIons,
and also at proper tI mes, lakIstan mIght be pushed to the wal l
and made to sI gn what t rOgarded as an unequaI treaty. Hhutto' s
attI tude changed after the secessIon of Hangladesh. He not onl y
accepted the realIty, but also trIed

to make people understand

hIs poInt of vew In thIs changed sItuatIon. HIs IntervIews wIth
the foreIgn press and especal ly wIth the IndIan journalIsts are
an example of thIs marked change.
1he strange thIng In thIs whol e process was hIs new stand
on the KashmIr probl em. HIs statements on KashmIr, before
sIgnIng the 5I ml a ^greement, and after that, are contrary to
what he had been sayIng In the past. ^bout 1 ammu and KashmI r
he Once argued that,
If a MuslI m majorI ty area can remaIn a part of IndIa,
then the raIson d' etre of lakIstan col l apses. . lakIstan
must contInue unremIttIngl y her struggle for the rIght
of sel f-determInaton of ths subject-people. lakIstan Is
Incomplete wIth

t 1 ammu and KashmIr both terrItor

|
ally
,
and IdeologIcally.
Hut after ! D7 ! , he came up wIth new formul atIons on
the subj ect he seemed to delegate the responsIbIlIty for determI nI n g
the rIght of sel f-determInatIon to KashmIrIs themselves.
4
He has
even gIven an IndIcatIon about adoptIng the concept of a "soft-
frontIer" between IndIa and lakstan. "We can make the ceasefIre
(qdo-Pak Relations 83
ne a lne of peace. Let the people of Kashmr move between
two countres freely. One thng can lead to another.
It doesn' t mean that Hhutto s abandonng lakstan' s clam
on Kashm r; he rather seems to try ways other than war. 1hree
wars in the regon and all on Kashm r have proved unsuccesslul
n solvng the dspute, and now espec al l y when the m ltary bal ance

s not n lavour ol laktan, Hhutto ddn' t want to contnue wth

the old rhetorc and the

[
olcy ol conlrontaton. I t wasn' t Hhutto'

s
own choce to change hs
'
polcy, t was the dctate ol the events
that compelled h m to do so.
I ndi an and Pai stani statements negoti ati ons
Inclnaton was lound n Hhutto' s att tude lor talks wth
I
Inda soon alter .he assmed responsblty as lresdent ol lakstan.
He showed hs wllngness to enter nto negotatons wth Inda
"on te outstandng Inda-lakstan dsputes on the bass ol justce
and lair play." He emphas zed: "Il the Indan government and ts
people want to lve a peacelul and honourable lIle we also want
to do the same, " and "l
}
t us work towards the betterment ol the
lot ol the common peopl n both the countres.n6
Real z ng the need lor both countres to enter Into
negotatons wth each other, Hhutto emphas zed that Inda should

not nsst on any precondtons.

7
He sad that the re

urn ol lOWs
to lakstan could make a good startng po nt lor negot atons wth
Inda.
d
1he I ndan

resp
(
nse, however, came ollcal!y on 1 anuary
l 2 when the I ndan delate, Mr. 5amar 5en n a note to the
L. l. 5ecretary General WaIdhe m, stated that Inda was prepared
to hold blateral negot atons wth lakstan on mutual troops wth-
drawals on the Western and Kashmr lronts. 1he Indan trOops
would be wthdrawn lrom Hangl adesh only when the governmOnts
ol Inda and Hangladesh thought t desrable.
lresdent Hhuttq to d a press conlerence on tbe same
day that there would be no pont n dscussng any settlement
l Inda mposed precondtons on the wthdrawal ol her

toops trom
"East or West lakstan, " or on the repatraton ol prsoners ol
D
war .

84
Iq4p-Pa Relation
^lter the exchange ol a lew statements lrom boh sdes,

showng ther nclnaton to hold the negot atons, Inda delvered

an other note to the L. M. 5ecretary General announcn that Indan
troops would leave Hangladesh by March ?, ! D7?. Qn February
! 4, Mr. 5en sad that Inda was prepared to have drect tlks wth
lakstan "at any tme, at any level, and wthout precond tons. "
Helore that, Moscow had also shown ts wllngness to "ntate
Indo-lakstan talks l both countres so desred."
! 0
Hut ths t me, the two countres dd not seem so wllng
to nvolve any third countr
)
on the pattern ol 1ashkent. ^ll Inda
Rado broadcast a report, wth relerence to a loregn correspondent,
on Iebruary ! , that Inda would gve due cons deraton to "any
request" lrom lresdent Hhutto to hold talks wth Mrs. Gandh.
Hut, t sad "no request ol ths nature had been receved ether
drectly lrom lakstan or through some thrd party. "
! !
Indan
ollcals sad also that Inda wanted to release the lakstan lOWs,
but could not allord to send home nearly ! 00,

000 traned solders

unless lakstan ended the state ol war wth Inda.
1he open ng ol negotatons was delayed by a number ol
lactors, the most mportant ol whch was lakstan' s relusal to
recogn ze Hangladesh. 1he lakstan government was anxous to
secure the release ol the prsoners ol war who had surrendered
n Hangl adesh,

but the Indan government mantaned that as they

had surrendered j ontly to the Indan ^rmy and the Mukt Hah n,
Hang|adesh must take part n any negotatons on ths queston.
lresdent Hhutto appealed to Inda to release the lOWs
wthout lnkng then
j
to the other ssues between the two
countres,
!?
and showed hs consent to negotatons, sayng that
he was lookng lorward to negotatons wth the Indan government
and 5hekh Muj bur
Rahman.
!3
5hekh Muj bur Rahman repeatedly
rejected the oller ol talks wth Hhutto unless lakstan lrst
! 4
recogn zed Hangladesh.
1he Indan oller to hold talks cam on Iebruary ! D, when
a lormal oller was made by Indan representatves at the L. M.
through the L. M. 5ecretary General, Mr. Waldhe m. Inda olfered
to conduct drect talks wth lakstan, "at any tme, at any l evel ,
lndo-Pak Relations 85
and wthout precondtons" t o ensure "durable peace and stab l ty
n the subcontnent."

.
5mul taneously, the same thng was repeated by Mr. D. l.
Dhar, Charman of pol tcal plannng body of the External ^ffars
d l h h
. = = ! b
Mnstry n Frague an ars, w ere e was vtsttmg.
Hhutto welcomed the Indan offer of talks but at the
same tme he reterated the need of peace based on justce and
mutual respect
!7
He sad, "ths country would never accept a
dctated peace that did compromse ts honour. "
! 8
Inally, both countres agreed on a summt level meetng
between them. I n a letter dated ^prl 7, Mrs. Gandh suggested
an emssar
|
es level meetng to prepare the ground for the summ t
level meetng. Hhutto agreed to the summ t meetng n a reply
to Mrs. Gandh on ^prl l0, l D7?. Hs reply was welcomed

n
lew Delh wth the expectaton of an emssary level meetng
by the end of ^prl.
Prel i mi nary moves for I ndia-Paki stan summi t meeti ng
Inda and lakstan were n drect touch wth each other
through dplomatc channels. Exchange of notes went on through
the 5wss Embassy and fnally a decson was reached for
,
the talks
between specal emssares of the two governments to be opened
on ^prl ?b at Murree, a hll staton about twenty mles north
of Rawalpnd.
Hhutto ndcated that the probIem lakstan espe al l y wanted
to take up at the Murree talks was that of the prsoners of war,
and that he was prepared to send back the Indan prsoners "even
f Inda does not do the same. "
l D
1hese talks were carred out successfully wthout any nter-
rupton or deadlock. Inda felt the need to consult Hangladesh as
t was embarkng on a very mportant msson of ts rel atons
wth lakstan. Hefore
to Dacca for talks wth
1he talks were
was led

by Mr. Dhar,
comng to lakstan, Mr. D. l.
Muj b w th a message from Mrs.
opened on ^prl 2b. 1he Indan
Charman of the po|cy plannng
Dhar flew
Gandh.
?0
delegaton
commttee
86
Indo-Pak Relations
ol the Lxternal ^llars Mnstry, and the lakstan delegaton by
Mr. ^zz ^hmed, secretary general ol the Mnstry Ol Ioregn
^llars. Talks contnued untl ^prl ?7 and the ] ont statement
was sued on ^pr l 30. lresdent Hhutto was consulted at one
pont when Mr. ^hmed, dsagreeng wth Mr. Dhar, returned to
Rawalpnd lor consultatons. It was beleved that ^z z ^hmed
had been unwllng to accept an Indan proposal that Kashmr should
be ncluded n the agenda lor the summt talks, but was overrulod
by lresdent Hhutto. Mr. Dhar also had a separate meetng wth
Mr. HhuttO.
The ]ont statement announced agreement on the modaltes
ol a meetng between lresdent Hhutto and Mrs. Gandh whCh
was also to be held n Mew Delh towards the end ol May or at
the begnnng ol |une, and delned the sub]ects to be dscussed.
? l
To create a better stuaton lor the comng summt meetng, Inda
and lakstan decded to stop the propaganda campagn aganst
each other. Inda acted on that belore the Murree talks started,
and lakstan was nlormed about ts decson on Ma ??. 1he
propoaI went nto ellect on May ?.
Mr. Bhutto's pre-conference di pl omacy
Hy ^pr l, Hhutto was n a strong enough poston to respond
allrmatvely to Mrs. Gandh ' s suggeston ol summt talks to sett le
outstandng problems n the subcontnent. Moreover, he was under
heavy pressure to secure the return ol border terrtores held
by Indan lorces and the release ol D3, 000 lakstan prsoners
ol war. Mrs. Gandh was reluctant to release these lOWs as
she dd not want to add to the strength ol lpkstan lorces untl
Inda had reason to beleve that the two countres would lve
n peace.
^lter assumng the oflce,

Fresdent Hhutto ellectve|y

employed personal dplomacy as an nstrument ol loregn polcy
and succeeded n wnnng an overwhelmng poltcal and dplomatc
support lrom the countres ol

the, Mddle Last lor lakstan' s stand

on the unresolved

ssues emanatng lrom the War ol December

lndo-Pak Relations
8 7
l D7 l . In |anuary l D7?, Mr. Hhutto vsted eght countres o f the
regon. The supportng statements from these countres at that
moment of despar not only helped n rasng the morale of the
naton, but also ndcated the new trends n lakstan' s foregn
polcy after the secesson of Last lakstan.
^fter reachng an

agreement at Murree for

the talks
wth Mrs. Gandh n |une, Mr. Hhutto agan set ofI for the
whrlwnd tour of the remanng Musl m states of the Mddle
Last and ^frca to complete hs personal msson to the traternal
Muslm states west of lakstan.
??
The purpose of ths tour was
manly to brng dplomatc pressure to bear on Inda to adopt
a reasonable atttude n the mat ter of lakstan lOWs .

^nother
ob]ectve was to brng a message home that after the tragc
events of the l D7 l War, lakstan was not left alone n the nter-
natonal arena. lresdent Bhutto vsted fourteen countres from
May ?D to | unO l 0.
?J
Talks were delayed, as both Mr. Hhutto and Mrs. Gandh
d b f f
?4
w h h ma e a num er o vtstts to oretgn countres. tt t e consent

of both countres, t was agreed that the talks would open on

1 une ?d n Mew Delh.
?
In the meantme, most of the ]ont commun ques ssued
after lresdent Hhutto' s talks wth the leaders of the countres
he vs ted expressed ful l support for lakstan' s demands

for the
v .
repatraton of the lOWs and the wthdrawal of Indan and lakstan
troops n Kashmr to the postion yhch they occuped before
December l D7 l . Those ssued n Lebanon, Lthopa, and Mgera,
however, merely expressed the hope that lresdent Hhutto' s meetn
wth Mrs. Gandh would prove frutful. Unlke the communques
ssued durng lresdent Hhutto' s prevous tour, none of them referred
to the future rol atons between lakstan and Hanladesh.
On the home front, Hhutto had numerous meetngs wth
people from

all walks of lfe. Hy dong so, Hhutto gave them the

sense of partcpatIng n decson makng n the matter of talks
wth Inda. Durng thes meetngs, Hhutto reterated hs pledge
to go by the naton' s wll at the 5mla summt.
?b
Due to these
gestures, Hhutto ot

backng from the masses.

?7
Opposton pacte
88
Indo-Pak Relations
dd not try to undermne hs ellorts, as the atmosphe1e n the
country was one ol all-out support lor h m. Wal Khan assured
hs lul l support to

Uhutto on forthcomng summt.

?d
^ lew good wll gestures were shown lor Inda, to remove
the ll wll belore enterng nto a dalogue. Hhutto announced
the repat raton ol those Indans who had been capturd durng
the war. ^nt-Inda progaganda was completely stopped especal l y
on laks
[
an rado and TV.
On the eve ol leavn lor 5mla, Hhutto addressed the
naton on rado and televson. He sad lakstan was prepared to
resume dplomatc rel atons wth Ihda, reopen communcatons,
and re8ume ar servces. He agan showed hs desre

lor talks
wth 5hekh
Mu]bur Rahman, exp|anng that Inda had nO"locus
stand" n the matter ol re| atons between West lakstan and
Muslm Hengal, " and there cou|d be no talks on that sub]ect on
Indan sol.
?D
Hy usng the term "Musl m Hengal" nstead ol
"Hangladesh" or "Last lakstan" lresdent Hhutto avoded ether
recogn zng or denyng the ndependence ol Hangl adesh, whle
emphas zng ts Musl m character.
In the same broadcast, Hhutto summarzed the thorough
preparatons he had made lor the summt, good l lustra

ton ol
hs style ol democracy.
f the last two weeks I have ta|ked to leaders n every
leld, to

elected representatves, po|tcans ol every

shade ol opnon, Ul ama, nte| lectuals, edtors and
]ournal sts, lawyers, teachers, students, and labourers.

