DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA G.R. No.

134577, November 18, 1998 FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUES: 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader 4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? HELD: FIRST ISSUE

practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. THIRD ISSUE Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. FOURTH ISSUE Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review). The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue. SECOND ISSUE There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from

Farolan vs CTA Facts: S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging BuhayTrading (Baging Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-examination, it turns out that the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June 2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it actually lost. Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by the private respondent. Held: Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit privaterespondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereignimmunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that state may not be sued without its consent, categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Custom s enjoys immunity from suit. Alongwith the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. V. CA G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992 Grino-Aquino, J. Facts: The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint: SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. Any Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than one such agency except those which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x x. (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.) SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act. VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located.... As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).

The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and recommended the cancellation of VMPSIs license.

likewise

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO Issue: whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent Held: Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PCSUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments consent, especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies.
MARBURY V. MADISON Facts On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. Issues 1. 2. 3. Does Marbury have a right to the commission? Does the law grant Marbury a remedy? Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void? Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution? Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

4.

5.

Holding and Rule (Marshall) 1. Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams. 2. Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he

receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy. 3. Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. 4. No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance. 5. No. The Supreme Court jurisdiction to issue does writs not have original of mandamus.

Disposition Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt get the commission.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.