Public Redacted Indictment

R098548 MADE PUBLIC BY PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ORDER DATED 10 OCTOBER 2013
I STL-13-041P'fIPTJ F00121A01l20131 004!R098548-R098582/EN/af
BEFORE THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Case No: Before: Registrar: Date: Filing Party: Original language: Classification:
S TL-13-04/I/PT J Judge Daniel Fransen Mr. Daryl Mundis, Acting Registrar 5 June 2013 Prosecutor English Public
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
HASSAN HABIB MERHI
Public Redacted Indictment
Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Norman Farrell

I. PREAMBLE
1. The Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, pursuant to the authority stipulated in Articles 1 and 11 of the Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, charges under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute, and thereby under the Lebanese Criminal Code l and the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle,2: HASSAN HABIB MERHI, with: Count 1 - Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act; Count 2 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device; Count 3Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials; Count 4 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials; and Count 5 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 226 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials.
As translated from Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. As translated from Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
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11. THE ACCUSED

2. Pursuant to Rule 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the name and particulars of the Accused on this indictment is
HASSAN HABIB MERHI (MERHI}.3 MERHI was born on 12 December 1965 in

Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of Habib MERHI (father) and Latifa ABBAS (mother). He has resided at the following address: Section 27, eastern fayade, Real estate number: 2501, Real estate zone: Bourj-El-Barajneh, District: Baabda, Governorate: Mount Lebanon, in South Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese civil registration is 1126/Zqaq-EI-Blat. 3.
MERHI participated in a conspiracy with others, including MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE (BADREDDINE), SALIM JAMIL AYYASH (AYYASH), HUSSEIN HAS SAN ONEISSI (ONEISSI), and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA (SABRA), aimed at committing a terrorist act to assassinate Rafik Baha'eddine ALHARIRI (HARIRI).
4.
MERHl's role may be
summarised
as
follows.
MERHI,
together with
BADREDDINE, coordinated the preparation of the false claim of responsibility, and,

at times, was in contact with A YYASH in relation to the preparations for the attack.
MERHI, prior to the attack, coordinated the activities of ONEISSI and SABRA in
order to identify a suitable individual, later identified as Ahmad ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS), who would be used to make a video-taped false claim of responsibility for the attack. Immediately following the attack, MERHI, coordinated the activities of
ONEISSI and SABRA, who participated in (i) disseminating statements falsely

attributing responsibility for the attack; (ii) ensuring the delivery of the video, with a letter attached, containing the false claim of responsibility to AI-Jazeera; and (iii) ensuring the video would be broadcast.
In Arabic
~ ~
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Ill. A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A. OVERVIEW 5. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el Hos'n in Beirut, Rafik HARIRI, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, was assassinated as a result of a terrorist act in which a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of high explosives concealed in a Mitsubishi Canter van. In addition to killing HARIRI, the explosion killed 21 other persons (listed in Schedule A) and injured 226 persons (listed in Schedule B). 6. Shortly after the explosion, AI-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS falsely claimed to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist group called 'Victory and
Jihad in Greater Syria'. The video was later broadcast on television.
B. RAFIK HARIRI
7. HARIRI was born on 1 November 1944 in the city of Sidon, Lebanon. HARIRI served as Prime Minister of Lebanon in five governments from 31 October 1992 to 4 December 1998, and from 26 October 2000 until his resignation on 26 October 2004. 8. From 20 October 2004 until his assassination, HARIRI was a Member of Parliament and a prominent political figure in Lebanon. Upon resigning as Prime Minister in 2004, he started preparing for parliamentary elections to be held in 2005. 9. In the morning of 14 February 2005, HARIRI departed his residence at Quraitem Palace, in West Beirut, to attend a session of Parliament, located at Place de l'Etoile, Beirut. 10. Shortly before 11 :00, HARIRI arrived at Parliament where he met with many Members of Parliament, including his sister, MP Bahia HARIRI, and MP Marwan HAMADEH. 11. Shortly before 12:00, HARIRI left Parliament to go to Cafe Place de l'Etoile, located nearby where he stayed for approximately 45 minutes. 12. At about 12:45, HARIRI left the Cafe and asked his security detail to prepare the convoy to go back to his residence for a lunch appointment.
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13.
At about 12:49, HARIRI entered his armoured vehicle accompanied by MP Bassel FULEIHAN and the convoy then departed the Place de l'Etoile. His security detail had planned to drive back to Quraitem Palace along the coastal road.
14.
Approximately 2 minutes ahead of the convoy, the Mitsubishi Canter van slowly moved towards its final position on Rue Minet el Hos'n. As the convoy passed, the suicide bomber detonated the explosives.
C. PHONE NETWORKS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK

15. Five interconnected mobile phone groups were involved
III
the assassination of
HARIRI. Four of these five phone groups operated as networks. A network is defined as a group of phones with a high frequency of contact between the phones within that group. The analysis of these networks included the use of Call Data Records and attribution evidence, including the analytical technique of co-location. a. Call Data Records are digital records of phone activity. The records contain details of the originating (outgoing) number and recipient (incoming) numbers, call duration as well as the international mobile equipment identity, international mobile subscriber identity and Cell ID data for mobile phones. These records therefore contain information such as time, date and duration of each phone call and the cell mast activated by the call, which provides an indication of the mobile phone user's location. b. Attribution is evidence that supports the assertion that a SIM card (telephone number) was used by a specific person (the phone user) during a particular time period. Attribution evidence may include, but is not limited to: subscriber information, witness statements, other forms of documentary evidence and analysis of Call Data Records, including co-location analysis. c. Co-location analysis is used as a form of attribution evidence where multiple phones are attributed to a single user. It is an analytical technique designed to determine whether an identified person consistently uses two or more phones, at least one of which is a mobile phone.
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16.
Each phone group has been colour-coded for ease of reference. a. Red Network: a network consisting of 8 phones which were used from 4 January 2005, until it ceased all activity 2 minutes before the attack on 14 February 2005.
Red Network phones communicated almost exclusively with each other and had
no outgoing short message service (SMS) use. All 8 Red Network phones were used to observe HARIRI or locations connected with him between 14 January 2005 and 12 February 2005. Six of the Red Network phones were used by the assassination team, consisting of A YYASH and five other unidentified individuals
(S5, S6, S7, S8, and S9), for carrying out the assassination of HA RI RI. The Red Network phones are listed below with their short-names:
Red Network Number Short-name
3292572 3125636 3129652 3478662 3129678 3123741 3129893 3127946
Red 572
Red 636
Red 652
Red 662
Red 678
Red 741
Red 893
Red 946
b. Green Network: a network consisting of 3 phones which were used from at least 30 September 2004 to 14 February 2005. From 13 October 2004 until they ceased all activity on 14 February 2005 about one hour before the attack, Green
Network phones communicated exclusively with each other and had no outgoing
SMS use. The Green Network phones were used to monitor and coordinate the preparations for the attack, including the preparation of the false claim of responsibility. The Green Network was also used to monitor the physical perpetration of the attack. The 3 Green Network phones are listed below with their short-names:
Green Network Number Short-name
3140023
3150071
3159300
Green 023
Green 071
Green 300
c. Blue Network: a network consisting of 18 phones that were used between 18 October 2004 and 1 October 2005. Fifteen of these phones were used for preparations for the attack including some for surveillance of HARIRI between 18 October 2004 and 14 February 2005. These 15 phones communicated almost exclusively with each other and had almost no SMS use. Of these 15 phones, 6 were used by the assassination team, who also used Red Network phones. The

