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org/2006/11/06/bryan-caplan/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter/ THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER

by BRYAN CAPLAN LEAD ESSAY November 6th, 2006

Theres an election tomorrow. Do voters know what theyre doing? According to the typical economist and many political scientists the answer is No, but it doesnt matter. How could it not matter? The main argument is that the publics errors cancel out.[1] For example, some people underestimate the benefits of immigration, and others overestimate the benefits. But as long as the average voters belief is true, politicians win by promoting immigration policies based on the facts. This story is clearly comforting, but is it correct? Are the average voters beliefs true? InThe Myth of the Rational Voter, my forthcoming book with Princeton University Press, I review a large body of evidence and conclude that the answer is definitely no. Like moths to the flame, voters gravitate to the same mistakes. They do not cancel each other out; they compound. In my book, and in this essay, I focus on the publics mistaken beliefs about economics. Partly, this is because I am an economist, but mainly it is because economics is such a clear example of a subject that is politically important (Its the economy, stupid,) yet poorly understood. I suspect that the publics errors extend far beyond economics. There is convincing evidence that the public holds systematically biased beliefs about toxicology and cancer.[2] In foreign policy, similarly, we have the rally round the flag effect, the publics tendency to support wars as soon as they have been declared. But even if the average voter perfectly understood every non-economic subject, misconceptions about economics by themselves would pose a serious problem for democracy.

IDENTIFYING MISCONCEPTIONS
Suppose that one scholar maintains that the average voters belief about X is true, and another denies it. For their debate to make sense, both sides have to claim knowledge about (a) what the average voter believes, and (b) which belief is true. How can we get to the bottom of this sort of dispute? It is fairly easy to figure out what the average voter believes. High-quality surveys abound. The hard thing is figuring out how to grade the beliefs of the average voter to find a yardstick against which his beliefs can be measured. The most straightforward is to compare voter beliefs to known fact. We can ask voters to tell us the fraction of the federal budget that goes to foreign aid, and compare their average answer to the actual number. Studies that use this approach find that the average voter has some truly bizarre beliefs. The National Survey of Public Knowledge of Welfare Reform and the Federal Budget finds, for example, that 41% of Americans believe that foreign aid is one of the two biggest areas in the federal budget versus 14% for Social Security. The main drawback of this approach is that many interesting questions are too complex to resolve with an almanac. But there is another mirror to hold up to public opinion. We can track down people who are unusually likely to know the right answer, see what they think, then check whether the public agrees. Who might these unusually-likely-to-know people be? The most obvious candidates are experts.[3] To see if the average voters beliefs about the economic effects of immigration are right, for example, you can ask the general public and professional economists, and see if, on average, they agree. Is this an infallible test? No; experts have been wrong before. But it is hard to get around the strong presumption that if experts and laymen disagree, the experts are probably right, and the laymen are probably wrong. More importantly, if you have some specific reason to doubt the objectivity of the experts, you can control for it. If you think that economists high income biases their beliefs, for example, you can check whether laymen and experts agree after statistically adjusting for income. This was precisely the approach that I used to analyze the best available data set on economic beliefs, the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. The overarching finding: Economists and the public hold radically different beliefs about the economy.[4] Compared to the experts, laymen are much more skeptical of markets, especially international and labor markets, and much more pessimistic about the past, present, and future of the economy. When laymen see business conspiracies, economists see supply-and-demand. When laymen see ruinous competition from foreigners, economists see the wonder of comparative advantage. When laymen see dangerous downsizing, economists see wealth-enhancing reallocation of labor. When laymen see decline, economists see progress.[5]

While critics of the economics profession like to attribute these patterns to economists affluence, job security, and/or right-wing ideology, the facts are not with them. Controlling for income, income growth, job security, gender, and race only mildly reduces the size of the lay-expert belief gap. And, since the typical economist is actually a moderate Democrat, controlling for party identification and ideology makes the lay-expert belief gap get a little bigger. Economists think that markets work well not because of their extreme right-wing ideology, but despite their mild left-wing ideology. From one perspective, we should have expected these findings all along. From the time of Adam Smith, if not earlier, economists have complained that economic policy was based on misconceptions, and tried to make a difference by correcting their students prejudices against markets, international trade, and so on. Economists preserve this tradition to this day when they teach undergraduates, write for popular audiences, or talk amongst themselves. In recent decades, however, economic research has built on the contrary assumption that the beliefs of the average voter are true. What is surprising about my results is that I race long-standing economic tradition against recent economic research, and the traditional view wins.[6]

