UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANDAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH,KANSAS

COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Hag, Jr.

DEPUTY COMMAND~T
Brigadier General David S. Henderson

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national

security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Judge Not Lest Ye Be,Judged Czechoslovakia . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COL Samuel H. Hays, USA . . . . , PhiHipA Karber MichaelParrish John H. Hoagland 3
11
22
28
40
49
57
63
73
77
86
65
96

The New Soviet High Command Arms in the DevelopingWorld Quarterly Review and Analysis Terror in Venezuela , ReaderSurvey . . . . . .

MG David W. Gray, USAj Ret COL EdwardF. Callanan,USA . . . . . . . .

Projectionof Soviet Power

Thomas W. Wolfe Roger A Beaumont

GeographicalPatterns of Conflict Master Plans for Nationbuilding The Western Soldier Reader Forum MifitaryNotes MilitaryBooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

COL Maurice D. Roush, USA

BRIG C. N. Barclay,British Army, Ret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 106

The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.

Editor In klhiaf COL Donald J. Oelaney Atiockate Editor slOL John B. B. Trussell, Jr.
Am7y War College
Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey Featrsras Editor LTC Robert G. Main Production Editor Heien M. Haii Spanish.Amarissn Editor MAJ Juan tiorta-Meriy Brasilisn Editors LTC Ssmuei T. T. Primo LTC Romero Lepesqueur Publication Supervisor AMOS W. Gaiiaway Art and Design Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-Publi@sd monthly by the U. S. Arm Scmmrsndand General Staff Wege Fort Leav enworth, Kaeas$ in E heh, Spanish, and Portwese. i se of funds for printing of this pukstion has been approved by H3 quertersj Da saewth, Kmrs5a. rats.h $4.00 (US currency) a !Mond-s@ poataga rid at m: of tha AmsY, 25 Subscriptii JIIIY WI. aar m the Umted Stsfeq nitad States rnili~WtoRws,andWaWi=tikh~e mandrsrsof {ha Pa-Arnaricsn Postal Union (inclodiog $s , $S.00 a rear in all other smmtrieai single sorIY wise 50 sents. Addrass subscription mail to tlm S@ Depsrbnati, U. S. ASMY Command and Ganersl Staff Sollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas SS027.

PROFESSIONALISM

(Extracted from a speesh by General W. C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, United Statea Army, Washington, D.C., 29 October 196G)

Our soldiers today-and services-are

I refer to all of our fighting men of all

professionals in every sense of the word. They have the

skills required, even though tha majority of them are not career mili tary men, They acquire this professionalism quickly becausa they pos sess the essential attributes of personal character+nd because they are willing to discharge their obligations as citizens. They have the na tive abitity and the educational background necessary for learning. Our young men in Vietnam have received an extra measure of maturity along the way: from their parents, from their churches, and from their teach ers, In addition, they receive the best training possible from a topflight career professional base on which soundly rests our national sacurity. i have yet to talk to a man who has been honorably discharged from the military sarvice who did not believe he had personally profited by the training and experience. And we, the Army, must ratain the experience we have gained from our operations in Vietnam-and profit from the lessons we have Iearnad. Yet, we must exercise caution in this application of experience and iessons bacauae our operations in the environment of Southeast Asia are unique. Many of the lessons have broad applications, but some do not. We must have an Army that is versatile-versatile enough to carry out its assigned mission in any tarrain, in any climate, and against any enemy. We must continue to work toward making the Amry stronger and more responsive to all challenges, and we must ba prepared to meet and handle ali future tasks.

Colonel SamuelH. HaY&UnitedStates .4rmu

The mewa expnwaed in this article are the wthora do not n.eceseamlureflect those of the Departnwnt of Defense or its agmea.lhiitor.
and

ESPITE the obvious wisdom of the Biblied injunc tion against judging othere, for some ysars we have been embarked upon the diametrically opposite course. We judge beemwe we also are bsing judged. In fact, in these days of expending organizational stroetures, with their ve reeious appetite for trained and qualified personnel who paeaeasspeeific aptitudes, se well as the potential for devel opment, we em pereeive no other course open ~ us. FobrmJy 1969 3

JUDGE NOT

We have an ever-growing require ment for the capability of measuring accurately the quatity of individual performance and the ability ta predict performance under future conditions. With this requirement in mind, we have undertaken the task of evaluat ing performance against various types of criteria. We have devised a variety of taste designed to measure skilfs, aptitudes, and personality character istic. Yet with all our labors over the last 30 years, we have not succeeded in devising an evaluating system that meets our requirements. Judgments based essentially on efficiency reporte are subject to serious question, and their use may well have an impact on our oilicer corps which could result in seriously reducing its effectiveness.
Reasons for Pradioament How did we get into this predica

and more, the officer corps marched in locketep through the officer grades undismayed by worries of relative effi ciency in comparison with their peere or of how popular they were with their commanders. Characters, individualists, and non conformists flourished equally with the hard working, the efficient,and the conformists. Such selection as existed in thoee daye was used in picking colo nele and general officere,in making ae signmenta, and in attempting to elim inate those very few whose perform ance was felt to be unacceptably poor. Even theee efforts were not universally acclaimed as complete successes.
Selection System

ment ? It appears that it did not result from a single decision, but gradually crept up on us as one of the many re sults of the increasing size and com plexity of our organizations. Prior to World War II, advancement through officer grades was beeed almost en tirely on seniority. Initially by regi ment, later by branch, for a century Colonel Samuel H. HaV8 k Director, Militaw p8Uch0fOgWand Leadefehip, US MUitarU Academy, We8t Point. He is a graduate of USMA, the US ATW Cemmaud and Geneml Staff CoEege, the US Army War CoUege, and re ceived hia Masters degree in Political Science frem Columbia University. He waa aseigned to the 94th ItifantW Di vision in Europe dunng World War II. Other 8ervise iaelude8 duty ua A8 eietant Plane O&er, 7th Fleet, We8& ern Pacific; with the Ofis of the Dep uty Chief of Stuff for Personnel, Washington; and ua Chief of Staff, Berlin Brigade, Germany. 4

If questioned, a personnel officer of thoee days would have stoutly denied that the Army was even interested in a selection system. Yes, perhaps a few officers were carried along who had little to contribute, but the advantages in career security, officer independ ence, and lack of tension and competi tion greatly outweighed any advantage which might accrue from a selection process. He could point at the allegedly harsh competition which resulted when the Navy had adopted eelection. The lack of security resulting from non election and the currying of favor of those in high places were not for the Army. If these arguments were not enough, the personnel officer could have pointed to the weakness of the existing efficiency report as a rational objective basis for any type of useful evaluation. He would havd been quite right as far es he went, but, as subsequent eventa were to show, he did not go far enough. The Army was SUM. Offi cers capabilities and capacities, as well as their weaknesses, were fairly
MMirs Reviaw

JUDGE NOT

well known to their peers and superi ors who knew them either personally or by reputation. The demand to in vestigate and develop improved sys tems of officer evaluation was insuffi cient to trigger serious action.
Wartime Promo&ms

Then, World War II arrived with its massive mob]iiiation and expansion and the commissioning of officers in wholesale lots. After a brief period in whlcla promotions were made by bloc in order of seniority, the old system gave way, and the authority to premote was delegated to subordinate commanders with relatively few limi tations. In the final event, wartime promotion depended on chance of ae sigmnent, available vacancies, and the superiors knowledge of the abilities of his subordinates. It was found, somewhat to every ones surprise, that we had been carry ing more than a few loads of dead wood. Officerswho appeared to be mar ginally effective under the prewar con ditions of garrison duty proved te he incapable of etandlng up under the rigors and uncertainties of wartime mobilization and combat. Efficiency re ports on file, as suspected, proved to be of little predictive value. The bad had been promoted with the good, and many errors of assignment and eelec tion for key positions were the result. Selection during the war was largely exercised by subordinate commanders on a trial-and-error basic. While some what waeteful and inequitable, this system provided adequate leadership in most units during the warat least in those unite that had time to make the trials and take advantage of the errore. With the demobilisetion and recon struction of tbe career Army, an efFebruary 1969

fort wae made to profit from wafilme experience, as well es from the grow ing stock of knowledge of the behav ioral ecientista. During World War II, psychologieta, in PrMcular, had ueed the Army as a vest laboratory to test theories, investigate motivations, ap titudes, Ieedershlp characterietica, and peer-rating aysteme. Thie gave a tre mendous lift to scientific personnel managemeaa&and the psychologists now felt that they could contribute something in the way of scientific method to the problems of human eval uation and prediction. SelectionandElimination This possibility, plus memories of dead wood and promotion stagnation produced by war-created humps of of ficere, provided tbe incentive to in corporate into our Otlicer Personnel Act of 1947 the principles of promo tion selection and forced elimination. It was felt that selection would re duce the number of ineffective, and, by eliminating those tilce not selected for promotion, we could introduce an element of forced attrition which would avoid the fear of promotion stagnation. Since accuracy of sekw tion depende largely on accuracy and objectivity of evaluation and ratinge, the psychologist were aeked to pro duce a rating instrument which would do the job. Unfortunately, we never found out whether or not the new form would turn the trick. Its forced choice questions and the inability of raters to know the reeults of their ratings caused commanders on all eides to re quest ite withdrawal. So we returned to an improved vereion of the old sub jective-type rating. We have now been on the eeleetion system for 20 years. Any judgment of the results would have to conclude
5

JUiSE

HOT

that they have been mixed. We have lost in some areas what we gained in others. It would probably be ssfe to say that, through selection for both promotions snd elimination, we have been abIe to eliminate the worst of the
nonproducer. also say that In general, promotions one could to higher

pletefy some emerging factors on the debit side of the ledger. Perbspe the meet valuable Ieeson we have learned about seiti}on is the importance of evaluation. Accurate evaluation is a sine qua won of effec tive seleeticm. The fact is, we do not have it. Bating forms simply do not

Subjective efficiencyreports tend to exalt conformity, pleasing perewmlity,and the skills of communication and interpersonalmanipulation grades have included meet of the bet ter officers although few claim that they have invariably been the best. In human terms, the actual results of the system have been greatly soft ened by the expanded military struc ture required eince 1960 to cope with hostilities in Korea, the Berlin crisis, the Cuban crisis, and the war in Vlet nsm. But even these mitigating fac tore have not been able to cover comS stand up under the preesures of ce reer selection. They might provide a reasonably accurate evaluation of an officer if not involved in promotion. But when one adde to the already sub jective viewpoint of rater and endorser the knowledge that future career op portunities of the rated oflicer depend on the comparison of his etflciency re ports with those of others, the inevi table occurs. MllibiyRlvfna

JUDGE NOT

Nearly all effective officers get rated as superior or outetandbg, Instead of a normal dhtribution, we get a clus ter, and the dependability of the rat ings diminishes sharply. Even if the rating forms are changed frequently, efficiency reports are an exceedingly weak foundation upon which to con. struct a selection system.
Rating Oftkara Standarda

We delude ourselves into thinking that the sum of subjective inaccuracies equals objective reality. For assign ment, such a theory might work. For promotion selection againat restrictive ratesit does not. One bad adjective, one vindictive, poorly informed or in afiiculate rater frequently spells the difference between selection and non election.
Side Effects of Selection

Performance reports made out by superiors are inefficient instruments for fine discrimination between indi viduals for several reasons. Rating of ficers have different standards. They are subjectively involved in their sub ordinates performance, their morale, and future career chances. They see only one aspect of their subordinate when they observe him from above and that only in the light of their own
bias.

Raters who are themselves highly rated and see themselves es successful tend to rate their subordinates sim ilarly. Low-rated officers incline to the reverse. A few officers rate subordi nates on the basis of bow the ratings reflect on tbe rating, rather than on rated, officers. Objective raters, com menting fearlessly on the strong and weak points of their subordinates whom they rate literally according to the words of the regulation and the rating form, have damaged the ca reers of countless trusting subordi nate. Ratings are difficult when outstand ing officers are grouped in staffs as they often are. Since common person ality traits will be mentioned repeat edly in efficiency reports, we tell our selves that tbe variations and limita tions of rating officers do not matter. The high and low, the friendly and unfriendly, will cancel each other out.
February 1969

An even more serious aspect lies in side effects of selection on the officer corps. As predicted by our prewar personnel officers, the feeling of ca reer security, especially in upper field grades, appears to have been substan tially diminished, thereby increasing the sense of competition between con temporaries and the need to curry favor with the rating officer. Although one could probably not produce empir ical evidence to support it, many wit nesses feel that the sense of independ ence and willingness to stand up and be counted is a steadily declining char acteristic among those who have gained successive promotions through tbe selection system. while independentrecommendations and opinions not necessarily in con sonance with those held by a superior will bring atilration and recognition for some, in the longer run, the inde pendent thinker, the innovator, and the determined fighter for causes will inevitably earn the displeasure of some superior with results tantamount to iionseltilon when seltilon ratea be come restrictive in the Idgher grades. Even the most astute selection beards pass over officers with critical reports when faced with bard decisions to make on a list of thousands of superior and outstanding officers. One can plead for moral courage and 7

JUDGE NOT

fighting character, but, in tbe long run, salection based on subjective effi ciency reporta tands to exalt conform ity, pleasing personality, and the skills of communication and interpersonal manipulation. The officer with inter personal skills and pliable opiuions seems likely to succeed more often

qnately to support the welfare of his command or accurately report bis sit uation. If it is true that selection based on efficiencyreports breeds excessive com petition, toadying, conformity, fear of failure, oversupervision of subordi nates, and indecisiveness or overcen :!~A\. .\ 4

Selection boards need all the help they can get and frequently there is too little valid evidenceto suggest which officerhas more potentialthan others than the officer with tbe more forceful, dogmatic, and determined personality frequently sought for command as signments. Thus, the clever and intuitive staff officer who produces KISwork for the decision of others stands a much better chance of success than the officer who is personally responsible for a com mand with all the pitfalls involved, and who must oeeesionally oppose the views of his superior if he is ade 0 tralization of decision, we are, indeed, paying a heavy cost for selection. To the degree that we may be forcing out or nonselecting onr individualists, in novators, and fighters, we are seriously damaging our future effectiveness. To the extent we inhibit risk-taking and decisive initiative in oursubordinates, we are weakening the quality of our future leaders. Selection boards are faced with a nearly insuperable task. From a list Military Rsview

JUD6E NOT

of thousands of officers with different skills, different career patterns, and a great diversity of assignments, they must select a lesser number of officers hased only on the aubjeetive ratings of their superiors whose own egos and career effectiveness were involved in their ratings. Those closely connected with promo. tione will testify as to the tendency to use any type of comparative data, such as relative standin ervice schools or relative time Y in co mand, as a basia for consideration. one can say without exaggeration that the selec tion boarde need help-all the help they ~n get. Only too frequently, there is little valid evidence to suggest which officer hae more potential than others.
Evaluation of 8ystem

ante ie measured against specific job reqniremente rather than subjective comparison with all other officers of the same grade. New they tell us that peer ratings have proved more valid than superior ratings in predict ing future officer performance. How. ever, neither industry nor government has today the means readily available to meet fully these requirements. While considerable research has been undertaken in testing and eval uation, we have yet to discover an effective all-purpose system. As it now etands, any modification to the pres ent syetem would be a temporary ex pedient based on insufficient research and inadequate development.
Areas for Investigation

What, then, can one say about per sonnel evaluation and selection ? First, one must admit that it is here to at,ay. Few would be willing to go back to a, seniority system. Next, it is certain that we must evaluate. whether we like it or not, the immediate com mander of the officer rated has views which should be made a matter of reeord and which should be consulted when the o5cer he rates is considered for assignment or promotion. One could also say that we have an urgent requirement for more objective means of otltcer performance evaluation which would supplement or even re place efficiency reports in their role aa the primary factor in selection. We also have a need for an instrument which would have some predictive ca pability. Recent conclusions of behavioral sci ence and management researchers in dicate that the most valid performance ratings are made when the performFebruary

The potential seriousness of a sit uation resulting from continued inac tion clearly calls for a remedy, even if only a temporary one. Somehow, we must take the pressnre off the et% ciency report by reducing its impor tance as the basis of selection. The following suggest themselves as pos sible areas to investigate: Consider an interim solution of awarding bonus puinte for ratings during command time to adjust for the obviously increased opportunity to earn the displeasure or peer rating of a superior while holding such posi tions. The forced choice type of rating used in 1947-48 might be improved and reintroduced as a periodic supple ment to the normal annual subjective efficiency report. If adequately inter preted, this could provide selection boards with valuable additional infor mation which might reinforce or con tradict normal ratings. Develop a system of peer ratings made at appropriate stages in an of 9

we

JUB6E NOT

ficers career. Ratings of this type, if made under reasonably objective cir cumstances, could give selection beards valuable insight into how the oilicers contemporaries view him. It should help eliminate some of the more obvi ous errors that occur now when we only use the view from the top. We never have exploited the po tential which exists in the area of testing. We award skill pay to enlisted men and even give them major promo tiow consideration on the basis of roil. itary occupational specialty proficiency tests, but seem to have felt that simi lar techniques were inapplicable to of ficers. Tests have obvious and well recognizsd weaknesses, but they are an objective resins of evaluating peo ple and do not have tbe unfortunate side effecte of our present system of efficiency rating. It would seem possible to devise , tests which might measure certain attitudes, aptitudes, and personality traits on one hand, and such technical knowledge of broad military or po litical affairs on the other as might be appropriate to the rank and experi ence of the officer tested. Such tests

should not be the only criteria for selection. They could be an effective ecreening device and would supple ment other mwms to give a much more rounded and accurate estimate of the individuals being evaluated. Modern, large-scale organizations, with their requirements for an infinite variety of individual ekWs and char acteristics, demand a vast refinement in our current personnel evaluation andmeasurement techniques. hecur rent rapid technological an1 secial change places increased premiums on innovation, independent thought, moral courage, and even audacity. This makes sslection for assignment and promotion not only desirable, but es sential. Yet if it is to be done without longterm damage to our officer corps, it must be based on instruments more objective than the present efficiency report. If we are to insure individual independenceand creativity in our of ficer ranks, we should act fast to de vise alternate means of evaluation to supplement or even to replace the offi cer efficiency report.

10

Military R@Vim

A Scenario of the Future?

PhilIip A. Karber

HERE has been a flood of anal yses following the Soviet inva sion of Czechoslovakia. Yet all the analytic verbiage in the Free World will not undo the Soviet fait accompli. It is with this regret that we must ask ourselves: Was the Soviet inva sion and occupation of Czechoslovakia a scenario of the future? Until we can be sure that aggressive Soviet military action will not be repeated, it is neees sary to etudy the possibility, extent,
F8bwary 1969

and likely success of a similar Soviet aggression in central IlurOpe. The occupation of Czechoslovakia was one of the meet slyly executed op erations in recent history. The Czech oslovak Defense Minister, General Martin D;ur, was said to have com mented that the preparations for an invasion of such magnitude had to start some six months before. This euggested, he said, that the Soviet Union had begun contemplating a mil
11

Czechoslovakia

itary invasion shortly after the Czeeh oslovsk party deposed the conservative leadership of Antonin Novotny in Jan uary 196S.
Preparing for Aation

The expertise of this planning was visible not only in tbe complete mili tary success of the invasion on 20 and 21 Auguet, but also in the stealth of the preinvasion maneuvering under the noses of the Western alliance. The appointment of General Sergey M. Shtemenko to replace a weak and ag ing Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces took place the day following the Soviet eigning of the Bratielava com munique that supposedly endbrsed the broad lines of policy adopted by the reformist leadership of Alexander Dub&q First Secretary of the Czcch oslovak Communist Party. Shtemenko, a Staliuist general, was credited with conceiving a winning strategy for the decisive tank battle at Kursk in 194S. Even as the Sovieta seemed to be signing a truce at Bra tislava, the Soviet High Commandwas preparing for action. The ultimate coordination of plan ning and deception culminated one hour before the invasion when an un scheduled Soviet Aeroflot commer cial airliner landed at the Ruzyne
,Tad ::h S*UIC, ,s&viets to Lea.. Bloc Divisions on Soil, Tlw NW Ycrk TJme., 29 Ausust 196S,

International Airport in Prague. Cam ouflaged within the airliner was a mo bile air traffic control post which be gan directing the landings of other unscheduled Awojlot planes loaded with paratroops who then secured the firat Soviet airhead just four miles from the center of Prague.s The mobilization of troeps and the coordination of five national armies into a successfully orchestrated inva eion under complete secrecy and with minimum suspicion from the West are, indeed, a tribute to Soviet military planning.
Viable Military Foroe

PhiUip A. Karber is a Reeearch FeUow w-ih the Center for Strategic Studie8 in Wwhington, D. C., and is working on advanced a%greee in inter national law at Georgetoum Univer sity. He woa a Reeearch Aesociate mth Peppwdine Reeearch Institute in Loe Angels.% California, and ha served ae a Reeearoh (%wuZtunt on muttere of mwlenr strategg and proliferation to a congreseionat member of the Jmnt Committee oa Atomis Erwrgg. 12

The capabilities of the satellite ar mies under the Soviet Unions leader ship within the Warsaw Pact are cer tainly much greater than the Western preinvssion estimates. They were thought too politically unreliable to be used against the West, but now they have gone into action witbout protest against an ally. The invasion was in the beet tradi tion of mechanized warfare with em phaeie on shock and epeed. The Soviet faith in and expertise with armored forces have obviously proliferated to all the pact countriee. Over half of the 30 invading divisions were armored and at full strength. Since 1927,the Soviet Army has em ployed and developed the use of air borne eesaulta. The airlift of the huge invasion vanguard that wee flown into Prague wae the largest ever conducted by the Soviet Union outside her fron tiere250 aircraft put down a full airborne division complete with ar mored vehiclee, fuel, and supplies. Within houre of the invaeion, the airlifted troops had completely secured ventim i.
2 s,PbIk ,Cbde E Fmtnc.watb. c-seven nCzechmbvskis,. Th@ New York Timen. 196e, P I.

of Inw

Mllitmy Review

.=..f

-----

February 1339

13

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Pragu% ita airport, and all the en trances to the city, including the bridgea over the Vltava; surrounded ?@ristries, the Communist Party Heedquarters, the post office, and the newspapera; and controlled the citys water and power eources. The speed and efftilveneas were as smooth and effortless as the heat oneration of approximately 9,000 men end 360 T55 and T62 medium tanks. The motorized rifle divisions, consisting of shout 10, 500 men were equipped with medium tanks and armored personnel carriers which enabled the entire division to speed across country.* The Warsaw Pact accomplished such complete paralyzation of the DuMiek

Atlantic Treaty Organization forces are believed to be capable. Prague was occupied and sur rounded within two days by 100,000 troops and 2,000 tanks, yet the real potential of the Warsaw Pact was demonstrated in the tactical applica tions of Soviet blitzkrieg throughout Czechoslovakia. The Soviet, East Ger man, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgar ian armored columns entered Czecho slovakia dispersed along 1S crossing points from the north, northwest, south, and east, All of the ground forces were completely mechanized, with each tank division consisting of 14

shadow a puszlhg f question: What happened to the CzechozlovakArmy ? The Czechoelovak Army of four ar mored divisions and 10 motorized rifle dkisions was considered by most military experts prior to the invasion tn be at near parity with Poland and overshadowed only by tbe Soviet Union. W%le the total number of War saw Pact troops of the Soviet Union, Poland, Eazt Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria would certainly have over whebned the Czechoelovak ArmY in a prolonged conflict, the initial Warsaw
for
The kfilitim 1967-1968, l%= lmthte Stmtiic LUudi.a London, D 7. {Ibid, D S.

B.al.ma,

MilIbry
Review
a

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Pact invasion force barely reecbed a strategic ratio of two to one during the first week of the invasion. This would not have been enough force had the Czeehoslovak Army fought back, and the invasion certakdy would not have had the same degree of succese if i! bad succeeded at all.
Advantageous Position

satellites, and agenta. However, the preparations for the invasion of Czech which enti]led massive oslovakia, troop movements and stockpiling of

It could be argued that, even if the Czechoslovekehad fought the invadere, the eurprise and epssd of the action did not give them time for mobiliza tion. Yet the Czeehoslovak Defenee Ministry issued a communique an nouncing maneuvers in division strength would take place on 21 and 22 Auguet in central and western Bo hemia. Whether or not tbeee maneu vers were called because Czeehoslovak intelligence got wind of the invasion, or if they were just a training exer cise, the fact remaine that these ma neuvers put the Czechoslovake in a most advantageous fighting position should a surprise attack be launched. So the questione remain. Why did not Dub&k order the army to resist? Did he feel it futile? Did he hope to prevent needless bloodehed and de struction of Czechoelovakla? Or did he doubt the loyalty of the Czeehoelo vak Army and ite commander to choose and fight for nationalism over communiem? The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czech oslovakia came ae a total surprise to the US public and news media. Were the Free World intelligence and deci eion-makirig communities totally eur prieed ? Weetern intelligeilce agencies have repeatedly claimed knowledge of the exact location and number of Soviet ballistic miseike through electronic monitoring systems, spy in the sky
Fehfmfy laa9

the necessary fuel and supplies, seem ingly went unnoticed. Ur&es 811 of thie was known to US intelligence agencies, but classified from the public, the NATO early warning eystem muet be revised and lese reliance placed on ita accuracy. War-limiting Policy Harlan Cleveland,US reprwentative to NATO, etatad ehortly after the in vasion that a government that can move troops so efficiently behind zo sloppy a political plan might be capa ble of misreading Western determina tion too. D&enta and flexible re eponse, ae the recent coraeretenes of Western political and military strat egy, have greatly decreased the threat of immediate nuclear response to a Soviet conventional tbruet. While thie war-limiting policy may prevent a gen eral conflagration, it also has increased the ambiguity of the Western deter rent to conventional attack, thus in creasing the likelihood of that type attack end resting the security of cen tral Europe on the perceptions and motivations of the Soviet Union. Before the invasion, there had been much debate within the Weetern al liance as to whether the Moscow Lead ership was beceming increasingly moderate. whatever the ideological climate witldn the Kremlin, it seems clear that the Soviet atilone were dic tated by: An aknost pathological Soviet fear of Weat Germany and her inilu ence in eastern Europe. Fear of a liberalized Czeehoslo
aAr.thow Lewis, .NATO BnJM-UD Doubted
Deaplte the Pram. Crisis,. TAm New York Times,
19SS,D 1.
8 Septembr

15

domination of political deeision-mak ing authority, and eeonomic exploita tion of east Europe. In this respect, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was nothing new to the Soviet Union. Con quest by invasion was used in Hun gary in 1956; political stooges like Waiter Ulhricht are notorious; and the preinvasion economic exploitation of Czeehoslovak uranium alone has been placed at 170 million dollars annually. The Soviet Union has acted like any
*Peter (ktw.e, U.S. to Ask M.vby NATO 1. wake cl Prame Crisis. The NW York T-. 9 ZeptemMr 196S, D 1. , c.~=hd.dh & * M&or TJ1.a.im Chriatim Scimce Monitor, 1 A.JCUSt 1968, B 1.

which claim that, in the Federal Re public, anticommunism is, se it was in Hitlers time, the official state doc trine, part of the psychological prepa ration for war. Leonid I. Brezhnev, Party General Secretary of the USSR, warned Euro pean Communists that: Bonn is hoping to involve the USA and @ other NATO parfnsm more dssplg in its revengs-aseking plans and thereby secure a revision of the Sec omi World War {n its favor?
%Iform.4bI 70-71. .auoted by Stephen R. JohIM60n, AU Intm6mtion to tbe Sole of Pmxfes {n Soviet Strategic Planr&c,,, PAdana Vol.rne 1, Summer 1667, P 60.

