The Philosophy of Freedom

By Rudolf Steiner
Table of Contents:
Introduction. Notes On The Translation. Freedom. Spirit, Soul And Mind. Concept And Percept. Idea And Mental Picture. Imagination. Intuition. Experience. Moti e And !ri ing Force. "ill And "ant. Footnotes# Author$s Pre%aces. &. Pre%ace to the re ised edition o% &'&(. ). Pre%ace to the %irst edition, &('*+ re ised, &'&(. & , Conscious -uman Action. Footnotes# ) , The Fundamental !esire %or .no/ledge. Footnotes# 0 , Thin1ing in the ser ice o% .no/ledge. Author$s addition, &'&(. Footnotes# * , The "orld as Percept. Footnotes# 2 , The Act o% .no/ing the "orld. Author$s addition, &'&(. Footnotes# 3 , -uman Indi idualit4. 5 , Are There 6imits to .no/ledge7 8The 9ealit4 o% Freedom:. Author$s addition, &'&(. Footnotes# ( , The Factors o% 6i%e. Author$s addition, &'&(. ' , The Idea o% Freedom. Footnotes# &; , Philosoph4 and Monism.

Author$s additions, &'&(. Footnotes# && , "orld Purpose and 6i%e Purpose 8The Ordering o% Man$s !estin4:. Author$s addition, &'&(. Footnotes# &) , Moral Imagination 8!ar/inism and Moralit4:. Author$s addition, &'&(. Footnotes# &0 , The <alue o% 6i%e 8Optimism and Pessimism:. Author$s addition, &'&(. Footnotes# &* , Indi idualit4 and =enus. Footnotes# >ltimate ?uestions , The Conse@uences o% Monism. Author$s additions, &'&(. &. ). Appendix , Added to the ne/ edition, &'&(. Footnotes#

----.

Introduction.
A4 Michael "ilson. 9udol% Steiner /as Aorn in &(3& and died in &')2. In his autoAiograph4, The Course o% M4 6i%e 8see %n &:, he ma1es @uite clear that the proAlems dealt /ith in The Philosoph4 o% Freedom pla4ed a leading part in his li%e. -is childhood /as spent in the Austrian countr4side, /here his %ather /as a stationmaster. At the age o% eight Steiner /as alread4 a/are o% things and Aeings that are not seen as /ell as those that are. "riting aAout his experiences at this age, he said, B. . . the realit4 o% the spiritual /orld /as as certain to me as that o% the ph4sical. I %elt the need, ho/e er, %or a sort o% Custi%ication %or this assumption.B 9ecogniDing the Ao4$s aAilit4, his %ather sent him to the 9ealschule at "iener Neustadt, and later to the Technical >ni ersit4 in <ienna. -ere Steiner had to support himsel%, A4 means o% scholarships and tutoring. Stud4ing and mastering man4 more suACects than /ere in his curriculum, he al/a4s came Aac1 to the proAlem o% 1no/ledge itsel%. -e /as er4 much a/are# that in the experience o% onesel% as an ego, one is in the /orld o% the spirit. Although he too1 part in all the social acti ities going on around him ,, in the arts, the sciences, e en in politics ,, he /rote that Bmuch more ital at that time /as the need to %ind an ans/er to the @uestion# -o/ %ar is it

possiAle to pro e that in human thin1ing real spirit is the agent7B -e made a deep stud4 o% philosoph4, particularl4 the /ritings o% .ant, Aut no/here did he %ind a /a4 o% thin1ing that could Ae carried as %ar as a perception o% the spiritual /orld. Thus Steiner /as led to de elop a theor4 o% 1no/ledge out o% his o/n stri ing a%ter truth, one /hich too1 its start %rom a direct experience o% the spiritual nature o% thin1ing. As a student, Steiner$s scienti%ic aAilit4 /as ac1no/ledged /hen he /as as1ed to edit =oethe$s /ritings on nature. In =oethe he recogniDed one /ho had Aeen aAle to percei e the spiritual in nature, e en though he had not carried this as %ar as a direct perception o% the spirit. Steiner /as aAle to Aring a ne/ understanding to =oethe$s scienti%ic /or1 through this insight into his perception o% nature. Since no existing philosophical theor4 could ta1e this 1ind o% ision into account, and since =oethe had ne er stated explicitl4 /hat his philosoph4 o% li%e /as, Steiner %illed this need A4 puAlishing, in &((3, an introductor4 Aoo1 called The Theor4 o% .no/ledge Implicit in =oethe$s "orld,Conception. -is introductions to the se eral olumes and sections o% =oethe$s scienti%ic /ritings 8&((0,'5: ha e Aeen collected into the Aoo1 =oethe the Scientist. These are aluaAle contriAutions to the philosoph4 o% science. !uring this time his thoughts aAout his o/n philosoph4 /ere graduall4 coming to maturit4. In the 4ear &((( he met Eduard on -artmann, /ith /hom he had alread4 had a long correspondence. -e descriAes the chilling e%%ect on him o% the /a4 this philosopher o% pessimism denied that thin1ing could e er reach realit4, Aut must %ore er deal /ith illusions. Steiner /as alread4 clear in his mind ho/ such oAstacles /ere to Ae o ercome. -e did not stop at the proAlem o% 1no/ledge, Aut carried his ideas %rom this realm into the %ield o% ethics, to help him deal /ith the proAlem o% human %reedom. -e /anted to sho/ that moralit4 could Ae gi en a sure %oundation /ithout Aasing it upon imposed rules o% conduct. Mean/hile his /or1 o% editing had ta1en him a/a4 %rom his Aelo ed <ienna to "eimar. -ere Steiner /restled /ith the tas1 o% presenting his ideas to the /orld. -is oAser ations o% the spiritual had all the exactness o% a science, and 4et his experience o% the realit4 o% ideas /as in some /a4s a1in to the m4stic$s experience. M4sticism presents the intensit4 o% immediate 1no/ledge /ith con iction, Aut deals onl4 /ith suACecti e impressions+ it %ails to deal /ith the realit4 outside man. Science, on the other hand, consists o% ideas aAout the /orld, e en i% the ideas are mainl4 materialistic. E4 starting %rom the spiritual nature o% thin1ing, Steiner /as aAle to %orm ideas that Aear upon the spiritual /orld in the same /a4 that the ideas o% natural science Aear upon the ph4sical. Thus he could descriAe his philosoph4 as the result o% Bintrospecti e oAser ation %ollo/ing the methods o% Natural Science.B -e %irst presented an outline o% his ideas in his doctoral dissertation, Truth and .no/ledge, /hich Aore the suA,title BPrelude to a $Philosoph4 o%

Freedom$.B In &('* The Philosoph4 o% Freedom /as puAlished, and the content /hich had %ormed the centre o% his li%e$s stri ing /as placed Ae%ore the /orld. Steiner /as deepl4 disappointed at the lac1 o% understanding it recei ed. -artmann$s reaction /as t4pical+ instead o% accepting the disco er4 that thin1ing can lead to the realit4 o% the spirit in the /orld, he continued to thin1 that BspiritB /as merel4 a concept existing in the human mind, and %reedom an illusion Aased on ignorance. Such /as %undamentall4 the ie/ o% the age to /hich Steiner introduced his philosoph4. Eut ho/e er it seemed to others, Steiner had in %act estaAlished a %irm %oundation %or 1no/ledge o% the spirit, and no/ he %elt aAle to pursue his researches in this %ield /ithout restraint. The Philosoph4 o% Freedom summed up the ideas he had %ormed to deal /ith the riddles o% existence that had so %ar dominated his li%e. BThe %urther /a4,B he /rote, Bcould no/ Ae nothing else Aut a struggle to %ind the right %orm o% ideas to express the spiritual /orld itsel%.B "hile still at "eimar, Steiner /rote t/o more Aoo1s, Friedrich NietDsche, Fighter %or Freedom 8&('2:, inspired A4 a isit to the aged philosopher, and =oethe$s Conception o% the "orld 8&('5:, /hich completed his /or1 in this %ield. -e then mo ed to Eerlin to ta1e o er the editing o% a literar4 magaDine+ here he /rote 9iddles o% Philosoph4 8&';&: and M4sticism and Modern Thought 8&';&:. -e also emAar1ed on an e er,increasing acti it4 o% lecturing. Eut his real tas1 la4 in deepening his 1no/ledge o% the spiritual /orld until he could reach the point o% puAlishing the results o% this research. The rest o% his li%e /as de oted to Auilding up a complete science o% the spirit, to /hich he ga e the name Anthroposoph4. Foremost amongst his disco eries /as his direct experience o% the realit4 o% the Christ, /hich soon too1 a central place in his /hole teaching. The man4 Aoo1s and lectures /hich he puAlished set %orth the magni%icent scope o% his ision. 8see %n ): From &'&& he turned also to the arts ,, drama, painting, architecture, eur4thm4 ,, sho/ing the creati e %orming po/ers that can Ae dra/n %rom spiritual ision. As a response to the disaster o% the &'&*,&( /ar, he sho/ed ho/ the social sphere could Ae gi en ne/ li%e through an insight into the nature o% man, his initiati e Aearing practical %ruit in the %ields o% education, agriculture, therap4 and medicine. A%ter a %e/ more 4ears o% intense acti it4, no/ as the leader o% a /orld,/ide mo ement, he died, lea ing Aehind him an achie ement that must allo/ his recognition as the %irst Initiate o% the age o% science. 8see %n 0: Anthroposoph4 is itsel% a science, %irml4 Aased on the results o% oAser ation, and open to in estigation A4 an4one /ho is prepared to %ollo/ the path o% de elopment he pioneered ,, a path that ta1es its start %rom the struggle %or inner %reedom set %orth in this Aoo1. ~~ The Philosoph4 o% Freedom can Ae seen as the cro/ning achie ement o% nineteenth, centur4 philosoph4. It ans/ers all the proAlems o% 1no/ledge and moralit4 that

philosophers had raised, argued o er, and e entuall4 le%t unsol ed /ith the conclusion that B/e can ne er 1no/ B. Fet this great achie ement recei ed no recognition, and onl4 /hen Steiner had ac@uired a large %ollo/ing o% people than1%ul %or all that he had gi en them o% his spiritual re elation, did there arise the desire to read also his earlier /or1, upon /hich he al/a4s insisted his /hole research /as %irml4 Aased. Perhaps i% Steiner had spent the rest o% his li%e expounding his philosoph4, he /ould toda4 Ae recogniDed throughout the /orld as a maCor philosopher+ 4et his achie ement in going %or/ard himsel% to de elop the science o% the spirit is much the greater, and this /ill surel4 Ae recogniDed in time. Indeed, philosoph4 has got itsel% a Aad name, perhaps %rom its too,%re@uent negati e results, and it might e en Ae Aetter to consider the Philosoph4 o% Freedom not Cust as a chapter o% philosoph4, Aut as the 1e4 to a /hole /a4 o% li%e. Considered Cust as a piece o% philosoph4, it might in an4 case Ae thought out o% date, ha ing onl4 historical interest. For instance, a modern scientist ma4 /ell Aelie e that an4 philosopher /ho spo1e up against atomism has Aeen pro ed /rong A4 the success o% atomic ph4sics. Eut this /ould Ae to misunderstand the nature o% philosoph4. Steiner deals in turn /ith each possiAle point o% ie/, illustrating each one /ith an example %rom the literature, and then sho/ing the %allacies or shortcomings that ha e to Ae o ercome. Atomism is Custi%ied onl4 so long as it is ta1en as an aid to the intellect in dealing /ith the %orces o% nature+ it is /rong i% it postulates @ualities o% a 1ind that Aelong to percei ed phenomena, Aut attriAutes them to a realm that A4 de%inition can ne er Ae percei ed. This mista1en ie/ o% the atom ma4 ha e Aeen aAandoned A4 science, Aut it still persists in man4 @uarters. Similarl4, man4 o% the old philosophical points o% ie/, dating Aac1 to .ant, sur i e among scientists /ho are er4 ad anced in the experimental or theoretical %ields, so that Steiner$s treatment o% the proAlem o% 1no/ledge is still rele ant. Con%usion concerning the nature o% perception is /idespread, Aecause o% the reluctance to consider the central part pla4ed A4 thin1ing. Thin1ing is all too o%ten dismissed as BsuACecti eB and hence unreliaAle, /ithout an4 realiDation that it is thin1ing itsel% that has made this decision. The Aelie% that science can deal onl4 /ith the BoACecti eB /orld has led to the position /here man4 scientists are @uite unaAle to sa4 /hether the real /orld is the %amiliar /orld o% their surroundings, as experienced through the senses and pictured in the imagination, or the theoretical /orld o% spinning particles, imperceptiAle %orces and statistical proAaAilities that is in%erred %rom their experimental results. 8see %n *: -ere Steiner$s path o% 1no/ledge can gi e a %irmer Aasis %or natural science than it has e er had Ae%ore, as /ell as pro iding a sure %oundation %or the de elopment o% spiritual science. Although there are man4 people /ho %ind all that the4 need in contemplating the /onders o% the spiritual /orld, the Philosoph4 o% Freedom does not exist mainl4 to pro ide a