I have also met the commanders ol our armed lorOes.
Ior the lrst t me n the hstory ol lakstan, represen-
tatves ol all sectons have been nvolved n matters
ol vt
_
l natonal concern at the hghest level
The Si ml a Meeti ng: Demands and Expectati ons
. of I ndia and Pakistan i n the Si ml a Summi t
Jalks wth l nda at 5m| a were not expected to be easy.
lakstan, beng a deleated country, was n f: re| ati ve|y weak
postion. In the I D7 I War Inda had deCsve|y demonstrated its
m| tary superori ty and had a|| the i mportan

cards in

hand,
most i mportant being l stWi terr tory a the pr sonrs of war. From
lndo-Pak Relations
89
among the bg powers, Inda had a|lut support by the 5ovet
Lnon, whereas lakstan' s a| l es, Chna and the

L.5. , had carefu| |y

stopped short of decsve support. In the Lnted latons, lakstan
got wdespread support durng the crss, whch annoyed Inda
but dd not affect ts decsons.
Heng n a stronger poston, Inda tred to exert pressure
on lakstan. I t was n a poston to negot ate as the m|tary
vctor. 1hough Mrs . Gandh inssted that she would not ta|k wth
lakstan from a pos ton of strength,
J
l
that dd not change the
preva lng s tuaton.
Ind a' s vctory over lakstan had resulted n the improvement
of ts nterna| poltcal atmosphere. I t brought a sense of conf denco
to the Indan naton. Mrs. Gandh ' s pos ton was aga n strengthened
wth the Congrss' overwhel mng success n the state electons
n March. 1hrd, and the most mportant consderaton, was the
5ovet m ltary and dp|omatc backng--whose b ttr frut lakstan
had tasted n the recent past.
lakstan, on the other hand, was not free from nterna|
dssensons. 1hough Hhut to enjoyed the support and confdence
of the masses, labour unrest and |anguage tensons threatened
domestc peace.
J?
last experence of wars wth Inda proved
that they so|ved no prob|ems, especal ly the Kashm r prob|em.
Hesdes there wasn' t much choce left for lakstan n settlng
the matter. 1here was some evdence that the 5ovet Lnon was
tryng to foment separatsm n lakstan Ha| uchstan. Lnder these
crcumstances, lakstan was compel|ed to come to terms wth
Inda. 1here s no denyng the fact that the task for lresdent
Hhutto n the days before the 5 mla accord was form dab|e and
chal |engng, as the press, the po| tcal partes, and pressure groups
were vocal n ther asserton that natona| honour shou|d not
b

d h f h

JJ
e compromise at t e ort commg summi t.
Considerng the strong Indan ,poston at the negotatng
tab|e, t was not beyond expectatons that Inda cou|d come up
wth the dea of sgnng a no-war pact. 1hs concept to out|aw
the use of war, wh |e Indo-lakstan dsputes remaned unreso|ved
had always been opposed n lakstan. From the very begnnng,
90 lndo-Pak Relations
Hhutto had been rejectng any move whch suggested the no-war
pact, and on many occasons he made t clear that "In lakstan,
no-war pact means surrender."
4
Hut at the same t me, he dd
not rule out the possblty of consderng a pact f t contaned
a c| ause provdng for the arbi traton of dsputes whch remaned
unresolved n bl ateral negotatons.
Reducton n the armed force' s sze was another suggeston
that Inda mght have brought up. Hut Hhutto had no ntentons
of alenatng the armed forces by comm tt ng h msel f to a reducton
n ther s ze. ^n Indan suggeston along these lnes would also
be hard to accept.
Kashmr was expected to be a tough pont of dscusson
at 5mla. Hhut to' s stand on Kashmr used to be qute unbe
_
dng.
Hut after assumng offce as the lresdent, he made dfferent
formul atons. In early l D7?, he was determned not to talk on
Kashmr wth I nda. He sad,
We are prepared to resolve al | our b| ateral dfferences.
Hut we cannot bargan state prncples for human flesh.
1he rght of se| f determnaton of the peop|e of 1 ammu
and Kashmir has not been bestowed on them e ther by
Inda or lakstan. It s ther inherent rght whch no
one can take away from them.
4
On another occasion, he sad,
We have fought three wars on Kashmr, we cannot forget
the Kashmr dspute. Lven f we forget the Kashmr dspute ,
the people of Kashmir w | l not forget t.
4
`
1hs represented an i mportant change, for he was now sayng
that t was up to the Kashm r' s themselves to fght for ther rght
of self-determnaton f they wanted a d fferent future.
5truggle for sel f determnaton cannot be inspi red from
outsde. Lke revolution it cannot be exported. It has to
be an ndgenous strugg|e. If the people of Kashmr beleve
that they have been deprived of the rght of se| f deter-
mi nation, they wi | | rise. 1her strugg|e wi | | be basica| |y
thers. Outside support cannot solve their prob|ems.
37
Jurning to Indian perceptions regardng the prob|ems of
peace making, the frst poi nt to note was the disinc| inaton to
dea|wim them pecemea|. lakistan argued for a step-by-step
Indo-Pak Relations
9 1
approach to the many ssues n dspute. I nda, whch had favoured
the approach n the past but had been rebuffed, now argued for
a comprehensve and overa| l settlement, coverng both the |ong-
standng dsputes as we|l as those arsng out of the ! D7 ! War.
1hs stand was understandab|e as Inda was worred and
uncertan about lakstan' s ntentons. ^t the same t me, she wanted
to get advantage of her superor poston n the ! D7 ! War. Mrs.
Gandh had fu| l support from al| the partes on ths stand. 1he
extremst, 1 an 5angh party, n fact urged that there shou|d be
no return to the pre-war status quo un|ess

l | outstandng ssues
were brought wth n the sphere of overa| | sett| ement.
38
1hough
other partes dd not share ths extreme opnon, a|| of them
wanted a fna| sett| ement so that endurng peace cou|d be
establshed n the subcontnent.
Inda preferred to ta| k wth Hhutto, who was comng
as an elected representatve of the peop|e, to ta|kng wth a
m | tary general.
3D
It a|so we|comed the change n Hhutto' s
atttude towards Ipda. I t shared the vew that Hhutto was
emergng "as a more chastened and more sober-m nded po|tcan
than what he was n the o|d U. M. days. " It was suggested that
Inda would lose nothng by takng Hhutto at hs word.

^t that
t me, he was Inda' s best bet and Inda dd not want to |et ths
opportunty slp frOm ts hands. ^nother cons deraton that mght
have nfluenced Inda was the preva|ng unfavourab|e nternatona|
opnon aganst ts nterventon n Last lakstan. ^dverse votes
n the U.M. General ^ssembly ndcated that Inda was fast |osng
nternatonal support and that t must change ts course.
It was the frst Inda-lakstan dalogue at the hghest
|eve| snce the 1ashkent meetng.
The Si ml a Accord--text of the agreement compari son
of the Tashkent and Si ml a Agreements
1he summt conference between lresdent Hhutto and
Mrs. Gandh opened on | une ?8, ! D7? n 5m|a. 1he talks were
due to end on | u|y ! , but were extended for one more day as
9 2
Indo-Pak Relations
no agreement was reached unt | | u| y l. Hhutto and Gandh were
present Jn 5 m| a but, to begn wth, the ta|ks were actua||y
conducted by ollc a|s, the two de|egatons agan beng headed
by Mr. Dhar and Mr. ^hmed. ^s expected, dsagreement on many
ssues mmedate|y arose as both countres were ho|dng opposte
postons.
^s a|ready dscussed, Inda wanted no sett| e a|| the prob|ems
n one package, so t proposed a treaty ol lrendshp p|edgng
the two countres to ab]ure the use ol lorce n sett| ng dsputes,
to relran lrom nterlerence n each other ' s nterna| allars, to
desst lrom seekng thrd-part y nterventon n the sett|ement
l ther dllerences, and to renounce m | tary a| |ances drected

h h
4l
agamst eac ot er.
lakstan wshed to concentrate on such mmedate ssues
as the

re|ease ol prsoners ol war, the dsengagement ol troops,

and the resumpton ol dp| omatc re|atons. It ob]ected to the
Indan proposa| on the ground that t wou| d nvo|ve permanent
acceptance ol the dvson ol Kashmr and the wthdrawa| ol
the Kashm r dspute lrom the Un ted Natons.
4?
1he meetng |asted lor lve days. ^t that tme t appeared
that the summt wou|d end n la| ure. However, alter much argu-
mentaton on both sdes, exchange ol numerous dralts, and a
|ast mnute prvate

meetng between Hhutto and Mrs. Gandh,

an agreement was reached on |u| y ?, l D7?. Hoth sdes made
e|eventh hour concessons to produce a commun que when a
dec|araton ol ther "agreement to dsagree" was a|ready beng
dralted.
4
J
1he agreement contaned the ma n e|ements ol the ear|er
Indan dralts, but the wordng was consderab|y mod led

to make
t acceptab|e to lakstan. In partcu|ar, the c|ause relerrng to
the ceaselre |ne n Kashm r was rephrased to read. "Jhe |ne
ol Contro| resu| tng lrom the cease lre ol Oecember I 7, I D7 l ,
sha| | be respected by both sdes wthout pre]udIce to the recogn zed
poston ol e ther sde. "
Indo-Pak Relations
Text of the agreement
I . The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan
are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict
and confrontation thaL have hi therto marred their relations
and work for the promotion of friendly and harmonious relations
and the establ ishment of durable peace in the subc6rtin.nt,
so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources
and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare
of their people.
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India
and the Govenment of Pakistan have agreed as follows:
I. That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations shall govern the relations between the two
countries.
2. That the two countries are resolved to settle their differen
ces by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or
by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between
them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems
between the two countries, neither side shal l unilaterally
alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization,
assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to
the mai ntenance of peaceful and harmonious rel ations.
3. That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness
and durable peace between them is a commitment by
both countries to peaceful coexistence, respect for each
other' s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and non
interference in each other' s internal affairs, . on the basis
of equality and mutual benefit.
4. That the basic issues and causes of confl ict which have
bedeviled the rel ations between the two countries for the
past 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.
5. That they shall always respect each other' s national unity,
territorial integrity or pol itical independence.
I. Both Governments will take all steps within their power
to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other.
Both countries will encourage dissemination of such information
as would promote the development of friendly rel ations between
them.
III. In order progressively to restore and normal i ze relations
between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:
1. Steps shall be taken to resume communicati ons--postal,
telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air links
including overflights.
2. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel faci lities
for the nationals of the other country.
9 3
94 . lndo-Pak Relations
3. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields
will be resumed as far as possible.
}. Exchanges in the fields of science and cui ture will be
promoted in this connection, delegations from the two
countries will meet from ti me to . ti me to work out the
necessary details.
I. In order to initiate the process of the establ ishment
of durable peace, both gov:ernments agreed that:
1. In J ammu and Kashmi r the line of control resulting from
the ceasefire of December 1 7, 1 97 1 , shall be respected
by both sides without prejudice to the recogni zed position
of either side. Neither side shal l seek to alter it, unilaterally ,
irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.
Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat
or use of force in violation of this line.
2. The withdrawals of forces shal l commence upon the entry
into force of this agreement and shall be completed within
a period of 30 days thereafter.
V. This agreement will be subject to ratification by both
countries in accordance with their respective constitutional
procedures and will come into force with ` effect from the
date on which the instruments of rati fication are exchanged.
V. Both governments agree that their respective heads
will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future
and that, in the meanti me, representatives of the two . sides
will meet to discuss further the modali ties and arrangements
for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of
relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners
of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of J ammu
and Kashmir, and the resumption of diplomatic relations.
1he 5I m|a accord was haI | ed wIde|y In both coun|rIes
a a| so by th Interpt Iop| press. 0 hIs retum h frm 5Im| a.
Hut to
got a warm we|come at the Is| amabad and Lahore aIrports. He
addressed the peop|e at the aIrports, and exp|aIned and defended
hIs po| Icy In the NatIona| ^ssemb|y specIa| |y convened, to get
a verdIct from It In favour of hIs po| Icy. Hhutto descrIbed the
5 | " h

"
}
1h I d

Im a agreement as more t an a commumque. e n 1 an

spokesman descrIbed It as "an agreement of peace and cooperatIon. "
}b
In lakIstan, the opposItIon partIes had mI xed reactIons.
^rbab 5Ikandar, MuftI Mahmood, 5ardar ^ttau| |ah Menga| ,
Indo-Pak Relations
95
Mahmooddul Haq Lsman , S. : .M. Zalar | lormer |aw mnster n the
centre} , Khan ^bdul 5amad Khan ^chakza a|| we|comed the
agreement, sayng, "though the accord dd not lul li | the aspratons
ol the people with

regard to

the repatraton ol IOWs t was a

good begnnng to end the contnuous conlrontaton. "
47
Wa| Khan
we|comed the agreement "on the whole under the exstng
crcumstances. "
4d

1he rightsts on the opposton benches rejected the accord

outrght. Mr. Hamd 5arlraz , chiel organi zer ol the Counc l Muslm
League cr tc zed the accord, consderng t, "a pol tica| vctory
ol Ind a, " and adding that lakstan had lost "everythng at the
negotiatng tab|e,"
4D
Malk Ghu| am | | am, 5ecretary Genera| ol
1ahrk Istaql a| , sai d. "What Mr. Hhutto has sgned n 5 mla was
not a 'peace document ' but a ' surrender document ' much worse
than the one sgned by Genera| M az n Oacca |ast Oecember. "
0
1he same reacton came

lrom Ind a' s opposton party,

| an 5angh. Its |eader, ^ta| Hehar Vajpa, cal |ed i t "an Indan
se| lout. ''
!
Hut t was we|comed by the Lok 5abha. ^l l partes
endorsed the agreement |except |an 5angh} sayn that t
set '' an example lor the other areas n ^sa to lo| low. "
?
1he same senti ments were shared by London, Washngton,
Moscow, leking, and by the L. M. General 5ecretary KurtWa|dhe m.
^bdus 5amad ^zad, Hangladesh' s loregn minister, we|comed the
agreement between Inda and lakstan as "a success towards acheving
more success."

}
Hoth Mrs. Gandh and Mr. Hhu|to were accused by their
54
opponents ol having entered nto a secret agreement. Hut both
ol them denied ths a||egation.
5
Anal ysi s of the Agreement and Its Compari son
wi th the Tashkent Accord
1he 5 m| a agreement was sgned under the circumstances
when lakistan was reduced n Its si ze alter |osng ts East wing.
Mnety three thousand ol its so| ders and
5, ! }
D square mi |es ol
Its terri |ory in the lunj ab and 5nd were n Indi a' s hams. Lnder
9 6
Indo-Pak Relations
these crcumstances, lakstan was w thout any ellect ve barganng
power. Inda had fu| | contro| of the stuaton. Keepng these thngs
n vew, lakstan cou|d not have acheved more than what t
got n 5m| a.
1he agreement provded for a return to the status quo
a| ong the border,
5b
whch meant that Inda exchanged lor ts
sma||er terr tores under lakstan possessons wth the extensve
lakstan terr tores t had captured. Inda was more strct regardi ng
the terr tory t had captured n Kashmr. I ts ma]or gan n the
ta|ks was lakstan' s acceptance of the |ne of contro| n Kashmr
resu| tng lrom the ceasefre on December ! 7, ! D7 ! .
57
In the matter
ol sett| ng the dsputes wth each other, Inda a|so got lakIstan' s
acceptance to sett| e the dlferences b |ater||y.
58
1he w| |ngne

ss
was shown by both sdes to resume dp| omatc re|atons and a|so
to enter nto trade and other cu|tura| actvtes.
1he 1ashkent and 5m| a agreements were sgned n entre|y
dllerent crcumstances. In ! Db5, the fghtng was | m ted to West
lakstan, whereas n ! D7 ! the war engu| fed both the wngs and
resu| ted n the separaton ol the Eastern wng. lakstan and
Indan pos tons n the two meetngs were dfferont. lakstan
met Inda at 1ashkent as an equa| . I t was not a vanqushed country
n ! Db5. lakstan was ho|dng ! , b ! 7 square m| es ol Indan terr tory
as compared to 44b square m | es ol ts own terrtory n Indan
occupaton. It was a un ted country. lresdent ^yub Khan was
n a lavourab|e pos ton to ta|k on equa| terms wth hs Indan
counterpart.
1he agreement
ol th 5ovet ellorts.
at 1ashkent was made possb|e because
Hy dong so, Russa wanted to ollset the
growng Chnese nl|uence n the regon. Hut after 1ashkent,
there w

as a sgnfcant change n the po|tca| stuaton n ^sa.

1he emergehce ol Red Chna as a super power, and lakstan'

s
nc|naton towards her, brought a change n 5ovet po| cy. 1hs
was a|so due to the fact that lakstan showed very | tt| e nterest
n the "^san 5ecurty 5cheme" proposed by Russa. 1hs was
qute a ]ustfcation for 5ovet Russa to dscard ts ear|er neutra|
stance and estab|sh c|ose re| atons wth Inda. In a bref span
Indo-Pak Relations
9 7
ol lIve years t supported Inda mater a| ly as we| | as po|tca| |y.
Despte ths reorentaton n 5ovet pol cy, ts ma] or
ob] ectve remaned the same. normal zaton ol Indo-Fakstan
relatons, a step towards ts secur ty scheme.
Under these c rcumstances, the studey ol the two agree-
ments becomes

much easer. 5ucceedng paragraphs contan an

analyss and comparson ol the s m| ar provsons, whch more or
less have the same sprt.
Normal izati on of rel ati ons
I l we compare the two agreements, the pr me ob]ectve

n ther preambles to be lound s the norma| zBton ol rel atons

between the two countres. Hoth natons must strve hard lor the
progress and wel lare ol ther people. 1he only dllerenc one
can make out s n the organ zaton ol the phrases. 1here was,

however, the dllerence ol approach n pursuance ol matters to

rOal ze ths common purpose.

