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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949

LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents. Roseller T. Lim for petitioners. Antonio Belmonte for respondents. FERIA, J.: This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty. Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same. After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, prescribed by the respondents, issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty. The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the President with the concurrence of Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows: WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the different areas comprising the territory of the Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for of other nationalities operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups pursued

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activities in opposition to the forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Philippines; WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring about his ultimate defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code; WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many members of these resistance forces, for such acts; WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy is not a valid defense under the laws of the Philippines; WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as criminals but rather as patriots and heroes who have rendered invaluable service to the nation; and WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed form the indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected; NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty inn favor of al persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives. It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who among those against whom charges have been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be filed in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions, simultaneously to be established , shall examine the facts and circumstance surrounding each case and, if necessary, conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. These Commissions shall decided each case and, upon finding that it falls within the terms of this proclamation, the Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged. The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that

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reason it does ""nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel AnheuserBusch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.) In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits. The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as the courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act. While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged was against chastity and was committed in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally presumed that is has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though the motive as a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it need not be testified to be the defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the motive for the commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of

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the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words hat may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement of testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive, can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the true expression of the reason o motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because such statements or testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest he may have to suit his defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does not stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers, that unless the defendant admits at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged, and states that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it is impossible for the court of Commission to verify the motive for the commission of the offense, because only the accused could explain of the offense, because only the accused could explain his belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense. There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act before a court of Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not for purely political motives. According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty Commissions, issued by the President of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed upon and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be passed upon by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and the writer oft he dissenting opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the directive of said Administrative Order, because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and all those pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have pleaded guilty or admitted having committed the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or could not have appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First Instance. To hold that a Amnesty Commission should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with which an accused was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having committed it would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and the Amnesty Commission were established. If the courts have to proceed to the trail or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has plead not guilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed the offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as there is no law which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justices in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does

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not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of submitting their case to said Commission. Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding, after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused, directed in the said Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible for the killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation, inducement or conspiration, or as accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty, because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered. Moran, C. J., Paras, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur. TUASON, J., dissenting: I am unable to agree with the decision of the Court and shall briefly state my reasons. The decision proceeds on the assumption that the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission refused to hear and decide the application for amnesty of the present petitioners. I think this is a mistake. There are examinations of records, hearing and decisions. The pleadings and annexes show that hearing was held on the 9th of January, 19947 in which the two petitioners and their counsel were present, and one of them, Barrioquinto, testified and that it was after that hearing, on the same date, that the Commission denied their petition in a written order and directed the clerk to return the "expedientes" to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga for its final action. It is apparent from this order that the Commission acted in the manner contemplated by Proclamation No. 8 of the President. The return of the papers to the court merely follow the procedure provided in the proclamation, which stipulates "that any case now pending on which may be filed in the future a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission decides as not within the terms of the amnesty shall proceed in accordance with the usual legal procedure in the courts without regard to this proclamation." The proclamation does not prescribe any specific mode of hearing. That the Commission shall examine the facts and circumstance surrounding each case is all that is provided for. In its discretion, the Commission may, if it deems necessary, hear the witnesses both for the complainant and the accused. The hearing does not have to be formal; it may be summary, according tot he proclamation. This privilege, discretionary with the Commission, was afforded the accused as far as the nature of their defense permitted.

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I get the inference from an examination of the orders of the Commission that the latter went over the record of each defendant's criminal case. These records are, without doubt, the "expedientes" which the Commission, ordered sent back to the court. The Commission, we are to presume, read the exhaustive and well-reasoned decision of the court against Jimenez and the evidence for and against him on which that decision is based. The fact that Jimenez and his witness had already given his evidence at length, may well account for the failure or refusal of the Commission to hear him and his witnesses further. Only Barrioquinto, whose case had not yet been tried in the Court of First Instance because he had escaped, was heard by the Commission. The record of heat hearing consists of 33 written pages. As to the determination of the pretended right of the defendants to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of the Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and final as far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that the defendants denied having committed the crime imputed to them was cited by the Commission as ground for its decision to turn down their application. That circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act. Moreover, in the second order, a lengthy order dictated on the motion for reconsideration by Jimenez, additional reasons are stated. The Commission has thus amply performed the duties required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the matters of investigating and deciding. The commission heard one accused and examined the evidence introduced and the decision rendered against the other. With the reasoning by which the Commission reached its decision, or with the result of its decision, it is not within the province of the court to concern itself. The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts; they are not performing judicial function, and this Court has no appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions. Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez, 55 Phil., 814.) The Court can order the Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission how to act. How or for whom a case should be decided is a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to control or review. And so ifs the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence. The write of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to any matter in which he is required to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 46 Phil., 190.) In the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the court's premise that "there is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the ac t s constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be charged." Nevertheless, I don't think the Commission was wrong in its theory. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evening that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is inn the nature of plea of confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency for one

