Professional Documents
Culture Documents
18 Gulbraar BPT - Tekna-ProcessSafety Rev01F - ConfPaper
18 Gulbraar BPT - Tekna-ProcessSafety Rev01F - ConfPaper
18 Gulbraar BPT - Tekna-ProcessSafety Rev01F - ConfPaper
2011
Overpressure Protection of Oil & Gas Production Facilities (Inlet Arrangements) Design av innlpsarrangement (choke kollaps/feilpning) ved bruk av integrerte simuleringsverkty.
A M lb Arne Myrvang G Gulbraar Tekna, Prosessikkerhet Olje og Gass, 2.-3. Nov. 2011, Bergen
COMPANY PRESENTATION
Since 1998, BPT core business is to provide solution focused verificaton and support services as an independant 3rd party process specialist to asset owners and/or proprietory process owners. Our business is conducted by combining component and system design knowhow, field experience with structured use of both rigorous static and dynamic process simulation models. BPT holds own software licenses for steady state as well as dynamic simulations.: HYSYS & OLGA ( (Including like Crude, g HYSYS options p , Amines, , Upstream Dynamics,.Olga-Hysys link etc.). Models are as far as possible validated against field data. The company has implemented a Quality Assurance System according to ISO 9001:2000. BPT is certified to the Achilles Joint Qualification System under ID No. 26845 for suppliers to the oil & gas industry.
31.10.2011
BPT Utilizes Integrated Dynamic Multiphase (OLGA (1)) and Process (HYSYS (2)) to design Oil & Gas Production Facilities for the so called inadvertent opening of inlet block valves with production choke fully open and choke collapse scenarios.
Statoils Kristin incl the Tyrihans tie-in Enis Marulk tie-in to Statoils Norne FPSO Totals Hild
Enis Goliat
Statoils Huldra
(1) OLGA
31.10.2011
Extend operational limits (raise flowline PSHH)? Remove interlocks? Simplify procedures? Reduce maintenance requirements? Larger chokes/less change-outs? Allow for choke choke collapse collapse in design?
(ii)
Potential for... Less flowline trips Less planned maintenance Quicker start-up after trip
(i) Design based on improved model assumptions, by use of rigorous dynamic simulations => Robust / Conventional secondary pressure protection system (ii) Design based on too conservative model assumptions => Complex / Instrumented secondary pressure protection system.
Plant integrity
Billington Process Technology AS
Page5
Key standards:
API Std 521 Norsok P-100 ++ Example: Oil&Gas offshore production facility with long distance subsea tie-backs
Flare Tip
HV
PSV
HV
Test Separator
Inlet Manifolds
Risers
Flowlines
Templates
Wells
31.10.2011
Operators Needs:
Safe platform operations without restricting Production or Plant Operability
Optimum utilization of the facility
Overpressure Protection of process inlets Aim: Example 1: Protection of process equipment from
pressure overload resulting from Inadvertent opening of To keep the flow rate inlet block valve with production choke fully open from a shut-in
Inadvertent Opening! (1st error)
Riser Production Block Choke 100% Valve
Riser hang-off Production from wells or flowlines
HV
PSV
Flare Tip
Flare header
Flare K.O.Drum
Inlet Separator
pipeline, upon accidental opening of the blocking valve, below an acceptable value Means: Restrict settle-out pressure in pipeline upon shut-in Result:
PSV
open
HV
Test Separator
Inlet Manifolds
What is the flowline process conditions at the start of the incident? Well: Full shut-in pressure Flowline: Full shut-in pressure, or restricted settle-out pressure in pipeline upon shut-in ?
31.10.2011
Aim: To keep the flow rate from a shut-in pipeline, upon topside choke collapse, below an acceptable value Means:
PSV
Flare header
100% open
Flare K.O.Drum
Inlet Separator
PSV
Choke configuration
(1x100%, 2x50%..)
