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Rational Intuition: Bealer on Its Nature and Epistemic Status Author(s): Ernest Sosa Source: Philosophical Studies: An International
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 81, No. 2/3, Papers Presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting 1995 (Mar., 1996), pp. 151-162 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320646 . Accessed: 22/09/2013 11:15
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ERNEST SOSA BEALER RATIONAL ON ITSNATURE INTUITION: AND EPISTEMIC STATUS

(Received 7 August1995)
Thereis a lot I find agreeablein GeorgeBealer'soverallview of philosophical to come is indeed knowledge.The disagreement mostlya surface with extensive and phenomenon, deep agreement belowthe surface. The devil is saidto be in the details,however, andtodayI play thedevil'sadvocate. I will focusmainlyon intellectual under threeheads: intuition, A. Thephenomenology of intellectual intuition. B. Thestatusof suchintuition as a basicsourceof evidence, andtheexplanation of whatgives it thatstatus. C. Thedefenseof intuition thosewho wouldrejectit against andexcludeit on principle fromtheset of validsources of evidence.
A
Whatis ostensible intuition? Firstof all, ostensible intuition is like ostensible perception: thequalifier serves to cancelthesuccessimpliwhatremains cation; is mostlythephenomenology. In whatfollows we focus on the phenomenology, and 'intuition' will be shortfor 'ostensible intuition'. Theintuitions of interest herearea prioriintellectual seemings,
which present themselves as necessary: when ".... we have an a priori intuition, say,thatif P thennot not P ... it seemsthatthings
couldnotbe otherwise."(6)1 Such intuitings are to be distinguished fromimaginings. As in theexampleof doublenegation, intellectual intuition is a conscious positiveepisodebutit neednotinvolveanything picturable orimagPhilosophical Studies 81: 15 1-162, 1996. ? 1996 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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inable in any sensoryterms.The dataprovidedby such intuitionare "dataof reason,"not "dataof experience." Such intuitings are also to be distinguished from beliefs. Four arguments are advanced in support of this proposed distinction. let's distinguishtwo quite differBefore consideringthe arguments, ent distinctionsthatmight be at issue. Firstthe claim might amount to the following, relativelyweak, distinction: (WD) Not every belief thatp is necessarily an intuitionthatp. Second we have the much strongerdistinction: (SD) There is no sort of belief, a, such that to be an intuition thatp is to be a belief of sort a.
As we considereachof thefourarguments (Al throughA4 below) designed to enforce a distinctionbetween belief and intuition,we must wonderwhetherthe aim is to establishonly the weakerdistinction WD or also the strongerSD. Al. "Belief is highly plastic .... Not so for intuitions."(6-7)
Re Al: Since surely not all sorts of beliefs are so plastic, this could establishat most a weakdistinctionsuch as WD, andnot the stronger SD. A2. There are "... significantrestrictionson the propositions concerning which one can have intuitions; by contrast therearevirtuallyno restrictionson the propositionsconcerningwhichone can makea judgmentor a guess or have a hunch."(7)
Re A2: However, not all sorts of beliefs are thus unrestricted. For is a sort example, "belief whose contentis a simple necessarytruth" of belief with a significantrestrictionon the propositionsthat can constitute its content. So, again, this argumentcould establish at most a weak distinctionsuch as WD. A3. "Intuition mustbe distinguishedfrombelief: belief is not a seeming;intuitionis. For example thereare many mathe-
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matical theoremsthat I believe (because I have seen the proofs) but that do not seem to me to be true and that do not seem to me to be false ... ." (6) Re A3: It is compatiblewith this, however,thatintuitionbe a certain sort of belief: e.g., a noninferentialbelief that does not just derive from memory,perception,or introspection - or the like. Again, only a weak distinctionsuch as WD is establishedby A3. A4. ". . I have an intuition - it still seems to me - that the naive comprehension axiom of set theoryis true;this is so despite the fact thatI do not believe thatit is true(because I know of the set theoreticalparadoxes)." (6)
Re A4: Here we do clearly have an argumentfor the strongerdistinctionSD. If one accepts its premiss,then thereis no avoiding the conclusionthatto be an intuitioncannotjust be tantamount to being a certainsort of belief. The premisshere does insurethat one could have an intuitionthatp withouthaving any sortof belief thatp. We may conclude from the foregoing reflections that belief is indeed to be distinguishedfrom intuitionboth in the weak sense of WD and in the strongsense of SD. But how are we more positively to think of intuition.We are told that ".... there is a rathersimilar phenomenon in sensory (vs. intellectual) seeming. In the MullerLyerillusion, it still seems to me thatone of the two arrowsis longer than the other; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that one of the two arrowsis longer (becauseI have measuredthem). In each case, the seeming (intellectualor sensory) persists in spite of the countervailingbelief." (6) Compatiblywith the foregoing, nevertheless,seemings (intellectual or sensory) might be definable in terms of what one does or would believe in certain circumstances.Thus, in the Muller-Lyer illusion, in the absence of measuringand in the absence of memory aboutthe alreadyestablishedmisleadingnessof the situation,if one reliedjust on perception,one would believe thatone line was longer thanthe other. Similarly,most of us would naturallybelieve the naive comprehension axiom in the absence of the reasoning involving the set-