Bd&tin.N.mkr

ptitbr,..

16

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Marshal Vasili D. Sokolovsky de clared that: The main role in th tm.5eashing of a new war Lspla~ed bg West Gervnuny, where revanchiam hae been nrude etate policy. For thie reason United Stutes, Bmtieh, amt French imperialists have permitted West Germany to huve the strowgest army in NATO and are plan ning to give her nuclear weaperre, ew in everp wag poseible the cmtraging revanchbt aepiratiorw of Weet Ger mark militarism. in severity since the Csaehoslovakinvasion as evi denced by a Soviet broadcast commen tary proclaiming: The arrne race and claims of the Bonn militarists to a leading role in NATO are evio%we of the growing Wv-iveness of the foreign political policy of the German Federal Repub lic. The interest of peace and secunty in Europe demand a decisive counter action by atl peace-loving force8 to Bonn8 most evil plans. The Weet was shockingly reminded on 18 September 1968 by Pravda, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper, that, under the United Nations Char ter, the Soviet Union claims the legal authority to invade West Germany: The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that, in accordance with their ob ligation under the Potedam and other international agreements, the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition continue to bear the responsibility for prevent ing the revival of German militiw-iem and Naziem. As a partic@ant in ths Potsdam
D. %kolowky. ?dititiw .Slmtemr, Frederick A Praeser. Inc., New York, 196S, D 276. 10,D.!JIv Ijeport+?avlet Unjon,,, Brosdcsst by m.dio fmm Moscow in English to eastern North Americ% 19 Sezdmnber 1968. Fore&n Broadcast In fmmatjon &r.Ace. Volume III.

Soviet Commentary ThIS theme hae increased

agreement, the Soviet Union will cow tinue to stand ready, together with other peaee-loving stute8, to take the nece88aeqf effective measures, if the need ariees, to etop the dangerorw ac tivities of namaziem and milituriem. According to atilcle 53 of the UN Charter, the only military action legal without the authorization of the Se curity Council is action against any state which, during World War 11,had been an enemy of any signatory of the charter. Article 107declares that noth ing in the charter shall invalidate or preclude action taken or authorised as a result of World War II by the gov ernment involved. An invasion of Weet Germany by the Soviet Union would, according to Soviet interpreta tion, be legal. Western diplomats dis pute this claim.
Imperialism and Fear

The reasons why the Soviets want Weet Germany under their hegemony are the same overriding motivations that were beldnd the Czechoslovak in vasionimperialism and fear. If the Soviet Union controlled Weet Germany, if only up to the Rhine, the shift in the military and economic bal ance would he devastating to the Weet. Strategically, the USSR would hold the beet defeneive position on the Conti nent, with an unstoppable military ca pability to coerce any neighbor and thue attain many long-standing Com
.<Far Reaching Aitn,,,, V]aden K.met.wv, Pravda, 18 September 1968, P 6. 12S=m~W .f State DeaII Rusk, in addressing tbe UN General Awemblr on 2 October 1968, .Cab?d: Neither artic14 107 n.?? twficb 5$ of tk Charta. ..7 the two wtickd fomti oi.ed & Sma Union or oh%? Warsaw Pact &em ..v m.~ht to i.tertwiw bv fore. ..i@m.zllv i. tka Fdmzk Republic of Ommmw. Amw snch action mmtd lead imnwdiotdw to .elfdeftnm meamwes s+wmw.t to fhe North Afkmti. 2ve-atY,. treutn wkom vaaiitv under the U.itul Natbnu Charm? is u.suwtian abIe.
The D.partmetIt of State Btdketi., Volume LIX,
Number 16S0, 21 Octnber 1968.Editar

,~

OMsmhal Vasili

Fsbruars 1839

17

saw Pact through action against a tra ditional nationel enemy.

In 1956, in fear of an anti-Commu nist upsurge, the Soviet Union made a

preemptive invasion of Hungary. In 1968, in fear of national deviation with possible etrategic consequences, the Soviet Union launched a preemptive occupation of Czechoslovakia. Already in mortal fear of a re venge-seekhg West Germany, the So viet Union is showing increased alarm over the relationehlp of Bonn to nu clezarweapons. NATOs conventional inferiority to the Warsaw Pact traditionally has 18

terrent to, and thereb~ an indirect pro tedio?t agai~t, nUCleaTatttwk 80 long as the caparity for retaliation is suf ficient to ensure that any surprise blow -any attempt at a nuclear Pearl Har bor strike-is likely to prove mutually SUicidd. But it hue become doubtful whether this former Grent Deter rent remains a s-ujfcient deterw.nt to lesser forma of aggression, or even to a etrong invasion and conventiqnd force.= Considering the present state of the NATO forcee, a Warsaw Pact conven ,~B. H. LiddeU Em% Dat-t or Defense, Frederi.k A. Praecer, Irm., New York, 19SS, v 48.

MilitaIy

Rrvknr

tional surprise attack could meet with initial success, leaving nuclear re sponse the only option left. If the West ia deterred from using nuclear weapons and it refuses to maintain a parity in heavy conven tional forces, with what will it deter the Soviet conventional capability? One answer-allow Weet Germany to develop an independent nuclear deter rent. It is undoubtedly this anewer that prompted the Soviet Union te push so herd for a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union bee indicetd that she will stop Weat Germany from acquiring inde pendent control of the bomb somehow through diplomacy or coercion, and, if these fail, she hints at preemptive attack. Esceiittnt Capsbiiitios The prospect of reduced nuclear risk has led to Soviet reassessment of mil itary cQnllkts in Europe. Beginning around 1960, a distinct change took place in Soviet policy. In Marshal Sokolovskys work, Militaw Strateg#, the one example of a future limited war involves a full-wale nonnuclear attack initiated by the West in central Europe. This apparent reappraisal has been noted by the Soviet analyst, Thomas W. Wolfe: Under the new regime, there huve been further indications of a do.$trinal reappraisal of the po8sibditzl of rl.on nuclea thenter warfare, the implti tien being that the theater forces must be bettm prepared for a 8ituation in which itmight notbe expedient to bring Swet mwlenr power to bear> Wolfe bee also noted the Soviet dis cussions of the advantage of surprise and the new emphasis on the need for ,,~w. w&,?..V4* Maoaly pm and
EwmFM. SmI?it#. -d COIWmtim. Mcmfca. Ckuf.nlk, 19s6. P 4. =u*

prompt seisures of the initiative and rapid offensive expiration. The latest Soviet principles have also catted for a continuous offensive developing rapidly throughout the depth of the theater at an average speed of 60 miles per day. All of the Warsaw Pact divisions that would be assigned German action are mcdm nized, with belf of them armored, and the pact forces have enough transport aircraft to drop four airborne divi sions simultaneously.
ls~ssi Nuciesr WesptISs

The Soviets, while hoping for an absence of any nuclear weaponry, have shown preplanning for possible tac ticnl nuclear warfare. Dispersal of fae~moving armored thrusts starting at many points end following eeparete transportation lines, messing only when in battle or in capturing an en emy city, means tliat tactical nuclear weapons cannot be used effectively on the attacking forces witbout eliminat ing thousands of civilians, important positions, and friendly forces. It must be remembered tba~ in the early stages of. a surprise attaclq it will be the defender whose static po sitions will offer the best targets to tactical nuclear weapons. The employ ment of airborne troops in ccmjunc tion with major conventional ground units wonld allow for a quick oscuPs tion and give the Sovieta major hos tages: Over the past 13 years, the Warsaw Pact has changed its empbeeia radi cally from defensive te offensive. Pregrams were undertaken to reequip the east European forces up to Soviet standards, to establish integrated com mand for conducting joint warfare in

FebmaY 1SSS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

the European theater, and numerous joint exercises were held. The largest of these military maneuvers was con ducted in September 1966 in Czecho slovakia. Operation Molulm demon strated the belief within the Warsaw Pact that a nuclear strike at a wars outact was improbable. The success of these exercises was demonstrated in the perfeet coordination of the Czecb oslovak invaeion. StrongAdvant&aa Through the stationing of Soviet troopa in Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact hae achieved etrong advantsgee over the NATO alliance in position and forces. Prior to the eecupation, the conventional military balance in central Europe appeared stable. Ana lysts generally concluded that, to achieve a, blitzkrieg effect, the War saw Pact would need an over-all au perioriti in divieione of three to one, and that, becauee of a reliability fac tor, the eatellite armiee with the great eet Soviet integration would be the most successful. It wse usually considered that the Warsaw Pact could secretly move at least 10 more Soviet divisions and the bulk of the Polish Army into Eaet Germany becauee there were already Soviet divisions and logistics perma nently etationed there. Since no Soviet troops were stationed in Czechoslo vakia, the chance of a buildup being noticed was much greater. Considering these factors, the likely Soviet buildup would occur in East Germany and, consequently, the weight of tbe attack would be in the northern part of Germany, with a Polieh thrust toward I@, a march by the East German and Soviet divi eions to the Rhine north of Frank furt, while the Czechoslovake would 20

esteblieb basically a defensive line through Bavaria. NATO has met tfds potential tbreet by placing the bulk of its 24 divisions between Denmark and Frankfurt. This northern strat egy has been rendered inefficient since the CzeehosIovsk invasion be cause: . With Soviet forces permanently etationed along the Bavarian frontier, additional tronps can now be added for a surprise attack without drawing suspicion from the Weat. . With the Soviet occupation, the 14 Czechoslovak diviaiona can be re educated on the German threat and integrated within the Warsaw Pact for greater reliability. . With the postinvazion buildup in Czechoslovakia, the etrategic balance along the Iron Curtain has reached a Soviet advantage. The Warsaw Pact has greatly in creased ita options and capability. To cover this new and flexible Soviet strategy, the addition of conventional power by repositioning and rebuilding of present NATO forces, along with changes in doctrine, are necessary.
Future Scenario Considering the current Soviet mo tivation, the newly apparent Warsaw Pact viability, and the strategic ad vantages achieved through the occu pation of Czechoslovakia, the future of stability in central Europe leeks

bleak. The Soviet propaganda campaign that has already started against West Germany can be expected to incresee. The rise of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party, no matter how small, and the West German reluc tance to sign the Trmty on the Non proliferation of Nuclear Weapene, no matter how logical, will, undoubtedly,
Military Review

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

be claimed aa pruof that the W-t Ger mane are secretly manufacturing nu clear weapona and are following Hit lers path by starting world war III. Even the US public ia fertile ground for the sowing of skillful propaganda built on long-stendlng preconceptions. For the Communist propaganda ma chine, it is, indeed, an easy step to confuse the nonproliferation trsaty with nuclear war and patriotic Ger mans with Nazis. After an intensive propaganda cam paign eprezidover several months, the peace-loving Soviet Uniow with the unanimous support from the War saw Pact, would make a limited con ventional attack to remove the Gsr man threat to world peace. Only minutes before the midnight attack, Soviet Ambasaadora in all Western capitals with nuclear capa bilities would notify the heads of state that, since the West had not curbed the militarist aims of the Germans, the Warsaw Pact was, under the UN Charter, removing the threat with conventional arms. They would stress the limited aims and means of the attack, but would leave no doubt that any use of nuclear weapons whatsoever would trigger a nuclear holocaust. The various Am bassadors might even suggest that NATO bases and airdelde were being monitored, and, as long as they re mained uninvolved, they would not be attacked. The overriding emphasis to

the US President would be on the im mediate and fatal results of escalation once the nuclear threshold was crossed. Meanwhile, over the night skies of West Germany, the Sovieta would at tain air superiority, with tbe majority of NATO craft still on the ground. Four airborne divisions would be landed simultaneously so that the So viets could control the key bridges and roads. Fast-moving Soviet armored di viaiona dispersed in the dark country side would take city after city se hos tages and uee westward flseing refu gees as shields. Within hours, the conventional phaae of flexible reepense would be played out, leaving the US President with the decision to employ or not to employ tactkal nuclear weapons. As General Hana Speidel bas stated: It is he a&me who hokls the pcnesr and respmwibility-the gravest of all decisions: when, where, and with what weapons the counter blow is to be 8truck. Tbe only decision left would be to choose between a Soviet Germany and a nuclear world war III. The necessity for this decieion will have been the legacy of the 1968 eccuphtion of Czech oslovakia, for, if we do not study, re view, and project its reoccurrence into central Europe and then make the neceseary political and strategic ad justments, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia will have, indeed, been a scenario of the future.

Fehreary 1969

21

TheNew Soviet High Comman

Michsel Parrish ESPITE factionalism, differences of opinion on quastions of strategy, and professional jealousies, the post+ %elin Soviet High Command has been relatively free from extensive purges. Even such eventa as the ramoval of Marshal Gaorgi K. Shukov, the Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 war in the Middle East have failed to produce wholwale rashuilling in the high command. Nikita S. Khrushchevs ramoval, despite the dire predictions of some obeervera, did not result in a purge of the so-callad Sta lin~ad group of ganerals who allegadly owad their rise to the fallen chairman. Even his foremost apologist such se Vasili I. Chuikov, A. A. Epishev, and Kiril S. Moskalenko ramainsd un touchsd. Neither has the comeback of Marshal Shukov meant tlia silencing of his critice such as Ivan S. Konev, Chuikov, end M. 1. Kazekov. The slowneaa of change in the high command could be at tributed primarily to the msmoriea of the most traumatic event
2f

Nlliti COMMSI

in the history of the Red Army-the purges of the 1930s. Many of the present commanders eaw their com rades, no less loyal Communists, de stroyed in the holocaust. These mem oriee, and the wartime camaraderie, have contributed to solidify the high command to an extent that, despite many centrifugal forces, extensive purging both from inside and outizde has been discouraged. SeniorCommandara Such unity, althongh beneficial to the military establishment, has not been a complete blessing to the Red Army. It has kept the command in the hands of old World War 11 command ers whose conservatism and leek of technical knowledge could hamper the progress of the armed forces. In the early 1960e, when World War II reg imental commanders were holding the top poeitione in the West, the com msnd of the Red Amy remained al most totally in the hands of men who had been senior generals and army commanders in the Second World War. Since that time, a gradual change has been tak]ng place in the Soviet military leadership se younger men are promoted to higher positions. Thk change, however, has been slow. The average age of a sample 45 Soviet commanders has been lowered by only one and one-half years, from slightly over 61 to slightly under 60, between 1965 and 1967. The most significant event following Michael Parrish i-c a Research As sociate in Rw8ae-German militmy hia torg and probleme with the Div&ioa of Univerwty Ext-oa of Indiana Univerattw He attendia% school in New York City and holds degreee from Berea CoUege, Kentucky, and f~ I* diana Univereitzi.
Fobrimy 1G69

Defense Minister Redion Y. bfalinov ekys death in March 1967 wee not his replacement by Marshal Andrei A. Greebko, but the rise of several younger generale to the highest eche lone of command. Despite rumors of the poseible appointment of a civil ian) it wae logical that the rather dull, military bureaucrat Malinovsky be replaced by another oflicer of the same temperament. Nearly 25 yenre before, in the dark days of July 1942, Greebko had re ceived his first major command, the 12tb Army, in the battered remnanta of Malinovskye South Front. Later, he showed himself to be a tenacious defender in the Caucasus where he commanded three different armies. After that, he commanded, without any special distinction, the let Guards Army with both the 1st and the 4th Ukrainian Fronts. Hie postwar career bad shown a steady progress both in the military hierarchy and in the Com munist Party. At 64, and reputedly suffering from poor health, he is at the twilight of his career and, perhaps, the last of the senior World War II commanders to head the Minietry of Defense. NowGeneration In the changes of command follow ing Malinovskys death, the new gene ration was represented hy promotion of Ivan I. Yakuboveky to the rank of Marehal of the Soviet Union, his and Army General Sergei L. Solcolovs ap pointment as First Deputy Minietere, and Army General Ivan G. Pavlovskys promotion to a Deputy Minister of Defense. These men, along with Army Gen eral Pavel F. Batiteky (57), com mander of air defense forces; Colonel General Vladimir F. Tolubko (53),
23

HIGH COMMkD

many in April 1962 and the Kiev MiI itery District in February 1966-poei tions which were previously held by Grecbko. Hia views are not well known, but seem to he on the conservative side. He has advocated that, along with nuclear capability, the Red Army must have strong forces trained to wage conventional war. Sokolov, who has had a meteoric rise, came to hie new post from com mand of the Leningrad Miiitary Dis trict which he had held since Novem ber 1966. Pavlovsky, the new Deputy Minister of Defense, was commander of the Volga Military District from October 1961 until January 1964 when he took over the Far East Military District. Most of the new men have close First Deputy Commander in Chief of the etrategic rocket forces; Air Mar shal Yevgeniy Y. Saviteky (57) of the Air Defense Command; and Colonel General V. V. Okunev (47), com mander of the Moscow Air Defense District; and several younger military district commanders, are the men on the rice in the military establieinnent. They are all under 60, and none of them were generala in the last war. Ivan I. Yekubovsky (65), at the time of hie appointment, was nine years younger than the next Marshal of the Soviet Union. A war hero and one of the few ground officers to have twice received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, he distinguished himself as the deputy commander of the 6tb Guarde Tank Corpe in the Soviet bridgebeed across the Vistula at Bara nov in July 1944. At the end of the war, he wae a colonel. He had a steady rise in the postwar period, cutilnating in his command of the Group of Soviet Forces in Ger24
Military ROViEW

H16H COMMAHO eleeted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1961, and was re elected at the 23d Congress in April 1966. Batiteky wae elected to the Cen tral Committee in the latter congress, while Sokolov beeame a candidate member. Batiteky and Okonev have been active in the Moscow Party Com mittee. Tolubko, of the strategic rocket forces, however, does not hold a high party post and, at one time, was even critfeal of too much party activity on the part of hie highly professional troops,* Despite the emergence of these younger generala, the old guard etill occupy important positions in the mil itary hierarchy. Next to Grecbko, these forces are represented by the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Matvey V. Zekharov (69) whose im portance ean be gauged by his activi ties as the roving ambassador to the Arab countries and his exchange of

Admiralof the Fleet SergeyG. Gerebkov visits with the fate General of the Army Charles Ailleret, former French Chief of Staff. Zakharov, unlike meet Soviet gen erale, served 0U2Yin staff pusitiona during the Second World War and was in continuous combat from the very beginning as the Chief of Staff of the Odessa Military District. He was Chief of Staff to Konev and Malinov eky and culninatad his wartime career in August 1945 with the impressive planning of the Tranabaikel Fronts advance through the Gobi Desert. After a steady rise during the posh war period, including the command of the Leningrad Wllitsry District and the Soviet forces in Germany, he wea appointed the CMef of the General Staff in 1960. Following the Cuban

February 1989

25

Will

COMMAND

missile crisis, he was dismissed from this post under mysterious circum stances only to regain it after Khru shchevs fall, when kds replacement, Marshal Sergei S. Biryuzov, was killed in an air accident. 06rerPostwar Leaders Another old guard military leader is Marshal Nikolay I. KryIov (64) who wac Chief of Staff of the 62d Army during the Stalingrad campaign and now commands the etrategic rocket forces, an important position to be held by one whose military educa tion appears to be limited. The posi tione of First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces are held by Army General Kazakov (66) who held both command and staff positions during the war and is the author of an impressive book of memoirs. The post of Assistant Minister of Defense is held by Chief Marshal of Tank Troops Pavel A. Rotmistrov (66) who was an outstanding tank commander in the last war and now servee as a epokesman of the con servative forces in the military estabIiehment. Marshal Moskelenko (65), the foremost military operator dur ing the Khrushchev years, maintilns his position as a Deputy Minister of Defense, while Marzbal Ivan K. Ba gramian, one of the last of the Second World War front commanders, heade the rear area services. Two aging arms marshals, Pavel P. Poluboyarov (66) and Konstantin P. Kazekov (65) respectively, command the tenk and artillery forces of the Red Army. The military education ap paratua remains in the hands of the old guard. ArmY General V. D. Ivanov commands the General Staff Academy, and the outspoken Army General Pavel

A. Kurochkin heads the Frunze Mili tary Academy. In the air force, despite the retire ment in recent years of Marshals Vladimir A. Sudets and Stepan A. Krasovsky, the command remains in the hande of aging Chief Marshal Konstantin A. Vershinin (66) and Marshal Sergey I. Rudenko (63). The navy situation is much more promis ing. The Commander and the First Deputy Commander of tbe Soviet Navy, Fleet Admirals Sergey G. Gorebkov and Vladimir A. Kesatonov, are both 54; and several admirals com manding different fleets are in their midfiftiee. The positione in the Cen tral Political Department of tbe army and navy under Army General A. A. Epishev (59) are also held by rela tively younger men, some of them with experience in the security organiza tions.
Promotions Oivided

Since the fall of 1967, new appoint ments and promotions have been care fully divided between the old guard and the younger commanders. The re luctance of the former to give up posi tions could be seen in the fact that, in October 1967, the aging Colonel Gen eral A. Kh. Babajanian, a perennial Sxture of postwar military commands, was promoted to the Marshal of Tank Troops and appointed as Director of the Tank Troeps Academy in Moscow. Thie is despite the fact that the Red Army must have an unusually large number of younger armor specialists. Two other men also promoted to tbe marshal of their arms were Colonel General of ArtWery P. N. Kuleshov and the Minister of Civil Aviation, Colonel General of Air Force Yevgeniy F. Laginov. On 23 February 1968, seven men Military f(evlew

HIGH COMMAND

were promoted to the rank of army general: Georgiy I. Kbetagurov, S. P. Ivanov, N. G. Kyashchenko, P. N. Lashchenko, S. S. Maryakbin, Sergey M. Shtemenko, and Iosif I. Gusakov sky. These are some of the new faces that are reaching the pinnacle of com mand. The first five of the new army gen erale are important military district commanders. Gusakovsky, who spent time in labor camps during the purges, is the head of the Central Personnel Department of the Defense Ministry and has an; important voice in ques tione of appointments and promotions. In view of the partial rehabilitation of Joseph Stalin in military circles, it is interesting to note the promotion of Shtemenko, the present Deputy Chief of Staff, and an old Stalin fa vorite who had been shunned and de moted during the Khrushchev years. Also promoted in February to the rank of Marshal of Artillery was G. F. Odintsov. On 17 April 1968, for the firet time

since Yakubovskys promotion, two men received the coveted rank of Mar shal of the Soviet Union. Petr K. Koshevoy, commander of the Group of Soviet Forcee in Germany, was a Lieu tenant general in tbe last war and at 66 is past his prime. The other new marshal, Pavel F. Batiteky, is the en ergetic commander of the air defense forces and, with his new promotion, a leading contender for being the next Minister of Defense. All eigns now indicate a gradual phaseout of the older commanders in all branches of the Red Army. The new men taking over the leading po sitione are direct products of the Com munist society. Their experiences, both during the purges and war years, have been different from the older commanders, and, above all, they are far better educated. The question, as yet unanswered, is will they prove to be more adventurous and restless than their predeceesore on such issues as global etrategy of the Soviet Union and the party-military relations ?

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Avoid the inconvenience of renewingyour subscriptioneach year. Writs to The Book Department, U. S. Army Commandand General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas 66027. requesting cOnversiOn to the Automatic RenewalPlan.