^t Tashkent, lakstan' s stand was

that snce Kashmr was the basIc cause ol conl| ct, t should
be settled lrst and the re| atons be nor ma| zed subsequently,
whereas Inda wanted norma| zaton ol the relatons lrst. Clauses
V and VI ol the agreement cal|ed lor the restoraton ol dplomatc,
economc, and trade re| atons whereas the "matter ol drect
concern" were to be dscussed "at the hghest and other |evels
i
'
n the luture.
The 5 m| a accord was a comp|ete reversa| ol the att tudes
ol both. Hecause ol the changed poston, lakstan gave up ts
prevous approach whereas Inda, consderng the tme opportune,
sought a package deal on Kashmr. However, t was lakstan' s
v ew whch ganed ground.

J
One th ng common between Tashkent
and the 5 m| a agreement s that the sett |ement of basc ssues
was |elt lor luture negotatons between the two countres. 1hs
accord was descrbed as lresdent Hhutto' s ma]or accomp| shment
n breakng Mrs. Gandh ' s reso|ve to wrap up ssues n package
dea| s.
b0
9 8
Indo-Pak Relations
In short, both the agreements were amed at normal zng
relatons and restorng economc, trade, communcatons, and

cultural exchanges.
Bi l ateral ism
Though the Tashkent declaraton was sgned under the 5ovet
Unon' s gudance, t dd not prevent lakstan from rasng
the Kashmr ssue n the U.M. Pakstan made no such comm tments
under the pact. Clause IX of the agreement calls for the contnued
meetngs of both countres on "mat ters of drect concern to both"
whereas n Clause II of the 5 ml a accord, both partes are specf-
cally commtted to "settle ther dfferences by peaceful means
through b lateral negotatons, or by any other peaceful means
mutually agreed upon by both partes. " Ths clause of the treaty
rased much apprehenson n lakstan regardng the poston of
the Kashmr dspute n the U. M. Even the foregn press made
comments that "Kashmr w l l cease to be an nternatonal
queston.'

b !
lresdent Hhutto, wh le makng the speech n the Matonal
^ssembly, defended the accord and explaned that t dd not
prevent lakstan from brngng the Kashmr dspute to the U. M.
However, showng h s dsappo ntment n the capab l tes of the
U. M. n solvng the Kashmr dspute, he emphaszed that t was
n the best nterests of lakstan to have a forOgn polcy based
on blateralsm and that we must gve b lateralsm a chance as
far as relatons between Inda and lakstan were concerned.
b2
Cosderng that the U. M. had fa led to settle the matter,
there was perhaps no harm n explorng other possb ltes. Hut
as The Economst commented, "Jhe acceptance of the lrncple
of Hlateralsm was one of the major concessons that Mrs. Gandh
won at 5mla."
b3
It may be argued that as long as the 5mla accord subssts,
lakstan s prevented from rasng

the matter n the world body.

Hut as Hhutto mpl ed, f bl ateral negotatons eventually fa l,
lakstan could declare that Inda w

s volatng the "sprt" of

5mla accord and take the matter to thg U. M. f that course
Indo-Pak Relations 99
ol acton appeared t o promse more advantageous resu| ts.
`

I t
shoul d also be noted that t he 5mla agreement does not requre
lakstan to wthdraw the case lrom the U. M. It keeps the matter
dormant n the U. M. as long as b|ateral negotatons contnue
under the 5 m| a accord.
The pri nci pl e of non-i nterference
^s happens n the world, a| | blatera| and mu|tlateral
agreements and the prncples ol non-nterlerence are al ways a
lormal expresson, unless some partcu|ar agreement s studed
n the background ol the exstng condtons and the preva|ng
atttudes ol the partes concerned. The same s the case wth
the Tashkent and 5m| a agreements. Clause ` III ol the Tashkent
declaraton says that, "the re|at ons between Inda and lakstan
shall be based on the prncples ol non-nterlerence n the nterna|
allars ol each other. " ^t Tashkent, Inda' s poston on Kashmr
was that t consdered t a part ol ts terrtory and hence ts
nternal matter. ^ccordng to ths c|ause Inda could nterpret
lakstan' s acts ol assstance to the Kashmr lreedom lghters
as 1nterlerence n ts nterna| matter. Cl ause I ol the declaraton
states, "1 ammu and

Kashmr were dscussed and the two sdes

put lorth ther respectve postons. "
^t 5m| a, Inda, alter havng acheved ts am ol separat-
ng East Pakstan, could convenent| y agree to adhere to the prnc-
ple ol non-nterlerence and respect lor what was |elt ol lakstan' s
terrtory. ^s lar . as the queston ol 1 ammu and Kashmr s con-
cerned, lakstan dd better n some ways, and worse n others,
at 5mla. Inda recogn zed that part ol Kashmr Was undc lakstan
contro| and undertook not to do anythng to change that stu aton.
It alo agreed that there was a dspute regardng Kashmr whch
needed to be settled. On the other hand, t took some more ol
the lakstan sde ol Kashmr and kept t, t dd not return to
the old ceaselre lne. ^ lna| sett|ement ol the dspute was lelt
to luture negotatons at both Tashkent and > mla, thqugh the
relerence to Kashmr at Tashkent was lelt somewhat vague.
1 00 Indo-Pak Relation
Renunci ation of force
In 1ashkent, as we|l as n the 5m|a agreement, force
as a means of sett|ng dsputes was renounced by the sgnatores.
C|ause I oI the Jashkent dec|araton |ad down that the partes
"reaffrm ther ob|gaton under the charter, not to have recourse
to force and to sett|e ther dspuces through peaceIu| means. "
In the 5 m|a accord, C|ause VI mentons that n accordance wth
the charter of the Un ted Matons they wll refrain from the
threat or use of force aganst the terr tora| ntegrty or po|tca|
ndependence of each other.
Both these agreements were descrbed as "no war pacts"
and sub] ected to strong crtcsm. ^t 1ashkent, the Indan lr me
Mnster, Mr. 5hastr, emphas zed that the need for a no-war agree-
ment was urgent. Later, Inda gave ts own nterpretaton of
the c|ause, but lakstan frm| y re]ected Ind a' s nterpretati on.
Return of the POWs
^t 1ashkent, C| ause VII of the dec| araton dea| t wth
the re|ease of the lOWs. In that meetng repatraton of the
prsoners of war was not a prob| em. Re| ease of the lOWs was
a sde ssue whch was reso|ved by the agreement between the
two partes. ^bout ! , 000 lOWs he|d by both sdes were re|eased
b
by the end of | anuary ! Dbb.
^t 5 m| a the stuaton was dfferent. 1he return of D3, 000
|OWs was one of the basc ssues, the sett| ement of whch was
|eft to a future summt.
Inda c|ear| y vo| ated the Geneva Conventons and the
5ecurty Counc | Reso|uton of December 2 ! , ! D7 ! by de|ayng
the repatraton of the lOWs. It attached two condtons to ther
re|ease. Frst t nssted that as lakstan' s forces n the eastern
secton had surrendered to the ]ont command of Indan and
Hang|adesh forces, the "Hang|adesh " forces must approve before
anythng cou|d be done. ^nd to that effect, Inda reassured 5hekh
Mu]bur Rahman that t wou| d not re|ease the lOW5 unt| lakstan
had accepted the rea| ty of Hang|adesh. It was genera| |y be|eved
that n

addton to securng Pakstan' s recognton of Bang| adesh,

Indo-Pak Relations 1 0 1
t wanted to use the lOWs as a means of pressurng lakstan
nto makng a Kashmr sett|ement on ts terms. For ths the wor|d
press crtc zed

nda.
bb
Repatraton of the lOWs proved to e a very hard task
for lakstan. 1he vew was he|d that the 5m| a agreement wou|d
soon fade out and as there was no openness n the ta|ks thngs
wou|d deterorate. 1he stuaton remaned the same unt| the
ta|ks between the hgh offca|s of both countres fna||y started
on | u|y 24, ! D73 at Rawa|p nd. "It took !D days of hard and
at tmes extreme|y dffcu|t negotatons at Rawalpnd and Mew
Oe|h to work out ths sett| ement, " as Mr. ^z z ^hmed descrbed
t |ater.
1hs agreement came to be known as the Oe|h agreement
and had the concurrence of the governments of Inda, Hang|adesh,
and Fakstan. Its ma n features were that Inda agreed to repatrate
b7

to lakstan a| | except ! D lOWs. 1he date was to be fxed

mutua||y by Indla and lakstan, as soon as arrangements for the
transportaton of these prsoners were made. 5mu| taneous|y,
repatraton was a|so to begn, of

a|| Henga|s in Fakstan and

a substanta| number o! non-Henga|s n Hang| adesh. 1he most
sgn fcant feature of ths agreement was "that Hang| adesh agreed
n a sprt of reconc|i aton that the I D5 FOWs would not be
tred. "
b8
How dId Inda agree to the so| uton of the prob|em? |t
was part|y the pressure of wor|d opnon whch dsapproved the

use of lOWs as hostages. 1here were a|so "economc |abi| tes,

the non-a|gned conference that was to come | Ind and Hang|adesh
wanted to go to the conference w th c|ean hands} , and then the
Genera| ^ssemb| y' s sesson whch was to take p|ace n October,"
bD
1here were a lot of elements nvo|ved n ` the stuaton. hey
saved the 5m| a accord from dyng a premature deat. Lp to
ths moment lakstan had ressted the two pressure ponts of
Inda a
p
d even the lOWs were repatrated wthout ts recognton
of Hang|adesh. For that, Mr. Hhutto chose a very approprate
moment, whch was the Islamc summt he|d n February ! D74
at Lahore.
1 02
Indo-Pak Relations
Wi thdrawal s of troops
In both the 1ashkent and 5m| a agreements, there are
provsons for the pu| | out of the troop, but wth certan funda-
menta| dfferences. 1he 1ashkent d

c|araton ca||s for the wth-

drawa| of "armed personne| , " wh| e the 5m|a agreement ca||s
for the pu| | out of "Inda-lakstan" forces. Lnder C|ause II of
the 1ashkent dec| araton, wthdrawa| to the poston he|d pror
to ^ugust 5, ! Db5 was to take p|ace n a| | sectors nc|udng | ammu
and Kashmr. 1he 5 m| a agreement | mted t to the nternatona|
borders of Inda and lakstan. 1he former fxed February 25,
! Dbb as a dead|ne for the comp|eton of that task, whereas the
| atter sets a | m t of 30 days .to commence Irom the day of
ts rat fcaton. 1he reason for ths dif
_
rence |es n the stuaton
that preva|ed at the tme of the two agreements. ^t 1ashkent,
Inda by agreeng to mutua| wthdrawa|s, was to move back from
terrtory acros the ! D4D ceasefre |ne n Kashmr, whch t had
ear|er sad t wou|d not gve up. Osengagement of the forces
mater al zed before the set dead|ne. It can be sad to be the
major achevement of the 1ashkent dec|araton for lakstan.
Lnder the 5 m|a accord, wthdrawa| was to take p| ace
on the !nda-lakstan border exc|udng the ceasefre |Ine n | ammu
and Kashmr. 1he reasons are qu te c|ear. lakstan' s re|atve|y
weak poston at 5m|a and the great d fferences of terrtora|

gan and |oss of each sde n ! Db5 and ! D7 ! wars.

Wthout donyng
the poss b |ty of exaggeraton from both sdes, the fact remans
that, n the ! Db5 War, lakstan successfu||y ressted ai) Indan
attack and n Kashmr t was n a f
_
r|y advantageous poston.
^t 5m|a, the posi tons were reversed. It was Inda that had made
sgnfcant gans across the nternatona| border and ceasefire
|ne n | ammu and Kashmr.
One m

nth after the ratfcation of the agreement the

army commanders of the two countres met n ^ugust,
!D73
to
draw the new dotted |ne between them n Kash mr. ^ccordng
to that, each sde wou|d keep what t had won n the Oecember
war, some 450 square m |es for the lakstans near Chamb. Hut
Indo-Pak Relations
1 03
everywhere e|se, they w| | go back t o the border they crossed
n Oecember. 1he Indans were gvng up ore than 5, 000 square
m | es n Funjab and 5nd n exchange for some 70 square m les
he|d by Fakstan.
Mo doubt,

y agree ng to wthdraw, Mrs. Gandh made

a bg concesson to Mr. Hhut to, but n return, she won two major
concessons, a promse to respect the new ceasefre lne and
an agreement to settle dspu1e b|atera| ly.
Kashmi r
Kashmr s the pvot to Inda-Fakstan re|atons, s obvous
from the fact that the war of Oecember ! D7 ! began n Last
Fakstan but ended n the West and n Kashmr. ^gan n the
effort to reach a post-war sett|ement, t was pr marly Kashm r
rather than "Hangladesh" whch proved to be the stumb|ng b|ock.
Wh le makng comparson between the 1ashkent and the
5mla agreements, Fakstan vsb| y ganed nothng at 1

shkent.
Clause I of the 1ashkent declaraton stated "

hat ] ammu and

Kashmr was dscussed and each of the sdes put forth

ts respectve
pos tons. " 1hs shows that the dscusson took p|ace at 1ashkent,
that the dec|araton dd not recogn ze | ammu and Kashmr as
a dspute | for there s no ndcaton of tI, and that the dscusson
ended wthout any agreement between the two sdes or any con-
cessons from e ther s de. Fakstan stuck to ts poston that
Kashmr was a dsputed area and I nda remaned frm n ts stand
that Kashmr was Inda' s nternal prob|em and, therefore, non-
negotab|e.
Oespte a|l nferences and nterpretatons of the vague
c|ause, the fact remans that the agreement nether resolved
basc ssues, nor dd t make a start towards ts set tlement. 1he
non-recogn ton of the exstence ot

the Kashmr problem n the

clause, consoldated Inda' s pos ton and enab|ed t to nterpret
Fakstan' s future assstance to the peop|e of Kashmr as nter-
ference n ts nterna| affa rs. On the other hand, Fakstan made
no comm tment under the declaraton.
104
Indo-Pak Relations
^t 5 m| a the customary atttudes of Inda and lakstan
to a peace sett|ement were comp|ete|y reversed. Inda, as the
8tronger party, sought a sett| ement of the Kashmr ssue once
and for a|| n ts favour. It was lakstan who now demanded
that the perphera| ssues be taken up frst and the Kashmr
prob|em |eft n co|d storage.
Many questons were rased about the 5m|a accord. Is
there any undertakng by lakstan regardng Kashm r? Was there
a secret agreement between lresdent Hhutto and Mrs. Gandh
on the fate of Kashm r? Mr. Hhutto many t mes c|ear|y exp|ane

d
hs poston and repeated|y asserted that he had not entered nto
any secret dea| wth Inda. Hesdes, secret agreements n a demo-
cratc era se|dom create bndng ob|gatons on the partes. Hoth
the |eaders must have been aware of th s fact.
1he 5 m|a summt near|y ended n a dead|ock on the
Kashmr ssue. 1he stuaton was saved when the two |eaders
succeeded n fndng a new |anguage and a new out |ook whIch
enab|ed them to reach an agreement hgh|y abstract n character.
I t provdes that n ammu and Kashmr the "|ne of contro|" resu|t-
ng from the ceasefre on Oecomber ! 7, ! D7 ! , sha| | be respected
by both sdes wthout prejudce to the recogn zed postons of
the ether sde.
It c|ear|y emerges that the two sdes agreed to dsagree
on Kashmr but reso|ved to work on a permanent so|uton for
the prob| em. Hy removng the ssue from nternatona| surve| | ance,
the two partes agreed to a pro|onged freezng of the entre dspute.
Hy ru|ng out war n the areas they expressed ther w| |ngness
to preserve

the status quo, snce no other course was rea| |y open

to lakstan. However, nether Inda nor lakstan forma| |y abandoned
ther c| ams to Kashmr, whch was dec|ared to be a dsputed
ssue.
When t came to actua| mp| ementaton of the pact,
nether sde was prepared to concede much. Hence varyng nter-
pretatons of that fact were advanced. Inda nssted that by agree-
ng to the b|atera| approach, Pakstan had conceded remova|
of the Kashmr dspute from the nternatona| arena to reach
Indo-Pak Relations
1 05
a b| atera| sett| ement wthout nterference. lakstan nterprets
the c| ause n another manner.
and when we have agreed to have b |atera| negotatons
wth Inda t s on the bass of a prncp|e and of the Lnted
Matons reso|utons. 1herefore, when we agreed to enter nto
b| atera| negotat ons, we dd not n any way co1promse our
poston.
70
.
Offerences over the ro|e of the Unted Nati ms ve fo
pract ca| expresson n the att tude of the two sdes to the cease-
fre |ne and the m | tary observers n Kashmr.