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theoreticalparadoxes,if one relied just on one's understanding of what the axiom itself says. Seemings then, whethersensory or intellectual,might be viewed as inclinationsto believe on the basis of directexperience(sensory) or understanding(intellectual) and regardless of any collateral reasoning, memory, or introspection- where the objects of intellectual seeming also presentthemselves as necessary. What is more, thatone at a certaintime has such a "direct"inclination- such an inclinationindependentof inference,introspection, perception,or memory- seems the sort of thing one can be aware of in turn,and awareof with "introspective" directness.Thatis, one can be aware of this in turn without relying for this awarenesson inference,perception,or memory. Considerfor comparisona case where you think: "if he says that one more time I'll be angry,"or even: "if he had said that one more time I would have been angry." Here you may well be right, you may also know you are right, you may know your own stateof mind well enoughfor that,andyet your belief here seems not derivedfrom perceptionor memory,or even inference(in any relevantsense). One might perhapshold out for a more substantialconceptionof seeming as involving a more positive experientialcomponent,in a broadenoughsense of "experiential" to cover sui generis intellectual experience as well as the more ordinarysensory experience. Let's suppose that real intellectualintuitionrequiresthat the proposition intuitedhave a special "glow" under the light of reason, a special "luster." Again, I do not myself see sufficientneed to postulateany such glow, except as a metaphor for the properties, explicatedabove, that a propositioncan have of being such that we would believe it in the absenceof inference,etc. However, for the sake of argument, in what follows I will suppressthat dissent of mine, putting aside my propensityof deflatethe glow into just an inclinationto believe absent inference, etc. However we view intuition, our remaining questionsbeckon.2
B
Intuition, however,we conceive of it, is, we aretold, a basic sourceof evidence, and is treatedas such in our standard justificatory practice. Whatmakesintuitionthusa basic sourceof evidence?Whatexplains
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its being so? What is it in virtue of which it is so? Two main possibilities are consideredas the only likely contenders.Otherrivals are discussed elsewhere, but we are told that none of these is successful. Anyhow, the two possibilities consideredhere are: contingent reliabilismand modal reliabilism.
According to contingent reliabilism, something counts as a basic source of evidence iff there is a nomologically necessary,but nevertheless contingent,tie between its deliverancesand the truth.(23)
Against this sort of view, three counterexamplesare proposed,all cases of creatureswho, eitherby telepathicmanipulation or through hardwiring, arereliablyrightin theirbeliefs concerningsome fieldof propositions:either a field of contingentpropositionsaboutremote states of affairs to which the creaturehas no other access, or a motley set of necessary propositionsthat the creaturehas no way of establishingby ordinary modes of reason,where the propositions about which the creatureis thus reliable do not even fit into any theoretical systematizationknown to anyone, and where perhaps no-one is even intelligentenoughto be able to establishany of these propositionsthroughordinary reasoning. For a more specific example, take again a motley set of necessary propositionsbelief in which is fixed by hardwiring.Let the set include the propositionthat there is no largest prime. One just finds oneself believing this, even though this propositionfits into no theoreticalsystematizationknown to anyone, and even though no-one is even intelligentenoughto be able to establishthis through normalreasoning,or to establishany otherpropositionin the motley set. Contingently, becauseof the contingentfact thatone fortunately is hardwiredso as to believe just these propositions,one is bound to be right in one's belief that there is no largest prime. But it is hardly a belief that can thus count as basically evident for one in such circumstances.
The conclusion is clear: as it stands, contingentreliabilism fails as an account of what it takes for somethingto be a basic source of evidence. In each of the counterexamples, the tie to the truthwas only contingent.A naturalway of ruling out such counterexamples would thereforebe to requirethat the tie be some sort of strong modal tie - thatis, to abandoncontingentreliabilismin favor of some form of modal reliabilism,as I favor. (25)
The alternativeis thus modal reliabilism,wherebythere is some modal tie to the truth:i.e., some modal tie that connects the basic