February 1969

A mn$cd
From

Orbi.9

World

John H. Eeagland

, N EXAMINATION of local mil itary confl]cte in the developing world since World War II reveals one predominant but ecarcely surprising, fact-that the weapone with which these wars have been fought were ob tahed from sourcee outeide the coun triee involved. Even in the aggregate, the military cnpebilitiw of the devel oping countriee are amall in compar ison with thoee of the major powers. Six countriee-the United Statea, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Germeny, and Communist China+ccount for about S6 percent 28

of the worlds military expenditures; the remaining countries, shout 130 in number, account for only about 15 percent. Yet in epitc of their limitations, the military capabilities of the developing countriee poee important probleme for international eecurity. In a period of delicately balanced strategic deter rence between Eaet and Weat, local military preparations and conflicts have become a frequent source of in ternational teueion. For what they have felt to be com pelling political and eeonomic reasons,
MMtarj Review

TNE0EVELOPIN6 the major powers have been willing to supply large quantities of wespone to the developing count&e and occasion. ally to enter their contliete directly. In the came period, the developing world has beem a etorm center of ideological competition and a rising sense of nationalism, both of which have led to a greatly increased de mand for modern weapons. For the foreseeable future, and cer tainly throughout the 1970s, the de veloping countries will continue to be largely dependent on industrial states for the supply of military hardware and technology. To understand why and how their military forces may change in the next decade, it is, there fore, neeeesary to understand the proc ess by which weapons and military technology are transferred. SmallArms A realistic look at the diffueion proc ess must ded not only with obvious and well-publicised cases such as the Middle Eastern or South Asian inter state competitions to procure major armamenta, but also with the more obscure arese of the arme tradic, espe cially the transfer of light weapons -automatic rifles, submachineguns, and small mortars. Unlike the larger This article was ctied from the origiwal which appeared in Omua, No. 1 SWng 1968, pub lished by the Foreign Pol@ Re 8eaYeh Institute of the i%ivermty of Pen?w@ania. Co.o@ghted @ 1968 by tha Tnwteee of tb Uni vermtg of Pcnn@vaniu. Mr. Heaghwtd is Ezecutive Vice President of Bmmw & Shaw Re search Gwporation and directs epwwored research in the fields of daf ctwe planning, 8trategy, and control. arms
February 1969

WORI.O

weepone, smeU arms can be obtilned from a multitude of sources, includ ing private traders, and their move ment in relatively smaUnumbers from country to country ie easily concealed. Nevertheless, the bulk of the smell arms trsSic to developing countries since World War II has coneieted of large-scale transfers, normaUy involv ing hundreds of thousands of wespone, in a single tranedion under military aid agreements. Connected with this point are the related facts that small arms, once introduced into the world inventory, are likely to remein there for a long time and to change hands rapidly, in ways totally uaforeeeen by the supplying power.
Change in Ownership

An example of the way smaU arms may change ownerehip in surprising ways, 5ding ueee that are diametri cally opposed to the suppliere inten tion, ie the path taken by weapons from Belgium and the United States, via Cuba, to ineurgente in Venecuela. During 1959, ita first year in power, the Castro government appealedto nu meroue sources for arms to equip ita growing national army. It was even tually succeeeful in purchasing 65,~00 etandard North Atlantic Tr.wdy Or ganisation rifles from a Belgian man ufacturer, 1,000 Uzi submeehinegune made in Belgium under Israeli license, and 200 mecbineguns, all repreeent ing the then current level of techn.o ogy in emall arme. In addition, Fld & Castro inherited a large areenal of weapons that the United States had eupplied to the regime of Fulgencio Bsetists y Saldhmr under a military assistance pact. As the new Cuban Army grew in eice, Soviet and Czech arme-includ ing 125,000 automatic rifles, 10,000
m

THE DEVELOPIN6

WORLD

subrnacMneguns,and hundreds of field weapons-began arriving. With the army standardized on Soviet weapons, the Belgian and United SMez arms were gradually rendered surplus. Witbin a short time, they found uses in Venezuela which neither the United States nor Belgium would have con sidered appropriate at the time of their initial transfer. An arms cache .

parture in 1949. Some of these British weapons have, undoubtedly, found their way by now to other parts of Africa, and their potential for future miscldef is considerable. The regular forc~ of national gov ernments in the developing countrks have most often been equipped with small arms obtained as part of an over all military assistance agreement. In

Cowtasm

of

E.nQIW

M.rli?wz

Cod6

A Soviet-msnefacturedRPG2 rocket projectile raptured from Csstroite guerrillas in Argentina in 1967 discovered in Venezuela in 1963, in tendpd for use by Communist irrsur genta, consisted of automatic rifles made in Belgium, Uzi submachineguns, 60-millimeter mortars made in the United States and identified as having been given to the Batiste gov ernment, as well as US bazookas and recoilless riflez. This is not an isolated ease. To men tion one other example, military as sistance from the Soviet Union to the United Arab Republic probably brought on the retirement of the ap proximately 100,000 .Lee-,EnfieZd rifles eupplied to the Egypti?? Army prior to the British MWarY Missions de30

all of these cases, international atten tion has focused mainly on the more sophisticated weapons included in the agreement. In the case of the United Arab Re public, the Soviet transfer of medium bombers, jet fighters, and tanks has heen well publicized. However, the hundreds of thousands of Soviet emall arms included in the agreement have gone comparatively unnoticed, even though their intluence on regional sta bility may be felt for yeare to come, in many different countries where their introduction even in small mrm bers will, in turn, prompt large build ups by the opposing forces. MilitcIY Rovir!w

store up enough ammunition for a pro longed cotilct. Consequently,a few na tions have, for some time, been pro ducing their own small arms and am munition. To the extent that more countries follow suit, the worlds sources of supply will multilply, and the arms market will be even more accommodating than it is today. India manufactures not only small arms, but aleo artMery, tanks, and air. craft, usually on the beeis of imported deaigne or foreign licenses. Similarly,
Fabruaw 1389

throwers, 81-millimeter mortars, and 92-millimeter bazookas. It is not possible to estimate with any confidence the size of the interna tional trtic in small arms. The num bers of riflee, mechinegune, and other light weepone trsneferred outdde the major alliances since World War II might lie anywhere between 10 million and 50 million. It ie also ditlicult to gauge the effects of thh tratlic on the security and stability of the develop ing world. 31

and target Ioeators of various kkds, will inevi~bly find their way into the de~eloping world, consigned both to regulars and insurgents-and much sooner than we may expect. In contract with the lack of data on transfers of small arms (ss well as battlefield weapons and artillery), a great deal is known about transfers of larger weapons from the industrial to the developing natione. For several reasons, transfers of tanks, aircraft and naval veesels attract considerable publicity. To varying degrees, tbess larger weepone extend the range, speed, and scele of potential contlict, bringing wider areas under the threat 3

a high governmental level. The high cost of sophisticated systems, the many eecurity aspects surrounding the technology they represent, and the need for policy decieions regarding the political and economic impacte of the transfere abnoet inevitably require government participation in the nego tiation. In some of the more heated regional arms races, notably in the Middle Eaet, the spiraling buildup of combat aircraft hoe been the focal point of the comw]tion, around which all other military preparations are cluetered. Four suppliers-the Soviet Union, the United Ststea, the United KingMilitmy Review

THE 0EVELOPIN6

WORI.O

dom, and Franc+have accounted for about 98 percent of all jet combat air craft shipped to the developing world since the end of World War II, a total of over 5,000, including at least 500 bombers. Aecofding to available date, the breakdown, as of 1966, was about as follows: the Soviet Union, 1,870; tbe United States, 1,540; the United Kingdom, 1,280; France, 420.
Other Sourcss

affects the perceptions of the national Ieederehip. The experience of the Mid dle Eaet in 1967 and KesW1r in 1965 indkates that the peeeeseion of a vaet armory may give the leadership un warranted confidence in its ability to initiate and win a war. The experience of the Suez war in 1966 may further indicate that a rapid military buildup by one party can stimulate a preem~ tive attack by other parties.
Range of Expression

In addition, several other nations have strong exieting or future poten tials as sources of military jet air craft for the developing world. Im portant among these are Sweden, West Germany, Canada, Itely, Japan, Czech oslovakia, and Communist China. Their most potentials do not, how ever, match those of the four main suppliers. Clearly, large air forces are costly -costly not only in monetary terms, but in absorbing the energies of some of the most competent people in the countries involved. It ie important, therefore, to ask what eecurity they provide to either country or to the region generally. For obvious military reasons, the airpower of one side ,must be matched, at least qualitatively, by the other. Therefore, competing buildups in airpower tend to occur in an upward epiraling pattern. Yet tbe net gain in eeeurity, if a relative balance of power is maintained, may be negligi ble. Furthermore, the strategies im posed by the possession of highly effec tive offensive aircraft, based on highly vulnerable airfields, may be especially unstable, favoring tbe use of surprise attack. Even more basic, however, is the queetion of how the influx of air craft, tanks, and other large weapons
February 1W9

Conversely, it can be argued that the possession of modern combat air craft gives developing countries a greater range of expression, an ability to communicate degrees of intention and to make chows of force to the advereary which conventional ground forces could not provide. It seems likely, for example, that tbe Turkish Air Force, by carrying out sofiles over Cyprus in 1964, was able to communi cate Turkeys most serious concern about the Cyprus situation to the Greeks and to convince them of her readhess to intervene with troops if it dld not improve. In some cases, then, the limited com mitment of airpower across national borders may eerve as a substitute for attack by ground forces, with all the potential for escalation that would in volve. It is far more likely, as the Egyptian airstrikee against Yemen in dicate, that such uses of airpower sim ply tend to downgrade the whole con cept of sovereign and inviolate na tional borders. Of growing importance is the ques tion of retransferthat is, the second or later international transfer of cOm bat aircraft following their initial ex port from tbe country of manufacture. During tbe 20 years from 1945 to 1965, retransfers represented only
33

THE DEVELOPING

WORLO

about one percent of all the jet combat aircraft transferred to the developing countries. Since 1965, the number has been increasing rapidly. Obviously, the continuing reequipment of air forces around the world is beginning to create a relatively large surplus of jet fighters and bombers, aircraft whose longevity is impressive. To counteract their overdependence on outaide suppliers for spare parta and maintenance, some of the more advanced developing countries either have established licensed production of foreign aircraf on their soil or have attempted to i d ign and develop their own combat aircraft.
Egyptian Project

progressed at a much slower pace than corresponding programs in the indus trial countries. Even for less complicated parts and eubsysteme-for example, cockpk can opies or flight controls-the participa tion of foreign suppliers has been an essential element. Although tbe HF-24 program has resulted in the manu facture of several subsonic preproduc tion versions of the aircraft, it has not succeeded in ita main purpeee of pro viding a wholly independentcapability. licensed Production
Licensed production, on the other hand, appears to be a compromise so lution in that it provides at least a

In recent years, the Egyptian Gov ernment has attempted to develop its own supersonic fighter bomber, the HA-900.eThe Egyptian experience has demonstrated how difficult it is for a less-industrialized country to mount such an effort without ]arge quantities of outeide support, therehy defeating the programs main purpose. It be came necessary to set up recruiting and procurement activities in Switzer land in order to obtain qualified per sonnel, technology, and material from Western Europe to keep the program moving forward. Even with consider able outside participation, the project met with little success. Even in India, whose aircraft in dustry is well established, the attempt to develop indigenous, high-perform ance combat aircraft has been, for the most part, unsuccessful. In the mid 1960s, the watilme chief designer of Focke-Wulf emigrated to India and led a design team made up mainly of German engineere in the preliminary development of the HF..% supersonic, all-weather fighter. The effort has

slight amount of domestic control ovsr the source of supply. A current exam ple is the establishment of licensed production in India of the Soviet MiG-f!l fighter. Successful licensed production efforts have also been un dertaken in Israel who manufactures the French Maui-ster jet trainer un der license, and in South Africa who is establishing licensed production of the Italian M.B.926 jet trainer. In August 1967, the Israelis teek the un usual step of purchasing an entire US aircraft manufacturing firm in Or der to move its production facilities to Israel. Although licensed production as sures the availability of spare parts and, undoubtedly, helps to raise the level of domestic industrial technology, it has also proved to be estremely costly, ditlicuit, and time-consuming. Even within a single US aircraft com pany, the initial unit cost of manu facture at a second facility is much higher than at the original source. The rate at which costs at the second source approximate those of the pri mary source depends, to a great exMilitary ROVi@W

tent, on the skill and experience of personnel. When that source is a dif ferent country, all of the various man agement, industrial, and technical problems are .mukiplied greatly. Therefore, although licensed produc tion programs may slowly become more important in the advanced devel oping countries such as India, the sale

research rocket which had contributed to the French ballistic-missile pro gram. The exchange of statement illus trates two intereating pointa. The first is that the dhwct transfer to a devel oping country by a major power of complete and ready-to-operate offen sive ballistic-missile systems ie an ex-

Itam%in

One of 72 Israeli Mirage 11/.CJ multimission fighterspurchssedfrom Francesince 19s3 of completed aircraft will almost cer tainly continue to be the predominant form of transfer to the developing world. Early in 1966, it was reported in the American press that Israel had entered into an agreement with France to purchase a large number of French ballistic missiles. The report was im mediately and convincingly denied both in Paris and Tel Aviv.. French spokesmen were also quoted as eaying, however, that the French Government would not object if French private companies were to cooperate with Is rael in reeket research and develop ment. In particular, Ierael appeared to be interested in developing a two etage vehicle based on the ToPsze, a
Febreary 1969

tremely eensitive matter, virtually cer tain to stir up etrong political reac tions. The second is that the transfer of technology to support an ostensibly indigenous effort may rouse lees op position because many of the details can be held secret and because the re sults are not immediately apparent. The preews of ballistic-missile diffu sion is just beginning, and it is not likely to advance rapidly. The problems encountered by the United Arab Re public, similar to problems in her air craft development, illustrate the com plexities. Beginning ahout 1960, the Egyptian Government recruited rccket design ers in Weat Germany and elsewhere, and brought them together at a mis 35

THE DEVELOPING

WORLO

sile complex in Heliopolis. By 1962, there were over 260 Weat German rocket experta and technicians in the United Arab Republic, along with a total labor force of about 1,000. The development of three different liquidfueled ballistic missiles, somewhat reminiscent in their configuration of the V-2 miseilee, wee undertaken. The largest of these was to be a two-stage missile capable, of propelling a war head of 2,000 pounds acroes a distance of about 500 miles. The first publicly announced test flights of Egyptian miesilea cccurred in July 1962. Shortly thereafter, the two smaller of these missiles, of 200 mile and 325-mile range respectively, were displayed in the annual Revolu tion Day Parade in Cairo. Preeident Gamal Abdel Neeser claimed, at that time, that both were in quantity pro duction. A few months later, however, one of the German technicians was reported se saying that it would be several years before the rockets were reedy for military use.
Political Implications

received. Some of the eenior person nel are said to have been paid over $100,000 annually for their consulting servicw on the program. S]milarly, the prices paid for equipment and ma terials prccured in Europe were ob viouely intlated. In total, the Egyptian experience alweare to indicate that developing countries will be faced with almost insurmountable difficulties if they at tempt to develop effective ballistic miseile systems on a relatively auton omous basis. , The high coet of development,added to the uncertainties of trying to un dertake such a program without the neceseary domestic industrial base, may lead some developing countries either to seek the procurement of com plete miesile systems from abroad or to carry out what would be, in effect only a domestic facade for a foreignexecuted program.
Potential Suppliers By 1970, there will be five countries capable of supplying complete ballietk

It is obvious that the perfection of an effective ballistic weapon system has remained beyond the capabilities of a limited design team operating un der adveree cireumetances. However, the initiation even of a technically unpromising effort involving ballistic missiles has enough political potency to create etrong repercussions. The Israelis program of terrorism . against the German personnel, as well ae their political preseuree on West Germany to recall her scientists, are sufficient evidence of the political im plications of bellietic-miesile preeure ment. Furthermore, the cost to the United Arab Republic wee clearly enorrnoue in exchange for what she
aa

missile eystems and about 10 addi tional national euppliers of subsystem embracing guidance and control, pro pulsion, or aerodynamics. By 1976, it seeme likely that there will be as many as eight euppliers of complete systems and 11 additional euppliere of subsys tems. By 1980, there could be as many as 16 euppliers of complete systems and 12 additional suppliers of subsys tems (see chart). This expansion will result not only from military programs, but also from the increase in space activities throughout the world. Japan, for ex ample, has already supplied sounding rockets to Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and other countries. As the number of po tential missile suppliers grows, the
MNtery Rsvlsw

THE 0EVE10PlN6

WORM

bargaining power of potential recip. ients wi13 increase, and the enforcement of controIs over missile diffusion, in the event controls are attempted, WW grow staqdily more difficult. Although the ultimate effects of ballistic-mis~ile diffusion to developing
POTENWAL

tain to stimulate interest in weapons powerful enough te destroy large and valuable targets. In addition, the inproduction of be33isticmissiles into regional environments will atmost certcinly introduce new and unfamiliar strategic considerations among adver

SUPPLIERS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS ANOSUBSYSTEMS

%&m3

S@teme United States

Subemtems
United States Italy

ro 1970

USSR France United Kingdom China

USSR France United Kingdom China United Arab Republic Weat Germany Japan Above Plue The Netherlands Belgium Czechoslovakia India Abeve Plea
South Africa
Poland
Norway
Yugoslavia
Pakistan Indonesia Argentina Brazil
Chile

Canada
East @~y
Auetrelia
Sweden
Switzerland Iareel

1970-75

Aboos Plue United Arab Republic Japan Israel Abeve PIM West Germany Italy Canada Ecst Germany Australia Sweden Switzerland The Netherlands

1975-80

countries is unknown, at lesst some uossible effeeta can be identified. Because the cost of the fully deployed system is eo greet, it may demand tbe selection of targets such as cities or large economic complexes whose value is commensurate with the cost of the system. Missile procurement is virtually cerFebruary 1969

sariee which could, at least initially, produce marked instabilities. It is pefilnent to note that the end of a local interstate war usually marks an important takeoff point for the next round of an arms race. The termina tion of fighting in the Palestine War (1948), Suez (1956), the Sine-Indian war (1962), and Kashmir (1965)
31

THE DEVELOPING

WORLD

marked the beginning of a major stepup in arms procurement by one or both sides involved in these conflicts. In each ease, there were important changes in the quantity and quality of weapons procured, accompanied, in some cases, by changes in supplier alignment (for example, PakistanCbina). The reasons are obvioue. After corn. - bat experience, better easeesmentacan

motives associated with the cold war and the encounter of ideologies. The Weat has, on balancq made more efforts to restrain and control the flow of arms into the developing world than is generally realized. Transfers have often been made for what seemed in the WeN to be the right reasons-protecting a legally constituted government from subver sion and disorder, or trying to main tah some kind of stable military bal ance between states in a region. But even when the motives seem accept able, the results may be unpredictable, and the furnishing of arms remains an increasingly complicated and dan gerous process wbicb, in many aspects, ia not in the long-term interests either of the developing world or the major powers.
Common Appeals

Air Farm

awl Smwe Digest

Egyptian medium-rangemissile fired in 19s4 be made about the performance of dif ferent types of weapens, and there is also a pressing need for reequipment due to use and attrition. Furthermore, in the wake of tbe crisis, the leader ship is pafilcularly responsive to mil itary requeata. Why do major powers supply arms to the developing world? Certah eoo nomic motivations are apparent. Tbe desire to sell surplus equipment, to aesure orderly and sustained prodtic tion rum, and to help the national bal ance of payments have all been im portant faotors. But far more com pahg, patilcularly to the competing superpowers, have been the political 38

In the case of interstate wars, one ironic fact deserves consideration be cause it calls into question the whole rationale of the arms tratlic. It is that, when hostilities finally break out in an interstate conflict the same major powers which eupplied the armamente have abnost invariably joined in com mon appeala for a cease-fire. In the Horn of Africa, even though the United States and the Soviet Union were involved in competitive buildups of Somalian and Ethiopian forces, they joined in a direct appeal in 1964 to bring the fighting to an end. Simi larly, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union worked urgently for a cease-fire in the Kashmir dispute of 1965. In many such conflicts, there are grounda for suspicion that the influx of weapons from a major power provided the ag gressor with the confidence he needed to start the fighting.
Militcfy Rr.vlsw

THE 0EVELOPIN6

WORI.O

There are no easy answers to the question of how to control the inter national traffic in armaments, and the prognosis is not especially hopeful. The Soviet Union, who since 1965 has tended to set the pace of the traffic, shows every sign of continuing her preeent course. In spite of setbacks both in Indonesia and the United Arab Republic, the Soviets have given ample evidence in their resupply of equip ment to tbe United Arab Repubiic and in the hasty introduction of weapons into the Nigerian conflict that they are not ready to abandon arms exporta as an instrument of their national pol icy toward tbe developing world. In part, it may simply be that, once a bureaucracy hae been developed to handle thie type of transaction, the momentum of the activity becomes sufficient justification for its contin uance. An additional sign is that So viet logistic capabilities to support this type of activity, in the form of airlift and sealift, have improved dra matically in the last few years and appear to portend more extensive So viet arms exports in the future. Initiatives of various kinds to in vestigate international arms transfers have been made from time to time. In November 1965, the Maltess delega tion to the United Nations placed a draft resolution before the General Assembly which called for the United Nations to eetablish: . . . a general and effective 8z18t8m of publicitg to tra?wfer8 betw8en etutee, whether by way of trade or otherwbe, of arms, ammunition and implements of war. Similarly, in June 1967, the Pres ident of the United States proposed an arms registration system, under
February 1989

UN auepicee, for all weapons chipped to the IWddle East. Probably under lying both of theee propoeals wae the assumption that publication of trans fers would, in itself, constitute a par tial deterrent to the tratlic. But the value of publication could also go much fnrther. . A more intensive public or private international effort to aeeemble a bcee of information on arms tranefers, even if it were not totally reliable, would in evitably result in a better understand ing of the tratlic in arms. Until more professionals in the fields of defense, strategy, and arms control become bet ter acquainted with the details of the problem, it will not be possible to con firm or deny, by analysie, that the in ternational arms traffic represents a net lees in international security. One suspects, for example, that weapons occasionally do precipitate conflicts; that the traffic in arms pro vides a tacit major power endorsement of military conflict and competition in the developing world; that the largescale import of miIitary hardware or technology is producing, in tbe devel oping countries, effecte of a social, po litical, and economic nature that no one really understands; and, finally, that a tone is being eet in the con duct of international relations that may some day react adversely on the major powers themselves. For a long time to come, sovereign natione will etill need arms. The be ginning of wisdom will be the recog nition by all psrtks in the East, the West, and the developing world that a greater international effort is needed to measure the ecope of the arms traffic and calculate ita present and possible future effects on international eecu. rity,
39

Maior GeneralDavidW. Gray, Urdted Stotea Arm, Retired

LL organisations use some means of Periodically re viewing and analyaing their activities to determine how well their goale are being achieved. In those organizs tiona designed to make a protl~ this process is relatively simple and generally uniform since achievement ran be ex pressed quantitatively, and major goals ran be smnrnariaed in terms of profit and loss. Conversely, in military organisations, which by their nature are nonprofitmeking, this review process is not sim ple. Since thaaa goals usually are expraasad, to come degres at leae~ in qualitative terms, they are more didicult to de ilne and to meaaure precisely. This probably explaina, in hill~ Rerhw

UMR?ERLY

RNFEW

part, why each military headquarters has a somewhat different approach to this problem.
Prrrpes8

The purpose of a periodic review and analysis process is to assiet the commander in determining the degree of attainment in carrying out the ma jor responsibilities assigned to him. The process is not intended se a means of monitoring day-to-day actions or the requirements in the form of ac tions or projeeta assigned by Depart ment of the Army, although these will, to some extent, emerge in the process. The main purpose is to assess the sta tus of principal responsibilities in or der to anticipate difficulties before they become critical probleme, and ar rive at appropriate solutions to elimi nate the eeuses. Although the staff should ferret out Major General David W. Gray, US Avrng, Retired, waa gradmted from the US MiMaw Academy, West Point, in 19.7s. He has served with Head quarttwa, 6th AvmrI; Z4th Infantrll Di vision, Japan; and with the .Wth In fantW and Heudqmw%ere, 10th Cows, during the Korean (kw@et. He held van-we pemtiona with ths Department of the ArmII, including Divector, Op eration Directorate. In 1957, he went to Germunri where he ae?ved with the Ilth Airborne Divisiw %th Infantrv Division, aud with 5th Corpe. During the Lebanon crisis in Beirut, lw cm man&d the $34th Airborne Brrgode. He retwned from Get-many and wus aawgnzd as AvmII Membev of the Jo+nt Strategic Swverl Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1961. He again went to KoTea in 1968 WhST8he assumed com mand of the 7th Infantrg Division. At the time of hia VetiT.3?tZc?)tt in JulII 1968, he waa Depaty Commanding Gcneval, US Continental Amnrt Com tnand, Fovt Monroe, Virginti.
Febreary we

meet of the problems, the review should be presented in sufficient depth and scope to enable the commander to identify additional probbmm besed on hk broader knowledge of higher headquarters policy. Essential to this process is a means of smmnarichg and highHghting problems se a basic for positive and continuing followup on action taken.
Review by Exception

There are several methode by which these requirements can be accom plished. One, and, perhapa, the meet used, is to have each functional etaff section present the reeponeib]litiea or tbe elements of reeponeibilitiee which fall within its province. In come com mands, the review will consist of a complete and comprehensive rundown of every responsibility. This will give the commander a det.idlsdand periodic look at every aspect of his operations. However, it will aleo ineure that the commander will spend too much time on the review and that hie staff will be bored. This, of course, ie selfdefeating since the review must be de signed to produce pesitive results and not be just a periodic onerous chore. To prevent thk from happening, re view by exception is often used in lieu of a comprehensive review. In thie pro cedure, each etaff section ch:ef reports only on those aspects of the commande responsibiFitiae which present prob lems or in which performance has been oot of the ordinary. This approach re duces considerably the time needed for the review, but it places responsibility on the staff section chief rather than the commander for determining whet are the critical areas. There is always the temptation for a presenter to omit controversial or advsrse data. How ever, with a competent etaff worthy 41

of the commandere conddence, tbie ehould present no real problem. The commander may specify the type of data to be presented in con ntilon with each responsibility of the command. Thie review by direction in sures that the commander will be given aU the eaeential data on matters in which he has a particular interest without having to. spend time on non eeeentials. AS tbrm of tbeae methods have one eerious drawback-so long es each section chief reporta on only his part of the commands reaponeibilitiee, the commander will get a diejointed and dkcontinuoue picture of hh re eponeibSitiea and one which doea not lend itself well to a clear determina tion of potentiil problems.
Sinslo Ofiaa system

hence, the name mieeion monitor sys tem. Each omce provides the data for which it ie responsible to the deaig natad monitor who, in tu~ easamblea the data in a coherent form for pres entation to the commander. The de fects of a eingle otiice approach are thereby avoided. The commander is provided a full anelyeie of each of his principal miesione by the 05ce etaff which ie moat concerned with that mis sion and beet qualified to discuss it.
Essential thamteriatics

Commands have sought to eolve this problem in several waye. In one solu tion, each fun&Ional otlice or section reporta the data for which it ie re sponsible to a single otlic~sually the comptroller. The comptroller then ar rangec the date as it applies to the commande major reaponeibilitiee and preeenta the entire review to the com mander with the functional office cbiefe acting se backup. This method might be termed the single 05ce eyetem. It will wor& but it has a major flaw. One presenter, no matter how skilled and knowkdgenble, cannot speak with the same authority es the otllce cti]efe who are responsi ble for the activities being diecussed. Aleo, in condensing and rednhg the presentation, many of the nuancea of problems inevitably are lost. An alternative ie to eoneolidete the assigned reqamaibilitiee of the com mend into major miseions and to des ignate appropriate functional otlice chiefe to monitor these mieeione

Therefore, some of the deaireble characteristka of a geed review and analyeis are: The review ehould be beeed on the commands mieeions se developed from ite eesigned responsibilities. The essential eepeets of each mie eion should he covered each tiie, but the review muet be concise and of rea sonable length. The data for each miseion should he eetabliehed by dirtilon and pre sented by a miesion monitor. To permit flexibility, presenta tion of additional data by exception also should be allowed at the dkcre tion of the mission monitor. A positive means of followop on problems encountered ehould be estab lished se an integral part of the process. . The review process used at the US Continental Army Command (US CONARC) is a good example of the application of these guidelines. CON ARC ie a major euhordinate ele ment of the Department of the Army. It includes 42 tilve poeta in main land United States on which are lo cated 17 training centers, 26 schools, and &637 units of all typea and sires from detachment to divieione. All these activities are controlled through
Militafs Revtw

QUARTERLY

REYIEYf

REMTIOSBHIPB ~nitiea

BCIWENRESPONSIBILITIES
MOOSW~

AND MISBIOMS

Departmentof tbe Army

AeshncAby

(MmncnAMissions WSPOmdbiiity shownin

permtbecie

1. Command CONUSAMDW (num- bered armiea in the continental United Statee and Military District of Washington, US Army), installations, and actMtiee. 2, Plan: program, and coordinate reqmremente and supervise use of resources for basic and euppurt missions.
3. Administer military justice,
claims, and ins~lon and re view funti]ons.
4. Conduet the public information
program.
6. Command tbe US Army Forces Strike Command and provide Army component command planning assistance to the Commtmder in Chief, Atlantic. 6. Command, organize, train, equip, and ineure combat readiness of assigned troop units. 7. Plan for and support civil author- ities in domestic emergencies. 8. Plan for and execute missions as- signed relative to defense, other
than air defense, of continental
United Stetea and to military
participation in civil defense.
9. Supervise training of Reserve component unite.

