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Itt This Issue

*Strategic

Mobility

~ Military Managers ~ RegionalWar Strategy

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July 67

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANOAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LUVENWORTH, RANSAS

COMMANDANT Major general Michael S. Davison

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT Brigadier General Robert C. Taber

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General I
Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a I
forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national
security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Regional War Strategy in the 1970s A National Security Corps How New Is Limited War? Strategic Mobitity 1967-80 New Soviet Defense Minister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LTC Joseph K. Bratton, USA . . LTC Irvin M. Kent, USA . Charles A, Lofgren 3
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16
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37
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48
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58
65
71
83
89

LTC George D. Eggers, Jr., USA . . . . Harriet Fast Scott

Soviet Armed Forces at Midcentrrry Military Managers Strategy Defined . . , . .. . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . , . . . . .

COL GEN V. F. Tolubko, Soviet Army . . . . . Robert D. Miewald

BG Arnaldo tiacalone, Italian Army

Service Life in 1976

BRIG G. S. Heathcote, British Army, Ret

The Case for the Defense Israels Nahal The Mananas Sive Up-fts Corps . . . .

. MAJ N. A. Shackleton, Canadian Army . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . Leo Heiman .. Louis Morton

~ood for You

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CDR Jarl J. Diffendorfer, USN COL Joseph P. DWezo, USAR

Systems Analysis in the ArmY Maos 10 Principles of War Military Notes Mifitary Books . . . . . . . .

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. Kenmin HO . . . . . . .

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99

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The VIEWS expressed in this ma esine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the f Staff College. US Army or the Command and Genera

Editor in Chief COL Donald J. Delanay ._ Associate Editor COL George S. Pappas Army War College Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey Features Editor LTC Charles A. Gatzka Production Editor Helen M. Hall Spanish-American Editor MAJ Juan Horta-Merly Brazilian Editors LTC Paulo A. F. Viana LTC Samuel T. T. Primo Publication Officer LTC Edward A. Purcell Art and Design Charlea A. Moore Donald L. Thomas

MILITARY REVIEW-Published monthly by the U. S. Arm Command and General Stsff College,. Fort Leav enworth, Kanaaa in En@sh, apanish, and Portu uese. se of funds for rinfing of this publication has been approved by Headquarters, Department ofaitha Army, 28 May 1C& sacomhlsas postage rid at Fort Leavenworth, ICarreas..%bscriptkm rates $400 (US currency) a year in the United states, rdted Sfatae military post offices, and those countries which ars mambars of tha Pan-Amerisan Postal Union (including SPSinh $S.00 a yaw in all othar oounfrieai eingle copy price 50 cents. Addraea evbsmipfion mail to the Gook Department, U. S. Army Command and General WI College, Fort Leavenworth, Ifansaa 68027.

THE LEAVENWORTH TIE

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v
he US Army Command and General Staff College has adopted an official necktie symbolizing the fine traditions of the College. The Leavenworth Tie is all silk, dark blue in color,and has a small Lamp of Learning embroidered in gold. The blue and the gold are from the College crest as is the Lamp of Learning which represents the knowl. edge acquired at the Command and General Staff College. The tie has been authorized for duty wear by o Members faculty. of the
off-

staff and

. Students attending a USACGSC course leading to a diploma or certif icate. . Any individual who has earned a USACGSC diploma by either resident or nonresident instruction. The tie is available at the College Book Store for $S.75 or $4.00 by mail.

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RegionalWar Strategyin the 1970s

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph K. Bratton, United States Armg

The views ezpres.red in this article are the authors and are not neeewarilg those of the Departnwnt of the Ar-mg, Department of De feuse, or the US Armg Command awd GeneraJ Staff College.Editor. S THE United States ap. preaches the critical dseade of the 1970s, the worldwide etruggle for power which has overshadowed the aspiration of 20th-century man may accelerate to unprecedented intensity. Militant communism will remain the principal threat, and instabilities causad by uphaavals in the emerging, nations, population expansion, ag gressive nationalism, and nuclear pro
July1967 3

~@lONAL WAR ,0TRATE6Y Iiferation may increase tensions throughout the world. Internationally, the threat or ap plication of military strength will be the moat important operative power factor. On the other hind, military power will be employed more fre quently in ita threatening role in sup port of policy than in ita active opera tional role. Threat and Challanga In form, the Communist threat will not change greatly. The idea of war as a continuation of political intercourse will be the essence of Communist theory and practice. The overriding danger of general war will remain as will the possibility of regional wars. It is in the peripheral areae, however, that the greatest danger of confronta tion and conflict probably will arise, and it ie in these lands that the tur moil of emergent development will be exploited by communism whenever possible as a means of enlarging its sphere of influence. If Communist strategy should be successful, the United States would be confronted with two or more con current limited wars. If either of the two major Communist countries were deliberately to choose a policy of in stigating limited wars, it would be sound strategy to initiate concurrent conflicts. The impact on US security Lkwtsmmt Colonel Jo8eph K. Brat toa k with the Arnwe O&e of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Afilitarv OP emtwrw in Washington, D. C. A gmd uute of the US Army Command and Geweral Staff College and the US ArmzI War College, he received a Master of Science degree from Masew chu8etts Institute of Technology, Cam bridge, Ma8swchneett8. His milita~ eervice includee duty in Europe with the hth Armored Diviaien awd in Korea wth the 7th Divisiow. 4 L..
resources would be severe.

.-Darticularlv

if war in Korea, India, Iran, or Europe were to begin while the United States is committed heavily in Vktnam. If this should happen, the United States would also be committed to protect the Free Worlds vital interests in each threatened area. There are Iimite to the number of regional wars for which the United States can tolerate concurrent com mitment. The potential opponent= also is limited in this respect. Neverthe less, it appears that the United States must be prepared to wage.concurrently at least two limited wars, and to do so in widely separated regions. Since it may not be feasible for the United States to wage a large-scale regional war or ware and still maintain an ad equate capability for other con tingencies and for deterrence with in being forces alone, such forces prob ably would have to be reinforced sub sequently by sizable general purpose reserve forces. Problams Are Many The problems associated with con current regional wars are enormous. ,The United States must retain a gen eral war capability at all times. Stra tegic mobility mnst be provided to match forces programed in any com bination of two regional war contin gency plans. Mobilization and reserve bases capable of rapid reconstruction of forces and material committed in limited wars, moreover, are essential to avoid degradation of general war capabilities. The Korean War was a limited re gional war without a prepared etra tegic plan and without any widespread prior recognition that such a war could or would be waged in the nuclear age. Thus, Korea made it possible for the first time to think seriously of limited

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Miliiry IWiew

REGIONAL WAR S7RATE6Y

war. Currently, the Jimited war in ecmtheeetAeia ie another example of the application of an ad JLoc strategy to a situation which wae not foreseen clearly in its incipiency. It ie important to recognize that un lese regional war can be prevented, it muet be limited. When the vital inter este of the United Statee are involved, she must be prepared to conduct a

toward general war. US strategy, therefore, must aim to confine re gional war w the minimum intensity possible. Objsctivee must be acldevsd by regional etrategy asytnmetrieslly advantegeeue to the United Stetee without exceeding the opponents es calation threehold. A key to sueeees in regional war ie the achievement of maximum conces

limited war or, alternatively, to face escalation to general war or some sig nificant surrender. Neither of these al ternatives i! acceptable. Accordingly, the US continuing search for military options and emphzaie on the less de structive forme of violence is intended to provide controlled and useful force in environments of great ~ uncertainty. The major concern in regional war ie escalation. If crucial interezta are involved, successive and progressive commitments may force the conflict
Jdy 1SS7

sions from tbe enemy without undue escalation and without forcing him to the desperation created by the need to relinquish a vital interest, At worst, there would be a return to the statwc quo ante; at best, it may be possible to achieve certain rollback goale be fore terminating hostilities. Since a strategy for regional war muet provide for deterrence ae well as for the conduct of hostilities, plan: ning should consider the intsrdepend ence of nuclear and nonnuclear deter 5

REGIONAL WAR STRATE6Y rents. There can be no effective re gional deterrence without a global deterrenc~another example of the direct relationship between general and limited war capabllifles. The Cu ban missile crisis exemplified the ap plication of a combined regional and global deterrence against a epeciiic threat. It will always be important for the enemy to know that all over the world he is opposing US military power in its entirety-even though only a emall fraction of the power may be in the field. Similarly, while regional stabil ity ie primarily a function of the pre vailing local balance of power, there Can be no truly effective regional bal ance without a concomitant global bal ance. These considerations illustrate that, while regional wara inherently are limited, in their global context, they affect the world powers and world balance of power either directly or indirectly. Structural Options In planning regional deterrence, there are three structural options available, and the optimnm deterrent strategy is the one wbich permits the adoption of the beet mix of theee op tions. In essence, the United States could uee onsite power, regionally available power, and homeland-based power. The optimnm military power mix for any patilcular region muet be de termined by weighing local power fac tors. Defense economics, the prevail ing regional political climate, and global commitments will be important factore in deeieion making, ae will the unique military criteria of the region itself. If aggression is part of a piecemeal operaticm, forces immediately avail able in the area mnet block a fait acwmnpli.The exietence of such forcee usually will be an. adequate deterrent, If aggression is more ambitioue, how ever, deployed forces would delay the aggressOr untill reeerve forces could be applied. A continued and selective US for ward deployment, therefore, still will be needed in the 1970s. A forward strategy not only provides quick reac tion, it alao ie a means to exploit favor able evente at appropriate times and places. In planning forward deploymentfor the 1970-80 period, the epeeitic loca-, tiona of military bases will require careful scrutiny to avoid a possibility that the politicai liabilities of using foreign facilities will outweigh inher ent deployment advantage. Wherever possible, military forces abould be IOJ: cated on territory that is controlled by the United States or by come firm ally. Increased etrategic lift capabilities in the future significantly will leesen requirements for overseas bases and even for deployed manpower, if we as sume that reeerves can be responsive within 30 to 45 days. A forward de ployment solution will encompass both regional and strategic reserve forces in some suitable mix, with technology and defense economics playing roles equally important with that of mili tary planning. Nuclear Ragional War Whether nuclear weapons should be injected into regional war is a func tion of prevailing circumstance. Nor mally, it will not be in the best US interest to do so, but their use cannot be precluded peremptorily. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has stated that, !preeent forcee conld rely on nonnuclear means to counter a wide range of Sine-Soviet aggreseione, ex . MiliiryilwioW
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REGIONAL WAR STRATEGY cept in Europe. The overriding 05 jection to the use of nuclear weapons in regional war is the danger of esca lation that is inherent in such use. Al though some strategist have written that nuclear weapons must be used in limited wars, most have concluded otherwise. The United Statee, with mutual de fense agreements with over 40 nations,

meaningful partnership in crisis. The training of indigenous armed forces is necessary. Continuing politicO-mili tary etTorts to identify and correlate mutual goals and strategy are needed sinca it ia essential that US and allied forces have clarity of understanding and mutual acceptance of common re gional strategy. As long as the United States has

.%t NATO
Regional strategy muet recognize the primacy of maintaining Europe will retain her commitment to coHecthe integrity of NATO

tive security in the 1970s. No feasible US strategy for the deterrence or conduct of regional war can be developed without regional alliance structuree. There are corollaries to alliance systerns.Continued military and economic aid to allies usual]y is required to provide greater strength and a more My les7

vital there

interests in a particular region, must be allies in that region.

It also will he crucial to US strategy to be able to maintain the stability of these allies against external pressures of internal insurgency. Inherently, the government of the allied country is the one best agent to withstand local pressures, just as indigenous forces are best able to cope with regional

portance of regionai alliances is the

j probability that in tbe 1970s the
Unitad States will be the only Free
World nation that has the power to
cmmmmism.
international oppose Even the strongeet of other Western
~states henceforth will be of significant ~strategic assistance only in its own ~-European region. F ~lnally, the strategic importance of k. *logistics is such that no state can en gage succeaefuSy in distant wars without an adequate base infrastruc ture. Problems of base rights and ac 1.

mutual security systems and coopera tive logistics arrangements will be es sential to solve the problem. In formulating spesific teneta of military strategy which would be ap- plicable wofldwide, it is necessary first to establish a strategic cmwapt which supporta national objectives. Such a concept for regional war is selective containment supported by a strategy of dynamic stability. It is essential to this strategy that vital US strategic interests in each world region be identified. Regional MilibIYSwim

~6

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REGIONALWAR STRATE6Y warfare, with its inherent threat of escalation to general war, should not be accepted except to preserve or at tain these vital intereste. Even then, force should be applied on a ecale best calculated to prevent hostilities broad ening into general war. In some areas, preservation of the status quo will he the best feasible policy; in othere, dynamic stability may permit advances toward objec tives which a more conservative strat egy would dlamiss as unattainable. But these advances must be made short of regional war, or by a success ful conclusion to such a war. Gener ally, advancee ehould not be attempted which would create a probability of regional war. Stratagic Tanets An analysis of the military etrategy requirements of those areas of the world in which regional war is meet likely to occur indicates certain etra tegic tenets of general application for regional wars: US regional military strategy in the 1970s must be conceived princi pally to defeat the major threat: Com munist-inspired aggression of varying intensities, aimed at subverting, iso lating, and destroying the countries of the Free World. Since no military strategy can be operative without a first-priority general war readinese poeture, re gional war strategy must be consid ered an essential subsidiary to general war strategy and an adequate general war capability must be maintained. Regional and global balances of power are interdependent. Military strategy, therefore, must insure that global or regional power elements, to gether and separately, remain in bal ance or develop asymmetries favorable to the United States. My 1SS7

In the 1970s the probability of concurrent limited wars may arise. In consideration of the anticipated capabilities of the Communist camp, regional war strategy must provide for at least two concurrent limited wars in widely separated areas, and etill maintain contingency reserves and a general war posture. In regional war, the United States probably would be allied with one or more indigenous powers. Typ ically, the armed forces of such allies would he engaged in strength in their homeland or in adjacent areae. US forces, on the other hand, would de pend on long lines of communication. Regional war strategy, therefore, dic tates that mutnal security must be structured to provide maximum par ticipation of indigenous allied forces and facilities, with allied forces to be trained and equipped by the United States, prior to hostilities, wherever neceseary and possible. Loss of Western Europe to com muniem would represent an irrevers ible and unfavorable shift in the world balance of power far exceeding in magnitude and significance any Ioee in other areas. Regional strategy, ,therefore, muet recognize the primacy of maintaining the integrity of NATO Europe. Regional war normally will not be in tbe best intereets of the United States because of its high coste and the ever-present danger of escalation. National security policy prescribe goale to deter war and to win any war which becomes necessary at the lowest possible level of inteneity. Re gional war etrategy, therefore, dic tates the need to have available a glob ally committed force which possesees a complete range of integrated, flex ible, and credible deterrence that can

be applied in any region or combina . tion of regions. s In most world regions, the fiscal and political problems of a peacetime deployment of US forces will render such deployment, on a large ecale, in feasible. Peacetime forward deploy ment, however, are important to prevent fait8 wconzplie, acclimatize forces, establish a regional infra structure, demonstrate the firm pur pose of US commitment, and aid in the maintenance of regional eecurity, country building, and stabilization. Appropriate US forces with an ex pandablesupport infrastructure ahonld be deployed forward in those areas where the khreat of confllct exists and where such forces are acceptable to the country or countries concerned. . The difficulties of arranging for ward deployment in certain distant areas, coupled with the. problems that would be created by the movement of etrategic reserve forces to these areas from the United States on short no tice, dictate the creation of regional reserve forcee, on land or afloat, es the beet available compromise. Sufficient air and sezpower muet be provided to control etrategic routes to any region of deployment. The peacetime deployment of re gional war forces of the strengths and types required probably ie infeasible. Since the greatest opportunity to limit and terminate regional war dependeon a rapid initial response that could lead to quick victory or favorable negotia tion, a responsive strategic mobility capability-air and sealiftis essen tial. Readineas of mobility elements ae a minimum must be equal to that of the forces being deployed. In large-scale limited war, or in concurrent regionak wars, active duty foicee probably will Be inadequate in 10

numbers to engage in suetained opera tions. Regional war strategy, there fore, will dictate the organization, training, equipping, and maintenance of eiaable general purpose reserve forces that are capable of overseas combat deployment within 30 to 45 daya of initial notification. . Timely strategic responee to re gional threats frequently will depend on the US capability to lift men and equipment. To insure rapid strategic responee in regional war, selected equipment and supplies for planned, deployment forces ehould be proposi tioned in or near the threatened re gions. Regional war strategy ehould en vision the use of nuclear weanons only for use in or near the battle area should be available regionally but not planned for uee, except as directed by proper politics] authority after the enemy initiates nuclear warfare. In consideration of the require ment for worldwide deterrence and the possibility of concurrent conflict, forces should not be shifted from one region to another to counter sudden threats. Such threete must be met by forces in the threatened region or by uncommitted strategic reserves. Strategy for regional war muet be based on alternate means of eelective containment and collateral exploitation to support or cree~ dynamic etebility fully consistent with over-all national objectives and national security pelicy. Such a comprehensive capability is militarily essential, economically feasible, and politically indispensable. With it, US military st?ategy car frustra&by deterrence, indirect means, or military victory-regional Communist thrusts in the decade of the seventies. :

Military ROViOIV

ANATIONAL SECURITY CORPS

Lieutenant Colonel Irvin M. Kent, United States Armu

The views ezp-re.med im this arti cle are the author8 aud are not uec e88arily thoee of the Depmtmont of the ATVW, Depavtmeut of Defeuse, or the US Army Cemmaud and Gen eral Staff College.Editor. ESPITE racent improvement in training programe for Fed . eral career civilian personnel, there re maine a wide gap between the need for, and the eupply of, midlevel and higher level personnel who unders@nd the relationship between military force, military poIicy, and the other aepects of the foreign and domestic policy of the United States. Numeroue officials throughout our Federal structure must not only un derstand this relationship, but must be able to apply such understanding to the eolution of their daily prob lems. This ie obviously true in depart ment and agencies such as State,
11

NATIONAL SECURITY CORPS Defense, United States Information -Ageqcy, Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Civil Defense, Office of Emergency Planning; and the Ex ecutive OSice of the President. Other Agencies This understanding and application is, perhaps, less obvious, but almost equally neeeesary, for at least certain key officiale in other departments and agenciee euch as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Avia!ion Agency, and the Departments of the Treaeury, Justice, Agriculture, and Health, Education, and Welfare. Cer takdy, the newly created eenior inter departmental group, and ite subor dinate regional interdepartmental groups, must be etaffed with person nel who have had training in the uee of both the military and the nonmili tary facets of national power in the achievement of national objectives. The laat-namedgroups represent the clearest requirement for such quali fied pereonnel. As U. Alexis Johnson has eaid: . . . the peculiar nattwe of internal warfare, its deterrence and m@prea aien require a blend of military and ncnmilitaW coantermea8uree and cor rective actions. In a veW real 8en8e there is no line of demaroatirm be tween milita~ and nonmilitary meaa ures. Thla pronouncement ie beginning to
be understood throughout most af

fected Government agencies. Less clearly understood, perhape, is the in terplay between military and nonmil itary meaeurea in other aspects of the cold war, and in the deterrence or COU. duct of a limited or a general war. Economic, political, and military pol icies muet he coordinated. ThkJ does occur today to a considerable degree at the highest levels of Government where policy ie formulated. However, the implementation of such a cohesive policy requires a parallel level of un derstanding by those who must turn policy pronouncements into daily acts. Senior Action Officers At mismanagement, and even higher levels, daily acte are not often dramatic, bold etepe. Rather, the na . tional policy is executed by thousands .of small, seemingly unrelated actions Lieutenant Colonel Irvin M. Kent taken in our national capitol, through is with the Judge Advocate Section, out the United States, and at hundrede Heudquartere, US Amny Air Defense of placee throughout the world. It is Command: Ent Air Force Ba-se, Colo at thie senior action officer level that rado Sprmge, Cotarado. He holde a we need, and largely do not have, per B.A. dtrg~ee from Swracuee University sonnel who have the training and who in New Yark and an LL.B. from Har understand the relationship between vard Law School, Cambm-dge,Ma8ea the military and the nonmilitary as c?weett8. His 8ervice indudee duty in pects of our policy. These senior ac Ewrope during World War II; in the Avctic; with the O~e of the Staff tion officers must he integral mem Judge Advocate, US Arnw Communi here of their own department or ageu cations Zone, Europe; and with the cies if they are to be truly effective. US Army Combat Development r70m Some emall stepe have heen taken mand, Civil Affair8 Agency, Fort Gor to provide such personnel by: don, Georgia He is the author of The Sending a handful of civilian of Commander and Civil-Military Rekr= ficials through the eenior service tirww~ which appeare,d in the April schorde. 1967 i8eue of the MILITARY Rmaw. 12
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NATIONAL SECURITT CORPS

Exchanging an even smaller number of career dicers between the State and Defense Departments. Attendance of a still smaller number of military personnel at State Department schools. Detailing a few military officers for duty with certain civilian agencies. Hiring some retired military per sonnel for work in such agencies. Nevertheless, the total of these ef forts, while laudable, is insufficient to meet the needs of the Federal Gov ernment for an outstanding group of key trained people who can work with both military and nonmilitary prob lems, can understand the relationship between the two, and understand the absolute neceseity for coordinated ac tion: A corps of national security officials could provide these personnel. Such a corps would not constitute a new department or agency: Rather, it would serve as a pool to provide the requisite talent needed to fill key po-

and. could probably best be performed within the framework of an existing office of the executive branch. These officials would be required on a long-term basis. A three or four-year detail of a career military officer

A primary incentive would be s career lasting to age 60 or 65

Senior action
militsry

officers must understand and nonmilitary aspects of policy

sitions which require a high degree of understanding of the interplay be tween military and nonmilitary fac tors in national policy. Some admin istrative overhead system would have to be oreated, but this should be small
July1967

would be inadequate since, before he could reach a level where he would have a real impact on policy, he would return to his military service. For tunately, however, the number of such people required would be relatively limited. A survey of the departments and agencies probably would show a requirement of not more than 2,000 snch spaces from GS13 or lieutenant colonel and higher grades. Such a eur vey should be made promptly to iden tify specific positions to be tilled by adequately cross-trained personnel. The Executive Office of the Presi dent should be charged with super vision of such a survey and with the monitorship of a program designed to insure that these spaces are properly filled. This monitorship would, of ne-, cessity, include responsibility for the recruitment, training, initial place ment, and career management of these
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: NATIDNAL SECURITY CORPS specially selected and trained perkennel. The key to a successful program ie the recruitment of the type of people who are needed. Certain special in ducements probably will be required to obtain a steady flow of highly quzdi fied applicant. A primary incentive would be the opportunity to enter into a career corpe in which an individual could remain until age 60 or 65 so that there would be neither the neces sity nor desire to prepare for a Seccmd career w~]ch now faces so many pro fessional mifitary officere. While euch a career corps would need peaple physically and mentally capable of outstanding performance of duty, the physical standarde need not be as strict as those required for acaPPIY for transfer to such a career
corps.
Similarl~ career civilian officials all too often find themselves stymied in midcareer by the lack of opportunity for further professional training, and

Some military officers would make good

recruits for the corps

Career civifian Omtid.9often sre etynried by the nsrrownese of their career field

tive military service. This factor, when combhed with job security until age 60-subjeet to proper performance of duty and ~sonal. good conduct should provide a prime incentive for many military officers inmidcareerto 14
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frustrated by the narrowness of the field in which they mayapply their skills. Between these two groups may well be found tbe bulk of the candL ,dates for a career corps of national security officiale. Accepted applicant should be al lowed to take with them to this coims their accrued retirement rights. All active Federal service, regardless of type, sbouldbe credited forlonge%ty and retirement purposes. They should enter the corps at a rating not less than that which they held in their pre vious eervice. Within tbe corps, they would be subject to transfer as ,and where required on a worldwide baeis. They and their dependents should be entitled to governmental medical care. ontheaeme basis as active duty mili tary personnel. Their grade should be personal, and promotion ehould be based upon a
Military Roriow

NATIONAL SECURIN CORPS merit selection system. Continuing programs of middle and upper career education should be provided by at tendance at senior service schools, at private institutions of higher learn ing, and by other governmental agency training. A progressive educational program at least equal to that now provided for career military officers would be required. Such a program should be tailored for the individual, and supplement, rather than duplicate, the educational and experience back ground he brings to the corps. Pay should be based on civil serv ice standards, with a saving clause to prevent any initial financial 10ss. Pro vision should be made for adequate station and family separation allow ances for certain assignments. Retire ment pay would be on a contributive basis with the Government providing the requisite initial sum for those transferred from active miJitary duty. Others would bring with them the funds which had been built up in their previous Federal service, Some special stipulation might have to be made for those recruited into the corps from outilde the active Federal service. The sxistence of such a corps would be a powerful magnet to attract a number of highly qualified people who, for one reason or another, had left govern mental eervice after some years of service. Thks would not be a corps into which a young man could enter upon completion of college. Rather, thk+ corps, designed to fill only key eeIeetedpositions, would require a great deal of maturity and experience. WMle almost all recruitment into the corps eventually would beat about the end of 15 years of Federal serv ice, recruitment initially should span the group of those who have between 16 to JJOyears of service. Those in the
JUJY1967

upper level of thk group could serve in the corps for at leest 10 years be fore reaching age 60, or perhaps 66 for those in the supergrade or general officer category. Application should be open to all in the Federal service with out restriction to current department or agency, and to those currently out side the Government who have a num ber of years of previous governmental experience. Detailed study of former records, as well as written and oral examinations, would provide selection boards composed of high-level govern mental officials with a basis for their choice of those to be accepted. It would be impossible in any short period, of course, to fill all the key Po sitions in the various departments and agencies with national security corpe 0-~ national agency charged with the anagement of the program would have to develop priorities for manning such positions. But once a position in any department or agency had been determined to be a national security corps official position, the de partment or agency would fill it with a designated national security corps officer unless none was available with the requisite qualifications. It should be possible within a year to recruit and plsce at least 10 per cent of those required, and to have the program at full strength in not more than five years after initiation. Following that, annual recruitment would be on an as required basis. A national security corps reserve structure might also be etudled to pro vide for the needs of the Nation upon mobilization. A structure similar to mobilization designees in the ArmY might be used. With or without such, an expansion capability, the existence of such a corps would provide an in crease in national security. 15