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sourceof evidence with the truth.It is proposedthatwe make .. . the strong modal tie to the truth dialectical and holistic rather than local [so as to avoid any local infallibilism of intuitions, which is unacceptablein light of paradoxesor aporeia,wherebylocal reason indicts itselfl:
For suitably good cognitive conditions, it is necessary that, if while in such conditions a subject goes through the whole procedure of a priori justification ..., then most of the propositions derivable from the resulting comprehensive theoreticalsystematizationof the subject's intuitionswould have to be true."(33)
The 'procedure of a priorijustification'hadbeen explainedearlieras being one "... thatsuitablyapproximates the following idealization: (1) canvassing intuitions;(2) subjectingthose intuitionsto dialectical critique;(3) constructing theoriesthatsystematizethe surviving intuitions;(4) testing those theories against furtherintuitions;(5) repeatingthe process until equilibriumis approached." (5) So much for the critiqueof contingentreliabilismandthe shift to modalreliabilism.A problemfor thatshift now appears: namely,that the counterexamples to contingentreliabilismseem no less effective against modal reliabilism.Considerthe subject who, throughtelepathy or through hardwiring,happens to believe the proposition that there is no largest prime. He just finds himself believing this proposition.Now isn't it true that any belief of that sort, that is to say, any belief that there is no largest prime, is bound to be right with modal force? Being the sort of belief it is, a belief with that content, it is a necessarilytruebelief. So, do we not satisfy here the requirements of modal reliabilism?That is to say, do we not have a sort of belief that is not just contingentlyreliable but necessarily reliable?Isn't anyone with that sort of belief necessarilyright? It mightbe arguedthatthis is just partof the fearsome"generality problem"besetting forms of reliabilismgenerally.Once we have a betterconceptionof the allowable sortsof "processes" or "faculties" or "psychological modes," we can just rely on that result to rule out such problematicmodes as acquiringa belief that there is no largest prime. And here the more positive and rich conception of intellectual"seeming"may actuallybe of some use. The right way to thinkof the relevantfaculty,it may be suggested,is as the faculty thatdeterminesbelief on the basis of whetheror not the right"glow'
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or "luster" is found in the propositionunderconsideration. However, two problemsattachto this suggestion. Firstof all, it is not reallyclear exactly whatthe glow has to offer that makes it betterthan the specific content. Take again the belief thatthis among thatthereis no largestprime.If one is so hardwired othernecessarytruthsis a truthone is boundto believe; if, being so bound, one is also necessarilybound to be right in the beliefs that one is thus led to accept; and if one can even tell by introspection whatthe respectis thatmakes one's belief so worthyand so reliably true, then exactly how is this mode of belief acquisitionlacking by comparisonwith the use of the glow as one's guide to belief? It's not as thoughwe do not know whatcontentourbelief has when it has the contentthatthereis no largestprime.This aspectof one's belief is no less internallyaccessible thanis the presenceof absenceof the glow. Moreover,it is a modally reliable guide to truth.Exactly wherein lies its shortcoming,then, as a source of evidence, and indeed as a basic sourceof evidence, if it is just hardwired andnot derivedfrom more basic faculties. A secondproblempertains to the use of theglow itself, andis more of an internalproblem.Suppose,again, we grantthatthereis such a thing as a positive experienceof intellectualseeming, a sort of glow irreducibleto any mere propensityor inclinationto believe. Even so, what explanationis offered by modal reliabilismof how such a positive experiencecould serve as a basic sourceof evidence? After all, we are given no assurancethat it is so much as nomologically possible for us to reachconditionswithin which such an experience would likely lead us to the truth,andnecessarilyso. It's as if we were told:Whatexplainsthe fact thatvisual appearances area basic source of evidence is thatin suitableconditions- open eyes, good light, no obstructions,clear medium, operativelaws of optics, etc. - visual appearancesare necessarily truthconducive. However, none of us has sufficientreasonto believe thatany of us has ever been or would everbe (nomologically)in suchfavorableconditions.The conditions we are actually in may doom us with nomological necessity to our visual appearances being highly unreliableand misleading. It may be replied that all I have done is to remind us of the possibility that one might be in an evil-demon, brain-in-a-vator othersuch skepticalscenario.And, afterall, in such scenariosvisual