1. Command Structure. Provide within available resources the commend structure, essential re zourcee, and dirtilon required to command US Continental Army Command aasimed installations (Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptrol ler).

2. Strategic Army Forces. Achieve a Strategic Army Forces pceture in the continental United States tbat, within assigned Priorities and available resources, can best fulfill the requirement of appropriate plans, to include the US Army Forces Strike Commend and the US Army Forces, Atlantic, responsibilities (Deputy Cldef of Staff for Military Operations).

9. Reeewe Forces. Maintain a US Army Rcaerve tba~ within avail able resources and priorities, will beat complement the Active Army in fulfilling requirements of mo bilization and contingency plans; establish training criteria for and euperviee and inspect trdbing of continental US Army National Guard unite (Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations). 4. Fiscal. Insure provieion of adequata Snancial resources end ef fective financial management (Deputy Chief of Staff, Comp troller.) *

10. Budget end fund for financial rc. Sourcee.

m---

QUARTERLY

REYIEW

the five regional Army headq~rters and the M]litary District of Wash ington. CONARC derives ita missions from 26 r~poneibititiee given to it by the Department of the Army which can be encompassed in the over-all mission of preparing unita and individuals of the Active Army and Reserve compon ents for any contingency which may occur. To carry out these responsibilities, CONARC is organiked funtilonally into six general staff ofScea: personnel, intelligence, operations, individual training, logieties, and the comptroller. In addition, there are seven special staff officw for support functions-the adjutant general, provost marehal, surgeon, judge a@cate, information officer, chaplain, and the inspector general.
Two Programs

therefore, are also referred to as hori zontal programs. An example of the relationship between the functional programs and the command mission programs is shown in Figure 1. The first four command mission programs-command structure, the US Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), the Reserve forces, and the training bees-include the majority of the physical resources of the command, or, in other words, the operating forces. The remaining five programs-logis tics, intelligence, personnel, medical, and fiscal-are largely systems which ! support the operating f&ces.
Division Is Clear

CONARC has estebliphed two sets of progra-functional programs to guide the staff, and commandmission programs to guide the commander. The functional programs were developed by subdividing the 26 responsibilities into functional elements and assigning these to appropriate functional staff offices. In Someceeee, an entire respon sibility fell witbin tha purview of a single office. Since the various ele ments flow vertically downward into separate compartments of the staff, these functional programs also are re ferred to as vetilcel programs. The command mission programe were developed by combining associ ated responsibilities into nine groups and designating each group as a com mand mission. Since, in the majority of eases, these missions concern more than one functional office, they flow horizontally across the staff, and, 44

The division of activities among these programs is clear in some cases, a matter of judgment in other cases, and containe some overlap in still others. For example, the living quar ters occupied by STRAF and by the training base are included in the com mand structure program rather than in STRAF or training base programs since the quarters are constructed and maintahed by the post, and the troops using them are merely tenante who constantly vary in composition and strength. On the other hand, school buildings, being designed for and es sential to the school mission, are un der the training base miseion program. Training facilities used by all per sonnel on the post are a part of the command structure, whereas mission peculiar facilities such as jump towers for airborne troops are a part of the STRAF mission program. Similarly, tbe status of personnel assigned to training centers is a part of the train ing base program, but the status of all personnel assigned to CONARC falle under the personnel mission pro gram. e hrilitcrg Rericw

WJARTERLY RMEW

Fobmafy 1969

The review process beeed on these programs consists of three phases. In Phase I, each general and special staff office conducts its own internal review of ita functional programs, given by the responsible division or branch chief to the otiice chief. Since tbh is a complete examination of all sctivi tiee of importance witbin the office, it may be termed a comprehensive re view. Each staff office develops the content of its functional programs according to a at+mdardformat pub lished in a headquatirs memorandum. Each program includes an objective or objectives and specific progress in dicators by which performance is measured. Every effort is made to find quantitative progress indicetore, but sometimes qualitative indicators must be used. Thus, although comprehensive in scope, this process is, in reality, review by direction (Figure 2).
Chiefs Meet

a review by direction. Addltionelly, each mission program contains an open end second tilon designed to permit the inclusion of any significant date or problems not directed by the headquarters memorandum, but ob tained se fallout from the functional reviews. Thus, the mission programs actually enable review by both dires tion and exception. This insurw that the commander is expesed to the really significant items on a recurring basis and also provides for a review of tran sitory items se required. At the time of the mission presenta tions to the Chief of Staff, the special staff also presenta significant parts of their functional programs which they consider of intereat to the general staff, and recommends selected items to be included in the mission program presentations to be made to the com mander.
Presentation to Cemmsnder

Phase II of the review involves a meeting of the chiefs of tbe general and special staff otlicea with the Chief of Staff. The otlicers designated se monitors for the mission programs present their mission program reviews as they have developed them from eup potilng data separately obtained, se well se from facta selected f mm the functional reviewe. Again, a standard format is used. Each mission ie sub divided into mission elements, and each mission element sets forth the objectives and status of the program in terms of the principal resources needed for support-that is, personnel, facilities, equipment, supplies, and
funds.

Since these programs, including the raporthg and the reviewing criteria, are publiehed in a headquarters mem orandum, this process also constitutes

After tbe staff chiefs have agreed on ita content, the review is presented to the commander. Pbese 111 of the review consists of two parte: the pres entation of the mission programs, and a summary of the significant problems identified in tbe presentation. Since these problems will be resolved by the staff on a functional basis, rather than by the miesion monitor, they are re grouped in the summary by functional otlice rather than by mission program. This tixea responsibility for staff ac tion and provides a means for peritilc followup at weekly or monthly staff meetings. The CONARC method follows the guidelines stated earlier. Tbe review is geared dhctly to the commanders nine missions which cut across func tional line.%By prescribing the objec tives and the progrese indicators to be
Mllrtwy Review

WNERLY

REVIEW

used, reasonable brevity is assured, but flexibility is provided by including other data by exception. Positive fol lowup also baa been incorporated. Thus, the review enables the com mander to anticipate problems in ids primary missions and ta take correc tive action. AddedBentdits Additional benefits accrue from the review process. In presenting ita func tional programs to its office chief, each branch and dhision knows that it is initiating a process which wiU even tually cuhnkmte in the commanders review. This feeling of patilcipation is heightened by the feet that the etaff office chief must rely on other olticea formuch of his essential data. The re sulting coordination serves to cross ed ucate tbe staff personnel and make them more fully aware of how their atilvities mesh with those of other offices in accomplishing the command ers principal miesions. This is par. titularly important in todays rapid turnover of personnel. These review and analysis proce dures are designed for use quarterly, but the major requirements placed on CONARC frequently shift at other times. Because of the croea relation ship between the command mission and functional programs, the eeme proce dures can also be used at any time to inform the commander on how changes in requirements or resources will af fect his ability to carry out his mis sions. These procedures may also help to resolve the frustrations of those who eeek to overcome the compertmenta tion commonly found in functional or ganisations by organizing the staff along mission instead of functional lines. Experience bee shown that such

mizeion+riented organizations era not only expensive in manpower, but they inevitably lend to staffs witbin staffs competing for ascendancy. If the com mand mission and functional programs are properly constituted, these creee relation procedures can overcome staff parechialiem no matter how drmly en trenched or how strong the perzoneli tiee who guide it.
Funding

Funding provides one example of the importance of the creee-relation process. Since all funds muet be used by functional otlhws,they are disWlb uted within the headquarters purely on a functional beeie. Thus, funds are not budgeted for STRAF itself, but are aUocated to OSkea such se opera tions, pereonnel, and logistics. Using this precedurq tbe commander would not be aware of how much money is spent on STRAF se compared with schocda,training centers, and the rest of his physical plant. However, eince the functional and command mission programs have been cross related, it is feasible to sum marize tbe major fund alkatione un der the command missions. Thue, throughout the year, unfinanced re quirements can be related te principal missions. At the end of the year, a final determination can be made se to how availability of funds has affected mission performance. Iaeking further to the futu~ it maybe feasible to al locate funds to command mimion pro grams and then cross allocate these to functional programs for expenditure. CONARCS automatic data proceed ing (ADP) programs also may benefit from WISprocess. From the etzndpoint of CONARC alonq the objectkas and progress indicators of the varioue pro grams can serve se a means of eatab 41

RUARTERLY

REVIEW

lisidng finite requirements for a data information system and priorities for progressive implementation of that system. It also can establish sound justification for acquisition of ADP equipment on a long-term beeis and relative priorities for tbe installation of equipment acquired. To some extent, this benefit hea al ready been realised in validating tbe soundness of CONA~Cs current ADP progrenis. Looking even further abead, when the normal daily acthitiez of a staff will be automated to a consider able eatent, the command mission and functional programs will provide a log ical basis for that automation. Lastly, tide review process antici pates peseible future developments in resource management. At present, projects are underway at Fort Ben ning, Georgia, and witldn the 6th Army to teat various aspects of re source management under the aegis of either the Department of Defense or the Department of the Army. Previ ously, tests had been conducted at Fort Carson, Colorado. None of these testa covers the entire spectrum of activities which may be necessary or which is euitable -for intensive management. Such tests do not necessarily cover the most essential actilvitiea. Rather, they have been based, to a great extent, on activities which easily lend themselves to test at this time. The commsnd mission programs, se developed at CONARC, have essential application at the continental army and post level, although they naturally would need to be altered to fit reepon sibilitiee peculiar to each level of com mand and be expanded considerably to cover the more finite and detailed re

sponsibilities at post level. In any event, the CONARC review process does provide a sound beeis for the de velopment of resources management throughout CONARC and, particu larly, in the establishment of priori ties for activities ta be managed. Thk is especially important in view of the considerable investment in ADP equip menh personnel, and facilities which will be required if present conceptual ideas of resource managementare pur sued. The quarterly review and analysis process as developed at CONARC not only serves the requirements of the command to aeeeez its situation peri odically, but seek to anticipate fur ther sophistication in the management of military resourcw. Any system such as tlds must be dynamic to be contin ually effective. Although the broad missions of CONARC may not change to any appreciable degree, the specific objectives will vary considerably. Vietnam, for example, has brought definite and positive changea to many of CONARCs programs. The com mander will recognize and direct many of these changes, but it is also the rwponsibility of all the pereonnel throughout the offices who play a part in the review process to be constantly alert to changes in the situation and to recommend consequent, necessary changes in the programs. Although modifications to fit each individual organization would be nec eseary, thie system of review and anal ysis could be applied to all military organizations and to those civilian or ganisations, both governmental and private, whose control mechanisms are organized along functional lines.

46

Militery Rwiew

ColonelEdwardF. Cellena%United StoteE Armg

ERRORISM has long been a favorite weapon of in surgents. Difficult to control, it can quicldy destroy the confidence of the people in their government. But ita indiscriminate use can also alienate popular support for the insurgents themselves. The experience of Venezuela from 1960 through 1964 offers an excellent ease study of a campaign of Communist terrorism, representing 8s it doee a complete cycle from start to finish. The campaign etarted in 1960, shortly after President R6mulo Betancourts govermnent turned down
February 1S69

49

vEHRuE# by democratic proeeazee. The Bctan conrt regime in 1960 inhertted serious smioeeonomic problems along with the mandate to govern White there was a large income from the oil induetry, th~rc was also widcapraad poverty and mzez unemployment. The Conmmniata exploited these problems to advantage in their campaign to overthrow the govermnenL
Polftioal Bass effort

Iievm9 Militaim .iInfwtion R6muloBetancoart

Fidel Castros request for a, loan of 300 million dollars, and it ended with the presidential election in Venezuela in 1964. President Betancourt was the first president of Venezuela to be elected Colonel Edward F. CaUamzn ie mth the Ofie of ~he A88i8tunt Secretury of Defmwe (Manpowsr and Reecrve Affai?8) in Wa8hin@0tt, D. C. He u?80 8erved in Washington with the Ofier Psr80nnel Directorate, O@e of Psr 8onm31Operation% and with the O@e of the Deputg Chief of Staff for Logis tiG8. Other OSSignm~ti i7wkt.d8 duty with the 16th InfantW in Germany, th8 ~bth Division in Korea, and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and Vietnam. A graduate of the US MiU taru Acadenw, he how an M..4. from George Washington Univsreity, and W~ graduat8d fTOm ths US Arnw Command and Gsncnd Staff CoUege and the US ArmII War CoUege.
50

The political base of the insurgent of the Vene wee a combkistion zuelan Comnmnist Party, with an eati meted memberzldp of 30,000 to 40,000, and a small pro-caatro party-the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. Both partkz drew their support from profozeionale, intellectuals, atudenta, and trade union membere in the large urban areae. Neither ever developed a signitteent following in the rural areae. No other political psrty joined or eupportad the insurgency. Overt insurgency began in October and November 1960 with riotz in Ca rasas and a call for a general etrike. These failed to overtbrow the governmen~ and the Conmmniet insurgents developed a five-stage plan for rapid victory as opposed to a protracted in surgency effort. The objective was a Conmmniet tnkcover in late 1962 or early 1963. The first three stages were to be cxcsuted eimultaneouelyuntil ap proximately the end of 1961. Then etage W would start. In the first stage, activist unita were to be found in Caracas and other nr ban areae. Stage II wae to see the ini tiation of organized urban violence. During 1961, there were 113 signiti cant riots in the urban areas, reenlti ing in nine dead and S9 wounded. In etage III, urban violence would be increased to include terrorist unit ItilitayRcdNI

attacks. Thla stage started in the late summer of 1961. During the period October to Deeember, 1.!3were killed and 32 wounded in the cities. Five of the desd were @iea oiltcere. This stage cliiaxed in January 1962. Taking advantage of a transport workers strike in San Crist6bal, an insurgent unit seised a local radio sta tion and broadcast an exhortation for an insurrection of the people. Subse quent riots and acte of terroriem in the cities from 22 to 25 January left 19 dead and 110 injured, On the night of 26-29 January, a unit comprised of 138 armed youths wcs captured before executing a suicidal atAackon military installations in La Guaira, the port of Caracas. Stage IV was to be the period of rural guerrilla activity, the purpose of which was to give the insurgents con trol of the rural areas. After January 1962, when it started, urban insur rectionist activity subsided. It appears unusual that the inaurgenta would di vide their rural and urban activities by time phases. Perhaps they hoped to conserve their urban resources until stage V.
Effort a Debacle

sident miM.ary units of the govern ment became impatient and demanded that stage V begin. Tbia wee tQ be a revolutionary war by aU elements, cul minating in a Cemnmnist assumption of power. It was to start with the re volt of some of tbe governmente troops and would include increased ur ban terrorism. This stage aborted at ita start when the two marine unita scheduled to tilgger the action mie tiied their revoka. One unit defected early and the other Fete.In both casee, the mutinies were crnshed with reFa tive ease. The Communists drat at tempt at a rapid victory had failed.
Terrorism Intenstihd

In any event, the rural guerrilFaef fort was a debacle. The guerrillas were, in most cases, not from the areas of operationa. Rather, in many caeea, they were urban studente recruited for this duty, and they failed to gain support from the loud rural populace. With the exception of two groups in Falc6n and El Charal, which were led by men with local family connections, the government forces were able to break up and capture the main guer rilla forces. while stage IV wee still progressing toward dieaater, the leaders of dis
F8bnmry 1669

The inaurgenta then developad a second pbm. They again opted for a quick victory because they attached great importance to preventing Betan court from completing hia term of of fice in December 1963. Therefore, they rejected a etrategy of protracted in surgency. The plan called for unprece dented levels of sabotage, arson, and terrorism to continue right up to elec tion time if necessary. The hope wee tbaL if Bctancourte admhistration continued to react by legal means only, the people would ba come uncertah of the governments abiliW b maintahi law and order. At the same time, it was hoped that the military forces would become alarmed at the danger to the state and would stage a COWP detut. On the other hand, if the regime responded with ucdawful repressive measures, the hope wee that people would respond with revulsion and overtbrow the government. In either case, the Communists looked forward to seizing power in the reaulfi ing turmoil and confusion. With only an urban insurgency ap paratus of between 600 and 1,000 ter 51

VENEZUELA roriata remaining, urban terror was the method selected. This time the plan had two stages. The ttrs~ to axtend from the summer of 1962 to the autunm of 1968, would include arson, sabotage, robbery, and terroriem. The main strength of the ineurgent organi cations would not be employed in this stage. The objective was the overthrow ,

Meanwhile, the tide of terrorism continued to rise. The ineurgente re peatedly goaded the military forces by attacks on personnel and their raei dencee. The government, after a particularly provoking attack on a crowded excureion train. instituted strong emergency measures. Neither the military forces nor the pcditicel

lneidmts of Terrorism and ~0~ ill urban has

196.?
August September October November December 21 48 43 6 6 January February March April May June F&mm1. of the Betancourt regime by coup detut or by popular revolt. The eecond stage, to begin in the autumn of 1963 if Betancourt were still in pewer, included a ricing tempo of terkorism, arson, sabotage, and sniping, combined with an outright civil war in Caracas using weapone smuggled in from Cuba. The ineurgente had to execute both phasea. The monthly frequency of in cidente of terroriem and sabotage in volving urban areas indicates that the plan wae followed (see Figure 1). As the campaign progreased, the in aurgenta enlisted known criminale, and the campaign degenerated into a mix ture of terrorist-criminal violence which threatened society and the gov ernment. An attitude of revulsion on the part of the public wae inevitable. 52 46 74 63 41 44 44

IM3
July August September October November December
70

74 164 240 252 122

parties reacted as the Communietehad hoped. There was no coup detit or popular revolution. The second etage of this plan in. eluded outright civil war in Caracas to eeize a portion of the city to assist in disrupting tbe elections. Weapone from Cuba were to be used. This stage was dierupted when the arms cache wae captured by the government, and, in November, the detailed plane for the attacka in Caracaa were also cap tured. The elections were held in December ae echeduled with over 91 percent of the registered votere taking part, and RadI Leoni eucceededto the presidency on 11 March 1964. The eecond insur gency plan had failed. A review of the methods used by the Military Review

VENEZUELA
terrorists and the governments coun terrneeeuree indicates why the terror ist campaign failed. The insurgents, in their urban efforts, employed both small-unit terrorism and mass terror ism. The basic organization, the Ur ban Tactical Unit, numbered about 30 people organized into detachments and subsections. Normally, five to eight hard-core terrorista performed the ac tual acta of terror. Other persons col lected funds, supplies, and intelligence, or conducted training. Private resi dences, apartments, and offices in built-up areas were used as bases, and the universities, with their traditional immunity, also provided sanctuary. Detailed Planning

frequently using automobile%The pur pose of thie type of terrorism was to cause the populace and the military forces to lose confidence in the govern ments ability to provide security. In mess terrorisu the insurgents used two teehniqu%niper fire and street violence by emaff shock bri-

Planning was meticulous and de tailed as evidenced by the fact that the government captured 774 opera tion plans in 1963 alone. One example of such planning is the spectacular robbery which the insurgents staged in January 1963 when 15 terrorieta stole valuable paintings from a French exhibition in a Caracas museum. They arrived in two cars and one truck rigged with an antennato appear as a police vehicle. The raid took place in daylight when hundreds of school children were in the museum. Their presence wae counted upon to inhibit the reactions of the guards. The insur gents escaped. The best examples of pure, emall unit terrorism were the random as sassinations of police officere. In Ca racas alone, 26 policemen were aseas sina~ed in one year, and another 55 were wounded. The types of persons attacked and their number in a two yeer period in Caracas are shown in Figure 2. Small-unit terrorist tactics were mainly hit-and-run in gangster style, February 1969

Annv Plans for civil war in Csracae were thwartedwhengovernment forres discov ered the srms csche gadea. The tactics of these check bri gades was simple. When the govern mente security forces were attending to urban disturbances, riota, or demon strations, these brigades would ap pear at another Iecation, set up bar ricades to halt traffic, burn automo biles and buses, set gasoline stations afire, and spread tacks and nails to disrupt tratlic. The largest outbreak of mass terror occurred in Caracas on 19 November 1963 in an attempt to enforce a cell for a revolutionary general strike. Shock brigades, rising their various tactics, attempted to increase the dfs
53

ruption, destruction, and confusion. In addition, snipers killed 12 persons and wounded 30. Thle all-out effort at mesa terror failed because the gov ernment took resolute counteraction, and the popnlsce, unsympathetic to the insurgents cause, did not reepond to the call to revolt. They were rmxioue to return tn life 8s usual. Even on the second day, when five ersone were Idled and 15 were

not defend itself by adopting un democratic methods, no matter how expedient. This premise imposed sig nificant restraints on the efforts of the government. There were ordy two de partures from this philosophy: The legal immunity of the uni versities which provided sanctuary to ineurgent elements finally had to be withdrawn. In October 1963, the outspoken

Tefrorist Tergets io Caracas July N6Z to Juty 1964 TarESC FrcyucncH

Police and National Guard Personnel, Reaidencee, and Installations W:litary Personnel, Reaidencee, and Installations Government Personnel, 0f3cee, and Residences Political Party Personnel, OSicee, and Meetinga Private Citiim and Residences

60 99 33 9 42 86

US Personnel and Property Pignre 2. wounded, life had returned to an al most normal at.ste. By 21 November, the attempt had been quelled. This use of mess terror comb]ning shock bri gade action and anipere is a technique
unique to the Venezuelan insurgency. What wsre ths governmente coun

teractions? J In examining the govemmente countermeasures, one basic fact must be undereteod. The Betancourt regime decided to treat the insurgency es a question of maintaining internal law and order. The government adopted the philos ophy that the insurgency must be met by legal and humane methods es a matter of policy. A democracy could 84

supporters of the insurgency who were members of the legislature, norndy untouchable by virture of legislative immunity, were imprisoned. As the December elections ap proached, the government wee being pressed by the rising terrorism and could no longer allow inviolate en couragement of the insurgents. How ever, in general, the govemroent ad hered to the limitations of legal, demo cratic reaponee to the threat. In terms of internal security forces, the country bed four separate forces at the national level: the Security Police under the Ministry of Intarior Relations, the Crinhrd Investigation Police under the Ministry of Justice, Mllitcry Rdm

Tredic Police under the Ministry of Communications, and the National Guard under tha Ministry of Defenze. In addkion, each of the 20 states and three federal districts had its own pcdice force. The armed forces, prin cipally the army, assisted when called upon.
Police OrgsrIization Problems

The problems caused by police or ganization are best illustrated by the eituation in Caracas. The capital had six eecurity forces: National Guard; Security, Criminal Investigation, and Traffic Police at the national level; the police of tbe federal district of Venezuela; and the police of Miranda state at the state level. Coordhation and cooperation were difficuR to achieve. Adequate equipment was also a major problem. The police forces in Caracas did not receive enough radio patrol ears and a satisfactory radio communications net until early 1963. The police forces outside the capital had to wait even longer. An even more important problem from the governments viewpoint was the traditional lack of trust and re spect between the people and the in ternal security forces, especially the police. This situation was caused by the historical role of tbe police and the armed forces as the oppressive arm of pact dictatorships. The government took steps to remedy this situation. The regime took special pains to encourage frank discussion of police problems. In fact, the government used this approach ae a means of ob taining more funds for the police forces. In cases where police brutality was charged, full investigations were made, and punishments were admin istered when appropriate.
February 1969

Perhapa moat important of ail wee the fact that the government explained to the people that no security force could provide 100-percent protection from terrorist and insurgent actions. In addition, in attempting to im prove police-pubIic relations, the government advertised police sucw?ssee in newapapera, established an emer gency police phone number in Car acas, and encouraged newspapers to publicize the bereaved familiee of as sassinated police officers. The gover nmentalso put ita police forces into civic action programs. These pro grams included work on improved urban sanitation and free traneporta tion for the sick and needy to gover nmenthealth facilities. Army troops served with success during the riots of October 1960, John F. Kennedys visit in December of 1961, and the violence of January 1962 and January 1963, culminating in suc cessful patrol duty prior to the elec tions in December 1963. The National Guard performed its internal seeurity mission under the control of the nationaI government. It earned a good reputation and main tahied an excellent relationship with the people, but, at a strength of 9,000, it was overextended. Twofold Technique The basic counterterrorist technique of the government was twofold: To provide improved and more effective eecurity forces to counteract the terrorists efforts. To affirm the ability of a demo cratic government to do so within the limitations imposed by the democratic way of life. One reason that the insurgency failed can be found in the small num ber of active insurgenta who were 55

VENEZUELA actuaffy moblfized. Operating from a political bsee of 90,000 tQ 40,000 people in a nation of over eight million population, the movement initiated a violent urban terrorist program with an atilve roster that numbered 600 to 1,000 men. The insurgents, at this low strength, had dared to open their second campaign to gain eecendency after suffering defeat in their first campaign. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the irrsrrrgerrta ever gained public support. In the rural areas, they met quick defeat. In the urban areas, they did not succeed in obtaining eupport for classic mess action such se the revolutionary general strike against the government. The urban public re

acted with indifference to the insur gent cause. On the govermnente side, the mil itary forces, with few exceptions, sup ported the elected regime. In addition, the measures taken to improve the ef fectiveness of the seeurity forces through increased efficiency and im proved relations with the populace were meet beneficial. Perhaps the most important factor was the moral position gained by the government in maint.zbring itself by legal and demo cratic meeeuree in the face of a long and vicious insurgency campaign which used terrorism as a principal weapon. This is an important lesson counterinsurgerrte can learn from Venezuelas experiences.