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to justify an act, seek forgiveness for an act of which, according to him, he is not responsible. It is impossible for a court or commission to verify the presence of the essential conditions which should entitle the applicants to exemption from punishment, when the accused and his witnesses say that he did not commit a crime. In the nature of things, only the accused and his witnesses could prove that the victim collaborated with the enemy; that the killing was perpetrated in furtherance of the resistance movements; that no personal motive intervened in the commission of the murder, etc., etc. These, or some of these, are matters of belief and intention which only the accused and his witnesses could explain. As a matter of procedure, certiorari or mandamus, whatever the present proceeding may be, does not lie because there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The decision of the Commission has not closed the avenue for the petitioners to invoke the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation before the courts. I invite attention to the provision of the proclamation which I have quoted. In the case of Jimenez, he could ask for a new trial, as he in effect would have the Commission grant him; and in the case of Barrioquinto he could set up the proclamation in his plea when his trial comes up. EN BANC G.R. No. L-18184 January 31, 1963

GAUDENCIO VERA, RESTITUTO FIGUERAS, LORENZO AMBAS, JUSTO FLORIDO, PAULINO BAYRAN AND JAYME GARCIA, petitioners, -versusPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. De Mesa & De Mesa for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. BARRERA, J.: In the Court of First Instance of Quezon, petitioners Gaudencio Vera, Restituto Figueras, Lorenzo Ambas, Justo Florido, Paulino Bayran, and 92 others, as John Does, were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946, the case was referred to the Eighth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, which actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the petitioner-defendants admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozanes categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in its decision of January 12, 1956, held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Commission in its order dated January 11, 1957, which partly reads:

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The Commission is convinced that the motive for the kidnapping and killing of Lt. Amadeo Lozanes of the Hunters was the keen rivalry between the Vera's Guerrilla Party and the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla organizations. It is noteworthy that the Hunters were driven away by General Vera from Pitogo in December, 1944, and that after said kidnapping and killing on February 13 and 14, 1945, Mayor Ramon Isaac of Unisan, was in turn kidnapped by the Hunters. Leopoldo Miciano, secretary of Col. de Luna of the Vera's Guerrilla Party, testified that General Vera told him of his (Vera's) suspicion that Mayor Isaac was kidnapped by way of reprisal as he, Vera, had ordered the liquidation of Lt. Lozanes (dinispatcha). In any event, since it is an established fact that when Lozanes was kidnapped, tortured, and later killed, he was actually a lieutenant of the Hunter's ROTC Guerrilla Organizations then engaged in the resistance movement, it may not be said with any amount of truth that the aforesaid killing was to further the resistance movement at the time, as the defense intimate. Rather, the killing of Lt. Lozanes of the Hunters ROTC Guerrilla would tend to weaken commensurately the resistance movement against the Japanese invaders. The Commission noted, however, that nowhere in the evidence of record has it been shown that defendant Jaime Garcia had any participation in the complex crime charged. Neither does the evidence reveal that he admitted or disclaimed any role therein. Consequently, there would be no room, either for his conviction, or for the application of the provisions of the aforementioned amnesty proclamation. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Eighth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission denies the defendants motion for reconsideration and maintains its order contained in its decisions, to return the case to the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the latter to act on it accordingly, not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because, even if it has jurisdiction, the defendants are not entitled to the benefits of the amnesty proclamation. From this order of the Commission, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter, on July 27, 1959, certified the appeal to us, in view of the legal issue involved, namely, whether or not persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of which they were accused. On August 13, 1959 we ordered the docketing of the appeal in this court (G.R. No. L-15803). However, on petitioners' motion to return the record of the case to the Court of Appeals (on the ground that the appeal was originally coursed to said Court, due to "factual issues to the effect that the death of Amado Lozanes did not spring from personal motive or on account of rivalry between guerrilla units, but owing to the fact that said decedent had aided in the war efforts of the enemy, by having been a member of the Jap-sponsored Philippine Constabulary organization, and by having been one of those who arrested and subsequently massacred, innocent civilians and guerrillas in Catanauan, Quezon"), we ordered the return of said record to said Court. On November 16, 1960, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming the Order of the Commission, stating in part, as follows: Appellants stressed in their aforementioned motion for reconsideration that they had impliedly admitted their participation in the killing of Amadeo Lozanes. But mere implied admission is not sufficient, for Administrative Order No. 144 of the Department of Justice, dated October 11, 1950, amending Administrative Order No. 179 thereof, and issued on

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November 17, 1949, explicitly directs that "where the offense charged against any person is not one against chastity but is covered by the Revised Penal Code, and the offense took place between December 8, 1941 and the date of the liberation of the province or city where the offense is alleged to have been committed, "in order that the Amnesty Commission may take cognizance of the case, the accused or respondent must allege or claim verbally or in writing that he committed the acts charged against him in furtherance of the resistance movement or against persons who aided in the war efforts of the enemy', for amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime". xxx xxx xxx