WHAT MISCONCEPTIONS DO
Political scientists have often criticized economists for assuming that voters are selfish. The data along with personal experience have convinced me that the political scientists are right no matter how much you know about a voters material interests, it is hard to predict how he is going to vote.[7] In contrast, if you know what a voter thinks is best for society, you can count on him to support it. Before we can infer that the policies that are best for society will actually prevail, however, we have to add the very assumption I am challenging: that the beliefs of the average voter are true. If his beliefs are false, his good intentions lead him to support policies that are less than optimal, and possibly just plain bad.[8] Consider the case of immigration policy. Economists are vastly more optimistic about its economic effects than the general public. The Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy asks respondents to say whether too many immigrants is a major, minor, or non-reason why the economy is not doing better than it is. 47% of non-economists think it is a major reason; 80% of economists think it is not a reason at all. Economists have many reasons for their contrarian position: they know that specialization and trade enrich Americans and immigrants alike; there is little evidence that immigration noticeably reduces even the wages of low-skilled Americans; and, since immigrants are largely young males, and most government programs support the old, women, and children, immigrants wind up paying more in taxes than they take in benefits.[9] Given what the average voter thinks about the effects of immigration, it is easy to understand why virtually every survey finds that a solid majority of Americans wants to reduce immigration, and almost no one wants to increase immigration. Unfortunately for both Americans and potential immigrants, there is ample reason to believe that the average voter is mistaken. If policy were based on the facts, we would be debating how much to increase immigration, rather than trying to get tough on immigrants who are already here. Needless to say, I do not expect any prominent politicians to read this and publicly change their position on immigration. Democracy is a popularity contest. If the average voter believes that less immigration is best for society, democracy rewards politicians who oppose immigration. This does not necessarily mean that elected officials cynically pander to the prejudices of the public. Our leaders might have gotten to the top of the political game because they sincerely share popular prejudices. Regardless of what is going on in politicians hearts and minds, though, we can expect democracy to listen to the average voter, even when he is wrong. The empirical evidence indicates that he often is.

HOW MISCONCEPTIONS ARE POSSIBLE

Most of the economic misconceptions that we see today were already well-known in the time of Adam Smith. How can the public keep making costly policy mistakes, year after year, century after century? Public choice economists are used to blaming what they call rational ignorance. In elections with millions of voters, the personal benefits of learning more about policy are negligible, because one vote is so unlikely to change the outcome. So why bother learning? In my book, however, I argue that rational ignorance has been oversold. Rational ignorance cannot explain why people gravitate toward false beliefs, rather than simply being agnostic. Neither can it explain why people who have barely scratched the surface of a subject are so confident in their judgments and even get angry when you contradict them. Why, to return to the case of immigration, do people leap to the conclusion that immigration is disastrous, and have trouble holding a civil conversation with someone who disagrees? My view is that these are symptoms not of ignorance, but of irrationality. In politics as in religion, some beliefs are more emotionally appealing than others. For example, it feels a lot better to blame sneaky foreigners for our economic

problems than it does to blame ourselves. This creates a temptation to relax normal intellectual standards and insulate cherished beliefs from criticism in short, to be irrational. But why are there some areas like politics and religion where irrationality seems especially pronounced? My answer is that irrationality, like ignorance, is sensitive to price, and false beliefs about politics and religion are cheap.[10] If you underestimate the costs of excessive drinking, you can ruin your life. In contrast, if you underestimate the benefits of immigration, or the evidence in favor of the theory of evolution, what happens to you? In all probability, the same thing that would have happened to you if you knew the whole truth. In a sense, then, there is a method to the average voters madness. Even when his views are completely wrong, he gets the psychological benefit of emotionally appealing political beliefs at a bargain price. No wonder he buys in bulk.