philosophical Custi%ication %or their Aelie%+ its main alue lies in the sound Aasis it can gi e to those /ho cannot Aring themsel es to accept an4thing that is not clearl4 scienti%ic ,, a Aasis %or 1no/ledge, %or sel%1no/ledge, %or moral action, %or li%e itsel%. It does not Btell us /hat to doB, Aut it opens a /a4 to the spirit %or all those %or /hom the scienti%ic path to truth, rather than the m4stical, is the onl4 possiAilit4. Toda4 /e hear aAout the B%ree /orldB and the B alue o% the indi idualB, and 4et the current scienti%ic ie/ o% man seems to lend little support to these concepts, Aut seems rather to lead to a 1ind o% moralit4 in /hich e er4 t4pe o% Aeha ior is excused on the plea that BI cannot help Aeing /hat I amGB I% /e /ould reall4 alue the indi idual, and support our %eeling o% %reedom /ith 1no/ledge, /e must %ind a point o% ie/ /hich /ill lead the ego to help itsel% Aecome /hat it /ants to Ae ,, a %ree Aeing. This cannot mean that /e must aAandon the scienti%ic path+ onl4 that the scope o% science must Ae /idened to ta1e into account the ego that experiences itsel% as spirit, /hich it does in the act o% thin1ing. Thus the Philosoph4 o% Freedom ta1es its start A4 examining the process o% thin1ing, and sho/s that there need Ae no %ear o% un1no/n causes in un1no/n /orlds %ore er Ae4ond the reach o% our 1no/ledge, since limits to 1no/ledge exist onl4 in so %ar as /e %ail to a/a1en our thin1ing to the point /here it Aecomes an organ o% direct perception. -a ing estaAlished the possiAilit4 o% 1no/ing, the Aoo1 goes on to sho/ that /e can also 1no/ the causes o% our actions, and i% our moti e %or acting comes %rom pure intuition, %rom thin1ing alone, /ithout an4 promptings %rom the appearances and illusions o% the sense,/orld, then /e can indeed act in %reedom, out o% pure lo e %or the deed. Man ultimatel4 has his %ate in his o/n hands, though the path to this condition o% %reedom is a long and a hard one, in the course o% /hich he must de elop merciless 1no/ledge o% himsel% and sel%less understanding o% others. -e must, through his o/n laAors, gi e Airth to /hat St. Paul called Bthe second Adam that /as made a @uic1ening spiritB. Indeed Steiner himsel% has re%erred to his philosoph4 o% %reedom as a Pauline theor4 o% 1no/ledge. ----. Notes On The Translation. This Aoo1 /as %irst translated into English A4 Pro%essor and Mrs. 9. F. Al%red -oernle, in &'&3, and /as edited A4 Mr. -arr4 Collison, /ho /rote that he /as %ortunate to ha e Aeen aAle to secure them as translators, Btheir thorough 1no/ledge o% philosoph4 and their complete command o% the =erman and English languages enaAling them to o ercome the di%%icult4 o% %inding ade@uate English e@ui alents %or the terms o% =erman Philosoph4.B Follo/ing the puAlication o% the re ised =erman edition in &'&(, Pro%essor -oernle translated the ne/ passages and other incidental changes that !r. Steiner had made. For

this &')) edition the title /as changed, at the author$s re@uest, to The Philosoph4 o% Spiritual Acti it4, /ith the added remar1 that Bthroughout the entire /or1 $%reedom$ should Ae ta1en to mean $spiritual acti it4$.B The reasons %or this change and also %or the present decision to change Aac1 to the original title are gi en Aelo/ 8see Freedom, Aelo/:. The translation /as re ised in &'0' A4 !r. -ermann PoppelAaum, /hose oACect /as to Bchec1 certain /ords and phrases %rom the strictl4 Steiner point o% ie/B. -e /rote in his pre%ace as %ollo/s# The readers o% the =erman original o% this Aoo1 /ill 1no/ that the author$s argument is largel4 Aased upon a distinction Aet/een the di%%erent elements ma1ing up the act o% .no/ledge. English philosophical terms are rarel4 exact e@ui alents o% =erman philosophical terms, and the translator$s standing proAlem is to a oid, or at least to minimiDe, the amAiguities resulting there%rom. The aim o% the present re ision o% the original translation has Aeen to help the reader to understand the anal4sis o% the act o% .no/ledge and to enaAle him to %ollo/ the suAse@uent chapters /ithout Aeing trouAled A4 amAiguous terms. In spite o% !r. PoppelAaum$s remo al o% certain amAiguities, readers /ere still trouAled A4 di%%iculties that did not deri e %rom the original =erman. "hen I /as as1ed A4 the puAlishers to prepare this ne/ edition, it soon Aecame clear to me that %urther alterations to /ords and phrases /ould not Ae su%%icient to remo e these di%%iculties. It ma4 there%ore Ae help%ul to state Arie%l4 /hat m4 guiding principles ha e Aeen in ma1ing this translation. Steiner did not /rite his Aoo1 as a thesis %or students o% philosoph4, Aut in order to gi e a sound philosophical Aasis to the experience o% onesel% as a %ree spirit ,, an experience that is open to e er4Aod4. The Aoo1 is /ritten in such a /a4 that the er4 reading o% it is a help to/ards participating in this experience. For this reason all the terms used must con e4 a real meaning to the reader, and an4 explanations re@uired must Ae in /ords that are sel%, e ident. Indeed, Steiner states clearl4 that the terms he uses do not al/a4s ha e the precise meanings gi en in current scienti%ic /ritings, Aut that his intention is to record the %acts o% e er4da4 experience 8see Chapter ):. I ha e tried throughout to con e4 the essential meaning o% Steiner$s original /ords, and to %ollo/ closel4 his train o% thought, so that the English reader ma4 ha e as nearl4 as possiAle the same experience that a =erman reader has %rom the original text. Thus the structure o% the original has Aeen preser ed, sentence A4 sentence. It might Ae argued that a B%reeB translation, ma1ing %ull use o% English idiom and st4le, /ould Ae %ar more appropriate %or an English reader+ this could cut out the /ord4 repetitions and length4 phrases t4pical o% =erman philosophical /riting and ma1e %or a more readaAle text. Eut it /ould also ha e to Ae /ritten out o% the English philosophical tradition, and /ould re@uire a complete reconstruction o% Steiner$s arguments %rom the point o% ie/ o% an Englishman$s philosoph4. This might Ae an excellent thing to do, Aut /ould constitute a ne/ /or1, not a translation.

E en i% it /ere attempted, there /ould still Ae the need %or a close translation ma1ing Steiner$s path o% 1no/ledge a ailaAle in detail %or the English reader. The method I ha e %ollo/ed /as to ma1e a %resh translation o% each passage and then compare it /ith the existing one, choosing the Aetter ersion o% the t/o. "here there /as no ad antage in ma1ing a change, I ha e le%t the earlier ersion, so that man4 passages appear unaltered %rom the pre ious edition. This is there%ore a thoroughl4 re ised, rather than an entirel4 ne/, translation. It is m4 hope that it /ill pro e straight%or/ard reading %or an4one prepared to %ollo/ the author along the path o% experience he has descriAed. The %ollo/ing notes explaining certain o% the terms used are intended tor those /ho /ant to compare this edition /ith the =erman original, or /ho are ma1ing a special stud4 o% philosoph4. ----. Freedom. Freedom is not an exact e@ui alent o% the =erman /ord Freiheit, although among its /ide spectrum o% meanings there are some that do correspond. In certain circumstances, ho/e er, the di%%erences are important. Steiner himsel% dre/ attention to this, %or instance, in a lecture he ga e at Ox%ord in &')), /here he said /ith re%erence to this Aoo1, BThere%ore toda4 /e need aAo e all a ie/ o% the /orld Aased on Freiheit ,, one can use this /ord in =erman, Aut here in England one must put it di%%erentl4 Aecause the /ord $%reedom$ has a di%%erent meaning ,, one must sa4 a ie/ o% the /orld Aased on spiritual acti it4, on action, on thin1ing and %eeling that arise %rom the indi idual human spirit.B 8Translated %rom the =erman.: Steiner also dre/ attention to the di%%erent endings o% the /ords+ Freiheit could Ae rendered literall4 as B%reehoodB i% such a /ord existed. The =erman ending ,heit implied an inner condition or degree, /hile ,tum, corresponding to our B,domB, implied something granted or imposed %rom outside. This is onl4 partl4 true in English, as a consideration o% the /ords BmanhoodB, B1nighthoodB, Bser%domB, BearldomB, and B/isdomB /ill sho/. In an4 case, meanings change /ith time, and current usage rather than et4molog4 is the Aest guide. "hen descriAing an4 1ind o% creati e acti it4 /e spea1 o% a B%reedom o% st4leB or B%reedom o% expressionB in a /a4 that indicates an inner con@uest o% outer restraints. This inner con@uest is the theme o% the Aoo1, and it is in this sense that I Aelie e the title The Philosoph4 o% Freedom /ould Ae understood toda4. "hen Steiner @uestioned the aptness o% this title, he expressed the ie/ that English people Aelie ed that the4 alread4 possessed %reedom, and that the4 needed to Ae shoc1ed out o% their complacenc4 and made to realiDe that the %reedom he meant had to Ae attained A4 hard /or1. "hile this ma4 still Ae true toda4, the alternati e he suggested is no/ less li1el4 to achie e this shoc1 than is the original. I ha e not %ound that the title BThe