other three phones (of the 18 phones) were 3085338, 3872349, and 3872354, and were activated on or after 7 March 2005. The 15 Blue Network phones used in relation to the attack are listed below with their short-names:
Blue Network Number Short-name
3071233
Blue 233
3043585
3197610
3067324
3197817
3198864
3071235
3079501
Blue 585
Blue 610
Blue 324
Blue 817
Blue 864
Blue 235
Blue 501
Blue Network Number Short-name
3067322
3193428
3196742
3020967
3196813
3198940
3846965
Blue 322
Blue 428
Blue 742
Blue 967
Blue 813
Blue 940
Blue 965
d. Yellow Network: a network consisting of 18 phones activated between 1999 and 2003 and operational until 7 January 2005. Of these 18 phones, 13 were used between 1 September 2004 and 7 January 2005. Four of the YeHow Network phones were used by AYYASH and three other members of the assassination team for preparation of the attack including for surveillance of HARIRI. The call activity of these four phones involved contact with other YeHow Network phones almost exclusively. The four Yellow Network phones used in relation to the attack are listed below with their short-names:
3205294
Yellow 294
3345457
Yellow 457
3971933
Yellow 933
3712024
Yellow 024
e. Purple Phones: a group of three phones, which were used from at least 1 January 2003 until 16 February 2005. Purple Phones were used to communicate amongst each other and to communicate with others outside the group. Purple Phones were used to coordinate the false claim of responsibility. The Purple Phones are listed below with their short-names: Purple Phones Number
Short-name
3598095
Purple 095
3419018
Purple 018
3575231
Purple 231
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MADE PUBLIC BY PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ORDER DATED 10 OCTOBER 2013
17.
Some users of the network phones carried and used multiple phones on the different networks. In addition to network phones, personal mobile phones (PMPs) were used. A YYASH used PMPs in relation to the preparations for the attack. MERHI, SABRA and ONEISSI used PMPs, colour-coded 'Purple Phones,' in relation to preparations for the attack. BADREDDINE used PMPs for contacting friends and family and for business purposes. In addition, BADREDDINE used five 'sequential mobile phones' (SMPs) between September 2004 and November 2005. The phones were used in sequential order, meaning that each phone was used for a period of weeks or months and then replaced by another. The number of phone contacts was limited and SMS use was minimal.
18.
There was a history of contact between ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI. In particular, ONEISSI and SABRA were in contact with each other on their Purple Phones 84 times between 12 January 2003 and 16 February 2005. SABRA has been in contact 212 times with MERHI on Purple 231 between 7 January 2003 and 14 February 2005, and ONEISSI 195 times with MERHI on Purple 231 between 25 June 2003 and 26 January 2005. There was also a history of contact between AYYASH and MERHI. Between 4 December 2003 and 6 February 2005, MERHI on Purple 231 was in contact 32 times with AYYASH on PMP 165, PMP 935, and PMP 091, and in particular 7 times on PMP 091 between 23 January 2005 and 6 February 2005.
19.
The table below sets out a list of all phones used by each of the Accused and the unidentified others who used relevant Yellow Network, Blue Network, Green Network, or Red Network phones, or Purple Phones. Unidentified phone users have been designated subject numbers, e.g., S6. In cases where one individual used multiple phones, all phones attributed to that individual have been listed.
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Red Network BADREDDINE
Green Network 3140023 Green 023
Blue Network
Yellow Network
Purple Phones
PMPs/SMPs
AYYASH
3123741 Red 741
3159300 Green 300
3071233 Blue 233
3205294 Yellow 294
3966663 (PMP 663) 3833354 (PMP 354) 3476683 (SMP 683) 3293944 (SMP 944) 3103195 (SMP 195) 3121486 (SMP 486) 3442593 (SMP 593) 3767165 (PMP 165) 3523935 (PMP 935) 3831170 (PMP 170) 3020091 (PMP 091) 3598095 Purple 095 3419018 Purple 018 3575231 Purple 231
ONEISSI SABRA MERHI S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Sl1 S12 S13 S14 S18 S19 S23
nla nla nla
3150071 Green 071 3125636 Red 636 3129678 Red 678 3127946 Red 946 3129893 Red 893 3129652 Red 652 3478662 Red 662 3292572 Red 572 3043585 Blue 585 3197610 Blue 610 3067324 Blue 324 3197817 Blue 817 3198864 Blue 864
3345457 Yellow 457
3971933 Yellow 933 3712024 Yellow 024
3071235 Blue 235 3079501 Blue 501 3067322 Blue 322 3193428 Blue 428 3196742 Blue 742 3020967 Blue 967 3196813 Blue 813 3198940 Blue 940 3846965 Blue 965
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20.
A pictorial representation of the interconnected phone groups including the mam phones attributed to the accused appears below. In general: a. The Green Network was used by BADREDDINE to monitor, and together with
AYYASH, coordinate the surveillance of HA RI RI in preparation for the attack

and the purchase of the van that was used for the attack. BADREDDINE also used the Green Network to monitor the physical perpetration of the attack. In addition, the Green Network was used by BADREDDINE to monitor, and together with MERHI, coordinate the preparation of the false claim of responsibility. b. The Yellow, Blue or Red Networks were used by AYYASH to coordinate various tasks related to the preparation of the attack against HARIRI and its perpetration.
AYYASH also used network phones to participate in carrying out the surveillance
and assassination of HARIRI. c.
AYYASH used PMPs to be in contact with MERHI. In particular, AYYASH on

PMP 091 was in contact with MERHI on Purple 231 in relation to preparations for the attack on Hariri.
d. SABRA and ONEISSI communicated amongst each other and with MERHI using the Purple Phones in preparation and carrying out of the false claim of responsibility. The diagram illustrates the different phone groups, their attribution to the Accused and the links between the networks.
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Interconnected Phone Groups
BADREDDINE (82)
Red 741 Blue 233 Yellow 294
ONEI881 (816)
8ABRA (817)
85
86 Red 678 Blue 610 Yellow
87 Red 946 Blue 324
88 Red 893 Blue 817 Yellow 933 812
Red 636 Blue 585
457
89 Red 652 Blue 864 Yellow 024 813 814 818 810 811
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D. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ATTACK

1. Preparations 21.
AYYASH, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, Sl1, S12, S14 and S23 observed HARIRI on a
number of days prior to the attack. These observations were preparatory steps for the assassination.
22.
Observations of HA RI RI occurred on 10 days between 20 October and 10 November 2004. During that time, on 6 November 2004, AYYASH on Green 300 and MERHI on Green 071 were in contact with BADREDDINE on Green 023. BADREDDINE on Green 023 continued to be in contact with MERHI on Green 071 until 7 February 2005, and with AYYASH on Green 300 until 14 February 2005.
23.
On at least 20 days between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, AYYASH,
S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, Sl1, S12, S14 and S23, communicating on their Blue Network phones and/or Yellow
phones, and/or as of 14 January 2005, their
respective Red Network phones, carried out acts in preparation for the attack including observation and surveillance, in order to learn the routes and movements of his convoy and the position of HARIRI's vehicle within it. Surveillance occurred on at least 15 days and in particular on 11 November 2004,1,7,14,20,28 and 31 January 2005, and 3, 4, 7, 8,9,10,11 and 12 February 2005. By doing so, AYYASH and the assassination team determined the most suitable day, location and method for the attack, which they then executed on 14 February 2005. 24. As part of the assassination preparations, between 22 December 2004 and 17 January 2005, ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI were responsible for locating a suitable individual who would be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack against HARIRI. With ONEISSI falsely calling himself 'Mohammed', the person they chose was ABU ADASS, a 22-year old Palestinian man, found at the Arab University Mosque of Beirut, also known as 'the AI-Houry Mosque'. The activity of ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI is illustrated inter alia by the following: a. On 6 days, being on 22,29,30, and 31 December 2004 and 3 and 7 January 2005,
ONEISSI was in the vicinity of the mosque. On 2 of those days, on 22 December

