Below are excerpts of emails and documents from 2010 thru to this morning detailing the conditions at the

JPSU, attempts from military staff to get help from their CO and the results of not getting it. Ive included representation from every leadership position within the JPSU from Regions from East-to-West Coast, posted-in personnel, family members and medical staff. These are only a small sampling of complete documents I sent to the CAF Ombudsman to assist in their Probe so basically, to what youre about to read, theyve read in spades. Now you have a chance to be a pseudo Ombudsman and, based on the same information, compare your conclusions to theirs. To start this show, Ive given the first quote from the Ombudsmans Findings, and the last word to the CDS and Commanding Officer of the JPSU. For comparisons sake, Ive put a related excerpt directly after the Can-do CF culture comment from the Ombudsman. Be advised there is a lot of pain in this document from some of the best soldiers Ive ever served with and Id personally appreciate it if you took the time to read it through.

From the Ombudsmans Initial Report: By virtue of the can-do CF culture, shortfalls in staffing were often addressed from within the JPSU detachments as clients sometimes ended up as staff members. Excerpts from documents sent to the Ombudsman to assist in the Preliminary Investigation: "Staffing is adequate" my ASS. Most of our key spots are now being covered off by CLIENTS for God sakes which breaks all of the basic rules to begin with. The problem here is that we are maxed out and stressed out. This time of year is particularly busy with PERs and leave audit. Speaking of staff burn out, we just lost one of our new Sgt's after only 4 months in the job. She just couldn't handle it any more.. And the Pl Comd has been off on stress sick leave for the last two months with no indication if she's going to come back, but refuses to put in her resignation so we can't even try staffing the position for a new Capt. As you know, our Platoon staff is under severe pressure. The main issue is the volume of administrative requirements and the unique geographical region with the many usergroups with which we are engaged. There are several areas where we are severely behind such as 30/60/90 day follow-up with released members and with regular follow up with present members.
Pers said the IPSC was very under-manned - the OC pointed out that the current Retention system could benefit from some amendments as it didnt work for the JPSU. The JPSU does not have a MOC and therefore, despite the urgent requirement for staff, could never use the MMH process because it could never be deemed red. The only, and rare, exception is if there happened to be someone from a red MOC posted to the JPSU, but even then the process made little sense as the retention of this particular tradesperson was of no benefit to the red trade. Until this changes, the manning situation is expected to worsen as no more positions are allowed for our org.

We have 67 members posted in including the three in Mar. Of the 67, 13 were posted in the Dec-Mar timeframe. I just simply do not have the time to chase units for PERs for this volume.

The pace of operations over the summer and fall periods has made it impossible to maintain the services files as well as they should be. As a result, these files are in need of an audit in order to be brought up to date I'm seeing so much blame being shuffled at all level. Finger pointing is not going to identify or assist the broken soldiers. History circles around to bite it's own tail in these situations. Money is found by the barrel full to send our soldiers off to fight, and the bootlegger gets caught the minute things calm down. Then re-payment is expected when the empty bottles are counted but the bank accounts are empty.
All, Due to the current manning levels of the Support Platoon (Sp Pl) Staff we have had to take a different approach when it comes to dealing with our posted in ill and injured soldiers as well as some of the routine administration. Effective immediately and until September at the earliest, soldiers posted to this Sp Pl will not necessarily be assigned to a specific Section or Section Commander.

I thank-you for your patience during this extremely trying time for the IPSC and request that you all understand and support this change to the way we do business. I believe that my Platoon is at 40% efficiency and that there remains 60 % of Platoon administrative tasks regularly not addressed. Unfortunately I believe this is recently compounding. I had written a briefing note for you several months ago delineating staffing challenges however held it back while we trained a Platoon WO and engaged a Section Sgt with the belief that (your) JPSU support in the form of this timely augmentation would address the issue. I had planned to spend this afternoon opening 150+ unread however was quickly swarmed by on-going crisis' and have opened very few emails. I know that there are some very sensitive priority issues going temporarily un-actioned.
Question from posted-in members > The wait to see their sect commander can take up to a week why? (IPSC (O)) If manning is an issue, why not use the IPSC as a RTW placement? Answer > Section Commanders are managing a heavy workload and thus there will be wait times. As for RTW placement, this is always looked at as an option, if the right candidate is available. Unfortunately the staffing levels will not change and with postings in continuing, the situation will not improve. What can improve is for all members to take more ownership for their administration and to not rely on the Sect Comds to walk them through everything.