I n vew of the
new dspensaton, the Indans c| a m that the I. M. observers here
have no ro|e to perform, espec a| |y when the two partes have
agreed to respect the |ne of contro|. Hut the Indans have made
no offca| request to the L. M. 5ecretary Genera| to wthdraw
the observers. ^ny move to

secure the remova| of the observers

wou|d nvo|ve 5ecutry Counc | acton and wth Chna a permanent
member of the counc|, supportng lakstan' s stand on the ceasefre
|ne, the Indan government wou|d prefer not to rase the ssue.
Ind a' s nsstance for the securng of recogntion of the |ne of
contro| n Kashmr s sgnfcant to ndcate ts motves. 1hs
s that through usage the |ne shou|d acqure the status of an
nternatona| boundary.
5ummng up the precedng ana|yss t can be sad that
as wth the 1ashkent dec|araton, the 5m|a accord a|so pug off
the basc dsputes for future negotatons. Insofar as Kashmr
s concerned, the 1ashkent agreement was not a step forward,
whereas the 5m|a accord was a step towards a new drecton.
Oespte certan basc dfferences both agreements contan about
the same materi a| on peace and harmony n the re|atons between
two countres. Hoth envsage steps to be taken to norma| ze
re| atons and, most crtca| of a| | , both |eave the Kashmr dspute
unso|ved.
1 06 Indo-Pak Relations
References
! . 5ee Z. A. Hhutto, 1he Myth of Inde_endence |London. Oxford
Ln versi ty lress, ! DbD} .
2. "Hhut to' s Intervew wth the H. H. C. , " publshed n 1he Oawn,
February ! 8, ! D72.
3. Hhutto, p. ! 80.
4. 5ce Olp Mukerjeo, p. 2 ! 5.
5. "Intervew wth Kuldp Mayyar, " cted by H.G. Verghese,
n ^n End to Confrontaton |Hhut to' s lakstan} |Oelh . 5. Chan d
& Co..} ! D72} , p. 78.
b. ^ddress to a publc meetng at Mshtar park, Karach,
3, ! D72.
7. 1he Oawn, | anuary !4, ID72.
8. ^ddress to the pOople n leshawar on | anuary ! 5, ! D72.
D. "lresdent Bhutto' s lress Conference, " 1he Oawn, | anuary
! 3, ! D72.
! 0. 1he Oawn, | anuary ! 5, ! D72.
! ! . Report through Reuter, quoted by ^l l Inda Rado |^IR} ,
February ! 5, ! D72.
! 2. Mrs. Gandh, however, rejected ths request on March ! D
statng that the queston o f the prsoners o f war "s lnked
wth our securty."
! 3. |resdent Hhutto' s broadcast on March 3, ID72.
! 4. 5hekh Muj b' s ntervew to LlI, on February ! D, and hs
statement on March ! D, ! D72.
! 5. 5ee Te Oawn, February 20, ! D72.
! b. Mr. O. l. Ohar sad n lrague that Inda wanted lastng peace
wth lakstan. In lars, he sad, "1he Indan government
would welcome lresdent Hhutto wth an open mnd and
open arms. " In 1he Oawn, February 22 and 23, ! D72.
! 7. "Hhutto' s I ntervew to ^Fl, " n 1he Oawn, February 23,
! D72.
! 8. "Hhutto' s 5peech n Lahore, " n 1he Oawn, March 20, ! D72.
! D. Hhutto' s sworn-n speech as lresdent under the nter m
consti tuton on ^prl 2 ! , ! D72.
20. 1he Oawn, ^pr l 20, ! D72.
2 ! . "1ext of the | ont 5tatement, " n 1he Oawn, May 1 , ! D72.
22. Hhutto' s announcement of May 7, ! D72.
23. Countres vsted were the Ln ted ^rab Emrates and Kuwa t
| May 2D} , Iraq | May 30} , Lebanon | May 30-3 Il, | ordan
lndo-Pak Relations 1 07
| May 3 ! -lune ! I, 5aud ^raba | | une ! -3I , 5oma|a and
Ethopa iune 3I , 5udan | | une 4I, Mgera | | une 4-5I , Gunea
| | une 5I, Maurtania | | une bI, 1urkey | | une b-8I, and lran
|
| une 8- ! 0I .
24. Mrs. Gandh, who was occuped w th the par| amentary sesson
unt| the end of May, was due to |eave on | une ! 3 for
a twe|ve-day vsi t to Hungary, Czechos|ovaka and 5wedon.
25. Venue of the ta|ks was changed |ater on from Oe|h to
5 m|a because of a heat wave n the lndan capta|.
2b. Hhutto' s ^ddress to a gatherng of |awyers, n 1he Oawn,
| une 24, ! D72.
27. Hhutto' s mssosn backed by the masses, see 1he Oawn,
| une 20, ! D72.
28. lbid. , | une 28, ! D72.
2D. "lresdent Hhutto' s Hroadcast to the Maton on | une 28, "
n 1he Oawn, | une 2D, ! D72.
30. Ibd.
3 ! . "Mrs. Gandh ' s lress Conference n lrague, " Mew York
1mes, ] une 2 ! , ! D72.
32. "1he ler|s of lakstan, " Mewsweek, ^pr| ! 0, ! D72.
33. "Hhutto Mounts the l| ank, ' 1he Economst, ^pr | ! 5, ! D72.
34. lresdent Hhutto' s speech at t he unversty campus n lesha-
war on | anuary ! 5. 5ee 1he Oawn, | anuary ! b, ! D72, and
a|so Hhutto' s ntervew wth Ku|dp Mayyar, n 1he 5tatesman ,
March 25, ! D72.
35. lresdent Hhut to' s speech to the Matona| ^ssemb|y, ^pr|
! 4, ! D72.
3b. ^ddress to a pub|c meetng n Lahore, see 1he Oawn,
February ! 5, ! D72.
37. Hhutto' s i ntervew wth O| p Mukerjee, c ted n Muker]ee,
p. 2 ! 5.
38. "Reso|uton of the | an 5angh Genera| Counc | , " 1he 1 mes
of l nda, May 8, ! D72.
3D. 5ee Mukerjee ,p. 223.
40. Frank Moraes ' edtora| n l ndan Express, cted n Mukerjee,
p. 223.
4 ! . 5ee the report on the negotatons n 1he Oawn, | u|y ! , ! D72 .
42. 1he Oawn, | u|y 2, ! D72.
43. 1he Economst, | u|y 8, ! D72.
44. 1he text of the 5m| a ^greement s n 1he Oawn, | u|y 3,
! D72.
45. 1he Oawn, | u|y 4, ! D72.
4b. lbd.
. 1 08
lndo-Pak Relations
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. , |uly b, ! D72.
4D. Ibid. , } u ly 4, ! D72.
50. Ibid.
5 ! . Ibid. , | uly 5, ! D72.
52. Ibid, ^ugust 2, ! D72.
53. Ibid. , | uly 5, ! D72.
54. ^. U. Vajpai ' s speech i n Lok 5abha.
55. Mrs. Gandhi ' s press conference on |uly ! 2. Mr. Hhutto' s
speech in the Mational ^ssembly on | uly ! 0. He sai d th

ere
had been no secret agreement wi th India, and no compromise
on principles, lakistan had not given up the principle that
the right of sel f determinat ion belonged to Kashmiris.
5G. Clause IV, article l .

7. Clause I, article ?.
d. Clause l , article ?.
D. "One 5ummi t that Worked, " The Lconomist, | uly d, I D72.
b0. Ibid.
b l . 5ee The Guardian, | uly d, l D7?.
b?. Fresident Hhutto' s speech n the Mational ^ssembly on | uly
l4. The text is in The Dawn, | uly l , I D7?.
bJ
. The Lconomist, |uly d, l D7?.
b4. The Dawn, | uly l , l D7?.
b. 5ee the

report on the repatriation ol the FOWs i n

The Tim

, London, | anuary 24, l Dbb.

bb. 1he Oai |y 1ele_ra_h, London, 5eptember 5, ! D72.
b7. Th question ol l D FOWs is discussed in Chapter VI.
bd. "^zi z ^hmed' s Fress Conlerence, " The Guardian, 5eptember
?, l D7?.
bD. Fri me Minister Hhutto' s intervew with Mewsweek, October
? l , l D7J.
70. lresident Hhutto' s speech in the Mational ^ssembly on
| uly ! 4, ! D72.
CHAPTE R VI
I MPLEMENTATI ON OF THE SI MLA AGRE EME NT
Wi thdrawal of Forces from Each Other's Terri tories
and Readj ustment of the Ceasefi re Li ne in Kashmi r
5gnng of the accord was just a sma| | step towards the
comp|eton of the most dffcu| t task that was yet to be dea| t
wth. 1he agreement had no prob|em n gettng approva| from
the |egs|atve assemb|es of the two countres, t was approved
by the respectve assemb|es mmedate|y by an overwhe| m ng
. !
majority.
1hough the forma| tes nvo|ved n ts rat fcaton were
carred out quck|y, some dfIcu| tes arose at the tme o! ts
mp|ementaton. lrovs ons regardng the wthdrawa| of Iorces,
whch were to be carred out wthn thrty days, cou| d not be
mp| emented because of a sudden change n Inda' s atttude.
Contrary to the 5m|a agreement, Inda made the wthdrawa|
of forces a|ong the nternatona| border condtona| upon agreement
on the |ne of contro| n Kashmr.
Ind a' s tr umphant emergence from the war gave her an
upper hand over lakstan. Her terr tora| gans were more than
what lakstan had occuped durng the war. Hy returnng the
5, ! 3D square m |es of the terrtory occuped n 5nd and lunj ab,
Inda was dong a favour to lakstan, who was gvng up on|y
bD square m |es of the Indan terr tory. Osparty was a|so greater
n the Kashmr sector, where Inda was defn te|y n a bet ter
poston than lakstan. It was not unexpected that Inda, due
to her superor m | tary poston and strong barganng power,
tred to take advantage of the stuaton.
1 1 0 lndo-Pak Relations
1hs was the approprate tme for Inda to get the most
out of lakstan, espec a| |y n Kashmr where the queson of the
de| neaton of the ceasefre |ne was yet to be set t|ed. 1he
ndicaton of some possb|e de|ay came when 5awarun 5ngh art-
cu| ated lnd a' s new stand.
?
Hs statement was c|ear enough to
convey the rea| motves of Inda, whch was not ready to exchange
the captured terr tory a|ong the rest of the border of Inda and
lakstan if no agreement cou| d be reached on de| neation of the
Kashmr ceasefre |ne.
Inda moved further and emphasi zed the remova| of U. N.
observers. ^ccordng to t, they had no ro|e to p|ay, as the o|d
ceasefre |ne was "ob| terated" n the Oecember war.
4
1his wasn' t
a new move n Indan po| cy. 5nce |ong, Inda had been persstent
n ts po|cy of dec| arng Kashmr an ntegra| part of Inda there-
fore non-negotab|e. Remova| of the U.N. observers wou|d not
on|y have

strengthened ts pos ton, but a|so wou|d have thrown

the Kashmr queston nto co|d storage.
lakstan relused to accept ths condton.
4
I t seemed that
the 5 m| a agreement was j ust mpossb|e to carry out. 1here was no
f|cxb | ty n the att tudes of the two countres on the matter.
Efforts were, however, made to sett|e the queston by
negotatons. Commanders from both the countres met to decde
on the methods and procedures for the de|neaton of the | ne
of contro| n Kashmr.
5
1h s was j ust the begnnng of ther
protracted meetngs, whch resu| ted n nothng. Oue to the fa|ure
of the commanders In reachng any agreement, the matter was
brought to the offca| |eve|. 1a|ks between the Indan and lakstan
representatves so| ved nothng. 1he stuaton remaned the same--
ther jont statement was nothing more than the reaff rmat on
b
of the 5 m| a agreement.
When the ta|ks were comp|ete|y bogged down and t was
fe| t that the commanders were unab|e to so|ve the comp|cated
queston of the de| neaton, the mat ter was taken up by the Chefs
of 5taff:

1he ntatve was taken by lakstan ths tme and a

7
new seres of meetngs took p|ace. Most of the work was comp|e-
ted durng these ta|ks, and when t was expected that the maps
lndo-Pak Relations
I l l
and de| nraton proceedngs woul d be sgned, a dispu

te over a
vllage called "1hakur Chak" arose unexpectedly.
1he lakstan sde mai ntaned that

as the vllage was

n |ammu and had been held by the lakstan forces at the cease-
fre they should retan contro| n accordance wth the provson
of the 5 ml a agreement, whch sa d that both sides were to respect
the l ne of control resul tng from the ceasefre of Oecember
! 7, ! D7 ! .
Inda came

up wth its own nterpretaton of the clause

and contended that ths clause

appled only to the lne separatng

Indan-he|d from lakstan-held Kashmr. ^s 1hakur Chak |ay
on the border of |ammu and lakstan, t was covered by the
provson of the agreement that "Indan

and lakstan forces

shal | be wthdrawn to ther sde of the nternatonal border.
d
Mow the matter was more pol tca| rather than strategc.
lakstan hardened ts atttude towards acceptng the decson
whch |nda arbtrarly wanted to mpose on t. lakstan, by sensng

Ind a' s nterest n that smal| tract of land, tred to bargan.

lakstan was ready to w thdraw ts clam to 1hakur Chak f t
adequately compensated wth terrtory elsewhere a|ong the lne
of contro| Y 1he work of the delneaton was a| most comp|eted
by th

s tme. Inda was w||ng to carry out the wthdrawal of

the troops, proposng to settl e the 1hakur Chak dspute |ater
on, but lakstan refused the proposa|.
Oead|ock had to be broken somehow, as the ta|ks were
not leadng anywhere. ^fter a long exchange of correspondence
between the Chefs of 5taff, the decson was taken to meet
agan. 1he matter was sett|ed after long dscussons and as |ater
on declared by both the governments, the gspute was so|ved
by the sprt of "gve and take. " 1hough lakstan abandoned ts
c|am to 1hakur Chak, t was nterested n gettng ts own two
vllages back. 1wo man tactcal features domnatng the | he|um
Va| |ey Road-Ohum and Ohrkot--were receved n exchange. Inda
descrbed ths exchange as "a gesture of good w l | , "
!0
whereas
l k

1 1 d
|I
h

f
.
1
It
! !
a istan ca e t t e victory o prmclpe.
1 12
lndo-Pak Relations
1he agreement whch was reached n ! 22 days consttuted
an mportant

m |estone n mp|ementng the 5 m| a agreement.