HV
Test Separator
Inlet Manifolds
Restrict settle-out pressure in pipeline upon p shut-in Result: Conventional pressure protection according to API
Billington Process Technology AS
Page9
What is the flowline process conditions at the start of the incident? Normal production? Normal start-up? Choke position at time of collapse
Picture reference:Cage Collapse, Safety aspects of TC cage collapse and impact testing, Presentation by Mokveld at TEKNA Process Safety Conference, Bergen, 2010.
Basic requirements
31.10.2011
analyses shall be performed to assess factors such as the effect of pressure-relief method to better define the relief load and devices with excess capacity, the action of improves the understanding of what happens automatic controls, controls controller tuning, tuning during relief understood, the dynamic simulation model shall include conservative assumptions.
impact number of sensitivity cases that are q be used Key yp parameters torelief define: required. ..can to calculate rates from
loads are generally conservative and can Flowline conditions (P, T, Holdup) lead to overly sized relief- and flare system Separator conditions (P, T, Level) designs.
analyses shall be performed to assess factors such as the effect of pressure-relief method to better define the relief load and devices with excess capacity, the action of Piping P-Flow relation and volumes improves the understanding of what happens automatic controls, controls controller tuning, tuning Valve capacity & characteristics during relief understood, the dynamic simulation model shall include conservative assumptions.
31.10.2011
Statoils Kristin
(1) OLGA
Statoils sgard B
Pictures: With courtesy from Statoil
31.10.2011
Figure: OLGA application areas and users (With courtesy from SPT Group) Billington Process Technology AS
Page15
OLGA/HYSYS Link
By AspenTech and SPT Group
16
work Use the same set of pseudo components and apply the same equation of state/fluid definitions in both OLGA and HYSYS. A HYSYS Reference stream defines compositional split from phase fractions, P & T as received from OLGA (Gas, Liquid & Water)
Time Synchronization
The solved pressure-flow conditions from OLGA are not immediately enforced upon the HYSYS model but instead HYSYS linearly moves to the final values at its own (shorter or equal) step size.
31.10.2011
++ + ++ ++ + + +
31.10.2011
PSV modeling:
Key factor is tuning of flow capacity Stand alone HEM calculations required? (acc to API Std 521)
Fast to get started, a model may already exist? User friendliness with regard to interpretation of process results
Billington Process Technology AS
Page19
10
31.10.2011
Example
Case: Separator conditions following fail opening at time=1050s Gas/Oil fluid with GOR 1500 Value +5 s Max GAS flow peak into separator at time Max OIL flow peak into separator at time +19 s Max TOTAL mass flow (used in static calculations) 135 kg/s F ll R Full Relief li f at t ti time Max TOTAL relief No relief during initial peak flow Reduction in design relief flow 30-50% (static vs dynamic) +50 s 70 kg/s
Example
Tie-in of high GOR (3000)
satelitte field to an existing North Sea operating facility.
11
31.10.2011
Example
Graph for PRIMARY barrrier defines the requirement for the PSD function to close inlet valves
12
31.10.2011
Example
(1)
Economic benefits
Although the main result from such overpressure protection studies are related
to plant safety, huge cost impacts may be gained:
A too high flowline arrival PSD PSHH setting and/or a too large choke size may result in an unprotected system : None API secondary protection => None-API => Potential loss of installation => Cost/HSE impact? Need of flare system modification ? (if yes, a full topside production shutdown is required for x number of days/weeks) => Cost/HSE impact? Optimization of production choke capacity. If over-conservative assumptions must be taken due to a non-rigorous calculation, the production choke will unnecessary limit the production for x number of years) => Cost/HSE impact ? N Need df for more complex l i inlet l t arrangement t configuration; fi ti 2 x 50% or 3 x 33% lines with block valves and production chokes to reduce relief rates? => Cost/HSE impact
Extend operational limits (raise flowline PSHH)? Remove interlocks? Simplify procedures? Reduce R d maintenance i t requirements? i t ? Larger chokes/less change-outs? Allow for choke collapse in
design? A too conservative (low) PSD PSHH setting causes unnecessary trips. => Reduced availability => Cost impact?
13
31.10.2011
14