I just had a mtg with the Capt, from his perspective the Pl Warrants complaint is stress driven due to the sheer numbers of personnel that the IPSC supports. The Pl Comd himself stated that the stress has reached a level to which even he has been affected to the point he went to the hospital this past Wednesday with chest pains. He was informed after testing that his heart was fine but work related stress was most likely the cause. I could easily spend the next 2 weeks catching up on old work without

addressing high priority issues, I won't hammer you with gory details here. Indeed my staff (save our new wide-eyed Section Sgt) are displaying signs of fatigue and burn-out in spite of mitigating actions such as minimum

manning for long-weekends and attempts at monthly de-stress/team building events.

It is so sad that so many people are being hurt by the situation with the JPSUs. What is it going to take to get these people the quality support they deserve? Much more than the pocket full of money they were promised to expose themselves to the environments that broke them. It would be disloyal on my part to tell you that we are in good shape when we are not. He has no idea what he'll be facing in an understaffed Unit, where most of the IPSC Sgts (all three of them) are already burned out and the Pl Comd and Pl 2 IC are manned by clients because no one else is applying for the positions. Hell most of the Service Coordinators are already at the breaking point. One of them has been off on stress leave for over a year! I'm seeing so much blame being shuffled at all level. Finger pointing is not going to identify or assist the broken soldiers. History circles around to bite it's own tail in these situations. Money is found by the barrel full to send our soldiers off to fight, and the bootlegger gets caught the minute things calm down. Then re-payment is expected when the empty bottles are counted but the bank accounts are empty. Manning Ratio while 1:9 (leadership to supported pers) is the optimal, equation, the IPSC is operating at around 1:43, with the leadership supporting high effort, administratively complex ill and injured pers this is wearing out the staff to the point of emotional and physical exhaustion. The stressors of loss of lively hood are also proving a distraction and are affecting all levels of the platoon. The Captain went on to say that the loss of one of his best Sect Comds and the entailing extra workload has added to the stress on top of this, the latest replacement candidate, a PO1, pulled her application because of the unknown annuitant exception policy. Not enough emphasis is being focused on getting the resources and advertisement to support our broken soldiers. It takes a lot of soul searching and swallowing of pride to get a soldier through the doors for support and assistance. All levels of internal and external bureaucratic influences needs to step forward with a solid promise of support. Request immediate assistance from HHQ in the form of authorization to close this (my) office for three days next week to allow me to re-organize and re-prioritize; Action highpriority items; and close stagnant tasks in order to be prepared to address incoming issues. I would forward any new immediate action items to (Adj?) note: My Pl WO is on pre-planned annual leave for the next two weeks; Finally sir, I offer an option to you that may help relieve immediate stress to this IPSC, and perhaps the JPSU: Perhaps the impression that has been given by the rest of IPSC Kingston

is that we are staffed appropriately. The fact is that I am currently

unable to stay ahead of the curve and am not able to complete the bulk of the tasks that are expected of me.
The stigmatism of being weak is preventing many of our leadership and subordinates from getting the assistance they require. The workplaces are getting poisoned by the lack of compassion and true ability to provide proper guidance for our members. Capacity and potential burn out:

There are concerns over the potential flooding of JPSU with ill and injured (particularly should the CANFORGEN be issued pretty much as drafted). This leads into concerns over: the contingency plan for addressing the resultant (and in some cases current) manpower issue. span of control for Sgts and OCs in particular. Each IPSC has two direct reports, and HQ adds another 4 persons, resulting in current span of control ranging from 8 to 12 for OCs and up to 35 for Sgts, which far exceeds most O&E guidelines. There are concerns over managing stress levels of staff, for which TB guidelines do not suit (e.g. "no-cost" long walks at lunch, PT periods etc for civilians). There are concerns over workload management at all levels. Thin coverage - things like having to provide AOs (investigators, CoAs) for very ill, dying or decease SPHL pers, coverage for annuitant breaks and vacation, secondary duties etc becomes a challenge for which we have little to no flexibility or bend. Regarding uniformity of organizations across the JPSU there are very (very) large differences amongst Regions but it is my belief that JPSU Eastern Ontario Region is the closest to the original intent of the organization. I am aware however that there are differences between IPSCs within our Region, and this is the product of a rapidly (by CF terms) stood-up unit and immediate high Op-Tempo. IMO. the largest obstacle to maintaining uniformity across the Region is staffing; if we arent manned correctly then we must compromise to make it work. Additional Tasks - Tasks even marginally outside of the SP Pl mandate are extremely disruptive and require a lot of planning to ensure that the primary care of the ill and injured is not affected.