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experiencedoes still appearto constitutea basic sourceof evidence. Knowledge is one thing, evidence quite another. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that the modal reliabilist has earneda rightto thatresponse.This may be seen more clearly if we view the problem- essentially the same problem,I believe - from anotherangle, as follows. Take somethingthatis normallynot takento be a basic source of evidence about a certain subject matter:say, a pain in one's joints as a sourceof evidence aboutcoming rain.Aren't thereconceivable circumstancessuch that as a matterof nomological necessity if one is in those circumstancesthen one's achingjoints are quite reliable aboutcoming rain?And can't we now just includethe relevantlaws in the circumstances,so that it becomes metaphysicallynecessary that in those broadercircumstances,one's achingjoints are necessarily mostly reliableaboutthe coming rain?Whatis the difference betweenthe place of the relevantaches in this meteorologicalfaculty and the place of the relevantglows in the modal faculty,or the place of visual appearances in the faculty of vision? It may be repliedthatthe relevantintellectualseemingsor experiences are describedas havingthe appropriate content,acceptanceof which they justify, in virtue largely of their appropriate disposition to occuronly in circumstances wherethe contentin questionis likely to be true.If a seeming or experiencewere not so relatedto the truth of its content, then it would not be properlydescribableas a visual appearanceor as an intellectualintuition with such a content. But it seems equally possible to find correspondingdescriptionsof the aches in questionso-thatthey would be describableas "rainindicating" aches only if they were appropriately relatedto coming rain.So we still lack a convincingexplanationof any fundamental difference between the epistemicrole of the aches and the epistemicrole of the glows. In this section we have asked what gives intellectual intuition its ability to serve as a source, a basic source, of evidence. We have consideredthe proposalthatthe answer is some sort of modal reliabilism.And we have found doubtsaboutthatproposal.
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Nevertheless,Bealer arguesthatintuitioncannotproperlybe denied as a source of evidence - even if we might falter in our positive explanationof what makes it a source of evidence. For example, he arguesthatradicalempiricismfails in its attemptto exclude intuition as a source of evidence. What is the argument? The argument dependsessentiallyon severalconceptsthatarenot yet as clear as can be desired, and will presumablyreceive further clarification So let the dialectic dialecticallyandin a fullertreatment. begin. Among concepts crucial to the proffereddefense of intuitionare these: intuitionitself, of course;evidence;source of evidence; basic source of evidence;psychological mode; and, most of all, standard justificatory procedure. The defense proposed in behalf of intellectualintuitionmay be put largely in the form of the following argument. 1. Intuitionis a psychological mode thatfunctionsas a basic sourceof evidence, accordingto the standard justificatory procedure. Accordingto the standard justificatoryprocedure,a basic source of evidence is not impugned simply because it is not sufficiently defensible as a source of evidence by reliance merely on the other basic sources of evidence recognizedby that standard justificatoryprocedure.(This distinguishesbasic sources from derivedsources.) According to the standard justificatoryprocedure,therefore, there is no way to reject intuition as a source of evidence except arbitrarily, by just stipulativelydropping it. But"... intuitionsurvivesas a genuinesourceof evidence when one applies the standardjustificatoryprocedure's mechanismfor self-criticism."We are unable "... to find a relevant difference between radical empiricism, which excludes intuitionas a sourceof evidence, andvariouspreposteroustheories(e.g., visualism)thatarbitrarily exclude standard sources of evidence (e.g., touch). But, surely,
2.
3.
4.
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these preposteroustheories are not justified. So [radical] empiricismis not justified, either."(18) 5. "Ourepistemic situationis in this sense "hermeneutical": when one makes an arbitrary departureform it, reasonable doubts are generated, and there is in principle no way to overcome them. This is the fate of radicalempiricism. Only the standardjustificatoryprocedureescapes this problem;because it conformsto - and, indeed,constitutes - the epistemic norm, thereis no primafacie reason to doubt that the theories it yields are justified, so the problemnever arises."(19)
So far the defense of intellectualintuitionproposedfor our consideration.Severalquestionsarise. Firstwe must considerthis: "standard" for whom? What is standardamong astronomers may not be so among astrologists.And so on. And if we are told: "standard for us," then who are "we"? But let that pass. Suppose we can settle on some appropriate actual group. What then is it that makes the standard justificatory procedure"standard"? Thatit is widely and firmlyenough accepted amongus, at least in practice?If so, is it just thefact of "our"firmly and widely enough accepting a source that makes it a source?And is it our firmlyand widely enough acceptingit as basic thatmakes it basic? Recall, however,the earlierproposal:whatmakesa basic sourcea basic sourcewas supposedto be ratherits modal reliabilisttie to the truth.Thereis clearlyno modalreliabilisttie betweenourwidely and firmlyacceptinga sourceas basic andits deliveringmostly truths. On the otherhand, if it is not its being firmlyand widely enough accepted among us that makes our standardprocedure"standard," then one wonderswhat it might be instead. So we have a problemof coherencehere.If we defendintellectual intuitionby appealto our widely and firmlyenough acceptedpractices the question arises: What is it about such practicesthat gives them the requiredstatus in this defense, as a court of appeal,if not of last appeal?Is it theirbeing standardthatgives them thatstatus? - if being widely and But why shouldthatbe, if being thus standard