1he wthdrawa| of Indan and lakstan troops from the terr tory
on e ther sde of the nternatona| border began on Oecember
! 3 and was comp|eted on Oecember 20, ! D72.
Return of the POWs
1he most mportant and at the same t me very dffcu|t
prob| em faced by lakstan was re|ated to the return of ts
prsoners of war. lakst an as a defeated country had no barganng
power to brng D3, 000
! 2
of ts so|ders back. From the begnnng,
lakstan persuaded Inda to repatrate the lOWs under the terms
of the Geneva Conventon. Inda, however, wshed to use the
prsoners as a |everage n persuadn lakstan to forma| | y
recogn ze Hang|adesh. Hut outward|y, t took the pos ton that
t cou| d not re| ease the prsoners wthout the consent of Hang|adesh.
lressure was mountng on Hhutto to get the lOWs back,
as ther fam | es started gettng mpatent. Many commttees
were formed nsde the country whch organ zed demonstrar ons
and sent de| egatons to see the lresdent and foren dgn tares.
Most of these demonstratons were organ zed by the oppos ti on
partes. Hut there s |tt|e doubt about the fact that the fam | es
of lOWs were genune|y worred, as there wasn' t any surety about

ther ear|y return. lnda seemed unsympathetc and had a stubborn

att tude towards the ssue.
1o reso|ve the ssue, lakstan worked on mob | zng wor| d
opnon n ts favour to seek the return of the lOWs. Hhutto
sent messages to Inda through the L. M .

stressng that the repa-

traton of lOWs wou|d have "an mportant bearng on future
re|atonshps between India and lakstan. "
! 3
1he countres whch
had a|ready recogn zed Hang|ades were approached to use ther
nf|uence for the mp| ementaton of the L.l. reso|ut ion ca||ng
for wthdrawal of the Indan troops and the exchange of lOWs.
! 4
In this matter, lakstan got some support from the frend|y
Mus| m countres whch had backed lakstan' s efforts on
Indo-Pak Relations
1 1 3
humantaran grounds.
!
1he wold really pad attenton towards
the matter when the reports of kllng of prsoners n the Indan
camps reached the outsde world.
!
1hese tragc nc dents ncreased
the anxety and concern n lakstan about ther safe return. Oele-
gatons comprsng of lOWs' relatves were sent all over the
world to appeal to the worl d news meda to brng ths ssue to
ther country' s attenton so that they should use ther nfluence
"n the name of humanty." lresdent Hhut to was not wllng

to subm t to I ndan pressure n exchange for Ind a' s re|ease of

the prsoners. Inda would have to bear consderable expense n
keepng D3, 000 prsoners. Hhutto seemed convnced that the OWs
were a dmnshng asset for India and he could therefore afford
to wa t. I f repatraton dd not take pl ace, he expected the nter-
natonal agences to ntervene to brng pressure on Inda.
The issue of war cri mes
1he queston of the release of the lOWs was complcated
by three factors. l! } Whle the Indan Government was prepared
to exchange the prsoners taken on the Western front, lakstan
pressed for the release of a! l prsoners, |2} as the lakstan
forces n East lakstan had surrendered to a "jo nt" Indan-
Hangladesh command, Inda contended that the prsoners could
not be released wthout the concurrence of Hangl adesh, and
nssted that lakstan must settl e the queston through trlateral
negotatons after recogn zng the new state,
! 7
and l3} the
angladesh government ' s ntenton to try a number of the prsoners
for all eged war cr mes.
! 8

5tatements regardng the trals of lOWs came from the

Hangladesh Law Mnster, Or. Kamal Hussan, who accused ! D
lakstan prsoners of comm tting genocde, cr mes (anst
humaty, murder, rape and arson durng the War of I D7! n
Hangldesh.
! D
lakstan promptly expressed ts opposton to any
tral s on both practcal and legal

grounds. It was decl ared 1ha|

these trals would unl eash hostle forces n lakstan, br ngng
possble harm to the Hengals present n West l'stan. There
1 14
Indo-Pak Relations
wou|d be demands for the tra| of many Henga| i s on charges
of passng nformaton to the Indan and Hang|adesh Iorces duri ng
the war.
20
lakstan brought the matter before the Internatona| Court
of 1 ustce. On |ega| grounds, lakstan tred to convnce the court
that whatever happened n ! D 7 ! was wthn the terri tory of
Pakstan, whch gave ts exc|usve jursdcton n judgng and punsh-
ng any |aw-breakers.
2 !
Inda obj ected to ths acton taken by
lakstan. ^ccordng to the 5 m| a agreement, ssues were to be
so|ved through b| atera| negotatons, wthout nvo|vng any thrd
party. lakstan |ater on requested the court to postpone further
consderaton, as negotatons between Inda and lakstan were
expected to begn short|y.
22
Lp unt| /ugust ! D73, India and Hang|adesh showed no
f|exb|ty. 1he stuaton, however, changed as the economc burden
of carng for the prsoners began to be more and more rksome.
Moreover, lakstan ganed support from the wor|d communty
because of Ind a' s reIusa| to act accordng to the Geneva Conven-
tons. lakstan had a|so damonstrated that t not on|y cou|d afford
to wthho|d the Hag|adesh recognton, but that wth the he|p
of Chna t cou|d prevent Hang|adesh' s entry into the Uni ted
Matons.
23
1he lOWs were rapd|y becomng an neffecti ve barganng
|ever for India. Rea| zng that

Inda changed ts atttude and

showed some f| exb|ty. It asked

Muj b to cooperate n sett| ng

the prob|em.
1he dead|ock was broken after a pro|onged correspondence
between 5waran 5ingh and ^z z ^hmed. Megotat ons were started
on 1 u|y 24, ! D73, but no decson cou|d be reached, because
Hang|adesh wanted to send a|| of ts non-Henga| popu| aton away
to lakstan on the ground that they were ds|oya| to the new
reg me. 1hese non-Henga|s | Known as HharsI numbered about
b80, 000. Muj b stated that about 2b0, 000 of them had opted for
lakstan as th

er choce of future natona|ty.

24
lakstan was
prepared to accept on|y West lakstans who had been stranded
i n Hang| adesh n ! D7 ! and about 40, 000 others who were forma| |y
Indo-Pak Relations
1 1 5
emp| oyed, by the Fakistan government or had strong fam| y |nks
In Faki stan.
Hardenng of Is| amabad' s attItude towards acceptng HharIs
re|ated to the fact that the 5Indh speakIng

popu| ati on a| ready

had grIevances aganst the Lrdu speakIng Mus| I ms, who had migrated
from I ndIa after the parttIon. Great numbers of those refugees
are sett|ed n the

provnce of 5Ind, heavI|y concentrated n bIg

cItIes |ke KarachI, Hyderabad, 5ukkur, Mawabshah, and Mrpurkhas.
1he 5IndhIs fe| t threatened on economIc grounds and a|so found.
the Lrdu-speakIng peop|e' s atttude towards the 5IndhI language
chauvInIstIc. 1he fear was understandab|e then that these new
refugees, who speak L

du, wou| d Increase the number of unemp|oyed ,

create new soc a| and |ngustIc tensons, and create prob|ems

on
the natona| |eve|.
1a|ks were agan he|d n Mew Oe|h on ^ugust ! 8, and
after ntense negotIatons for about ten days an agreement was
25
sgned on ^ugust 28, ! D73.

I t provIded that.
! .
2.
3.
4.
1he prIsoners of war and c vI | an nternees wou|d be repa-
tr ated as quIck| y as possb|e.
^| | Henga|s In Fakstan, I nc|udng the 203 charged wIth
subverson, wou| d smu| taneous|y be repatrated.
lakIstan wou|d receve "a substanta| number" of non-Henga|s
from Hang|adesh.
1he ! D5 lakIstans charged wth war cr mes wou|d remaIn
In IndIa and \ou|d not be brought to trI al durIng the erIod
of repatraton, on the comp|etIon of whIch dIscussons
on ther future wou|d take p| ace between Hangl adesh, Inda
and laksan.
1 he repatrIaton of the Henga| Is In lakstan and the non-

Henga|s n Hang|adesh bean on 5eptember ! D.

2G
Hy October
2, about 4, 500

Henga|Is and 4, 000 non-Henga|Is were repatrIated

1he frst batch of ! ,680 Fakstan prsoners, most of them cvI|an
Internees, women and ch|dren, were taken to the lakIstanI
|ronter on 5epte

mber 28. 1hs three-way rgtrIatIon was

comp|eted by ^prI | 30, ! D74.
Lnder the Mew Oe|h agreement, Fakstan undertook to
accept "a substantIa| number" of Hihars In Hang| adesh. In the
process, lakstan accepted about 27, 000, n addItIon to 22, 000
1 1 6 lndo-Pak Relations
peop|e who had f|ed to Mepa| from Hang|adeh and 25, 000 other
"hardshp" cases,
27
whereas, 3D4, 000 non-Henga|s |or Hhars}, who
had never been domic|ed n West lakstan, wshed to emgrate
to lakstan.
28
Or. Vctor Lmbrct, the former head o the L. M.
Re|ef Operaton n Oacca, wh|e vstng Rawa|pnd, submtted
a p|an to the lakstan government for the sett|ement of Hhars
on uncu| t vated land n 5nd wth nternatona| ad.
2

D
1he lakstan
gover.iment rej ected the proposa| , on the grounds that there was
I unpub| shed nderstandng wth Indi a that n addton to returnng
lakstans and members of dvded fam|es, on|y about 25, 00O
"hardsh p cases" among the Hhars shou|d be admtted. l t wt s
a|so ponted out that the Hhars were not farmers but artsans,
ndustra| workers and traders, and that the proposa| wou|d meet
wth opposton from the 5ndhs.
1he matter was further dscussed at a trpartte meetng
n Mew Oe|h. Regard ng the Hhars, lakstan reterated ts
past stand, but promsed to be more sympathetc n revewng
the app|catons. In the same meetng Hang|adesh agreed to abandon
the proposed tra| of lD5 prsoners as an "act of c|emency. "
30
1he rapatr aton of the 72, 7D5 prsoners of war and ! 7,! 8b
nterned cv| ans was comp|eted on ^pr | 30, ! D74. 1he fna|
group to return to lakstan nc|uded Leutenant GOnera| ^.^. K
M az , the former lakistan commander n Last lakstan.
Recogni ti on of Bangl adesh
1he recognton of Hang|adesh was a hgh|y emotona|
ssue for lakstan. 1he very bass of lakstan' s exstence was
questoned. 1o many lakstans, recogn t' on of Hang| adesh was
the repudaton of the "1wo Maton 1heory" on whch the state
of lakstan had been founded.
.Anda, from the very beg nnng, pressed lakstan for the
recognton of Hang|adesh and made t a precondton for the
re|ease of lOWs, but lresdent Hhutto ressted wth patence.
He was persona| |y n favour of recogn ton yet he took tme n
exp| ainng the pros and cons of ths acton to hs countrymen.
lndo-Pak Relations 1 1 7
He dd not want to take any action un|ess pub|c opinon was
n ts favour. He tred to convnce hs peop|e sayng that the
concept of Mus| m natonhood n the l ndan sub-continent had
orgna| | y envsaged two separate st ates in the northeast

and the
northwest wth some confedera| |ink between them.
3 !
However,
he emphas zed that lakstan' s stand on the ssue was unchanged.
1hough a coup|e of voices were raised n the beginn

g for the
recogn ton of Hang| adesh,
4

Mr. Hhutto was |ooking for mass

support which was st|| not forthcomng.
Oppositi on to the recogni ti on
Wth a v ew to havng an dea of pub|c opnon at |arge
about ths ssue, Mr. Hhutto took a tour of the country. He
addressed publc gatherngs at varous p| aces and exp|a ned the
mportance of recognton. Ourng ths tour he rea| zed that the
mass opnon was st|| not favourng any acton |eadng to Hang|a-
desh' s recognton. 1he rlght-wng opposton partes had organ zed
a vo| ent campagn aganst the vews of the government. ^s a
resu| t of ths campagn, student demonstratons were he|d n
varous parts of the country.
44
1he unrest spread a| | over the
country especa| | y n cind and lunj ab lrovnces. Lven | awyers
partcpated n such dOmonstrations.
1hese deve| opments forced Hhutto to change hs mnd
at |east for the t me beng. He reverted to consttutona| measures
by seeking the advsory opnon of the 5upreme Court of lakstan.
^ccordng to this opnon the Matona| ^ssemb|y was |ega| |y
empowered to adopt a reso|uton author zng the government to
grant recogn ton to Hang|adesh .when any such step wou|d be
n the nterest of th naton.
34
1h

ugh fr. Hhutto got the author-

zaton from the ^ssemb|y, he contnukd refusa| of Hang|adesh
recognton. ^ctua||y he was |ookng for some proper t me at
whch the decson wou|d arouse as |tt|e opposton as possb|e
from the genera| pub| c. 1he best occason for such an acton
turned out to be the Is| m

summ t meeting he|d at Lahore n

Februury ! D74.
1
18
lndo-Pak Relations
Role of the I sl ami c summi t i n recogni ti on
of Bangl adesh
Jhe l sl am c summt was arranged by lakstan and was
attended by the heads of statesl governments and foregn mnsters
of al most all the Musl m countres. 1he prescence of these
mportant personaltes ol the lsl amc world created an atmosphere
charged wth feelngs of unversal brotherhood of Isl am. lsycholog-
cal ly t was the rght t m

e for recogn ton of Hangladesh and

the government .f lakstan took advantage of t.
1he dgntares from Musl m countres played an mportant
role n brngng about a reconclaton between lakstan and

Hangladesh.

1he 5ecretary Gener

l of the Islam c 5ecretarat

went to Oaca, wth Hhutto' s consent, to nvte 5hekh Mu] bur
Rahman to attend the summ t. It was

descrbed as "the frst

step towards formal recognton."
4
5hekh Mu] b however, refused
to attend unless lakstan frst accorded formal reCogn ton.
^s the summ t date was approaChng, the foregn mnsters
of the Islamc countres met at Lahore for pre-summ t dscussons
and preparaton of

the agenda. ^t ths meetng t was decIded

to send a

delegato
,
n, on behaIl of the Isl amc world, to

persuade
the Hangladesh government to attend the summ t m'eet ng. 1he

del egaton was comprsed of representatves from Kuwat, 5omala,

Lebanon, ^lgera, 5enegal , and the l. L. O.
lakstan, reali zng the mportance of the ssue, dd not
want to lose ths opportunty. ^ few hours before the openng
sesson of the summ t, n a natonally televsed address, Mr. Hhutto
made the hstorc announcement of recognt

n of Hangl adesh.
1o

create a favourable atmosphere he declared that the govcrn-

ment had Ignored the pressure lrom bg powers regardng recognton
of Hangl adesh, but t could nOt re]ect the advce of Musl m
brothers who were present n Lahore.
`
^fter ths declaraton o
j
formal recognton, 5hekh Mu] bur
Rahman attended the

Islamc summ t meetng. ^t Lahore, he

was gven a warm welcome

by a cheerng crowd. Hefore leavng

lor home, 5hekh Mu]b extended an nvtaton to Mr. Hhutto to
Indo-Pak Relat ions
1 19
vs t Hangladesh,
7
descrbng h m as "an old frend. " Wth ths
started a new chapter n the relatons of the two countres,
Orgnally two parts of one sovereg

sate.
1he approprate moment selected by Mr. Hhutto for the
recogn ton of Hangladesh left those aganst the decson n a
state of confuon. 1hey were not n a poston to organ ze any
campagn aganst the government because of

the strong feelngs

among the masses that whatever was done by the government
was under the advce of Musl m brothers. 1he address by Col.
Gaddafi of Lbya to a huge gatherng at Lahore, supportng Hhutto,
had a sgnfcant mpact on publc opnon.
Jd
Establ i shment of Di pl omati c Rel ati ons, Resumpti on
of Trade and Travel . faci l i ties
1he accord sgned at 5mla was not an easy one to
mplemeni. Hut after resolvng the complcated ssues

of troops
wthdrawal and return of the prsoners of war, it was expected
that other ssues lke dplomatc rel atons, resumpton of trade,
and postal and communcaton servces wouldn' t be dffcult to
tackle. Lven the most crucal and emotonal ssue of the recogni -
ton of Hangl adesh had been resolved.
1he emphass on blateralism n the accord mpl ed further
negotaton

s on exstng problems. lakstan had actually suggested

tbe mmedate restoraton of dplomatc relatons at the very
openng sesson of the 5ml a talks but, Inda beng reluctant,

the proposal dd not go forward.