Philosoph4 o% Spiritual Acti it4B gi es the ne/comer an4 indication that the goal o% the Aoo1 is the attainment o% inner %reedom. Toda4 it is Cust as li1el4 to suggest a Custi%ication o% religious practices. Throughout the Aoo1 it has pro ed @uite impossiAle to translate Freiheit as Bspiritual acti it4B /here er it occurs. The /ord appears in the titles o% the parts o% the Aoo1 and o% some o% the chapters+ the Aoo1 opens /ith the @uestion o% %reedom or necessit4, and the %inal sentence 8see Conse@uences o% Monism: is B-e is %ree.B >ndouAtedl4 B%reedomB is the proper English /ord to express the main theme o% the Aoo1, and should also appear in the Aoo1$s title. Times ha e changed, and /hat ma4 /ell ha e Aeen good reasons %or changing the title in &')) are not necessaril4 still alid. A%ter much thought, and ta1ing e er4thing into account, I ha e decided that the content o% the Aoo1 is Aetter represented toda4 A4 the title The Philosoph4 o% Freedom. Moreo er, /ith this title the Aoo1 ma4 Ae instantl4 identi%ied /ith !ie Philosophie der Freiheit, and I ha e alread4 remar1ed that this edition is intended as a close translation o% the =erman, rather than a ne/ Aoo1 speciall4 /ritten %or the English. ----. Spirit, Soul And Mind. Spirit, Soul And Mind are not precise e@ui alents in English o% the =erman =eist and Seele. Perhaps Aecause /e use the concept o% mind to include all our experiences through thin1ing, the concepts o% spirit and soul ha e practicall4 dropped out o% e er4da4 use, /hereas in =erman there is no distinct e@ui alent %or BmindB and the concepts BspiritB 8=eist: and BsoulB 8Seele: are conse@uentl4 Aroader in scope. An4 /or1 descriAing Steiner$s point o% ie/ in terms o% English philosoph4 /ould ha e to deal /ith the mind as a central theme 8see %n 2:, Aut here our tas1 is to introduce readers to Steiner$s concepts o% spirit and soul. For Steiner, the spirit is experienced directl4 in the act o% intuiti e thin1ing. The human spirit is that part o% us that thin1s, Aut the spiritual /orld is not limited to the personal %ield o% the indi idual human Aeing+ it opens out to emArace the eternal truths o% existence. The English /ord BspiritB gi es the sense o% something more uni ersal, less personal, than Bmind B, and since Steiner$s philosophical path leads to an experience o% the realit4 o% the spiritual /orld, I ha e 1ept the /ord /here er possiAle, using Bmind B or Bmental B in a %e/ places /here it seemed more appropriate. The Bspiritual acti it4B here meant is thus more than mental acti it4, although it starts at a le el /e /ould call mental+ it leads the human Aeing, a/are o% himsel% as a spirit, into the ultimate experience o% truth. The soul, too, is directl4 experienced+ it is not a ague metaph4sical entit4, Aut is that region in us /here /e experience our li1es and disli1es, our %eelings o% pleasure and pain.

It contains those characteristics o% thought and %eeling that ma1e us indi idual, di%%erent %rom each other. In man4 common phrases /e use the /ord BmindB /here =erman has the /ord Seele, Aut since Steiner recogniDes a distinction Aet/een soul and spirit, it is important to 1eep these di%%erent /ords. E en in modern English usage something o% this di%%erence remains, and it is not too late to hope that Steiner$s exact oAser ations in this realm ma4 help to pre ent the terms BsoulB and BspiritB Aecoming mere s4non4ms. There%ore I ha e 1ept these /ords /here er the distinction /as important, though in a %e/ places an alternati e rendering seemed to %it Aetter+ %or instance, the Bintrospecti e oAser ationB @uoted in the motto on the title,page could ha e Aeen rendered literall4 as BoAser ation o% the soulB ,, this oAser ation in ol es a critical examination o% our haAits o% thought and %eeling, not studied %rom outside in the manner o% a ps4chological sur e4 o% human Aeha ior, Aut %rom inside /here each person meets himsel% %ace to %ace. The /hole Aoo1 can Ae considered as a stud4 o% the mind, Aut using an exactness o% oAser ation and clarit4 o% thin1ing ne er Ae%ore achie ed. Ne ertheless, the stream o% materialism still %lo/s so strongl4 that there is a real danger that the mind, and indeed the /hole realm o% the soul and the spirit, /ill Ae dismissed as a metaph4sical construction. Onl4 A4 adopting a philosoph4 such as is de eloped in this Aoo1 /ill it Ae possiAle to retain an experience o% soul and o% spirit /hich /ill Ae strong enough to stand up to the o er/helming desire to accept nothing as real unless it is supported A4 science. For in this philosoph4 Steiner opens the door to a science o% the spirit e er4 Ait as exact and precise as our current science o% nature /ould Ae. ----. Concept And Percept. Concept And Percept are the direct e@ui alents o% Eegri%% and "ahrnehmung. The concept is something grasped A4 thin1ing, an element o% the /orld o% ideas. Steiner descriAes /hat it is at the Aeginning o% Chapter * 8see Chapter *:. In descriAing the percept 8see Chapter *:, Steiner mentions the amAiguit4 o% current speech. The =erman /ord "ahrnehmung, li1e the English BperceptionB, can mean either the process o% percei ing or the oACect percei ed as an element o% oAser ation. Steiner uses the /ord in the latter sense, and the /ord BperceptB, though not perhaps in common use, does a oid the amAiguit4. The /ord does not re%er to an actual concrete oACect that is Aeing oAser ed, %or this /ould onl4 Ae recogniDed as such a%ter the appropriate concept had Aeen attached to it, Aut to the content o% oAser ation de oid o% an4 conceptual element. This includes not onl4 sensations o% color, sound, pressure, /armth, taste, smell, and so on, Aut %eelings o% pleasure and pain and e en thoughts, once the thin1ing is done.

Modern science has come to the conclusion that one cannot deal /ith a sensation de oid o% an4 conceptual element, and uses the term BperceptionB to include the /hole response to a stimulus, in other /ords, to mean the result o% percei ing. Eut e en i% one cannot communicate the nature o% an experience o% pure percept to another person, one must still Ae aAle to deal /ith it as an essential part o% the anal4sis o% the process o% 1no/ledge. >sing the /ord BperceptB %or this element o% the anal4sis, /e are %ree to 1eep the /ord BperceptionB %or the process o% percei ing. ----. Idea And Mental Picture. Idea And Mental Picture, as used here, correspond to the =erman /ords Idee and <orstellung respecti el4. Normall4 these /ould Aoth Ae rendered as BideaB, and this practice led to an amAiguit4 that oAscured a distinction central to Steiner$s argument. This /as the main cause o% !r. PoppelAaum$s concern, and his solution /as to render <orstellung as BrepresentationB and Idee as BIdeaB /ith a capital BIB. Though this usage ma4 ha e philosophical Custi%ication, it has Aeen m4 experience in group studies o% this Aoo1 o er man4 4ears that it has ne er Aeen %ull4 accepted in practice+ BrepresentationB remains a specialist term /ith a sense rather di%%erent %rom its usual meaning in English, and it certainl4 does not ha e the same oA ious meaning %or the English reader that <orstellung has %or the =erman. In explaining his use o% the /ord BrepresentationB, !r. PoppelAaum /rote in his pre%ace as %ollo/s# The mental picture /hich the thin1er %orms to represent the concept in an indi idual /a4 is here called a BrepresentationB ... Since Bmental pictureB is here used to explain the term BrepresentationB, it seems simpler to use Bmental pictureB throughout. It %its Steiner$s treatment er4 /ell, since it con e4s to the reader Aoth the sense o% something conceptual, in that it is mental, and the sense o% something perceptual, in that it is a picture. In %act, Steiner gi es t/o de%initions o% the mental picture, one as a Bpercept in m4 sel%B 8see Chapter *: and another as an Bindi idualiDed conceptB 8see Chapter 3:, and it is this intermediate position Aet/een percept and concept that gi es the mental picture its importance in the process o% 1no/ledge. Another ad antage o% the term Bmental pictureB is that the erA Bto pictureB corresponds /ell /ith the =erman orstellen, impl4ing a mental creation o% a scene rather than a ph4sical representation /ith pencil, paints or camera, /hich /ould Ae Bto depictB. O% course the isual term BpictureB must Ae understood to co er also the content o% other senses, %or instance, a rememAered tune or a recollection o% tran@uillit4, Aut this Aroadening o% meaning through analog4 is inherent in English usage. Although mental pictures are commonl4 regarded as a special class o% ideas, here the term

BideaB is used onl4 %or the =erman Idee, /ithout amAiguit4. Ideas are not indi idualiDed, Aut are B%uller, more saturated, more comprehensi e conceptsB 8see Chapter *:. In the later part o% the Aoo1, /hen discussing the nature o% a conscious moti e, Steiner uses the /ord to include all concepts in the most general /a4, indi idualiDed or not, /hich comes er4 close to the English use o% the /ord BideaB. ----. Imagination. Imagination means the %acult4 and process o% creating mental pictures. The /ord is the same as the =erman Imagination, Aut I ha e also used it %or the =erman Phantasie, Aecause the /ord B%antas4B suggests something altogether too %ar %rom realit4, /hereas BimaginationB can mean something not onl4 the product o% our o/n consciousness, Aut also a step to/ards the realiDation o% something ne/. Thus the title gi en to Chapter &), Moral Imagination 8%or Moralische Phantasie:, seemed to me to Ae correct, and I ha e 1ept it. It descriAes the process o% ta1ing an aAstract idea, or concept, and creating a i id mental picture o% ho/ it can Ae applied in a particular circumstance, so that it ma4 Aecome the moti e %or a moral deed. In later /ritings Steiner descriAes ho/ this ordinar4 %acult4 o% imagining, or ma1ing mental pictures, can Ae de eloped to the point /here it Aecomes the %acult4 o% actuall4 percei ing the creati e ideas Aehind the phenomena o% nature. In these later /ritings BImaginationB Aecomes a special term to indicate this le el o% perception, Aut in this Aoo1 the meaning remains near to the ordinar4 usage. -o/e er, the gate/a4 to such higher le els o% perception is opened through the path o% experience here set %orth. ----. Intuition. Intuition is again the same as the =erman /ord, and means the %acult4 and process o% grasping concepts, in particular the immediate apprehension o% a thought /ithout reasoning. This is the normal English usage, though Steiner uses the term in an exact /a4, as %ollo/s 8see Chapter 2:# In contrast to the content o% the percept /hich is gi en to us %rom /ithout, the content o% thin1ing appears in/ardl4. The %orm in /hich this %irst ma1es its appearance /e /ill call intuition. Intuition is %or thin1ing /hat oAser ation is %or the percept. 6ater in the Aoo1 he gi es another de%inition 8see Chapter ':# Intuition is the conscious experience ,, in pure spirit ,, o% a purel4 spiritual content. Onl4 through an intuition can the essence o% thin1ing Ae grasped. From this it is not di%%icult to see ho/ again, in later /ritings, Steiner could descriAe a

stage o% perception still higher than that called BImaginationB, the stage o% BIntuitionB in /hich one immediatel4 apprehends the realit4 o% other spiritual Aeings. Although this Aoo1 deals onl4 /ith the spiritual content o% pure thin1ing, intuition at this le el is also a step to/ards a higher le el o% percei ing realit4. ----. ----. Experience. Experience has t/o meanings, /hich correspond to di%%erent /ords in =erman. BActual oAser ation o% %acts or e entsB corresponds to the =erman ErleAnis and to the erA erleAen, /hile Bthe 1no/ledge resulting %rom this oAser ationB corresponds to Er%ahrung, Thus the accumulation o% 1no/ledge can Ae descriAed as Bpast experienceB or Btotal sum o% experienceB, i% the single /ord is amAiguous 8see, %or instance, Chapter 3:. "hen spea1ing o% human Aeha ior that is Aased on past experience, Steiner calls it pra1tische Er%ahrung, /hich is rendered as Bpractical experienceB 8see Chapter ':. On the other hand, ha ing direct experience as an acti it4 o% oAser ation is expressed A4 the erA erleAen, /hich means literall4 Bto li e throughB. Thus, in the latter part o% the Aoo1, particularl4 in those passages /hich /ere added in &'&( 8see Chapter 5 and Conse@uences o% Monism:, Steiner spea1s repeatedl4 o% the Bthin1ing /hich can Ae experiencedB. This experience is to Ae understood as e er4 Ait as real and concrete as the Bactual oAser ation o% %acts and e entsB descriAed aAo e. ----. Moti e And !ri ing Force. Moti e And !ri ing Force are t/o elements in an4 act o% /ill that ha e to Ae recogniDed as distinct 8see Chapter ':. The4 correspond to the =erman /ords Moti and TrieA%eder, respecti el4. BMoti eB, as used A4 Steiner, corresponds exactl4 to the common English usage, meaning the reason that a person has %or his action. It has to Ae a conscious moti e, in the %orm o% a concept or mental picture, or else /e cannot spea1 o% an act o% /ill, let alone a moral deed. An Bunconscious moti eB is reall4 a contradiction in terms, and should properl4 Ae descriAed as a dri ing %orce ,, it implies that some other person has Aeen aAle to grasp the concept /hich /as the reason %or the action, though the person acting /as not himsel% a/are o% it+ he acted as an automaton, or, as /e properl4 sa4, B/ithout moti eB. Ne ertheless, modern ps4cholog4 has contri ed to de%ine the Bmoti e B as something no di%%erent %rom the dri ing %orce, /hich precludes the recognition o% a moti e grasped out o% pure intuition, and there%ore o% the essential di%%erence Aet/een a moral deed /here a man 1no/s /h4 he acts and an amoral one /here his 1no/ledge is a matter o%