Therefore, and since appellants did not claim verbally or in writing that they committed the offense with which they were charged in furtherance of the resistance movement or against persons who aided in the war efforts of the enemy, but on the contrary, as already stated, herein appellants had verbally denied the charge against them, their case should be tried by the ordinary courts of justice. Hence, the 8th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission could not take cognizance of their case. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. Appellants, however, want us to rule one way or the other, as to the factual question that the death of Amadeo Lozanes did not spring from personal motive or on account of rivalry of guerrilla units but owing to the fact that the said decedent had aided in the war efforts of the enemy. Without shirking from our duty to make a finding or pronouncement on a question of fact, we are constrained not to make a pronouncement on this question, in view of our ruling stated earlier that the Commission is not competent to take cognizance of this case, for the reasons already stated, but it should be the ordinary courts of justice. Any ruling that we would make now on the factual issue postulated by appellants would not only be premature and prejudicial, but also useless, because this case proceeded from a body (the Commission) that has no jurisdiction to entertain the same. It may be stated, in this connection, that jurisdiction could be raised at any stage of the proceedings. WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. Their motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied, petitioners instituted the present petition for review. Petitioners contend (as they did in the Court of Appeals), that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946, it is not necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission the cases of Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al. (L-1278, January 21, 1949, 82 Phil. 642), Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte v. De los Santos, et al. (L-2502, December 1, 1949, 85 Phil. 77) and Viray v. Amnesty Commission, et al. (L-2540, January 28, 1960, 85 Phil. 354), to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8) of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should,

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as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation." But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of People v. Llanita, et al. (L-2082, April 26, 1950, 86 Phil. 219) and People v. Guillermo, et al. (L-2188, May 18, 1950, 86 Phil. 395), wherein we held that It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would being the crime charged uithin the scope of the amnesty proclamation. (Emphasis supplied) At any rate, the facts established before the Commission do not bring this case within the terms of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8. Note that said proclamation extends its provisions to "all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy." As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased (Lozaes) was not in furtherance of the resistance movement, but was due to the rivalry between the Hunter's Guerrilla, to which he belonged, and the Vera's Guerrilla of petitioners. Neither may petitioners rely on the case of Buyco v. People, et al. (L-6327, July 29, 1954) because in said case, we held that petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation not only because "the evidence did not suffice to show that appellant had acted in the manner contemplated in the amnesty proclamation," namely, that he killed the deceased Luis Gonzales due to his being an enemy collaborator, but also because if petitioner's version was true that he had no participation whatsoever in the killing of the deceased, then he "had committed no crime whatsoever, and, hence, there would be no room, either for his conviction or for the application of the provisions of the aforementioned amnesty application," which, in effect, reiterates our previous ruling in the Llanita and Guillermo cases, supra, that amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the commission of the offense charged. We find no merit in petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals erred in applying or citing Department of Justice Administrative Order No. 144, series of 1950,1 considering that the latter was issued precisely pursuant to our ruling in the aforesaid Llanita and Guillermo cases. Petitioners also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to resolve the factual issues they had raised before it. The argument is untenable, because as the appellate court correctly pointed out, any ruling that it would make on the factual issues presented by petitioners "would not only be premature and prejudicial, but also useless, because this case proceeded from a body (the Commission) that had no jurisdiction to entertain the same."

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WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. EN BANC G.R. No. L-47941 December 7, 1940

MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, petitioner, vs. ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., respondents Victoriano Yamson for petitioner. E. Voltaire Garcia for respondent Santos.

LAUREL, J.: This is the petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal. The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated as follows: On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the accesories provided by law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the amounts P375 and P125, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. On appeal, this court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, he was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. As to his civil liability consisting in the return of the two amounts aforestated, the same was condoned by the complaints. Not withstanding his conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipality of Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known as the Election Code, was approved by the national Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against the property." In view of this provision, the respondent forth with applied to his Excellency, the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939. Upon the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December 24, 1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment,

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he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility." On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357. After hearing, the court below rendered it decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and questions raised by the petitioner, the court declares that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent on December 24, 1939, has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the disqualification created by section 94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The petition for exclusion of the respondent Teofilo C. Santos should be, as it hereby is, denied. Let there be no costs. Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of the court below on the several grounds stated in the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondents to the full enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function, and (c) the respondent having served his sentence and all the accesory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution. Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides: (6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as may be deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly. It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of

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imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights." (Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24, 1939.) While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the State and not in the hands of the Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then, there are cases to the contrary (Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth vs. Health, 1 Ill. App. 82). Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action. The petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. EN BANC G.R. No. L-48100 June 20, 1941

FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee. Rodriguez & Aclaro for appellant. Cecilio Maneja for appellee. LAUREL, J.: The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atendado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon. The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondentappellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

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The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction, While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (19221931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant, So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Diaz and Moran, JJ., concur.