WHATS WRONG WITH DEMOCRACY AND WHATS BETTER

Unfortunately, the social cost of irrationality can be high even though it is individually beneficial. If one person pollutes the air, we barely notice; but if millions of people pollute the air, life can be very unpleasant indeed. Similarly, if one person holds irrational views about immigration, we barely notice; but if millions of people share these irrational views, socially harmful policies prevail by popular demand. When individual choices in markets have harmful social side effects, most people want to do something to about it. In the case of pollution, for example, economists usually want to tax emissions, and non-economists want to set emission standards. Few people just shrug their shoulders and say, The solution to the problems of markets is more markets. When individual choices in democracy have harmful social side effects, however, many people really do just shrug their shoulders and say, The solution to the problems of democracy is more democracy. If they wish to sound more hardheaded, they may instead quote Churchill: [D]emocracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.[11] On reflection, though, quoting Churchill in the face of democratic failure makes about as much sense as seeing rampant air pollution, and saying, The free market is the worst form of economic organization, except all the others. One can criticize markets or democracy and propose remedies without advocating socialism or dictatorship. Democracy, like the free market, can be limited, regulated, or overruled. So what remedies for voter irrationality would I propose? Above all, relying less on democracy and more on private choice and free markets.[12] By and large, we dont even ask voters whether we should allow unpopular speech or religion, and this elitist practice has saved us a world of trouble. Why not take more issues off the agenda? Even if the free market does a mediocre job, the relevant question is not whether smart, well-meaning regulation would be better. The relevant question is whether the kind of regulation that appeals to the majority would be better. Another way to deal with voter irrationality is institutional reform. Imagine, for example, if the Council of Economic Advisers, in the spirit of the Supreme Court, had the power to invalidate legislation as uneconomical. Similarly, since the data show that well-educated voters hold more sensible policy views[13], we could emulate pre-1949 Great Britain by giving college graduates an extra vote.[14] I suspect that these and other! eccentric institutional reforms would be helpful if tried. Unfortunately, there is a catch-22: The majority is unlikely to vote to reduce the power of the majority. Still, milder versions of these reforms might slip through the cracks. The public has largely ceded control of monetary policy to professional economists; perhaps the public would be willing to defer to expert judgment on some other areas as well. In a similar vein, although the majority is unlikely to approve plural votes for college graduates, it does allow the well-educated to exert extra influence by virtue of their higher turnout rate. It might be politically possible to further increase the de facto influence of educated voters by spending less money to increase turnout. In the end, though, the catch-22 means that institutional reform is unlikely to be a very effective check on voter irrationality. What else is there? Even in the most democratic countries, political actors have a degree of slack or wiggle room. It is usually possible for officials to deviate moderately from voter preferences without being removed from power. And to be blunt, if the average voter holds irrational beliefs that lead him to support bad policies, using political slack to mitigate the damage seems like the right thing to do. If the average voter is wrong about immigration, and you have the political slack to push through an amnesty, go for it. The Supreme Court may be the best example of a political body with a lot of slack. Justices serve for life, and it takes a constitutional amendment to overturn their decisions. This suggests and history confirms that they have significant power to improve upon democratic outcomes. If the Court has the chance to rule on the constitutionality of legislation inspired by anti-market misconceptions, why not overturn it for violating due process, or the Ninth Amendment, or the Tenth Amendment?[15] This was the essence of so-called Lochner era jurisprudence. Given what we know about the publics economic biases, however, I think we owe those stodgy old judges an apology.

Of course, I do not expect the Supreme Court to revive Lochner anytime soon. At least as far as economics is concerned, the current justices basically accept the idea that they should defer to majoritarian wisdom. And obviously, they are not alone. The prevailing view even among the well-educated is that it is unseemly to question the competence of the average voter. Many elites go further by praising the insight of the average voter, no matter how silly his views seem. As long as elites persist in unmerited deference to and flattery of the majority, containing the dangers of voter irrationality will be very hard. Someone has to tell the emperor when he is naked. He may not listen, but if no one speaks up, he will almost surely continue embarrassing himself and traumatizing spectators. My final remedy for voter irrationality, then, is for people who know more than the average voter to stop being so modest. When experts and those who heed them address a broader audience in the media, in their writings, or in a classroom they need to focus on the questions where experts and the public disagree, and clearly explain why the experts are right and the public is wrong. Thus, when economists get the publics ear, they should not bore them with the details of national income statistics, or quibble with each other about marginal issues. They should challenge the publics misconceptions about markets, foreigners, saving labor, and progress. But if the public is as irrational as I say, will this work? It might. Irrationality does not rule out persuasion, but it does change what people find persuasive. If people accept beliefs, in part, because they feel good, it is important to wrap your message in the right emotional packaging. Im right, youre wrong, change, falls flat. But in my experience, Im right, the people outside this classroom are wrong, and you dont want to be likethem, do you? is fairly persuasive. Frederic Bastiat, arguably the greatest economic educator in history, should be our role model. Who else could make a critique of popular economic prejudices not just charming, but funny?