Trade and communi cati ons
He|ore talks on resumption of postal and communcaton
servces could begn th ngs took

a dfferent tur. 1he Indi an

nuclear test created grave concerns n lakstan and tenson be-
tween the two countres rose once agan. ^fter losng her Last
wng, lakstan was already weak and mltarly i nferor to lnda
and the nuclear test was cons dered a clear threat to lakstan' s
1 20
Indo-Pak Relations
securty. 1hus progress towards norma| zaton of re| atons was

bIocked for the tme beng. ^| though Indan |eadershp assured

others that nuc|ear energy was 1o be used for peacefu| purposes,
it was not a satsfactory answer for lkstan because of her
past experence wth Indan host| ty.
In the meant me, lakstan successfu| |y mob | zed wor| d
opnon agaInst nuc|ear weapons n Inda and got assurances aganst
an Indan nuc|ear threat.

Havng done ths, lakstan showed a

w||ngness to start negotatons on mp|ementaton of other phases
of the 5m| a accord.
Varous meetngs and dscussons were he|d between the
representatves of the two countres. ^fter a seres of negotatons
a ont communque was ssued under whch both governmants
agreed to restore posta| and communcaton servces and the trave-
| | ng fac| tes whch were suspended durng the war of ! D7 ! . l
was a|so decded that te|ephone mu| t-exchange areas of Hombay
and Karach be | nked by sate| | te crcuts. ^s far as resumpton
of trade, de|egatons of the two countres were to exchange vsts
to exp|ore further possb| tes n ths regard. 1he queston of
resumpton of overf|ghts and ar|nks w

as |eft for further

dscuss on.
3D
losta| and te|ecommuncaton |nks were restored
short|y. It was agreed that trade shou|d be conducted "on the
bass of free convertb|e currency n accordance wth foregn
exchange regu|atons n force from tme to tme n each country. "
4
0
In t a| |y, trade was to be hand|ed by government

corporatons though
there was provson for prvate sector' s partcpaton at some |ater
stages.
Resumptons of trade was a major achevement based on
the 5m| a agreement, as the
trade re|atons had been cut of!
snce the ! Db5 War. 1hough the 1ashkent dec|arati on provded
for ts resumpton, t never happened because oI nf|exi bl e atttudes
by both si des.
Indo-Pak Relations
1 2 1
Restorati on of ai rl i nks and overfl i ghts
verflghts by Fakstan arcraft across Indan terrtory
were suspended by Inda n ear|y J1 whOn two Kashmrs hj acked
an Indan ^rl nes p|an, and forced the p lot to |and at Lahore.
1hey dent fed themselves as members of a secret organ zaton
operatng nsde Kashm r ca| | ed tha Matona| Lberaton Front.
Fa

kstan refused to return the h] ackers to Inda on the p|ea

that the persons, beng Kashmrs, were not Indan natona|s and
as such there was no legal necess ty to hand them ovOr to Inda.

5urprsngly, after the judca| nqury t was a| leged that the

so-ca| led h]ackers were members of the Indan Inte|l gence 5ervce
and that the who|e drama had been engneered by Inda for the
purpose of gvng t a ]ustfcaton to stop Fakstan overflghts
across Indan terrtory and thus create hurdles n the movement
of people and supp|es between East and West wngs of Fakstan.
Fakstan had |odged a complant aganst ths acton on
the part of Inda, before the Councl of Internatonal Cvl ^vaton
Organ zaton | IC^O}. ^

contenton by Inda that the Counc l had

no ]ursdcton n the matter had been rej ected by the Counc|
and by the Internatona| Court of | ustce. Lnder these crcumstances
the ssue of restoraton of these lnks proved to be touh to
handle. Inda was re|uctant to al|ow resumpton of overflghts

unless the comp| ant was wthdrawn from IC^O, whereas Fakstan
refused to do so n the begnnng. Jhe Indan vew was that
Fakstan' s complant to IC^O m | tated aganst the 5 mla accord
to set t| e dfferences b|atera||y--that s, wthout nvo|vng th rd
partes. 1he matter could not be resolved unt | Mr. Hhutto, n
order to gve a new mpetus to ths process of norma| zaton,
showed hs w | |ngness to wthdraw the case from the IC^O.
5ubsequent| y, dscussons were held and an agreement was reached,
whch contaned the fol |owng mportant ponts besdes restoraton
of arlnks.

. Jhe two countres wou|d send a jont |etter t o IC^O

wthdrawng ther respect ve comp|ants. Cverf| ghts and
ar| nks wouj d be restored.
l ,
1 2 2
lndo-Pak Relations
2. Goods and passenger
through Wagah-^ttar
^mr|tsar n Inda}.
traffc by ra| wou|d be resumed
border l Lahore n Fakstan and
3. Op|omatc re|atons wou| d be reestab| shed at the
ambassador' s |evel.
4. Frvate sectors wou| d be al| owed to partcpate n trade
and commerc between the two countres.
5. 1he ssue of cv| an deta nees wou|d be reso|ved exped-
tous|y, and efforts wou| d be made to |ocate and repatrate
persons st | | untraced.
1he mplementaton of ths agreement was completed
short| y after that. 1he overflghts were resumed and the ra |
|nks between Inda and Fakstan, snapped snce the l Db5 War,
were restored n l D7b.
^nother mportant step towards the process of norma| zaton
of relatons was the resumpton of dp| omatc rel atons. ^fter
al most four years of ther suspenson the two countres reestab|sh
dp|omatc relatons. 1he ambassadors

of the two countres arrved

to

resume ther responsb | tes by the naugura| flghts of |I^

and ^r Inda. Wth ths, a foundaton of a new phase of corda|
43
re| atons was begun.
References
! . Fakstan' s MatonaI ^ssembly gave ts approva| on | uly ! ,
! D72, whereas n Inda, Lok 5abha and Rajya 5abha approved
t on ^ugust I and 3, ! D72. Instruments of rat fcaton were
exchanged on ^ugust 4, ! D72.
2. 5waran 5ngh' s address t o t he Far|ament on ^ugust 5, ! D72.
3. 5waran 5ngh' s statements on ^ugust 2b, 2D, and 5eptember
3, ! D72.
4. "Mr. Hhutto' s 5tatement, " 1he Oawn, 5eptember 4, ! D72.
5. 1he frst meetng between the two commanders

took p|ace
on ^ugust ! 0- ! 2 and ^ugust 2 l -22, ! D72.
b. "1he ] oint 5tatement, " 1he Oawn, ^ugust _30, ! D72.
Indo-Pak Relations 1 23
7 .

lakstan and Indan Chefs o f Staff were Genera| 1kka Khan

and General Manekshaw, respectve|y,

who met from October

! 4- ! 8, ! D72.

.
8. General Manekshaw' s nterpretaton of the c|ause s reported
n 1he Dawn, Movember 3, ! D72.
D. 1he foregn offce spokesman' s statement on Movember 2,
! D72.
! 0. 5waran 5ngh' s speech n Lok 5abha, December ! 2, ! D72.
! ! . Mr. ^z z ^hmed' s press conterence on December ! 2, ! D72.
12. Indan Defence Mnster, Mr. |ag] van Ram, gave the number
of lakstan lOWs on ^prl ! 4, ! D72, as 75, 323 and on May
2, as D ! , b34. 1he |at ter fgure nc|uded para-mltary personne|
and cv|an nternees. 1he number declared by lakstan was
b37, al | of them captured at the Western front.
! 3. Hhutto' s statement s n 1he Dawn, February ! 7, ! D72.
! 4. Jhe Dawn, February ! 7, !8, and 2b, ! U72.
! 5. ^ssurance to the |akstan de|egaton to te !s|amc ConferenO
at |eddah by 5aud

^raba, 1urkey and Egypt, n 1he Dawn,

March ! , ! D72.
|
! b. 1he frst ncdent occurred on March

7, when the securty

guards opened fre on the lOW5 kl|ng twe|ve of them. 1he
acton was repeated in the comng months and up unt|
November 28, ! D73, about 38 prsoners were

shot dead, n
d fferent camps, on each occason al|eged|y wh|e attemptng
to escape.
! 7. 5waran 5ngh' s speech n the U. M. eneral ^ssembly, October
7, ! D72. \
! 8. Jhe number of those gulty of war cr mes was nta| ly set
at about ! , 500, but |ater on the numbar was reduced to ! D5.
! D. Dr. Kama| Hussan' s press conference, n 1he 5tatesman,
^pr | ! 8, ! D73.
20. lresdent Hhutto' s

ntervew wt

the Iew York 1mes,

| une
! , ! D73.
2 ! . Yahya Hakhtar' s statement before the court, n The Dawn,
| une b and 27g _ ! D73.
22. 1he lakstan government' s l etter to the court on | u|y ! ! ,
! D73.
3. It was the frst veto to b

cast by the leople' s Republc

of Chna sInce Its admsson to the \nted Natons.
24. "Mu]b' s 5tatement, " In 1he 5tatesman, March D, ! 973.
25. 1he text of the New De| h agreement s In 1he Dawn, ^ugust
2D, ! D73.
2b. 1he cost of transport was provded by the L.5. , L.5.5. R. ,
' .
1 2
4
Indo-Pak Relations
Hrtan, Canada, ^ustra| a, France and West Germany. Jhe
estmated cost of the oeraton was about $ ! 4, 000, 000.
27. ^ statement re| eased by the foregn affars offce of Fakstan
on MovembOr !, ! D73.
28. ^ sutvey report conducted by the IRC, n Keesn_' s Contem-
_orary ^rchves, London, March 25-3 ! , ! D74.
2D. 1he Oawn, October 2b, ! D73.
30. 1he new trpartte agreement was sgned at Mew Oe|h
on ^pr | D, ! D74.
3 ! . "Mr. Hhutto' s 5peech at the Matona| ^ssemb|y, " n 1he Oawn,
^ugust ! D72.
32. Mr. ^sghar Khan, Cha rman 1ehrk -e-Istaq| a| , made the
demand for recognton as ear|y as | anJary ! ! and Wa| Khan,
Head of Matona| ^wam Farty, came up wth the argument
that Mr. Hhutto' s assumpton of the Fresdency mp|ed tact
acceptance of Hang|adesh because the popu| ar mandate was
gven to hm on|y by the Western wng of Fakstan.
33. 1he Oawn, Oe

ember ! 2 , ! D72.
34. 1he Fakstan 5upreme Court ru|ng came on 1 u| y 7, ! D73,
that Fresdent Hhutto had the power under the consttuton
to recogn ze Hang| adesh. ^ reso| uton, author zng the govern-
ment to accord forma| recognton at an approprate t me,
was p|aced before the Matona| ^ssemb|y whch adopted t
unan mous|y wth oppos ton absent.
3. Mr. Hhutto' s addrss, the text s n 1he Oawn, February
23, ! Dl4.
' 3b. Ib d.
37. Mr. Hhutto' s press conference on February 24, ! D74.
3 8 . Co| . Muammar ^|
_
Gaddal ol Lbya addressed at | ahore
a huge pub| c gatherng |over !, 000,000} . In hs address,
he dec|ared that F

kstan' s decson to recogn ze.

Hang|a-
desh was based on the un ty ol Is| amc brotherhood and
the decson was taken under the advce

of a| | Mus| m
countres. He further dec|ared that a| | Mus| m countres,
especa||y Lbya, wou|d stand wth Fakstan n every
crcumstance .

5ayng,"We are brothers.

You friends
areour frends and your enemy s
-
our enemy. "
3D. 1he jo nt communque by Ind a and Fakstan, n 1he Oawn,
5eptember ! 5, ! D74.
40. 1he text ol the agreement s, n 1he Oawn, Oecember
! , ! D74.
4 ! . "Fakstan Foregn 5ecretary' s ^nswer to Inda, " n 1he Oawn,
Februar y , ! D74.
42.

1he text s n 1he Oawn, May ! , l D7b.

43. 1he Indan Ex_ress, | u| y ! 7, ! D7b.
CHAPTE R VU
R E LATI ONS I N 70'
5Ince the return of the lOWs, the exchange of theIr
respectIve cI tI zens between lakIstan and Hang|adesh, and the recog-
nItIon of the l atter by lakIstan, Indo-PakIstan re|atIons were quIte
correct. IndI a' s detonatIon of a nuc|ear devIce on May ! 8,

! D74,
dI d not a| ter the IntentIon of betterIng future re| atIons, nor dId
Oe|hI ' s decIsIon to make

KashmIr an ordInary state wIthIn the

IndIan unIon. I t Is true

that In both Instances, Hhutto made state-

ments cr tIca| of the IndIan government. Hut hIs ub|Ic dec| aratIons
were meant prI marI |y for dometIc consumptIon, Intended to pacIfy
hIs audIences. 1he IndIans were condemned and warned that lakIstan
cou|d not stand Id|y by. lakIstan, too, cou| d buI| d nuc|ear weapons
If It wIshed to put its resources Into such a programme. Hhutto
ca| |ed for a natIonwIde work stoppage to demonstrate lakIstan' s
dIssatIsfactIon wIth the IndIan decIsIon t o absorb KashmIr. Hut
the be| | IcosIty of the past was notIceab|y subdued.
9
lakIstan under Hhutto' s |eadershIp l ! D72-77I trIed to move
wIth the tImes. Rea| I zIng that the o|d mI|Itant attItude towards
IndIa wou| d not profI

t hIm or hIs country, he emphasI zed reducIng

o|d enmItIes whI| e makIng new frIends. For more than two decades,
lakIstan had harboured the notIon that It was the equa| of IndIa,
despIte that country' s vast numerIca| superIorIty. ^s a resu| t,
successIve lakIstanI governments assumed an aggressIve posture
towurds IndIa that made any kInd of meanI ngfu| accommodatIon
dIffIcu| t. ^pparent|y, a new rea|Ism was shown Dy the lakIstanI
|eadershIp after Hang|adesh' s emergence.
: : !

: ; ; :
' l
126 Indo-Pak Relations

5nce | u|y , ! D77, lakstan came under another spe| | of

marta| |aw. 5outh Asa saw a brand of popu|sm n the ear|y
! D70s. Irom Co|omo to Mew De|h and from Is| amabad to Dacca,
reg mes were swept nto offce and stayed n power by arousng
the expectatons of the masses through |eftst s|ogans and
programmes. Lnfortunate|y, they cou|dn' t tran

s| ate them Into rea|ty,

whch gave way to dscontentment and resort to unconsttutona|

methods to contan t. A|| of those reg mas have co| | apsed--through

e|ectora| defeat n lndia and Sri Lanka,

through m | tary takeover

n Hang|adesh and lakIstan.
Armed forces of laks| an, particu|ar|y the army, have p| ayed
' a domI nant ro| e n the country since ts exIstence. Jhey have becn
engaged n four armed conf|cts with IndIa n 40 years. For a| mos|
ha|f of this period, the mI | i |ary of lakstan, wIth the army as
ts vanguard, has we|ded the sceptre as we|| as the sword. Jrad-
tona||y the domestc Interests of the armed forces estab|shment
n lakstan had been | nked to lakIstan' s posture of confr.ontaton
wth Inda. An nf|ated mI | I tary establshment cou|d on|y be justfIed
n terms of a threat from IndIa

Jhs Inf| ated mI | tary machIne
s consdered essenta| In order to preserve the po|tIca| power
of the top m | tary e|te as the arb ters of the country' s destny.
Hut

thIs tme,

nstead

ofplaying up the tune of constant

Indan threat, the m | tary regI me of lakstan under Genera| Zau|
Haq seemed

to fo| |ow the foregn po|cy broad|y formu|ated by

Hhutto' s government. In ts re|atonshp wth Inda,

lakstan Is
tryng to reso|ve the prob| ems and promote re|atons on the prIncp|e
of bI|atera| sm.
Morma| I zatIon of re|atons s takIng p|ace s|ow|y but
stead|y. Jhe process has been started by the exchange ol

vstors.