2004 and 7 January 2005, ONEISSI on Purple 095 was in contact with MERHI
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on Purple 231. In addition, on 3 of those days, on 30 and 31 December 2004, and 7 January 2005, ONEISSI on Purple 095 was in contact with SABRA on Purple 018. b. On 8 days, being on 30 and 31 December 2004 and 1,3,4,5,6, and 7 January 2005, SABRA was in the vicinity of the mosque. On 2 of those days, 1 and 4 January 2005, SABRA on Purple 018 was in contact with MERHlon Purple 231. In addition, on 6 of those days, 30 and 31 December 2004 and 1, 4, 6 and 7 January 2005, SABRA on Purple 018 was in contact with ONEISSlon Purple 095. c. During this activity, MERHI on Green 071 was in contact 3 times with BADREDDINE on Green 023 on 23 and 27 December 2004, and 2 January 2005. d. Between 12 and 15 January 2005, in the days preceding the disappearance of ABU ADASS, MERHI on Green 071 was in contact 6 times with BADREDDINE on Green 023. Between 14 and 15 January 2005, MERHlon Purple 231 was in contact 3 times with SABRA on Purple 018, and SABRA was in contact 2 times with ONEISSlon Purple 095. On 16 January 2005, in the morning ABU ADASS met ONEISSI calling himself 'Mohammed', MERHI on Green 071 was in contact 5 times with BADREDDINE on Green 023. e. On 17 January 2005, ONEISSI was in the vicinity of ABU ADASS' home and used Purple 095 to contact MERHI on Purple 231. ONEISSI and SABRA would later participate in ensuring delivery of the video for broadcast, accompanied by a letter in Arabic, after the assassination. MERHI would coordinate those activities in ensuring the delivery of the video for broadcast. 25. Between 1 January 2005 and 14 February 2005, often during activity by the assassination team, BADREDDINE on Green 023 was in contact 59 times with A YYASH on Green 300. 26. On 4 January 2005, S6 and S9 activated the eight Red Network phones in the Tripoli area over a period of approximately 30 minutes. The Red Network phones were all pre-paid and purchased without supplying subscriber information.

27.
On 11 January 2005, AYYASH visited the area of AI-Beddaoui in Tripoli where vehicle showrooms are located including the one from which the Mitsubishi Canter van would be purchased on 25 January 2005. From the same area, AYYASH, on
Green 300, contacted BADREDDINE twice on Green 023.