indi%%erence. E4 ma1ing the distinction Aet/een moti e and dri ing %orce, Steiner has Aeen aAle to characteriDe all possiAle le els o% action %rom the purel4 instincti e to the completel4 %ree deed. The literal meaning o% TrieA%eder is the mainspring that dri es a piece o% cloc1/or1. In pre ious editions, this /as rendered as Bspring o% actionB. "hile this is legitimate philosophical usage, I %ound that it /as o%ten misunderstood A4 the ordinar4 reader, Aeing ta1en to mean a spring li1e a %ountain or ri er,source, as in the phrase Bsprings o% li%eB. This immediatel4 causes con%usion /ith the origin or source o% the action, /hich is the moti e. O% course, at the higher le els o% action there is no other dri ing %orce than the idea /hich stands as the moti e, Aut in order to %ollo/ the de elopment %rom lo/er le els one must distinguish the idea, /hich is the moti e, %rom /hate er it is in us that thro/s us into action /hene er a suitaAle moti e presents itsel%. BMainspringB does not al/a4s %it /ell in the text, and a%ter tr4ing arious /ords and phrases I ha e chosen Bdri ing %orceB as Aest expressing the d4namic nature o% this part o% our constitution. The dri ing %orce di%%ers %rom the moti e in that /e ma4 /ell remain unconscious o% it. Eut i% /e are not conscious o% the dri ing %orce Aehind our actions, /e cannot Ae acting in %reedom, e en though /e are a/are o% our moti es. Onl4 i% /e ma1e our o/n ideals the dri ing %orce o% our /ill can /e act in %reedom, Aecause then nothing apart %rom oursel es determines our action. Thus the %inal triumph o% Steiner$s path o% de elopment depends on ma1ing this clear distinction Aet/een moti e and dri ing %orce. A ie/ that treats all moti es as dri ing %orces /ill not Ae aAle to recogniDe the possiAilit4 o% %reedom, /hile a ie/ that regards all dri ing %orces as ideal elements /ill not see the need %or o ercoming our unconscious urges and haAits i% %reedom is to Ae attained. ----. "ill And "ant. "ill And "ant are t/o distinct /ords in English /here the =erman has onl4 one erA /ollen and its deri ati es. -ere the tas1 o% translating runs into a consideraAle di%%icult4, %or in an4 discussion o% %ree /ill it is important to Ae clear /hat /illing is. The noun %orms are %airl4 straight%or/ard# ein "ollen means Ban act o% /illB, das "ollen means B/illingB in general, and der "ille means Bthe /illB. Eut the English erA Bto /illB has a restricted range o% meaning, and to use it all the time to render the =erman /ollen can Ae @uite misleading. An example is the @uotation %rom -amerling in the %irst chapter 8see Chapter &:# !er Mensch 1ann allerdings tun, /as er /ill ,, aAer er 1ann nicht /ollen, /as er /ill, /eil sein "ille durch Moti e Aestimmt ist. The pre ious edition rendered this# Man can, it is true, do /hat he /ills, Aut he cannot /ill /hat he /ills, Aecause his /ill is determined A4 moti es. I% this means an4thing at all in English, it means that man cannot direct his /ill as he

chooses. The archaic sense o% B/illingB as BdesiringB is 1ept in the phrase B/hat he /illsB, in 1eeping /ith current usage, %or instance, in the remar1 BCome /hen 4ou /ill.B Eut the acti e sense o% B/illingB as contrasted /ith BdoingB implies a metaph4sical po/er o% compulsion @uite out o% 1eeping /ith Steiner$s /hole method o% treating the suACect. This metaph4sical attitude to the /ill is clearl4 expressed in a sentence such as BI /illed him to goB, /hich implies something more than mere desire Aut less than o ert action. It is less oA ious /hen dealing /ith the genesis o% one$s o/n actions, Aut the tendenc4 to attriAute a metaph4sical @ualit4 to the /ill is de eloped in Schopenhauer$s philosoph4, and this ma4 /ell Ae a tendenc4 inherent in the =erman language. Steiner has no such intention, and he lea es us in no douAt that his use o% /ollen implies a de%inite element o% desire 8see Chapter &0:+ indeed, the highest expression o% man$s /ill is /hen it Aecomes the %acult4 o% spiritual desire or cra ing 8geistige Eegehrungs ermHgen:. There%ore, /hene er the archaic sense o% the erA Bto /illB is not appropriate, I ha e decided that it is Aetter to render the =erman erA /ollen /ith the English B/antB and its ariants, B/antingB, Bto /ant to . . .B and so on. This ma1es immediate good sense o% man4 passages, and moreo er i% one /ould translate this Aac1 into =erman one /ould ha e to use the /ord /ollen. -amerling$s sentence no/ Aecomes# Man can certainl4 do as he /ills, Aut he cannot /ant as he /ills, Aecause his /anting is determined A4 moti es. Although Steiner has to sho/ that this ie/ is mista1en, one can at least understand ho/ it could come to Ae /ritten. That it can Ae a genuine human experience is sho/n A4 the similar remar1 attriAuted to T.E. 6a/rence, BI can do /hat I /ant, Aut I cannot /ant /hat I /ant.B In other /ords, BI can carr4 out an4 desires %or action that I ma4 ha e, Aut I cannot choose ho/ these desires come to me.B Eoth 6a/rence and -amerling lea e out o% account Cust those cases /here man can /ant as he /ills, Aecause he has %reel4 chosen his o/n moti e. Steiner$s treatment o% the /ill o ercomes an4 necessit4 %or metaph4sical thin1ing+ %or instance, it no/ ma1es sense to sa4 that to /ant /ithout moti e /ould ma1e the /ill an Bempt4 %acult4B 8see Chapter &:, Aecause to /ant /ithout /anting something /ould Ae meaningless. I ha e dealt /ith this at some length Aecause it has Aeen m4 experience that the message o% the entire Aoo1 springs to li%e in a ne/ and i id /a4 /hen it is realiDed that the original moti e po/er o% the /ill is in %act desire, and that desire can Ae trans%ormed A4 1no/ledge into its most noAle %orm, /hich is lo e. ~~ It /as the late Friedrich =euter /ho sho/ed me, together /ith man4 others, the importance o% this Aoo1 as a Aasis %or the social as /ell as the intellectual li%e o% toda4. M4 deAt to the pre ious translators and editors /ill alread4 Ae clear. I also o/e much to the man4 %riends /ho ha e ta1en part in Coint studies o% this Aoo1 o er the past thirt4 4ears and to those /ho ha e helped and ad ised me /ith suggestions %or the translation, especiall4 the late =eorge Adams, O/en Ear%ield, and 9ita SteAAing. Finall4 I must

mention m4 colleague 9alph Eroc1leAan1, /ho has shared much o% the /or1, and, /ith !oroth4 Osmond, prepared it %or the Press. Michael "ilson, Clent, &'3*.
,,,,.

Footnotes:

&. PuAlished in parts %rom &')0,2, and ne er completed. The titles gi en %or !r. Steiner$s Aoo1s are those o% the English translations. ). The list o% titles is long, Aut the more important Aoo1s include# Christianit4 as M4stical Fact 8&';):, .no/ledge o% The -igher "orlds and its Attainment 8&';*:, Theosoph4, a description o% the nature o% man and his relation to the spiritual /orld 8&';*:, and Occult Science , An Outline, an account o% the e olution o% man and the uni erse in terms o% spiritual realities 8&'&;:. 0. For an account o% the li%e and /or1 o% 9udol% Steiner, see A Scientist o% The In isiAle, A4 A. P. Shepherd 8&'2*:. The range o% his contriAution to modem thought can Ae seen in The Faith%ul Thin1er, edited A4 A. C. -ar/ood 8&'3&:. *. See the discussion A4 O/en Ear%ield in BSa ing the AppearancesB, 8&'25:. 2. See B9udol% Steiner$s Concept o% MindB A4 O/en Ear%ield, in The Faith%ul Thin1er, pp. &&,)&. ----.

Author's Prefaces.
----. #. Pre$ace to the re ised edition o$ #%#&. There are t/o %undamental @uestions in the li%e o% the human soul to/ards /hich e er4thing to Ae discussed in this Aoo1 is directed, One is# Is it possiAle to %ind a ie/ o% the essential nature o% man such as /ill gi e us a %oundation %or e er4thing else that comes to meet us ,, /hether through li%e experience or through science ,, /hich /e %eel is other/ise not sel%,supporting and there%ore liaAle to Ae dri en A4 douAt and criticism into the realm o% uncertaint47 The other @uestion is this# Is man entitled to claim %or himsel% %reedom o% /ill, or is %reedom a mere illusion Aegotten o% his inaAilit4 to recogniDe the threads o% necessit4 on /hich his /ill, li1e an4 natural e ent, depends7 It is no arti%icial tissue o% theories that pro o1es this @uestion. In a certain mood it presents itsel% @uite naturall4 to the human soul. And one ma4 /ell %eel that i% the soul has not at some time %ound itsel% %aced in utmost seriousness A4 the proAlem o% %ree /ill or necessit4 it /ill not ha e reached its %ull stature. This Aoo1 is

intended to sho/ that the experiences /hich the second proAlem causes man$s soul to undergo depend upon the position he is aAle to ta1e up to/ards the %irst proAlem, An attempt is made to pro e that there is a ie/ o% the nature o% man$s Aeing /hich can support the rest o% 1no/ledge+ and %urther, that this ie/ completel4 Custi%ies the idea o% %ree /ill, pro ided onl4 that /e ha e %irst disco ered that region o% the soul in /hich %ree /ill can un%old itsel%. The ie/ to /hich /e here re%er is one /hich, once gained, is capaAle o% Aecoming part and parcel o% the er4 li%e o% the soul itsel%. The ans/er gi en to the t/o proAlems /ill not Ae o% the purel4 theoretical sort /hich, once mastered, ma4 Ae carried aAout as a con iction preser ed A4 memor4. Such an ans/er /ould, %or the /hole manner o% thin1ing on /hich this Aoo1 is Aased, Ae no real ans/er at all. The Aoo1 /ill not gi e a read4,made sel%,contained ans/er o% this sort, Aut /ill point to a %ield o% experience in /hich man$s inner soul acti it4 supplies a li ing ans/er to these @uestions at e er4 moment that he needs one. "hoe er has once disco ered the region o% the soul /here these @uestions un%old, /ill %ind that the er4 contemplation o% this region gi es him all that he needs %or the solution o% the t/o proAlems. "ith the 1no/ledge thus ac@uired, he ma4 then, as desire or destin4 impels him, ad enture %urther into the Areadths and depths o% this enigmatical li%e o% ours. Thus it /ould appear that a 1ind o% 1no/ledge /hich pro es its Custi%ication and alidit4 A4 its o/n inner li%e as /ell as A4 the 1inship o% its o/n li%e /ith the /hole li%e o% the human soul, does in %act exist. This is ho/ I thought aAout the content o% this Aoo1 /hen I %irst /rote it do/n t/ent4,%i e 4ears ago. Toda4, once again, I ha e to set do/n similar sentences i% I am to characteriDe the main ideas o% the Aoo1. At the original /riting I limited m4sel% to sa4ing no more than /as in the strictest sense connected /ith the t/o %undamental @uestions /hich I ha e outlined. I% an4one should Ae astonished at not %inding in this Aoo1 an4 re%erence to that region o% the /orld o% spiritual experience descriAed in m4 later /ritings, I /ould as1 him to Aear in mind that it /as not m4 purpose at that time to set do/n the results o% spiritual research, Aut %irst to la4 the %oundations on /hich such results can rest. The Philosoph4 o% Freedom does not contain an4 results o% this sort, an4 more than it contains special results o% the natural sciences. Eut /hat it does contain is in m4 Cudgment aAsolutel4 necessar4 %or an4one /ho see1s a secure %oundation %or such 1no/ledge. "hat I ha e said in this Aoo1 ma4 Ae acceptaAle e en to some /ho, %or reasons o% their o/n, re%use to ha e an4thing to do /ith the results o% m4 researches into the spiritual realm. Eut an4one /ho %eels dra/n to/ards the results o% these spiritual researches ma4 /ell appreciate the importance o% /hat I /as here tr4ing to do. It is this# to sho/ that open,