How New
Charles A. I.ofgren

N THE years since 1953, something of a myth has deteloped about the Korean War. It was, according to some commentators, the United States first limited war. But was it? Central to answering the question is the job of defining limited war as the term is currently used. When sug gesting that past wars were or were not limited, the same meaning must be assigned to limited as ie assigned to it in current military, diplomatic, and scholarly discourse. Otherwise, we are in no position to make real com parisons. Unfortunately, much of the literature on limited war in the nu clear age gives relatively little atten tion to those general features which a conflict muet display to qualify as a limited war, and which the hk!torian might use for comparative purposes. However, some characteristics are ap parent. The most obvious. element in our currsnt concept of limited war is that such war must, in fact, be limitsd in
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LIMITED WARFARE nenta, homeland, colonial eelf-deter its dimensions. The dimensions most relevant to limited war include the mination, protection of American lives and property, and the safeguarding of oter-all objectives of each side, con. American security which has been a flict techniques, amount and types of forcee employed, weaponry, and the goal in every war in the view of many geographiwil area of conflict. people. When we compare ohjectivee in the Other dimensions include the dura pre-1950 wars with alternative under tion of hostilities, the number of al discueaion at the time, we eee that lies participating with each side, and what appears to he a limited aet of the legal status of tbe war on each goals to us in the mid-20th century side. Actually, measuring limitation in may not have seemed so limited to con any given war may be a problem. For temporary obaervera, In the War of historical pnrposee, we can best meas 1812, simply fighting for freedom of ure the restraint present in the actual the eeaa and to end the Indian menace dimensions of conflict by comparing from Canada appears tame compared those dimensions againet what obser to fighting to subjugate England. vers at the time regarded as real al Matched againat destroying the Span ternatives. ish Government, fighting for a free IfistoricalExsmples Cuba in the Spanish-American War American military hietory readily eeems similarly mild. But, of conree, provides examplee of limitation on the contemporaries did not consider sub dimensions of warfare. Regarding ob jugating England or destroying the jectives, only in the Civil War and Spanieh Government as serious, real World War II were they unlimited to alternativee. the extent that the United States de Modesof Conflict manded the complete eurrender of the Although judged against alterna foe. And in World War II, Japane sur tives that contemporaries did regard render was not entirely unconditional as real, the major objectives in come since the nation retained its Emperor. past American ware can paes muster In other US conflicts, objectives as limited ones. During the undeclared sometimes shifted and even broadened naval war with France, a less limited iu the cdprse of the fighting, ae in the War of Independence and the Spanish- , alternative was considered at the time. Alexander Hamilton relished the idea American War. However, neither pre of the United States takhrg a portion liminary nor final war aims included of the New World possessions o%, tbe complete subjugation of the Frances ally, Spain. In World War I, enemy. More typical goale have been the US concept of peace without freedom of the seas, territorial gain, victory paled beside what emerged as not including conquest of the oppothe victory-through-peace goala of the Charles A. Lofgren ie an Aesietant European alliea. Professor of American Historfi at Regarding conflict techniquee Claremont Ikfene College, CCaremoat, forces involved and weaponryAmeri California. He holde a Bachelor of cans observed less restraint in their Arte, a Masters, and a Ph. D. degree pre-1950 wars, as meaeured againet, from Stanford University tn Califor potential modes of conflict. The need nia. He formerly taught at San Jose for limitation in these areae simply did State College, San Jose, California. July 1967
17

&

! LIMITED WARFAilE not occur to the policymekers involved. Yet in its two least limited war%the Civil War and World War IIthe Nation observed certain limits. In the CWil War, the Union was highly circumspect in its use at firet of ax-slaves as soldiers and in inciting rebellion or even flight among the slaves remaining in the Confederate States. The Federal Government also refrained from treating Crmfederate prisoners as traitors, although in a strict legal eense this might have been done. The nonuse of poison gas in World War II ie an example of re straint. We can also detect some holding back in other conflicts. In the un declared naval war, the US Navy was not permitted to ctipture unarmed French ships. In the war with Mexico, the total forces fielded by the United States seem small com@ared to those mobilized by either side a mere decade and half later in the Civil War. In the Mexican interventions under Preei dent Woodrow Wilson, the United States again exercised restraint against bringing sizeable forces to bear. 6eograpkical Limitations In geographical extent, Americans have clearly observed limits in their military operatione-World War H, with ita global scope, is most note worthy as an aberration in the broad sweep of the Nations past. Perhaps we ehould not make too much of geographical limitation, because lim ited objectives and lirhited resources, in part, may have dictated it. The Mexican War provides an example both of force used for essentially per suasive purposes beyond the area being contested, but used as a pre cieion instrument within geographkxd limits. General Winfield Scott marched 18 .. -.%. on Mexico City, but President James IL Polk resieted demands to annex all of Meaico or even to extend the war to all of Mexico. It seems readily apparent that, among the wars which the United States fought prior to 1950, at least some were limited in their dimensions. If such limitation is the only test, the Korean War most certainly was not our first limited war. When present analysts speak about limited war, they are talking ahout a phenomenon in a world far different from the pre-1950 world. What has made limitation in the conflicts of the present era of history especially ur gent is the exietence of what Albert Wahlstetter some years back called the delicate balance of terror. Today, threatened or applied force is a rational instrument of policy only if it is used with restraint. Use of the larger nuclear weapone against an enemy involves the risk that he or an ally of his will use them in ret~n. Addtiional Elements This leads to consideration of &o other elementsin addition to the ob vious one of limitation-which are hound up in the modem notion of lim ited war. First, recent analysts have stressed that limited war ie a means of employing carefully and consciously controlled force for international communication and persuasion. In it, military operations are not primarily valuable in their own right for seizing and holding, destroying, or kWing. They are meant to convince the enemy that coming to terms is less costly than not doing so, and to convince allies that their support is well placed. Second, current limited war doz. trine contends that formal or informal diplomacy-that is, some form of

Review MllitaIY ... .. :.. . .. . .

. .4

LIMITED WARFARE bargaining between the contending parties-must be an integral part of armed con~lct if it is to remain lim ited. Sometimes diplomatic inter change may be tacit at most, as when a war just fades out. On other occasions, diplomatic negotiation represents a means of adjusting minor outstanding differences. In addition, it offers the To aesign either force or diplomacy a etatus inferior to that of the other is to miss a fundamental point-both are tools of policy. Thie doee not mean that policy is the independentvariable, for developments on either the diplo matic or the military front may affect policy goals. The important fact is that threatened or applied force and

USAmw
While the Korwm ContJict was limited in territory and forces used,it does not fit the

moderndetinitimr of limited wsr chance to formalize whatever the con tending parties may be willing to ac cept in light of their gains and losses both on the military front and in those areas closely intertwined with the mil itary situation. Ae comprehended by current doc trine, force and diplomacy are closely related. Battlefield succese may make diplomacy fruitful; diplomacy may mask low-level applications of force, and it may give legitimacy to po sitions established by military means. JIIly 1967

diplomacy are dynamically related. Moreover, far from being a new de velopment, this is a traditional as sociation. Statesmen and warriors, however, temporarily lost sight of it in their first reections to the near-total ex perience of World War H and to the nuclear weaponry which came out of that war. The implicatfone of the bal ance of terror reintroduced the forcediplomacy relationship into the strat~ egists world.

19

LIMITED WARFARE Limited war in the 1960s is de fined hy the presence in an armed con flict of three interlocking elemente: Actual limitation on the con flicts dimensions. Force employed as a persuasive tool. Diplomacy used as an integral The most useful period of the war to examine for determining whether it was a modern limited war is that which followed the Chinese Corn. munist intervention, when the strat egic debate in the United States over the war reached its height. In late November 1950, as the United Natione

Atnw NwJs p.d,,, Futurehistoriansare likelyto term Vietnamthe first US limitedwar ef the nuclearage part, with force, of the policy imple mentation process. There is a new urgency behind each of these elements because of the riske which all-out war entails. Because a complex of considerations like these was found in the Korean War, that war may have heen limited for reasons more imperative than those which underlay limitation in pre vioue US wars. But wae the conflict in Kores really ahaped by a commitment to modern limited war doctrine? 20 forces neared the northern border of Korea, they met large numbere of Communist Chinese troops. Shortly thereafter, they withdrew and the battleline was stabilized acroes the peninsula somewhat south of Seoulr the capital of the Republic of Korea. The following summer, they pushed the North Korean and Communist Chinese northward to a line slightly above the 38th ParaUel, the boundary from 1945 to 1950 between North and Sbuth Korea. The war in Korea then . Mlliify Review

% LIM17E0 WARFARE turned into a stalemate along that line and, finally, was concluded by an armi stice in July 1953. Despite the presence of Communist Chinese Armies in Korea, the makers of US strategy refused to condone direct air or naval warfare against the Communist Chinese homeland. Such action, they feared, would in volve the United States, ae General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with tbe wrong enemy. No Precedent General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the US commander in the Far Eaet and United Nations commander in Korea, took exception, however, to Washingtons refusal to condone direct action againet Communist Chbm. On 1 December 1950, when an interviewer asked him about the limitations im posed on his forces, MacArthur called them an enormous handicap without precedent in military history. Againet the foregoing background, no one can doubt that, in the way it was conducted by Wash@ton, the Korean Conflict was something less than an all-out war, especially when measured against the alternative. sug gested at the time by General MacArthur. The various officiale of the Truman administration, who teetified in the Senate hearings which followed General MacArthurs dismissal, made abundantly clear that the US Govern ment under President Harry S Tru man was intent on keeping it that way. After January 1953, the new adminis tration of Dwight D. Eisenhower largely displayed the same determi nation. But that in itself doee not make the Korean ConSict fit the current model
Jlliy 1967

of limited war. For one thing, the motives underlying US restraint need consideration. As early as 1957, Henry A. Kissinger suggested that the United Statee feught the Korean War as she did, not becaupe we believed in limited war but because we were re luctant to engage in all-out war over the iseues which were at stake in Korea. Official Position The Truman administration saw the affair in Korea not so much as a real war, but rather ae a nuisance and an aberration which distracted attention from the more important European area. Limitation, then, was not out of any realization that in the nuclear era force could serve ae a rational tool of policy only if it were limited. When General Bradley stated that the ad ministration opposed implementing the MacArthur proposalabecause doing so might trigger an enlarged Far Eastern warhe demonstrated the official position. Subsequent events lend credence to this analysie. The maeeive retalia tion and new look policies of the immediate post-Korean period sug gest that policymakers stiK did not comprehend the central fact of the nu clear era. With the developmentof mu tual deterrence between tbe major powers, the most probable wars would be limited and the most credible na tional defense posture would be a bal anced one which included forcee equipped for such wars. The Korean experience is a mislead ing one eince limitation was present, but the reasone for limitation were essentially different from those of the modern limited war. In addition, peace negotiations-another element bear-, ing a deceptive surface similarity to tbinkhg in the 1960e-appeared in
21

LIMITEOWARFARE the conflict. As early as mid-December 1950, when President Truman pro claimed a national emergency in the face of what Me Far Eastern com mander called a new, waq he also hinted that the United States was wi]]. ing to. negotiate a settlement. In July 1951, seven months Iater, talks were launched. However, they never heeame part of a closely coordinated combina tion of force and diplomacy. Wasbir@ons Refusal Washington largely refused to ad mit that force might be gainfully em ployed for persuasive purposes-that ie, to give incentive to the enemy to opt more quickly for a satisfactory armietice. On one han& this refusal appeared in the failure to apply air and naval power against the enemys vitals in China. A century earlier, much in contract, Preeident Polk did eend his forcee against the center of Mexico in an effort to hasten a satisfactory peace. Similar action in Korea could have led to a far less limited war. On the other hand, the US policymakers might have ordered the US ground attack northward to continue. But they even declined to try this more moderate method of raising the ene mys costs. Instead, the US Govern ment was content with such pressure as a strategically static war put on the North Korean and Communiet Chinese opponents. Some Americans, General MacArthur included, did propose that a great deal more force be applied against the other side. Yet even im plementing their suggestions would not have transformed the war into the type of conflict which limited war connotes to todays strategists: MacArthur and his supporters never linked their proposils to any mechan ism for ending the war short of the a surrender of the enemy. Pertinently, one of the final incidents Lw&ng to General MacArthurs recall was his unauthorized ultimatum to the enemy farces in the field to capitulate or face destruction. Altogether, then, according to the view that any war limited in its dimensions. ie a limited, war, Korea wae not the first such contlict in IN history, becauee there were others be fore it. And for the sophisticat~d lim ited warrior of the 1960e who believes that Iimited war involves not only ob jective reetraint, but also tbe skillful and purposeful manipulation and co ordination of force and diplomacy, the Korean Conflict wae not the Nations firet limited war. It eimply did not con tain all the essential ingredients, much less a proper mixture of them. Insufficient Ferce Limitation was present, but for the wrong reasons. Negotiation was present, but not coordinated with force. It was in many ways a sterile factor. Force efficient to raise the enemys costs to the point where he desired a more rapid settlement was lacking in official US policy. Further, even those critice of the official policy who called for more military pressure did not conceive of it as an integral part of a meaningful whole. If future historians accept the so phisticated views of current strat egists as the etsndard for categoriz ing limited wars, they likely will ac cept Vietnam rather than Korea as the firet US limited war, at least in the nuclear age. In Vietnam, the United States and her allies have consciously limited the conflict in respect to each of the dimensions mentioned, Tbe degree of limitation and restraint ex ercised may be insufficient in the eyes of some critics of official policies. Tbe Miriiry Review

.?
LIMITED WARFARE : actual restraint observed, however, can only be called substantial, if not remarkable, in view of national capa bilities and considering the alternative of a world nuclear war or of an en larged Far Eastern war. In Vietnam, too, military force is being put to persuasive uses. Gon cera for the psychopolitical effects of military operations and attention to civic action programe testify to this. US bombing of the north is a claesic example, in the same category as Gen eral Scotts march on Mexico City, of applying force beyond the area in which a decision is sought to influence the decision in that area. US leaders have reaffirmed repeatedly a willing ness tu negotiate. In a sense, the conduct of the Viet nam war signifies that a revolution in strategic thinkhg in the United States has occurred within the past decade and a half.

Many Americans are confused by the bsrrage of i@~m)tion about mifitery engagements. They Iong for the capsule eummary which has kept tebs en our previous war% a fine on the map that divides friend from foe. Precisely what, they ask, is our military situation, and what are tbe pros pects ef victory? The first snswer is that Vietnms is aggression in e new guise, ss fsr re moved from trench warfare ss the rifle from the Ionghow. This is a wsr of in filtration,of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are very rare, and even more rarely are they decieive.

Presirfat

L@on

B. Joh?won

July 1967

23

Lieutenant ColonelGeorgeD. Eggers,Jr.

UmtedStateu AZWW

URING an appearance before the House Armad Services Com mittaa in early 1961, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General David M. Shonp, appraised the ade quacy of the existing US strategic air lift and sealift capacity by saying there was actualIy %oore tight then ferry in the Armed Forces, and that he wae including airplanes and ships in the word ferry. This analysis re fleetad Ganeral Shoups concern over signitieant dedcits in the tiational stra tegic mobili~ mpability. With MBpeet to airlift, both quan titaliv13ar@quaMatiVe@ScienciS5 sx istsd. k the sealift tield, the Navys amphibious sh~~ troop trarteporta, did! tddpei,fg@@mra were atIW2tad wit%~~w~intf bl~k obsohsacence. Th6ae dei3cien&i@hti developed dur 24

STRATE61C MOBILITY ing an era when US decieion makers had assigned a relatively low priority tothe maintenance of the capability to deploy sizable air and ground forces of the continental United States (CONUS) -based etrategic reserve to overseas crisis areae. Presidential Recommendations In a epecial defense meesage sub mitted to Congress in March 1961, Preeident John F. Kennedy announced plane to improve the capability of US conventional forces to cope with the threats of nonnuclear ware and sub limated warfare. Among the specific meztsurezrecommended by the Preei dent and approved by Congress in 1961 were: An acceleration and increase in the procurement of airlift aircraft al ready in productionthe C-130 and the C-295. Development and procurement of the C-1.41jet traneport. Construction of new ships to in crease the speed and capacity of the amphibious lift provided the US Ma rine Corps by the US Navy. The defenee budgets for the ensu ing four yeare continued to pbaeeem phasis on the improvement of strategic Ltsutenant Colortel George D. Eg gers, Jr., ie w-tit the 1st Battalion, Islth Cavnkp, 1st Cavalr# Diviaierc (Airmobile), in Vietnam. He hokfe a B.S. in Militaty Science from the Uni vsrmtg of Mar@wu2, College Park; a Minter of Public Affairs from Prince ton University, New Jersey; and is a grae!mzte of the US ArmII War CoUege, Carliale Barracka, Penna@ania. ?Iiz acrvice ineludee troop and etaff duty in Japan, Korea, and Germang, and w-t+ the War Plane Diviaien, Direc torate of Strategic Plana and Poliog, O&e of the Deputy Chief of Staff for l&litt?&Operatiene, Department of My 1s7 airlift and amphibious chipping capa bilities. However, efforts in the stra tegic mobility ares were not confined to the procurement of new aircraft and shipe. Strategic mobility exer ciees were conducted to test the valid ity of movement plans and to demon strate the ability of the United States to project elements of her military power in support of her global collec tive security commitments. The most epeetacular of the exercises was l?ig Lift, during which the personnel of an armored division were deployed by etrategic air2ift from Texas to Ger many in lese than three days. Ferry Capability Today, we obviouely poseesa a con siderably enhanced ferry capacity. Clearly, we must continue to improve upon tbie capability in the years ahead. Strategic mobility will constitute a vital component of the US national defense posture during the next 15 years. The primary threat te the peace and etability will continue to be the resolve of the major Communist na tions to inspire, suppoti and exploit low-level aggression against the coun tries of the Free World. The United States, undoubtedly,wili be called upon to help counter this threat by provid ing assistance to her alliee in the form of advice, materiel, and combat sup port or combat forces. To mueter her resources and to de ploy her forcee as required, the United Statee might be required to choose between two broad strategies. The United States might continue to pur sue her present strategy of forward deployments, with heavy commitment of forcee to key overeeae areas, pre stoekzge of equipment and suppliee both afloat and zzhore, and her up keep of a mobile strategic reserve within the CONUS. 25

STRATEGIC MOBILITY Alternatively, we might withdraw part or all of our forces presently de. ployed and place greater reliance on the rapid deployment of the CONUS strategic reserve to dealwith the Com munist threats ae they develop. Re gardless of the nature of the strategic concepts which evolve, strategic mo-, bility will be a matter of continuing concern to US planners and operators

ity. The advantages of one mode of transportation offset the dkwdvan tages of the other. An optimum mix of strategic airlift and sealift to meet future contingencies cannot be de termined with precision. The variables involved are many, and their interre lationships are highly cOmP1eX . ~ Among the purely military factors I which apply in each crisis situation

Troops of the M Armored Dhision st Fort Hoed, Texss, await their departure for
Germany in Operstion Big Lift

aa they devise and implement national strategy in the 1967-80 period. Stra tegic mobility involves, essentially, the intertheeter deployment of forces by airlift or sealift or by a combina , ~ionof both means. A movement which revolves long distances within a thea ter of operation may also be classified as a etrategic deployment. The experience of the past two dec ades has demonstrated that the air craft and the SKIPare partners, not rivals, in the field of strategic mobll 26

calling for strategic deployment of US forces or equipment are consider ations of time and speed, the distance to the objective area, the quantity of troops and materiel to be deployed, and the usability and capacity of port and airfield facilities at both ends of the move. Other military factors are the availability of prepositioned stocks in the overseas area, tbe resupply and replacement requirements, and tbe concurrent demands upon the US stra tegic lift capacity. .

Review , Militcry

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STRATEGIC MOBILITY Two strategic mobility operations il lustrate tbe relevance of these factore. The nature of the initial phase of the commitment of US units to the Do minican Republic was such that a pre ponderance of airSift over sealift was employed. On the other hand, the vaet bulk of the men and equipment de ployed to South Vietnam has moved by sea. Budget Program The dimensions of the US strategic mobility capability are set by a con tinuing planning and study cycle whose annual end product is the De partment of Defenee (DOD) budget program for airlift and sealift forcee. Theee forces include the traneport air craft of the Military Airiift Command (MAC), the troop carrier aircraft of the tactical air command (TAC), the passenger ships, cargo ships, and tank ers of the Military Sea Transporta tion Service (MSTS) nucleue fleet, and certain reconditioned cargo chips designated as forward floating depots. The military etrategic mobility in ventory also contains the long-range transport aircraft of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reeerve, and the amphibious shipping of the US Navy. Supplementing this military capability are the aircraft of the US commercial air carriers and the ehlps of the US Merchant Marine. Several major trende are discern ible in the strategic airlift and sealift programe and activities of the past five years. One of these ie tbe modern ization of the strategic airlift fleet. Top priority has been given to the development, production, and precnre ment of long-range, large-payload, tur bine-powered aircraft. By the early 1970s, the military strategic airlift fleet of the regular Alr Force will be composed primarily of the C-141 and
July 1ss7

the C-5A. This modernization program will create a dramatic increaee in air lift capability. At tbe present time, it would take MAC 30 days to transport an Army force of 21,000 troops and 34,000 tons of cargo from the United States to South Vietnam. By the end of Fiscal Year 1971, MAC, using a combination of C-141s and C-5As, will be able to move the same load in only 15 days. The decision by the DOD leader ship to assign the highest priority within the strategic mobility field to the modernization of strategic airlift was based principally on ite determi nation that tbe existing airlift capa bility was less adequate to meet con tingency requirements than was the aealift fleet. The airlift modernization program wae also given impetus by DODs adoption of the concept of air lifting personnel to join up with equip ment and euppliee already positioned in eehmtedforeign locations. Sivil Air Carriars Another trend is the increased use of US civil air carriers to supplement MACe capability. Since 1961, MAC has applied an increasing percentage of its capability to fulfilling specific , military airlift requirements, particu larly those generated by large-scale, etrategic deployment exerciees. Con currently, the civil air carriera have handled more routine military traffic. This trend wae accentuated by the de cieion to commit US combat and com bat support units to South Vietnam. During one 6-month period, US com mercial airlines carried approximately 66 percent of the total number of pas sengers and approximately 30 percent of the total cargo tonnage airlifted to that area. Modernization of amphibious ship ping is yet another trend in tbe pro
. 21

STRATEGIC MOBILITY gram. To increase the deployment po tential of the Marine Corps, the am phibious forces of the Navy are being furnished new shipa with speeds of 20 knots and with a capability for ver tical envelopment as well as over-the beach aesault. A long-range goal is to provide sufficient modern amphibious shipping to lift eimultaneouelythe as eault echelons of two Marine division and wing teame. Partial Modemmtion A fourth trend is the patilal mod ernisation of the MSTS nucleue fleet. This modernization has been limited to the roll-on and roll-off ship cate gory. In Fkcal Year ~966, three of these ships, designed to load and dis charge wheeled and tracked vehicles rapidly, were operational. MSTS hae also contracted to charter a fourth ship of this type which ie to be con structed and operated by private in dustry. A program was initiated in 1965 to develop a new clase of Navy roll-on and roll-off ships with greater capacity and speed and lower procure ment and operating costs. Congress authorized and appropriated fends for the construction of two fasbdeploy ment logistics ships. No comparable modernization pro gram is contemplated for the MSTS general purpose cargo ships, paeeenger shzps, and tankers, although rehabili tation and lengthening of some of the latter ships are planned. The deeision not to modernize theee elementeof the MSTS fleet stemmed from the judg ment that the combined MSTS and Merchant Marine capabilities were generally adequate to meet present and projeeted military requirements. Another factor which influences the nature and scope of the MSTS sea lift modernization program is con gressional insistence that the MSTS a fleet not duplicate the capabilities the oretically available in the US Mer chant Marine.New MSTS ships muet be justified, in part, on tbe basicthat they are special purpose ships which are military in design and function and do not compete with US commer cial shipping interests. Detariemtien A final trend is the deterioration of , the US Merchant Marine. Since the end of World War H, ite posture has deelinedto euch an extent that increas ingly larger Federal financial assist ance has been required. One aspect with which we are concerned is the ability of the active and reserve mer chant fleets to supplement,as required, the national military seaiift. There has been general agreement that the number of ships in the Mer chant Marine was adequate to meet the requirements imposed by a cold or limited war crisie. It has also been recognized, however, that our mer chant ships have been growing pro gressively obsolescent. Most of them are extremely slow by present-day standards and lack modem cargo hanHling capabilities. Nevertheless, no comprehensivemodernization program has been undertaken. The effort to meet the sealift re quirements in support of the US com mitment in South Vietnam brought to light tmo additional shortcomings of the Merchant Marine ae constituted. First, there is the question of the availability of US merchant shipping in a low or mid]ntensity warfare eit uation. MSTS officials have contended that US private shipping operators have not made sufficienttonnage avail able te satisfy the requirements in Vietnam. Representatives of the ship ping iines have countered by charging that MSTS: . MilprY Revmw

y
STRATEGIC MOBILITY . Has not developed an effective sh]pping requiremen~ program to fa cilitate the preparation of long-range plana by the shipping induetry. Has failed to make the most effi cient use of the ships under its con trol; and charter rates, in some in stances, have been too low. The availability problem centers around the question of whether the chippers can be expected to meet ex panded military requirements in a nonnational emergency situation while risking the loss of the commercial businese to foreign competitors. The shippers position ie that the Govern ment ehould rely more heavily on the withdrawal of cargo ships from the Maritime Adminiatrations national defense reserve fleet. More than 100 time Administration and MSTS have been meeting periodically in an at tempt to resolve some of the immedi ate sealift problems which adversely affect the Iogiatics situation in South Vietnam. Regardless of any progress made toward the elimination of these short-range difficulties, the long-term ,.. . m, . . . . .. {- .. ~,:-,,. .. .-.} ,<.~:,? ~$s+ .:.} :$ ., .& 6. ,., .!