SM, in addition, I identified our need Wed to DCSM for additional staff in Ottawa. I will need to take folks from other regions because, as you know, we cannot increase our current establishment. Annuitant Policy (AP) the AP and associated unknown exception policy has had a tremendous negative impact on morale and moved the stress from the mbrs work stressors into the home, affecting the QOL of the family unit. The stressors of loss of lively hood are also proving a distraction and are affecting all levels of the platoon. Taskings from Regional Sergeant Major external tasks frm RHQ must be strictly controlled, the Pl staff is past max effort, a level of effort which must be sustained for the mid-to long-term. Any additional tasks frm the Regional Sergeant Major to the Pl must be carefully vetted. Just wanted to let you know that the IPSC (K) mil leadership have applied for new employment (below), potentially leaving the IPSC without a mil component as early as 15 Mar 13 (There are currently 67 pers in their AOR) or latest mid-March. Also, just to underscore the effects of the manning shortfalls, the Region is still waiting for PER rtns, frm year 2011/12 FYSA Also outstanding are an increasing amount of administrative tasks remaining outstanding to be researched such as CFPAS inquiries; losing unit communications; and leave coordination. We are able to catch-up with outstanding intake based on the "core services only" semi-closing of this unit for the next three days. Good Friday sir. I have been trying to get to my tasks this week however this has been again impossible (in spite of taking work home in the evening and days-off and extended office hrs etc). I recently undertook a UI and wrote the paper at home in an attempt to stave off any more timeconsuming inquiries regarding the issue in question (very high profile), in hopes of gaining a foothold on the tasks at hand. Sir, this email is intended to give you SA and raise a flag that this IPSC is operating in a completely reactionary mode due to the work-load. There is no expansion capacity nor any capacity for reactivity. While it is true that the addition of PL WO and Sect Sgt has been a boon, it is just scratching the underlying need. I intended on discussing it with you last week however Lucienne rightly asked me to wait as she has a request for manning as well, and I believe we have parallel issues that could be captured in one paper. In closing I point out that we have been operating a relatively medium to large sized IPSC with unique needs and geographical AOR for an extended period of time with minimum staff. I believe the staff have performed extremely well faced with these challenges. The support received by the Regional HQ has been instrumental in what successes we can claim and I want to provide you as our

OC with SA of present challenges.

XXII Parking Lot, 2010 Capacity. LCdr Rasmussen asked how capacity is measured. He stated that its impossible to have pers everywhere, but when visits are required to remote locations, it places added work on everyone. Halifax has three staff with caseloads of 35+. There is a maximum of what people can deal with. What do we do if we cant hire extra staff? Whats the maximum case level? 40? The DCO replied that some regions are closer to full capacity than others and asked for options. As everyone knows, there will be no significant increase in the establishment. The option of reducing the frequency of visits to clients was discussed. The DCO stated that there may be a possibility of securing YE funding for oneyear contracts but will it help in the long term? Cdr Carter stated that due to large SPHL in Esquimalt it would help temporarily, but not in long term. There was discussion whether the ability to properly manage caseloads might impact on the confidence personnel have in the unit. While some expressed concern that some may try to declare the JPSU a failure, LCol Hand stated that it is his opinion that the Army would never return to the SPHL format. There was consensus that we have to keep doing the very best we can with the resources we have and always remain vigilant for signs of staff burnout. I began reading about the situation with the JPSUs when he was first assigned there, but had faith that after all of his years of service he would receive excellent care. At this point I am not convinced that is happening and I am not convinced that the JPSU in its current state is the right placement for Jim or others in his situation. I am not asking for special treatment for him, just some consideration for what he is going through and some response from someone in CF to help him to get back to work and have his medical needs met. 3- Mental health crisis: I have spoken with several unit Adjts in the past few weeks. If the CoC is concerned that some of your mbrs are experiencing difficulties in mood or behaviour, please send them our way. Recently, I have seen several mbrs in crisis, some with suicidal ideation, and others have attempted suicide just recently. Many of these mbrs are embarassed to say they need help. It is reported that in Canadian society 1 in 5 has been diagnosed with a mental health condition. This can range from bipolar disorder and schizophrenia to shopping addiction or OCD. Unfortunately, from my exeprience both working here and in the civilian hospitals, that number is greatly underestimated. I have noticed MH is a huge issue in Petawawa especially in CDU2. Please ensure the message is passed down to your mbrs that there is nothing wrong saying "I need help"

and we need to see them pronto.

I honestly hope I never hear the term JPSU or IPSC again. I've done my last Road Trip and Recovery Call for this outfit and just want to carry on with the rest of my life and try to forget I was ever part if this dismal failure

I have questioned my professional capacity to maintain this pace however after careful contemplation I dont believe any other would have much more successes in effectively addressing the multitude of issues this particular IPSC faces on a daily basis.
I am totally convinced that in a short amount of time we will be back to the old days of the SPHL where the IPSC's will only be putting a check mark beside the names of those posted into us because there is just no way to manage the constant influx of client and no way to manage them.