minded consideration simpl4 o% the t/o @uestions I ha e indicated and /hich are %undamental %or e er4 1ind o% 1no/ledge, leads to the ie/ that man li es in the midst o% a genuine spiritual /orld. In this Aoo1 the attempt is made to sho/ that a 1no/ledge o% the spirit realm Ae%ore entering upon actual spiritual experience is %ull4 Custi%ied. The course o% this demonstration is so conducted that %or an4one /ho is aAle and /illing to enter into these arguments it is ne er necessar4, in order to accept them, to cast %urti e glances at the experiences /hich m4 later /ritings ha e sho/n to Ae rele ant. Thus it seems to me that in one sense this Aoo1 occupies a position completel4 independent o% m4 /ritings on actual spiritual scienti%ic matters. Fet in another sense it is most intimatel4 connected /ith them. These considerations ha e mo ed me no/, a%ter a lapse o% t/ent4,%i e 4ears, to repuAlish the contents o% this Aoo1 practicall4 unaltered in all essentials. I ha e, ho/e er, made additions o% some length to a numAer o% chapters. The misunderstandings o% m4 argument /hich I ha e met seemed to ma1e these more detailed elaAorations necessar4. Changes o% text ha e Aeen made onl4 /here it appeared to me that I had said clumsil4 /hat I meant to sa4 a @uarter o% a centur4 ago. 8Onl4 ill /ill could %ind in these changes occasion to suggest that I ha e changed m4 %undamental con iction.: For man4 4ears m4 Aoo1 has Aeen out o% print. In spite o% the %act, /hich is apparent %rom /hat I ha e Cust said, that m4 utterances o% t/ent4,%i e 4ears ago aAout these proAlems still seem to me Cust as rele ant toda4, I hesitated a long time aAout the completion o% this re ised edition. Again and again I ha e as1ed m4sel% /hether I ought not, at this point or that, to de%ine m4 position to/ards the numerous philosophical ie/s /hich ha e Aeen put %or/ard since the puAlication o% the %irst edition. Fet m4 preoccupation in recent 4ears /ith researches into the purel4 spiritual realm pre ented me %rom doing this in the /a4 I could ha e /ished. -o/e er, a sur e4 o% the philosophical literature o% the present da4, as thorough as I could ma1e it, has con inced me that such a critical discussion, tempting though it /ould Ae in itsel%, /ould Ae out o% place in the context o% this Aoo1. All that it seemed to me necessar4 to sa4 aAout recent philosophical tendencies, %rom the point o% ie/ o% the Philosoph4 o% Freedom, ma4 Ae %ound in the second olume o% m4 9iddles o% Philosoph4. 9udol% Steiner April &'&(. ----. '. Pre$ace to the $irst edition, #&%() re ised, #%#&. In the %ollo/ing is reproduced, in all essentials, /hat stood as a pre%ace in the %irst edition o% this Aoo1. Since it sho/s the mood o% thought out o% /hich I /rote this Aoo1 t/ent4, %i e 4ears ago, rather than ha ing an4 direct Aearing on its contents, I include it here as an

appendix. I do not /ant to omit it altogether, Aecause the opinion 1eeps cropping up that I need to suppress some o% m4 earlier /ritings on account o% m4 later ones on spiritual science. Onl4 the er4 %irst introductor4 sentences o% this pre%ace 8in the %irst edition: ha e Aeen altogether omitted here, Aecause toda4 the4 seem to me @uite irrele ant. Eut the rest o% /hat /as said seems to me necessar4 e en toda4, in spite o%, indeed, Cust Aecause o% the natural scienti%ic manner o% thin1ing o% our contemporaries. Our age can onl4 accept truth %rom the depths o% human nature. O% Schiller$s t/o /ell, 1no/n paths, it is the second that /ill mostl4 Ae chosen at the present time# Truth see1 /e Aoth. Thou in the li%e /ithout thee and around+ I in the heart /ithin. E4 Aoth can Truth ali1e Ae %ound. The health4 e4e can through the /orld the great Creator trac1+ The health4 heart is Aut the glass /hich gi es Creation Aac1. 8Translation A4 E. Eul/er 64tton.: A truth /hich comes to us %rom outside al/a4s Aears the stamp o% uncertaint4. "e can Aelie e onl4 /hat appears to each one o% us in our o/n hearts as truth. Onl4 the truth can gi e us assurance in de eloping our indi idual po/ers. "hoe er is tortured A4 douAts %inds his po/ers lamed. In a /orld %ull o% riddles, he can %ind no goal %or his creati e energies. "e no longer /ant merel4 to Aelie e+ /e /ant to 1no/. Eelie% demands the acceptance o% truths /hich /e do not %ull4 comprehend. Eut things /e do not %ull4 comprehend are repugnant to the indi idual element in us, /hich /ants to experience e er4thing in the depths o% its inner Aeing. The onl4 1no/ledge /hich satis%ies us is one /hich is suACect to no external standards Aut springs %rom the inner li%e o% the personalit4. Again, /e do not /ant an4 1no/ledge o% the 1ind that has Aecome %roDen once and %or all into rigid academic rules, preser ed in enc4clopedias alid %or all time. Each o% us claims the right to start %rom the %acts that lie nearest to hand, %rom his o/n immediate experiences, and thence to ascend to a 1no/ledge o% the /hole uni erse. "e stri e a%ter certaint4 in 1no/ledge, Aut each in his o/n /a4. Our scienti%ic doctrines, too, should no longer Ae %ormulated as i% /e /ere unconditionall4 compelled to accept them. None o% us /ould /ish to gi e a scienti%ic /or1 a title li1e Fichte$s BA Pellucid Account %or the =eneral PuAlic concerning the 9eal Nature o% the Ne/est Philosoph4. An Attempt to Compel the 9eaders to >nderstand.B Toda4 noAod4 should Ae compelled to understand. From an4one /ho is not dri en to a certain ie/ A4 his o/n indi idual needs, /e demand no ac1no/ledgment or agreement. E en /ith the immature human Aeing, the child, /e do

not no/ada4s cram 1no/ledge into it, Aut /e tr4 to de elop its capacities so that it /ill no longer need to Ae compelled to understand, Aut /ill /ant to understand. I am under no illusion aAout these characteristics o% m4 time. I 1no/ ho/ much the tendenc4 pre ails to ma1e things impersonal and stereot4ped. Eut I 1no/ e@uall4 /ell that man4 o% m4 contemporaries tr4 to order their li es in the 1ind o% /a4 I ha e indicated. To them I /ould dedicate this Aoo1. It is not meant to gi e Bthe onl4 possiAleB path to the truth, Aut is meant to descriAe the path ta1en A4 one %or /hom truth is the main concern. The Aoo1 leads at %irst into some/hat aAstract regions, /here thought must dra/ sharp outlines i% it is to reach clearl4 de%ined positions. Eut the reader /ill also Ae led out o% these arid concepts into concrete li%e. I am indeed %ull4 con inced that one must raise onesel% into the ethereal realm o% concepts i% one /ould experience e er4 aspect o% existence. "hoe er appreciates onl4 the pleasures o% the senses is unac@uainted /ith li%e$s s/eetest sa ors. The oriental sages ma1e their disciples li e a li%e o% renunciation and asceticism %or 4ears Ae%ore the4 impart to them their o/n /isdom. The /estern /orld no longer demands pious exercises and ascetic haAits as a preparation %or science, Aut it does re@uire the /illingness to /ithdra/ onesel% a/hile %rom the immediate impressions o% li%e, and to Aeta1e onesel% into the realm o% pure thought. The realms o% li%e are man4. For each one, special sciences de elop. Eut li%e itsel% is a unit4, and the more deepl4 the sciences tr4 to penetrate into their separate realms, the more the4 /ithdra/ themsel es %rom the ision o% the /orld as a li ing /hole. There must Ae a 1no/ledge /hich see1s in the separate sciences the elements %or leading man Aac1 once more to the %ullness o% li%e. The scienti%ic specialist see1s through his %indings to de elop a/areness o% the /orld and its /or1ings+ in this Aoo1 the aim is a philosophical one ,, that 1no/ledge itsel% shall Aecome organicall4 ali e. The separate sciences are stages on the /a4 to that 1no/ledge /e are here tr4ing to achie e. A similar relationship exists in the arts. The composer /or1s on the Aasis o% the theor4 o% composition. This theor4 is a collection o% rules /hich one has to 1no/ in order to compose. In composing, the rules o% the theor4 Aecome the ser ants o% li%e itsel%, o% realit4. In exactl4 the same sense, philosoph4 is an art. All real philosophers ha e Aeen artists in the realm o% concepts. For them, human ideas /ere their artists$ materials and scienti%ic method their artistic techni@ue. AAstract thin1ing thus ta1es on concrete indi idual li%e. The ideas Aecome po/er%ul %orces in li%e. Then /e do not merel4 ha e 1no/ledge aAout things, Aut ha e made 1no/ledge into a real sel%go erning organism+ our actual /or1ing consciousness has risen Ae4ond a mere passi e reception o% truths.

-o/ philosoph4 as an art is related to human %reedom, /hat %reedom is, and /hether /e do, or can, participate in it ,, this is the main theme o% m4 Aoo1. All other scienti%ic discussions are included onl4 Aecause the4 ultimatel4 thro/ light on these @uestions, /hich are, in m4 opinion, the most immediate concern o% man1ind. These pages o%%er a BPhilosoph4 o% FreedomB. All science /ould Ae nothing Aut the satis%action o% idle curiosit4 did it not stri e to raise the alue o% existence %or the personalit4 o% man. The sciences attain their true alue onl4 A4 sho/ing the human signi%icance o% their results. The ultimate aim o% the indi idual can ne er Ae the culti ation o% a single %acult4, Aut onl4 the de elopment o% all the capacities that slumAer /ithin us. .no/ledge has alue onl4 in so %ar as it contriAutes to the all, round de elopment o% the /hole nature o% man. This Aoo1, there%ore, concei es the relationship Aet/een science and li%e, not in such a /a4 that man must Ao/ do/n Ae%ore an idea and de ote his po/ers to its ser ice, Aut in the sense that he masters the /orld o% ideas in order to use them %or his human aims, /hich transcend those o% mere science. One must Ae aAle to con%ront an idea and experience it+ other/ise one /ill %all into its Aondage. ----.

1 - Conscious Human Action.