The absorption of Cuba into tbe Soviet cenrp has made tbe danger of communism evenmoreacute in the WesternHemisphere. Fer althenghRrweia in reeentyears sPPearB to havetakenthe %rrrrservative approachof sttempt iog te woo macefollowingfor ite ideology,Castro,whe dependson the USSR for his survival,hss intensifiedCubae eupport of insurgencyand guerrilla activity. YorI could eey thst the Communfetsare thus covering all bets with their varied approsehee. Geweral Robert W. Porter, Jr.

56

Militaty ROVIOW

reader survey to assist in &aluating the magazines effectiveness and to determine measures to be taken for further improvement. We believe those who participated in the survey, as well as other readers, would like to share in the knowledge gained from the sumey and the editorial changes that are planned as a consequence. The survey was carried out by means of a seven-paga questionnaire distributed with the September issue of tlra Military Review. Twelvehundred questionnaires were sent to English edition readers selacted at random. This representa 10 percent of all paid subacribem and readers who receive the magazine from official distribution, except that no questionnaires were sent to raaders in Southeast Asia or to foreign

February 1989

57

f
READER SURVEY subscribers not served by an Army Post Office. Responses were received from 34 percent, or 412, of the readers surveyed-considered a good return for surveys of this type. The Readers Several demographic questions were included in the survey to determine the type of reader the magazine is reaching. Fifty-six percent of the respondents are officers on active duty, and 37 percent are members of the Reserve or National Guard components or are re tired from actiie duty. Seven percent have no diract military affiliation. The largest group of readers, both active duty and nonactive duty, are field grade officers. Less than 10 percent are below the rank of major. The average length of service of active duty readers is 16.5 years. One of the more significant findings of the survey is the high educational level of our readers. Over 95 percent are college graduates and almost half (46 percent) hold advanced degrees. A parallel Department of the Army survey found that 47 percent of the Army officers who are graduates of the US Army War College or other senior service schools read all or most issues of the Military Ravlaw, while another 34 percent of the graduates of the US Army Command and General Staff College are regular readera. In general, the results of the survey provided a reassuring endorsement of current editorial policy. The majority of responses indicate that no drastic changes in the nature of the magazine are necessary to satisfy our present readership. This vote of confidence does not provide @ification for assuming the magazine cannot improve its future worth, however. Approximately two-thirds of those replying feel that the value of the magazine would be enhanced by the addition of a readera comments section and the use of reference footnotes. In line with these preferences, we are inaugurating with this issue a new section, Reader Forum. We feel this will enhance the mission of the magazirre TO provide a forum for the discussion of military thought . . . AY permitting a more lively dialo~e in the expression of opposing viewpoints or new considerations on the principles and theories presented in the magazine. We are also beginning the use of reference footnotes with appropriate articles where the establishment of authority or attribution is indicated to enhance the scholarly value of tha magazine. The Survey The following questions summariza the survey questionnaire. Some elements of the original questionnaire have been edited for clarity and to save space. However, all mearr ingful questions and results are reported: 1. How much ef each Issue of the Military Review do you normally read? All or Most 34% es About Half 61% Little or None 4% No Response 1% Mllii Revisw

REAOER SURVSY 2. HOW do you rata the Milita~ Review in atimufatfng thought and inaraaahrg professional oompatenaa? Highly Effective 41% Ineffective Moderately Effective 51% Slightly Effective 7% No Response

1%

3. When askad to show readar prafarancas among categories of matarfsd published in the Military Review, readars made tha follewing ratinga (computed feur peints for ffrst choicq one point for last choiceh Original Oigests Military Miiiiary Articles of Published Articles Notes Books 1,098
182
764
453

Comment Original articles are by far the most preferred content of the magazine, While Military Notes are rated below the Military Oigests, the difference is not great, Although the Military Books are the least attractive feature of the magazine, thay are obviously an important service to many readers as indicatad by a subsequent question which shows only 11 percent desire this saction be eliminated. We are attempting to increase the value of the Military Books section by publishing naw titles as soon as the books are raceived. Reviews of selected books will be published in later issues. 4. Do you baiiava that a readers section cemposad of sho~ readers should be addedto the magazfne? Yes 64% No 34% unsolicNad commants from

No Response 2%

5. Has the Military Review been ef practical valua in yeur work? Yes 76% No 23% No Response 1%

6. Do yeu keeptha Military Review for refarenca purpeses? Yes 76% No 19% No Response 5%

7. Are you in favor of publishing footnotas and bibliographies In conjunction wfth artfcles? Yes 63% No 37%

Comment: Some readers expressed strong feelings by commanding a major improvament~ a must for a truly professional magazine: and this is now a serious deficiency in the magazine. However, some readers remarked, 00 not try to become too scholarly. Febrvwy 1SS8 8s

REAOER SURVEY 8. Do you keep the Annual Index for referenae purpoaea? Yea 62% No 35% No Response 3%

9. Would yeu prefer to see more arhvork (phetoa, illusfrationa, and diagrams) in the Military Review? More 31% About the Same 64% Less 2% No Response 3%

10. Currently, about 50 percent of the magaxines authers are ofticera on active duty, and 60 percent are civilians, Wouid yeu prefeb More Military Authors? 19% Ratio Remain the Same? 74% 11. Do you prafer more articles-by foreign authors? More 27% About the Same 61% ; Less 8% No Response 4% More Civilian Authora? 2% No Response 5%

12. Werrld you prefer to see more articles on foreign countries included? More on Allied Countries 26% About the Same 44% Less 3% More on Communist Countries 39% No Response 1%

Comment: Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple responses. 13. Do you read the statements by miliiry articles? Read Ali 33% Read Many 34% and civilian leaders at the end of some

Read a Few 23%

seldom Read 8%

No Response 2%

14. in the Original Articles and Withy Digests categories of the ma~-ne, readers were asked to rank in order of preference the subjects listed. Reader order ef preference is shown by subjeck 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Stratagy Leadership Military History Tactics Communism, Soviet Bloc, and Red Chin? Unconventional Warfare (Guerrilla, Psychological and Speciai Forces).

00

MIMary Revisw

READER SURYEY 7. General (Politics, Economics, Geography, ate.) 8. Military Education and Training 9. Administrative 10 Organization
Support (Logistics, Personnel, etc.)

15. Do you raad tha Military Notas? Every One 30% Most 44% About Half 16% A Few 7% Nona o No Response 3%

16. hrdicata your preference for the typa subject you find moat interesting in the MNNsry Note& Foreign (Non-Communist Countries) 30% Communist Countries 41%

United States 32%

No Preference 2%

17. Would you like to eee less emphasis on hardwara and equipmant in the MNNsry Notas? Yes 38% No 60% No Response 2% changes, and

18. Would you prefar to sae mora emphasis on doctrina, organizational parsonnal in tha Military Notes? Yas 65% No 27%

No Response 8%

019. Do you think tha Military Notes section should ba eliminated to aNow more space for other types of articles? Yes 6% No 93% No Response 1%

20. How much of the Military Books secticn do You read? All or Most 32% About Half 35% Few or None 29% No Response 4%

21. What do you look for in a book review? Statement of What Book Covars 29% Commenh Fairly Detailed Summary 26% Brief Summary of Content 43% Editorial
Evaluation
42%

Total exceeds 100 percent because of multiple responses.

22. Do you Usink the Military Books section should be eliminated to allow more spaca for other typas of articles? Yes H% February lSSa No 85% No Response 4% al

READER SURVEY In addition to definitive questions, respondents to the survey were given an op.

portunity to volunteer any comments they wished concerning size, formag subject matter, manner of presentation, and other aspects. Over twMirds made substantive comments which were carefully analyzed and evaluated. While the preponderances of these remarks are favorable to the Military R6sfew and its value as a professional journal, there are also recommendations for change. Many of the suggestions for improvement are contradictory, reflecting the diverse preferences and needs of our readara. Some like a larger format wlrile others want the magazine pocket siza, Sbrrze want longer book review$ othera like short raviewa. Some feel the articles are too long, and others want greater length even if it means fewer articles. One of the most frequent requests is for more stimulating and challenging ideas and treatments. Another common suggestion is for more scholarly presentations with critical analysis and documentation. This is not entirely one way, however, as a few readers complained the magazine is too intellectual al{eady and should be more of a digest. Other criticisms which occur most frequently are for more timely and better written book reviqws and for better quality illustrations. The primary criticism here is in quality and appropriateness of photographs, rather than any increase in quantity, Soma readera feel illustrations should be eliminated entirely to provide more space for articles. For obvious reasqns, all of the many written comments cannot be reproduced hare. All have received consideration toward improving the magazine, and the qualiiy, objectives, and effectiveness of the Milktary Raviaw will be a matter of continuing appraisal by tfza editorial staff. We are grateful to those who devoted their valuable time and effort to this survey and encourage all our readers to continue to submit further ideas, comments, and criticism.

Military RItieu

A%ml:19@$t
From Merplau

TheProjectionof SovietPower

!5

HE rather conspicuous display of a Soviet naval-amphibious presence in the eastern Mediterranean during and subsequent to the ArabIsraeli conflict in June 1967 has had the effect in the West of dramatizing the Soviet Unions efforts to improve the mobility or reach of her tradl tionally continental military power. February 1969

The very novelty of Soviet naval unite and landing craft turning up to show the flag in a severe lord conflict sit uation has tended to evoke the image of a Sovie$ Union now prepared to make her military presence similarly felt in loesl crieis situations that may arise in other widespread areas of the globe. 63

policy under Joseph Stalin and Khru shchev. Stalin pursued essentially a conti nental policy, limiting his expansion ist aims to communization of areas which lay immediately around the So viet periphery, and showing hbneelf loath to commit the Soviet Union, exThie article was condensed from the original, published in INTEWPLAY, March 1968, under the titlq ftuesias Forces Go Me- bile. Copgwighted @ 1988 by the Welkin Corpmution, New Yvrk. AU Rights Raerved. Mr. Wolfe ia a woted tnilitaru ecqwrt who is currently with the Rand Corporation. 64

continental ehell to aeeert her influ ence and interests in every quarter of the world. Initially, Kbruehcheve military pro. grame were oriented mainly toward creating a nuclear deterrent posture, placing chief emphaeis upon building up the strategic offensive and defen eive components of Soviet military pewer to counter the strategic nuclear forces of the United Ststee. Only gradually toward the end of the Khru shchev decade did it also come to be recognized that there was a need for more mobile and versatile forces, either for asserting a Soviet presence in dietsnt areas of political contention or for possible use in local contlict sitMllitary RAW

SOVIET Powsl?
uations in wh]ch it might not be ex pedient to invoke the threat of im mediate nuclear holocaust. A good deal more was required, however, than mere recognition of the need to improve Soviet military capa bilities for support of foreign policy intereete in various parte of the world. In the first place, the Soviet Union lagged far behind the West in many perthent elements of maritime-air logistfc capability, raising the ques tion whether she could marshal the very large resources necessary to nar row the gap. In the second place, as the internal pulicy dialogue of the Khrushchev period testified, the con ceptual framework for development of globally mobile forces fitted for inter vention in distant local conflicts was far from complete. Although a few Soviet military the oriste managed to establish the point by tbe early 1960s that preparation for local and limited wars had heen neglected, they failed to come up with an explicit body of doctrine for the employment of Soviet forces in such ware. Despite the various constraints of resonrces, geography, and doctrine which stood in the way, however, the Khrushchev period did produce evi dence that the Soviet Union, tradi tionally a continental military power, was making gradual although uneven progress toward the kind of global politico-military maneuverability that would be needed ehould the USSR wish to project her military presence into areas of the world well beyond the periphery of the Soviet bloc. To mention a few relevant develop ments, there wee first the initiation in 1955 of Soviet military aid proFebruary 1969

Undersealaunchof bsffistic missilefrom a Soviet nucl~r-pewered submarine ated against a time when political de velopments might permit their use. These aid programs also gave So viet professional cadrea useful oppor tunities for studying the operations of military forces, even if not their own, in varied geographic and cli matic settilngs from the Middle Eaet to Indonesia. In certain cases, such se that of Cuba, elements of the Soviet Unione own forces (missile troops and protective tank-infantry forma tions) were dispatched abroad, gain ing on-the-job experience, se it were, in such relevant problems as planning 6s

Som

POWER

for oversees movement, Iogietica sup port, and communications. Other trends more directly related to Soviet sea-airlift and combat-land ing capabilities appeared toward the end of the Kbrnshchev period. Begin ning in the early 1960s for example, increased attention wee given to the study of amphibious landing opera tions, along with developmentand pro curement of amphibious materiel. In the summer of 1964, Soviet Ma

lift capability, a pest Soviet short coming, also wee indicated by pro grams to develop sueb large transport aircraft as the An-%? Cock. Further, in the military literature of the early 1960s, it was pointad out that air borne landing operations in conjunc tion with amphibious operations would take on increasing signittcance in the future. Meanwhile, the Khrushchev decade saw a eteady rise in Soviet merchant

rine forces (naval infantry) were ra aetivated and put through special landing exercises with a good deal of attendant publicity. These forces re mained relatively modest in size and were estimated by 1965 at around 3,000 to 4,000 men distributed among the eeveral Soviet territorial fleets. However, their conspicuous rehabili tation at a time when Inca]crises were intensifying in varioue parts of the world from the Gulf of Tonk.in to Cypros suggested that the Soviet Union may have been seeking to dem onstrate her potential for epecial land ing operations of the type that might occur in conflict situations overeeae. New investment in long-range air 66

ship tonnage built in both Soviet and foreign shipyards, sometimes on terms that apparently amounted to foreign subsidy of the Soviet effort. Thh con strntilon program brought Soviet mer chant shipping up fmm about 1.5 mil lion deadweight tona in 1959 to nearly eix million by the end of 1964. If con tinued at the rata of around a miltion tone annually, which bad been reached by the tiie Khrushchev left the scene, it promised to make the Soviet Union one of the worldstwo or three leadlng maritime powers well within the next decade. Moreover, the activities of the So viet Unions growing fleet of ocean going fiehing trawlers and her oceanMIIIWY Rcvlm

SOViEI

POWER

ographic program also marked an ex tension of Soviet maritime interests to wider arms of the world. In a miiitsry sense, it can be said that the maritime program fostered during the Khru shchev regime both improved Soviet abdity to take on global military re sponeib]iitiee and posed new problems of no emall dimensions. successors, there have been further significant developments in several tielde relating both to Soviet naval forces and to the mobility of Soviet conventional mili tary power in general. With regard to the former, the policies of the re gime of Lecmid I. Brezhnev and Alekeei N. Kesygin have carried fur ther the process of transforming the Soviat Navy from ita traWionel role as a mere adjunct to Soviet landpower into an instrument for global SUppert of Soviet intereste. There has, however, been no massive new construction program of the kind necessary to create balanced naval forces in the Western sense. Primary emphasis has continued to fall upon strengthening the underseas fleet of about 400 submarines, both for etra tegic delivery of sublaunched miesike and for interdiction of eeaborne sup ply iines. According to Admiral S. G, Goreh kov, head of tbe Soviet Navy, the sub marine fleet and the naval air arm (a land-based force of some 850 aircraft) have been given the leading place in the buildup of Soviet naval power. The surface forcee-incIuding some 20 cruisers, more than 100 destroyers, and a fleet of several hundred fast pa trol boata-have received a lower pri ority although some of these unite have been modernised to fire surface
Further Developments Khrushchev% Under

te-surfece and antiaircraft missilas. In the maritiie field, on the other hand, the eteady growth of the Soviet merchant fleet has continued reaching a level of around 10 miUlon tons in 1967, according to the Soviets. Aithough the Breshnev-Kosygin re gime has held back from a massive program of balanced naval expansion, eeveral noteworthy innovations and

departure from past practice have oc curred during ite tenure. Since the advent of tbe new regime, for example, Soviet submarines have regularly con ducted patroie in distant ocean areas, including a much-publicized around the-world cruise in 1966 by Soviet nu clear-powered submsrirw.. Ae pointed out in April 1966 by Paul H. Nltze, then US Secretary of the Navy, dem onstration of a Soviet eepacity for blue-water operations has not been confined te the submarine fleet: Th.c# are also developing the ca@ bilitg for high seas epsrationa awati from their confined home watera, re plenishing at sea, as our ?Wvie8 .b?tg ago found advantageous. 07

1909 Febnmy

SOVIET POWER

Certainly, the notion that the Soviet Navy hae the teak of looking after the ~or]dwide ~~stite interests of the USSR refleeta the changing role of Soviet aeapower from earlier Soviet history. The increasing incidence of harassment-type encounters at aea be tween Soviet and United States naval units in the past year or so seems to manifest thie new conception of the Soviet Navys role. example of the Soviet Navys departure fmm past practice hae been the establish ment of what appeare te be a perma nent naval presence in the Mediterra nean, dramatized by the conspicuous dieplay of Soviet naval unite in Medi terranean waters. Actually, the Soviets began the gradual establishment of a modest na val presence in the Mediterranean os early aa 1964, with, regular submarine patrols and the appearance of other vessels during the Cyprus crisis. How ever, it waa only after Brezhnev de manded withdrawal of the US 6th Fleet in April 1967, on the eve of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, that the dispatch of additional Soviet naval unite to the eastern Mediterranean at tracted widespread attention. The inclusion of a few tank and troop-landing ships in the augmented Soviet force of some 30 tu 40 combat and auxiliary vessels captured partic ular notice eince it was seemingly meant to convey the impression that the Soviet Union was prepared to in tervene with local landing parties if necessary. This demonstrative gesture, it may be noted, was not matched by any other signs of a Soviet wiSing nees to become militarily involved in the Arab-Ieraeli fighting; indeed, at
Pemranrmt Naval Presence, Perhaps the moat striking

the height of the sixday war, Soviet diplomacy eeemed bent upon avoiding a poseible military confrontation with the West. Although the activities of the So viet Mediterranean force have not gone beyond the demon~trative level, and although tbe force itself ie clearly inadequate to challenge the 6th Fleet, Soviet apokeamenhave contended that its presence has played a decisive role in frustrating the adventurous plans of the Israeli aggreesore.
Carrier Aviation notable innovation in So Another

viet naval policy has been the decision to build helicopter ~rriers, two of which reportedly have been con etmcted. This development cornea as the climax to a long and evidently frustrating internal Soviet debate over the pros and cone of adopting aircraft carriers. Admiral Nikolai G. Kuznet SOV, heed of the Soviet Navy in World War II, revealed in his memoirs in 1966 that proposala for carrier con struction in the late 1930s were ve toed by Stalin, even though profes sionals on the naval staff rightly con sidered, according to Kuznetsov, that carrier aviation would become an in dispensable element of naval power in the next war. After World War 11, the question of embarking on a carrier program arose once more, but again the deci sion waa negative, in part, becauae catching up with the Weat posed too great a demand on Soviet resources, and, in paw because the advent of the nuclear age underscored the vul neratillity of carrier forces. By electing finally te invest in heli copter carriere, the Sovieta appear to have adopted a compromise that dose not compete with the United States in

SOVIET POWER

carrier aviation, but, rather, strength- ens the Soviet potential for landing operations and antisubmarine war- fare. Wbicb of these two purposee may have priority in Soviet plans for the new helicopter carriers hae not

vancee such as new air landing equipment and through training emphaeis on airborne operations and airlift reenforcement. In a doctrinal sense, there has been a further tendency to embrace the view advanced only by occeeional mili tary theorista toward the end of the Khrushchev periodthat Soviet forces should be better prepared for a wide range of militaryoperations below the level of general nuclear war. In a practical sense, meanwhile, the con fliot in Southeast Asia hee brought home to the Sovieta many new lessons in the conduct of limited war, even though Soviet forces have not been directly involved on a formal basis.
Soviet Aid

Tbe inc&eing scale of Soviet aid to North Vietnam, for example, hae yielded experience in dealing with problems of logistics support, training and technical backup, as well as afford ing the opportunity for combat test ing of weapon systems in a limited war tbmter environment. At the same time, Soviet military professionals ap parently have kept an attentive eye upon the developmentof new US tech nology and techniques se applied to the war in Southeest Asia. To judge by the Soviet military press, there seems to be some concern lest Soviet military thought and prec tice fail to keep pace with innovation spurred by tbe US effort in Vietnam. The bulk of Soviet military commen tary on the war has emphaeiced tbe difficulties encountered by US forces, but occasional accounts of new tac tice, such se the widespread employ ment of airmobile unite, have seemed te imply a professional Soviet aware nees that the United Statea has moved ahead in euch fiebfe. Febnmy 1S69 69

Sovm

POWER

The over-all effect of the war in helping to boozt US defeuze axpendi turea also baa had an impact upon the Soviet Union whose leaders have found it expedient to make successive increases in the Soviet military budget. The Brezhnev-Kosygin re gimes first military budget, for 1965, wae 12.8 billion rubles (officially 14.4 billion dollars). Since then, the figure has risen each year: 1966, 1S.4 (14.9); 1967, 14.5 (16) ; 1968, 16,7 billion ru bles (officially 18.5 billjon dollara). These, of course, are the publicly an nounced military budgete, and do not take into account additional sums for defenee purposes generally thought to be buried in other parta of the state budget. StrategicPosture The upward trend of Soviet mili. tary outlays cannot be attributed solely, of course, to the effeete of the ddepening conflict in Southeast Asia. Stepe to bolster the Soviet strategic posture, probably growing out qf a reappraisal of the USSRs etrategic position vis-a-via the United States in tbe wake of the Cuban crisis of 1962, doubtleee account for a large share of the heavier military outlays nnder the pre+pt regime. These stepe have ineluded a pro nounced buildup of Soviet interconti nental ballistic missile forces, the de velopment of come sort of orbital or fractional orbital delivery system, and the concurrent deploymentof anti ballistic missile defensea. If nothing else, the large investment devoted to strengthening the Soviet strategic de livery and defense forces seems to tes tify to the determination of the Brezhnev-Koeygin regime to erase the image of a Soviet Union strategically inferior to her major adversary.
70

Although it is not my intent tn deal at length with the strategic force as peeta of Soviet military policy, it should be noted that the etforte of the incumbent regime to strengthen the Soviet etrategic posture tend to over. shadow in scope and priority whet we have been describing cc ita parallel attempt to improve the reach and mo bility of Soviet general purpoee forces. When taken together, however,these complementary trende represent a process through which the Soviet Union seems to be striving to bring her military posture into better line with her growing global obligations and commitments. Indeed, it may be suppused that the Soviet leadership is hopefnl that ita military policies will help to bring about a major change in the familiar situation of the paat two deeadez in which the United Statee enjoyed not only marked stra tegic superiority over the Soviet Union, but also went virtually uncbalIenged in her eapecity to intervene locally in troubled situations around the globe,
Crucial Questiens

What are the proepccts that Soviet hopes for a favorable shift in the mil itary balance may be met and how would Soviet conduct npon the inter national scene be affected if this ehould eccur ? Certainly, these can be reck oned among the more crucial quee tions of the next decade. Wkh due regard for the contingent and pre carious nature of any eaaumptione about the future military balance and its consequences, let us consider tbeee queatiorrebriefly. Fire& with rwpect to the military balance, it can be said that, despite the measures taken during the peat few yearn by the Soviet Union to imMilnarf nwlcw

niticantly narrowing the margin be tween United States and Soviet power. Many unpredictable variables may influence these trends over the next few years. The precise character of the future balance will not only depend upon the continued willingness of the Soviet leaders to raise the ante in build~ng up their forces and upon the capacity of the economy to stand the strain. It will also depend upon what ever responsive steps the United States may chwse to take, which could have the effect of canceling out any appre ciable gains achkved by the Soviet side. However, without prejudging the outcome, it seems only prudent to ae Febmny 1969

any anewers preferred are bound to be speculative. To take firet a some what optimistic alternative it might be argued that a significant shift in the previously recognised military bal ance would give the Soviet leaders a new sense of security and help them shed their ingrained suspicion of the Weetern World. Feeling free at laet from external danger, they would, ao the argument runs, feel more inclined to play a reaponeible sfatua qwo role in international politics. In this view, the widening maritiie acthities and intereata of the Soviet Union would tend atso toward greater economic interdependence with the rest of the world, giving the Soviet