CONCLUSION
I suspect that many readers will just view me as tone-deaf to democracy. Whether or not the people know what they are doing, dont they have a right to choose? I can understand when people make this argument about self-regarding choice. Even if an individual does not know his own best interest, I normally think that he should be free to make his own mistakes. The problem with irrational voting, unfortunately, is that people who do it are not just hurting themselves. If the average voter is irrational, we all have to live with the consequences. Every parent eventually asks his child, If all your friends jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge, would you? I have an even more loaded question for those who refuse to second-guess the wisdom of the average voter: If the majority said we all had to jump off the Brooklyn Bridge, would you push people who refused to jump? Notes [1] See e.g. Wittman, Donald. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press; Drazen, Allan. 2000. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; and Page, Benjamin, and Robert Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [2] See Kraus, Nancy, Torbjrn Malmfors, and Paul Slovic. 1992. Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risks. Risk Analysis 12(2): 215-32; and Lichter, S. Robert, and Stanley Rothman. 1999. Environmental Cancer A Political Disease? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [3] Another possibility is to compare the views of laymen who score well on tests of political knowledge to those of demographically similar laymen who score poorly. This is the standard approach in the political science literature on enlightened preferences. The findings of this literature are quite compatible with my own; for a comprehensive survey, see Althaus, Scott. 2003. Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the People. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [4] See here for a readable overview. For more academic treatments, see e.g. Caplan, Bryan. 2002. Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy.Economic Journal 112(479): 433-58; Caplan, Bryan. 2002. Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Political Failure: Reflections on the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy.Social Science Quarterly 83(2): 416-435; and Caplan, Bryan. 2001. What Makes People Think Like Economists? Evidence on Economic Cognition from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. Journal of Law and Economics 44(2): 395-426.

[5] How can these patterns be so clear-cut, given economists legendary tendency to disagree with each other? The answer, quite simply, is that there is much more consensus than meets the eye. Popular culture creates a false impression because it is more entertaining to watch experts debate than it is to watch them agree; and in any case, once economists reach a common understanding, they move on to new topics. [6] For a two-round debate between myself and a leading defender of the rationality of the average voter, see here [pdf] and here [pdf]. [7] For overviews, see Sears, David, and Carolyn Funk. 1990. Self-Interest in Americans Political Opinions. In Mansbridge, Jane, ed. 1990. Beyond Self-Interest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 147-70; Citrin, Jack, and Donald Green. 1990. The Self-Interest Motive in American Public Opinion. Research in Micropolitics 3: 1-28; and Caplan, Bryan. 2001. Libertarianism Against Economism: How Economists Misunderstand Voters and Why Libertarians Should Care. [pdf] Independent Review 5(4): 539-63. [8] For further discussion, see Caplan, Bryan. 2003. The Logic of Collective Belief.Rationality and Society 15(2): 218-42; and Caplan, Bryan. 2001. Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political Failure. Public Choice 107 (3/4): 311-31. [9] On the fiscal effects of immigration, see Lee, Ronald, and Timothy Miller. 2000. Immigration, Social Security, and Broader Fiscal Impacts. American Economic Review90(2): 350-4; and Simon, Julian. 1999. The Economic Consequences of Immigration. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. [10] For further discussion, see Caplan, Bryan. 2001. Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality. Kyklos 54(1): 3-26. [11] Eigen, Lewis, and Jonathan Siegel, eds. 1993. The Macmillan Dictionary of Political Quotations. NY: Macmillan Publishing Co.: 109. [12] Commentator Ian Shapiro has repeatedly denied that this is a coherent option. See Shapiro, Ian, and Casiano HackerCordn. 1999. Reconsidering Democracys Value. In Shapiro, Ian, and Casiano Hacker-Cordn, eds. Democracys Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-19; Shapiro, Ian. 1999. Democratic Justice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; and Shapiro, Ian. 1996. Democracys Place. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. I critique Shapiros arguments at length in my forthcoming book. If he would like to pursue this issue, I would be happy to do so during the discussion phase. [13] In What Makes People Think Like Economists?, I estimate that each step of education on a 1-7 scale has 9.3% as much effect on economic beliefs as a Ph.D. in economics. [14] As Speck explains, [G]raduates had been able to vote for candidates in twelve universities in addition to those in their own constituencies, and businessmen with premises in a constituency other than their own domicile could vote in both. (Speck, W.A. 1993. A Concise History of Britain, 1707-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 175). [15] See e.g. Barnett, Randy. 2004. Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; and Macedo, Stephen. 1987. The New Right v. the Constitution. Washington, DC: Cato Institute. Bryan Caplan is associate professor of economics at George Mason University where he is also affiliated with the Center for Study of Public Choice and the Mercatus Center.
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49 RESPONSES TO THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER

1. Economic Investigations says: November 6th, 2006 at 4:13 am Caplan on Democracy Prof. Caplan, of GMU, has this months leading essay on Cato Unbound. The text is based on his forthcoming book. Youve heard of it before, youve read passages, if youve been reading EconLog. The Myth of the Rational Voter The

2.

