PHIL

1013: Society, Self & Knowledge

Knowledge and Belief Lecture 3

Dr. David Macarthur

MoBvaBon
We are making a philosophical inquiry into the concept of knowledge. In light of GeJer counterexamples to the JTB deniBon we have given up Platos aQempt to nd a fruiRul non-circular essenBalist deniBon of knowledge. We can sBll ask what the conceptual connecBons are between knowledge and other concepts like belief. And we can sBll ask what funcBon the concept of knowledge serves (cf. Lecture 5).

Conceptual Inquiry
One such connecBon we have noted is between knowledge and truth. Knowledge that p implies the truth of p. Q: Does knowledge also imply being sure? Does knowledge imply belief? A good way to start exploring these quesBons is to consider cases of knowledge such as the case of knowing the way to Larissa.

Method & LinguisBc Data

The method of reecBve equilibrium can be used to test a hypotheBcal conceptual connecBon. The data is our pre-theoreBcal sense of when it is right to say one knows something. Radford remarks that whether [Jean] 'knows' is a ques=on of what 'know' means, which in turn is very much a maBer of when, in what situa=ons, English speakers say or would say that someone knows or does not know.

Case 1: The Locked Car

A man knows that he locked his car but, when quesBoned by his wife, is not absolutely sure. He says, I am sure But I could sBll be mistaken. I might as well go and check. So knowing that P is consistent with not being sure that P.

Case 2: The Anxious Librarian

Miss Tercy, a librarian, says she isnt sure what happened to some novels of W. J. Locke. She thinks they were sold for pulp. Mr Gee tells the inquirer that Miss Tercy has a memory like an elephant so what she thinks happened may be safely taken as knowledge of what did happen. Her anxiety and uncertainty is a personal quirk.

Knowing vs Being Sure

These cases show that it is possible to know something (that the car is locked/that the novels were sold for pulp) without being sure about it. The second case also suggests that knowledge is a social status that may be, under certain circumstances, beQer appreciated by someone other than the knower!

Comment on Case 2
Miss Tercy does not claim to know what happened to the novels, only that she thinks she recalls what happened to them. Mr Gee says that she knows what happened based on the reliability of her memory. That is, he gives grounds for her knowledge. Her failure to realize her own reliability is something he explains away as her general lack of condence.

Having Good Grounds

Important insight: a knower need not be aware that she has good grounds for a claim to know. It may be someone else who realizes that you have good grounds and that, as a consequence, you know. In that case, you might not claim to know but you can be credited with knowledge anyway.

Case 3: The PoQery Shard Sorter

Suppose an archeologist, Jenny, is, by objecBve standards, able to reliably sort poQery shards into dierent periods, say, Greek and Roman. Further suppose that for some reason she does not know exactly how she does it; nor does she believe that she is reliable (although she is). In any given case we can say she knows even if she doesnt.

Knowledge as a Social Status

The fact that another can correctly credit you as knowing even when you would not claim to know yourself suggests that knowledge is a social status with public criteria. It is a public maQer whether one has good grounds for some claim.

Having Good Grounds

This ts a moral of the GeJer cases: that in addiBon to being epistemically blameless one needs good grounds to be a knower, that is, an objecBve (publically assessable) likelihood of being right. Note: the one who has good grounds (the knower) need not believe that she has them!

Case 4: The Uncondent Student of English History

Jean and Tom are engaged in a history quiz. Jean says he does not know any history (he cant remember learning any) and that hell just guess. But it turns out that a considerable number of his guesses about the Tudor and Stuart monarchs are correct. So Tom takes Jean to know that Elizabeth died in 1603, for example.

Comment on Case 4
Tom takes Jean to know the answers given that it would be wildly implausible to suppose that Jean has simply guessed all these correct answers. In other words, Tom thinks Jean must know since any other hypothesis is too implausible to accept. There is no magic or mysBcal intuiBon!

The KK Principle
Like the previous cases this shows that one can know without being sure and without being aware of the grounds of ones knowledge. Jean knows the answers without knowing that he knows. This has been called the KK- principle. Knowing does not require the KK-principle.

(3): Knowledge =/=> Belief

The case also shows something more radical. It shows, contra Plato, that one can know that p even without believing that p! That is, it is possible to be credited with knowledge that p even in cases where you would not even claim to believe that p.

Case 5: The DoubRul Chicken Sexer

Chicken sexers can reliably sort chickens into male and female but do not know how they do it. Suppose that although a highly reliable sexer, Jack, is made doubRul of his ability by his superiors (maybe to keep his pay down). When Jack sorts chickens he doesnt even believe that hes right. From his point of view hes only got a hunch.

Belief vs Guesswork
To believe that p is to take p to be true; it is to commit oneself to the truth of p. [There is false belief but no such thing as believing falsely.] Guessing is doing something less than that, say, imagining or hoping that p is true. Jeans guesses are consistent with his actually remembering certain historical facts (although he does not recall learning them). Jacks guesses are consistent with his being able to reliably sort chickens by way of his training.

Knowledge and Belief

On Platos molecular model knowledge is assumed to be partly composed of belief. But we have seen there are cases of knowing without believing. Perhaps, then, we should ask why we found Platos assumpBon so plausible iniBally. Why does belief SEEM to be a part of knowledge?

Knowledge Challenge Format

S: I know that p. Q: How do you know? Perhaps [Doubt] S: Im not sure. Q: Then you dont know. S: Well, I believe that p.

RetreaBng to Belief
Under raBonal criBcism one can retreat from a claim to know to an expression of belief. If this is the only evidence for the Platonic view then all we need is another way of explaining it. On the alternaBve account we are now exploring we might suppose that a claim to know is a stronger, more demanding status than an expression of belief.

Knowledge and Belief are DisBnct

Knowledge is a social status with public criteria of what counts as good grounds. Belief is a psychological state of one who is commiQed to the truth of some proposiBon. The reason one can retreat from knowledge to belief under raBonal criBcism is that both involve a commitment to the truth; but a belief, unlike knowledge, does not require having good grounds.

Belief Challenge Format

S: I believe that p. Q: Why do you believe? [Doubts] S: Im not sure. [Q: Then you dont believe.] This last response makes no sense and shows that one need not have good reasons in order to believe. Suppose the quesBoner had said: Q: Then you ought not to believe.

Belief and Reason

The view that one ought always to have good reason (or evidence) for ones beliefs is called Eviden6alism. But if ones enBtlement to believe that p always depended on having good reason for p how could we ever be enBtled to believe anything? EvidenBalism seems to quickly generate an (vicious) innite regress of reasons for reasons. (cf. Lecture 6 on Agrippas Trilemma)