Is man in his thin1ing and acting a spirituall4 %ree Aeing, or is he compelled A4 the iron necessit4 o% purel4 natural la/7 There are %e/ @uestions upon /hich so much sagacit4 has Aeen Arought to Aear. The idea o% the %reedom o% the human /ill has %ound enthusiastic supporters and stuAAorn opponents in plent4. There are those /ho, in their moral %er or, laAel an4one a man o% limited intelligence /ho can den4 so patent a %act as %reedom. Opposed to them are others /ho regard it as the acme o% unscienti%ic thin1ing %or an4one to Aelie e that the uni%ormit4 o% natural la/ is Aro1en in the sphere o% human action and thin1ing. One and the same thing is thus proclaimed, no/ as the most precious possession o% humanit4, no/ as its most %atal illusion. In%inite suAtlet4 has Aeen emplo4ed to explain ho/ human %reedom can Ae consistent /ith the la/s /or1ing in nature, o% /hich man, a%ter all, is a part. No less is the trouAle to /hich others ha e gone to explain ho/ such a delusion as this could ha e arisen. That /e are dealing here /ith one o% the most important @uestions %or li%e, religion, conduct, science, must Ae %elt A4 an4one /ho includes an4 degree o% thoroughness at all in his ma1e,up. It is one o% the sad signs o% the super%icialit4 o% present,da4 thought that a Aoo1 /hich attempts to de elop a ne/ %aith out o% the results o% recent scienti%ic research, 8see %n &: has nothing more to sa4 on this @uestion than these

/ords# "ith the @uestion o% the %reedom o% the human /ill /e are not concerned. The alleged %reedom o% indi%%erent choice has Aeen recogniDed as an empt4 illusion A4 e er4 philosoph4 /orth4 o% the name. The moral aluation o% human action and character remains untouched A4 this proAlem. It is not Aecause I consider that the Aoo1 in /hich it occurs has an4 special importance that I @uote this passage, Aut Aecause it seems to me to express the ie/ to /hich the thin1ing o% most o% our contemporaries manages to rise in this matter. E er4one /ho claims to ha e gro/n Ae4ond the 1indergarten stage o% science appears to 1no/ no/ada4s that %reedom cannot consist in choosing, at one$s pleasure, one or other o% t/o possiAle courses o% action. There is al/a4s, so /e are told, a per%ectl4 de%inite reason /h4, out o% se eral possiAle actions, /e carr4 out Cust one and no other. This seems oA ious. Ne ertheless, do/n to the present da4, the main attac1s o% the opponents o% %reedom are directed onl4 against %reedom o% choice. E en -erAert Spencer, /hose doctrines are gaining ground dail4, sa4s, That e er4one is at liAert4 to desire or not to desire, /hich is the real proposition in ol ed in the dogma o% %ree /ill, is negated as much A4 the anal4sis o% consciousness, as A4 the contents o% the preceding chapter. 8see %n ): Others, too, start %rom the same point o% ie/ in comAating the concept o% %ree /ill. The germs o% all the rele ant arguments are to Ae %ound as earl4 as SpinoDa. All that he Arought %or/ard in clear and simple language against the idea o% %reedom has since Aeen repeated times /ithout numAer, Aut as a rule en eloped in the most hair,splitting theoretical doctrines, so that it is di%%icult to recogniDe the straight%or/ard train o% thought /hich is all that matters. SpinoDa /rites in a letter o% OctoAer or No emAer, &35*, I call a thing %ree /hich exists and acts %rom the pure necessit4 o% its nature, and I call that un%ree, o% /hich the Aeing and action are precisel4 and %ixedl4 determined A4 something else. Thus, %or example, =od, though necessar4, is %ree Aecause he exists onl4 through the necessit4 o% his o/n nature. Similarl4, =od cogniDes himsel% and all else %reel4, Aecause it %ollo/s solel4 %rom the necessit4 o% his nature that he cogniDes all. Fou see, there%ore, that %or me %reedom consists not in %ree decision, Aut in %ree necessit4. Eut let us come do/n to created things /hich are all determined A4 external causes to exist and to act in a %ixed and de%inite manner. To percei e this more clearl4, let us imagine a per%ectl4 simple case. A stone, %or example, recei es %rom an external cause acting upon it a certain @uantit4 o% motion, A4 reason o% /hich it necessaril4 continues to mo e, a%ter the impact o% the external cause has ceased. The continued motion o% the stone is due to compulsion, not to the necessit4 o% its o/n nature, Aecause it re@uires to Ae de%ined A4 the thrust o% an external cause. "hat is true

here %or the stone is true also %or e er4 other particular thing, ho/e er complicated and man4,sided it ma4 Ae, namel4, that e er4thing is necessaril4 determined A4 external causes to exist and to act in a %ixed and de%inite manner. No/, please, suppose that this stone during its motion thin1s and 1no/s that it is stri ing to the Aest o% its aAilit4 to continue in motion. This stone, /hich is conscious onl4 o% its stri ing and is A4 no means indi%%erent, /ill Aelie e that it is aAsolutel4 %ree, and that it continues in motion %or no other reason than its o/n /ill to continue. Eut this is Cust the human %reedom that e er4Aod4 claims to possess and /hich consists in nothing Aut this, that men are conscious o% their desires, Aut ignorant o% the causes A4 /hich the4 are determined. Thus the child Aelie es that he desires mil1 o% his o/n %ree /ill, the angr4 Ao4 regards his desire %or engeance as %ree, and the co/ard his desire %or %light. Again, the drun1en man Aelie es that he sa4s o% his o/n %ree /ill /hat, soAer again, he /ould %ain ha e le%t unsaid, and as this preCudice is innate in all men, it is di%%icult to %ree onesel% %rom it. For, although experience teaches us o%ten enough that man least o% all can temper his desires, and that, mo ed A4 con%licting passions, he sees the Aetter and pursues the /orse, 4et he considers himsel% %ree Aecause there are some things /hich he desires less strongl4, and some desires /hich he can easil4 inhiAit through the recollection o% something else /hich it is o%ten possiAle to recall. Eecause this ie/ is so clearl4 and de%initel4 expressed it is eas4 to detect the %undamental error that it contains. The same necessit4 A4 /hich a stone ma1es a de%inite mo ement as the result o% an impact, is said to compel a man to carr4 out an action /hen impelled thereto A4 an4 reason. It is onl4 Aecause man is conscious o% his action that he thin1s himsel% to Ae its originator. Eut in doing so he o erloo1s the %act that he is dri en A4 a cause /hich he cannot help oAe4ing. The error in this train o% thought is soon disco ered. SpinoDa, and all /ho thin1 li1e him, o erloo1 the %act that man not onl4 is conscious o% his action, Aut also ma4 Aecome conscious o% the causes /hich guide him. NoAod4 /ill den4 that the child is un%ree /hen he desires mil1, or the drun1en man /hen he sa4s things /hich he later regrets. Neither 1no/s an4thing o% the causes, /or1ing in the depths o% their organisms, /hich exercise irresistiAle control o er them. Eut is it Custi%iaAle to lump together actions o% this 1ind /ith those in /hich a man is conscious not onl4 o% his actions Aut also o% the reasons /hich cause him to act7 Are the actions o% men reall4 all o% one 1ind7 Should the act o% a soldier on the %ield o% Aattle, o% the scienti%ic researcher in his laAorator4, o% the statesman in the most complicated diplomatic negotiations, Ae placed scienti%icall4 on the same le el /ith that o% the child /hen it desires mil1# It is no douAt true that it is Aest to see1 the solution o% a proAlem /here the conditions are simplest. Eut inaAilit4 to discriminate has Ae%ore no/ caused endless con%usion. There is, a%ter all, a

pro%ound di%%erence Aet/een 1no/ing /h4 I am acting and not 1no/ing it. At %irst sight this seems a sel%,e ident truth. And 4et the opponents o% %reedom ne er as1 themsel es /hether a moti e o% action /hich I recogniDe and see through, is to Ae regarded as compulsor4 %or me in the same sense as the organic process /hich causes the child to cr4 %or mil1 Eduard on -artmann asserts that the human /ill depends on t/o chie% %actors, the moti es and the character. 8see %n 0: I% one regards men as all ali1e, or at an4 rate the di%%erences Aet/een them as negligiAle, then their /ill appears as determined %rom /ithout, that is to sa4, A4 the circumstances /hich come to meet them. Eut i% one Aears in mind that a man adopts an idea, or mental picture, as the moti e o% his action onl4 i% his character is such that this mental picture arouses a desire in him, then he appears as determined %rom /ithin and not %rom /ithout. No/ Aecause, in accordance /ith his character, he must %irst adopt as a moti e a mental picture gi en to him %rom /ithout, a man Aelie es he is %ree, that is, independent o% external impulses. The truth, ho/e er, according to Eduard on -artmann, is that e en though /e oursel es %irst adopt a mental picture as a moti e, /e do so not arAitraril4, Aut according to the necessit4 o% our characterological disposition, that is, /e are an4thing Aut %ree. -ere again the di%%erence Aet/een moti es /hich I allo/ to in%luence me onl4 a%ter I ha e permeated them /ith m4 consciousness, and those /hich I %ollo/ /ithout an4 clear 1no/ledge o% them, is aAsolutel4 ignored. This leads us straight to the standpoint %rom /hich the suACect /ill Ae considered here. -a e /e an4 right to consider the @uestion o% the %reedom o% the /ill A4 itsel% at all7 And i% not, /ith /hat other @uestion must it necessaril4 Ae connected7 I% there is a di%%erence Aet/een a conscious moti e o% action and an unconscious urge, then the conscious moti e /ill result in an action /hich must Ae Cudged di%%erentl4 %rom one that springs %rom Alind impulse. -ence our %irst @uestion /ill concern this di%%erence, and on the result o% this en@uir4 /ill depend /hat attitude /e shall ha e to ta1e to/ards the @uestion o% %reedom proper. "hat does it mean to ha e 1no/ledge o% the reasons %or one$s action7 Too little attention has Aeen paid to this @uestion Aecause, un%ortunatel4, /e ha e torn into t/o /hat is reall4 an inseparaAle /hole# Man. "e ha e distinguished Aet/een the 1no/er and the doer and ha e le%t out o% account precisel4 the one /ho matters most o% all ,, the 1no/ing doer. It is said that man is %ree /hen he is controlled onl4 A4 his reason and not A4 his animal passions. Or again, that to Ae %ree means to Ae aAle to determine one$s li%e and action A4 purposes and deliAerate decisions. Nothing is gained A4 assertions o% this sort. For the @uestion is Cust /hether reason, purposes, and decisions exercise the same 1ind o% compulsion o er a man as his animal passions. I% /ithout m4 cooperation, a rational decision emerges in me /ith the same

necessit4 /ith /hich hunger and thirst arise, then I must needs oAe4 it, and m4 %reedom is an illusion. Another %orm o% expression runs# to Ae %ree does not mean to Ae aAle to /ant as one /ills, Aut to Ae aAle to do as one /ills. This thought has Aeen expressed /ith great clearness A4 the poet,philosopher 9oAert -amerling. Man can certainl4 do as he /ills, Aut he cannot /ant as he /ills, Aecause his /anting is determined A4 moti es. -e cannot /ant as he /ills7 6et us consider these phrases more closel4. -a e the4 an4 intelligiAle meaning# Freedom o% /ill /ould then mean Aeing aAle to /ant /ithout ground, /ithout moti e. Eut /hat does /anting mean i% not to ha e grounds %or doing, or tr4ing to do, this rather than that# To /ant something /ithout ground or moti e /ould Ae to /ant something /ithout /anting it. The concept o% /anting cannot Ae di orced %rom the concept o% moti e. "ithout a determining moti e the /ill is an empt4 %acult4+ onl4 through the moti e does it Aecome acti e and real. It is, there%ore, @uite true that the human /ill is not B%reeB inasmuch as its direction is al/a4s determined A4 the strongest moti e. Eut on the other hand it must Ae admitted that it is aAsurd, in contrast /ith this Bun%reedomB, to spea1 o% a concei aAle %reedom o% the /ill /hich /ould consist in Aeing aAle to /ant /hat one does not /ant. 8see %n *: -ere again, onl4 moti es in general are mentioned, /ithout ta1ing into account the di%%erence Aet/een unconscious and conscious moti es. I% a moti e a%%ects me, and I am compelled to act on it Aecause it pro es to Ae the BstrongestB o% its 1ind, then the thought o% %reedom ceases to ha e an4 meaning. -o/ should it matter to me /hether I can do a thing or not, i% I am %orced A4 the moti e to do it7 The primar4 @uestion is not /hether I can do a thing or not /hen a moti e has /or1ed upon me, Aut /hether there are an4 moti es except such as impel me /ith aAsolute necessit4. I% I am compelled to /ant something, then I ma4 /ell Ae aAsolutel4 indi%%erent as to /hether I can also do it. And i%, through m4 character, or through circumstances pre ailing in m4 en ironment, a moti e is %orced on me /hich to m4 thin1ing is unreasonaAle, then I should e en ha e to Ae glad i% I could not do /hat I /ant. The @uestion is not /hether I can carr4 out a decision once made, Aut ho/ the decision comes aAout /ithin me. "hat distinguishes man %rom all other organic Aeings arises %rom his rational thin1ing. Acti it4 he has in common /ith other organisms. Nothing is gained A4 see1ing analogies in the animal /orld to clari%4 the concept o% %reedom as applied to the actions o% human Aeings. Modern science lo es such analogies. "hen scientists ha e succeeded in %inding among animals something similar to human Aeha ior, the4 Aelie e the4 ha e touched on the most important @uestion o% the science o% man. To /hat misunderstandings this ie/ leads is