EconLog says: November 6th, 2006 at 1:24 pm Doubt the Vote Ive written the lead essay for this months Cato Unbound. Ive got a habit of laughing at my own jokes.

3.

Is democracy viable? ZenPolitics says: November 6th, 2006 at 4:01 pm [...] As I read Bryan Caplans Cato Unbound Lead Essay for October, The Myth of the Rational Voter, I couldnt help but be reminded of a certain passage from Scott Adams book, The Dilbert Future, about democracy. Im paraphrasing now, so if I butcher it then Adams will have to come give me a very fierce rhyming. What, too soon? [...]

4.

rightlinx.com Blog Archive Why Should Voters Be Any More Rational Than Anyone Else? says: November 6th, 2006 at 4:27 pm [...] Bryan Caplan discusses the myth of the rational voter. Theres an election tomorrow. Do voters know what theyre doing? According to the typical economist and many political scientists the answer is No, but it doesnt matter. How could it not matter? The main argument is that the publics errors cancel out.[1] For example, some people underestimate the benefits of immigration, and others overestimate the benefits. But as long as the average voters belief is true, politicians win by promoting immigration policies based on the facts. [...]

5.

chemgasm Blog Archive News and Notes says: November 6th, 2006 at 5:20 pm [...] 3. In other Libertarian News, Bryan Caplan today released an essay on the strange beliefs of voters. In my book, however, I argue that rational ignorance has been oversold. Rational ignorance cannot explain why people gravitate toward false beliefs, rather than simply being agnostic. Neither can it explain why people who have barely scratched the surface of a subject are so confident in their judgments and even get angry when you contradict them. Why, to return to the case of immigration, do people leap to the conclusion that immigration is disastrous, and have trouble holding a civil conversation with someone who disagrees? [...]

6.

Irrationality and Voting The Everyday Economist says: November 6th, 2006 at 6:05 pm [...] Bryan Caplan looks at voters, rationality, and what to do in order to fix democracy. [...]

7.

O Insurgente Blog Archive Mitos democrticos says: November 6th, 2006 at 7:23 pm [...] The Myth of the Rational Voter. Por Bryan Caplan. Theres an election tomorrow. Do voters know what theyre doing? According to the typical economist and many political scientists the answer is No, but it doesnt matter. How could it not matter? The main argument is that the publics errors cancel out.[1] For example, some people underestimate the benefits of immigration, and others overestimate the benefits. But as long as the average voters belief is true, politicians win by promoting immigration policies based on the facts. [...]

8.

qui tacet consentire videtur - jaywalking on the road to serfdom Leaning closer to authoritarianism? says: November 6th, 2006 at 9:38 pm [...] Leaning closer to authoritarianism? By qui tacet The policy proposals of Bryan Caplans (of EconLog fame) new lead Cato Unbound piece to adjust for voter irrationality are practical to the point of being machiavellian, but they seem to be based on principles somewhat contrary to libertarian ideals, which worries me. Though I agree that more issues should be taken off the table and out of the sphere of the state, some of his ideas might be very disturbing to libertarians. [...]

9.

links [off-topic] at Caveat Emptor says: November 7th, 2006 at 1:00 am [...] Democracia: com eleies acontecendo nos EUA nesta tera-feira, hora de discutir o quanto votar faz sentido ou diferena, e o quanto o eleitor mdio faz idia daquilo em que est votando. No mesmo esprito, parece que aumentar o poder do governo uma maneira de diminuir o poder dos pobres. [...]