Inttwa
The C-5A represents significant progress

in cargo-carryingcapability problems which beset the Merchant Marine, particularly chip moderniza tion, seem likely to persist pending a major revision of present Government policies and programs. There ie no dearth of documenta tion aa to the inadequacies of these programa and policies. Seldom haa a single industry been examined so thor oughly by eo many ad hoc and perma nent groups and committees. While the doctors agree that the patient is ill, their prescriptions for remedial ac tion differ sharply. Actions reeom mended include the phaaing out of the US-flag passenger fleet, revisions in Federal eubeidy precedurea, and con struction, under certain conditions, of US ahipa in foreign ehipyarde.
29 ,.

Intwavi.

WirIifter became operational in 1965

ships have been ordered placed in an active status at a cost of approxi mately $300,000 to $400,000 per chip. A final deficiency in the Merchant Marine ia a shortage of trained per sonnel to man the ahlps aseigned to the Vietnam run. Shipping line offi ciala and representatives of the Mari July 1S67

STRATEGIC MOBILITY Reflection upon these strategic mo bility trends leads to the conclusion that the modernization programs have not made a thoroughgoing attempt to develop a modern sealif,t capability to complement the comprehensive airlift modernizatkm program. As a conse quence, a progressive lack of balance is emerging ,betweenthe quaSityof the strategic airlift capacity and that of the strategic sealift fleet. The development of the C-5A repre sents eigniticant progress toward over coming one of the primary disadvau tagee of present-day airlift aircraft the cargo-carrying constraints im posed by their configur+ions and pay load capacities. Aside from the modern and unique features built into the new and highly specialized amphibious and roll-on and roll-off shipping, no com parable breakthrough has been made or is in prospect with regard to two problem areas in the militsry sealift field-increased speed and improved cargo handling. Recommended Actions The current trends toward partial and sporadic airlift modernization and over-all deterioration of the US Mer chant Marine must be reversed if we are to possess the requisite flexibility to deploy forces and equipment under the conditions of international crisis which could obtain during the re mainder of the 1960s and 1970s. We must have botb modern sealift and airlift to perform the strategic mobil ity tasks best suited to them. These specific actilons are recommended: Continued emphasis on tbe care ful preparation, review, and correla tion of strategic transportation re quirements to support low or midin tensity warfare operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff-Department of De fense planning, programing, and 30 budgeting process provides a frame work for the accomplishment of this purpose. ~ The implementation of a longrange MSTS modernization program to replace the fractional effort pres ently programed. First priority should be given to the development of the new class of fast-deploynient logistics ships. Second and third priorities should be assigned to the procurement of new general purpose cargo ships and tankers for the MSTS nucleus
fleet.
The creation of a Presidential Commission to investigate the capa bility of the Merchant Marine to per form its dual mission of carrying US commercial cargoes and serving as an auxiliary to the MSTS tleet. The continuation of the strategic airSift and amphibious s~lpping mod ernization programs. Funds for the modernization of MSTS seelift should not be diverted from these programs. The procurement of C-141S and C-5As should be completed as echeduled or even expanded if future airlift re quirements so dictate. The amphib ious shipping modernization program should be continued until it achievee ita stated goal of providhg a sufficient number of new SKIPSto lift simul taneously the assault elements of two Marine division and wing teems. Strategio Mobility Operations The current DOD organization for the planning and execution of stra tegic mobility operations has evolved since the end of World War II. Under this syetem, tbe unified and specified commanders together with the indi vidual services and transportation agenciee develop the transportation plans and movement echedules to eup port Joint Chiefs of Staff-appre+ed plans. The JCS periodically review

Militsrs Review A

STRATEGIC MOBILlfY transportation requirements snd ca pabilities and, when necessary, estab lish priorities for the allocation of re sources to the ueing services and com mands. As DOD Single Manager operating agencies, MAC and MSTS provide the meane for etrategic airlift and sealift; the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) is re sponsible for the movement of mili tary traffic witbin CONUS, to include the transportation of personnel and cargo to air and sea terminals. In fulfilling the requirement for si multaneous strategic deployments to the Dominican Republic and to South Vietnam, our strategic lift resources were taxed severely, but no evidence emerged of deficiencies in planning and control which would call for a major change in organization. Focal Point One organizational improvement which has been made is tbe establish ment of a focal point for strategic mobility within the Defense Establish. ment. A Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Mobility bas been des ignated. ,His mission is to provide a focus for all strategic mobility mat ters and to furnieh information and advice to the JCS and to the Secretary of Defense on all facets of strategic mobility. In developing strategic mobility programs, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense have relied in the past on the diverse inputs of the services, the operational commands, and the transportation agencies. These inputs were correlated and evaluated by the Joint Staff and the DOD staff as part of the annual planning, programing, and budgeting cycle. It is in this cor relation and evaluation process that July lea7 the Special Aseistant for Strategic Mobility can perform an invaluable service. He can provide the expert knowledge, objectivity, and continu ing interest with respect to a balanced concept of etrategic mobility that has at Ulmesbeen lacking at the JCS-DOD level. Major Advantages Should the present organization for etrategic mobility prove ine@tual in the years ahead, it can be anticipated that an attempt will be made to com bine MAC, MSTS, and MTMTS inte a unified mobility command under the immediate jurisdiction of the JCS. Such an arrangement, its supportera contend, would have these major ad vantages: It would provide a unity of effort missing under the current concept which calls for separate managers for the three primary forma of trans portation. By eliminating many of the overlapping and duplicator functions of the Single Manager operating agencies it would reeult in greater economy and efficiency. It would facilitate strategic de ployment planning by furnishing a single point of contact for the using services and commande. To date, the studies of the various proposale made along theee lines have concluded that the creation of a stra tegic mobility command would result in costly requirement for new persOn nel and facilities arqi in the generation of complex budget and funding prob lems. The new command would not offer any important advantages over the existing organization to offset the difficulties which its establishment would propagate. These, of couree, are the traditional arguments in opposition to centraliza 31

~tion. They were employed, without sieccess, against the setting up of the Defense Supply Agency and the Strike Command. However, they have been -decisive in relation to the determina tion not to restructure the strategic mobility organization. This is because they have been reinforced by the lack of reedily demonstrable operational or planning defeeta which would justify consequential cbangee in the present organizational groupings. Perhaps a rough parallel can be drawn between the establishment of a strategic mobitity command and the organizztionof a Federal Department of Transportation whic~ was estab lished by Congress. Civilian transpor tation probleme on land, sea, and air reached proportion that demanded centralization of national transporta tion plans, policies, and programs. For this reason, President Lyndon B. John eons proposal was, received favorably by Congress and enacted into law. Fu ture stresses and strains placed upon the organization for strategic mobility

may

disclose major deficiencies that will make it imperative that a mech- anism be created for more and respon sible direction over the strategic lift capability. Westand onthethrezhold of what military historians may term the age of strategic mobility. Although we have long recognized tbe significance of a etrategic Czpabllityto project con ventional elements of national military power over long distances in short periods of time, we have only recently begun to develop that capability in a determined manner. The progress made in the past several years toward the achievement of an acceptable strategic mobility attitude has been notable. Our future efforts must be geared not only to the pursuance of further qualitetilve and quantitative improve ments, but to the attainment of bal ance and flexibility in the strategic lift inventory and to the continual shaping of a responsive and creative organization for strategic mobility.

SUBSCRIBERS
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MllitzIY Review

flew Soviet Defense Minist

Harriet Fast Scott

HE Soviet Mhister of Defense roughly corresponds to the US Sssretsry of Defense and the Chair man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mar shal Andrei A. Grechko was appointed to this position on 12 April 1967 by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, replacing Marshal Rodion Y. Malinov sky who died 31 Marsh 1967. Krem linologists were not eurprised; Gre cbko, a marshal of the Soviet Union since March 1955, has been the num ber two man in the Ministry since 1960. He was the obvious choice. With the immense power wielded by the Soviet Minister of Defense, Mar shal Grecbkos views on war are of particular interest. In June 1966, he stated: In our day the advance dsplognzsnt Titlephoto co.rkw author.
July 1967

33

f,

[ NSW MINISTSR

f Central Committee of th; Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and was elseted as a full member in 1961. He has been eleeted as a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet eix times, His military ctweer has shown a eteady progression. In 1936, about 17 years after he had enteped the Red

i ~ of troops of the forward strategic eck ~ don and their comvlete combat readi nem km the greatest significance. The
nature of modern war ia eueh that
the time avmkzble for a retaliatory etrike is counted irt minutes, At the present time, the problem of eurpri8e takes on major significance, becauee weapo?w of mase de8tTUCti~, used by surprise, give a emce of ad vantage8 to the eide wing them jiret. Therefore, the role of correct and timelg evalmttkm of the sit?iation be fore a war and the adoptioa of the firet decisione by the High Command growe to the came degree to which the 8igni&atwe of surprise. ha8 inerea8ed. In thfc light the correctness and far eightedneee of thoee mec.vures which the Party and the government are now taking in advamx for preventing a ~W8e attack bv ,a potential aggre8 sor become especiall~ umferetaudable. fi Profile What kind of man is the new De fense Minister ? Marshal Grechko ie a Ukrainian, a natilve of the Roetov Oblast in the area of the Don River. Greehko wae born there in 1903, of peaeant parente, and joined the Red Army in 1919. He became a member of the Communist Party in 1928, and his political positions have paralleled hia military rise. From 1962 to 1961, he wae a candidate member of the Hamet Fast Scott regukzrlg trans lates Sow-et militarg publieatione for the Peutagohe Current Naws. Mrs. Scott ic the wife of a US Air Force Of%W whO vw Air Attachd to the Sornet Uniou during 196%64. She ia the coauthor of a aeon to be published book, The Revolution in Soviet Mili tary Affaire. Her article Soviet Mil .- itarll Literature fqr 1966 app8ared in the JUIV 1966 iceue of the MILITARY , R-w;

ColonelAndrei A. Grechkq-1941 Army, Greehko was graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. In 1938 and 1939, he was first a regimental commander and then chief of staff of a cavalry divieion. Soon after, he was sent to the General Staff Academy where he graduated in 1941 on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. At dawn on 22 June 1941, Adolf Hitlers forces invaded the Soviet Union. Grechko wae aeeigned to the operational administration of the gen eral staff. At that time, he was 37 years old and a colonel.
Militwy Revi@w

;34 L..

...

The assignment to the general staff lasted only a few days, Gr&chko ex plained: On .9 JulsI Comrade Zhukov came into the ro~ where I waa working and with a sort of ga~ ton-e in hi8 voice said: WeU, congratu-kztio?w, you have been named commander of a cav alrsI division. Yow can go to the front. I wish yvu 8uccs88. After hearing hi8 parting advice, I said goodby to mu eomrade8, packed a few .4tcaaee, and headed for Kkarkov on the South western Front. Within a short time, Grechko was promoted to major general (the Soviet one-star rank), and in September 1942, took command of the 47th Army. The following year, he wae promoted to lieutenant general and commanded the 56th Army in battles near his birth place at the mouth of the Don River.

Successes In these commande, he achieved out standing successss. Early in 1944, he was given command of the 1st Guards Army on the let Ukrainian Front. During thie year, he aleo wae pro European Oriented moted to colonel general. Along thk In contrast to the late Marshal Ma 1st Ukrainian Front were two polit linovsky, Grechko appears to have ical officers who were to influence epent all of hie time in the past 25 Grechkoe postwar career. Lieutenant yeare in the western part of the So General Nikita S. Khrushchev wae a , viet Union and in the eastern Euro member of the military council fOr pean nations. It remaine to be seen the entire front. The 18th Army po if hie future actions are influenced litical advisor, along tbe same front, by this European orientation. wae Major General Leonid I. Brezh Hia views, ae expreseed within @e nev.. pact year, follow the emphaais given After liberating Kiev, the 1st by Soviet military theoretician to Guarde Army moved into Czechoslo nuclear concepts and strategy: vakia in September 1944. Soviet sol The beginning of contemporarlI diere, overcoming the steep Carpath war, according to aU the signs and ian Mountains, reached Prague on 9 information, if the imperialists un May 1945. lensh it, w{ll be, apparently, differ8nt from the lust war. New means of cam- In the immediate postwar period, bat are producing a .ceriee of ab80 General Grechko took command of the

important military district of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. The Firet Secretary of the Communiet Party of the Ukraine, Khrushchev, was aleo in Kiev. In 1953, after the death of Jo eeph Stalin, Grecbko was promoted to general of the army (four stare) and was sent to command the Soviet forcee in Germany. In 1965, he was promoted to marehal of the Soviet Union. Events suggest Greehko muet have impressed Khrushchev. In 1957, after the ouster of Marshal Georgi K. Zhu kov, who wae accused of harboring Napoleonic tendencies, Marshal Ma linovsky became the Minieter of Da fenee. Grechko was returned to Mos cow to become commander in chief of the Soviet ground forcee. In 1960, Marehal Grechko was designated First Deputy Minieter of Defense and com mander of the Wareaw Pact forcee. Marshal Grechko is tall, dignified, and looks much younger than hk 64 years. He speaks fluent German and come English. Ae with most Soviet officials in prominent positions, little is known of hie family.

July le67

!ikw Ml,,,,,
$lutely different problems. It in @i k ; ment to name a few euc~ rre carWing ~ out the first nuclear etrzke, using ite ~ re8ult8, the vitality of the rear and ~.industrial objective8 and so forth. But there ie no doubt that mang of the queeti&rre from the expertenoe of the beginning of the faat war are in clo8e prozimtt~ w{th the pre8ent. The correct undentanding of the theoretical aud hietoricd aspecte of the nature of the beginning of mod ern war aud the peculiamtiea of it8 unkwahing have the greateat 8ignifL oanm? for the further strengthening and perfection of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armie8 of the count~ea of the eocidiet commun{tg. Marehal Grechko ia a strong per sonality who hae seen many change8 in the Soviet military poeture airwe the end of World War II. He claims that, . . . the revolution in military affairs demands firet of. all movement forward, boldness of thought, daring in etating new problems of military theory. Whether this euggest? that he will seek continued increasea in missiles and antimiasiles, or that he might have the conrage and ability to look for waye to rednce interna tional tensions, remaine to be seen.

There is reaeon to belisve that the new Ieaderehipof the Soviet Union finds the Iron Curtain not only a crude barrier to the West, but also a costly impediment to their own well being smf progress. The Soviet Union of 1967 is a powerful, productive and modern nation. There ie a growing realization that a closed society is an admis8ion of weakne8%that a closed society in hibit8 progress. Surely a eystem that can produce Sputnik missile8 and prescientific satellites must find an Iron Curtaina relic of tbe precomputer, mentafit y. Vice Pre8ident Hubert H. Htcmphreg

~ #a wl:v~ From Ekonomicheskava &azeta (USSR)

SOVIET
ARMED
FORCES
AT MIDCENTURY
Colonel General Vladimir F. Tolubko, Souiet Armg

HIS is a special year for the Soviet armed forces ae they celebrate the 50th anniversary of their birth during the graat October Socialist Revo lution. Since then, the Soviet Army and Navy have grown into a powerful force. Their development is inseparably linked with the dometilc and international sit uations and with the taeka worked out by the party and people in the process of building communism.
July 1967 37

oration with Socialist countries based on its ammaisal of Drohable war. .. Currently, the most distinctive fea ~res of the development of the So bt armed forces are the qualitative Iange and the strengthening of the This avtiele waa translated and digeeted from the origiual, pub liehed in EKONOMICHESKAYA GA ZETA (USSR) February 1967, uw der the title, Na StrazheZa voevanii Oktgab~a. Translation by Mr. Norman Precoda, Santa Barbara, CaZ@-nkz. Genera-1 Tolubko ie First Dep uty COrnnrander in Chief, Stra tegic Miemle Forcfe.

of the Soviet PVO (antiaircraftt de fense) forcee. Since the air force hae been equipped with rocket-armed, au. personic aircraft, ite power hae grown to gigantic proportion. Nuclear powered submarine equippedwith nu clear miesiles now constitute the navye baeic fighting power. The strategic rocket forcee are now the main source of the arm4d forces firepower. Modern combat and the ca. pabilities of etrategic nuclear rockets have transformed this organization into the meet important force in the armed forcee. Maintenance of Soviet superiority againet the probable enemy, with m.
MiiiiIY Review

SOVIET IIRMED FORCES spect to technical equipment in the army and navy and with reepect to the power of nuclear rockets, consti tute one of the meet important tasks of the Soviet armed forces. Trends ih the further development? of the armed forces will be determined by the progress in all spheres of the natural and technical sciences. This progress will contribute to the con tinuous improvement of the military art. Adoption of nuclear rockets hae produced essentially new demande for command and control which pose a number of important and difficult probleme to military theory and prac tice. The preeent stage of development ie characterized not only by changes in technical fundamental, but aleo by important changes with reepect to mil itary personnel. The high demands made on personnel stem from the ne cessity for them to maeter quickly tbe newest technology. The tempo of transformation in the military ephere makes great demands on Soviet com mander cadres, for stagnant military thinking, marking time eo to epeak, is fraught with grave consequences. It is not enough for an officer to be only technically qualified. In order not to fall behind the demands of the de veloping military art, it is eesential for him to have a spirit of daring in hie search to find the meet effective methods of application, and the abil ity to eense the new and incorporate it into education and training prac tice, advancing both military theory and practice. Every fourth officer poseeeses a higher military or specialized educa tion. The commander trained in engi neering has become the central figure in the military. It is gratifying that each year youth becomee better pre pared. Today, more than 90 percent of the enlisted membere of the Soviet Army have higher, secondary, or partly completed eecondary education. More than 70 percent of the youth en tering the armed forcee has a technical specialty. Preparation through higher education assists the military eetabIishment to master complex rocket technology. In the second year of serv ice, many become epecialiete of a high grade. The high appraieal of the fighting ability of the Soviet armed forces and the combat readinese of the rocket forces place great responsibility on Soviet fighting men.

July 1967

38

MILITARY MANAGERS

Robert D. MiewaId

N ATTEMPTING to capture the cesence of a profession as old and complex es the military service, it is understandable that tbe observer may feel forced to rely upon a few simple ideas. There is at laest one instance, however, when such generalisation is positively harmful. If, for ease of anal ysie, it is decided that the military past is not prologue, the results may be misleading. The student is then in the position of a critic who enters the play at intermission, but does not feel it worth hk while to inquire ahout what went on before. In the United States, aech genera tion of military observers has hailed the passing of the old Army and the birth of the new Acmy. The chronicle of this remarkable cycle of death and resurrection may be found in the re flections of a long and distinguished line of Army officers. General Ulysses S. Grant believed that the Civil War mmrked the dividing line, while Gen ~,eralWilliam T. Sherman maintained ~tbat 1880 was the first year of a truly ?rnodernArmy.

Inspactor General Joseph C. Brack inridge, a reliable barometer of mili tary thinking in the 19tb century, served long enough to report the bhtbs of two new Armies: one after the ad ministrative reforms of the 1890e and another following the Spanish-Ameri can War. Leonard Wood thought that the turning point occurred sometime during his tour of duty ae Chief of Staff, but the veterans of World War I felt that the date was closer to 1920. Of course, modern studentaof militmy affairs are aware of the widespread use of the concept of the new Army. The importance of this racurring theme does not lie in the fact that many otherwise perceptive men were somewhat premature in their an nouncement of a new military order. The longevity of tbe old Army ie sig nificant hacause of the standards hy which newness is meaeured. Develop ments in military hardware or changes in tactics have seldom characterized tbe new Army. Rather, in the Amer. ican context, modernity has been de ecribed in tecma of an improved ad.
Militaty RfJViOW

p
$

MILITARY MANAGERS ministrative e.ituatilon-the new Army is one in which there is better utili zation of the human resources of the organization. Thus, managerial style distinguishes the bad old days from the good new days. In 1814, William Duane sug gested replacing a discipline based on fear with a discipline baeed on mutual respect between officers and men. And in 1949, Lieutenant General Willard S. Paul stated that the secret of mod ernization wae the (humanizing of miIitary life. Management has always been at the base of the new Army. Reconsider Principles The enduring concern of military managers with improving their doc trine, along with their apparent fail ure to attain any millennium, should help to emphaeize the need for a thor ough reconsideration of the principles of military administration by civilian studente. The lively ghost of the old Army indicates that military admin istration is centered around an in soluble dilemma. And, it can be ar gued, thk dilemma ie the same one which now perplexes civilian students of administration. A fitful peace now prevails in the study of adminietration. With few ex ceptions, hostile camps no longer con tend for control of the entire ecience of management. Today, it is not a mat ter of either scientific management or human relations, organizational engi neering versus the informal approach, or claeeical principles ae oppesed to or ganic models of man in the organizaRobert D. Miewald is an A89tititi Professop of Political Sc%nze at Cali ferala State CoUsge at Long Beach, and received his Ph. D. fmws the Uni versity of Colorado at Bouldev. He served with the Z8th Infant?y, Ist Division, from 1961 to 1968.
July 1SS7

tion. The social scientist of the 1960e is far more sophisticated than his predecessors about the efficacy of any one-eided approach to organizational life. Practically all modern treatments of managerial problems are prefaced by statements expressing the need for blending, eynthesie, integration, or reconciliation, ineofar ae a harmonious combination of the two complemen tary elements of organized life is pos sible. Organizational Conflict It ie now admitted that there ie an inherent conflict between the two basic parts of any organization-the formal etructure and the individual member. Theoretical deductions and empirical evidence show that complete congru ence of the two is unlikely. The indi vidual remaine an uncertain tool for the most efficient accomplishment of the formal goals of the organization. Modern administrative thought is approaching the imp~icit doctrinal foundation which has always influ enced military thinking about the na. ture of man in the organization. Re gardless of time or place, there have been few reputable officers who have seriously maintained that their pro fession involved nothing more than the operation of a precision machine. Few officers have overlooked the fact that each individual within an army represents a potential source of trou ble for the rationally conceived plan. On the positive side, military lead, ers have recognized that the individual has eometbing more to contribute than can be elicited through formal means. R ie only in the crudest caricature of the military mind that the fatuous of ficer orders his men to be brave, cheer ful, spirited, and reeolute. Instead, military literature abounds with ref erences to what Leo Tolstci called the 41

MILITARY MANAGERS X factor~the factor which en hances the physical mass of any army. Whether called military virtue, the spiritual element, the human equation, or morale, few successful officers have confessed that they believed the bat tle could he won without that intan gible factor. In military administrative thought, tion as two separate spheres. Essen tially, the development of managerial doctrine in any military unit can be told in terme of the attempt to bridge tbe organizational gap, with the her alding of the new Army understood as the claims of success. Generations of officerqhave tried to relieve the pressure of tbe formal structure upon the soldier. At t~e same time, officers have endeavored to r make tbe individual a more depend. able part of the organization by estab lishing morale as a fairly calculable item in the commanders arsenal. It is needless to add that tbe ultimate solution has yet to be discovered. The military profession was struggling with the organizational dilemma long before it was identified by social sci ence. It follows that the description of the struggle may be of relevance for modern problems in both military and civilian organizations. Formal Authority One may pick any of the classic works on military science and find at least a tacit awareness of the reali ties of organizational life. The sup posedly modern theme of man and structure may even be traced to the author, who is commonly thought of as the first serious student of military affaire in the Western World. Xeno phon knew that the formal structure was a weak thing in the heat of bat tle unless it was supported by a posi tive attachment of the men to their leader. With only minor revisions, the work of the ancient Greek could be iesued as a companion to the present field manuals on leadership. The es sence of both is the same: Formal au thority is not enough for tbe success . ful officer. Even more illuminating are the writings of the men generally associMilitary Revinw A

the individual has been important. In deed, one can detect a strong current of pessimiem which hints that the in dividual may be too great a part of the best laid plans. Men will be brave only on certain days, orders which can be misunderstood will be misunder stood, and an irreducible minimum will fail to get.the word. If the fatalistic theme were the dominant one in military literature, its study might not. be eo instructive. However, officers have seldom been content to leave the formal and in formal components of their organiza 42
k-....

,.
ated in civilian minds with all that is , retrogressive in military life. Some of the concepts of Frederick the Great may have been distorted by hk leee perceptive imitators, but his words in dicate he never lost sight of the fact that his army was composed of human I beings. FredericJdan Style , The original ideal for the Prussian officerwas more than the despotic drill master. Frederick demanded that his officers tend to the needa of each sol dier. It was no accident that Friedrich von Steuben included in the first regu lations for the US Army a strong re minder to all officers to look after the well-being of their men. Fortunately, for the young Army, ~euben was a keenetudent of the Frederickian style, andhe imported only the best elements of the emerging Prussian doctrine of military management. The reader who ia familiar with the worka of both men will also realize that the pioneers in modern military theory stressed the same theme about the harmonization of soldier and or ganization. In spite of etrong differ ences in temperament and style, Henri Jomini and Karl von Claueewitz were never far apart on matters of manage ment. Neither accepted tbe idea that war was simply the mechanical appli ~ cation of rrdea or that the inspired efforts of the troopa could compensate for faulty organization. Of tbe two, of course, Jomini wae more inclined toward the rational structure. However, the desire for a set of principles of warfare dld not lead this child of the Enlightenment to overlook the irrational elements of combat. Conversely, although Clausewitz em phasized the importance of friction in military operations, he stopped far
1

MILITARY MANAGERS

short of the outright glorification of the irrationality of war. Clausewitz only warned that the job of the mili tary manager was incredibly compli cated by the personal variables. Fur thermore, for all hk talk about fric tion, Clausewitz still believed the commander could take steps to deter

, ,.,
National A.ohiwe.