28. From 12 to 16 January 2005, MERHI on Green 071 and BADREDDINE on Green 023 were in contact on a daily basis for a total of 11 phone calls. In particular, on 15 January 2005, MERHI on Green 071 called BADREDDINE on Green 023 at 18:51 for 31 seconds. At 18:52, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA on Purple 018. [Redacted]. At 23:40, MERHI on Green 071 again called BADREDDINE on Green 023. 29. On 16 January 2005, at 06:19, MERHI on Green 071 was in South Beirut, and called
BADREDDINE on Green 023. At that time, BADREDDINE was in the Faraya area.
After this call, BADREDDINE travelled to South Beirut. At about 07:00, ABU ADASS left his home to meet with ONEISSI calling himself 'Mohammed'. At 07:40,
MERHI again called BADREDDINE who was now located in South Beirut. MERHI on Green 071 called BADREDDINE on Green 023 three more times
between 07:46 and 09:00. ABU ADASS has been missing since that day. 30. 31. [Redacted]. On 20 January 2005, HARIRI was scheduled to attend the Grand Mosque of Beirut in the morning but instead attended the Imam Ali Mosque for Bid prayers. All active
Red Network phones operated for less than one hour in the vicinity of Quraitem
Palace and the Grand Mosque. AYYASH, on Red 741, participated in the observations on that day. In the hours before the Red Network observations,
BADREDDINE on Green 023 was in contact with A YY ASH on Green 300 and,
subsequently, MERHI on Green 071. 32. On 23 January 2005, AYYASH on PMP 091 called MERHI on Purple 231 on two separate occasions at 20:02 and 20:22. 33. On 25 January 2005, six relevant Blue Phones were active, including Blue 233 belonging to AYYASH who made 16 calls. In particular:
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a. Between 14:41 and 14:59, AYYASH on Blue 233 in Beirut was in contact 3 times with S6 on Blue 610 who was in the Tripoli area. b. At 15:10, AYYASH on Green 300 called BADREDDINE on Green 023 for 81 seconds. c. Between 15:30 and 16:00, S6 on Blue 610, with another unidentified person, both giving false names, purchased for $11250 in cash a Mitsubishi Canter van with engine block number 4D33-J01926 from a vehicle showroom in the AI-Beddaoui area of Tripoli. The assassination team later used the vehicle to carry the explosives in the attack. d. At 15:37, S6 on Blue 610 during the purchase negotiations called AYYASH on Blue 233 for 81 seconds. 34. On 28 January 2005, HARIRI stayed at Quraitem Palace throughout the day. The assassination team, using the Red Network phones, including AYYASH on Red 741, operated for more than six hours around Quraitem Palace and HARIRI's residence in Faqra. 35. On 31 January 2005, HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace before going to the Higher Shiite Council, later returning to the Palace. The assassination team, using the Red Network phones, were active for less than three hours covering the period before, during and after HARIRI's movements. They were located around Quraitem Palace and the Higher Shiite Council when HARIRI was present. In both areas and in the same timeframe, AYYASH used Red 741, Blue 233 and Green 300. In particular, on Green 300, he was in communication 11 times between 10:49 and 12:07 with BADREDDINE on Green 023. 36. On 2 February 2005, S8, coordinating with AYYASH and S6, travelled to the greater Tripoli area where they, over a 45 minute period, topped up the credit of the eight Red Network phones. In the same area, within 10 minutes of the top-up, S8 on Blue 817, called S6 on Blue 610. Later, while travelling back to Beirut, S8, on Blue 817, was in communication 3 times with AYYASH in Beirut on Blue 233.
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37.
On 3 February 2005, HARIRI had a meeting close to his residence before going to the St. Georges Yacht Club for lunch and later returning to Quraitem Palace. AYYASH,
S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, and S10 were all active on their Red Network and/or Blue Network phones around Quraitem Palace and/or the St. Georges Yacht Club at the
same time that HARIRI was having lunch there. In particular: a. AYYASH, on Red 741, was around the St. Georges Yacht Club and in regular contact with S5, S7 and S8. b. Between 13:56 and 15:44, AYYASH had contact four times on Green 300 with
BADREDDINE on Green 023.

c. Between the first and third Green Network call, BADREDDINE travelled from south Beirut to the area of the St. Georges Yacht Club. d. By around 15:44, the time of the final call, AYYASH and BADREDDINE were both in the vicinity of the St. Georges Yacht Club and the location that would be used for the attack on 14 February 2005. 38. On 4 February 2005, HARIRI departed Lebanon. MERHI on Purple 231 was m contact with AYYASH on PMP 091 on 5 and 6 February 2005 for a total of five phone calls. On 7 February 2005, HARIRI returned to Beirut. On the same morning, both A YYASH on Green 300 and MERHI on Green 071 were in contact with

39. On 8 February 2005, HARIRI's movements and those of the assassination team are similar to their respective movements on 14 February 2005, being the day of the attack. HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace in the morning before attending Parliament and afterwards returning to the Palace at around 13:45. AYYASH, and the other members of the assassination team were active on their Red Network and/or Blue
Network phones around Quraitem Palace, Parliament and the routes normally used by
HARIRI to travel between both locations. In particular: a. AYYASH was active on Red 741, Blue 233, Green 300, and on his PMP 170 and PMP 091, at relevant locations, in particular around Parliament and where the attack would take place on 14 February 2005.
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b. At 13:40 and 15:05, AYYASH on Green 300 was twice in communication with

2. The Attack 40. On 14 February 2005, AYYASH and the other members of the assassination team positioned themselves in locations where they were able to track and observe HARIRI's convoy from his residence at Quraitem Palace in Beirut to Parliament and thereafter, travelling back to his residence, into the area of the St. Georges Hotel. They kept in frequent contact with each other, first on their Blue Network phones and later on their Red Network phones. In particular, there were 33 calls within the Red
Network between 11 :00 and 12:53, mostly in the vicinity of Parliament and the St.
Georges Hotel. Significant calls included: a. At 11:58, AYYASH, on Green 300, while positioned close to the area of the St. Georges Hotel, contacted BADREDDINE on Green 023 for 14 seconds. The
Green Network phones were never used again.