10. RollingDoughnut.com says: November 7th, 2006 at 8:28 am All Election, All Day Part I Earlier in this election season, I expressed reservations that Democrats would take control from the Republicans. The extensive reach for control over individual lives, as well as an obscene disregard for the Constitution, should be enough, but voters 11. Cato Essay Random Terrain says: November 7th, 2006 at 11:05 am [...] http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/11/06/bryan-caplan/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter/ Posted by randomterrain Filed in Rants [...] 12. Todays nov 7 election day Douglass Carmichael Before Decisions says: November 7th, 2006 at 11:47 am [...] So the we get a Cato essay The Myth of the Rational Voter by Bryan Caplan. He starts out [...] 13. Jerry Brito (dot com) says: November 7th, 2006 at 11:48 am Guarding my marginal product on election day As a resident of the District of Columbia, I am bereft of any reason to vote. Not only because I have no real representation in Congress (I love that the election is largely held to fill fake posts), but 14. EconLog says: November 7th, 2006 at 11:52 am Immigration: Has the Public Been Ignored? Matt Yglesias is puzzled that my piece in Cato Unbound uses immigration as an example where the publics misconceptions have 15. The Volokh Conspiracy says: November 7th, 2006 at 2:45 pm The Politics of Ignorance: I have an election day op ed on political ignorance in The Jurist. A brief excerpt: Nancy Pelosi may soon become 16. Anti-Democratic Excuses Abstract Nonsense says: November 7th, 2006 at 8:20 pm [...] Via Ezra: Bryan Caplan writes a long-winded article about how voters are irrational. While most of the article is okay, Caplan is overzealous in relying on public choice theory to explain ignorance, instead of correctly blaming political propaganda. His main example of irrationality is foreign aid: The National Survey of Public Knowledge of Welfare Reform and the Federal Budget finds, for example, that 41% of Americans believe that foreign aid is one of the two biggest areas in the federal budget versus 14% for Social Security. [...] 17. I am confoundinated with misunderstimastandings. ZenPolitics says: November 8th, 2006 at 10:31 am [...] Perhaps I am one of the dumb people Bryan Caplan might allow fewer votes to in emulating pre-1949 Great Britain, but I had a hard time chewing through David Estlunds Reaction Essay at Cato Unbound. Maybe he just would have had me shipped to Australia. Ill just highlight some of the areas I struggled and perhaps people more intelligent than I can provide some clarity in the comments section herein. [...]

18. teresa difalco Blog Archive flotsam says: November 8th, 2006 at 10:59 am [...] We dont know what were doing. [...] 19. Jon Swift says: November 8th, 2006 at 11:33 am Election Proves Voting Is Irrational In his forthcoming book The Myth of the Rational Voter, economist Bryan Caplan makes the argument that voters are not very smart. He believes that we need correctives to the mistakes voters make. 20. I am confoundinated with misunderstimastandings. ZenPolitics says: November 8th, 2006 at 5:22 pm [...] Perhaps I am one of the dumb people Bryan Caplan might allow fewer votes to in emulating pre-1949 Great Britain, but I had a hard time chewing through David Estlunds Reaction Essay at Cato Unbound. Maybe he just would have had me shipped to Australia. Ill just highlight some of the areas I struggled and perhaps people more intelligent than I can provide some clarity in the comments section herein. [...] 21. Caveat Bettor says: November 9th, 2006 at 3:31 pm Redemptive Cynicism I think the best thing Ive read in a long time is what Glen Whitman said about Bryan Caplans Irrational Voter. That said, I think that Caplans antireligious bias may cost him more than anything he is able to measure, at least, according to Pas 22. squareONE explorations Blog Archive THOUGHTFUL VOTES says: November 10th, 2006 at 9:05 am [...] In a recent post-election article by Bryan Caplan, from CATO Unbound, The Myth of the Rational Voter, the entanglement of cognitive perspective, ideology, and a potted subjective agenda posed as optimal and objective, (a category error the author is unaware of,) showcase this complexity. [...] 23. Accelerating Future What Does Bryan Caplan Really Think? says: November 10th, 2006 at 10:36 pm [...] Caplan believes in objective morality. His view on the Mind-Body Problem. On his homepage, Caplan claims that no one is smarter than Robin Hanson. Is this really true, or is it just a rumor we hear often? Caplan is also a fan of David D. Friedman, another genius economist who understands heuristics and biases. Extended rantings on philosophy. The economics of insanity. His semi-famous Libertarian Purity Test. A recent work on voter irrationality. [...] 24. EconLog says: November 12th, 2006 at 12:19 pm The Mirage of Libertarian Populism There are times and places where most people want more individual freedom than they have. The majority of the citizens 25. Cold Hard Wonk Foundation of Sand? says: November 12th, 2006 at 10:46 pm [...] The debate over the quality of voters choices rages on. Are they rational creatures? Can they be properly polled? Are they consistent? [...]