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firmly accepted among us - has no necessary connection with the truth? It might be replied that there is such a connection between our acceptanceof a source in ideal conditions,after we have followed a procedureof a priori justification,on one hand, and the source's deliveringmostly truths,on the other.But thatactually seems irrelevant to our currentconcern. For we are now trying to fend off radicalempiricists(Quinians,say, in actual,20th CenturyAmerica) in conditionswherewe cannoteven be surethatwe could ever arrive at such ideal conditions, in any nomologically possible world: and where much less can we be sure that we have alreadyarrived. There is also an internaldifficultythat I have so far suppressed. For along the way it is arguedthatvision, for example, is morebasic thana certain"politicalauthority," andthis is arguedby appealto an "intuition" thatwe aresaidto have, to thateffect. But "intuitions" are supposedto be our window onto necessarytruths.So thenhow can it be thatwhat is a more basic sourcethan somethingelse, and indeed what is a source at all, depends on the presumablycontingentfact of "our"firmlyand widely enough acceptingis as such? Moreover, the issue is complicated even furtherby the fact that the defense is not just by direct appeal to a bare intuitionof relative basicness. The defense is ratherby appealto the supposedfact that according to the standardprocedure we can reject a source as insufficiently supportedby the remaining sources if and only if intuitively the rejectedmethod is "less basic" than the other methods. All of this suggests to me some vacillation in Bealer's defense by appeal to the standardprocedure.It is an appeal to the standardprocedure but perhaps it is meant as an appeal, not to the standardnessof thatprocedure,but ratherto the substantive considerationsappealto which is allowed by thatprocedurewhich is in fact standard among us. If this is the strategy,however, then the problemwe face is one of relative emptiness, of insufficientcontent. If the reference via is entirelyaccidental- and plays no more significanta standardness role than might be played by "mentionedin the list that appearson p. n of such and such a book"- then, until the substantivecharacter of the proceduresin questionis revealed,we cannotassess the large claims made in theirbehalf.
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the stress placed on our Moreover,it is then hardto understand "hermeneutical" predicamentwhen we depart form our standard procedure,etc., for this seems essentially a function of the standardness of the procedure,and not just of the particularcontentthatthe procedurein questionhappensto have.
D
I have raised problemsunderthreeheads: (A) (B) (C) What is ostensible intuition? What gives it its statusas a basic source of evidence? Is it defensible against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle?
Returningto my opening theme, let me express the hope for some good resolutionsfor my problems,or at least the hope that,in default of such resolutions,other answerscan be found, perhapsby appropriatemodificationsof the answers alreadyproposed. For it is part of my underlyingagreementwith Bealer that these are, all three of them, good and importantquestions;and, what is more, that there are positive answers to be found, even if we have not found them just yet.
NOTES
1 Parenthetical referenceshere and later are to George Bealer's "On the Possi-
bility of PhilosophicalKnowledge." 2 Let me re-emphasizethatthe foregoingdiscussion is aboutostensible intuition, by analogy with ostensible perception:'intuition'here has thereforeabbreviated 'ostensible intuition'.In fairness,moreover,I should also stress, aboutthe postulation of a "glow"thatis more thanjust an inclinationto believe, that it is in any case metaphorical. Those who appealto a distinctiveexperienceor psychological mode of intuitionobviously are not appealingto any literally visual experience, as would be requiredfor perceptionof anythingthatis literallya glow.
Departmentof Philosophy Brown University Providence,RI 02912-1918 USA

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Rational Intuition: Bealer on Its Nature and Epistemic Status Author(s): Ernest Sosa Source: Philosophical Studies: An International

ERNEST SOSA BEALER RATIONAL ON ITSNATURE INTUITION: AND EPISTEMIC STATUS

THE NATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOF INTUITION

THE NATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOF INTUITION

THE NATUREAND EPISTEMIC STATUSOF INTUITION

THE NATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOF INTUITION

THE NATUREAND EPISTEMIC STATUSOF INTUITION

Departmentof Philosophy Brown University Providence,RI 02912-1918 USA

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