b. At 12:50:34, as HARIRI was leaving Parliament to drive home, S8 on Red 893 located near Parliament, called for 5 seconds to S7 on Red 946 located in the vicinity of the St. Georges Hotel and near the Mitsubishi Canter van. Immediately after, at 12:50:55, S8 on Red 893 then called AYYASH on Red 741 for 10 seconds who was located between Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel. At 12:51 :32, S8 on Red 893 called S9 on Red 652 for 7 seconds. At 12:52:02, S9 on
Red 652 called S5 on Red 636 for 20 seconds. At 12:52:09, S8 on Red 893 called S6 on Red 678 for 13 seconds. At around this time, from a location close to AYYASH, the van began moving towards the St. Georges Hotel. Through these
calls, S8 informed AYYASH, S7, S9, S6 and (through S9) S5 of HARIRI's departure from Parliament so that the van could move into its final position for attack. c. At 12:53, the last ever call within the Red Network took place, from S9 on Red
652 to S6 on Red 678, while both were in the vicinity of Parliament. By that time,
all members of the assassination team had been informed of HARIRI's final movements. The Red Network phones were never used again.
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41.
On 14 February 2005, at about 12:52, closed-circuit TV footage shows the Mitsubishi Canter van move slowly towards the St. Georges Hotel.
42.
On 14 February 2005, at about 12:55, a male suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of high explosives concealed in the cargo area of the Mitsubishi Canter van with engine block number 4D33-J01926, killing HARIRI as his convoy of six vehicles on Rue Minet el Hos'n passed the St. Georges Hotel.
43.
The explosion took place on a busy public street and was enormous and terrifying. Forensic examination has established the quantity of explosives was approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT (trinitrotoluene) equivalent. In addition to HARIRI, 8 members of his convoy and 13 members of the public were killed. Not including the suicide bomber, the explosion killed a total of 22 persons. Due to the size of the explosion, the attack attempted to kill a further 226 persons who were injured, and also caused partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby buildings.
44.
Fragments of the suicide bomber were recovered at the scene and forensic examination has established both that the remains were: (a) ofa male, and (b) not of ABU ADASS. The identity of the suicide bomber remains unknown. 3. Delivery of the Video
45.
MERHI coordinated the activities of ONEISSI and SABRA who acted together in
disseminating statements falsely attributing responsibility for the attack, ensuring the delivery of the video and ensuring that the video would be broadcast. Starting about 75 minutes after the attack, ONEISSI or SABRA made a total of 4 calls to the offices of the Reuters and AI-Jazeera news networks in Beirut. All 4 phone calls were made using the same prepaid Telecard 6162569 from 4 different public payphones. The sequence of events was as follows: a. At about 14:03, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA on Purple 018. b. At about 14:11, ONEISSI or SABRA claimed to Reuters that a fictional fundamentalist group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria' executed the attack.
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c. At about 14:19, ONEISSI or SABRA uttered into the phone to AI-Jazeera a claim of responsibility from 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria', a report of which was broadcast shortly after. d. At about 14:37, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA on Purple 018. e. At about 15:27, SABRA called AI-Jazeera and gave information on where to find a videocassette which had been placed in a tree at the ESCW A Square near the AI-Jazeera offices at Shakir Ouayeh building, Beirut. ONEISSI was watching the location to confirm receipt by AI-Jazeera of the videocassette.
f.
At about 15:50, the videotape was picked up from the tree [Redacted]. On the video, ABU ADASS claimed responsibility for the attack, that it was in support of 'Mujahidin' in Saudi Arabia, and that further attacks would follow. Attached to the videocassette was a letter in Arabic which stated inter alia that ABU ADASS was the suicide bomber.
g. Between 15:53 and 16:02, MERHI on Purple 231 was in contact three times with SABRA on Purple 018, and SABRA on Purple 018 was in contact five times with ONEISSI on Purple 095. h. At about 17:04, ONEISSIor SABRA demanded with menace that AI-Jazeera broadcast the video, which was done shortly after.
1.
At about 17: 15, SABRA on Purple 018 called MERHI on Purple 231. At about 17:24, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA on Purple 018.
46. 47.
On 15 February 2005, MERHI's Purple 231 ceased being used. On 16 February 2005, ONEISSI's Purple 095 and SABRA's Purple 018 ceased being used.
E. THE CONSPIRACY
48.
BADREDDINE, AYYASH, ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI, together with others as yet unidentified, including the assassination team, agreed to commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to assassinate HARIRI.
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a. BADREDDINE, AYYASH and MERHI agreed to commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to assassinate HARIRI between 11 November 2004 and the morning of 14 February 2005 prior to the attack. b. BADREDDINE, as monitor/coordinator, AYYASH, as the assassination team coordinator, MERHI, as the coordinator of the false claim of responsibility, and the other members of the assassination team were early members of the conspuacy. c. ONEISSI and SABRA joined the conspiracy between 22 December 2004 and the morning of 14 February 2005 prior to the attack. In the conspiracy, they performed supporting tasks for the assassination, namely:
1.
to seek a suitable individual, later identified as ABU ADASS, who would be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack against HARIRI; and,
11.
to ensure delivery of the video, with a letter attached, for broadcast after the assassination.
49.
MERHI is a supporter of Hezbollah, which is a political and military organisation in