26. Fixed Point - Power to the experts? says: November 15th, 2006 at 9:10 am [...] Power to the experts? By william Why do sub-optimal policies arise through the political process? Why do misconceptions about, for example immigration, survive year after year? Bryan Caplan believes voter irrationality is to blame. The public hold not just weird but contrary beliefs to experts in the field; the conclusion is to leave complex decision making to elites of experts (or markets). [...] 27. Outside Story says: November 16th, 2006 at 9:25 am In Defence of Democracy At Cato Unbound, Bryan Caplan lays out the thesis for his new book, The Myth of the Rational Voter. He alleges that voters are not just ignorant because they have no reason not to be, but are actually behaving irrationally.In 28. at tokyotexture says: November 16th, 2006 at 2:09 pm [...] http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/11/06/bryan-caplan/the-myth-of-the-rational-voter/ 41% 21% [...] 29. Bayesian Investor Blog Blog Archive Voter Rationality says: November 19th, 2006 at 12:04 pm [...] Bryan Caplan has a good post arguing democracy produces worse results than rational ignorance among voters would explain. However, one aspect of his style annoys me his use of the word irrationality to describe whats wrong with voter thinking focuses on what is missing from voter thought processes rather than what socially undesirable features are present (many economists tend to use the word irrationality this way). I hope his soon-tobe-published book version of this post devotes more attention to what voters are doing that differs from boundedly rational attempts at choosing the best candidates (some of which I suspect fall into what many of us would call selfishly rational motives even though economists usually classify them as irrational). Some of the motives that I suspect are important are the desire to signal ones group membership, endowment effects which are one of the many reasons people treat existing jobs as if they were more valuable than new and more productive jobs that can be created, and reputation effects where people stick with whatever position they had in the past because updating their beliefs in response to new evidence would imply that their original positions werent as wise as they want to imagine. Alas, his policy recommendations are not likely to be very effective and are generally not much easier to implement than futarchy (which I consider to be the most promising approach to dealing with the problems of democracy). For example: Imagine, for example, if the Council of Economic Advisers, in the spirit of the Supreme Court, had the power to invalidate legislation as uneconomical. If I try hard enough, I can imagine this approach working well. But it would take a lot more than Caplans skills at persuasion to get voters to go along with this, and its not hard to imagine that such an institution would develop an understanding of the concept of uneconomical that is much less desirable than Caplans or mine. [...] 30. Fixed Point - Baby Boot has arrived says: November 21st, 2006 at 5:09 pm [...] Many moons ago, we declined the opportunity to discover in advance the babys gender. Looking back, I think what I was doing is not maximising my own preference whilst taking my wifes wishes into account (i.e. as one would in a traditional rational analysis of altruism), but I was trying to understand my wifes preferences, and act on those. Extending this, it seems clear that when acting with responsibility for others, the nature of our choices may change, and in a way not always anticipated by traditional rational analysis. This goes to the heart of Bryan Caplans essay about the limits of democracy and the appropriateness of using experts to guide public policy. To make a judgement on this, we need to understand precisely the objective function the experts are maximising. [...] 31. Mankiw on the Minimum Wage The Everyday Economist says: November 27th, 2006 at 10:11 am [...] Indeed. This plays well into Bryan Caplans hypothesis regarding voter rationality and economic knowledge. [...]

32. TheophileEscargot from Hulver's site says: April 28th, 2007 at 3:37 am I have to push the pram a lot Reading: Fingersmith. Theatre: Spamalot. Web. Politcs MultiPoll! Discounting democracy, society should be ruled by? What Im Reading Finished Fingersmith by Sarah Waters, after reading her Night Watch recently. Can see why her fans we 33. The Ambrosini Critique Blog Archive Irrationality as Pollution says: May 15th, 2007 at 9:45 am [...] Theres too much pollution because the cost of producing it isnt born by the producer. Bryan Caplan thinks theres too much voter irrationality for the same reason: In a sense, then, there is a method to the average voters madness. Even when his views are completely wrong, he gets the psychological benefit of emotionally appealing political beliefs at a bargain price. No wonder he buys in bulk. [...] 34. Economic Investigations says: July 4th, 2007 at 6:40 pm Bipolar Politics Suck Oldies but goldies from early 2006 Democrats and Republicans Both Adept at Ignoring Facts, Study Finds Democrats and Republicans alike are adept at making decisions without letting the facts get in the way, a new study shows. And they get quite 35. Garances Preposterous Hypothesis Matt Zeitlin: Impetuous Young Whippersnappersays: July 19th, 2007 at 2:29 am [...] Wouldnt the more logical extension of this trend being them not voting at all, if youre cynical about the one guy who likes you, imagine how cynical youd be about the candidates who never talk about you. But if their cynicism leads them to supporting other candidates who are just as out for personal gain as Edwards especially on such specious reasons as She was out there protesting with us since she was a college student,(So was David Horowitz) Bryan Caplan is right, voters are just dumb. [...] 36. The Virtual Handshake Blog | Peter Thiel, Paypal co-founder, on How New Technologies Thwart Government and Promote Freedom says: August 3rd, 2007 at 11:57 am [...] [Cf. Bryan Caplans book, The Myth of The Rational Voter] [...] 37. Dissidncia A cabea de quem? says: August 29th, 2007 at 12:47 pm [...] E claro, o livro todo parece defender uma tese que eu sempre achei um tanto quanto cretina: que os problemas da governabilidade no Brasil seria a falta de educao dos eleitores brasileiros, que no saberiam votar. Bryan Kaplan, um professor da Universidade George Mason, publicou ano passado um livro chamado The Myth of the Rational Voter, em que ele utiliza a realidade americana para demonstrar que os eleitores votam motivados por preceitos emocionais, no racionais, de que a democracia tende a escolher politicas pblicas ruins e que grande parte do pblico desconhece preceitos bsicos de economia. [...] 38. The Ambrosini Critique Blog Archive How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the EUsays: September 14th, 2007 at 2:33 am [...] made me hate an institution that so often ignores the will of the people. Of course, reading Bryan Caplans Myth of the Rational Voter has mostly cured me of that instinct. But still, I didnt like the EU until I read this [...] 39. New Obama Ad - The American Promise: The New Cult of Change in the Country of Fear | Ad Savvy says: October 5th, 2008 at 7:04 pm [...] of my fellow man. Admittedly, Im a horrible misanthrope, of the opinion that the masses are irrational chumps, with about as much understanding of basic economics as I have about the inner workings of the [...]