General William T. Sherman mine the level of morale within the unit. Whatever ite value for the study of administration, the rich body of lit

erature produced by the great cah tains and their interpretera has been all but ignored by civilian students. Even more dieappointing is that the relevant writinga of US military Offi cers have not been incorporated into the mainstream of administrative sci ence in the United States. There ie every reaaon to believe that officers havebeen at leaet as advanced in the management of men ae their

JoJy1967

MILITARY MAkASERS civilian counterparts. Thus, the officer who, simply to be up to date in his description of another new Army, claims to have adapted civilian lan guage for military ueage may tind that the same thing could have heen ac complished with military concepts. Heritage Neglecter The etstua of military thought among students of management is more surprising because no other in stitution in the United States can boast of such a long line of serious commentators on the art of adminis tration. But the heritage is neglected by civilians and may be in danger of being forgotten by officers. General Shermans eloquent words on the soul o? the organization were ig nored even by his contemporaries. The wise and sympathetic adminis trative techniques, used by Adjutant General John C. Kelton to curb an alarming desetilon rate remain un known. The contributions of William S. Carter and Leonard Wood to a viable general staff system are given less weight than those of Elihu Root. There even is a tendency to overlook the managerial skill required of Peyton C. March, John J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisen hower in their successful conduct of two of the Nations larger adminis trative missions. The managerial theoreticians pro duced by the ArmY are also pertinent today. William Duanes remarke on discipline are as fresh and exciting ae they were in 1814. Dennis Hart Mahan was obviousIy aware of the need for a blendlng of organizational structure and individual initiative in the large operation. Edward Munson was a generation ahead of his time with hk observations on the impor 44 ., tance of employee attitudee in indus try. And, perhaps, the officer whose obscurity ie most undeserved of all is Lincoln C. Andrewe. It is truly regrettable that the work of Andrews is not better known to civilian scholare. His four books, written during and after World War

-- --iiF-Amu LirrceIn C. Andrews as a cavalry Major, Oetebsr 189@ I I, are th~ best synthesis of US mili tary marlagerial doctrine as developed over the pact century and es it was to be applied in the next global con flict. Yet Andrews wrote at a time when civilian sociologists were warn ing their colleagues to beware of the bureaucratic military mind, and at a time when industrial psychologists would need another decade to discover that workers tended to behave much -like human beings. Andrews ineisted that the individ ual was not a neutral unit, but a sen
Mllltafy riOViW

,.,,J

MILITARY MANAIWRS tient human being. Soldiers and workers were not cogs in an imper sonal machine. Instead, they were unique personalities who had to be persuadedto patilcipate effectively by the leader. In words already familiar to US officers, Andrews stated that the leader could not. expect to get the proper contribution from bis subordi nates simply because of tbe pieces of brass on the shoulder or the position iu an organizational chart. The true leader had to appeal to his men on a personal basis. Moreover, it is important to note that Andrews was not interested in thecrude manipulation of human emo tion for the good of the organization alone. For him, tbe consideration of the soldier as a personality was eth ically right. And again, Andrewe was only 1! ephrasing the basic ideae which were then being circulated among his fellow officers. There are other approaches to the organizational dilemma, but enough has been said to indicate the nature of persistent truths about the man agement of men to be found in the writings on military science. Perhaps, then, it is time for civilians and soldiers to change the term new Army from an empty slogan into a common denominator for the study of all ad ministration. The old Army must en dure. Insofar as the old Army ie a term applied to the uees and abuses of the formal structur+the cold, impersonal relations between superiors and infe riors, the restrictions en individual initiative by numeroue rules, the con trol over many aspects of the soldiers life, the consideration of the member as a unit in the mass and not ae a unique personality, and the imposi tion of a machine logic on human beingsthe prospects for modernization are not hopeful. The old Army, together with old businesses, old bureaus, and old churchee, schools, and hospitals, will persiet just as long as there is need for a formal structure which can in sure a degree of organizational ra tionality among all its members. Un less one is attracted to Utopias, such a message would not be one of bleak despair. It would only supply some sorely needed premises about the lim its of the possible in the management of any organization.

July 1967

da

~l:v~

From Rivi8ta Militare (Italy)

..

BrigadierGeneralArnaldo Giacalone,

Itfdian Armu

ONTEMPORARY writers on the subjeet of strategy provide little help to the reader in offering a pre cise definition of tbe term. Both dic tionaries and encyclopedias define the term in, such a way as to leave one with the impreeeion that strategy is etrictly a military term. However, non military writers frequently use the term in discussing a wide variety of subjects. The Nomevwlatore Organico, Tat tico, Logie$ico, which is equivalent to the Italian military dictionary, defines strategy ae <a branch of military art which covers the general principle of military operations and the general plan of war. A eimilar definition is contained in Militurieches !taechenIez icon, a Gmman military dictionary. The E~clwedia Italiana defines 46

strategy as a branch of military art whichbeing a continuation and in

strument of Politic%ontrok and co ordinates operation of war. In B. H. Liddell Harte well-knownwork, ~trafi egv, the term is defined as the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ende of policy. Military leaders and politician go a step further in describing the term when they apeak of nuclaar strategy: the strategy of maesive retaliation: the etrategy of connter forcefl and the strategy of flexible response. By manning the eports page in a news paper, one finds the term ueed in a different contc.xt-that of tennis or soccer etratagy. Indeed, a famous cook was recently given the title of Strat egies of the Culinary Art. It seeme logical to ask: Today, cau
Militqfy Review

STMTE6Y DEFINED called on to resolve conflicts are in ore ,accept the definitions of strategy frequent. On a day-to-day basis, nalPPf=ring in military and nonmilitary Dictionaries ? The answer is no. ~ tions attempt to reeolve differences through diplomatic, economic, finan Phesedefinitions are inadequate, not cial, scientific, technological, peycbo]eceuse they ire inexact, but because Iogical, and ideological means rather :hey are obsolete and have been for than through the use of military force. lometime. Therefore, it follows that: In essence, they reflect the original Modem strategy is no longer Greekmeaning, the art of the gen baeed solely on large-scale military wal. These definition were valid operations, but also includes political, priorto the end of the period of abso financial, economic, technological, and lutemonarchies when power was con psychological maneuvering and ideo centratedin the hands of one person; logical penetration which are able to when resources, routes of communi enhance the power factors of a nation cation, and the means of transport or coalition. were limited; and when diplomatic Modern etrategy is not applica treaties were kept secret. ble only in peacetime for planning of Diierent Methods large-scale military operation or in Today, the situation has changed. watilme for coordinating these opera [n the resolution of controversies be tion. tweencountries or coalitions, the fig This eupports the contention that ure of the general no longer seems the dictionary definition of strategy to be in the forefront. The resolu in current use is obsolete. tion of controversies, which takes the form of achieving political objectives The expressions that are used with m maintaining objectives already the term have a descriptive value for achieved,is not accomplished just by the application of strategy, but do not conducting the war and coordinating identify the etrategic concept. They specific war-like actions. are designed to restrict the meaning The political objectives just men of the term to a purely military area, and to identify more precisely the tioned usually identify themselves in means used to apply the strategy. conquest or in holding what has al readybeen acquired, and each implies Marshall Plan a conflict. However, conflicts between The Marehall plan was a program eetions or coalitions occur frequently for economic aid to the countries of md are not restricted to wartime. Western Europe. Its objective was to The times when military forces are block Soviet expansionism by givint new vigor and vitality to Western Eu This artick was translated and rope. In earlier times, such an objec digeeted from the Original, pub tive would have frequently required lished in RMSTA MILITASE the use of weapons. The plan will be (Italy) Novembev 1966, under the remembered not only bacauee of ite title, Quale d 6Attuule Signifi cato &l Termine Strategia ? great scope, but also because it was Gerund Giacalone h Deputy among the first and most significant Chief of Staff f~Ur&watione, examples in history of the widening Land Headquartsre, of the sphere of action of strategy. Fercee, Southern Europe, The terms of the North Atlantic h~ 1s67
47

,.
STRATEfiY liEFISED Treaty of 1949 represented the West ern Worlds answer to the threat of Soviet military aggression. The best and most eloquent proof of the alli ances accomplishment is represented by the fact that, from the treatys inception, no European border has been altered. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance, its activities are not confined to those tvnical of such a ~militarv alliance. strengthening their free institution by brtnging about a better undes%tand ing of the principles upon which theeo inetitutimw are founded, and by pro moting condition8 of 8tabil@ and well-being. They COW eeek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will ence+wage economic collaboration between any or all of them. One can see that, although the allij ante is essentially of. a. military char.

Arw Nw. Fcatwu Newspapermen frequentlyrefer to s tesms strategy on the playingfield acter, it is also aimed at the attain One has only to look at the economic ment of the Free Worlds political ob and social, objectives of NATO and jective of halting Soviet expaneios, the titles of the principal committees This is done not only by creating in. of the North Atlantic Council to eee tegrated headquarters and preparing evidence of this fact. Article 2 of the war plans, but also by bearing in mind treaty states: The Parties will contt$bute toward the influence that economic and social power have on the accomplishment of the ftmth.er development of peaceful this objective. and friendlg international relation8 by 4% flilitary Reviom

STRATEGY DEFINED NATO provides us with the cleareet wample of how modern strategy no longer ie restricted to the claesic mil itary theater of operations. It is worthwhile to emphasize that NATO is an alliance of sovereign nations, Yet in spite of differences such as the memberelevele of industrial and sci entificdevelopment, language, and the lack of a common politico-economic power, the alliance has accomplished its mieeion by realizing that a coali tion cannot accomplish its funda mentalgoals solely by the use of mil itary power. For a coalitiou to be efficient, it cannot he baeed exclusively on the art of the general: but, rather, on the art that identifies modern strat egy. Based on the previous discus sion, modern etrategy should be de imedas: The art of pfanning and employing, in coordination, all the in.rtrnmemts of porver available (political, iwdu8trial, economic, social, financial, scientific, technological, psychological, ideolog ical, and milita~) for the attainment of vital objectives. For the purpose of this definition, one must consider not only general strategy, which covere all instrument of power and can be defined se total strategy, but also the strategies rel ative to each of the instruments of power. These strategies, of couree, must be in harmony with, and subordi nated to, the over-all strategy. In the framew6rk of total strategy, military strategy has a definite place that can be defined as the art of conceiving and conducting large-scale operations for the attainment of fun damental objectives.>

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hly 1967

/#@ nl?v~

From Journal of the RUSI (Great Britain)

,ife in
Brigadier G. S. Heathcote, British Arm#, Retired

1976

HIS is a crystal gaze with a pur pose since 1976 is far enough ahead to allow ideas to ungum them selves from the military morass in which most seem at present to sink, and far enough for the mind to d& coller from the runways of tradition and range freely over the future. This is as muoh an exercise in original thinking as in extrapolation. For, al though the major political and techno logical changes that have taken place since World War II have, so far, had surprisingly Iittk effest on the life of the serviceman, this hardly seems 50

Militsvy hViVM

SERVICE LIFE likely to be the caee over the next nine years. The aim is to forecast a future sit uation as a challenge to todays policymakers. To do it, it seems worth ex amining some obvious factors that bear upon the future role and organi zation of the services. This is a twostage procees: takhig factors and dis tilling them into well-founded fancies at a lower level of thinking, and then taking these as a basis for the final crystal gaze. New Philosophy Not long ago every military miga zine bad a monthly article on the de terrent, and minds were locked in combat over the meaning of nuclear parity and stalemate, the missile gap, and the balance of terror. Their voices now seem strangely stilled. Why ? IS this because they have squeezed every pennys worth of print and cents worth of lecture time out of a boring subject, or because time is slowly providing resolution in a field of view so monstrous, diffuse, and dazzling as thie? It is probably a bit of both. Whatever the cause, it is pafilcu larly important now for the impecu nious Britieh services to clear their minds on this issue if they are to plot an economical course ahead for the armed forces. The trouble is that the monstrosity of the nuclear and bio rical threat has in the nast tended This article was digeetsd from thk original, pmbltihed in the JOURNAL OF THE ROYALUNITEO SERVICE IN5TITUTION (Great Britain) August 1966. CoW nghted @ 1966 b~ the JOURNAL OF THE ROYALUNITEOSERVICE INSTITUTION. Bmgad$ev Heathcote, now re ti?sd, is with a firm of manage ment and induatriul consultants.
I

to be so overwhelming that it hae in hibited dispassionate judgment. This is another reaeon for looking into the future. Surely, the British can now decide that power in the form of nuclear and biological weapons in the hande of the two greatest powersthe Soviet Union and the United Statesmakes it certain that even in 1976 neither will allow herself to be drawn into conflict with the other with these weapons. There is and will be a highly stable balance of terror between them, in which the weigh@ on either side are so gargantuan that no foreseeable changes or pressures will affect it. Moreover, their power superiority over any other nation in the world, in the timescale, will remain so over whelming that they will not be dragged or nudged into a war of this kind. Only caution and, perhaps, nos talgic memories of past grandeur pre vent the British from recognizing that their country will never be involved in a major nuclear war. Lesser Powers what has to be considered are the dangers of a lesser power attempting to impose its nuclear will on Great Britain and the need to be able to outthreaten the growing number of over ambitious, nonnuclear, second-division powers. In 1976 this will be even more important as the growing stability of the nuclear truce between the great powers and their reluctance to be drawn into conflict increase tbe credi bility of the British nnclear deterrent against lesser powers. It may be that, as nuclear parity is reached within the second division, another balance will be struck and the , scope of conflict once again driven down to a nonnuclear level. There will, 51

rely1ss7

SERVICE LIFE nevertheless, he grave dangers in thie period which will make it essential for Great Britain to retain a nuclear capa bility, albeit a not too sopbieticated one. Feara of nuclear conflict will con tinue to confine fighting Of any kind to unattractive places away from :he main centere of civilization where bat tle hurts too much: to jungles, deserts, and hush. Within this context, too, the deterrent philosophy will have its place. The petty thief is deterred by the policeman on hiwheat; the revolu tionary and mutineer hy the knowl edge that retribution could be nearnear specifically in time. It is not difficult to see that this implies an increase in the efficiency of intelligence and a great improve ment of strategic and, because of the type of terrain, tactical mobility of conventional forces. Whatever prog ress is made in intelligence, it seems certain that great strides will have to be made by 1976 in air mobility. Economic Stringency Unless an economic miracle occurs, Great Britain must, in the next nine. years, be forced to devote less money to .defenee, particularly overseas. Moreover, because of social changes, as well ae economic difficulties, the British people will be less and less inclined to put their hands in their pockets to support national overseas military adventure in the face of a critical world. For these reasone, the British people will be reluctant to take any military action except as part of a team. . It thue seems inevitable that, in the next nine y~ars, overseas spending will he cut and Britain will confine her actions to those that can occur within alliances. At the same time, as service purse 52 etrings are being pulled tighter, mili tary activities wiil become more ex pensive. Long past are the days when all the services required were leaders and thoee happy to be led. The services will requir%and at many levels men who can best be described as managers. Gone, too,, are the days when the so-called Western Powers can automatically rely on in-built su periority in weaponry over Iess-ref nowned nations. Streamlining Services Although savinge may be made by opting out of first.division technology and, perhaps, by reducing contribu tions to big-league play in Europe, it is certain that an ability to engage in limited war, coupled with even an unsophisticated nuclear capability, cannot be achieved cheaply. For th]s reason, drastic streamlining of the services will be needed if they are not to be priced out of any worthwhile market. The British serviceman will have to give up the idea that he can not fight without the best conceivable weapon. It would be lunacy if the only effect of technological advance was to make the services smaller and to require manning by men so h]ghly qualified that they can hardly be recruited. Al though, so far as limited war is con cerned, weapons will ngt need to be more powerful, it is essential that technological progress achieve sav ings by enabling fewer men to do the same job; by simplifying and lighten ing equipment so that repair and lo gistics are reduced; and, above all, by enormous strides in mans mobility and thereby his ability. These developments will only make economies possible if their effects are accepted and old ideas and organiza. tions are not retained for fear of a
Mmiry Review

that this speed multiplication will con

tinue? With this steady increase in flexi bility, it ie certain that by 1976 the requirement for our own aerial step ping stones around the world will be less, and the cost of long-range move ment will get cheaper as bigger air craft get into the hands of the Royal Air Force and charter firms. The ef fect of this on service infrastructures and administrative thinking ehould be
July 1967 f

thlrd d]mension to fight a war. Brit ain will have had to follow suit. It is not difficult to predict that hy 1976 Britains overseas responsibili ties will be lese. It ie as certain, how ever, that riots, rebellions, civil wars and confrontations in the world wil not diminish, if for no other reason than because this will be tbe main battleground of the Communist-Capi talist struggle. In addition to the fact that it wil

53

SERVICE LIFE
be in the interests of most powers to

reduce or prevent this turmoil, the growing number of international do gooders in the United Nations will insure that the main organizations for putting out the fire will be interna tional. British pati]cipation in these will be more frequent as the imperial ist image grows fainter. Allied Organizations The North Atlantic Treaty Organi zation must become less significant as a purely military organization. It may even have ceased to exist by 1976 un der the combined pressures of grow ing self-confidence in Western Europe the measure of its own successand the United States and Soviet concern with China. If it does not, the lunacy of a ma jor tactical nuclear engagement in Europe will have become obvious to all. The threshold then needed to dem onstrate Soviet aggression will enable the British and United States contri bution to NATO to be reduced. But the continuing vulnerability of the flanks of the alliance will have entailed an increase in the present small mebile reserve in scope as well as in size. This roll will match well with Brit- . sins limited war and peace-keeping reeponsibilities. The real threat to the Western World will be in the Far East and Af rica. In the Far Eaet, the menace will have crystallized into a single on% China. An alliance will have developed with a responsibility stretching from Korea to Pakistan to meet this threat. Its main biee and eupport area will be in Australia, and a British interservice force will be part of it. It should have begun to put on the flesh that, over the yeare, has been put on NATO. In Africa, the problem will be a

peace-keeping and lifesaving problem. This task could by then be so vast and the implications of failure so hor rifying that, within tbe next nine years, the United Nationa will have created a considerable peace-keeping force for Africa. British interests, and particularly the large AngloSaxon population there, make her participation certain. Geographically,, there will be a need for some means of entry into Africa from both west and eas~ requiring an Indian Ocean base on a limited scale-for allied use -either on islands or possibly % a seaborne force. Service Integration By 1976 service integration will be gathering speed. Although the serv ices will atili retain their identities, great etrides will have been made in bringing them together. Considerable economies will have been made by common budgeting, unified research and development, and the integration of administrative services. Some of tbeee eavings should have gone toward the creation of a defense academy, as well as a common technical university. Staff training will be more integrated. Greater reliance upon university training will be closing the gap be tween service and civil life. The greatest, although less tangible, gain will be in increaeed understand ing and trust between the services. In terservice squabblea will be for the hietory boeka. The tendency toward wider groupings, in the eense of serv ice integration and international mil itary organisations, will have cast more doubt upon the advantages that, so far, have lain in British regimental organizations as opposed to the eeono mies and increases in efficiency that could occur from a syetem based on larger groups.
Milii Review

SERVICE LIFE How will all this bear upon eervice

life in 1976? Within a lower ceil~nE. of man power, yet with a gre&y enhanced ability for strategic mobility and with the political changes already discussed, the British cervices will be divided between the Far Eaet, including come

in the nature of the threat will place first priority on the training and or ganization of forces for limited war. The great advancee and economiee in etrategic mobility in 1976 will make it poeeible for units or, when more convenient, their personnel to eerve overseas for no more than six months

I?ltmwia

dir mobility, botb strategic and tactical, will be tbe dominant factor in making economies in manpower and administrative overhead, and in the development of defense thinking and tactical organization

element in the Indian Ocean, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom on the other. The main function of the forces based in the United Kingdom, by then part of an allied undertaking, will be to relieve and reinforce the Far EastIndian Ocean theater, to reinforce the flanke of NATO, and to provide rein forcement for international peace keeping forces elsewhere. The change July 1957

at a time. Such a tour will make it poesible for most overeeas service *to be unaccompanied, with a consequent major caving in overseae expenditure. The effect of this on the army will be to reinforce other reaeons for broaden ing the basis of exieting regimental organizations. The terrain in which meet limited war and peace-keeping activities will take place, the need to move there by 55

SERVICE LIFE air and to, operate wholly or largely on a vertical takeoff and landing basis, coupled with the increase in integra tion between the services, will bring about major changee. in organization on the lines of the US Strike Command and the Marine Corps. Permanently established joint task forces will have been created in which tbe various service elements will have a single loyalty. The command and staff of euch, task forces will be truly integrated. Lower down the scale of command there must also have been organiza tional chasiges stemming from com mon budgtilng, a similar rank etruc ture, the move of army units into the third dimension, and even the use of similar combat clothing. Surely by then Royal Air Force squadrons, with in the context of a less-sophisticated type of warfare, will be contemplat ing operating alongside naval units from aircraft carriers, vertkal takeoff and landing aircraft by then having created a lees-expensive and contro versial seabome base. Mixed Service Unite The army will go to sea, and the marines will have switched their al legiance to the service whose uniform they wear. And will not mixed service units be the order of the day? The imagination is stimulated by the thought of a deep penetration unit on the linee of the Special Air Service, complete with its own aerial and nau tical vehkles. Certainly, interservice grouping of units or subunits will have been carried down to a lower level than today. It also se~ms likely that the thirddimensional look will lead to a review of the Napoleonic preference for big battalions and, perhaps, a reduction of the infantrys. support weapons. There will be, too, a great increase in 5e

demand for flak-although what arm or service will man it is doubtful and, perhaps, by then will be immaterial. Administrative Field The greatesti changes, however, should take place in tbe administra tive field. To say will is to under estimate the strength pf the service shacktes that bind the administrators to their particular elementsailors to water, airmen to the pale blue yonder, and eoldiers te the unyielding earth. No one doubts that by 1976 we shall ~ pray jointly and be hospitalized and I educated by services that have made some economies by coordination. The major savings could, however, come in a change of concept in logis tics. When a radio set can now be delivered from a factory to the Far East in hours, and a man can go from a jungle to a general hospital in little more than minutes, will tbe present concept of a base: the armys fond ness for administrate areas, and the scales ofl stocks and reserves now held still be appropriate? WIII not the antlike hoards of somehow pathetically entitled soft vehicles have largely departed and been replaced by vastly fewer vertical takeoff and landing and short takeoff and landing aircraft ? Integration of the three services will bring the rank structure of each into the limelight, and with it both the concept of the service career and the qualities required by the armed forces and the relationship of thk to the na tions economy. The greatest influence will come from the current social revolution in the country. The need to achieve a proper relationship between age and reeponeibility, and to offer attractive career proepecte in the services ,will have led by 1976 to a more variable set of terms of service for officers and Militsrv Review

.:

SERVICE LIFE men, to greater promotion from the ran$e, and to an organized tieup he hveen industry and the services over educational standards and the rede ployment of ~anpower. The services will, in turn, have made their image n great deal more claaslees. It seems inevitable, if logic and the ory count for much, that, in the next nine yeare, there will be changes in theservices that, taken together, could reachalmost the propofilons of a rev olution: a change in priorities between nuclear and limited war; a change in deterrent posture; a major change in the nature of overseas service; a great move, particularly for the army, into the third dimension; a ruthless reor ganization of existing logistic sys teme; and a reappraisal, probably agonizing, of the services rank struc ture. This could be the case, hut it also could not, for the island race re mains blandly reactionary in the midst of its neighhors and of accelerating change. Even this would not put an end to progress if the defenee services stood out within the K]ngdom as a progres sive organization.

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My1907

57

The Case for the Defense

Major N. A. Shacklet on, Canadian Armg yeara since World War 11 have besn marked by many in novations and improvements in mate riel which have significantly enhanced the offensive capabilities of ground forces. These developments have had an equally profound impact upon the conduct of defensive operations. Despite these changes in equip ment, there have been relatively few alterations to the basic tactical doc trine governing the employment of field forces in nonnuclear war. It is conceivable that certain of the con

T HE

cepts and battlefield techniques. many of- which were evolved mo~e than 20 years ago, are no longer practical in the modern technological environment. The important weapon developments of recent years are likely to impose fundamental change in current tacti cal doctrine. Research and development leading to new weapon systems or to improve ments in existing equipment stems from assessments of the potential enemy and the character of future hostilities. The adoption of the arMilitary Raview

t
DEFENSE mored personnel carrier (APC) may be attributed to the threat of nuclear war in the 1950e and to ifx intro duction by the Soviet forces together with a recognized need for mobility :end protection of the infantry. Anti $mk euided missiles were developed response to the armored preponder uce of the Soviet Army. ~ Night vision devices, surveillance equipment, and improvements in ar titlery were brought about for similar ens. Although the roles in which %he helicopter could be employed have been apparent for many yeare, de velopment and production of these aircraft were given tremendous im petus by, their successful uee under condition peculiar to Vietnam. From the point of view of armored operations, an ominous development to emerge from World War II was the shaped-charge, rocket-launched projectile. Weapons of this type were introduced too late to have a decisive effect on the course of the war. Since that time, there have heen few cir cumstances under which modern recket launchers, recoilless rifles and their progeny, and the antitank guided missiles could be assessed in largescale operations. New tactical concepts have gen erated new equipment. In some inMajor N. A. Shaekleton, Canadian Army, is a member of Lord Strath conss. Horse Regiment (Royal Cana diane), curt-ently on duty with the United Natione Trace Supervision Organization ~b8erVeVe in the Middle Eaet. He served with a Canadian armor unit in Europe during World War II, and ie a gradwute of the Ro@ Military Academg at Sand htwet, England, and the Canadian ArmII Staff College, Kingston, On stances, tactical concepte have been modified to suit equipment that has become available through technologi cal evolution. In other casee, neither tactical concept nor equipment has been tested under the rigors of war against a modern and equally wellequipped enemy. War ef Movement Current tactical doctrine for mecha nized operatio~e is based upon the concept of a *r of movement involv ing armored thruets, flanking maneu vers, and armored envelopment. This doctrine emanates from the blitzkrieg theory perfected by the Germans and employed by the Allies in Africa and in the campaign in northwest Europe. The dramatic successes achieved by the execution of these tactics have tended to overshadow the fact that the massed armored sweep was only pos sible under certain conditions-when overwhelming concentrations of armor and fire support were available; when the enemy was demoralized and weakened after a lengthy period of attrition, and lacked a strong, coheeive antitank defensive system. It should be remembered that there was a relative scarcity of antitank weapone that were held by units and formations at the time. For example, a German panze?-grewadier division of 1944 contained 168 antitank weapons ranging in caliber from 20-millimeter to 88-millimeter. Today, by compari son, the Soviet motor rifle divisiok containe more than 340 weapons of similar categorf to which must be added 211 guns found on the light, medium, and heavy tanks. Further more, all field artillery guns, howit zers, and antiaircraft weapona of the Soviet Army possess a significant antiarmor capability. Based on these facta, the task force 53

~ $ ; ~ :

kwio.