11

leaders a further incentive for fi~lng into the established international or der and for maintaining world ate bility. Unfortunately, this alternative mete on premises of rather marked trans formation in the world outluok of the Soviet ruling elite. Despite the proc ess of societal change at work within tbe Soviet Union, this writer this lit tle grounde for concluding that the Soviet leaders are finally prepared to accept a lasting accommodation with the present world order, eapwiaUy in an atmosphere of auccesa that would tend to persuade them that hietory wae running their way anyhow. To take a somewhat more likely al ternative, the Soviet leadership prob ably would set out to tact the new power relationatdp, probing for such political gains se the trtic might bear. This, in itself, may seem no more than a replaying of peat Soviet perform ance, when the necessity of operating from an inferior puwer position placed definite limits upon the riake that So viet pcdicymakers were wiUing to run. But operating from a more favor able correlation of forces, the Soviet leaders could be expected to reopen varioua stalemated East-West issues and to seek fresh pulitieel advances in the third world, thus introducing new elements of turbulence inte intern ationalrelations. In tbia environment, the Soviet Union might be more dis posed than not to employ her growing maritime capacity as an economic weapon to undermine the established international order, and to buttrees such a pelicy by further buildup and deployment of naval and other mobile elements of Soviet power. A plausible example of what Soviet policy maneuvering in a specific case 72

might seek tu accomplish can be drawn from the current uneasy situation in the Middle Eeet and North Africa, where further Soviet politico-military penetration of the area could be utiIkted in an attempt to outttank the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and to put Soviet inftuence in a poei tion to control the oil epigot to Wed. em Europe. Needless to say, this seeond and somewhat somber image of the future remains greatly contingent upon many imponderable, not the leaat of which ia the interaction between Soviet and Western policies, particularly those of the United Statea. As already noted, any substantial shift in the pewer equation which might tempt the Soviet Ieederehip to undertake a more dangerous range of ricks than in the peat depends,in part, on the nature of responsive military PcJicy decisions which rest in US hands. In another important sense also the international pusture of the United States will doubtless condition greatly the prospects open to the Soviet lead ership for prditical exploitation of So viet military power in the next decade. There would surely be a particular irony in the eituation should a re trenchment of US c0mmitment9 abroad uecur at the very time the Soviet Union was in the process of improving her capacities to intervene more effectively in the world at large, thus incre+wing tbe temptation to do so. Indeed, one might perhaps, best assess the Soviet quest for more glob ally mobile military power as a de velopment meant less to lay down a direct chaUenge to the West than to provide the Soviet leadership with broader options for moving in where US power and influence may recede. Mllitny Rcrisw

Geographical

Patterns of Conflict
Roger A. Beaumont

INCE World War II, the study of conflict has increased as sci entists and soldiers, diplomata and re porters have taken a closer look at man, his institutions, and how wars get started. Theorists and simulation experta have applied the computer and advanced mathematical tools in their search for methods of understanding, predicting, and controlling violent sit uations. Much of thk activity demonetrateg Febrcary 1939

the fact that many men of good will who long for peace have come to re alize that pacitlem is not enough. The dynamics of conflist are not that sim ple nor are they likely to bs managed by geod intentions. Many idealists have shown that preventing any type of conflict takes hard work and hard thinking. To the casual observer, some of the work in the area of conflict study might appear simple, jargonridden, impractical, or confused. Un 73

OYiflWSW 4!MSiW10Z 4*++ R16?41@ DL41PS =

5* ~ r31K0MI&cce WAIFS) A 6+% 1316,W03.I 41iUKIN DWSSI =1

AM

o
to derive solid conclusions about mans tendencies to fight. In hie Statistic of Deadl~ Quarrele,* he included a liet of conflicts-18S9-1949--to which he applied mathematical inatrumenta to find trends and Ieasone. He arranged wars and skirmisbee during thie pe riod into groups by magnitude, from 1+ ~z to 7A%, the magnitude determ~nedby the number of deathe in the war or conflict. Tho8e in the range below magnitude 3* 1A are relatively low casualty mo ducing spontaneous riota, incidents, gang ware, and raide, and are primar ily nonmilitary. Richardson came to several inter esting conclusions: The population increeee during 1820-1949 wae not matched by a pra potilonal increase in ware. The frequency with which na 1960.
.Ie.is F. IUchatin, Stntistiu of Deadlu Qwz? mle, The Boxwo.=d Preen, Pitiburch, Pcnnsrlvanis.

doubtedly, this is true, and progress has heen slow. There have been, how ever, major advances when men like Lewie F. Richardson have built entire new worlds in ideas and concepts. Richardson, one of the earlieet con. flict analysta, a mathematician and a Quaker, looked at patterns of conflict Roger A. Bsaumont ie with the De partment of I@tw, Wiacmwin Stute University, in Oahkosh. He holds a Ma8ter8 degree in Hietm from the Univer.sitg of Wisconsin, in Madison, and waa A88&tZ?Zt Director of the Un$ver8itzf8 Ccnte~ for Admwwed Study in Organization Sci8ns8. He waa an instructor in American Militarv Hi8terg at the University of Wiecon ni%Milwaukee, 8arved two teurs with the Active Army as a Militm-g Police omor, and wa8 a88igtwd to the De partment of History at Karwm State Univernit% Manhattan. His article, The Potential of Air-C.nehion Vehi clee, appeared in the June 1968 issue of the MILITAUYREV~W. 14

MilWy ROVhW

6E06RAPHICAL

PAllERNS

CONFLICT

MA6NITUOE

BY ZONES

Ma#nitude 7*Y2 6&Ya 5*y2 4*% 3*34

Numberot Death, 3,160,000-31,600,000 816,0009,160,000

within w Ot /3qu9tor o 0 8 38 112

More then 34 North Or Soath & 13qmator 2 5 b 12 31 63

Sl,ooo - 916,000 3,16031731,000 3,160 Pigure 1.

CNARACTERISTISS

OF MAJOR WAR AREAS

Climate: Humid medium-hot summer temperature sense

Normal annual temperature range 20 to 40
Normal eummer temperature range 50 to 90
Normal winter temperature range 10 to SOe
Rainfall, May to October, 10 inches ta 40 inches
Topography: Plains and low hills
Podsolic or adjacent yellow aubtropicel soils
Economic base: Intensive agriculture and manufacturing
Transportation aecaeeibility: Excellent Population density: Over 260 per square mile Other factors: Heavy religious, language, and ethrdc group M-mm&tare Figure 2. tione were involved in war related directly to the number of countries bordering them. Economic caueee were significant in only 29 percent of the csees. Revenge wae the meet important eingle cause. Most wars tend to be localized. Increase in the scale of conflict ueually grows in rough proportion to the number of belligerent countries involved. February 1889
Seapowers were less belligerent than kmdpowers. . Geography wee the most impor tent determining factor. Richardson, however, did not pro ject hie data in a strictly geographical way. This is surprising since, when the liet of conflicts which he drew up from magnitude 3+% to 7A % ie pre jacted onto a world map, a pattern appeare which he apparently did not note. In short, when such a projection

75

GEOGRAPHICAL

PATIESNS

is made, there are fewer but bigger ware in srmee farther north of the equator, while closer to the tropics, there are many small wars. (Figure 1). Looking further, when the sites of heavy killing are matched with environmental conditions, they all fall into a narrow range of limits (Figure 2). Several areas of the world fall into the limits of this mix of conditions: the nomnountsinous parts of northern and western Europe; the riorthernpart of the Indian subcontinent; the esstem United States; eastern Argentina; southern Africa; and eastern China. This all snggesta that there are definite geegraphleal restrictions on major contlict, and that there are also natural enviromnepta in which major conflict is more likely to appear. The hothouse conditions for major mutoal casualties can he more generally defined es areae of crowding, excellent communication and transportation, ethnic-religious tension and friction, relatively temperate climate, rich agricultural and industrial nutrients, and open terrain.

Further analysis of the patterns of conflict could have practical value in anticipating the severity and proba bility of wars and would, at beatj al low modification of the conditions to prevent such a critical mass from going wild. Any design for peace keeping forces-unilaterally or internationally-will have to keep cheeking development in tlds area of investigation. So far, designing military forces for commitment in trouble spots has often been ud hoc, too fre quently after the event, and limited by previous experiences of pelicymak ers. Even single-minded, fanatic dictators have been irrational in pre dicting and planning, although they picked the scene of conflict in advance. World peace is still dependent on the deft and timely use of military force and no doubt will be for some time. Any degree of exactneas in pre paring for trouble will continue to be valuable. The growing body of work in the field of conflict analysis should be of value to the planner when kept in perapeetive with the reslitiles of the situation.

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Mllitery RwhW

Master Plans for

Nationbuilding
Colonel MauriceD. Reuek Urn-tedStaten Armg E ARE confronted today with two potentially dengeroua and deatrnctive forcesindigenous up heavals in developing nations and mil itant comnmnism. Separately, each of these forces holds an immense threat to our sscurity; their confluence could ha our db4aater. The first half of the 20th century has witnessed three major revolutions: The p Iitieal revolution gave self government > o shout ona-third of the Febrmty 1869

worlds people and brought their as pirations for abetter life forcibly tu world attention. Unparalleled, revolutionary ad vances in communications have re moved from the dynamism of idsss the limits once impossd by social priv ilege and prditieal considerations. The demographic revolution has imparted a stark new gravity to the problem of poverty. Serious violence has ernpted in 48 n

in 69 percent of tbe poor nations, and in 87parcentof theverypoornatione since 1958. The ability of communism to aggravate this violence and turn it againat us has been evidenced all over the world. Clearly, even if our conaciencee would permit otherwise, the praaerva tion of our own freedom and security makes mandatory our. assistance to developing peoples worldwide. Not so clear, however, is whether we are go ing about this task correctly. Deter mining the nature of the problem may help to answer this question.
Anatomy of Corrntrha Each Iessdeveloped country (LDC)

Demographic and social prob lems. . Limitations resulting from in ternational position. . Weaknerrein public administra tion. The magnitude of this problem is exemplifiedin Africa, a continent with over 250 million people, where the to tal gross national product for 1966 was about on~half the increase in the gross national product of the United States for the same yeer.

is unique and possessee conditions that differ strikingly from those found in other such countries. However, there are some general characteristics which most share. The United Nationa Food and Agriculture Organization Iiete the following as the main obste cles to progress: IneSicient agriculture. Inadequacies of economic struc ture and shortages in essential factors of production, Colonel Maurice D. Rorwh ix the Die trtct Engirwer, Huntington, we8t Vir ginia. A 1950 gredwate of the US Militaw AcademrI, Weet Point, he re mimd hiv MA. fmsc 9AAI ilki!wsft~ ftom fif A%noie, ad was mMtateff the. US Army Command and Gwwral Sta17 CoUege,the AFmed Forces St@ College, and the US ArmII War Col lege. He ha-c served wiith the 7th Iu fantW Divieion i% Korea; wae Engi neer Advisor m-th the Turkish Sd Amrw, Ersurwn; was Oseignad to the Wit Infantry Division, Fort Lewie, Woxhington; and was with the Ravo lutiowzqt Develegmwnt Support Direc torate, Headquarters, US Afilitaru Aa eim%ce Command, Vietnam. 78

A.gricrdturai Improvamenta Agriculture ie the mainspring of the economy in moat LDCS, and only through improved output cnn efficient capital be amassed to allow industrial developmentand growth. However, ag ricultural improvements, such se di versification, can have far-reaching implication. Workers wbo processed the old product must find new work, and the new product may decay in storage areas unless trained workera are available to process it. Likewise, land reform can bring chaos unless the new owners are trained to meet their expanded reaponsibilitiee. For the most pert, the conditions which would allow spontmweue eco nomic development have not been at tained. Only through substantial gov ernment action can any real progrees be achieved in the frmeeeertble future. ShOagCS of skilled workers and man. combine wtth an almoet total agers lack of information on resources to pose immenee problems for even the most edicient of governments. Computer technology can eeeist in the tack of chronicling and aascaeing natural and human resources and de termining how beat they can be com bined. However, even after reaourcee are known, plane must be drawn up

NATIONBUILDIN6

Febmy 1969

79

ing society and bring chaos that would preclude progress. Populations are increasing rapidly, but are dependent upon a roughly un changing world food supply. Ma&al advancements have decreased infant and adult mortality with no significant decrease in birth rates. Population control and improvements in agricul tural produ&]on require training and persuasion that can come only through carefully integrated long-term educa tional efforts.
Efliclent 6evemment Needed

they can provide aU the needed assist ance. Under close scrutiny, however, this argument breaka down. These task forwa are made uu . of nede . . from a multitude of government and private agencies. In many cases, their first contact with other pafilcipating agen cies ie upon their arrival in the host

An almoet complete lack of bargain ing power, large debta, and reliance upon one or, at best, a few exports to gain foreign currency place the+ve nations in an unfavorable position in ternationally. Yet their governments appear to lack the vision and abUity to form the collective financial and bargaining arrangements that could alleviate their plight, nor have they fared better in attempta at internal diversification. There ia an absolute need for effi cient government and sound planning to solve immediate problems and bring into being the sustilning institutions that can produce steady progress. Yet many developifig countries dnd it dif ficult to tiU even key governmental positions with capable people; to say nothing of the important and more numerous lower level positions. In these straits, governments could ex pect to have didiculty in preserving public order, adrniniatering justice, and providing fair taxation, even with out considering the large planning tasks to be accomplished if progress is to be attained. Today, we have what amount to nationbuikUng tack forces in many countriee, and it might be argued that
eo

The Agency for InternationalDevelop ment hss many experiencedrepresenta tives who could help in master plsnrring countrynor is there a standard op erational organisation to tie together all efforts below Country Team level. The task force is faced with the press of administering assistance prO grams and providing needed day-to day advice and services, and it does not possess the technological and human planning assets available in the United States. What is more, task force elements are responsive to dif ferent agencies-whose views and in terests are not necessarily coordinated or even compatible-back in this coun try. Militcry Review

Under these circumstances, it is dif ficult to see how the task forces could be expected to provide the essential detailed and integrated long-term planning required. Actually, how can we determine the makeup of the task forces we deploy if we have no plan tellkg us what they are to accom plish? Also, our personnel resources are far from unlimited, and the pen alty of maintaining our people over seas in substantial numbere muet be considered not alone in dollars, but also in terms of the cost to our in dustry and government eceasioned by their absence. MasterPlans A military commander would be criticized severely for commiWlng hk forces simply to fight the enemy with out detailing the objectives they were to obtain and unifying their efforts under an integrated plan. An assist ance effort without a eound and inte grated development master plan is no less folly, and that plan is needed before we commit our eeeistance forces in order to avert embarrassing and costly reappraisals and wasteful with drawals. Can the countries themselves pro vide master plane for their own de velopment? If they truly posseesed the plenning ability neceesery to arrive at sound integrated programs, it is doubtful that they would need our aid. Actually, meet of these countries lack ability to conduct internal planning. It is not realistic to expect them to tacfde the greeter task of analycing world commerce and determining their correct place in it. We must take an active role in the nationbuilding planning of our less advantaged neighbors, even to the ex tent of aeeisting them in preparing Febnmy 1989

master plans for political, seeiel, and economic institution development.Thh not only will enhance rapid and orderly development, it will also help make our material aid acomplish ita aim rather than be weeted through ineffi ciency and corruption.
Update Information ObvioueIY, the development maater plan for a country takea time in prep

aration and must be updated contin uously. Yet the completed plan is needed the moment a country asks for assistance. A lack of cornldencemight result if our retort to a request is that we will need to study the situa tion for several months. More impor tant, however, any delay on our part postpones the time when progress be gins and further opens the door to violence or Communist takeever. We now ehould have well-developed plans for all developing nations as a basis for evaluation and programing aid and to assist them in their planning. In order to insure the most rapid progrese and beet use of our aid money, the master plans we develop must be highly comprehensive. All ae pect.-cin a host nation deaeme con sideration. Security, natural reeourcee, economic base, population cbaracter ietice, political and social structures, scientific and technological state, and many other facete must be examined and aeeessed to determine their rela tionships and the changes that must be made. Control of aspirations of the people muet be handled carefully, and secu rity must be maintilned to allow the orderly development of the mutually supporting and dependent economic, social, and political structures which alone can insure continued progrese. In the face of euch complexib, a lack

NATiONBUlLDlN6

of detailed and expert planning would spell failure. Amassing the necessary beze data on a worldwide scale to allow etfective planning appears to be a monumental task in iteelf. Yet much of the infor mation exists in our country today in the archives and experience of our public and private sectors, ae well as in organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. What is needed is a capability to pull it all together. The state of computer technology brings the task solidly into the reelm of fea sibility.
Numan Judgment Once the data has been aesembled,

could serve the entire world of the lesser developed. The problem-solving and planning techniques involved would vary and could include comparing given situa tions to similar models ek+ewhere models in which success has been ob tilned. where no relevant experience exista, it may be a matter of applying judgment to the basic data and then war gaming the resultant plan. Our aPParent need is for an organization which can accomplish our aims by amassing and uniting data and ability and providing meeningful direction to our aid efforts. National kistJtute for Progress We cannot consider this a oneagency problem. The size of the en deavor, its complexity, 8nd the respon sibilities it generates for nearly all federal and many private agencies re quire that all interested parties have a part in the venture. Perhaps what is needed is a National Institute for Progress (NIP) whose mission would include gathering data and planning for development. Such an institution would bring together all the govern mental and private agenciea partici pating in developmental endeavors, thus making it possible to centralize data and gain the beet of planning power. $ponaorship of NIP logically would rest with the Agency for International Development (AID). However, recog nition of 811participating agencies in policy and planning mattera would be a prerequisite for effective action. WMe most of the data collection and assessment would have to be cen trally managed by NIP to provide efficiency and accezsibility to all par ticipating agencies, certain planning respensibllities could be assigned to

the abilities of expertd, ranging from the sociologist to the industrial engi neer, must be 8pp1ied.While computere can assist, they cannot supply experi enced human judgment. This commod ity must come from a variety of public and private sectors and muet be &m centrated sufficiently to allow crossfertilization of ideas and a checks and balances system. In nationbuikling, there are no isolated actions or events. By accomplishing most of the plan ning in our own country, we can bring to bear brain power and technology that cannot be transmitted oversees economically or feasibly. Capable edu cators, politicians, and leaders of in dustry are not always able or willing to travel to a remote nation to help eoIvea vexing problem. Yet they might be able to give a few hours a week to addressing hosts of such problems throughout the world if they could do so from their offices. Likewise, build ing and manning computer complexes in many developing countries would be highly expeneive, especially since one large complex in the United $tstea 82

RWiO Military

NATIONBUII.01H6 individual agencies, perhapa with par ticipation by other agencies. Determi nation of individual agency planning responsibilities would be made on the basis of conditions in the country in question. Security planning for a cOun try undergoing insurgency logically

day, people from 54 different US Gov emment offices are serving with the AID. Manning of NIP with government employees could be accomplished by essigning to the various agencies the responsibility for filling identified po

would be initially a Defense Depart ment responeibility. However, most planning should be accomplished by the NIP itself, and all planning would have to be carried out within the guidance given by the NIP. The personnel to assist in master planning logically would come from parallel government offices and private institutions in the United States. ToFebruary 1969

sitions. Such agencies se the Depart ment of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute, and the Department of Agri culture could greatly enrich the base provided by AID. Participation from private sectors could be provided by long-term con tracte which would not be limited to personnel, but would provide research and etudy optione, Also, our growing a

ranks of retired business 811dprofaa sional men could make a contribution to NIP, perhaps, on a parktime beeie. Integration of personnel from volun tary agencies would not only bring added experience to the institute, but would also aesiet those agencies in most effectively integrating their ef forts into the composite development program. Undeniably, organization and opera tion of the NIP would cost a great deal, and we might ask whether we can afford to have it. Consider, though, the huge sume spent on assistance. In complete or disjointed planning could and probably has resulted in substan tial amounts of this money being wasted. More sobering, partial sohl tions without the provision for con tinued progress, and ill-conceived pro grams whkh fail to consider reper cussions, can increase greatly both the aspirations and impatience of the people. Clearly, without the thorough planning which the NIP could accom plish, possibilities for waste and added violence increase. A better question, then, is whether we can afford not to have the NIP. Serviceand Benefits Perhaps one of the greatest serv ices which NIP could perform is that of providing computerized collection, assessment, storage, and logic facili ties available not just to itself and participating agencies, but also to the countries concerned. By tying in with computers of the various US and for eign agencies working in development, the institute could make available, at one point, all known information on development technology. The tiie, la bor, and expenditure savings thus made possible alone would justify NIP. However, there are several interesting

subsidiary benetite whkb could be re aliced through the NIP: The institute could provide train ing to government and voluntary agency-sponsored advisors and work ers who are scheduled to go b host countries. The orientetilonon the total situation in the host country would help to insure their capability for max imum contribution the entire time they are overseas. Our composite programs and goals could be explained to help aseure an integrated effort and com mon approach. Equally significant, trainees could become familiar with the terminology and methods of other participating agencies before they reach their overseas destination. The institute could eeeept and give training to promising hoat coun try nationals, thus enhancing their ability to solve their own problems and to build the essential stabHizing and progressive institutions. This in fusion of host country personnel also could improve relations, provide greater ineight into problems, and in crease our own depth of knowledge. Our armed services have found it necessary to keep in the United States a training base to support units overseas. This training base furnishes trained replacement for deployed unite, provides unite for new deploy ment, and allows permanent personnel to rotate between US and oversees ee eimunente instead of remaining away indefinitely. The inetitute could per form the same function for our over sees advisory effort, increasing our flexibility and professionalism and providing greeter incentive for a ca reer in development. Through uWiza tion of NIP aeseta, efficient nation buikling task forma could be aaaem bled quickly and deployed to requesting ImtmyRdeu

countries, and a steady flow of trained replacements could be provided to maintain deployed teams and preserve the efficiency of those already de ployed. . The existence of sound, longrange development plans would go far in restoring the faith of Congrese in our foreign aid program. The plane would provide the basis for foreign aid cost estimates extending far into the future and would demonstrate the efficacy of the program. Quite pos sibly, they would facilitate commit ments covering longer periods, hence lending better continuity and progres

siveness to our assistance efforts. The task of assisting leas fortunate worldwide neighbore toward develop ment is one that has been thrust upon us by degrees, starting with the Mar. shall plan. The interdependence of all natione, their tremendously complex international problems, and the dis astrous effects of mistakes make man datory that we have sound, compre hensive, and integrated plans to chart our developmental efforte. The pru posed National Institute for Progreee can accomplish integrated worldwide development planning, and lend an in epiring sureness to our efforts.

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F8bruaty 1S89

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dersus
Communist Insurgent

Brlgedier C. N. Barclay, British Armg, Retired

ILITARY experts have been puzzled in rezent years by the frequent lack of success of the Western soldier against the Communiet in eurgent. The former-with his sophis ticated weapons and equipmentsuch as jet bombers, tanks, and helicopter~ might be expected to eddeve dezisive and quick results against men armed mostly with only their personal weapons, without any regular SUPPlY system, supporting aircraft, artillery,

or other items which the Weetern soldier regards se essential. Explanations for thie state of affairs often are more in the nature of excuses for failure than valid reasons. Many of the reseons or excuses are trivial and include the obvious assertions that the insurgents are fighting on their home ground and are little affeeted by bomb ing beeause. they operate mostly in small parties and have no installations worth bombing. There are, however,
Miliimy Rwlsw

several valid, fundamental reasons for this lack of success by the Western soldier. At the same time, there are indk%atione of possible remedke. TIMProblem In order to place the specifics of the problem in their proper context, we need to recall thet the Communist system of warfare is based on the teaching of Mao Tse-tung who pre scribes operations in three stages: Subversive action within the enemy country. By means of propa ganda and incitement to violence, to subvert the minds of the population so that they either welcome and help the Communist forces when they arrive or remain apathetic. The infiltration of small patiles of guerrilla tighters who seek to ter rorise the inhabltante into active sup port of the Communist cause and dis locate the proeeee of government. The regular forces of commu niem march in to consummate the victory after it is considered that the first two stages have been thoroughly effective. Not all military operations which have taken place east of Suez in the past two decades have conformed to this pattern. In Korea, stages 1 and Brimzdicr C. N. Barclay. British Army: Retired, was comrn~simwd in the Cameroniana (Scotti8h Riflee) in 1915 and sewed in both World Wars I and II. He commanded a battalion at Dtmkirk and later saw Se*-ce in northwe8t Europe and Southeaet Asia. He i-c one of the Editors of Braeseys Annual and formerlg Editor of The Army Quarterly and Defence Jonrnal. Sirwe his retirement in 1946, he ha-r devot8d his time to militavil writing. His article, Fighting Men and Their appeaved in the Jan Equipment: mw 1966 issue of the Mumxrw REVIEW. February 1969

2 were imperfectly executed by the North Koreans, and stage 3 started too soon. The result wee a war which began in World War II style and tin ished as an inconclusive linear war of attrition, with both sides occupying entrenched positions Iiie those on the Western Front in World War I. The West learned two lessons: Asiatic Communist forma are largely invulnerable to air bombard ment. . The Chinese Communist soldler is a formidable opponent. Although we are now dealing with Communist Vietnamese instead of Chinese, both of these lessons have been confirmed in Vietnam. The Communists also have learned the lesson that subversive and guer rilla operation pay a better dividend againet Weetern troops than do opera tions on a World War II pattern.
Malaya and Aden

In Malaya from 1948 to 1960, opera tions followed the Mao Tse-tung doc trine in the first two stagee. Stage S was never reached. Stagee 1 and 2 were only partially successful, and the Communists were unable to deploy efficient forces for stage 3. Although it took British Commonwealth forces around 12 years, they eventually suc ceeded in bringing all of Malaya back to a condition of normal law and order. Experience in Aden before the British withdrawal at the end of 1967 ie hardly +@cal. The terronets there may have had some Communist back ing, but were mostly inspired by Arab nationalism. British troops acted more in a police role than a military capacity, but it was once again demon strated how difficult it is to prevent acta of sabotage and murder conducted by determined indltrators who do not

THE WESTERN

SOLOIER

wear uniforms and who resemble the local inhabitants in appearance. The confrontation between British Commonwealth and Indonesian troops in eastern Malaysia (North Borneo) is also not typical. The enemy were not Communiata but Indonesians who ting in an ~ ~me ,tiWnee

committed to combat in Vietnam. Since then, there baa been a steady buildup of strength until, by the spring of 1968, US land, see, and air forces exceeded one-half million men. Without this maeeive intervention, there is little doubt that the Com munista would have ~oy~n all of

In the jungles and swamps of Sontheset Ash the infantry ealdier is the only arm eepable of attainingdeeisivereawlteagainst the timmuniat insurgent from the heart of their homeland. The operations were on a emall scale and consisted mostly of clashes between patrols. It provides, however, one im portant lesson in demonstrating that well-trained regular treops can beat the Asiatic guerrilla at his own game. Britieh patroh-(%rkba unita in particulargained a marked ascendancy over the Indonesians, and thie led to
terms for the c-eetion of the fighting.