seen, %or example, in the Aoo1 The Illusion o% Free/ill, A4 P. 9Ie, /here the %ollo/ing remar1 on %reedom appears# It is eas4 to explain /h4 the mo ement o% a stone seems to us necessar4, /hile the olition o% a don1e4 does not. The causes /hich set the stone in motion are external and isiAle, /hile the causes /hich determine the don1e4$s olition are internal and in isiAle. Eet/een us and the place o% their acti it4 there is the s1ull o% the ass. ... The determining causes are not isiAle and there%ore thought to Ae non,existent. The olition, it is explained, is, indeed, the cause o% the don1e4$s turning round, Aut is itsel% unconditioned+ it is an aAsolute Aeginning. 8see %n 2: -ere again human actions in /hich there is a consciousness o% the moti es are simpl4 ignored, %or 9Ie declares that BAet/een us and the place o% their acti it4 there is the s1ull o% the ass.B To Cudge %rom these /ords, it has not da/ned on 9Ie that there are actions, not indeed o% the ass, Aut o% human Aeings, in /hich Aet/een us and the action lies the moti e that has Aecome conscious. 9Ie demonstrates his Alindness once again, a %e/ pages %urther on, /hen he sa4s, "e do not percei e the causes A4 /hich our /ill is determined, hence /e thin1 it is not causall4 determined at all. Eut enough o% examples /hich pro e that man4 argue against %reedom /ithout 1no/ing in the least /hat %reedom is. That an action, o% /hich the agent does not 1no/ /h4 he per%orms it, cannot Ae %ree, goes /ithout sa4ing. Eut /hat aAout an action %or /hich the reasons are 1no/n7 This leads us to the @uestion o% the origin and meaning o% thin1ing. For /ithout the recognition o% the thin1ing acti it4 o% the soul, it is impossiAle to %orm a concept o% 1no/ledge aAout an4thing, and there%ore o% 1no/ledge aAout an action. "hen /e 1no/ /hat thin1ing in general means, it /ill Ae eas4 to get clear aAout the role that thin1ing pla4s in human action. As -egel rightl4 sa4s, It is thin1ing that turns the soul, /hich the animals also possess, into spirit. -ence it /ill also Ae thin1ing that gi es to human action its characteristic stamp. On no account should it Ae said that all our action springs onl4 %rom the soAer deliAerations o% our reason. I am er4 %ar %rom calling human in the highest sense onl4 those actions that proceed %rom aAstract Cudgment. Eut as soon as our conduct rises aAo e the sphere o% the satis%action o% purel4 animal desires, our moti es are al/a4s permeated A4 thoughts. 6o e, pit4, and patriotism are dri ing %orces %or actions /hich cannot Ae anal4sed a/a4 into cold concepts o% the intellect. It is said that here the heart, the mood o% the soul, hold s/a4. No douAt. Eut the heart and the mood o% the soul do not create the moti es. The4 presuppose them and let them enter. Pit4 enters m4 heart /hen the mental picture o% a person /ho arouses pit4 appears in m4 consciousness. The /a4 to the heart is through the head, 6o e is no exception, "hene er it is not merel4 the expression o% Aare sexual

instinct, it depends on the mental picture /e %orm o% the lo ed one. And the more idealistic these mental pictures are, Cust so much the more Alessed is our lo e. -ere too, thought is the %ather o% %eeling. It is said that lo e ma1es us Alind to the %ailings o% the lo ed one. Eut this can Ae expressed the other /a4 round, namel4, that it is Cust %or the good @ualities that lo e opens the e4es. Man4 pass A4 these good @ualities /ithout noticing them. One, ho/e er, percei es them, and Cust Aecause he does, lo e a/a1ens in his soul. "hat else has he done Aut made a mental picture o% /hat hundreds ha e %ailed to see7 6o e is not theirs, Aecause the4 lac1 the mental picture. -o/e er /e approach the matter, it Aecomes more and more clear that the @uestion o% the nature o% human action presupposes that o% the origin o% thin1ing. I shall, there%ore, turn next to this @uestion. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. !a id Freidrich Strauss, !er alte und neue =lauAe. ). The Principles o% Ps4cholog4, &(22, =erman edition &(()+ Part I<, Chap. ix, par. )&'. 0. Phaenomenologie des sittlichen Ee/usstseins, p. *2&. *. Atomisti1 des "illens, <ol. ), p. )&0 %%. 2. !ie Illusion der "illens%reiheit, &((2, page 2. ,,,,.

2 - The Fundamental Desire for Kno led!e.

T/o souls reside, alas, /ithin m4 Areast, And each one %rom the other /ould Ae parted. The one holds %ast, in sturd4 lust %or lo e, "ith clutching organs clinging to the /orld+ The other strongl4 rises %rom the gloom To lo%t4 %ields o% ancient heritage. Faust I, Scene ), lines &&&),&&&5. In these /ords =oethe expresses a characteristic %eature /hich is deepl4 rooted in human nature. Man is not organiDed as a sel%,consistent unit4. -e al/a4s demands more than the /orld, o% its o/n accord, gi es him. Nature has endo/ed us /ith needs+ among them are some that she lea es to our o/n acti it4 to satis%4. AAundant as are the gi%ts she has Aesto/ed upon us, still more aAundant are our desires. "e seem Aorn to Ae dissatis%ied. And our thirst %or 1no/ledge is Aut a special instance o% this dissatis%action. "e loo1 t/ice at a tree. The %irst time /e see its Aranches at rest, the second time in motion. "e are not satis%ied /ith this oAser ation. "h4, /e as1, does the tree appear to us no/ at rest, no/ in motion7 E er4 glance at Nature e o1es in us a multitude o% @uestions. E er4 phenomenon /e meet sets us a ne/ proAlem. E er4 experience is a riddle. "e see that %rom the egg there emerges a creature li1e the mother animal, and /e as1 the reason %or the li1eness. "e oAser e a li ing Aeing

gro/ and de elop to a certain degree o% per%ection, and /e see1 the underl4ing conditions %or this experience. No/here are /e satis%ied /ith /hat Nature spreads out Ae%ore our senses. E er4/here /e see1 /hat /e call the explanation o% the %acts. The something more /hich /e see1 in things, o er and aAo e /hat is immediatel4 gi en to us in them, splits our /hole Aeing into t/o parts. "e Aecome conscious o% our antithesis to the /orld. "e con%ront the /orld as independent Aeings. The uni erse appears to us in t/o opposite parts# I and "orld. "e erect this Aarrier Aet/een oursel es and the /orld as soon as consciousness %irst da/ns in us. Eut /e ne er cease to %eel that, in spite o% all, /e Aelong to the /orld, that there is a connecting lin1 Aet/een it and us, and that /e are Aeings /ithin, and not /ithout, the uni erse. This %eeling ma1es us stri e to Aridge o er this antithesis, and in this Aridging lies ultimatel4 the /hole spiritual stri ing o% man1ind. The histor4 o% our spiritual li%e is a continuing search %or the unit4 Aet/een oursel es and the /orld. 9eligion, art and science %ollo/, one and all, this aim. The religious Aelie er see1s in the re elation /hich =od grants him the solution to the uni ersal riddle /hich his I, dissatis%ied /ith the /orld o% mere appearance, sets Ae%ore him. The artist see1s to emAod4 in his material the ideas that are in his I, in order to reconcile /hat li es in him /ith the /orld outside. -e too %eels dissatis%ied /ith the /orld o% mere appearance and see1s to mould into it that something more /hich his I, transcending it, contains. The thin1er see1s the la/s o% phenomena, and stri es to penetrate A4 thin1ing /hat he experiences A4 oAser ing. Onl4 /hen /e ha e made the /orld,content into our thought, content do /e again %ind the unit4 out o% /hich /e had separated oursel es. "e shall see later that this goal can Ae reached onl4 i% the tas1 o% the research scientist is concei ed at a much deeper le el than is o%ten the case. The /hole situation I ha e descriAed here presents itsel% to us on the stage o% histor4 in the con%lict Aet/een the one,/orld theor4, or monism, and the t/o,/orld theor4, or dualism. !ualism pa4s attention onl4 to the separation Aet/een I and "orld /hich the consciousness o% man has Arought aAout. All its e%%orts consist in a ain struggle to reconcile these opposites, /hich it calls no/ spirit and matter, no/ suACect and oACect, no/ thin1ing and appearance. It %eels that there must Ae a Aridge Aet/een the t/o /orlds Aut is not in a position to %ind it. In that man is a/are o% himsel% as BIB, he cannot Aut thin1 o% this BIB as Aeing on the side o% the spirit+ and in contrasting this BIB /ith the /orld, he is Aound to put on the /orld$s side the realm o% percepts gi en to the senses, that is, the /orld o% matter. In doing so, man puts himsel% right into the middle o% this antithesis o% spirit and matter. -e is the more compelled to do so Aecause his o/n Aod4 Aelongs to the material /orld.