July1367

DEFENSE commander who is ordered to attack faces many problems. His force will coneist of infantry in APCS, tanks, engineers, and artillery support. If the enemy ie occupying an organized de fensive position, the teek force com mander is able to define the objective to his companies and establish control procedures. He can also select targets and fire tacks for his mortars and ar meter guns of the TI O tanks whose 45-pound shot will destroy any APC and damage tanks at ranges beyond 2,000 yards. This tire will be accom. panied by that of the Swatter and Snapper antitank guided missilw (ATGM) whose shaped-charge war. heads will penetrate any armored vehicle. The TltYe will be difficult to Iocatt

The Soviet TIO heavy tank

tillery support. Important decieions wili include whether or not to attack mounted and when to dismount and continue the attack on foot. The tank company commanders conduct of the attack will ueually be limited to two baeic choices-whether to lead the attack with his tanka, or to move the infantry onto the objec tive from good, direct fire poeitions behind the APC mounted companies or from the flanks. In any event, when preparations are complete and the leading troops begin the attack, they will firet be engaged by the 122-milli ,. so

becauae of their low silhouette am frequent changes in fire position. The3 will also be difficult to destroy. In I hull-down position, the eight-incl frontal armor of the TIO rendere i invulnerable to all but the most power ful antitank weapona. If they can be located, the operators of the antitank guided missiles may be neutralized by smoke and high-explosive ehells. As the distance to the objective ie shortened to 1,000 yards or less, the ATGMs and heavy tank gunfire. will be joined by that of the 100-milli meter guns of the T54 tanks and the .

~litarySwiew

DEFENSE 107-rnillimeterrecoilless rifle B1l. The lattek can penetrate more than six inches of armor. However, back blast necessitates placing these grins in shallow pits with their tubes above ground level, at which time both crew and gun are vulnerable to a wellplaced shell. The next weapons to be,encountered are the 85-millimeter and 57-milli meter guns of the antitank batteries. These are towed auxiliary propelled equipment. With their limited mobil ity, they can be expected to hold their fire until a vital hit is more or less guaranteed. Infantry Launcher In the final stages of the assanlt, tanka and APCS will be confronted onthe objective by the RPG2 infantry launcher. This weapon fires a hollowcharge projectile more than 100 yards. Its penetrating power is on the order of eight inches. Of course, a Sobiet force would face similar weapons in an attack on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization formation. These, then, are the antitank haz ards facing an armored attack or a dismounted infantry assault sup ported br tanks against a strong or ganized defensive position. In the less sophisticated antitank environment of North Africa and Europe during World War II, losses of 50, 100, or even 150 tanks were not unusual un der these circumstances. On the occasion when actione of this type are likely to occur in the future, it seems that the only meas ures that would heighten the chances of success are the use of variable time-fuzed artillery shells combined with emoke, and the simultaneous concentration and movement of all available armor covered by close air support. By these means, it may be hty le67 poesible to blind and neutralize the defenders and, subsequently, over whelm the poeition by the speed and weight of armor. The ratio of attacking to defensive forces is the vital question+n the basic of wartime experience it cer tainly cannot be less than three to one. However, if the estimates of the potential enemys strength and tactics are correct, it is unlikely that ,he will remain stationary long enough to be the object of a setpiece attack. Mebile Battle What of the task force commander who is given the infinitely more dif ficult tack of attacking or intercepting the advancing colnmns of the tank and motor rifle divisions+specially if the enemy has already bypassed any euitable terrain features where his forward elements could be halted by an organized defensive position on the ground ? In this eituation, the commander is faced with the problem of launch ing and controlling an attack against fast-moving columns of tanks and APCS whose flanks and vanguard are protected by the 76-millimeter, 57 millimeter, and 85-millime~erguns of the Soviet reconnaissance tanks and eelf-propelled artillery. Thiz means that he must coordinate the tasks of the APC mounted infantry, the armor, and the supporting artillery, while they are on the move, and enga~e targeta which are traversing his front at 10 to 30 miles per hour. In its current function as an ar mored taxi, the APC has a restricted offensive capability. It is also vulner able to weapons of more than .50 caliber at meet ranges at which en gagements are likely to occur. Modern artillery lacks the capacity for the acquisition and effective indirect en

DEFENsE
gagement of armored targets moving at good speeds. In addition, the lethal armor-pene trating capability of Soviet antiair. craft and field artillery diminishes the scope for the claesic maneuvere of encirclement and destruction of enemy supporting arms and eervicee in the rear areas. Therefore, the brunt of the engagement will be borne almost

vehicle and improving the capacity of the crew to fight while mounted. It is significant that this has been a long. eatahliehedpractica in both the Soviet bloc and the West German Armies. It ie aleo noteworthy that the MI19 APC hae been ueed in thie manner in Viet nam. The vulnerability of the APC to direct fire is the principal objection

. .--w

..-.4,.

FrdcComo.d The armoredpersonnelcarrier can be utilized as an armoredfightingvehicleto con tribute firepowerto the mebile battle

entirely by the tanks of the task force. The artillery and infantry will play a relatively passive role in the interception battle. If the maximum value is to be gained from the infantry of the tsek force, it eeeme apparent that equipment should be modified end tactice adopted which will permit more vigorous participation in the war Of movement. In effect, thie means turning the APC into an armored fighting S2 %. J -,...,<. L-+.A. +.. -..A .A ....-..-a...

to its employment in this role. Neverthelesa, there ia good reason for suP posing that the APCS firepower con tributton to the mobile battle could offset the handicap of light armored, protection. Beeauee of ite low ailhouettq the APC can utilize the cover af. forded by the ground to a greater extent than the tank. Wider use of vehicle-mounted, ehaped-charge anti tank weapons will permit destruction

RoYitw Milittry

DEFENSE of moving tanks at ranges up to 765 yards or more. The 20-millimeter can non muuuted on the APC can be extremely effective against the nu merous BTR.50P and BTR60P ar mored carriers interspersed in the Soviet tank columns. Psychological Advantage The small arms of tbe crew can produce inetant all-mound offensive fire against enemy motorized riflemen who have been dismounted from their vehicles. Furthermore, there is a profound psychological advantage ac cruing to soldiers who go into battle in a vehicle from which they can ob serve or participate in the conduct of the action. In the closed type of APC, there is a loss of orientation and a sense of ineffectiveness among those of the crew who are unable to fire their weapons or see where they are going. In the mobile battle, the tankby reason of ite gunpower and armor is the k]ngpin of the, task force. The offensive employment of infantry APCS must, therefore, be designed to supplement that of the tanks and, in general terms, the movement of the APCS must conform to that of tbe tanks. However, within these limitations, the fighting APC can perform a vital role in the melee which will ensue after the tanks have made contact with the enemy. By the judicious uee of ground, epeed, and their capability for concealment, APCS can move out to the flanks, and forward, for fleet ing engagements with the enemy who is witbin reach of the recoilless ritle and 20-millimeter cannon. By provid ing protection along the axis of advance, they can prevent encroach ment on the flanks through early warning or by fire. By the aggressive
July 1S67

exploitation of the shock action ini tiated by the tanks, the APCS can deceive the enemy as to the scope and strength of the attack. Moat of the current artillery tech niques and battle procedures are based on those employed during World War II. An examination of 130 indirect fire engagement by artMery against German armor during the period 6 June to 27 August 1944 reveals the eesence of the problem confronting the artillery in the accelerated tempo of a future war. On tbe Caen-Falaise eector during the Normandy campaign, the average size of armored targete engaged by indirect artillery fire was 10 tanks. In most instances, movement of Ger man armor Was restricted to the foot pace of the infantry whom they were supporting. In those engagements for which results are available, the rec ords indicate that an average ex penditure of 14,000 pounds of ammu nition were necessary to destroy 0.5 of a tank and to compel an average target to halt, withdraw, or disperse. Changss Rsquired Basically, the problem demanda the elimination of the delay from the time of transmission of data between , the observer and the gun position to the fall of shot. This timelag has already been compressed to the mini mum by radio procedures and other means. However, this is not enough to permit the delivery of sufficiently effective fires to halt moving armored targets. Until there is a significant breakthrough in this area, however, it aeeme that certain changes are necessary in prevailing tactical doc trine if the artillery is to exploit ita full potential in the mobile battle. This requirement could be satisfied by making the engagement of targets

DEFENSE by direct fire the primary function of field artillery. This would enable the artillery to produce the antitank de fense in depth, provide the counterpenetration force of the battalion group, and eerw out the role of close direct support of infantry and tanks. With tbe communications and mobil ity of modern self-propelled guns, artil}ery detachments that have been deployed in the direct fire role can be qnicldy concentrated and revert to their traditional function of indirect fire support whenever operations stag nate into positional warfare. It is conceivable that certain doc trine concerning airpower, which has hitherto been accepted without reser vation, could be suepect when applied to future operations. In operation againat armies of the Soviet bloc, it would appear that any local ascend ancy achieved in the air by either side would be temporary and not neces sarily a dscisive factor in the outcome of the ground battle. Current antiaircraft syetems excel those of World War II to a marked degree. In the Soviet Army, the twin 57-millimeter antiaircraft guna mounted on the T5$ tank chassis, the SU57, can deliver 120 aix-ponnd ehells in a minute to a horizontal range of 13,000 yards or vertkdly to a height of 9,300 yards. With radar control, thie weapon could severely limit heli copter or close air-support activity in the forward areae. Further to the rear, thk syetem ie supplemented by 85-millimeter, 100 millimeter, and 130-millimeter gnne together with surface-to-air miaeilee. The latter, SA+2 and 5A-9 mis eiles, will likely be improved models. Perhape they will be more effective in the hands of skilled technicians than the performance of missiles in southeaat Asia would indicate. Although an increasingly effective variety of aircraft and electronic equipment is available to the Weet, it seems that those concepts which lean heavily on air support, and which envisage the vertical, envelopment tactical doctrine, will require careful reexamination before they are em. ployed againet any army possessing, all the advantages of advanced tech nology. Surveillance and night vision de vices have been the subject of exten sive research and development in the West and in the Soviet bloc. In some respects, the efforts of each side have canceled out those of the other. Not withstanding, in the uee of most of this equipment, the advantage lies with the defense. In the case of the infantry-type radars, this is dne to weight, bulk, power requirements, and other limitation of the equipment, infrared equipment used in the night movements of vehicles includes illuminator. These are readily visible through pasaive viewing devices which cannot be detected. The infrared il luminators for tank guns ean also be observed by the same means. Ciffen eive action entails movement and fire. At nighttime, thie renders an attack ing force vulnerable to observation and engagement by defeneive tie from positions that are not compelled to reveal their location by use of active viewing equipment. It appears that in conventional op erations in Europe, technology has
enabled the antitank weapon, and

hence the defense, to dominate the field as long as there ie time to select and prepare strong defensive pesi tions.

34

Military hviEW

lSIW1S NAHA1 CORPS

Leo Heiman

EW Israelia, and fewer foreigners, know any hard facts about the Nahut Corps except its emblem, the sword and sickle; its songs; and its girls. Nahals entertainment squad is considered one of Israels best song-and-dance ensembles, a tra ditional training base for actors, singers, and models. But Nahal also trains rabbie, midwives, carpenters, and auto mobile mechanics; supplies teachers to over 700 primary schools in Israeli villagee and rural development areas; provides free medical assistance to immigrants and poor farmers; and eup plies the backbone of one of the Israeli Armys toughest airborne formations. By American standards, NuhaZ is a combination of Peace Corps, Job Corps, Rangers, and Special Forces. By Israeli etand ards, it is much more than that. Whenever Israelis discuss de terioration of moral values, juvenile delinquency in the cities,

July 1967

65

disappearance of oldtime pioneering Zionism, and other ills of modern in dustrialized society, they eonsole one another with the words: But weve still got Nahal. Actually, Naha2, a shortened ver sion of Near Halutzi Lohem ( Pio neering Fighting Youth), was born almost by accident during Israels 1948 independence war. An elite group of that period was the tough Palmach Corps which originally comprised three battalions of volunteers from Israeli agricultural settlement, and eventually expanded to 10 battalions and a host of ancillary units hy ac cepting volunteers f ram the cities as well. Palmach Okbanded The Palmach fought a war of its own, had ite particular mystique, and often ignored the official channels of command. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minieter David Ben-Gurion, knew the Palmach never lost battles, but, on several occasions, important military operations failed to score the expected successes. This was because Palmach brigades refused to obey the orders of army group commanders and accepted instructions from their own headquarters. Fearing that the Palmach wae get ting to be a private army Within the Israeli Army$ and in the light of bit ter experience with other dissident Leo Hehnnn, an Israeli foreign preee correemmderst. was born in PoSand, studied in the Soviet Union, and fought with. Soviet partiaan forcee against the German AvmII for two Veare. He attsnded Munich Univeveitu, and went to Izwael in 1948 where hs ewwed in the arnw and rravti for eeven yeav8. He has written 8everaJ booke on miJitarg crtbjeete, and is a fveqckent contmbutor to the MXLITAUY REVIEW. @

groups,

the government disbanded the Palmach general headquarters, trans ferring its functions to the army op. eratione center and general staff. The three Palmacb brigades were attached to three different army groupe, and the Palmach Marine bat talion was incorporated into the tledg ling Israeli Navy. This left bebind a huge reserve training center with thoueands of 17-year-old volunteers. Too young to be drafted for combat duty except in emergencies, they were trained in commando tactics and sent as replacements to Palmach units when they reached 17I/zyears of agethe minimum legal fighting age. When the Palmach Corpe wae dis banded, the army proposed a Pioneer ing Youth Corpe based on Palmachs 17-year-old reserves. The suggestion was approved by Mr. Ben-Gurion who changed the name to Pioneering Fighting Youth; personally selected Nahals emblem, a sword symbolizing fighting and a sickle for ag~icultural settlement; and gave the new organi zation the status of a separate corps. Nahals Debut On 12 November 1948 the Nahal Corps held its first parade. Address ing the first two battalions ready to move out to tbe Negev battlefront, Mr. Ben-Gurion said Nahals task was to set up 200 fortMed agricultural settlements and carry on the Palmach% glorions traditionet Nahd, is still far from the 200-set tlement tadget eet in 1948. BY Jan uary 1967, Nahal had set up a total of 34 outposts and 20 eettlemente. Some of tbe outposts were abandoned, and only 14 of the eettlemente arb now operated by civilian volunteers who have completed their service in Nahnt units. But although Nahal has completed

Review . Militefy . . ,. --------

only 25 percent of the settlement schedule planned in 194S, its contri bution in other tields is great and could not have even been envieaged 19 years ago. Nakd soldiers built the first road along the Dead Seas west ern shore, from Sodom to the Biblical oaeis of Ein Gedi. Civilian contrac tera balked at the project because of

paved the way for the 20,000 civilian settlers wbo followed. Ministry of Agriculture experts de clared no intensive agricultural culti vation of the arid Ha Arava between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea was possible without costly irrigation. A group of Naluzl volunteers drilled an artesian well; irrigated 350 acres of

The swerd and sickle emblem and prstty gf;ls with antomatic wsepons are the trade marks sf the Nahal Corps

the distance, climate, and Arab guer Ein Gedi became the first per manent Naha2 settlement and is now one of Israele principal agricultural and tourist attractions. When no civilian groups were will ing to crose the burning Negev Desert and eet up a permanent settlement at Aqaba on the Red Sea, a Nahal com pany moved out, eetablfshed a fish ing village, hauled boats overland, launched them in the Red Sea, and
rillas.

land in the manmade oasis; and,grew potatoes, beets, and carrots. OnL day they sent a truckload of potatoes to the Ministry of Agriculture in Jeruea lem and dumped them in the office of the expert, who eaid no agricultural cultivation was possible to prove their point. But the Nakal Corps has its critice too. Israels influential Hsuretz daily wants to know how much Naha2 costs its budget ie a military secretand 67

July 1967 .

HAIIAL whether the same results could not be achieved with Iese money. Haaretz claims the Naiuzl Corps draine the cream of Israeli youth off other units, provides glamour, and the esprit of an elite formation in return tice. The one significant exception is the Nahat Corps. It provides a, chal lenge, a clear-cut aim, prospects of ad. venture, and a chance for boy to meet girl. In theory, Naha2 service is purely voluntary, but, in practice, women are usually drafted for Nqhal eervice in army basic training camps. Fewer girls than boys volunteer in the first place, and those who do prefer as signments in the fields of entertain ment, education, and public relations. The Nahal section at the Ministry of Defense sends representativee to all Israeli schools and settlements to recruit youngsters 16 to 17 years of age . for Nahal nucleus groups. These are volunteer teams which con tinue studying or working together before being drafted for active serv

A iValmf soldier inspects agave growing on a plantation near the Dead Sea

for an illusion of pioneering. The newspaper further claims that the tax payers could get a better return by di rectly subsidizing the existing kibbutz settlements and allowing them to eet up colonies in the desert. However, it is doubtful whether NahaZs true value can be estimated on a profit-and-loss basis or gauged by managerial effi ciency methods. Ite main impact today is psycho logical. In the 19 yeara since Israels emergence as an independent state, Zionism has euffered a rapid decline as a political ideology capable of in epiring the young generation. Public opinion polle show most Israelis are either cynical about Zionism or dieil lueioned about its application in prac 68

ice at the age of 18. They spend sum mer vacations in special indoctrina tion camps operated by the Ministry of Defenee together with other agen cies and agricultural settlement or ganizatfona. They develop their own Military Review I

--2 esprit, choose their own leaders, and enJis$as an integrated group pledged @ serve together as a platoon. The nucleus groups go through basic training together and are then taken to exieting Nahal villages or civilian settlements to serve their first period of apprenticeship. Their work ing days are divided into equal peri ods of miJitary training, agricultural studies, and patrol and security duties. Advanced Training In the third period of training, the men are sent for advanced commando training which includes parachute jumping, night raide, demolitions, re connaissance, armored cavalry tactics, and handing of heavy support weap ons. The girls are also detechsd for more training in such fields as edu cation; maternity care, first aid, cook ing, communication, ordnance, and ammunition storage. The best trainees of both sexee are selected for addi tional training ae squad leaders. And the best of those go on to officers school or platoon sergeants courses. In the last 12 months of eervice, the men and women are brought back and or dered to set up an outpost. Realizing that some individuals are not interested in argiculture, the Nahat Command now allows a choice of agricultural, industrial, or educa tional activities. One proup of reli gious i%hal volunteer even set up a rabbinical echool on top of Mount Zion in Jerusalem, 20 yards from the Jordanian demarcation line. Another Nahal unit operates a hoepital for re tarded children on a permanent basis. The choice of objectives or activi ties matters lese than the willingness to remain together ae an integrated, armed unit even after discharge from active service, with no military dis cipline to keep them in line. To qual July1267

NAHAL

ify ae a Nohal outpost, the unit must settle near a border where no one has lived before and make a significant contribution to Israela defense, econ omy, public health, or education. In return, iVah outposts that be come civilian com unities qualify for subsidies from 1 e Jewish Agency; the Jewish National Fund; the Min istries of Defenee, Agriculture, Health, and Education and Culture; and other department. And they pay no taxes. Thie explains the almost total absence of traditional military discipline in regular Nahal outfits. The commanders realize that disciplinary punishments or administrative meas urea are of little value when the time comes to reenlist voluntarily and to remain in the outpost as civilians at a latter etage. CombatForce Nahals combat force (airborne Nahal) is used to strengthen settle ments which are sagging or showing signs of disintegration due to a low reenlistment rate. In time of emer gency, airborne Nah.alleaves the set tlements and performs strategic or operational functions as ordered by the army general staff or one of the district commands. It usually operates and fighte side by side with the army airborne corps under unified com mand. The settlements are protected and defended against possible enemy attacks by women soldiers, civilian settlers, and nonparachute qualified troopers. As the iVahat Corps prepares to cel ebrate its 20th anniversary in 1968, two questions are etill left unan swered: WH1the Nahd idea work ae well in the future, and can the NahaJ principle be exported to other coun tries, especially developing ones? NaMt raining teams and advisory 69

NANAL groups have been active over the past decade in some 20 foreign countries, ineluding Burmai the, Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Nepal, and Uganda. Their experience shows that the i%hal idea can be exported, but not trans planted. The NuhoJ framework can be utilized for a variety of positive pur potreein any foreign country, but its ideology and motivation are uniquely IsraeIi. Developing countries often lack the education and ideological drive that make Israels Nahal such a potent instrument. And industrial. ized countries do not require corps foi pioneering, desert conquest, and bor. der settlement. Looking to its future, Naha2 will continue serving as an ideological force, agricultural experimental ten. ter, military formation, and matri. menial agency for many yeara to come It is too much a part of the Israeli life and scene to be removed now.

I know it is sometimes popular, at least among a few, to point out the de fects in the youth of our Nation today. I suppose, really, the elders have pointed out the defects of youth for centuries. But I believe the youth of our Nation today deserve and have earned the faith and the confidence of their elders. They are tine young peeple. There may be small groups among them who are nerrconforraist% but I believe that, in the main, the youth ef this Nation are a serious generation. They hsve deep feefings about their own country and sre going earnestly about the task of preparing themselves to take over the re sponsibllitiee of running this country when their turn comes.
General

Creightarz W. Abrams

70

Milltery Review

-q

Louis Morton

N 20 and 21 March 1967, Presi dent Lyndon B. Johnson visited th~ island of Guam where he con ferred with Vietnamese and American officials on the war in South Vietnam. In his arrival remarks; the President noted that Guam had been chosen as the meeting cite because of its con venience and for its historical signifi cance. He then said: Guam kunws war in a wag that no other American kuows it. It was the to only inhabited part of our uatien be occu~ed by hostile forces durzng the Seceud World War. Just 23 years ago this month US forces under Admiral Chester W. Nim itz were bringing the Marianas Cam paign to a successful conclusion re Jldy 19s7

euking in the return of Guam to US control. On 12 March 1944, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff directed AdmiraI Nim itz to eeize and OCCUPY three of the major islands in the Marianae: Sai pan, Tinian, and Guam. The date set for the invaeion was 15 June. With this order, the Joint Chiefs gave the signal for a campaign that took US forces within B,-29 bombing range of Tokyo, led to a Cabinet crisis in Ja pan, and to the resignation of Premier Hideki Tojo. To most Americane then, and to a new generation that has grown up eince World War II, the Marianas meant only a series of small dote somewhere in the middle of a map 71

THE MARIANAS of the Pacific. The islands lie in the western Pacific, 3,500 miles from Pearl Harbor, and extend in a long arc for about 450 miles. They were discovered by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 and named by h]m the Ladrones or Isle of Thieves. Guam, the southernmost island in the group, is 250 miles from tbe Caro lines; Tinian and Saipan, the next lower runge in the Marianas ladder, are only slightly farther away. To the north is Iwo Jima and the Bonins. Across open watere, l,lf10 miles to the west, lie the Philippinesfurthermost US possession before World War II. US Interest US military interest in the Mari anas antedates World War II, and, for the firet two years of the war, the islands figured prominently in the emerging strategy for the defeat of Japan. There were at least four excellent reasons for takhg the Marianas. The Navy hoped by thie move to flush out the main body of the Japanese Fleet for a decisive engagement. The is lands otTered favorable sites for for ward naval bases. Possession of the Marianas would place the Americans in poeition to move either southwest Louis Morton, Profe8sor of HistoW at Dartmouth College, Hanovev, New Hampshire, holds a Ph. D. from Duke University in Durham, North Caro lina. He served with the Army in the Pacific theater durirtg World War II, and later, as a civilian, became a his torian in the /iPm#8 O@ee of the Chief of Milita~ Hi8fory. He ie the author of The Fall of the Philippines, and Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, volumes in the o@al his toW of the US AtudI IN WORLD WAR II. His article LWiei8 in the Pacific appeaied in the April 1966 issue of the MILITARY REVSEW. 72 L-.. ., into the Carolines, west to the Philip. pines, northwest to Taiwan, or north through the Bonins directly to Japan. The southern Marianas Were ideally euited as airbases for the newly de veloped B-.29; they contained good fielde, were large enough to accommo date the extensive facilities needed, and were within bombing range of the Japanese home islande. The fact that Guam ha~ heen a US, possession administered by the Navy did nothing to leseen the attractive ness of the choice of targets to the admirals. Anrpldtdous Warfara What distinguished the Pacific from every other theater of operations in World War 11was amphibious war fare. Thera were amphibious opera tions elsewhere, but the Pacific was tbe one theater where aseault from the sea was both customary and nor mal. Thle meant long lines of commu nication stretching for thousands of miles across the ocean, and it meant that all operation had to be truly joint with ground, air, and naval forces working in cloee harmony. The campaign in the Marianae was a prime example of amphibious techniques, as well ae one of the most controversial and decisive campaigns of the Pacific war. By mid-1944, the Americans had fought their way up the Solomons and New Guinea, past the Biemarck bar rier, and across the central Pacific as far west as the Marehalls. The southern arm of this two-pronged ad vance was under General Douglas MacArthur; the other was under Ad miral Nimitz. Both received their di rection from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and both were joint commande con sisting of ground, air, and eea forces. Ae far ae the vaet spaces of the PaMllltuy Review

y
TtlE MARIAMAS cific allowed, the general and the ad mirat were supposed to help each other end coordinate their operations. Although this double-edged strat egy represented a dla~ersion of forces, ss General MacArt~ur and Admiral Nimitz approached each other, each wouldbe able to support the other by air and naval operations. Each would Strategically off balance, the Japa nese would have to guard every point in their vast perimeter from the Aleu. tians to the Indies. The Allies, under no such compulsion, would be free to move their forces and to concentrate at the point of attack. Under Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, the technique of ampbib-

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keep the enemy in his area pinned down, uncertain where the next blow would fall and unable to shift hie forces. By timing their blows skillfully and selecting their objectives carefully, tbe Alliee could neutralize the advan tages the Japanese possessed in their interior lines of communication while exploiting fully their own advantages.
My 1967

ioue warfare reached a high etate o} perfection. First, the objective wee ieolated and its defenses eoftened by air and naval operations. Simultane ously, other targets were attacked to deceive the enemy ae to the true ob jective. Next came the air-naval bom bardment of the target area while the assault force was moving toward the objective. The landing force moved 73