In .1965, US Armed Forces were 68

South Vietnam and probably be well on the way to doing the same in other countries of Southeast Asia. I do not profess to know how US Government and military officials rated the prospects of early succees when they embarked on this course. But to many outdde observers, it eeemed likely that the matter would be aatisfactarily resolved in a matter of a year ode the United Statee had deployed a sicable force. why RMW

This has not happened. After more than thrae yams of bitter fighting, Communist guerrilla fighters and saboteursthe Viet Congare still in control of large areas of South Viet nam and are etill able to commit mur der and outrages, and carry out amb ushes in perte of the country nom inally under the control of the South Vietnamese Government. Communists Miscalculated The Communists have completed stage 1 of Mao Tse-tunge recipe for war and have gained a considerable measure of succees in stage 2. In the epring of 1968, they erred in th]nk]ng that the time was ripe for stage 3. Stage 2 was intensified by acts of sab otage and murder in all the cities and large towns of South Vietnam. At the came time, major units of the regular North Vietnam ArmY were brought into actilon, In most cases, these were at battalion strength, but sometimes, particularly in the area of the demili tarized zone, full divieione were de ployed. There is little doubt that this action was expected to bring decisive resuke and a victorious end to the campaign. It failed. The guerrilla attacks on the cities and towns did not bring about a revolution or uprieing in favor of the Communists, and the larger forma tions and unitz found that, in largescale operations, they were no match for US troops and the better trained of the South Vietnamese unita. The Communists had miscalculated in believing that stage 2 had advanced sufficiently to permit a successful launching of stage 3. Throughout these years of combat, the US Air Force has played an im portant part. Conventional-type bombe have been dropped in massive quantiFobrusry 1969

ties on impertant targeta. The Com munists surely have bean severely handicapped by these operations, but bombing has not proved decisive ores effective as anticipated. Losses in air craft have been heavy, mainly due to antiaircraft tire from Soviet and Chinese-made antiaircraft weapons. In this campaign, no eerious mili tary commentator contemplates the defeat of the foices of the United Statee, South Vietnam and the other allies. On the other hand, tbe Com munist forces have proved hard to beat, and there is a long road to travel before they are decisively de feated. We may now sxzmine some of the cauees of the difficulties axpsrienced by the Western soldier in fighting the Communist guerrilla, not only in Viet nam, but in Malaya and elsewhere. In thie connection, it ehould be noted that the campaigns of terrorism started recently by the so-called Afri can Freedom F]ghtere against the countries under white control in south ern Africa bear a strong resemblance to the methods adopted by the Viet Cong in Vietnam.
Factors Govsming Succass There appear to be three main for success when factors necessary

fighting Communist guerrillas: e A high etandard of tactical skill in the infantryparticularly at patrol level. The support of the civil popula tion, not merely paseively, but in an active capacity. A good intelligence system at all levels. The forcee of the Wsetern Powers have not always bcsn conspicuously eucceseful in these respects. The great advantages enjoyed by
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THE WESTERN SOLOIER

the modern guerrilla-saboteur are well known. He usually operates in hie own territory; he can pick and choose the time and place of his activities; and he can mingle with the population from whom he is often indistinguishable. To these and other inherent advantages must be added that his operations are usually skillfully directed at a high

operations were conducted mostly by regular, long-service volunteers. On the Malayan mainland, about 60 per cent of the fighting infantry were regular, long-service soldiers. The re maining 40 percent were national serv icemen except in Gurkba units which were all regulare. The situation is different in Viet

level, and the menwho carry them out are well trained in tactics and in the uee of their weapons which are of simple design, but of good quality. There is little difficulty in training the Weetern soldier to handle his weapons efficiently. However, it is not eaey to atiin a standard of tactical skill superior to that of the guerrilla. That it can be done wae demonstrated in the campaign by the British in Malaya. British troope and Gurkbse showed a degree of tactical skill eu perior to the guerrilla enemy. How ever, these comparatively small-scale 90

nam, with operations being on a vast scale. In these circumstances, most of the men are ehort-service draftees or reservists whose etandard of train ingtactical training in particular cannot possibly be as high as that of long-service regular volunteers. A draftee who serves for only two years requires eight to 12 months to train to a good combat standard and be deployed in the theater of operations. The US forces in Vietnam suffer from the great disadvantage that a high proportion of their men serve in the theater for only one year. Military RBfiOW

TNE WESTSRN

SOLOIER

There is a belief among many people that, compared with the teehnical arms, the infantry soldiers task is an easy one, There can be no greater mistake. The high degree of tactical skill required by the modern infantry man is one of the most difficult arts in the military curriculum. The late Field Marshal Lord Archibald P. WaveII, whose combat experience was worldwide and extended over a period of approximately 40 years, once wrote: 2%6 art of the Infant-n is less stsretwd amt far hardsr to acquire in modern war than that of awy other arm. The role of the avemge AvtiL L2qmmn, for inetnnce, is largely rowtine; the setting of a fuse, the loading of a gun, even the laging of it, are procemse which once learned, are mechanical. The Infantryman k to use {nitiative and intelligence in dmeet everg etep he moves, evm action he takee oa the battlefield. We ought therefare to put am- men of best intel ligence into the lnfant~. As a result of experience in Burma in World War II, Field Marehal Lord William Slim aaid: The actual *k of the Infantr& man requires from him a much higher skmdard of tnaining and a much greater power to think and act and ad qaieklv, than that needed bg any other arm. Modem experience shows conclu sively that the first requirement for sueceee againet the guerrilla-eahe teur fighter is a highly trained force of infantrymen. In jungle, ewamp, or mountain, where the euppofilng arms find it di5cult to operate, this require ment ia even more important than in more open country. The subversive propagandist and the Communist guerrilla mix with the
Febnmy 1869

civil population and often closely re semble them in appearance. Obviously, if the civil population is friendly or overawed, their task is made easy. If the civilians are hostile, the task is diSicult and aometimw impossible. Clearly, it ie a primary task of Weet ern troepe to gain and maintain the support of the civil population. This ia not to be done by id-]atic slogans. People who are starving, ill, and living in the middle of a battle ground want help to grow their crops, and need doctors, nuraea, and shelter. Above all, they want to be cure that if they help the Western troops, they will not besome the victims of Com munist reprisals.
Occupy Small Arms Once the regular troopa occupy an

area, they must etey there. They can not expect help from the civil popula tion if it is known that they are Iiiely to withdraw and let the Communieta return. Moreaver, burning and de etroying villages beeauee of a eus picion that they harbor Conmmniet fighters ia a Policy of doubtful wisdom. The Communists may well be unwel come visitore in a friendly village. They are armed; the villagers are not and, therefore, have no alternative to admitting them. It is much better to oeeupy a small area and protect it properly than a large one and leave its inhabitants open to Communist re prisals. Another factor of succese ie intel ligence. In great wara such as World Wars, I and II, military intelligence ie mostly on a high, or etrategic, level. It aims at discovering when and where the enemys next major attack will be delivered, the movement of forces from one theater of operationa or front to another, the enemys man
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power situation, and the state of his armament industries, his morale, and similar matters. In operations against Communist insurgency, some of these matters are still important although the intel ligence is directed to a much lower level. This is tactical intelligence and is concerned with small enemy con centrations and camps; stores of food and ammunition; and, above all, prior information about impending am bushes, acts of sabotage, and attacks on posts and defended villages.
Tactioal Offansive

It is only by tbe plentiful and prompt supply of information of this type that the guerrillas plans can be upset and tbe regular treops as sume the tactical offensive. The surest way to failure is to assume a defensive posture and await attack or ambush. The guerrilla banda must be sought out and deetroyed bafore committing their acte. This is no easy matter, and 100-percent success is obviously un attainable. However, ae was ehown in Malaya and later in Borneo, even a modest degree of success in offensive operations pays a good dividend. The guerrillas become dispirited and phys ically exhausted and eventually aban don the contest. Without goed intelligence, these re suke are unobtilnable. Clearly, intel ligence is tied closely with geod tac tical training and the cooperation of tbe civil population. Highly trained troops will automatically provide a large measure of their own intelligence at a low level. If cooperation with the civil population, including civil police, ia also good, a steady flow of informa tion about enemy activities is assured. How can these requirement for de feating guerrillas be met? 92

In the dwerta of the Middle Eaet, and in much of the open country of Europe, the airplane, the tank, and the long-range gun or recket can often play a decisive role. In the jungle and swamps, and sometimes in the moun tains, of Southeast Asia, the enemy cannot be seen from the air or by the artillery ground observer, and the tank cannot operate because the ter rain, except on roads, is mostly un suitable. In these conditions, the infantry soldier+perating on his feet with little more than his personal weapons to help him-is the only arm capable of attahing decisive results. In my view, thk is the crux of the entire matter. If the infantryman is h]ghly trained, then the other requirements will come easily.
Oifiicult Problam

The dilemma for the United States is this: How is it possible to have highly trained infantrymen in largescale overseas operations, as in Viet nam, in an Army where a h]gh pro portion of the soldiers serve for onIy the ebort period of two years? Thie is a difficult problem. A good proportion of my 31 years of army service was spent in training infantry soldiers, directly and indirectly, and commanding them in battle. Special thought was given to minor tactics. Even with the long-service eoldiers which the British Army recruited in peacetime before World War II, and the excellent training facilities often available overseas, it wcs no eaey matter to produce a unit really well trained in minor tactics. In war, with men enlisted only for the duration, it was even more difficult to attain a high standard of tactical training once the peacetime junior lex+dere had goneMilitary Review

THE WESTERN

SOLDIER

through casualties or through attri tion. This problem was never solved to my satisfaction. However, with the in creasingly high standard of intel ligence and education among Weetern soldlers, it may now be possible to put the short-service combat soldler in a position of tactical superiority over the Communist guerrilla-sabo teur. The following suggestiona are offered: Insure that the men of best in telligence and physique are put into the combat arms-the infantry in particular. The so-called technical arms should not be given preference. There is no higher grade technician than the well-trained infantryman who always beare the brunt when the going ia toughest and the terrain too difficult for the other arms to operate. The basic personnel in minor tactics are the junior officers and non commissioned officers-the men who, once trained, train the men under them. In times of peace, it is not ditlicult to provide junior leaders of this stamp from among the long-serv ice professional soldiers, and they will last for a short time when war begins. After a few months, however, when casualties, wastage, and dilution due to the formation of new unite or the activating of old ones take their toll, the supply begine to run out. If opera tions are on the ecale of World War II, Korea, or tbe campaign in Vietnam, the standard of minor tactice gradu ally deteriorates and can become thor oughly bad or practically nonexistent. To prevent this trend in a big war of long duration is dltlicult. Most mili tary skills such as weapon training, signal procedure, and defense con struction can be learned as a drill, and
February 1969

quick3y, by intensive methods. But

there minor is no ehortcut to the art of

tactics in which the soklier and the junior leader in pc#lcular must use initiative and intelligence in every move. The solution lies in taking timely action to secure a steady flow of good junior leaders. In World War II, this matter was not tackled seriously in the British Army until halfway throngh. By 1943, some improvements had been made, but many units never atttdned a high tictiml atsndard. In the meantime, battles and engagements were lost, mainly in North Africa and often due to a low standard of battlefield tactice. It should be part of the mobilicetion plans of every Defense Ministry to establish schools of instruction at various levels for teaching minor tactics to junior leaders as soon as it becomes clear that big-scale operations are impending. A carefully thoughtout plan for instruction in this sub ject would provide a continuous flow of instructors for existing units, and instructors and a cadre of junior leaders for newly raised, or newly ac tivated, unita. If the existence of the problem is realised at the outact, its solution should not be too difficult under modern conditions. Another important matter is that a team functions at its best when the members know, and have confidence in, each other. If its personnel are con tinually changing, it loses efficiency. Some changes are inevitable in war, but, in tactical unite, they should be reduced to the minimum. A greater propotilon of training time should be devoted to tactical training. There ie a tendency to spend too much at weapon training which is comparatively easy to arrange, 93

THE WESTERN

SOLOIER

whereas tactica is more troublesome and requires considerable preliminary thought. With more time devoted to the latter subjecg shor&service men should attah a degree of proficiency which enables them to be efticient fol lowers, if not instructors and leed ere, in the field of minor WICS. The inventive otllcer, with sufficient senior ity end authority to influence train ing, will have little difficult in adapt ing his methods and organizing in-

struction to suit the men and the conditions at the time. I em convinced that it is the welltrained, lightly equipped infantryman, operating on his feet who can bring victory ageiuet the Communist guer rilla-eeboteur. The aupporthg arroa aircraf~ artWery, and tcnke-ehould be used to the full, but experience has shown that they cannot be decisive. The more ditllcult and enclosed the country, the lees effective they bceome.

Our number one weapon is still the individualsoldier armed with a rifle he knowe how to me. GeneraZ Earle G. Wheekr

Wt#y

RN&V

N RESPONSE to reader request, the ilfilita~ Review inaugurates this see tion for the jmblication of reader comments. Editorial DohcYfor the Reader ~orum is axpr&eed in the following statement:

A wnmrg fnwpoee of the Military Review ia to provide a forum for the exchunge of &fcn.s and infermed ~nion conoo%ng militmy affairs. When controver8iu4 mattere are preeented in the Review, readere disagreeing mth the themee or conclusions presented are invited tomute brief cosnmente of divergent viewe. Conci8e disctwskwra on any t~ce of general militurg in terest are ako welcomed for Weeible publication. Because of limited space, the editor re80rve8 the right to eelect tho8e remler intereet for publication and to commente and diacuseiotw of greateet edit or eliminate giz8eage8 for bmvitg, Editing wU not intentionally modifti a contributor8 meaning or contest. Contributions to the Reader Forum should be a&irea8ed to: Editor in Chief, Military Review, US Anng Command and General Stiff CoUcge, Fort Leavenworth, Kansae 66087.

Armor in tbe Middle East Leo Heimane statements in his article, Armored Forcee in the Middle East: in the November iesue of MiZitaty Review, that: The Israeli . . . attempt to utilise Britieh doctrine and methods cost them thoueands of caeualtiee [in 1948] . Ieraeli Army chiefe, all of whom had served as officers in the Britieh Army in World War II, were eubeaquently replaced by veterans of Palmath. The last British-trained Israeli Chief of the General Staff was re Febmmy 1969

IAaced in the 1950s bv Pahnach vet eran General Moehe Dayan . . . are not true and are offending many geed men. Mr. Heiman should be reminded of, among others, General Haim Lsekovs roles ae Director of Military Training of the Israeli Defense Forces; Chief of the Actuating Team; Deputy Chief of Statf; and Chief of Staff (1960s). Also of the work and reeults of the Actuating Team. E. Porat Maabarot. Israel

MILITARY NOTES
UNITED STATES
MIRV

A Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) was success fully tested last year aboard tbe Na vys Poseidon and the Air Forces Min uteman 111. It is reported that the Soviets have also teated a multiple re entry type of missile. MIRV is not expected to he opera tional until the late 1970s. Rather than increasing the number of landbased missiles or building additional Pokzris submarines, the United States, for the time being at leaet, hae decided to increase nuclear delivery capability with the MIRV system. Using the new technique, a single Minuteman III or Poseidon could place several miesiles on targets hundreds of milee apart. With the addition of de coys, MIRV also is expected to be bet ter able to penetrate antiballistic mis sile defenses and saturate a target area to the point that the antiballistic missile defenses would be limited in their effectiveness. While no official figures have been released by the Department of De fense, reporta have been widely pub lished that the Minuteman 111 will carry three warheads while the Posei don will carry up to 10.

It is believed that the United States is well abead of the Sovieta in the MIRV technique. The Soviets, how ever, have succeasfu]]y launched the fractional orbital bombardment sys tem (FOBS) that could be used, with little warning time, against Strategic Air Command bases and metropolitan areas. FOBS also has the advantage (to the Soviets) of being able,to come in from the south where tbe United Statee does not have adequate warn ing syetems.-fhvhzance, @ 1968.
Quiet Submarine Program

.= a6

The Department of Defense will go ahead with a program to build a new kind of nuclear-propelled attack sub marine, the se-called quiet subma rine. The program, estimated to cost 150 to 200 million dollars, cells for the construction of one ship to contain a combination of advanced silencing techniques. Thie nuckar submarine will have a new turbine electric drive propulsion system, and new and quieter machinery of various kinds. The submarine built will be more than a test bed. It will carry weapons and perform an operational mission. The quiet submarine is in addi tion to the new high-speed class of nuclear-powered attack submarine pro gram approved in July 1968. Work is also continuing on 29 additional Stur geen ck+ee. nuclear attack submarines. DOD release.
Militwy Review

MILITARY NOTES Grenada Launchar Attachment A 40-miCCimeter detachable grenade

launcher is being designed for use with the MM rifle family. The objective of the project is to provide the individual rifleman with a weapon having both point fire and ares fire capability. Evaluation testing of the weapon will be conducted during late spring, with unit issue scheduled for 19?0.

The combined active aircraft inven tory of the Navy and Marine Corps will be 8,791 at the end of FkcA Year 1969-e decrease of 67 from 1968. For the Air Force, the 30 June 1968 total of 14,398 will rise to 14,420 by 30 June 1969.DA release.
Vehicle Rapid Firs Weapon Systems

The MZ1.4A1 command and recon naissance vehicle mounting a 20-milli meter antomatilegun is eeheduled for deployment to unite in US Array, Eu rope, by mid-1969. The Ml.v9 20-milli meter cannon ie manufactured by sev eral European firms and is being pro cured through the Federal Republic of Germany. The weapon is an interim arma ment ayetem pending development of the Armye Bushmaster automatic cannon. The B@ma-ste~ is expected to be 20 millimeters or larger, with a feed eystem that will permit the gunner to seleet from several types

Ar&i

Farca Manqwmnnt

New M16grenadelauncher The launcher is a single-shot, ham merless, pump-operated mechanism which will fire the same rounds used in the M79 launcher. Ita accuracy, maximum range, and mnssle velocity will be equal to that of the M79. Tbe unloaded weight ia approximately 2.7 pounds.US Army release. ArmysAviation Force The Armys aviation force is now the second largest in the armed serv ices. A summary of major forces in a report on the 1969 Department of Defense appropriation bill shows the Active Army aircraft inventory is projected to contain approximately 11,500 aircraft on 30 June 1969, com pared with approximately 10,500 in June 1968.
Febmars 1369

us Arm The MU9 20-millimetercannonmounted en the MI14AI vehicle of ammunition depending on the tar get being engaged. It will also have increased range and lethality. Development contracts are to be awarded in 1969, with production schedul?d for the 1970s.US Army release.
W

MILITARY NOTES Huge New Cage Ships

A US shipbuilder has contracted for the construction of three of the worlds largest eargo transports of a revolutionary design to be built at a cost of about 32.6 million dollare each. They are scheduled to enter service in 1971. Each ship will be 375 feet long and 106 feet wide. This makea them the

The bargee are loaded and diecharged by a 2,000-ton submersible elevator at the etern of the ship. Two barges can be handled simultaneously. The bargee are moved from the ele vator to their storage location by power-operated transporters. Each of the carrier vessels can be loaded or

General Omamics

New,

Artists conceptof new Seabee CISSS merchsntship showingthe 2,066-ton stern elevator about to dischsrge two fully loaded bsrges largest common carrier freight ships ever built anywhere in the world. They will have powerplants of 36,000 ehaft horsepower, the largest installed in any eargo vessel. The ships will be capable of speeds of 20 knote or better. Theee mammoth ships represent a new concept in cargo handling for ocean transportation. They are designed to carry 38 bargee contzdning 17,600 tons of cargo. Each of the bargee will measure 97% feet long and 35 feet wide. 98 discharged in 13 hours, better than 15 times faster than present-day break bulk cargo carriers. A major advantage of the new eys tem ie tbe potential reduction in cargo handling and the ability to operate without extensive shoreaide facilities. The bargee may be loaded on an inland body of water, then towed to the carrier sSdpand loaded aboard for dis charge oversees and delivery at the ultimate destination without the barge carrier ever entering congested port
RSrkJW Military

MILITASY NOTES

areas or tying up to a dock. The num ber of handlings of the cargo is re duced to two as compared with the five or eix handSingeit must undergo now. This also reduces the opportunity for pilferage. The ships are not restricted te barge carrying. The avaitable cargo epace may be used insteed to transpert more than 1,600 containers of standard size, equivalent to 1.5 million cubic feet of ezrgo, or the shipe can handle roll-on roll-off vehicles and unitized loads with equal facility. In addition, each ship could carry 15,000 tone of liquid eargo in its deep tanks. The ships heavy lift eepacity of 2,000 tone is far greater than any other ship or crane in the world.Newe item.
Artillery Teat Weapon A new experimental howitzer was recently demonstrated by Army ord nance at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Designated the XM199, the

and more mobile than the present 105 millimeter Ml 02 howitzer. The weepon consieta of a rifled bar rel similar to the Ml 02 barrel, a cir cular baeeplate, and a two-wheeled towed ezrriage. It has the capzbiSity of providing indh& fire to howitzer rangee with projectile dispersion char acteristics comparable to that of a howitzer. The weepen weighs approx imately one-third that of the MIO.2 howitzer and can be towed by a %-ton vehicle or transported by helicopter. The experimental model will be used only to prove the concept, officials said. Newe item.
Shrine Cemmand Post

weepon wae designed to provide a pre totype for teet and evaluation of a direct support weapon much lighter

US Army Combat Developments Command riverine warfare specialists are examining a nine by 24-foot porta ble command post inserted into an armored riverboat to eee if it can adequately accommodate an Army tac tical operations center. Thie is a bat talion headquarters staff with radios, maps, and other gear required to dl rect tactics] operations. The portable headquarters module, developed by the US Navy Inshore Warfare Project Office, ie designed to be lowered into the well deck of an armored troop carrier (ATC) a prin cipal craft used in riverine warfare flotillas. Rather than requiring eepa rate command crafk one of the Navy ATCS contilning the Army command ers pod becomes the command control boat. To prevent the Viet Cong from iden tifying the command boat and giving it their full sniper and water-mine at tention, the Army pod on board will not change the appearance of the beet. The command pod may be able to house a frilly operational Army brigade head quarters.-US Army releaee.

as

Satellite Cemmunkstiens

Test

C0mmun&r8 Di7.t

USCGC Gleeier, largest of the Coast Guards icebreaker%is mrrying satellite coel mmrirationsquipmentfor Antarctic testing The ArmY, Navy, and Air Force have begun the sseond phase of a joiht setice test effort to determine the fsaeibility of using utrahigh fra quency (UHF) communisation satel lite to nwat the eapanding tactical communication nseds of the Armed Forces. , Initial tests have been accomplished using a limited number of terminals loeat.ed throughout the United Statas with the rssently launched Lincoln Ex perimental Satel]iti (LES-6) now in a synchronous parking orbit about 22, 000 etatute miles above the equator. The first phase of this joint service experiment was accomplished with LES-5, the predecessor of LES-6. Announcement of the teats was made by the Air Forse SYsteme Com mands Electronic Syateme Division, the agency rseponeible for the coordi lW nation and conduct of the joint serv ice LES-6 tset effort. The field condition experiments will tsst UHF terminale suitable for de ployment in aircraft, ships, subma rines, helicopter, and mobile ground vehicles of the military services. The Coast Guard is participating in one pert of the tmte to determine sat ellite communication capebilitiea in the Antarctic ares. Terminal equipment aboard the cutter G.?aeiet will test propagation characterietice from tbe polar regions where auroral and other magnetic disturbances frequently play havoc with conventional communica tion links. The Gktcbm, with two other ice breakers, will panetrats McMurdo Sound during the Antarctic summer to reeupply United States naval sup port forces there.DOD release. Mlltsry Rwbw

MILITASY NOTES Coaat Guard R&D OfAce

Discovering new concepts and de veloping technological improvements necmsary to meet preeent and future requirements in marine science, search and rescue, aide to navigation, and ma rine safety are the aims of a new Of fice of Research and Development re cently eetabliehed by the Coeat Guard. The R&D Office is beginning with a staff of 39 military and civilian per sonnel and ie expected to expand to 120 within the next three years. An initial appropriation of four million dollara wae approved for Fiscal Year 1969.DOD releaee. Oepleted Uranium Projectile The Army has conducted test firinge of 25-millimeter depleted uranium rounda recently at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. A doaen rounde were fired at a range of 500 yards againat two-inch armorplate targets. The uranium projectile on striking the armorplate reacta chemically with the steel to create extremely high tem peratures. This, plue the heat of im pact, actually melts the armorplate. Armed Forcee Mamzgement, @ 1968.
Chemical Alarm Neara Completion

etockpile nerve agents in their chem ical warfare arsenals. The varioua nerve agents are odorleea and color less, and very small dosee are lethal. The XM8 contah an electrochem ical cell which samples air continu ously. The presence of nerve agente cauaee the cell to produce electric en ergy which triggers the alarm. It ie extremely sensitive and will detect minute amounta of nerve agent vapor in below-lethal concentrations. The alarm can be manpacked,vehicle mounted, or used in tied emplace ment. Complete with its battery pow

