i Pakistan
or ISI. Mehmood had just completed an official visit to Washington but
his return to Pakistan had been delayed because, following the attacks,
all the airspace around New York had been closed. The State Department
called the embassy at 5.00 p.m. Lodhi and Mehmood were asked to
attend a meeting with senior US officials the next morning.
At 8.00 a.m. on 12 September the US deputy secretary of state,
Richard Armitage, told the two Pakistanis that their country had to
make a choice. Islamabad could align itself with the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan or with Washington. 'You are either 100 per cent with us
or 100 per cent against us,' he said. 'There is no grey area.' 1 Straight
after the meeting Mehmood called Islamabad and spoke to General
Musharraf. Pakistan's military leader made a snap decision. He told
Mehmood that Washington would get what it wanted. At 3.00 p.m.
Armitage held a second meeting with Lodhi and Mehmood. This time
he had more specific demands. The US would need basic logistical sup-
port and a high degree of intelligence co-operation. Mehmood assured
Armitage that Pakistan would co-operate.
Musharraf may have taken his decision quickly but he abandoned the
Taliban with some reluctance. Before n September he had consistently
supported Mullah Mohammed Omar's Kandahar regime. This was not
because he sympathised with the Taliban's interpretation of Islam (on
the contrary, he clearly rejected their obscurantist outlook) but because
he believed the Taliban served Pakistan's regional interests. For Mushar-
raf the Taliban had two main advantages. First, since most of the Taliban
were ethnic Pukhtoons, they had a natural affinity with Pakistan which
also has a significant Pukhtoon community. Islamabad, Musharraf
argued, had always backed Pukhtoon regimes in Kabul: the alternative
was to have a hostile Afghan administration filled with Tajiks and
Uzbeks. Second, since the Taliban had been created largely in and by
Pakistan, the leadership in Kandahar was relatively sensitive to Pakistan's
interests. With Mullah Omar in charge, Musharraf believed, Pakistan had
strategic depth. His army could concentrate on guarding the border with
India and had no reason to fear an attack from the northwest.
Musharraf realised that once the US had made up its mind to topple
the Taliban there was no point in Pakistan continuing to support them.
But he had not yet sold the decision to the rest of the army leadership.
Musharraf's Challenge 3
September, he called a meeting of his corps commanders in the
ligh command's nuclear bunker in Chaklala where the top brass
they could talk without the risk of American surveillance^. He told
colleagues that Pakistan faced a choice. It could either align itself
the United States or be isolated as a terrorist state. For Musharraf
Jjsue was never in doubt but many of his senior commanders, such
the deputy chief of army staff Lt. General Usmani, were reluctant to
'gWrturn Pakistan's long-standing Afghan policy. They argued that Pak-
jttan should wait to see exactly what Washington would offer in return
for Islamabad's co-operation. But Musharraf insisted there could be no
v delay. It took six hours for Pakistan's president to get his way. He
;^i clinched the argument by pointing out that any Pakistani prevarication
"•'" would present India with an opportunity to curry favour with the US.
The corps commanders duly fell into line.
Musharraf's decision brought immediate financial benefits to Pakistan.
By January 2002 Pakistan had secured US $3 billion worth of external
assistance in the form of debt relief and the rescheduling of interest pay- f
ments.2 Anld while the decision helped Pakistan's balance sheet it also
benefited Musharraf's international political standing. Before n Septem-
ber he was-perceived as a military dictator who should announce, and
abide by, a road map for the restoration of democracy. After 11 September
his status was transformed: the Western world had a stake in his survival.
General Musharraf may have won friends in the West but within
Pakistan he had made enemies. Thousands of Islamic radicals, swearing
loyalty to their Islamic brethren in Afghanistan took to the streets in the
cities of Quetta, Peshawar, Karachi and Islamabad. One of the demon-
strators was a 25-year-old from Peshawar, Mohammed Ali. A student in
a local madrasa, or religious school, Ali was typical of those who
decided to protest. The attack on the United States, he believed, was a
Jewish plot. He had heard that thousands of Jewish employees at the
World Trade Center had not reported for work on n September. 'It was
obviously planned by the Jews,' he said. 'Why else would there have
been a camera there, ready to film it all? 1 '
It was hardly surprising that Ali had a somewhat unrealistic view of
the world. He had started his religious education when he was six years
old. His parents, landless farmers who could- not afford to send him to