Lebanon.
50.
All who concluded or joined the criminal agreement were perpetrators of the conspiracy against state security. BADREDDINE, AYYASH, and the assassination team, were also perpetrators of the substantive offences of committing a terrorist act, intentional homicide of HARIRI, and of 21 others, and attempted intentional homicide of 226 others. Additionally, ONEISSI, SABRA, and MERHI, were accomplices to the above substantive offences by preparing and delivering the false claim of responsibility in order to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice.
51.
The aim of the conspiracy, to which all conspirators knowingly agreed, was to commit a terrorist act by detonating a large quantity of explosives in a public place, in order to kill HARIRI.
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IV. THE COUNTS

52. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Prosecutor charges the Accused person with the following counts: COUNT ONE Statement of Offence 53. Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act, a. pursuant to Articles 188,212,213,270, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and b. Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Particulars of Offence 54. HASSAN HABIB MERHI, a. between the eleventh day of November 2004 and the morning of fourteenth day of February 2005 prior to the attack, b. together with MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL
AYYASH, HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI, ASSAD HASSAN SABRA, and others unidentified, c. bearing individual criminal responsibility as a co-perpetrator with shared intent, d. concluded an agreement, aimed at committing a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a predetermined means liable to create a public danger, e. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI,
f.
which intentionally with premeditation should,

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g. or he foresaw and accepted the risk would, h. kill and attempt to kill others in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, and cause the partial destruction of buildings,
1.
and in so doing thereby together they committed a conspiracy against state security. COUNT TWO
Statement of Offence
55.
Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device,
a. pursuant to Articles 188,219(4) and (5), and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
56.
HASSAN HABIB MERHI,

a. between the twenty-second day of December 2004 and the fourteenth day of February 2005, b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of February 2005 then did, c. commit a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to create a public danger, namely by means of a large explosive device in a public place; d. MERHI, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to commit the said terrorist act, e. with intent,
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1. bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an accomplice to the terrorist act, and 2. aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,
f.
agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group, as follows:
1.
as preparatory to the offence and/or acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, by participating in the identification of a 22-year old Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS who would later be used to create a false claim of responsibility on video for the forthcoming offence on behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria '; and
11.
as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, by coordinating the acts of others who ensured that the video, with the
attached letter, of the false claim of responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon immediately after the said offence.
COUNT THREE Statement of Offence

57.
Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188,219(4) and (5),547, and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
58.
HASSAN HABIB MERHI, between the twenty-second day of December 2004 and
the fourteenth day of February 2005, a. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of February 2005 then did,
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b. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI; c. MERHI, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to commit the said intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI, d. with intent,
1.
bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an accomplice to the intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI, and
11.
aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,
e. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group as follows:
1.
11.
as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, by coordinating the acts of others who ensured that the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon immediately after the said offence.
COUNT FOUR
59.
Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in

addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using
explosive materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and
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b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
60.
HASSAN BABIB MERHI,

a. between the twenty-second day of December 2004 and the fourteenth day of February 2005, b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of February 2005 then did, c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would kill others in the vicinity of the explosion, e. and who thereby committed the intentional homicide of 21 others,
f.
MERHI knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to kill others in addition to
killing Rafik HARIRI,
g. with intent,
1.
bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an accomplice to the intentional homicide of 21 others, and
11.
h. agreed with the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group, as follows:
1.
as preparatory to the offence and/or acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, by participating in the identification of a 22-year old Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS who would later be used to
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create a false claim of responsibility on video for the forthcoming offence on behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria '; and
11.
as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, by coordinating the acts of others who ensured that the video, with the
attached letter, of the false claim of responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon immediately after the said offence.
COUNT FIVE
61.
Being an Accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 226

persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with
premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,200,201,219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
62.
HASSAN HABIB MERHI,

a. between the twenty-second day of December 2004 and the fourteenth day of February 2005, b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of February 2005 then did, c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would attempt to kill others in the vicinity of the explosion,
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e. and who thereby committed the attempted intentional homicide of 226 others, which attempt failed to reach the intended result due to circumstances beyond the control of the co-perpetrators,
f.
MERHI, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to attempt to kill others in
addition to killing Rafik HARIRI,
g. with intent,
1.
bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an accomplice to the attempted intentional homicide of 226 others, and
11.
h. agreed with the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group, as follows:
1.
11.
as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and himself from justice, by coordinating the acts of others who ensured that the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon immediately after the said offence.
This 5th day of June 2013, Leidschendam, The Netherlands Word Count: 7,289
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R098575
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Schedule A
Below is an alphabetical list of 21 other persons intentionally or foreseeably killed as a direct consequence of the public explosion on 14 February 2005 intended to kill the former Prime Minister Rafik HARIRI, and who Count 4 pleads were each and collectively subject to intentional homicide with premeditation.
In addition to Rafik HARIRI, eight members of Rafik HARIRl's motor convoy were killed, (following in alphabetical order):
1. Yahya Mustafa AI-Arab, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - burns
due to an explosion. 2. Omar Ahmad AI-Masri, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - (not provided on death certificate). 3. Mazen Adnan AI-Zahabi, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - burns to more than 90% of the body due to an explosion. 4. Mohammed Saadeddine Darwish, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death heart attack due to explosion of 14 February 2005 and burns to entire body. 5. Bassel Farid Fuleihan, [Redacted]. Mr. Fuleihan was a Member of Parliament who was travelling with Mr. HARIRI. He initially survived the explosion but received third degree burns to 96% of his body. He was flown to Paris for emergency treatment. He remained in hospital in a coma for 60 days before he died on 18 April 2005. 6. Mohammed Riyadh Hussein Ghalayeeni, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - burns due to an explosion. 7. Talal Nabih Nasser, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - burns due to an explosion. 8. Ziad Mohammed Tarraf, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - burns due to an explosion.
In addition, thirteen public bystanders were also killed (following