The ArmY has achieved a br~k through in chemical warfare defenee with a new chemical field alarm sys tem nearing completion of develop ment bv acientiste and engineere at Edgew~d Areenal, Maryland. The new portable chemical agent alarm (XM8) will provide US field forces, for the first time, with auto matic means of detection and warning of the presence of nerve agents. The need for an adequate detection and alarm system has increased in recent years as major world powers
Febrrury 1*9

..- ..
CIIsoge in Armed Forces

The lotb annual report of The Insti tute for Strategic Studies (1SS), The MWtaW Bolmux, 1968-1969, provides estiiatea of Soviet military strength as made in July 1968. The report eoncludea that the 1969 Soviet defense budget is likely to be considerably increeaed, and that the case for expansion in conventional arms must have been strengthened by the invaaion of CcechoalovMla But in Fiscal Year 1968, the only major and significant increase in the armed forces has been the rapid expaneion of the strategic rocket forces, leaving conventional arms an even smaller ahare of the defense budget than in 1967. The report was compiled before the invasion of Cceehoelovakiaand, there fore, doee not reflect any changes as a reeult of that operdtion. It is be lieved that perhaps se many es 200,000 reservieta were ealIed up in the summ er of 1968, but theea men should be released aa the situation in Europe becomes lees tense. The length of service for the army is now two years,,a six months reduc tion. The na~ and air force have cut one year from their previous fouryear service requirement. Th]s meas ure must inevitably reduce the effec tiveness of the Soviet conscripts, de spite the stepping up of promilitary training which accompanies it. The overt appropriations for 1968 were 40 bNion dollars, but total mil itary expenditure was estimated at 50 billion dollars (based on the pricing syetem ueed in Soviet industry, one dollar equals .42 rubka). This new estimate constitutes a considerable in crease over the 1967 total of .36billion 162

dollara. For the first time in many yeara, the USSR ia thought to be epending abnoat as much on defense in absolute terms se the United States whose estimates for 1963-69 are given ss $79,576,000,000, of which abnost 30 billion dollars are attributable to Vietnam. Yet the USSR has a gross national product (GNP) estimated at only 358 billion dollars for 1967, whereas the US figure for that year wcs 807 billion dollars. According to the 1SS estimates, the USSR is, therefore, making a greater defense effort in propotilon to ber GNP than the United States. The Soviet Union in July 1968 etill had fewer men under arms than the United Statea. The total regular Soviet foreee were eetimated at 3,220,000 (the same figure se in 1967), whereea the United States had 3.4 million. The only branch of the armed forcee to chow any major change during the year wcs the strategic rocket forces. Operational intercontinental ballietic miaeilw (ICBMa) numbered about 800 at midyear (of 475 in mid-1967), and the total by the end of 1968 may be as high sc 1,000. Even so, the United States still has an advantcge of almost three to two because, together with 1,054 landbased ICBMS, there is the Pokms force of 666 miseilee, ae against only 125 fleet ballistic miesiles in the So viet Navy. The number of Soviet midrange and intermedia~range ballietic miesilea remains at 760. There ww little change in the air defenses, with the exception of the in troduction of the new ZSU-.#9-b fourbarreled, self-propelled, antiaircraft Militcry Review

MILITASY HOIES

gun and a new intercepted fighter, the Ya,L&2 Fiddler. No change was shown in the strength of the army estimated in July at two million men. No major changes in ground forces equipment was re ported. The navy strength of 465,000 men did not change, hut, during the year, two more Kresta claee guided-mieeile
cruisers were commissioned while
tXVO

change during the year was a 10 per cent decrease in both the Polish and East German Air Foreee (Poland from 820 to 750 combat aircraft and East Germany from 300 to 270 combat aircraft) .Radio Free Europe.

older cruisers were taken out of serv ice. Neither the destroyer nor the eub marine inventory changed appreciably, but tbe number of landing ships and landing craft was reduced by 100, ac cording to the 1SS. Nuclenr ballietic missile submarines continued to be built at the rate of one or two a year. The naval air force lost 100 of its bombers (the new strength ie ,shown as 400), but it gained 180 other air craft, most of which are probably heli copters for the new helicopter carrier Moskmz now in the Mediterranean. Although the number of combat air craft and men in the Soviet Air Force remains the same, the number of me dium bombers dropped from 800 to 750 in the latest estimate. The heavy bomber force still has 200 aircraft, of which 50 are tankera and about 40 more (the Tw95 Bear) are turboprops. There was no change in the strength of the tactical air force which is still shown as having nearly 4,000 aircraft. In the air transport force, there was no change in either the number of aircraft (still 1,500) or in the num ber of helicopters (also 1,500). The onfy equipment change is the intro duction of a few Antonov $%?.s which provides a small but significant longrange air transport capability. Among the smaller powers of the Warsaw Pact, the only significant Fdlrmry 1969

kfmr

.%;.:

Albma

Turkish ranetrmtionworkers mmpleting the masonryend of a snow tunnel on s section of the CENTO rail link between Lake Van end the Iranianborder that will carry the trains across Lake Van in Turkey. Good progress is also reported on the Iranian section of the CENTO project which is scheduled to link the railway systems of the two countries by 1970.News release.

103

Smrsh-and-Rescrra

Sserciae

The Central Treaty Organisations (CENTOS) annual search-and-rescue

crashes in the rugged mountahs of southwestern Iran. Medical and rescue teams were parachuted to the disaster Iecations, and eurvivors were picked up by ship and helicopters. In one incident: tough mountain rescue teams from Iran, Turkey, and the United Kingdom effected the res cue of a downed pilot from a 10,600 foot mountain peek. Such combined, international efforts strengthen the search-and-rescue ca pabilities of the CENTO region. CENTO release.

ITALY
Maritime Aircraft

CE~TO Iranian paratroopers exit aircraft on a

recme

The Italian Air Force and Navy have selected the A tfantic antisubma rine patrol aircraft to increase their surveillance capability. The Atlantic will replace the S-2A Tracker whose range is limited. The initial order is for 16 aircraft. The longer range At/antics will mean that Italy could cover nearly all of the Mediterranean. The North At lantic Treaty Organization is pressing for increased maritime surveillance of

mission

southwestern Iran and adjacent waters of the Persian Gulf recently. NEJAT was hosted by the Imperial Iranian Air Forc# which coordinated paWlcipetion in the exercise by the civiIian Iranian Search-and-Rescue Organization, ground forces, navy, and gendarvnene,plus officers, teams, and special equipment from Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and from CENTOS Combined Military Planning Staff. Search operationa were conducted to locate survivors of a simulated ship sinking in the Persian Gulf and air

NATO,,

Fijkm

N.tk

The At&mticpatrol aircraft the Mediterranean, and Britain is sta tioning a squ~dron of her Shackleton patrol aircraft in Malta for thie purpose.News item. Military Review

104

MILITARY HOlfS

VU60SLAVIA
Jastrab 1

Prototype Jaetreb with armamentcombinations

Bristol Vim

New.

A new Yugoslav-produced military aircraft has made ita debut. It is the Ja-ctreb 2, a single-scat derivative of the GaZebjet trainer in service since 1964. The armed version of the aircraft, Jaw3eb I, carrica three 12.7-millimeter ma chhiegune in the nose and various combhations of bombs and air-to-surface rockets underwing. It also hee a more powerful engine with a apeed well in excess of 400 knote. The first rmermoduetion aircraft have already been flowu. News release.

ISRAEL
Navy Espsnds

INDIA
Cembat Aircraft India hae announced plani w manu facture a new Indian-developed com bat aircraft to succeed the HF-24

Israels Navy is undergoing a ma jor facelifting, according to top naval officers. New bases hive been cstab liehed both on the Mediterranean and Red Sca shores to support the new patrolling activities required of the Israeli sea arm. It was aleo announced that two merchant ships have been completely redeaigaed and reequipped and will be used for naval miesioue. The need to refurbieh the navy was demonstrated last year when the de stroyer IMat was destroyed by Egyp tian Stwt sea-to-sea missiles. The Is raeli Navy must cope with the Egyp tian naval arm which has been receiving fresh new supplies from the Soviet Union and is the most formi dable in the Middle Eest.-Amned Forces Manwwwzemt, @) 1968. February 1969

Marmb. The new fighter plane is to have greater speed and range and will carry a heavier armament load. It was aleo announcedthat MiG aircraft made entirely in India will be available by the end of 1969.India News.

COMMUNIST CHINA
Ballistic.Missile Submarines According to the Indian Institute of Defense Studiee, the Red Chinese

have 24 submarine capable of launch ing nuclear miesilce. Chinas naval strength, in addition to the subma rines, consists of four destroyers, five dcetroyer escorts, 11 frigates, 18 mine sweepers, and 36 patrol boata,-Naoy. 105

MILITASY NOTES

NATO EsersisaSilver
Tower

A large North Atlantic Treaty organization exercise, known as Silver Tower, teak place in the last half of September. More than 100 NATO .ddps from nine nations took part, together with ehor~based maritime aircraft from the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, Portugal, and Norway. The exerciee postulated a eituation in which a foreign power was exerting political and military pressure on Norway. The power wae known to have eur face forces at sea in northern waters and a large number of eubmarinee in the Atlantic. A feature of the exercise was the continuous surveillance by the Soviet Union. Two fleet oilere, three Kotlin claes destroyers, and two electronically equipped trawlera were eeen, and, in fact, one destroyer traveled in company with each of the three carriers in the NATO force. In addition, there wae con tinuous cover by Soviet four-engine jet maritime aircraft of the Bear and Bison classee. The exercise wae the first big NATO exercise of its kind since Teamwork in 1964 in which a number of strike zarriers took part. With tbe US commit-

A Soviet guided-missiledestroyer ehsdowingthe aircraft rarrier KIWS Eagle during ExereiseSikwr Tower ments in Vietnam, only one strike carrier could be epared. It ie interesting to note that it was British and that after the mid-1970s Britieh carriers will not be available. The analysie of the exerciee will not be completed for some time, but one leeson is certain: NATO does not have sufficient ahipe of all classes, nor are there enough maritime reconnaissance aircraft available for sustained opera tiorm.Navg.

106

Mmtcry Review

MILITARY NOTES

GREAT BRITAJN
second Polaris Submarine

HMS Remlution, Britainsfirst Polaris mbmarinejon its sm tride Greet Britah has commissioned a sacond PoZati submarine, the HMS 12e pulee. After a shakedown cruise and miseile-firing exercise, the Repuke is sx on operational patrolling by pected to join its sister ship, the HMS Reeoltttiort midyear. Britiln plans to connniesion her third PoZarie submarine, the HMS Renown, in 1969 and the fourth, the HMS Revenge, ie to be completed in 1970.Nav#.
15Millimeter Weapen

JAPAN
lokye Prepares for MAA6 Reductien The US Military Assistance Advis ory Group to Japan, known as MAAG-J, will be drastically reduced in size and composition and will be renamed by June 1969, according to reports in Tokyo. After the scheduled phasing down, the group will handle mainly buPort, of military teehnologiee into Japan. At ite pee~ MAAG-J had 625 msrn here.Armed Force8 Management, @ 196S,
107

An agreement for joint development of a new Anglo-German 156-millimeter towed gun hae been announced. The new weapon will be capable of being carried in aircraft, and helicopters will be able to transport it clung below the fueelage. Although the gun, with a range of more than 24,000 meters, will be towable, it will also have a detachable power unit enabling it to move short dietancee without a towing vehicle. Armed Forcee Management, @ 196S.
Fobremy 196e

MILITARY BOOKS
7NE ZINOWEV LE7TER. By Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay, and Huge Young. 219 Pages. J. B. Lippfncett Cc., Philadelphia and New York 1SB7. $5.95.

BY LTC Orre P. CHANEY,JR., USA

In the fall of 1923, the Labor Party, under the premiership of Rameay MacDonald, came to power in Britiln. On aeeuming office, the party kept ita campaign promise and gave uncondi tional recognition to the young Soviet THE KOREAN DECiSiON [June 24-30, 1S501. Government. Soon, other nations of By Glen ~. Paige. 394 Pages. lha Free Prass the Capitalist world followed suit, and ef 6fencoe, Inc., New Yorftj and Ceiiierthus one of the main objectives of Macmillan Ltd., Lenden, Eng., 1SSS. $B.95. Soviet diplomacy-efficial acceptance of the fledgling regime-became a BY LTC CARLF. BASWELL, USA reality. The Korean Decision is a meet in In October 1924. in the midst of new formative reconstruction and analysis elections, Britain was rocked by a let- of the US decision to resist agureesion -ter supposedly written by Grigori E. in Korea in 1950. It is a unique case Zinoviev, head of the Comintern, to study in international relations and the British Communiet Party. The let high-level decision makhg in foreign ter, which called for revolutionary act policy. The author gives a detailed, chronological account of how the Ko ivity in Ireland and in the colonies, greatly embarrassed the Labor Gov rean deeieion was made. The author ernment and contilbuted to its defeat. stresses the crisis aspect of the deci The letter also destroyed any prospect sion in that the situation was unex of the Angla-Ruseian trade treatise be pected, the time was short, and a heavy ing ratified by the British Parliament. US commitment was made in just seven days. The deeision-making proc In their absorbing account of thie esses were severely limited, the num episode, the authors have shown that ber of decision makers was relatively the Jetter was forged by Russian emi small, and the amount of study and gres in Berlin, planted in the Euro intelligence research was meager. pean intelligence network, and then This interesting volume ie stimulat paeeed to the Foreign Officein London. ing reading for students of political In researching the story of this fa science and American history and for mous conspiracy, the authors turned all those interested in contemporary to the British Foreign Office wldch international events. gave them no assistance and whose lea htilltary Review

otlicial attitude, according to the au thors, still seems to be that Zinoviev actually wrote the letter. But two vital pieces of new evidence were discovered which, when pieced together with pre viously known information, allowed the authors to reconstruct the forgery. The result of their investigation is a highIy readable voiume combining the properties of a mystery, spy thriller, and fast-moving history.

Mlf.fTARYBOOKS
ASPECTS OF MOOERN COMMUNISM. Edited With a Prafaco by Richard f. Stasr. 416 Pagas. Urrisersity of South Csrollrra Pres& Columbia, S. C., 1966.$7.95. TNE ANATOMY OF A RIOT: A OatmJt Judgas Rapork Oy James H. Linceln. ~ Pages. Mc6raw4iill Beek Ce. New YeX Torente, Can., Lenden, Eng., Sidney, Aus., 1S66. KAMANDULIS, $5.95.

BY LTC DONALDA. USA

BY LTC FSSANK S. WFSTLING, USA This book will undoubtedly be of considerable value to judicial officers, but it will be of little value to military officers concerned with the employment of troops in the cities to suppress civil disordere. In fact, the authore only recommendation in this regard is to euggest that the National Guard provide security for youth homes and detention centers. Relying principally on hla experience and observations from the bencb, Judge Llneoln dis cusees some of the causes of the 1967 Detroit riot and argues a program to eliminate them.
MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY: Its Use in Modem War and Indiract Cenffict. Oy Howard C. Walters, Jr., United states Military Academy. 39 Pages. Wm. C. 6rawn Co., Oubuque, Iowa, 1666.$.65 paperbound.

The 13 essays in this book were pre pared for a symposium on modern communism held under the auspices of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. Tbe purpose of the sympoeium was to analyze the political, military, and eco nomic situation in the 14 Communiat ruled states and the contradictions in relationa among them. The introduction to the book, pre pared by tbe reporter for tbe confer ence, skillfully synthesizes the major themes of the conference, acts the stage for the problems discussed in the book, and poses problems for fur ther consideration. China, East Eu rope, and the Soviet Union each re ceive three essays while the smaller states of Mongolia, Cuba, North Ko rea, and North Vietnam are discussed separately. Each essay is followed by a brief discussion by another author who refutes, corroborates, or expands the points made in the essay. The book, containing tables, charts, and much other useful data, is liberally footnoted to ahow sources. Of epecial interest to military readers are the articles on the relationship of Soviet ideology and military etrategy, the Warsaw Pact, probleme in the Chi neee Communist armed forces, and achievements and failures in North Vietnam. The author, on leave of absence from the Chairmanship, Department of Po litical Science at Emory University, is Professor of Foreign Affairs at the National War College. FehWSrY le6e

BY COL THSQDOSE R. ROTH, USA This pamphlet provides a brief over view of the nature and history of mil itary psychology and its application to men, weapone, and environment. Of particular interest is Mr. Wal tere discussion of two new dimensions to the study of mane adjustment to epecial military environment: hydre space and aerospace. A major potilon is devoted to psychology as a weapon of war. The framework of psycholog ical operations is discussed. The au thor closes with an analysis of Com munist revolutionary warfare and a Vietnam caee study. Thk pamphlet providee a textbook-type approach to military psychology at what could be
considered the introductory level.

lfle

MILfTARY BOOKS SINSAPORE The Baffle That Changed the Worfd. TIM Crossroads of World History Serfs%By James Lessor. 325 Pages.Oouble. day & Co., Inc., Garden Cfty, New York, WBB. $535. BY LTC JACK G. CALLAWAY, USA The Japanese attack down the Ma lay Penineula and Singapores capture through the %ackdeor is generally well known; therefore, the author fo cuses on other factors which contrib uted to the loss of Singapere, and the effect thie hae since produced on Weet ern influence in Asia. lhe story be gins with Singapores founding in the 19th century and follows its develop ment through the peried of prosperous colonialism to World War I when the city clearly established ita interna tional value by serving as the provider of the worlds needs for rubber and tin. Following World War I, the British decided to fotilfy Singapore and to construct a naval base that would en- , able the fleet to assure the protection of colonial interesta. For tbe next 20 years, the islande defenses grew fit fully. The British largely ignored jun gle training on the assumption that the jungle was impenetrable, and otTi cers and their ladies lived in the com placent spirit of Rudyard Hiplings 19th century. According to the author, the British withdrew into enclaves sur rounded by walls of ignorance, snob bery, and prejudice. This produced a sense of dissatisfaction among local inhabitenta and caused the image of Western paternalism to wither and crumble. Thus, when the Japanese invaded the Malay Peninsula, the British found they were forced to defend with out lecal support. The Malayans felt indifferent to the brief struggle of the
110

British, for they had been promised an improved existence following a Jap anese victory. Perhaps, a reversal of tbe BritishMalayan sociological relationship wordd not have prevented the defeat that followed, but the author contends that it would have aided the defense of the island city. It would also have made easier the establishment of a government friendly to the West after the war, and would have provided the necessary base for an orderly, mutu ally beneficial, transition to independ ent rule. As it was, tbe East was provided proof that the West was not invinci ble, and the movement of Asia for the Aeiatiee was given impetus. The author contends the loss of Singapore set the pattern for the overthrow of colonialism in the Orient. . . .
THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA. By Fred J. Sbouri. 436 Pages. Syracrise University Press, Syracuse, N. Y., 1S6S. $10.00.

BY COL ELMEKP. CUKTSS, USA The Arab-Israeli question has plagued the United Nations almost from its inception. This problem is rightly labeled in the title of this boo~ a dilemma. The author, a PeIitical Scientist specializing in Middle Eset affairs, sets out to determine the: . . . pertinent facti and the furs&z mental IO+mples involved, and to eval cafe frdly, cnnaWUy, aad objectively, the v&?w8, potties, and acfhe of the 04 Weu a8 the contending partw8, rolee played by the major power8. He reviews the historical origins of the Arab and Jewish ties to Palestine, the British actions in the early 1900s, and the UNs actions from 1948 to date. Professor Khouri is a firm believer
sl!ilitsryREVIEW

MILITARY BOOKS in the UN as a means of achieving

true and lasting peace and avoiding catastrophic wars in the future. He

has made a rather exhaustive study of the issuee presented to the UN by both the Araba and Israelis. The draft resolutions and the final agreements are annotated for the se rious etudent to review. The author concludes that: . . . so bag M passions are injlamed and two extreme natiendisnw con tinue to be relentlessly pitted agaimt each other, and so kmg as no deter mined and constructive efforte are made, eepecinlly through the United Natione and quiet diploma~, peace in the Middle Eat will remain only a forlorn hope and dream. THE LANOIN6 AT VERACRUZ 1914.The Pirst Complete Chronicle of a Strange Encorurtar in April f914 Whan tia United States Nauy Capturad and Occupladthe City of Verecruq Mexico. By Jack Swaetman. 221 Pagas. Unitad States Naval bsstituta, Amrapofis, Md., 13SS. $S.50. BY COL GEORGE D. EOGEUS, JR., USA The momentous world events of the pact half century have obecured come dramatic episodee in the hietory of the United Statee which, at the time they toek place, etirred the emotions of the American public and teated the mettle of ita national leaderehlp. Such an incident ie recounted in thie volume. Ii April 1914, Marinee and aailore of the Atlantic Fleet were put aehore in response to a Presidential directive to Take Veracruz at once. Their mis eion wae to prevent the delivery of a large shipment of arms and ammuni tion inbound to Veracruz on a German vessel. This cargo was destined for the forces of provisional Preeident V1c toriano Huerts of Mexico, whose gov-

ernment the United Statee had re fused tQ recognize. After a short bat tle, Veracruz wee captured and Army troops were brought in to occupy the city. The author concludee that the op eration was a resounding tactkml euc ceee, but he coneiders the US invasion to be the manifestation of President Woodrow Wileons unsound pcdicy to ward Mexico. He citee the Presidents decieion to intervene es the Siret public demon stration of the doetrinair~ a~ltude that would lead ultimately to Wilsone confrontation with the Senate and to the repudiation by that body of the Trcety of Versailles. Mr. Sweetman, whose father was a participant in the Veracruz expedition, hae done an impreeeivejob of research in reconstructing the landing and the fighting that followed. His book, written in clear and terse prose, will interest both military and civilian readere. MASS BEHAVIOR IN BATTLE ANO CAPTtVITY. Tha Communist Soldiar [n ttse Korean War. Edited by Samuel M. Meyara and Albart O.
Biderman. Resaarzh Studias Oksctad by William C. Brzdbury. 377 Pages. The Univar zity of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111.,and London, Eng., 1303.$11.00.

At the end of the Koreen War, 14,325 of the 21,014 Chinese Com munist prieoners of war refused repa triation to China. This volume pre eents the resulte of a series of atudke designed to determine why this hap pened. The findinge are impurtant both from the standpoint of behavior of Communist prisoners of war but also in understanding behavior in cent.em. porary China.
111

MANAGING BY DESIGN... for Mssimum Es. wutive EffmtfvNIess. Sy w A. Mllian. 370 P2ges. Ar6erf4arI Msnspment Associsdfon, fncq New Yom 18SS. $11.23. BY COL HaardaN E. KESSLES,Ja., USA This interesting book defines the job of the professional manager and de eeribee in detaS how to go about do ing that job. The central theme is that management is a profession with a body of definite, recognizable skills wldch can be learned and practiced. The profeasiomd manager attempts to predict the future and then molds him self and his company to take maximum advantage of that future. while the beok is not for the gen eral military reader, it would be worthwhile reading for someone who is about to retire, and who is think ing about a second career. NEWBOOKS RECEfVEO A TIME OF WAR, A TIME OF PEACE. BY George McGovern, United States Senator. 20S Pages. Random House, New Yorh 1968.$5.95. TELEVISION AND THE NEWS : A Critical Appraisal. BY Harry J. Skor nia. 231 Pages. Pacific Beoke, Palo Alto, Cal., 1968.$5.75. HORRIDO ! Fighter Aces of the Luft waffe. BY Trevor J. Constable and Colonel Raymond F. Toliver, Retired. Introduction by Lieutenant General Adolph Galland, General of the Fighter Arm, 1941-45.348 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1968.$7.95. CIVIL RIGHTS AND RESPONSI BILITIES UNDER THE CONSTI TUTION. By Sidney H. Asch. 218 Pagee. Arco Publishing Company, New York, 1968.$4.96.
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POLAND : EAGLE IN THE EAST: A Survey of Mcdem Times. BY WII liam Woods. 272 Pages. Hill & Wang, Inc., New Yorlq 1968.$6.50. THE MEXICAN WAR: A Compact History 1346-1848. By Charles L. Dufour. Mapa by Barbara Long. 304 Pages. Hawthorn Books, Inc., New York, 1963.$6.95. THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS IN SOUTH AND SOUTH EAST ASIA. By Werner Levi. 186 Pagee. Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J,, 1968.$2.45 peperbound. $4.95 clothbound. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CON SCIENCE: A Constitutional Inquiry. By Milton R. Konvitz. 116 Pagee. The Vifdng Press, New York, 1968.$4.50. THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV. BY William Hybmd and Richard Walkwe Shryeck. 209 Pagea. Funk& Wagaalls Co., New York 1968.$4.95. DEMOCRACY IN A REVOLUTION ARY ERA: The Political Order To day. By Harvey wheeler. 224 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York Washington, and London, Eng., 1968. $5.96. NIGERIA. BY Walter Schwarz. 326 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New Yorlq Washington, and London, Eng., 1968. $7.50. MODERN GREECE. By John Camp bell and Philip Sherrard. 426 Pagea, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York and Washington, 1968.$9.00. PAKISTANS RELATIONS WITH INDIA, 1947-1966. By G. W. Choud bury. 941 Pages. Frederick A. Prae ger, Inc., New York and Washington, 1968.$7.50.
Military Rovlaw