Efforts have been made by both countres to provIde vsa fac| tes
to peop|e to trave| eas|y n both countres. Jo create good wI |
and to ease tenson, hockey and crcket teams of Inda and lakstan
have exchanged vs ts.
!
On the dp| omatIc scene, lnd a' s Externa| Mnster, A.H.
Vajpayee' s vIsIt to lakstan n February ID78 was the most
mport
.
ant deve|opment.

He was the frst lndm Foregn MnIster

lndo-)ak Relations 12 7
wth a pause of ! 4 years to come to lakstan to negotate \th
hs lakstan counterpart on matters of mutua| nterest. !twas
nterestng that Mr. Va]payee, who as a member of the an 5ang
party denounced the 5m| a agreement as

a "stab n the back, "

came to lakstan to dscuss matters n the sprt of the 5m| a
agreement. Wh|e addressng a press conference, he showed hs
desIre to brng re|atons

between the two countres to norma|.

He sad, "f there are msgvngs we w| | try to remove these.
rr
3
Hesdes exp|orng the possb| tes of mprovng trade, both
sdes showed keen nterest n promotng exchanges n varous
fe|ds |ke cu|ture and sports. ^n mportant topc whch came
under dscusson re|ated to the 5a|a| dam pro]ect on the Chenab

4
Rver n | ammu and Kashmr. 1he ta|ks resu|ted n an agreement.
lakstan, under the Indus Water 1reaty of l 9b0, was entt|ed
to examne the Idan desgn of the hydroe|ectrc pro]ect that
country p|anned to bu|d. I t had orgna||y rased ob] ectons <
th

grounds that the desgn dd not confom to the crtera ad

down n that treaty. ^fter the restoraton of dp|omatc

re|atons
under the 5m|a agreement, an ntatve was taken by both
countres to resume b |atera| negotIatons to reso|ve ths prob| em.
" 1a|ks have been contnued snce l 974. Tw
_
rounds of dscussons
were he|d at the foregn secretary' s |eve| n October l 97b

at
Mew De|h and Is|amabad, but no agreement was reached. Mr.
- Va]payee's vst to lakstan was most|y to so|ve ths prob|em
b|atera| |y."

1he good w|| generated by the norma| zaton of re|atons

between the two countres n md seventes was not a| | owed to
suffer a setback durng that decade whch wtnessed nternal
changes n governments n both count

es. 5ett|ng of dsputes

through b |atera| negotatons showed the ntentons of Inda and
lakstan to manta
p
norma| re|atons and to |ve n peace. It
was for the frst tme n the |ast forty years that the subcon-
.. |
tnent was not one of the troub|ed reas of the wor| d at that
tme.
1 2 8
Indo-Pak Relations
Prospects of rel ations between I ndi a and Paki stan
1he events of J 1 cu| mnatng n the separaton of East
lakstan from West lakistan radca||y transformed the very
character of the lakstan state. ^s a resu| t of the |oss of the
East wng, lakstan

for the frst tme n ts hstory b on the

thresho|d of evo|vng a vab|e natona| dentty for tse| f based
on terrtora| terms. ^s |ong as East and West lakstan were
kept together n an uneasy marrage, lakistan was forced to
project tse| f as an "deo|ogca| state. " 1he new stuaton that
emerged after J1 not on|y demonstrated the power rea|tes
on the subcontnent, but a|so created the possb|ty for lakstan
to attempt a redefnton of ts own natona| dentIty n vab|e
terrtora| terms. 1oday' s lakstan s not on|y geograph ca| |y who|e
but t s re|atve|y homogeneous n cu| tura| terms.
1he sgnng of the 5m|a agreement has ushered n a new
era of peace through b| atera| negotatons n ths troub|ed subcon-
tnent. 1he opt msm regardng Indo-lakstan re|atons s a|so
due to the estab|shment of a new power equ| brum n 5outh
Asa. 1hs means that lakst an understands that t s not possb|e
to change the status quo n the subcontnent by force. 1here
s a need, therefore, for both countries to agree to bu |d a
structure of peace n 5outh ^sa based on the acceptance of
the status quo.
1he prospects of an Indo-lakstan detente, whch emerged

from the 5m| a agreement n J

, are reasonab|y good. Its

progress depends pr mar |y on the deve|opment of po|tica| trust
n each other by the rulIng e| te of Inda and Pakstan. Unfortuna-
te|y, ths has a|ways been |ackng n the Indo-lakstan re| atonshp.
1hs, however, does not ru|e out the prospect for such trust
emergng in the future as a resu| t of a changed domestic and
nteratona| context.
Wth lakstan reduced n s ze and n m|itary power--even
|ess of a match for Inda than before--Indans and Indan po|cy
makers need not see lakstan as a threat to ther securty. For
the frst tme snce J

7, and patrcu|ar|y snce Jb

when lak-
i i i >
lndo-Pak Relations

129
stan' s m1!tary capabl tes were augmented by ts m l tary alla
p
ce
wth the Ln ted 5tates, the I ndan decson makers can

take
relatvely relaxed vew ol Indo-lakstan relatons. 1hs assessment

means a return to normal ty n Indan rellexes towards lakst

n
moves.
^s lor the

presumpton stll
circles that Inda s nterested n

.
present n certan Fakstan
the

lurther dsmemberment

ol lakstan, t would be enough to say that such a polIcy goal

on Inda' s part s not probable. 1he cost ol such an operaton,
n human and materal trms, to Inda would be al most prohbtve.
Il lakstan were to be broken up agan, parts ol t may go to
Iran and Alghanstan. It s not to be assumed that !nda would
wsh or perm t such a development. Any parts ol lakstan that
Inda mght want to swallow would be extremely dllcul t to absorb.
1he rentroducton ol large Musl m populatons nto the Indan
polty would tend to tear apart the labrc ol ts domestc peace,
un ty, and coheson.
References
! . 1he Indan hockey team vsted lakstan n | anuary !
g
78
and the lakstan team went to Inda n February ! D78
to play a seres ol matches wth each other I n the
same manner crcket teams have also been vstng each
other' s countres.
2. Mr. Vajpayee vs ted lakstan on February b, ! D78.
3. 1he Hndu, February ! 8 , ! D78.
4. 1he agreement was sgned on the 5alal Hydroelectrc
lro]ect on the Chenab n | ammu and Kashmr on ^prl
! 4, ! D78.
5. 1he text ol the agreement s n !nda Mews, Apr l

i 7,
! D78.
l : \ 1
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Indo-Pak Relation 1 33
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JlDkCt, Hugh. lDdl8 8Dd l8kl8taD A lOlltlCaI PDaI8l8. LODdOD
8II MaII rC88, l 5b1.
VCtghC8C, .L. PD LDd tO LODtODtatlOn. (UhuttO' 8 akl8taD). LCI hI
5. LhaDd & LO. , l 51Z.
W8IID8Dk, J.W. (Cd. ) hC lattltlOD O lDdla. L8u8C8 8Dd
HC8_OD8lDlltlC8. O8tOD L.L. HCath LOmpaDy, l 9bb.
WIICOX, W.P. JhC LmCr_CDCC O U8D_IadC8h. NCw YOrk: LOIumDl8
LDlVCt8lty lrC88, l 51Z.
ZIrIDg, r8ID8Dtl, 8Dd WtlgglD8 (Cd8. ) 8kl8t8D JhC LOD_ VICw.
Ourh8m, N. L. LukC LDlVCr8lty tC88, 911.
NCw8_8_Cr8
JhC L8lIy JCIC_r8_h (LODdOD). ) uI y Z0-Zb, Pugu8t ZZ, NOvCmDCr
Z9, 91 , 5CptCmDCt

, 91Z.
JhC L8wD (K8r8Chl, 8kl8t8D). ) uIy , 5CptCmDCr 1, Z , Z
4
, Jb

,
CDru8ry

, 1, ] , 9bb, CDru8ty , 1, Z , Zb,

M8rCh
4
, PprI I , 9b9, ) 8DuBry Z, LCCCmDCr Z,
b, Z , 910, M8rCh Z, 1, lb, Z0, Z, PprI | J, | uy
Z0-Zb, Pugu8t ZZ, 5CtCmDCt Zb, CtODCrb-(),NOVCmDCr
-Z0, LCCCmDCr 9-Z , J1 , ) 8Du8ry
4
, u, b,
4
- b,
CDruary

, 1, , Z0, ZZ, Z
4
, Zb, M8rCh , 3,

, Z0, PprI | , Z0, Z , M8y , ) uDC Z0, Z

, Zd, ZJ, | u y
-b,

, Pugu8t Z,
4
0, 5CptCmDCr

, NOVCmDCr
4
,
LCCCmDCr Z, 91Z, ) uDC b, Z1, Pugu8t ZJ, CtODCr
Zb, J1
4
, CDru8ry

, Z
4
, 5CptCmDCr

, OCCCmDCr ,
J1

.
JhC Lu8tdI8D (M8DChC8tCr). ) 8Du8ry 1, J1 , ) uy , 5CptCmDCr
Z, J1Z, Pugu8t 0, 91
4
.
HIDdu (M8dr88, lDdI8). M8y
4
, Jb

, CDru8ty , l 91.
lDtCrD8tIOD8 HCr8IdJrIDuDC. Pprll Z
4
, 91
4
.
JhC
NCw YOrk JImC8. PprI I Z

, Z, 9b

, OCCCmDCr Z , J10,
M8rCh

, 0, PprII Z, , J, Pugu8t

, 5CptCmDCr
Z1 , OCCCmbCr , 1, 91 , ] uDC Z , J1Z, | uDC , Pugu8t

, J1
4
.
JhC I8kI8t8D JImC8 (L8hOrC). CDru8ty 0, J1Z.
JhC 5t8tC8m8D (L8ICutt8, Ddl8). CtODCr Z, Jb

, | uy 0, I Jb,
M8rCh Z1, PprI | ,

, Z

, BM8y Z

, Pugu8t 0, OCCCmDCr
b, 91 , M8rCh Z

, 91Z, PprI d, J1
4
.
JhC JImC8 |LODdOD). )8Du8ry Z

, Jbb, M8y Z, OCCCmDCr Z, J1 .

JhC JImC8 O I lDdI8 (NCw OCIhI). | uy , 5CptCmDCr b, 1, Jb,
M8y , J1Z, CtCDCr

, J1

.
W88hI D_tOD IO8t. M8rCh , 91
.
CtIOdIC8I8
1 34
nUO-0k KOl8lOn8
hC LCODOml8t.
"huttO MOuDt8 thC I8Dk." PptlI l, l D7?.
"DC 5ummlt th8t WOtkCd." ) uIy d, l D7?.
KCC8lD_'8 LODtCm_Ot8ty PtChlVC8 (LODdOD), VOI.7ll1. l Dbb, Pugu8t
?I -?d, l D7 l ,

M8tCh ?-Jl , l D74.

NCw8wCCk. "JhC CtlI8 Ol 8kl8t8D " Pptl I l 0, l D7?. CtODCt ? ! ,

l D7
J
.
l8kl8t8n HOtlzOD (K8t8Chl. l8kl8t8D lH8tltutC O lDtCtD8tlOD8I PI8lt$
5CCODd Qu8ttCt, l Db6}. hh8Ild8 QutC8hl, "l8kl8t8D 8Dd
thC Mldd1C L88t. "
8CllC LOmmuDlty PD P8l8D Qu8ttCtIy HCVlCw.
ZuDCld8 Mu8t88. "8kl8t8D 8Dd thC MddIC L88t." 7: 4,
- ) uIy l D7b.
Zuteida Mu8t88. "Pgh8Dl8t8D 8Dd thC P8l8D
Owet 8I8DCC. ' ' b. ?, ) 8Du8ty l D7.
l mC. "8kl8t8D JhC H8V8glDg O LOIdCD CDg8I." Pugu8t ?, l D7 l .
I NDEX
Achakzai, 71 95
Afghanista
n
, 50, 5 1 , 52, 56, 63, 1 29.
Afri ca, 47, 87.
Afrl,an,
.
54.
Afro-Asian, 42.
Afro-Asian Conference, 54.
Air India, 1 22.
Aleksei Kosygin(Premier), 22, 5 1 , 57.
Algeria, 1 1 8.
American, 49, 62.
American Military, 25.
American Stooge, 48.
Amritsar; 21, 1 22.
Anglo-French, Israeli, 49.
Arab(s), 43, 44, 45.
Arabian Sea; 63.
Arbab Sikandar, 94.
Army, 34.
Asia, . 23, 47, 53, 62, . 95, 96.
As
f
an(s) , 43, 5 1 , 52. 54.
Asi
a
n Affairs, 45.
Asian

Collective Security
System(ACSS), 52 _
Asian Security Scheme, 96.
Assembly, 35.
Awami League, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
71 .
Ay
u
b' s Convention Musl i m League,
69.
Ayub Khan(President, General),
2 1 , 25, 44, 50, 55, 56, 57, 58, 68,
69, 70, 7 1 , 8 1 , 96.
Azad, Jbdus Samad, 95.
Azad Kashmir, 2 1 .
Azi z Ahmed, 86, 92, 1 01 , 1 1 4.
Baghdad Pact, 43.
Balochi, 63.
Baltistan, 56.
Baluchistan, 46, 52, 72.
1 35
Bandug, 54.
Bangladesh, 32, 46, 6 1 , 74, 75,
76, " 8 1 , 82, 83, 84, 87, 88,
9. 1 01 , . 1 03, 1 1- 2, 1 1 3. 1 1 4,
1 1 5, 1 1 6, 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 25.
Bangladesh Government, 1 1 3. ,
Bangladesh Movement, 52.
Bangladeshi Forces, 1 00.
Bangladesh's Provincial
. Government, 34.
Bar Bet, 2 1 .
Bedabe
.
r, 45, 50.
Bengal, 23, 25, 60,
Bengali(s), 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 59,
1 1 3, . 1 1 5.
Berkeley, 68.
Bhutto

(Mr., President), 22, 30,
35, 47, 52, 59, 60, 6 1 , 67, 68,
69, 70, 7 1 , 72, 73, 74, 75, 76,
8 1 , 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,
89, 90, 92, 94, 97, 1 03, 1 04,
1 1 3, 1 1 6, 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 1 9.
Biharis, 1 1 4, 1 1 5, 1 1 6.
Bombay, 1 20.
Brezhnev, 5 1 .
British, 41 , 42, 47.
Bur'ma, 23, 53, 56.
Carter, 47.
Ceasefire, 72, 73, 1 04.
CENTO, 28, 43, 47, 50.
Ceylon, 23.
Chad Bet, 2 1 .
Chamb, 1 02.
Charisma, 70.
Chenab River, 1 27.
Chief of Staff, 34,1 1 1 .
China, 2 1 , 22, 23, 35, 43, 44, 451
47, 49, 50, 5 1 , 52, 53, 54, 55,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 6 1 , 63, 82,
89, 1 05, 1 1 4.
China Pakistan Relations, 68.
China Policy, 46.