order):
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III
alphabetical
5 June 2013

9.
Joseph Emile Aoun, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - crushed and disfigured in explosion.
10. Zahi Halim Abu Rjeily, [Redacted]; died 15 February 2005, cause of death - blockage of the respiratory tract as a result of the heavy accumulation of debris due to an explosion in the St. Georges area. 11. Mahmoud Saleh AI-Hamad AI-Mohammed, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - explosion leading to death. 12. Mahmoud Saleh AI-KhaIaf, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death explosion leading to death. 13. Sobhi Mohammed AI-Khodr, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005. 14. Rima Mohammed Raif Bazzi, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death multiple injuries caused by the St. George's explosion. 15. Abdo Tawfik Bou Farah, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death explosion of the brain as a result of shattering of the skull due to a bomb explosion. 16. Yamama Kamel Damen, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - bums due to an explosion. 17. Abd Al-Hamid Mohammed GhaIayeeni, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - injuries due to an explosion. 18. Rawad Hussein Suleiman Haidar, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death cardiac and respiratory arrest due to an explosion. 19. Farhan Ahmad Issa, [Redacted]. 20. Alaa Hassan Os four, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - bums due to an explosion. 21. Haitham Khaled Othman, [Redacted]; died 15 February 2005, cause of death [illegible] ... explosion.
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Schedule B
Below is an alphabetical list of 226 persons 4 intentionally or foreseeably injured as a direct consequence of the public explosion intended to kill the fonner Prime Minister Rafik HARIRI and who Count 5 pleads were each and collectively subject to attempted intentional homicide with premeditation.
2 3
4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
4
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This figure and the listed names are subject to change, as further evidence is gathered.
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35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
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78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120
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121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163
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164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206
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207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226
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Public Redacted Indictment - Prosecutor v. Merhi (STL-13-04)

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R098548 MADE PUBLIC BY PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ORDER DATED 10 OCTOBER 2013

I STL-13-041P'fIPTJ F00121A01l20131 004!R098548-R098582/EN/af

BEFORE THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Norman Farrell

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STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

R098550 MADE PUBLIC BY PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ORDER DATED 10 OCTOBER 2013

11. THE ACCUSED

HASSAN HABIB MERHI (MERHI}.3 MERHI was born on 12 December 1965 in

MERHl's role may be

BADREDDINE, coordinated the preparation of the false claim of responsibility, and,

ONEISSI and SABRA, who participated in (i) disseminating statements falsely

STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

R098551 MADE PUBLIC BY PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ORDER DATED 10 OCTOBER 2013

Ill. A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Jihad in Greater Syria'. The video was later broadcast on television.

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C. PHONE NETWORKS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK

STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

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Blue Network Number Short-name

STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

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Red Network BADREDDINE

Green Network 3140023 Green 023

3123741 Red 741

3159300 Green 300

3071233 Blue 233

3205294 Yellow 294

3345457 Yellow 457

3971933 Yellow 933 3712024 Yellow 024

STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

AYYASH, coordinate the surveillance of HA RI RI in preparation for the attack

AYYASH used PMPs to be in contact with MERHI. In particular, AYYASH on

STL-13-04/I1PTJ Public Redacted

R098558 MADE PUBLIC BY PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ORDER DATED 10 OCTOBER 2013

Interconnected Phone Groups

Red 741 Blue 233 Yellow 294

86 Red 678 Blue 610 Yellow

87 Red 946 Blue 324

88 Red 893 Blue 817 Yellow 933 812

Red 636 Blue 585

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D. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ATTACK

On at least 20 days between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, AYYASH,

ONEISSI was in the vicinity of the mosque. On 2 of those days, on 22 December

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Green 300, contacted BADREDDINE twice on Green 023.

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BADREDDINE on Green 023.

BADREDDINE on Green 023.

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BADREDDINE on Green 023.

Green Network phones were never used again.

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