Man well done! I know you had the balls from our conversations and that you were - as the rest of us - way over-tasked.. Its difficult for me to return to it, like I said I cut the string completely in order to keep myself together. I too believe in the program whole-heartedly however I embrace it's ideals and mores I do not believe in the capacity of it's senior leaders to appreciate the coal-face needs regarding boots on the ground and the unit's (IPSCs) ways of doing business (learned through experience and prior knowledge) again at the coalface.. not the boardroom.. I find it ironic that when we came on board we had to go through a detailed screening and interview process to ensure we were the "right fit" for the job because of the complexity of having to dealing with troubled clients. But now that they are changing our senior positions back to the Regular Force that process is gone and that decision is now totally up to the various Career Managers. I'll tell you here and now something that you may have suspected when I left but I've not articulated to anyone: if I had stayed with the IPSC I would have been an utter train-wreck. Not an easy thing to say, I've always thought of myself as having a seeming endless capacity to work... I just deleted about five paragraphs of rambling on I find it difficult to articulate my thoughts on the JPSU it's juxtaposition of Ideal and execution... When I left I severed myself from most connections and communications with anyone there in order that I could move forward. I was proud to have been there and make my meagre contributions but could no longer stomach the hypocracy and I felt that I was doing a disservice to my members and my staff by staying. I think you feel the same.

The following are closing excerpts from the CDS and JPSU CO. A Comment from the Canadian Armed Forces Chief of Defence Staff:

While we acknowledge that we have not yet reached the optimum solution set, we are striving to fill the gaps to ensure that no one gets left behind on their road to recovery. Providing appropriate resources for this vital support network remains my continuing priority.

Dialogue between the Commanding Officer of the JPSU and MP, the Hon Cheryl Gallant, November 2012. Question from the Hon. Cheryl Gallant to the CO JPSU:

I'm told that the usual ratio for section commander to subordinates is optimally 1:9, and usually in practice maybe 1:15. I'm told that at the JPSU in Petawawa, the ratio is about 1:45, and in some cases 1:70, and that an injured soldier takes about one and a half times the work of a healthy soldier. My question is, is there a staffing and infrastructure expansion plan in place to allow for the growth as required?
Answer from Col. Gerry Blais, Commanding Officer, JPSU

I will. The other dynamic to be considered when we're looking at the numbers is there are a number of people posted to the JPSU in Petawawa, and there are a number who only receive services. If you distinguish between the two, there are approximately 600 people who are receiving services, but about 200 or so who are posted. Therefore, when you break down the ratios with simply those who are posted which are those for whom the military staff are responsible, those numbers go down quite a bit. The other one is that in a unit, the NCMs are responsible for training and a number of other issues as well, whereas in the JPSU, they are strictly responsible for the personal administration of those, so the ratio can be a little higher and still be very workable.

https://openparliament.ca/committees/national-defence/41-1/57/colonelgerry-blais-1/ Comment from the Commanding Officer of the JPSU to Parliament - 2012.

Im happy to say that exact situation has now developed. For about six months now we have been ensuring that every person who is medically released is presented with what is called an integrated transition plan. All of the different partners sit together at the table: Veterans Affairs, the health services case manager, people who look after education needs and employment needs post-release. We sit down and include the individual in that conversation, and a transition plan is prepared for each one of them. The member signs off at the bottom of that before he's released, indicating that he understands what's in there and is happy with it.
https://openparliament.ca/committees/veterans-affairs/41-1/38/colonel-gerryblais-1/ A Response from the JPSU CO on the Ombudsmans Findings, Oct 31 2013. The head of the joint support units, Col. Gerard Blais, said they have been working with the ombudsman's office to resolve the concerns. "Most of the issues have been or are definitely in the process of being resolved," http://m.therecord.com/news-story/4186665-watchdog-criticizes-soldiersupport-centres/ Response from the JPSU CO on the Ombudsmans Findings, Oct 31 2013 I have the freedom to staff civilian positions now, JPSU Commander Col. Gerry Blais told the Citizen Thursday. The right fit is so important in these jobs because of the delicate nature of what they do that we really make sure weve got somebody that has both the emotional and knowledge makeup to work in this area. But Blais rejected suggestions that the system was dysfunctional and said his staff was committed to their work.

The unit has always functioned very well, he said. Obviously it becomes more challenging when you have less staff but the results we have all kinds of letters of appreciation from families, individuals, etc. The results are there, no doubt about that. When you dont have a full complement of staff it makes it more difficult but we were still finding a way to conduct operations effectively. Were not perfect by any stretch of the imagination, he added, but we are constantly working on it. http://www.ottawacitizen.com/JPSU+support+units+injured+troops+badly+unders taffed+watchdog+says/9109523/story.html