THE MARIANAS from ship to shore under cover of air and naval gunfire. The landing itself was ueually made in wavea or echelons, with rackettiring landing craft in the lead, fol lowed by amphibian tanks carrying the aesault troope directly from the water onto the beaches and then in land. Finally, came the landing craft with more infantry, artillery, and eup Arthura area, the central fact con. trolling operations was the range of land-based fighter aircraft. In theeen. tral Pacific, where the advances had to be much greater, far beyond the range of land-based fighter cover, the decisive element wae the large aircraft carrier. If the fast carrier was tbe essen tial element of eucceee in Admiral

LSTS carried the asssult battalions, tractors and tanks, and light artillery in the
Marianaeinvasion
porting troops. Whenever possible, neighboring emall ielande often were occupied in advance to provide sitee for the emplacement of afi]llery. The advance inland proceeded without pauee, air and naval forces providing eupport when neceeeary, until the ob jective was -finally secured. The essential ingredient of euccees in thie type of warfare was the con. certed and coordinated action of ground, sea, and air forces under a eingle commander. In General Mac 74 Nimitz formula for victory, the float ing eupply baee wae tbe key to the operations of the fast carrier force. Consisting of oilers, tenders, repair and salvage ships, and a large variety of miecellaneoue vessels, this mobile baee was capable of providing the fleet with the supplies and services re quired for extended operations far from home. In ehort, it wae the logis. tic equivalent of the fact carrier force. Vital also to amphibious operations were the landing vehicle, tracked
MiliiIY Review

..... ..,.-q
THE MARIANAS (LVT) and the 2?LL-ton truck, amphib ious (MWUV). The first, more com monlyknown aa the Amtrac or Atlia* tor, solved one of the chief tactical problems of an amphibious assault how to get troops across the reefs and onto the beaches. The D UKW solved the problem of getting artillery and critical supplies to the beachhead dur ing the early stages of an assault. Both weretruly amphibious weapons of the most modern deeign, and they rate among the great contributions of World War II to the art of amphib ious warfare. StandardizedPattern For the invasion of the Marianas, Admiral Nimitz drew from all the r& sources in his theater. From the Pa cific Fleet he took the bulk of the warships, including tbe fact carriere; from the Fleet Marine Force, two corpe headquarters, three divisions, and a brigade; from the Army, two more divisions, corps artillery, gar rison troops, and the 7th Air Force. The organization of these forces fell int6 a pattern that was by now well standardized. Command was single and was lodged in Admiral Raymond A. Spruance who reported directly to Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Spruance commandedeverything assigned to the invasionexcept the submarines on die tsnt missions and the logistic forces afloat.These Admiral Nimitz retained under his own control. To #ccomplish his mission of cap turing the Marianas, and in the proc essdefeating the enemy fleet, Admiral Spruanceorganized three major forces the Joint Expeditionary Force led by Rear Admirat Richmond Kelly Turner; the Fast Carrier Force com manded by Rear Admiral Marc A. Wltecher; and, third, a force consist ing of all the Army, Navy, and Ma rine land-based aircraft aseigned to the operation. This laet was also com manded $Y an admiral even though it included the Armys 7th Ah Force. Commfurd relationships in this in volved organization, where virtually all the higher commanders wore two hate, was quite complex. At the top was Admiral Nimitz who was at one and the same time Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, a joint com mand; Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, a naval command; and Com mander in Chief, Central Pacific, an area command in which he reported to himself. Below him wae Admiral Spruance who was in eupreme com mand of the operation and aleo com mander of the 5th Fleet. Tactical Command Tactical command during the am phibious phases of the operation was in the hands of Admiral Turner who simultaneously commanded the entire Expeditionary Force and its largest component, the Northern Attack Force. Tactical control of the troope ashore wae to be exercised by Marine Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith. He wae responsible to Admiral Turner until the amphibious phase was ended, and then he would aseume command. .Like Admiral Turner, General Holland Smith wore two hats, for he exer cised tactical control of the troope on Saipan as well as all the troops in the Expeditionary Force. , Assembling the forces with all their eupplies and equipment for an amphib ious operation like the Marianas was an enormously complicated job calling for the meet detailed planning and split-eecond timing. Thus, one of the two corps scheduled for the operation was mounted in Hawaii and on the west coast; the other in Guadalcanal. Ships of the Pacific Fleet that were to 75

TIIE MARIANAS pafilcipate in the operation were scat tered throughout the area. All these had to assemble in the Marshalls in a specified order at par ticular times and then move out ac cording to a carefully computed time table toward the target 1,000 miles away. Wheh finally assembled, the in vading force consisted of about 106, and 4th Marine Divisions-made final preparations for the assault in Ha. waii. The journey to tbe target began on 25 May. On that day, the slower landing ships, tank (LSZS) carrying the LVTS and the assault elements of the two Marine divisions sotiled from Pearl Harbor. All ships carrying the assault troops rendezvoused on 8 June

000 troops and no less than 535 com batant ehlps and auxiliaries. Transpofilng the troops was the least part of the job; loading the suP pliea and equipment was the really ditlicult task. The operation plan pro vided that assault and garrison forces should be allowed 32 days of rations, 20 days of other classes of supply, and seven units. of fire. Altogether, a total 0 about 75,000 tons of cargo repre s$ ting nearly eight million cubic feet was loaded by the Northern Attack Force alone. The Saipan invasion force-the 2d 16

at Eniwetok where Iaet-minute preps. rations were completed. The L%% left on the ninth, and, by the llth, the last of the attack transports had weighed anchor, and the mighty ar. mada was steaming westward through hostile waters toward still more hos. tile shores. Meanwhile, the US bombardment of the Marianas, which had begun early in February in conjunction with th! great raid against Truk, contin@ unabated. In March, land-based air. craft took up the task of pounding Japanese bases within reach of the
Miliiry Rwim

THE MARIANAS Marianas. For three months now, they bad been bombing the islands eteadily, neutralizing Japanese airpower and simultaneouslygathering aerial recon naissance for the invading forcee. WMe land-based aircraft did their job, submarines on distant reconnais sance reported the aseembly of a large Japanese Fleet off Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago near the Borneo oilfields. This was the 1st Mobile Fleet led by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa and under orders to seek out and de stroy the US Pacific Fleet. The Japa nese were as eager as the Americans for a naval ehowdown and had given Admiral Ozawa the bulk of the fleet and made elaborate preparations for the battle. A Natursl Mistake In May, as this fleet was assem bling, Admiral Ozzwa sent a screen of his own submarines couth into the Solomons in the mistaken belief that the carriers were there and that Ad miral William F. Halsey was getting ready to mount another offeneive. It wae a natural mietake, for the South ern Attack Force was, indeed, assem bling off Guadalcanal, but it was a fatal mietake. Admiral Halsey, with the escort carriers of the Southern Attack Force, hit the submarines hard. The loss of theee underwater craft seri ously crippled the reconnaissance capa bility of Admiral Ozawas fleet and deprived him of a weapon he could well have used againet the invaeion force just then beginning to move to ward the Marianas. The Allied strat egy of a two-pronged advance was paying off. The ground forces of the enemy on tbe first target island, Saipan, num bered about 30,000 troops. Their plan was to stop the Americana at the
July 1967

shoreline, and they had constructed their defenses with thie purpose in mind. From positions along the beach, they hoped to knock out moat of the landing craft. US troops who, never theless, reached the ahore were to be destroyed promptly by counterattack. In keeping with this concept, the Japanese constructed strongpointe along the shoreline. A similar line was located inland as a baee for counter attack. ArtNery emplaced in and be hind both lines were to fire antiboat missions. All around the island, the Japanese placed navy coast defenses and dual-purpose guns cited to cover the shores, the sea, and meet of the sky overhead. Task Force 58 The first element of the US invaeion force to reach the Marianas wae Ad miral Mitschers Fast Carrier Force, the famed Tack Force 68. On 11 June at 0100, it reached a point 200 miles east of Guam and there launched ita first strike. Palau, Yap, Truk, and other islands had been hit during the previous months by the land-baeedair craft, but Admiral Mitschers strike was the big show. For four days the carrier planee emothered the ielands, destroying Japanese planes on the gronnd, knocking out airfields, and hitting everythhg in sight on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Then they moved out to refuel and to hit Iwo Jima to the north. When the carriers moved out, sev~n new battleships of the fleet went in to bombard the shore. Firing at ranges of 10,000 to 16,000 yards be cause they were toe valuable to he risked in shallower waters, these giants accomplished little: The next day, old battleships of Admiral Tur ners fire support groups arrived and took over. All that day, these old chips,

THE NlAlttAMA3
three of which had been hlt at Pearl Harbor, kept up their fire. The re sults were satisfactory, but still they failed to knock out all the enemys atrongpoints. Underwater Teams . While the navaI bombardment was in progress, destroyer transports brought in the underwater demolition teams-another amphibious innova tion of World War II. These teams consisted of frogmen trained to map a reef, blow gaps in it, and clear the shoal of underwater obstacles. Under the protective arch of naval gunfire, the frogmen opened the way for the amphibious tractors of the Saipan in vaeion foice. Following the frogmen came the transport and tractor groups of the Northern Attack Force, circling arwind the northern tip of Saipan to the west coast where the landing beaches lay. Before eunrise of 15 June, D-day, they had reached the rendez vous point. For the Americans, few of whom had ever seen Saiprm, the island lay stretched before them in the clear dawn of a perfect tropical day. In the foreground were the beachee and the town of Charan Ka noa; behind it the low escarpments of the islands mountainous spine; and, farther off, the volcanic cone of Mount Tapotchau. Aboard the transporta, the Marines of the 2d and 4th Diviaiona break fasted at 0445. Naval bombardment began at 0530, and, 15 minutes later, Admiral Turner gave the signal to Land the landing force. H-hour was 0840. Shortly-after 0700, tbe ~4 LSTS carrying the aesatdt battalions moved into position and dropped anchor about a half mile from the line of departure. Bow doors swung open; ramps were lowered; and amphibian tractors and

tanks, over 700 of them, crawled into the water and began to circSe, awaiting- the moment to crose the line of departure, 4,260 yards offshore, and move toward the enemy. Astern of the aseault landing ships lay 12 other LSTS carrying Sight ar tillery, most of wbieh would be landed in DUKWS. Still farther seaward lay two dock landing ships embarked with mechanized landlng craft that would take aehore the tanks and heavy artW lery after the infantry had eeised the beachee. About 18,000 yards offehore, the larger troop transports swung at anchor. Aboard were reserve troops, headquarters, shore parties, heavy ar tillery, trucks, tractors, bulldozers, and & assortment of supplies and equipment. At 0700, naval gunfire lifted to al low a 30-minute strike by 150 carrier planes: Then, the close support ships took up the fire again with their heavy guns until the first wave of troops was only 1,000 yards from the ahoreIine. At that point, the ships switched to five-inch guns until the troops were within 300 yards offshore, landing Plan The plan for the landing was simple the two dlvieions were to ge in simultaneously on their respective beaches,. and advance rapidly inland to the first high ground about 1,500 yards inland, designated the O-1 line. Once there, the beachhead area would be secured, and the troops could move onthe 2d Division to the north, the 4th Division across the ieland to Ma gicienne Bay on the east coaet, cap turing Aslito Field on the way. A few days, it wae thought, should suffice to capture Saipan. Then, the troops would move on to Tinian and, finally, Guam. This was the plan, but it did not
MilitaryReview

18

THE MARIANAS

quite work out that way. Boats bring ing In the 2rl Division veered to the left (north) away from Afetna Point and piled up battalion on each others beaches. The landing plan had pro vided for a gap between the two di vieions at Afetna Point where the en emy was expected to place his heaviest concentration of atilllery. But the dis-

could find it. Thereafter,, they pro ceeded as best they could on foot or crawling. , Adding to the confusion of men, tanks, and tractors ashore was the jumble of crates, cartons, boxes, and equipment of all kinds piling up on the beeches. No aspect of an amphib ious assault nreeents more comulex

US Arnw

A flamethrower attacks a Japanese pilIbox on Saipan

tance between the tio divisions after the landing was more than double that planned. Almost three days would elapse before firm contact between the two divisions was estab~iehed. Another failure was the inability of the armored Amtracs to get beyond the shoreline and carry the assault ele ments inland. These vehicles had neither the power to negotiate the rough terrain nor tbe armament to withstand the Japanese fire. It proved safer for tbe troops to extricate them selves and take shelter wherever they My 19s7 . .

problems than that of unloading and distributing supplies; none is more likely to become disorganized and even disorderly. To the casual observer fit least, the pileup and congestion of sup plies during the first phase of a nor mal amphibious assault present a pic ture of complete chaos. This chaos is more apparent than real in a well-run operation, but, even under ideal conditions, the problem of sbip-to-shore supply is a complicated H one and has no easy solution. At Sai pan, it was made more difficultby local 78

TSE MARIANAS problems, such as the strong resist ance on the beaches and by unfavor able hydrographic conditions. Despite the confusion and chaos on the beach and the failure to reach the O-1 line, it was evident by the end of the first day that tbe landing was a success. The troops had established a beachhead approximately 10,000 yards in length and over 1,000 yards in depth. Two divisions and their com mand posts were ashore with almost all their reserves, as were seven bat talions of artillery and most of tbe two tank battalions-altogether about 20,000 men. Cancel Landings Although the beachhead could not yet be considered completely secure or large enough to bring in heavy equip ment and logistic support for extended operations, tbe most critical stage of the ship-ta-shore movement was past. The top commander of the invaeion force were not eo sure. Word had come the day before, D-day, from the sub marines on distant reconnaissance that Japanese Fleet units were approach ing the Marianae. They were still in Philippine waters, but trouble was clearly brewing. By the morning of the 16th, Admiral Spruance had rightly concluded that the naval battle he had hoped for wae not far away. He canceled the Guam landings opti mieticaiiy scheduled for 18 June. For the naval engagement he would need all the warships available, and he took cruisers and destroyers from Admiral Turners fire suppert groups to furnish a screen for the fast carrier force. He sent the battlesbip~ of these groupe weetward to cover Saipan against a possible end run by the Japa neae carrier sleet. The escort carriers he ieft,,with Admiral Turner to furnish cloee air eupport for the troops. 80 The imminence of a full-scale naval battle aleo required an immediate de cision on the ArmYs 27th Division, tbe floating reserve still enroute to Sai pan. The decieion was General Holland Smiths, and he wanted hie reserves ashore where be could get at them if neceeeety. Admirals Spruance and Turner had no objections. On 16 June, the 27th Division, less one regiment assigned to the Guam in vaeion, was still about 30 miles away from Saipan. At noon, Major Geneial Ralph C. Smith, the division com mander, received orders to land as soon as practicable on the southern beaches of Saipan and there take over the extreme right flank of the line. The troops began to land at dusk of that day. Japanese Mistakes While the troops on Saipan were still trying to expand their beachhead, Admiral Spruance prepared to do bat tle with the asmroacbing enemy fleet. Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese had made come eerious mis takes. First, they had sent their sub. marines south into the Solomons and lost most of them. Then, when General MacArthurs forces landed at Biak at the end of May, they made another mistake. They sent to western New Guinea almost one-half of the navai land-based aircraft they had so care fully aesembled in the Carolines and Palau. These were the planee that Admiral Ocawa, the Japaneee com mander, was relying on to support hk surface forces during the impending naval battle, and he lost them. By the time he learned of the Marianae inva sion, it wae too late to call back even those few that had survived the at tacks of General MacArthurs air
force.

When Admiral Spruance arrayed

MllibwyREVIEW

THE MARIANAS

his great force in battle formation west of Tinian on the afternoon of the 18th, he had only fragmentary in formation of the enemy. Was the Jap aneee Fleet advancing in eingle for mation or in separate groups? This knowledge wae vitally important to him, for he had to protect the amphib ious forces off Saipan as well as de-. stroy the Japanese Fleet. And what if Admiral Omuva ehould make an end run? Actually, Admiral Spruance had no cause for worry on this point, for the great Japanese armada, come 400 miles away, wae advancing in undi vided strength. OrdersSlualifiad But not knowing this, Admiral Spruancee orders to destroy the en emy were qualified with the provieo that Tack Force 5S must cover Saipan and the landing force. Thie wae a con cern that he could not overlook, and it lay behind many of the decisione he made during the course of the bat tle. Atilral Ozawas orders were sim pler-strike and destroy the US Fleet. Task Force 5S in battle formation on the eve of the engagement covered an area of 25 by 36 milee and carried 98,618 men in 112 ships. It contained 15 carriers to the Japanese nine and wae euperior to the Japanese Fleet in every category except heavy cruisers. But Admiral Ozawa counted heavily on fighting the battle in waters of his own chooeing, within range of land baeed planee on Guam, Rota, and Yap. Hie carrier planes had a longer range than the Americans, and, with the easterly trade wind, he could launch and raeover his planee while approach ing, whereas the Americans would have to turn away. The battle that followed, one of the great naval battles of the war, wee essentially an air battle. When the two July 1S87

fleets engaged, they were a hnndred miles farther apart than Washington and New York. But the blows that really crippled the Japanese Fleet were delivered by submarines on 19 June when Admiral Mitachere force was on the defensive and eteaming away from the enemy. Not until the afternoon of the 20th did the admiral obtain full and ueeful intelligence of the enemy fleet from search planee. And it waa not until evening-of that day that anyone on the deck of an enemy chip saw an airplane from the fleet that had dealt it a mortal wound the day before. Of the three Japanese carriers sunk by the Americans, only one was the victim of Admiral Mltecbers carrier planes; the other two were destroyed by submarines surprised to find ench rich targets in their periecope aighte. The battle wae virtually over by the 21st, and Admiral Ozawaa fleet wae in full retreat, with only 35 of its 430 carrier planes still operational. oimcuh Dacision Admiral Spruance now had a hard decision to make. Should he pursue the enemy in the hope of destroying him, or should he return to Saipan? Ae a naval officer, it wae hk clear duty to . pursue, but, as commander of the in vasion, he had other responsibilities he could not evade. He chose the sac ond course and, perhape, missed the golden opportunity every eailor dreame ofto meet and destroy tke main enemy fleet in a single deeiaive engagement. For this decieion, he has been strongly criticized. But it ehould be said in hie behalf that he dealt the Japanese Navy a mortal wound at lJt tle coet to hie own fleet. Furthermore, , by gaining command of the sea and air in the Marianas, he aseured final tic.
81

THE MARIANA3

satchel charge, and flamethrower who had to do the job. What had the Americans won in the Marianas ? To say they captured only three small islande after 24 days of strenuoue battle is to miss the point. The Marianas invasion force accom. plished far more than that. It pierced the first hole in the inner line of island fortifications that the Japanese had constructed to defend their homeland 4 and the Empire. The US victory also brought disgrace on the Japanese Cab inet end forced the resignation of Pre mier Tojo, leader of the military clique in Japan, thus opening the way for the emergence of the peace party and the final eurrender a year later. Of more immediate significance, the seizure of the Marianas gave the United States air and naval supremacy over the central Pacific as far weet as the Philippines and northward to the Bonins. With the Carolines neutralized and isolated, the Navy now had con trol of sea communications and baees from which to operate against Japans vital lines of communication. Just as important were tbe airbases for the B-29s. In November 1944, five months after the invasion, the Super fortreeees began bombing Japan, blasting and burning her cities and industries. It was from an airfield on Tkrian that a B-29 took off for Hiro shima in the early morning houra of 6 August to drop the first nuclear bomb in the history of warfare.

tory. No matter how bravely and te naciously the Japaneeetroops resisted, their doom wae sealed. By the after noon of 23 June, Admiral Spruance
was back on station off Saipan. Much had happened on that wartorn island while the naval battle was

in progress. The Marine General Hol land: Smith had assumed command ashore, and, cm 21 June, the supply shipe had returned to their interrupted task of nourishing operations ashore. By the 23d, the three divisions were lined up abreaet across the island fac ing north, the Armys 27th on the right (east ) flank. Ahead of them was rugged terrain, Mount Tapotchan, and the surviving Japanese who were de termined to die fighting. On 23 June, General Holland Smith ordered an all-out offensive. The at tack got off SIOWIY, and it took the Marinee and the 27th Division two more weeka of the hardest fighting to reach the northern tip of the island and overcome the final Japanese re eistarme. In the Marianas, as everywhere in the Pacific, American soldiers fought two enemies, the Japanese and the ter rain. Tough and resolute, the Japa neee used the jungle, the thick vegeta tion, the swamps, and the stony ridges with reeourcefukrese and eklll. Not all the power of modern artillery, armor, and airpower was able to destroy them. In the final analysie, it was the eoldier on foot, with rifle, grenade,

MilitaryReview ., - _H-<~

GIVEUP-- IT$ GOOD FOR you

Commander JarI J. Diffendorfer, Umted Stetea Nev#

N THE early days of the Revolu tionary War, American soldiers, knowing that the English troops were not very anxious to engage in hostili ties so far from home and with so lit tle opportunity for spoils of war, de cided to worry their opponents. They scribbled notes, tied them to rocks, and threw them into the Eng. lish camps. The note appearing on the following page is one of the earliest sxamples of psychological warfare in our history. As the war progressed, other oppor tunities for psychological warfare arose with Hessian troops. The natural dislike between them and tbe English troops was ueed tQ foment discontent. The technique was different in that captured Hessian prisoners were shown around the countryside, partic ularly in Pennsylvania, so they could ass how the Germans who had settled in the New World were living. After this indoctrination, they were ex. changed for American prisoners. The result wae a desertion rate of 20 per. cent among the Hessians-a total of 6,000 troops. Clearly, these early psy chological operationa ( PSYOP) were important factors in the success of the American Revolutionary War. Psychological operations is defined as the intentional and organized uee July 1967

61VE UP

. Internationally, the Voice of Amer ica broadcasts have long heen project ing the image of America. The meas ure of the success of these broadcasts muet be taken indirectly. At the depth of the cold war in 1959 and 1960, the Soviets were spending in excess of 100 million dollars a year ,to jam these broadcasts. The application of PSYOP to the international arena in its general , I Bunker Hill

of mental persuasion diraeted at a target group for the purpose of favor ably altering ita actions or feelings relative to the originating group. PSYOP are conducted in timee of peace as well as war. The target group may be neutral, friendly, enemy, or any combination thereof. Propaganda may generally be thought of as the means of projecting the mental per suasions to the tarEet grour). The Proepect Hill I. Seven dollars a month. II. Fresh provisions and in plenty. III. Health. IV. Freedom, eaee, atlluence, and a good farm. means include radio and television broadcasts, newspapers, magazinea and periodicals, flyers or leaflets, mov ies, loudspeakers-either fixed or mo bil~iplomatic exchanges, speeehes, and demonstratione. The US public has long been ex posed to mental persuasion by all of these media. Buying habits, civic par ticipation, and even private lives are greatly influenced. Presumably, this is a form of PSYOP in a peaceful arena. Commander Jart J. Diffendorfer is a 1967 graduate of the US Army War College, Carlisls Barracks, Psrmeyl vania. His semcs hue irmluded duty with cawer aviatioa, princamlg in fighter and l~ght jet attack equadrorw. Following a tour as (%rmnarcding Otli cer, Attack Squadron 16S, en board the USS Oriskany, he was aesigned to the USS Hancock aa Air operations and Operatiorca O~er which encotw paeeed two ,kn4r8 of dutg in the Viet nam ar8a. u

I. Three pence a day. II. Rotten salt pork. 111. The scurvy. IV. Slavery, beggary, and want.

sense can be termed strategic PSYOP. Radio programs, information cervices, books, and atilclee are projected to the public in addition to diplomatic pro nouncements aimed primarily at oSi cials responsible for governmental de cisions. The trade fair and exhibition technique is particularly effective for dissemination of information. The purpose is to acquaint the people of the various nations with the originat ing country, her people and ber poli cies, so that relations between the conntriee involved will tend toward those deeire~ by the country originat ing the propaganda. Political, cultural, social, and eco nomic factore will normally be inter Ioeked. The propaganda teehnique will vary with theee factors and whether the receiving nation is friend~y, neutral, or hostile. The effect sought must be one which enhances or serves the national interests of the originat ing country.
MoitcryReview

GIVE UP Tactical PSYOP is primarily con cernedwith the uee of propaganda to reducean enemys will to fight. If the memy soldier can be induced to de sert or surrender, his unit is weak med, firepower ie lessened, and the probability of successful action with !ewer casualties against such a unit is enhanced. If the civilian population such normal mattcrsas food, clothing, music, and expreeaions? With detded subdivision of the main groupings based on these factors, the propaganda is refined and can be employed with more telling effect. What is the best meane of projecting the propaganda tothe target group? Should it bc let ters, leaflete, Ioudepeakers,or rumors?

SAFE

CONDUCT

PASS

The

BEARER, reasrdlemefhimmili imk

.:mnntmd fram Dersaml i.j.ry, x. will rmive UCI *Y mmltmafmemt er treatment if meiieal

.? nntimn!ity. is hereby .nc..diti.ndly Ircazln!xm. net-y

retain .11 pem+rtsl @em.