1 36
Chinese, 33, 5 1 , 54, 57, 59, 60, 96.
Chou-En-Lai, 54, 58.
Ci vi l Mil itary, 24.
Col. Gaddafi of Libya, 1 1 9.
Columbo, 1 26.
Communism, 42.
Communist, 43.
Communist State, 23.
Congress, 47.
Congress Party, 3 1 .
Culcutta,

3 1 .
Dacca, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 85, 95, 1 1 6, .
1 1 8, 1 26.
Oaud(President), 52.
Dawn, 77.
Del hi Agreement, 1 01 .
Del hi' s decision, 1 25.
Democracy, 69.
Deputy High Commissioner, 3 1 .
Dhirkot, 1 1 1 .
D. P Dhar, 85, 86, 92.
East, 83.
Indo-Pak Relations
Gandhi, Mrs. 83 1 , 32, 47, 5 1 , 74,
76, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 9 1 ,

92,
95, 97, 1 03.
General Assembly, 1 01 .
General Manekshaw, 34.
General Ni azi , 34, 95, 1 1 6.
Geneva Convention, 34, 1 00, 1 1 2,
1 1 4.
Ghouri, S. R. 77.
Gilgit, 58.
Government of India, 93.
Government of Pakistan, 93, 1 1 8.
Governments, 83.
Gratis, 45.
Hamid Sarfaraz, 95.
Hi mal ayan, 33.
Hi mal ayas, 54, 58.
Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai, 54.
Hindu, 2e.

Hungary, 4.
Hunza, 56.
Hyderabd, 1 1 5.
I.C.A. O, 1 2 1 .
East Bengal, 6 7
Ideologcal
.
State, 1 28.
East Pakistan, 23, 24, 25; 26, 27, 28, 29,
' Ideology, 69.
31' 32, 33, 34, 35, 4; 46, 59, 60, 70,
72, 75, 88, 92, 99, 1 0, 1 1 3, 1 28.
East Pakistan Civil War, 28.
East Pakistani, 25, 26.
East-West, 43.
East & West Pakistan, 71 ; :
East Wings, 24, 9 5 , 1 1 9.
" Economist",The 98,
Egypt, 48:
Eisenhower Administration, 43.
Ethiopia, 87.
Europe, 42.
Fai th, 69.
Far East, 42.
Fazi l ka, 22.
Federal Government, 27.
Foreign Minister, 69.
France, 35.
India; 22,
2
3, 25, 27, 30, 3 1 ,- 33,
34, 35, 41 , : 42, 43, 44, .. 45; 46,
47, 48, 49, 5 1 , 52, 53, "4, 55,
57, 58, 6 1 , 62, 68, , 7 1 , 75, 76,
8 1 , 82, 83, 84 . 85, 86, 88".
90, 9 1 , 92, 95, _98, 99, 1 01 ,
1 02, 1 04, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2, 1 1 5,
1 1 6, 1 1 9, 1 22, 1 27, 1 28, f29.
Indian(s), 2 1 , 25, 31 m 33m 34, 35,
47, 54;
8
3, 85, 86,
.
92, 95, 96,
1 03, 1 05, , 1 1 2 , 1 1 3, U7, 1 20,
1 2e.
Indian Air For
c
e, 2 1 .
Indian - Ai r Line, 1 2 1 .
Indian Arms, -44.
Indi an Army, 33, 34, 84.
I
n
dian Defence Minister, 1 .
Indian Defence Ministry, 2 1 .
Indian Forces, 2 2 , 34.
Indian Foreign Minister, 22.
Indian Foreign Pol icy, 48.
Indo-Pak Relations
Indian Government, 22, 3 1 , 48, 59,
83; 84, 1 1 3.
Indian Leadership, 32.
Indian Ocean,
.
4 1 62, 90.
Indian Ocean Region, 63.
Indian Policy, 1 1 0.
Indian Prime Minister, 43.
Indian Subcontinent, 67, 1 1 7.
Indian troops, 2 1 .
Indian Union, 1 25.
Indo-China, 44.
Indo-China War, 6 1 .
Indo-Chinese, 44.
Indonesia, 23.
Indo-Pakistan, 4 1 , 43, 84, 89.
Indo-Pakistan Policy, 62.
Indo-Pakistan Rel ations, 2 1 , 97, 1 25,
1 28.
Indo-Soviet, 49.
Indo- U.S. 43, 46.
Indus Water Tre
a
ty of 1 960, 1 27.
Intrnational Court of Justice,
1 1 4, 1 2 1 .
In ternati

nal Press, 2 1 .
Iran, 5 1 , 1 29.
Ish
i
m, 23, 69, 1 1 8.
Islamabad, 30, 52, 6 1 , 62, 73, 94,
1 1 5m 1 26m 1 27.
Isl amic Secretariat, 1 1 8.
Isl amic State of Pakistan, 24.
Islamic Summi t, 1 0 1 , 1 1 7, 1 18.
Israel, 45.
j ammu, 2 1 , 82, 90, 94, 99, 1 02,
1 04, 1 1 1 , 1 27.
j an Sangh, 95m 1 27.
j a panes Peace T
r
eaty, 48.
Jh
e
lum Valley . Road-Dhumb, 1 1 1 .
J ohn Foster Dul les (Dul les) , 43, 48.
J ohnson Admi nistration, 45.
j ohnson, President, 45, 56.
Kamal Hussai n, 1 1 3.
Karachi , 73, 1 1 5, 1 20.
Karachi University, 70.
Karakor,am, 56.
Kashgar, 58

1 37
Kashm
i
r, 2 1 , 22, 23, 25, 33, 49,
50, 54, 55, 58, 68, 8 1 ' 86, 87'
89, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99, 1 (1 '
1 02, 1 03, 1 04, 1 05, 1 09, 1 1 0,
1 2 1 , 1 25, 1 27.
Kashmiris, 1 2 1 .
Kenedy (President), 43, 44, 54.
Korean War, 42, 48, 53.
Krem
.
lin, 48.
Kutch, 2 1 .
Kuwait, 1 1 8.
Ladkah, 54.
Laho
!
e, 69, 73, 76, 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 1 22
Lebnon, 87, 1 1 8.
Liu Shao-Chi, 57.
Lok Sabha, 30, 95.
London, 95.
Mal i k Ghul am J ilani , 95.
Mangolia, 56.
Mao Tse-Tun tung, 52, 58.
Martial Law, 71 .
Mazhar Ali Khan, 77.
Mengal , Sardai Attaul lah, 94.
Middle East 42; 43, 45, 53, 62,
86, 87.
Mintaka (Pass), 58.
Mirpurkhas, 1 1 5.
Moraji Desai, 47.
Moscow, 48, 49, 50, 5 1 , 52, 56,
57, 59, 6 1 , 63, 95.
Mufti Mahmood, 94.
Muhammad Al i j i nnah, 24, 67.
Mukti Bahini, 33, 35.
Muree, 85, 86.
Musl i m(s), 23, 25.
Muslim Bengal, 88.
Musl i m League, 24, 67, 72.
N. A. P. , 72, 77, 1 1 7.
National Assembly, 26,

28, 29, 7 1 ,_
94, 98.
1 38
Nationalism, b.
National Liberation Front, Z .
Navy, Z1.
Nawabshah, IJ.
N
e
hru, 4Z, 4d, 44, 41, 4, J, JJ.
Nepal, Jb.
New Delhi; d , 4d, J , JZ, Jb, Jd,

b , J, b, 1, U , J, b,
Zb, Z1.
New U.S Pol icy, 4Z.
New York, 1d.
Nigeria, 1.
Nixon, J.
Nixon' s Adminis
t
ration, 4b.
Nixon' s Policy, 4b.
Non-Bengalis, 4.
North East Frontier Agency(NEF A) ,
J4.
N. W.F.P. , 4b, JZ, 1Z.
Oxford, b.
Pakhtoonistan, JU, JZ.
Pakistan, Z , ZZ, Zd, ZJ, Zb, Z1, Z,
, d , dZ, dd, d4,, dJ, , 4 , 4Z,
4, 44, 4J, 4b, 41, 4, 4d, JU,
J , JZ, Jd, JJ, Jb, J1, J, Jd,
b, b , bZ, bd, b1, bb, bd, 1 ,
1Z, 1b, 11, , Z, d, J, b,
1, , d, dU, d , dJ, db, d1,
d, dd, UU, U UZ, Ud, U4,
d, U , l , Z, d, 4, J,
b, 1, , d, ZZ, ZJ, Zb,
Z1, Z.
Pakistan Air Craft, Z , Z .
Pakistan Army, d , dd, d4, 4b.
Pakistan Nation
a
l Assembly, Z .
Pa.kistan People' s Party (PPP),
Zb, dU, b1, 1U, 1 , 1Z.
Pakistan Radio and T.V, .
Pakistan State, Z.
Pakistan Tim

s, 1J.
Pak
i
stanis, Z , ZZ, dd, d4, dJ, 1b, 1,
b, Z1, Zd.
Pakistani Baluchistan, d.
Pakistani Forces, ZZ, d4, .
Pakistani GovernmQt, d , dZ, d4,
4, b, ZJ.
Paki stani Posts, _
.
7J .
Indo-Pak Relation
Pakistani te
i
ritoly, 14.
Pakistani troops, 1 1 7.
Parliament, b .
Pathar, b.
Peking, 4b, Jb, J1, J, b, b, dJ.
Peopf
e
' s Daily; Jd.
Persian G
l
lf, 4, 9Z.
Peshawar, 4J, 1.
P. I.A. Z.
P.L.O. .
Podgotny, Jd.
Pows, 1J, 1b, d, 4, b, 1, dJ,
lOa, U , l l Z, i d, 4, b,
ZJ.
Presidency, 1 .
President, 4b.
Presidential elections, b.
President's House, 1d.
Prime
M
inister Li aquat Ali Khan,
Z4, 4.
Punja

Z , Z, Zb, 1Z, JJ, dJ,
Ud, Ud, 1 1 7.
Punjabis, Z4.
Rajasthan, ZZ, d.
Rann of Kutch, Z .
Rawalpindi, 1d, J, b, U , b.
Red China, db.
Republic of Bangladesh, .
Richard Nixon(President U.S), 4J,
4b.
Russian(s), 41, bU.
Salal Dam; Z1.
SEATO, Z1, 4d, 41, J4.
Second World War, Zd, d l .
Secretary General Wal dhei m, d,
4.
Secretary of State, 4d.
Security Council, bU, UU.
Senegal, .
Shastri (Prime Minister), JJ, UU.
Sheikh Mui ibur Rahman, Zb, Z1,
Zd, dU, Jd, 1 , 14, 4, J, ,
UU, 4, .
Sikiang, J.
Indo-Pak Relation
Sikki m, 57.
Silk Road, 58.
Si mla, 67, 88, 89, 90, 9 1 , 92, 94,
95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 1 02, 1 04,
1 1 9.
Siml a Accord, 98, 99,

1 00, 1 01 ,
1 02, 1 04, 105, 1 20, 1 2 1 .
Siml a Agreement, 82, 94, 95,
96, 97, 99, 1 00, 1 01 , 1 02,
1 03, 1 09, 1 1 0, I l l , 1 1 2,
1 1 4, 1 20, 1 27, 1 28.
Siml a Summit, 87, 1 04.
Sind, 26, 72, 95, 1 03, 1 09,
1 1 5, 1 1 7.
Sindhis, 1 1 6.
Sindhi Language, 1 1 5.
Sindhi Speaking, 1 1 5.
Somalia, 1 1 8.
Sri Lanka, 1 26.
Sukkur, 1 1 5.
Supreme Court of Pakistan, 1 1 7.
Swiss Embassy1 85.
Sino-American, 4 1 , 52.
Sino-American relations, 58.
Sino-Indian, 49, 1 1 6.
Sino-Indian friendship, 54.
Sino
-
Indian relations, 54, 6 1 .
Sind-Indian War, 55.
Sino-Soviet, 41 , 44, 60.
Six Point Movement, 27.
Socialism; 69.
South . Asia, 4 1 , 42, 43, 47, 54, 57, .
5
'
9, 60, 6 1 , 1 26, 1 28.
South Asian 41 , 62.
South East Asia, 42, 45.
Soviet Airlines, 73.
Soviet
:
American, 4 1 .
Soviet Arms, 5 1 .
Soviet-Chinese, 43.
Soviet Critici sm, 48.
Soviet Mil i tary, 89.
SovieL Policy, 47, 50, 96, 97.
Sovia Press, 48.
Sovi et Relations, 52.
1 39
Sovi et Union ( U.S.S. R, Russia), 22,
32, 35, 42, 13, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, 50, 5 1 ' 52,, 53, 54,
5
5,
57, 62, 63, 89, 98.
S. P. Sangh, 61 .
Sri Nagar, 22.
Stal in, 47, 48.
Subcontinent, 60, 6 1 , 62, 77, 8 1 ,
82, 84, 85, 86, 9 1 ' 93, 1 27,
1 28.
Suharwardy, 26.
Swaran Singh (Sardar), 22, 3 1 ,
1 1 4.
Swiss Embassy, 85.
Tashkent, 23, 50, 81 ; 84, 9 1 , 96,
97, 98, 99, 100, 1 02, 1 03, H
J
5,
1 20.
Tashkent Conference, 57.
Tashkent Declaration, 57, 58, 69;
1 02.
Tehrik-e-Istaqlal, 95.
Thakur Chak, 1 1 1 .
Tibet, 53.
Tipu Sul tan, 76.
Tiwari B. K, 77.
Truman (President),
'
48.
Two Nation Theory, 76, 1 1 6.

` Ul era, 88.
U. N. , 2 1 , 22, 32, 33, 35, . 58, 89,
92, 93, 98, 99, 1 oo, t o5, 1 1 o;
1 1 4, 1 1 6.
U. N. General Assembly, 35, 91 .
United Nations Resolution, 1 05.
University Ordinance, 70.
U. N. Secretary General, 22, '83.
84, 95, 1 05.
U. N. Secretary General U.Thant,
31 .
U.N. Security Council, 2 2 , 1 05.
Urdu Speaking, 24, 1 1 5.
U.S. (Uni ted States),- 35, 42, 43;
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50; 5 1 ,
5 5 , 57, 58, 59, 6 1 ' 63, 89,
1 28.
1 40
U.S. Consul ate, 34.
U.S. Foreign Policy, 44.
U. S Government, 46.
Usmani, Mahmoodul Haque, 95.
U.S Mil itary, 45, 46.
U.S. Paki stan, 43, 47.
U.S. Pol i cy, 42, 44, 45, 46.
U.S.S. R. , 63.
U.S. Pl ane, 45.
Vajpai , Atal Bihari , 95, 1 26.
Victor Umberict, Dr. 1 1 6.
Vietnam, 45.
Violence, 71 .
Wagha, Attari, 1 22.
Waldheim; Kurt, 83, 84, 95.
al i Khan, 72, 77, 88,
9
5.
War 1 965( Indo-Pakistan) , 27, 44,
46, 50,
.
73, 102.
War 1 97 1 , 87, 88, 9l, 1 02.
Washington, 42, 46, 47, 58, 95.
West Pakistan, 2 1 , 23, 25, 26,
27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 35, 59,
70, 74, 75, 83, 88, 1 1 4, 1 1 5.
West Pakistan Border, 33,
West Pakistan Frontier, 33.
West Pakistanis, 24, 25, 34.
West Pakistani troops, 29.
West Wing, 28.
Western Front, 73.
Western India, 24.
Western Mili tary Pacts, 48.
White House, 46.
World Bank, 3 1 .
Yahya Khan (President, General).
25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34,
35, 46, 58, 60, 7 1 , 72.
Zafar, S. M. 95.
Zia-ul-Haq, General, 1 26.
Jndo-Pak Relations
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Pakistan-j i-Smajiyat (in Sindhi) by Lal Bakhsh J iskani.
*
Musli m Politics in Sind 1 938- 1 947 by
Muhammad Qassim Soomro.