40. In defense of voting High Variance says: November 4th, 2008 at 8:25 am [...] Now that Ive got that out of the way, there are some interesting arguments for why people shouldnt necessarily vote. Will Wilkinson says abstaining can be a way of looking after the public good, too. His argument is that ill-informed voters are bad for a democracy wed be better off if they just stayed home. Theres more here. Bryan Caplan has been arguing the same thing. He notes that ill-informed voters arent just randomly ignorant; they have systematic biases, especially regarding economics. Anti-foreign bias, for one; also, a tendency to think the economy is worse than it is and thus to favor government intervention. Theres much more here. [...] 41. The myth of the rational voter The visible hand in economics says: November 9th, 2008 at 9:26 pm [...] the moment to read Bryan Caplans new book or the piece he has written at Cato unbound on the myth of the rational voter. Having only done the briefest skim I cant really comment on the conclusions he reaches. [...] 42. Wheres the love? Robbies Blog says: January 16th, 2009 at 11:17 am [...] love to see a Myth of the Rational Voter style study conducted comparing what voters think when it comes to politically relevant scientific [...] 43. The shortcomings of decision by majority Tea with Mara says: June 12th, 2009 at 5:05 am [...] The shortcomings of decision by majority An economics-professors take. [...] 44. Keynes and the efficient markets hypothesis says: July 20th, 2009 at 1:16 pm [...] not have a strong incentive to be rational because irrationality is basically costless. Thus Caplan writes irrationality, like ignorance, is sensitive to price, and false beliefs about politics and [...] 45. How To Fight Terrorism Despite The Publics Rational Irrationality Modeled Behaviorsays: January 1st, 2010 at 12:50 pm [...] see this belief as an example of rational irrationality, a concept from Bryan Caplan that people have preferences over beliefs, and when those preferences come at no cost, they will [...] 46. Give Voters a Break says: January 3rd, 2010 at 7:39 pm [...] years later this topic still seems to be fascinating to some and scary to others: a recent book, The Myth of the Rational Voter, by Bryan Caplan attempts to shed new light on the issue, while Arnold Kling worries about [...] 47. Voters are dumb and stubborn Andy Hallman's Blog says: May 21st, 2010 at 6:51 pm [...] I read a book last fall that was simultaneously enthralling and depressing. The book was called The Myth of the Rational Voter by Bryan Caplan and was published in 2007. The central argument of the book is that voters are [...] 48. Constraint and Flexibility Let A Thousand Nations Bloom says: August 18th, 2010 at 12:26 am [...] there is a chance things will turn out really well. Without needing to pander to ignorant and irrational voters, a wise and benevolent ruler can enact whichever policies best serve his subjects [...] 49. The Goal Is Freedom: Mixed Day at the Polls | The Freeman | Ideas On Liberty says: September 3rd, 2010 at 12:35 pm [...] Most people would admit they know little about economics. So why do they vote to increase the minimum wage? George Mason University economist Bryan Caplan believes it's due to irrationality. In politics as in religion, some

beliefs are more emotionally appealing than others. For example, it feels a lot better to blame sneaky foreigners for our economic problems than it does to blame ourselves. This creates a temptation to relax normal intellectual standards and insulate cherished beliefs from criticism in short, to be irrational, he writes in The Myth of the Rational Voter. [...] This entry was posted on Monday, November 6th, 2006 at 1:14 am and is filed under Lead Essay. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.