1SSUCD B~
TCF. KOBEANPH3PLIV5 ASMI TCSCmNESEPEOPLIM VOLUSTEESHXO1O N

A safe conduct pass used by North Korea and Communist Chins during the KoreanWsr

Df an area is supporting the enemy, }ither willingly or through coercion, propaganda directed at this element is both feasible and necessary. It is tactical PSYOP which ie of most concern to the military man. If its use contributes to a weakened op position through desetilon or eurren der,then it is a useful weapon. The preparation of the propaganda ievices must be made with careful at tention to detd. What are the back ~rounds of the prospective target WOUDS? Arethcy subject to supersti tions? What are their family custome? What are their likes and dielikee in Iuly 1967

Field conditions, availability of ma terial, and target group objectives are considered in the selection. Leaflets are patilcularly well suited to the com bat environment. The simple leaflet, easily understood, plausible, and which promises something, isquiteeffcetive. A safe conduct leaflet designed to re semble the local currency is ceey for the recipient to conceal. Even if he dose not intend to defect immediately, circumstances may lead him to do ao later, at which time the safe conduct pase is available for use. Surprisingly, thelack of literacy is not a major factor. The recipient 85

GIVE UP

. a photograph of a dead Chinese sol dier next to one of a smiling soldier with hie wife and child was very ef. fective. In Vietnam todav. -. . . four main mouo. ings are evident, and each will react differently. The Vlet Cong include three of these groupings. Upon con clusion of the war with the F?ench,

either gets the message from the il ]Ustratiohe or finds a friend to read it to him. Patilcular care must be taken to make sure that the illustra tions are credible and the language simple. A leaflet used by the 8th US Army in Korea in 1951 showed a soldier in a quilted uniform, no hat, ehavenhead,

and with an expression of fear being fired upon by a jet aircraft resembling an F-8o. The caption read, Death in many forme-awaits you on thie foreign soil: The frightened man in the illustration was mesnt to dapict a Chinese soldier, but because it was a stereotyp-an American conception of a Chinese soldierit was not rec ognised by the Chinese and wae in etkctive. Convereely, a leaflet bearing

the Vietminh largely diebanded. Some of the South Vietnamese went home to their families, others went north for further training expecting to re turn when the country waa reunited in 1956. When the reunification did not occur, and commencing in 1960, these two groups were reactivated for insur gent activities in the south. The South Vietnamese Viet Cong who had returned from the north had
MiiibwyRWiEW . ._-,L _*xa

..

..
GIVE UP

-,. ~.

not seen his family in up to a decade, so faidy ties were weakened. Accord ingly, he is relatively immune to fam ily oriented propaganda. The others who had remained in the south with their familiee are susceptible to this type of propaganda. The third group of Viet Cong con sists of the growing percentage of young recruits. They are poorly trained, less accustomed to the stren uous life, and are approachable on a herdshlp basis, The fourth group is the North Viet namesesoldler. If his unit is correctly eddressedand his casualties accurately stated-by loudspeaker, for instance -credibility is established and fol 10WUP propaganda can receive favor sble responee. Here, the need for ac curate and timely intelligence is evi dent. Principis of Truttr Truth is a fundamental principle of PSYOP, but there are situations in which it should not be literal. If the target group is known to be short of food, it would seem tactically sound to broadcast a typical menu of the US soldier. However, tbe variety alone would sound like a fairy tale to the enemy, and some of the foods men tioned could easily he repulsive. A simpler menu would be far more ef fective. The method of delivering the prop aganda will depend upon the tactical situation and suPPort available. Leaf lets can be dropped from aircraft, fired by artillery pieces, and under some circumstances hand delivered. Loud speakers are particularly well suited to situations in which immediate in telligence is available. If the loud speaker is mounted on an aircraft, relatively low altitudes are necessary in order for the message to be heard My 1967

anti understood by the man on the ground. Radio can be useful for wide and timely coverage, and the poesibiiity of television cannot be overlooked. Of course, the consumer audience may not have receivers readily available, much less the opportunity to listen. The PSYOP team must be alert to every possible method of propagandiz ing. The tactical situation wi~ be in a continual state of flux; ingenuity will be a prerequisite. Dual Control The war in V[ietnamie being waged with the civilian population in the bat tle zone. Dual control of villages is commonplace. Under such conditions, it ie necessary that considerable PSY OP effort he expended on the civilian element, but the problem is much more complex. If combat action in an area is planned, one PSYOP objective is to warn the people of impending homblng and shelling so they can take cover. On the other hand, tbe Viet Cong are also forewarned and can take defen sive actions accordingly. Thus, the ef ficiency of the military operation is diluted, but the pacification operation is enhanced. If the area can be made secure, the Vlet Cong are denied an other source of support, and the peo ple can engage in their peaceful pur suits without +ear which is the uRi mate objective. Of course, PSYOP ,is only one of several organizations con cerned with influencing the attitudes of the civilian populace. Persuasion through personal contact is the most effective technique. While time is important in the tac tical situation, this is not necessarily true in the semistrategic application of PSYOP. Rather, much patience and understanding are required. Tbe tar

81

GIVE UP get group must be made aware of the problem, be convinced that it is neees sary to eolve the problem, and made to feel that the solution was largely eelf-generated. In addition te patience with the target group, this requires careful coordination between the as sisting agencies and organizations. The patient persuasive approach, given sufficient time, does materially assist in the stabilization effort, but, in the preeess, the allegiance of the local population tends to orient with the activating group, primarily the United States. WKIe this is gratify ing, it does little to enhance reliance upon Saigon for leadership. This ie a separate problem, one which time will solve in a stable atmosphere and
no reel effort should be made to direct

allegiances. Partkular]y important in the case of tactical PSYOP is the requirement that it be a part of the military or. ganiaation. The propaganda must com

able methods may be limited, the medis for dissemination must be carefully eelested and be compatible with the) military situation. Constant updating of techniques is neeessary, and in genuity and resourcefulness enhance the effectiveness. The road to peace and stability must have signposts. Their provision ie the function of PsYpP.

We must have the ceurage of eur convictions and the same t~e of insight that sew our own greet cormtry through its early, trying days. It hss been said that freedom ie never an accomplishedfact; it ie alwaysn preceee.A processis a dynamicthing.And todayin Vietnamwe havemotion-a favorably
dynamic eituation. Getzeral Harold K. Johneon

Miiiiry Review

Symiim

Wiljiis

in the
Colonel Joseph P. D&ezzo, United Staten Armg Re$ems

AmY bee made mat Drog ~ ress in i~ applicatia; of a;alfiical methods to deeision making. But improved understanding of these methods and, a, broader uqe of them are necesemy and obtainable. A Con sideration of systems smdgais must begin wftb en unaer+anding of whst is @neraUy meant by systems analy: siis and ciosely retitid,w suchM systems rsaesrek operations.rweara i+lldcoat WM$tivenws. .. ,! A egatqns fbiysia ia a study of a par%itmlm @obleml -usually broad in natufgitrtiliMh the.mm2rt@atiea rmd

~HE

~ .

, . ~

July 1967

89

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS . tional, teehnieal, economic, political, and organi@ional. The study follows the scientific method and makes use of all available analytkal tools. To fa cilitate the use of these analytical tools which are primarily mathematical, data and relevant knowledge are quan tified whenever practicable. Other Terms Other terms often encountered in discussing systems analysis are sys tems research, operations research, operations analysis, and cost effective ness. In general usage, these terms are ueed abnoet interchangeably with sys tems analyeis. They aii connote the same general idea of analythxd meth ods, primarily mathematical, being brought to hear on the task of evaluat ing the. relative value of alternative courses of action in complex situa tions. If any distinction is made, systems analyeis usually relates to the prob lems of engineering and technical in tegration and trade off within a weepon or equipment system. Systems research relatea to problems of very broad scope, such as a study of a new type ArmY division; operations analy sis applies to tactical, procedural, or organizational studies; and cost effac. Cokmel Jossph P. DArezzo, US ArmsI Reeerve, ia a graduate of the US Amau Command and Gemwal Staff CoUsge, and received an M.S. degrse in Engineemng from Johns Hopkirw Uttivereity, Baltimore, Margland. He hae held vartmw aesignmente includ ing teetimg and evaluating mw weap ons and eenoepfa for antiaireraf t de fwwe, and hua @%ipated actively in the develtrpmcnt of conoepte and re quirements describing the ArmIIs guided-miesite weapons euetsm. He ie a mobilization deerg?we to the O&e of the Chief of Resea+eh and Developmeat, Department of the ArmsI.
90

tiveness is used in tbe determination of factors which describe the cost for a given Payoff. While all of th&e terms may be synonymous to a de gree, it is consistent with current us age to say that major syetems analysis includes considerable operations analy sis and coet effectiveness work. Other than for the mpelianiceof the mathematical procedure, there is no handbook approach to systems analy sis. Problems differ in their scope, character, objectives, conditions, and level. Each problem requiree thought and imagination as how best to struc ture it eo that analytical tools can be ueed to the best effect. Good eystems analysia work cannot be done with an .aI1-purposechecklist. Meaningful sys tem analyses are those in which a high order of judgment has guided tbe analysts hand, Only in this way can the various choices presented be sim ple to understand and to make. Technical Area The systems analysis approach is a fact of life, not because a patilcular regime believes in it and demands it, but because poesible courses of atilon have multiplied so rapidly and the choices to be made are of such conse quence that every tool must be used to reject the peer choices and to help human judgment in picking the right ones. A good example of what one faces today is found in the technical area. There is no doubt that the Army has made rapid and major strides in adopting the systeme analyeie ap proach to those activities where it can be ueed to advantage. There have been no organizational barriers to coopers-. tion between the various commands of the Army in this regard. In fact, iq dividuale at the US Army Combat Developments Command (USACDC)
Militafy Review

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~ SYSTEMS ANALYSIS contend their conceptual use of the ap - proacb has outstripped the known ana lytkal tools and techniques. But in general, comment both within and
without the Army on its demonstrated

abifitj in the utilization and performante of syshwne anefysis rangee from

iusbued with the agstenw aua@is ap proaoh. For him this rspreseutz a new wag of thonght and appraisal. His tkimbhsg teuh to be shallow fW cwv vent sg8tem8 analytical standards. . Keg Arww people sometimes ew weea and ezhibit an antagonistic at.

Systems

analysis performed a valuable function in tbe development of tbe She~a; reconnaissance vehicle equipped with the Shillelagh missile

excellent to poor. Most often the work is characterized as spotty. Probing into why the Army per formance is allegedly spotty brings forth a number of responses: The ArmII staf7 OT%XW ie too rigid in hie thinking. He muet euf?imrt the party line. Conditioned bg training and tem perament to making decieione rawdly, the Armv ofier ie in strange territow when it comee to digging deeplfi into the elements of a problem. He is not

titude toward the egetems anal@e ef fort. Other pereonrwl then echo this attitude. St&dies generated are piecemeal, throug their bases are not thwght quick action and reeults are expected, iweu#eient range and fatituh of eir cumatauce ars allowed, studies tend to prove w8cOWC8iVedconclusions, and qualitg of analytical work is pow. In the mid of some people, spetems analysis represents a frame of mind 4 questioning one-and the average

92

MilitaryReview

L., :...

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ATWVII Ofier does not fit t+ mold in their opinion. There are certain deficiencies in syetems analysie which come Army people are quick to point out. The shortcomings of syetems analysis in its attempted eimulatilon of realistic situations tend to be lost or underemphasized. Certain data of effects cannot be quantifiedor reduced to a simple value or merit indication. Many payoffs of great interest to the Army are of this type. Hence, the techniques are of limited application and utility. Piecemeal studies are essential to constrain outside etudy groups which are never satisfied with any limits on the scope of their investigations. Se curity considerations might be a good reason for the Army wanting to de limit the work. Many so-called eystems analysts are mesmerized with numbers and techniques. Intent on proving some small point, they lose sight of the big picture. o It is unrealistic to defer decisions and retain the latitude of action to the degree some analyets believe possible. Analyste overlook the need for imagination and boldness in the mili tary area. Benefitsto Army With this backdrop of current thought and attitude on tbe subject, the important question to answer is howthe Army can improve its exploi tation of the systems analysie ap proach. The objective is not to please one agency or another; it is not just to get approvals from higher author ity, although these admittedly are ee sential; it is not to appear modern or up to date. The objective muet be to utilize and to exploit these tools to the maximum of their usefulness to help
July 1967

the Army make sound decieions. Hu man judgment cannot be displaced by systeme analysis or any other similar techniques, but human judgment needs something to expand its efficient selec tion and review of alternatives. Sys tems analysis methode can help per form thie function. * The benefite that the Army will gain from systems analysis will be in about direct proportion to the comprehen sion of the general techniquesand ap proach by the Army officers involved. The effect of this comprehension is multiplied. First, they must under stand something ahout the science and techniques of the analytical approach if they are to guide prof eseional ana lysts in the conduct of meaningful work. Second, they must digest and evaluate completed studies and incor porate them in their decision making. Officer Education Improved comprehension should be obtained by requiring familiarity with tbe systems analysis approach on the part of all officers to whom this tool may be helpful and pertinent in their duties. To help achieve this, school programs should be made available to selected officers.* Steps to theee ends are being taken as evidenced by the Methodotogti Nots book for Action O&ers, prepared by tbe USACDC. An Army-aponsored project at the Research Analyais Cor poration is aimed at the continued $le velopment of tools and teacldng aida to assist the Army in performing and evaluating studies containing the anal yais of alternativea. A Guide for Re . m. recentlyamm.~ orn.e. ~u=ti.n w gmn in Operations +e.rch-eyntems A@Y.Is

comista of . pmfntss,ve course starting m ad vanced brmwb schools snd continuing through the US Amw Command and General Staff College and the Ua Army War Cohere. The coum. will .cm.ist of instruction in the core cwriclum a.nnented by extensive snd detailed instruction offered in ek ti.e cowna

93

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS mewera of Studiee Containing Co8t E#ectivenesa AIzal@z iu a product of this effort. The USACDC hae already held a special two-week course in ana lytical teehniqueu. The US Army Ma teriel Command (USAMC) has pub iished a regulation on systems anal ysie. The Army realizes that it needs to put more emphasis on eystems anal ysis. The report of the Haines Board, which investigated the Army officer education program, recommended that an Operations Research-Systems Anal ysis epccialist career pattern be estab lished. The Chief of Staff approved thk recommendation. TeamEfforl Under this career pattern, officers will be trained and receive recurring assignments in systems analysis posi tions. Good Army systems work re quires a team effort-Army officers who know their business coupled with analyst teams who know the tools and how to @pply them. Operations Re search-Systeme Analysis is a valued military specialty and euch qualitlca tions must be recognized. The USAMC has a major capability for the conduct of inhouse eysteme analysis work at the US ArmY Ballis tic Research Laboratories. The em phasis which this command is placing on the analytical approach to a solu tion of its problems is underscored by, the designation of the laboratory as the commands systems analysis cen ter. The USACDC aleo recognize the value of systems analysis and plans to establieh an inhouse study capability of significance. Of courec, both the US AMC and the USACDC can and do use outeide contract study services for eupport and aumneptation. It appears, therefore, that the ability of the Army 94
to conduct neceesary etudies is or soon

will be adequate. There is also required a strong and capable syetems analysis group at the Army staff level. The primary func tion of this group should not be to make studies, but to assure that stud ies made by Army agencies will be adequate in their essential elemente. It assures that viewpoints, require ments, and data emanating from the,

US Am

The Lonce surfsce.to-surfsce bsllistic missiie was designedto provide greater

fire support to Army divisiene ArmY staff and the Officeof the Secre tary of Defense are given timely con sideration in the formulation of these studies and in the course of their con duct. It assures that studies made will provide the breadth of choice and sup pofilng data required for major deci sions. Under the recently directed r? organization of the Office of the Chief of Staff, thk systems analysiu capabil ity will become one of the functions of the Vice Chief of Staff. MMify Re9iew

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS More thought and planning should be given to defining the studies which should be performed. In a sense, some system thinking should be applied to determine those subjects which re quire systems work and the sequence in which the subjects should be stud ied. In this way, the crucial studies, such as having the greatest potential significance in terms of implications and crucial guidance for other subsid iary studies, are done first. Milestone actions for which systems analytical work will be required can be antici pated. The systeme analysis effort is often terminated too soon. In crucial areas of investigation of development, it should parallel the action and execu tion to which it is relevant. For ex ample, if a particular analysis was of major consideration in a weapon de velopment program, then there should be a continuing interest in progress and the results of the development to check data and assumptions used and the validity of the approach. This CIOS. ing of the loop is essential in order to refine the art and science of systems analysis and to gain confidence for it. It is only reasonable that, as knowl edge, capabilities, and points of view have all multiplied in geometric pro: gression, some systematic approach to the analysis of problems be brought into being. The Army-ever preparing for the present. and the futur+is making rapid progress in embracing and advancing the new methods and ideas represented by systems analysis.

CONSOLIDATED INDEX
The Military Review announcee publication of the MILITASY REVIEWCONSOLIDATED INDEX1922-1965. The index, compiled by the Kansaa State University, containa 30,000 subject entries and 10,000 authors. This valuable research tool will be available 1 July 1967 from the Book Department, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. Price $2.00 postpaid.

ORDER YOUR COPY NOW

July 1987

95

EITHER Karl Marx nor Niko lai Lenin stated his own war doctrine. Lenin only quoted Karl von Clausewita dictum that war is an ex teneion of politics. Joseph Stalin, him self, having experienced bitter fight ing during World, War II, acknowl edged the importance of a war doctrine hut did not develop one. Mao Tae-tung advocated bia own war doctrine and devised hie own military etrategy to euit the condition and the needs of China. In his view, war is a bloody political action, and politics is war without bloodshed. From this point of view, he felt that the military forces must serve political needs, with the army under absolute control of the party. The Communist Chinese Army had been reduced from 300,000 to 30,000 at the handa of the Nationalist Gov ernment by the Klineit reached Yenan in October 1935. It wae in the after math of defeat and the Long March that Mao developed his theories of war. Within his broader concepts, which are generally well known, Mao also developed his so-called 10 Basic Principles of War. In their latest revieion, which ,OC. curred after the Korean War, they are: . Principle of aims. The chief aim .of warfare is to annihilate the enemy, not to attempt to capture or hold a city or a region. It is obvious that after the enemy has been annihilated, hie possessions fall to the victor. Principle of mobile concentra tion. The most effective tm,e of war fare is that in which the forces are invincibly superior to the enemys, so that a relatively small group may con centrate its power against the weak est part of an enemys defense. In MiliterY Review

MAOS PRINCIPLES order to seize every opportunity that might present itself, the forces must remain entirely mobile and be able to shift to whatever area may be at tacked profitably. Principld of annihilation. It is better to destroy one opposing enemy than to harm 10; it is better strategi cally to annihilate one enemy division to counterattack, a retreat is in order. Another battle may be joined on the following day, or later, when the en emy is again on the move. Principle of the offensive. The primary aim of the army is to attack, not to retreat. Thus, even in the midst of retreat, the posture of offense is assumed. As long as contact with the enemy is maintained, he must not be allowed to assume the offensive. Principle of surprise attack. Cli mate, terrain, and especially darkness must be used to the maximum ad vantage in springing attacks when and where the enemy least expects them. A major method of utilizing the sur prise attack is to scatter the troops in the daytime, with only token opposi tion snipers for the enemy to operate against, and to group the forces dur ing the night in order to mount a con centrated attack when the enemy can not function well. o Principle of continuous attack. If an attack is once mounted, it must be continued. The troops cannot con sider their fatigue or hunger, but must keep the enemy busy. o Principle of autonomy. There must be a high degree of autonomous Kenmin Ho, born in Taiwan, re ceived ha B.A. degree at Sun Yat-sen University in Cantm, China; an IU.A. from Tokyo Imperial University, Ja pan; and hie Ph. D. from the Amer iean Academy of Asian Studiee in San Franciwo, Galiforwia. Formerly a His toW Profeesor at Peking University and Northweetenz Universitft in Pe king and Sian, he served for 1.2 Uears with the Natiomrlist Government in mainland China, awd in Taiwan for 10 years. He h also taught Hietom at Long Beach State College in CaJi formk, and at Northern Illinois Uni- versity, De Kalb, Illinois. 91

Photo courtfw
of authov

The Peoples Liberation Army in 1960 be fore the elimination of insignia of rank

than to wound or even defeat two. Thus, a war of attrition is an inferior type of battle. Principle of fighting on the move. Armies in the field must make sudden assaults and retreats in order to attack the opposing forces while they are in motion. An example would he the am bush of a column while passing along a road where an entire group may be strung out in single file. But after the enemy is able to regroup and begins
July;1967

MAOS PRINCJPLSS operation. The chain of command is of almost no tactical eignitleance. The commanders main function is to set an example of energetic courage for his own troope. , Principle of unity. War is like chess; one cannot play just his own men, he must stay eeveral moves ahead of the enemy. Therefore, although each unit functions independently in tactical operations, there must be a high command to follow the action and formulate over-all plans for the cam paign. Principle of the military spirit. In war, the quality and quantity of arms are important; without them, one cannot win. Even with them, one can lose. The most important attribute of a victorious army is the military spirit. In every conceivable way, thought of poesibIe defeat must be eliminated from the army and re placed with an iron will to win. It ie to these principles that the Communiet Chinese attribute their succese against the Japanese Itagakl Divieion in World War 11 and in the later civil war. It is reasonable to as snme that they also influence the tsc tice of the Vlet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

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MuitW Rwhw

UNITEO STATES Parawing Concept Teated The latest version in the ArmYs concept of parachuting, the parawing, has been tested at the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Capable of flying into a wind of nearly 25 miles per hour, the parawing enables a jumper to select his own landing spot inetead of following a prevailing wind. Triangular in shape and suspended above the jumper by riser lines, the parawing comes down at about half th~ rate of a parachute which falls about 18 to 20 feet per second.-DOD release. Transportable Pharmacy ,A complete, transportable pharmacy that takes 30 minutes to set up and operate in climates ranging from frigid arctic wastes to steaming jun gles ie scheduled for delivery to the Army in the spring of 1968. The pharmacy will be a collapsible, medium-size shelter with stock and storage facilities for from 400 to 500 pharmaceuticals, a water purification unit, a refrigerator, and a eink. It will be transportable by ground, water, or air means over a variety of terrain. It can operate in temperatures from minus 65 to plus 120 degrees Fahrenheit.DOD release. Fuel-Typa Detactor A horn blows and a light flashes as a new detector automatically an nounces when to divert to appropriate storage tanks the batches of different refined fuele following each other through a military overland pipeline. Under teet by the US Army Mobil ity Equipment Commands Engineer Research and Development Labora tories at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the prototype device signals the product change in the pipeline as it detects the ktcation of a batch interface be tween dissimilar hydrocarbon fuels. It will replace reliance on computation of pipeline volume and rate of flow, and continuous hand sampling. Designed to prevent lose of fuel from excessive commingling of differ ent products, the new detector ia in stalled on both incoming and outgoing lines at each hulk storage terminal. It determines, on a continuous basis, the gravity of incoming fuel to permit correct stream-switching prec.edures, and of outgoing fuel for signaling to the next terminal. Its alarm system features a fl;eh ing red light and a klaxon-type horn, vieible and audible at 200 feet, to in dicate a product change in the pipeline.US Army release.

The DfILITAltY REVIEW and the U. S. ArmY Command and Ge.eml Staff C.llese mcmume n. re .wmdbnity for aeenmer of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES this nh Uu,ti.n. Stemn .re primed as a service to there.dera. No oCM.1 endorsement of the rievs, opir. / ma, or futd statementsk Intended.-The J%Wfor.

section
of

July1907

99

MILITARY NOTES Measurement by Laser Beam Engineers at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, will use an instrument with a laser beam to study effects of the earths at mosphere on precise measurements of distance through use of light rays. Developed by the US Army Geodesy Intelligence and Mapping Research and Development Agency, the proto type Laser Ultradistance Measuring Instrument is designed to measure millimeter changes in%e distance to a reflecting target up.to 40 miles away.
One of the most accurate methods of measuring distance between two points is to time the interval required for a beam of light to make a round trip over a prescribed path. Although done

naut shelters. The balance would bs available for other purposes such se waste incineration; recharging Iimar vehicles, crew backpacks, and other equipment; and support of research in

indirectly, accuracies approaching one part in one million are possible. Present limitations on accuracy are cauaed by small differences in at rnoepheric pressure and temperature along the line being measured which changes the velocity of light by an unknown. amount,DOD release. Moon Base Powar Study A concept employing tbe National Aeronautics and Space Adminietra tions SNAP-8 (Sr@em for Nuclear Auxiliaw Power) to supply electrical power for post-1975 manned research and exploration bases on the moon is being studied. SNAP-8 has been under develop ment for the paat six years. The sYs tem is designed to convert nuclear en ergy into 35 kilowatts of power while operating unattended for 10,000 hours or nearly 14 months. Engineers *say SNAP-8e 35 kilo watts (enough to serve five to 10 typical earth households) would fit tbe requirements of a semipermanent or permanent moon base. About half the output would be used for astro
Artiet%

Ae,oM-Geneml Boo.*

SNAP-8

concept of astronauts power aystern for a

setting

up

moon base

from lunar rocks, growing micro-Or ganisms and edible organic com pounds, and other projects. The study envisione firet a six-man then a 12-man moon base supported by a 35-kilowatt power supply. Such a base could eaeily be expanded into a large permanent colony by adding more shelters and SNAP-8 units. In addition to performance cbarac terietics of the SNAP-8, the study will consider the feasibility of uprating the syetem to 20,000 hours of operation, interactions between the system and men and equipment on the moon, varioua methods of operation, and configurations for use with a Saturn launch vehicle.News item.
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100

MILITARY NOTES Aircraft Escape System Tested .A new rocket eseape system for the A-1 Sk&raider is being developed by the Navy to eliminate the World War H over-the-side leap to escape dam aged aircraft. Called the Yankee Tractor Rocket Escape Ssistem, the device uses a tractor rocket which pulls the pilot on a pendant rather than pushing on an ejection eeat in the more conventional manner. Sled testing of the system is in prog ress.DOD releaee. Vietnamese language Training Increases The Defense Language Institute plans to teach Vietnamese to 11,320 military personnel during Fiscal Year 1968, an increase of 32 percent over the number of etudents scheduled to take Vietnamese in Fiscal Year 1967. In addition, the number of students taking other southeast Aeian lan guages will increaee 123 percent over 1967 to 520. The increase is primarily in the Burmese, Cambodian, Laotian, and Thai languages. Several courses in Vietnamese will be taught. These range in length from a 100-hour elementary introductory epeakhrgcourse to a 47-week program designed to give a basic professional proficiency in comprehension, reading, writing, and speakhg the language. Army Newe Features. Ststndard Missile Contract Awarded The Navy has awarded a production contract to reequip Terrier and Tartar surface-to-air missile ships with the new Standard missile. Under the con tract terme, the manufacturer will produce the improved missile for about 50 destroyers, frigates, and eecorts. The Secretary of Defenee hae told the Congrees that the missile has
July 1967

higher reliability, faster reaction time, improved high-altitude and muh5ple-target capability, and easier maintenance than older missiles. He added that the Standard can be fired from either Tartar or 1emsr launch ers and is produced in both the med. ium-range and extended-range ver eions. In explaining the two versions, a Navy fact eheet describes the mediumrange (12 milee) missile as employing a dual-thrust rocket motor similar to the Tartar. The Navy extended-range version (35 miles ) uees two individual rocket motors.DOD release. LAMS Flight Test Program Ueing an instrumented B-52 air craft, the Alr Force will conduct a Load Alleviation and Mode Stabiliza tion (LAMS) flight test program to determine whether the useful lifetime of large aircraft can be extended by the use of advanced fl]ght controle. A 15-foot-long probe extendhg from the nose of the B-52 meaeures wind gnst loads during test ttights. Instrumentation on the aircraft ia valued at more than 2.5 million dol-

US Ai,

For..

Iars. The project ia directed by the Air Force Flight Dynamica Labora. tory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Baee, Ohio.US Alr Force release. 101

MlLf7ARY NOW ShtphrrildingProgram for 1967 . 1 nuclear-powered,guided-missile The Navy has announced its ship building program for Fiscal Year frigate (DLGN). 1967, allocating construction pri . 1 landing ship, dock (LSD). marily to private ship~ards. The nine 11 landing shipe, tank (LSZS). naval ehipyards are heavily com . 10 escort ships (DEs). mitted, pertku]arly in the repair and 5 ocean minesweepers (MSOs). conversion of complex combatant 2 ammunition shipq (AEs). 1 Combat store ship (AFS). ships. However, the San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard will construct 2 replenishment fleet oilers one deconlamination barge (YFN) (AORS) . . 1 submarine rescue ship (ASR). and one nuclear-powered attack sub-

USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) marine (SSN) and the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Naval Shipyard will build one decontamination barge. Construction of the following ehipe in the 1967 shipbuilding program will be undertaken in private yards: 1 nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier (CVAN). 6 nuclear-powered attack sub marines (SSIV8). 102 2 salvage tugs (A2Y%). 1 oceanographical research SKIP (AGOR). 2 survey ships, medium (AGSS). 311 miscellaneous landing and service craft. The nuclear-powered atteck carrier in the program will be an improved version of the USS Enterprise (CVA iV 65) and the most modern warship

MIliiIY

RoviEW

MILITARY NOTES in the world. It will be pow~e-d with the new two-reactor plant that has beeh under developmentby the Atomic Energy Commission. The new carrier will have an over all length of 1,092 feet, a waterline beam of 134 feet, and a full-load dis placement of about 91,300 tons. The nuclear-powered attack subma rines in the program are the same clasa as those included in the Fkcal Year 1966 shipbuilding program. These submarine are designed for maximum effectiveness against all @es of chips, particularly enemy sub marines.News item. MN Vekicle Seven pilot models of an experi mental Marine Corps vehicle developed for the swamps and rice paddies of southeast Asia are being built by the US Army Tank-Automotive Center at Warren, Michigan. The Marginal Terrain Vehicle (MTV) is officially designated the XM759, 1+/&ton cargo carrier (soft tire tracked). It is specifically de signed to negotiate areas comprised of water and mud. The MTV has a gross weight of 11,500 pounds and will carry 3,000 pounds of cargo or a fully equipped 14-man Marine squad. A two-man crew operates it. It looks like a tracked vehicle except that, inetead of conventional tracks, it has a set of chains on each side re sembling giant Wlcycle chains, with 17 wide-track, low-pressure terra-tires strung between them. The chains are driven by two large sprockets on each side at the front and rear. The rear sprockets are adjustable to exert ten sion on the chain. The lightweight aluminum construc tionin combination with the terraJuly 1337

tireewill provide the MTV with ex cellent amphibious capabilities. The air pressure of the tires will be ap proximately three pounds per square inch. The wheels propel the vehicle at about seven miles per hour over in land waters. Top Iandepeedis about 35 miles per hour. The vehicle will be controlled in turning the same as any tracked vehl cle by the slowdown or stopping of one side while the other wheels are accelerated. The first five pilot modele will be equipped with the $ame power train used in the MI14 armored reconnais sance vehicle and the Ml 16 csrgo car rier. The last two vehicles will be pow ered by a compression ignition engine and an advanced hydromechanical power train. They will be designated XM759EI s.News item. lifelike Artificial Nand Developed A lifelike artificial hand that per forms with near-human precieion has been developed by the US ArmY Med ical Biochemical Research Laboratory, Walter Reed ArmY Medical Center, Washington, D. C. Tbe theory of the artMciaI hand is likened to that of human response where a signal is transmitted to the brain and then relayed back to the hand. An electronic b~ain mounted in the hand is supplied power by re chargeable batteries and a 12-volt $lec tric motor. Laboratory personnel are manufac turing aix additional hands for am putee testing at selected US clinics. The hands are for seriouely handi capped pereons who lack sufficient con trol points and power sources to use conventional mechanical artkicial devices.DOD release. 103

MILITARY NOTE3 tiew Kitcheb and Bakery sils, and an incinerator disposes of Prototype finits of a mobile kitchen waste. and a field bakery designed to provide fast and simple preparation and servThe familiar stainless steel mess ing of maals and pastries to soldiers trays will be replaced by a plastic under field conditions are scheduled tray with a disposable thin plastic or for delivery and Army evaluation in paper liner to hold the food. The tray July. can be cleane by a sanitizing dip in the sink, and he liner is fed into the Designated SPEED (Subsistence incinerator. ! Preparation by Electronic Enenry

by food technologists at the US ArmY Materiel Commande Laboratories at Naticlq Massachusetts. Fresh, frozen, thermally processed, irradiated, or freeze-dried foods can be prepared @ the rate of 200 hot meals an hour by one cook and an assistant. The cooks will work with two microwave ovene, an oven-toaster, a grill, and a refrigerator. A sink with a water conservation unit will be provided for washing plastic uten

bread and paetry van operated by two bakers. High-speed mixers will per mit preparation of 30 pounds of cake mix in about 45 seconds, and 30 pounds of bread dough in less than two minutes. The mixers can prepare a yeast dough of high quality that proofs in about half the time of regular doughs, as well ae the conventional wh~t, rye, and yeast doughs. Other equipment planned includes a
MiIitaIY Rwiew

MILITARY NOTES Survivol Radio A tiny, new, two-way radio for crew rescue and survival operations will be tested by the Ah Force at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The experimental radio-esdled a rescue beaeon transceiver becauee it transmits and reeeives voice and tone signals-resembles a poeket sized transistor radio. The equipment was designed for use if emergencies occur during spacewatke? If an astronaut becomes untethered, he could use the trans ceiver, shaped to fit inside a spacesuit, to keep in contact with his space ve hicle and ground stations. As a rescue beacon, the transmitter emits a tone that can be located by direction-finding equipment on a search aircraft or rescue helicopter as far away as 80 milesif the line of sight is unobstructed. Voice communication is effective as far as 50 miles, depend ing on aircraft altitude. Ground-to ground voice transmission is possible for only about five miles. If the man operating the aet ie in a wooded area, the range is decreased even more be cause trees absorb radio energy.-US
Air Force release. Radar Perimeter Acquisition A manufacturer

smaii proofing oven, a continuous mi crowave oven that bakes bread and pastry in about two or three minutes, a bread-browning element, and prod uct storage shelves. Each SPEED unit is powered by an internally mounted, 60-kilowatt, turbine-electric generator. Weete heat of the generator is used for heating water, to power an emergency water supplY purification unit for the kitehen, and to vent and evaporate waste water from the sink, Each unit will weigh less than 5,000 pounds. Of standard military size, the uniteare air transportable, and can be mountedon the bed of a 21/2-tontruck or towed.News item. Air Combat Simulator An electronic target system simu lating actual air combat conditions will coon go into operation at the Air Proving Ground Center at Eglin Alr Force Base, Florida. Known as the Air Force Weapons Effectiveness Testing (AFWEZ) in strumentation system, the unit will provide simultaneous operation of 26 teat targets which will compete as offensive and defensive forces. The targets include 15 aircraft, five radar sites, five antiaircraft, guns, and an optical tracker. Dnring simulated attacks, electronic computers will regis~r hits and misses. Once a target is etruck, it will be immediately deleted from the test. The AIWK?iZ instrumentation sys tem is designed tn monitor the per formance of all test aircraft from ground level to 70,000 feet within a 50.mile radius of Eglin Air Force Base and to determine the effeetive nw.s,survivability, and limitations of US air weapons.DOD releaee.
My 1ss7

has been selected

to design and develop a new Perim eter Acquisition Radar (PAR) for the
Nike X miesile defense system. The
new radar will be a major subsystdm
of the Nike X system and is expected
to increase signitlcantly the range at
which the system can detect targeta.
Concepts call for the radar to be a phased-array device, as are the Niks X Multifunction Array Radar (MAR) and the Missile Site Radar (MSR), both of which are already under de velopment.News release.

10$

MILITARY NOTES

,,

CANADA AUSTRALIA Armed Forces Strength o Tract Demon Vehicle Australia has more than 75,000 A all-weather general-purpose, men in the armed forces. The Austra ~ac~ed vehicle desimed to move men ] lian Department of Defense has re and material into areas with either T leased figures which show that the primitive or nonexistent roads is the ] army has more than 39,000 men, the Go-Tract Demon. It has been demon- { air force 15,700, and the navy just over 20,000. The army total includes a net gain of 2,000 national service men during tbe months of February and March.News release. NORWAY Modern Materiel Norway has ordered 100,000 G3 au tomatic rifles for the army as part of the program to provide her three de fense services with modern materiel. The rifles, which will use standard NATO ammunition, are scheduled for delivery in 1970. The navy renewal program is near ing completion. Thirty-six of the 50 planned ships have been delivered, and the remaining 14 will be turned over

the waedlands
strated

of

British

Columbia forces

to the Canadian enpport

armed

Air For4SPUoe

Dined

F-5A Freedom Fighter

to Norways Navy before the end of 1967. The Norwegian Air Force hae re ceived 35 of the 80 F-5 Freedom Fight ers ordered in the United States. An other 24 are expected in 1967 and the remainder in 1968.News item.

vehicle for men, munitions, and supplies. Designed and made in Canada, the rugged vehicle will roll over rock, muskeg, stumpland, mud, sand, and deep snow. It handles 60-percent grades with ease, as well as 40-per cent side slopes. Simple, sturdy suspension compo nents and generous road wheel travel combine to give a soft, steady ride whether the vehicle is loaded or empty. Two models are available: the Demon 100 has a weight of 15,000 pounds, and the Demon 200 weighs 18,000 pounds. Both are equipped with a 330-cubic-inch, V8 gasoline engine producing 183 brake horsepower at 3,800 revolutions per minute, and a torque converter automatic trans mission with six forward gears and reverse.News releaee.
as a possible

MiMsry Revien

MILITARY NOTES

Wdat

wd

Tech.ik

Sher.then class motor torpedo boat A new type of motor torpedo boat, classified as the Shershen ckwe, has been added to the Soviet Navy. The vessels are armed with two twin 25-milli meter antiaircraft guns and have four torpedo tubes. They are similar in size to the Osa claes (MR, May 1966, p 102). The craft are believed to be powered by gas turbines and to have a top speed of 40 knots.-N~ws item.

Transport Aircraft The new Soviet giant transport air craft An-2,8, NATO code-named Cock, is now included in the inventory of some transport wings of the Soviet Air Force, according to a European source. The An-22 is credited with a maxi mum speed of about 350 knots. WMh an 80-ton payload, the aircraft can fly about 3,100 miles without refueling.

SOUTH VIETNAM Allied Forces More third-country forces are eerv ing today in Vietnam than during the Korean Conflict more than a decade ago. These include some 46,000 South Koreans, 4,500 Australians, 2,000 Fili pinos, 200 Thais, and 150 New Zea landers.State Department release. SOUTH AFRICA Electronic Defensa Wield Stepa have been taken by South Af rica for the installation of a radio navigational aid system, capable of deterraining the position of veeeele at sea to within 25 yards, and which
would appreciably raise the capabili ties of South Afrisas maritime de fense. Known es the Decca Naviga

S.I&t

mu+ Tech.ik

With a 46-ton payload, it can fly about 6,800miles nonstop at a cruising speed of about 325. knots. The Cocks takeoff weight is 250 tone, making it one of the heaviest aircraft in the world.Newe item.
Idy 1967

tional System, it will involve an ex penditure of 8.4 million dollars. Decca will be used to cover the South African coast from South-West Africa to Natal.News release.
107

THE TWO VIETNAMS.A Politisal and MWtary Analysis. Sacond Ravisad Edition.By Bernard B. Fall. 512 Pages. Fredarick A, Prmger, inc., Naw York 1sS7. $7.95. BY Cr3L DONALO J. DELANEY, USA The late Dr. Fall stctes in the open ing sentence of the preface to this edition, {This ie a Iieok in praise of no one. In the pages following, he proveehis point, exposing with clarity and precision the blunders, duplicity, self-deeeption, and stupidity of the principal protagonists in the two In dochinese wars. Dr. Fall reserves his most criticai remarks for the Ngo Dinh Diem and later South Vietnamese Governments for their failure to institute land re form and other constructive measures after the 1954 Geneva agreements. He maintcins that from 1954 to 1964, the South Vietnamese Government not onIy failed to buiid a base of popular suppert, but also etruck down feelers of cooperation extended by North Vietnam, regarding them as a sign of weakness. The author believes that deeisions on US involvement in the Vietnam struggle were made on misinformation and misconceptions, that the United States insisted on regarding a civil war in South Vietnam in the light of a Korean-type invasion from the north long before significant North Viet namese forces were involved. The beoks chief value is in its thor ough and detcihxl chronicle of postWorld War II events in Vietnam by a well-kntnvn expert. lm

RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSE. By 6err. eral Maswall O. Taylor, United Statas Army, Ratired. S4 Pages. Jlarpar & flow, Inc.,New York#1ss7. $s.50. BY LTC FOSEST E. PIESCE,USA

This work, based on a series of kctures presented by General Taylor at ~ Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Penn sylvania, in 1966, clarifiee current na tional doctrine. General Taylor points out that, when the eplit between the Soviet Union and 1 Communist China became apparent, ! massive retaliation was no longer a valid basis for US strategy. It was neeessary to change our strategy to one of flexible response to ,cope with Red China and the other emerging troublemakers-Cuba and North Vietnamwho were endeavoring to export their own brand of communism. For these separate and weaker Com munist rivals, Wars of Liberation offered a cheap and eaey way to ,ex pand their influence. General Taylor maintains that the United States can not afford to lose one of these wars. Therefore, he feels that, before we intervene in future situations of thk typq it is essential that careful con sideration be given to our national intereate, the available alternatives, and their possible consequences. The author concludes by offering recommendations rela~ve to the over-, all direction, coordlnetion, and super vision of the interdepartmental activ ities of tbe US Government overseas. Some of these recommendations have, already been implemented.
MllitsryRwiew

MILITARY BOOKS SMALLARMS OF THE WORLD. A Basic Manual of Mlliiry Small Arms. BY W. H. B. Smith add JosepfIE. Smith. 735 Pages.TJreStack pole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1360.$17.65. BY LTC RENti RAMOS, USA This illustrated work, the eighth edition of SmaU Arms of the World, covers emall arrne currently in world wide uee. The Siret part of the hook traces the evolution of firearms in cluding the development of automatic weapone and machlneguns. The eec ond part includes small arms currently being used by 42 countries and the Viet Cong. This excellent reference will prove ueeful to shooters, studente of arms, gun collectors, and military personnel involved in identifying weapons. THE ARMIES OF 9UEEN ANNE. By Major R. E, Scouller. 420 Pages. Oaford University Press, New York, 1966.$11.20. BY LTC MASCO J. (hSACCIA, USA DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS. BY Colonel Robert Debs Neinl, Jr.,United States MarineCorps,Retired.367 Pagea. United States Naval Institute, An napolis, Md., 1366.$15.00. In this collection of quotation deal
ing with war and related subjects and

ideae, Colonel Heinl provides military writere, historians, and speech writ ers with a valuable reference. The author has included quotatiine span ning the years from Biblical times through the current conflict in Viet nam. THE TREATY OF MEOICINE LODGE. The Story of the Great Treaty Council as Told by Eye. witnesses. By Douglas C. Jones.237 Pages. University of OklahomaPress,Norman,Okla., 1966.$5.65. BY MAJ BARTON M. HAYWAISO, USA

The author hae done a masterful job of recreating the great council between tbe US Peace Commission The Armies of Qwen Anne deals and the Southern Plains Indiane dur with logietics in the British Army ing October 1867. Using, as his source during the reign of Anne Stuart of information, the accounts of tbe (1702-14). The author provides the newsmen preeent at the deliberation, reader with a detailed account of the he hae written a book of value not organization and administration of only to studente of that shameful pe Bntieh land forcee during that time. riod of our history, but also to indi Major Scouller hae written what, in , vidual interested in the early devel opment of the press corps approach all probability, is the most echolarly to reporting. description of how the British troope The treaties concluded at Medicine moved into hattl+how they were fed, how ammunition reached them, how Lodge in southern Kansas that y~r they were paid (or not paid), how the were entered into with apparent good wounded were cared for, and how dis faith on the part of both sides. Soon cipline was imposed upon them to pre both realized that the peace would pare them for battle. not be kept, promises would not be fulfilled, and the hoped-for solution In addition to a comprehensive bib had not yet arrived. liography, the book has a number of Colonel Jones writes in a fast-mov appendixesincluding articles of war, rates of pay, rates of subsistence, re ing matter+f-fact style which makes, cruiting requirementa, military etat hia book both profitable and enjoy. utes, and clothing scalee. able.
hly 19s7

MILITARY BOOKS MANAGEMENTS SELF-INFLICTEO WOUNOS. A Formula for Esecuth Seff.Analysis.By Colonaf Charlas F. Austin, United States Army. 319 Pages. Nolg Rinahart & Winston, Inc., New Yerk, 166B. $7.95. BY LTC A. LEWOY COVEY, USA This is one of the better books on the psychological theories of leader ship, command, and management. It is written from three points of view: the executive, the subordinate, and the organization. The author states that . . . with increase in importance of position held, there is a corresponding decrease in demonstrated leadership. He out linee in detail each problem, the self analykis, and the solution. Each indi vidual is given the opportunity to ex amine bimeelf as superior, subordi nate, and peer in his relationships with others. Colonel Austin describes 76 self inflicted wounds and their solutions. No problem and its solution require more than two or three pages. MEN OF THE PENTA60N. Frem Forrestal te McNamara. 6y C. W. Berklrmd. 236 Pages. Fredarick A. Praegar, Inc., Naw Yerk, 1966. $5.s6. BY LTC FSANK P. VELLELLA, USA Mr. Borklund, publisher of Armsd Forces Management, briefly outlinee the major events and the triale faced by Secretaries of Defertse from James V. Forrestal through Robert S. McNamara. The first three chapters cover the events that culminated in the establishment in 1947 of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Each of the remaining chapters is devoted to a study of one of the Secre taries. The book providee an insight into the character of the men who have directed the activities of the US Defense Establishment.
110

BOLD MEN, FAR HORIZONS. The Stery of Great Pieneer Flights. By Nerbert. Molloy Mason, Jr. 197 Pages, J. B. Lippincott Cc., Philadelphia,Pa.,and New Yerk,1966.$4.65. BY LTC JOEN R. VILae, USA This interesting, easy-to-read book relives early, long-distance flights which are of historic import. The pilot-author has skillfully combined the significant elements of selected flights with personal glimpsee of the, air pioneers who made them possible. ON THE USES OF MILITANY POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Ktaus Knerr. 185 Pages. PrinceterrUniversity Press, Princeto~ N. J., 1666.$5.00. BY COL JAMES G. HOLLANn, JR., USA In this essay, Professor Knorr ana lyzes changes in the nature of mili tary conflict and the utility of military force ae a political tQol in the conduct of international relations. Drawing a distinction betwesn gross military strength and effec tive military poweq the author points out how smaller states have become safer in the nuclear age. But despite the restraint which supPort this hy pothesis, he shows clearly that mili tary force continues to be a most important reality in the interstate sys tem with the risk of mortal mass destruction. Professor Knorr sees tbe hope that a new generation may have the time and the creative force to master the moneter of unbridled tech nology. Serious students of the military profession will find the essay fasci nating and ueeful. One of Americas foremost economist, the author finds that the increasing costs of war make its net utility smaller. However, he displays a keen appreciation of the limits of economic reasoning when ap plied to the phenomenon of war.
Militarv Review

... .=

.,

....~

-1
$

MILITARY BOOKS .. while he held positions as Swedkh air attach6 in Moscow and Washington, and Posts in Stockholm within the Swedish Defense Ministry and the Foreign Office. The story of this affair has been pieced together from carefully cen sored pretrial interrogations. Its reel value lies in the analysis of the trans formation of a loyal government serv ant into a traitor whose crimes in cluded the compromise of. Swedens air defense system. From this analysis of the motives and techniques of Colo nel Wenneretrom and his ability to escape detection, the possibility of a recurrence of this affair elsewhere be comes apparent. ONE OF OUR H-BOMBS IS MIS31N6.By Flora Lewis. 270 Pages. Mct%aw4!illBook Co., New York, Toronto, Can., London, Eng.,and Sydney, Aus., 1967.$5.65. BY LTC GLEN D. THOMPSON, USA The author has produced an in teresting account of the event of 17 January 1966 when a B-5.2 bomber carrying four thermonuclear bombs collided with a KC-1.95 tanker over Palomares, Spain. Although there is excessive repetition, and, in some cases, the events are overdramatized, the book ie informative. The author skillfully develops the story to include the many aspects of the incident. She discueses the pilots involved, the fears and anxieties of the local population, the international implications and developments, the military aspects, the diplomatic ac tions, and, finally, in great detail, the response of the highly skilled special ists that descended on the coast to search for the lost bomb in the Med iterranean. Thie thought-provoking book is well worth reading.
111

! + : ~

sTRATEGIC TERMINOLOGY. A Trikrrgual 610ssary. BY Urs Schwarz and Laazlo Nadik. introductionlay Louis J. Halle. 156 Pages. FrederickA. Praeger, inc., New York, 1966. $6.75. This work contains more than 100 definitions in English, French, and German of politico-military terme in commonuse today. SOVIET AND CNINESE COMMUNISM. Simi Iarities and Oiierences. Edited by Oonald W. Treadgold. 452 Pagea. University of WashingtonPress, Seattle, Wash., and London,Eng.,1967.$10.00. BY LTC PAULO A. F. VIANA, , Brazilian ArmII

~ ! j ~

This volume contains 20 essays by ~ Western authorities on the Soviet [ Union and Communist China which ~ were presented at a conference in 1965 in an attempt to provide a basis for 1 a comparative study of Soviet and Chinese communism. \ The books theme is the degree to which traditions of party organization and practices are now impeding de velopment in both countries. The es says cover the ideological, political, economic, and social aspects of the two sys~ems. The material preeented will aseist the reader in gaining a clearer insight of the Communist movement during the past two decades. AN AGENT IN PLACE. The Wennerstriim Affair.By Thomas Whiteside.150 Pages.The Wdrig Press, Inc., New York, 1966, $S,95. BY LTC ANTHONYP. DE LUCA, USA In Jnne 1963, Colonel Stig Wenner strom+ senior Swedish air officer and veteran diplomat-was arrested for engaging in espionage activities for the Soviet Union. These activities covered a span of more than 14 years

July1ss7

MIUTARY BOOKS . OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED U. S. LM!iltV IUl!i AUALJIWl X AUMIX A HISTORY OF THE U. S. AIR SION TESTS. The Complete Study FORCE BALLISTIC MISSILES. By Guide for Scoring High. By David R. Ernest G. Schwiebert. With Supple Turner. 152 Pagee. Arco Publishing mental Matarkl by tie Editors of Co., Inc., New York, 1966.$4.00 peper Air Force/Spece Digest. Foreword by bound. GeneraI Curtis E. LeMay. Introduc tion by Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET of the Air Force. 264 Pages. Fred FOREIGN POLICY. By Arnold L. erick A. Praeger, Inc., New Yorlq Horeliek and Myron Rush. 225 Pages. 1965, $7.50. The University of Chicago Press, Cid BOMBERS. Patrol and Transport Air craft, The Pocket Encyclopedia of World Aircraft in Color. BY Kenneth Muneon. 147 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New Yorh 1966.$2.95. THE STATESMANS YEAR-BOOK. Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World for the Year 1966-1967. EdM.edby S. H. Stainberg, Ph. D. 1,792 Pagee. St. Martins Press, Inc., New York, 1966.$12.60. THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS: The War Againet Japan. United States Army in World War II. By Karl C. Dod. 759 Pages. Superintendent of Doeumenta, US Government Printing Ollice, Washington, D. C. $6.50. TRUCE TENT AND FIGHTING FRONT. Unitad States Ariny in the Korean War. By Walter G. Hermes. 571 Pages. Superintendent of Docu ments, US Government Printing Of fice, Washington, D. C. $6.00. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI DENTS OF THE UNITED STATES. Harry S. Truman. Containing the Pub lic Meeeages, Speeeheeand Statement of the Praeident January 1, 1952, to January 20, 1968.1,334 Pages. Super intendent of Documents, US Gover nment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $9.00 clothbound. cago, 111.,1965.$5.95. FIGHTERS. Attack and Training Air craft. The Pocket Encyclopedia of World Aircraft in Color. BY Kenneth Munson. 147 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1966.$2.95. ADMINISTRATION COMPANY AND THE PERSONNEL SERVICE DIVISION. 30th Revised Edition. By Colonel C. M. Vhtue. 496 Pages. The Stack@e Co., Harrisburg, Pa,, 1966. $7.50. THE OFFICERS GUIDE. 1967-1968 Edition. By Major General Russel B. Reynolds, United Stetee Army, Re tired. 504 Pages. The StackPole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1967. $6.95. THE SIGNAL CORPS: The Outcome. (Mid.1943 Through 1945.) United States ArmY in World War 11. The Technical Services. By George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris. 720 Pages. Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing OSice,Wash ington, D. C. $5.25. THE EMPLOYMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS. United States Army in World War 11. Speeial Studlee. BY Ulysees G. Lee, Jr. 740 Pagee. Super intendent of Documents, US Goverri ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $7.75.

112 ,.

Mllikuy ROViEW

. ......