Thus the BIB, or Ego, Aelongs to the realm o% spirit as a part o% it+ the material oACects and e ents /hich are percei ed A4 the senses Aelong to the B"orldB. All the riddles /hich relate to spirit and matter, man must ine itaAl4 redisco er in the %undamental riddle o% his o/n nature. Monism pa4s attention onl4 to the unit4 and tries either to den4 or to slur o er the opposites, present though the4 are. Neither o% these t/o points o% ie/ can satis%4 us, %or the4 do not do Custice to the %acts. !ualism sees in spirit 8I: and matter 8"orld: t/o %undamentall4 di%%erent entities, and cannot, there%ore, understand ho/ the4 can interact /ith one another. -o/ should spirit Ae a/are o% /hat goes on in matter, seeing that the essential nature o% matter is @uite alien to spirit7 Or ho/ in these circumstances should spirit act upon matter, so as to translate its intentions into actions7 The most ingenious and the most aAsurd h4potheses ha e Aeen propounded to ans/er these @uestions. >p to the present, ho/e er, monism is not in a much Aetter position. It has tried three di%%erent /a4s o% meeting the di%%icult4. Either it denies spirit and Aecomes materialism+ or it denies matter in order to see1 its sal ation in spiritualism 8see %n &:+ or it asserts that e en in the simplest entities in the /orld, spirit and matter are indissoluAl4 Aound together so that there is no need to mar el at the appearance in man o% these t/o modes o% existence, seeing that the4 are ne er %ound apart. Materialism can ne er o%%er a satis%actor4 explanation o% the /orld. For e er4 attempt at an explanation must Aegin /ith the %ormation o% thoughts aAout the phenomena o% the /orld. Materialism thus Aegins /ith the thought o% matter or material processes. Eut, in doing so, it is alread4 con%ronted A4 t/o di%%erent sets o% %acts# the material /orld, and the thoughts aAout it. The materialist see1s to ma1e these latter intelligiAle A4 regarding them as purel4 material processes. -e Aelie es that thin1ing ta1es place in the Arain, much in the same /a4 that digestion ta1es place in the animal organs. Just as he attriAutes mechanical and organic e%%ects to matter, so he credits matter in certain circumstances /ith the capacit4 to thin1. -e o erloo1s that, in doing so, he is merel4 shi%ting the proAlem %rom one place to another. -e ascriAes the po/er o% thin1ing to matter instead o% to himsel%. And thus he is Aac1 again at his starting point. -o/ does matter come to thin1 aAout its o/n nature7 "h4 is it not simpl4 satis%ied /ith itsel% and content Cust to exist7 The materialist has turned his attention a/a4 %rom the de%inite suACect, his o/n I, and has arri ed at an image o% something @uite ague and inde%inite. -ere the old riddle meets him again. The materialistic conception cannot sol e the proAlem+ it can onl4 shi%t it %rom one place to another. "hat o% the spiritualistic theor47 The genuine spiritualist denies to matter all independent

existence and regards it merel4 as a product o% spirit. Eut /hen he tries to use this theor4 to sol e the riddle o% his o/n human nature, he %inds himsel% dri en into a corner. O er against the BIB or Ego, /hich can Ae ranged on the side o% spirit, there stands directl4 the /orld o% the senses. No spiritual approach to it seems open. Onl4 /ith the help o% material processes can it Ae percei ed and experienced A4 the BIB. Such material processes the BIB does not disco er in itsel% so long as it regards its o/n nature as exclusi el4 spiritual. In /hat it achie es spirituall4 A4 its o/n e%%ort, the sense,perceptiAle /orld is ne er to Ae %ound. It seems as i% the BIB had to concede that the /orld /ould Ae a closed Aoo1 to it unless it could estaAlish a non,spiritual relation to the /orld. Similarl4, /hen it comes to action, /e ha e to translate our purposes into realities /ith the help o% material things and %orces. "e are, there%ore, re%erred Aac1 to the outer /orld. The most extreme spiritualist ,, or rather, the thin1er /ho through his aAsolute idealism appears as extreme spiritualist ,, is Johann =ottlieA Fichte. -e attempts to deri e the /hole edi%ice o% the /orld %rom the BIB. "hat he has actuall4 accomplished is a magni%icent thought,picture o% the /orld, /ithout an4 content o% experience. As little as it is possiAle %or the materialist to argue the spirit a/a4, Cust as little is it possiAle %or the spiritualist to argue a/a4 the outer /orld o% matter. "hen man re%lects upon the BIB, he percei es in the %irst instance the /or1 o% this BIB in the conceptual elaAoration o% the /orld o% ideas. -ence a /orld,conception that inclines to/ards spiritualism ma4 %eel tempted, in loo1ing at man$s o/n essential nature, to ac1no/ledge nothing o% spirit except this /orld o% ideas. In this /a4 spiritualism Aecomes one,sided idealism. Instead o% going on to penetrate through the /orld o% ideas to the spiritual /orld, idealism identi%ies the spiritual /orld /ith the /orld o% ideas itsel%. As a result, it is compelled to remain %ixed /ith its /orld,outloo1 in the circle o% acti it4 o% the Ego, as i% Ae/itched. A curious ariant o% idealism is to Ae %ound in the ie/ /hich Friedrich AlAert 6ange has put %or/ard in his /idel4 read -istor4 o% Materialism. -e holds that the materialists are @uite right in declaring all phenomena, including our thin1ing, to Ae the product o% purel4 material processes, Aut, con ersel4, matter and its processes are %or him themsel es the product o% our thin1ing. The senses gi e us onl4 the e%%ects o% things, not true copies, much less the things themsel es. Eut among these mere e%%ects /e must include the senses themsel es together /ith the Arain and the molecular iArations /hich /e assume to go on there. That is, our thin1ing is produced A4 the material processes, and these A4 the thin1ing o% our I. 6ange$s philosoph4 is thus nothing more than the stor4, in philosophical terms, o% the intrepid Earon MKnchhausen, /ho holds himsel% up in the air A4 his o/n pigtail. The third %orm o% monism is the one /hich %inds e en in the simplest entit4 8the atom:

Aoth matter and spirit alread4 united. Eut nothing is gained A4 this either, except that the @uestion, /hich reall4 originates in our consciousness, is shi%ted to another place. -o/ comes it that the simple entit4 mani%ests itsel% in a t/o,%old manner, i% it is an indi isiAle unit47 Against all these theories /e must urge the %act that /e meet /ith the Aasic and primar4 opposition %irst in our o/n consciousness. It is /e oursel es /ho Area1 a/a4 %rom the Aosom o% Nature and contrast oursel es as BIB /ith the B"orldB. =oethe has gi en classic expression to this in his essa4 Nature, although his manner ma4 at %irst sight Ae considered @uite unscienti%ic# B6i ing in the midst o% her 8Nature: /e are strangers to her. Ceaselessl4 she spea1s to us, 4et Aetra4s none o% her secrets.B Eut =oethe 1no/s the re erse side too# BMen are all in her and she in all.L -o/e er true it ma4 Ae that /e ha e estranged oursel es %rom Nature, it is none the less true that /e %eel /e are in her and Aelong to her. It can Ae onl4 her o/n /or1ing /hich pulsates also in us. "e must %ind the /a4 Aac1 to her again. A simple re%lection can point this /a4 out to us. "e ha e, it is true, torn oursel es a/a4 %rom Nature, Aut /e must none the less ha e ta1en something o% her /ith us into our o/n Aeing. This element o% Nature in us /e must see1 out, and then /e shall %ind the connection /ith her once more. !ualism %ails to do this. It considers human in/ardness as a spiritual entit4 utterl4 alien to Nature, and then attempts someho/ to hitch it on to Nature. No /onder that it cannot %ind the connecting lin1. "e can %ind Nature outside us onl4 i% /e ha e %irst learned to 1no/ her /ithin us. "hat is a1in to her /ithin us must Ae our guide. This mar1s out our path o% en@uir4. "e shall attempt no speculations concerning the interaction o% Nature and spirit. 9ather shall /e proAe into the depths o% our o/n Aeing, to %ind there those elements /hich /e sa ed in our %light %rom Nature. In estigation o% our o/n Aeing must gi e us the ans/er to the riddle. "e must reach a point /here /e can sa4 to oursel es, B-ere /e are no longer merel4 $I$, here is something /hich is more than $I$.L I am /ell a/are that man4 /ho ha e read thus %ar /ill not %ind m4 discussion Bscienti%icB, as this term is used toda4. To this I can onl4 repl4 that I ha e so %ar Aeen concerned not /ith scienti%ic results o% an4 1ind, Aut /ith the simple description o% /hat e er4 one o% us experiences in his o/n consciousness. The inclusion o% a %e/ phrases aAout attempts to reconcile man$s consciousness and the /orld ser es solel4 to elucidate the actual %acts. I ha e there%ore made no attempt to use the arious expressions BIB, BSpiritB, B"orldB, BNatureB, in the precise /a4 that is usual in ps4cholog4 and philosoph4. The ordinar4 consciousness is una/are o% the sharp distinctions made A4 the sciences, and m4 purpose so %ar has Aeen solel4 to record the %acts o% e er4da4 experience. I am concerned, not /ith the /a4 in /hich science, so %ar,

has interpreted consciousness, Aut /ith the /a4 in /hich /e experience it in e er4 moment o% our li es. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. The author re%ers to philosophical BspiritualismB as opposed to philosophical BmaterialismB. See re%erence to Fichte that %ollo/s. ,, Translator$s Footnote. ----.

" - Thin#in! in the ser$ice of Kno led!e.

"hen I oAser e ho/ a Ailliard Aall, /hen struc1, communicates its motion to another, I remain entirel4 /ithout in%luence on the course o% this oAser ed process. The direction o% motion and the elocit4 o% the second Aall are determined A4 the direction and elocit4 o% the %irst. As long as I remain a mere spectator, I can onl4 sa4 an4thing aAout the mo ement o% the second Aall /hen it has ta1en place. It is @uite di%%erent /hen I Aegin to re%lect on the content o% m4 oAser ation. The purpose o% m4 re%lection is to %orm concepts o% the occurrence. I connect the concept o% an elastic Aall /ith certain other concepts o% mechanics, and ta1e into consideration the special circumstances /hich oAtain in the instance in @uestion. I tr4, in other /ords, to add to the occurrence /hich ta1es place /ithout m4 assistance a second process /hich ta1es place in the conceptual sphere. This latter one is dependent on me. This is sho/n A4 the %act that I can rest content /ith the oAser ation, and renounce all search %or concepts i% I ha e no need o% them. I% ho/e er, this need is present, then I am not satis%ied until I ha e Arought the concepts Eall, Elasticit4, Motion, Impact, <elocit4, etc., into a certain connection, to /hich the oAser ed process is related in a de%inite /a4. As surel4 as the occurrence goes on independentl4 o% me, so surel4 is the conceptual process unaAle to ta1e place /ithout m4 assistance. "e shall ha e to consider later /hether this acti it4 o% mine reall4 proceeds %rom m4 o/n independent Aeing, or /hether those modern ph4siologists are right /ho sa4 that /e cannot thin1 as /e /ill, Aut that /e must thin1 Cust as those thoughts and thought, connections determine that happen to Ae present in our consciousness. 8see %n &: For the present /e /ish merel4 to estaAlish the %act that /e constantl4 %eel oAliged to see1 %or concepts and connections o% concepts, /hich stand in a certain relation to the oACects and e ents /hich are gi en independentl4 o% us. "hether this acti it4 is reall4 ours or /hether /e per%orm it according to an unalteraAle necessit4, is a @uestion /e need not decide at present. That it appears in the %irst instance to Ae ours is Ae4ond @uestion. "e 1no/ %or certain that /e are not gi en the concepts together /ith the oACects. That I am m4sel% the agent in the conceptual process ma4 Ae an

illusion, Aut to immediate oAser ation it certainl4 appears to Ae so. The @uestion is, there%ore# "hat do /e gain A4 supplementing an e ent /ith a conceptual counterpart7 There is a pro%ound di%%erence Aet/een the /a4s in /hich, %or me, the parts o% an e ent are related to one another Ae%ore, and a%ter, the disco er4 o% the corresponding concepts. Mere oAser ation can trace the parts o% a gi en e ent as the4 occur, Aut their connection remains oAscure /ithout the help o% concepts. I see the %irst Ailliard Aall mo e to/ards the second in a certain direction and /ith a certain elocit4. "hat /ill happen a%ter the impact I must a/ait, and again I can onl4 %ollo/ it /ith m4 e4es. Suppose someone, at the moment o% impact, oAstructs m4 ie/ o% the %ield /here the e ent is ta1ing place, then, as mere spectator, I remain ignorant o% /hat happens a%ter/ards. The situation is di%%erent i% prior to the oAstruction o% m4 ie/ I ha e disco ered the concepts corresponding to the pattern o% e ents. In that case I can sa4 /hat /ill happen e en /hen I am no longer aAle to oAser e. An e ent or an oACect /hich is merel4 oAser ed, does not o% itsel% re eal an4thing aAout its connection /ith other e ents or oACects. This connection Aecomes e ident onl4 /hen oAser ation is comAined /ith thin1ing. OAser ation and thin1ing are the t/o points o% departure %or all the spiritual stri ing o% man, in so %ar as he is conscious o% such stri ing. The /or1ings o% common sense, as /ell as the most complicated scienti%ic researches, rest on these t/o %undamental pillars o% our spirit. Philosophers ha e started %rom arious primar4 antitheses# idea and realit4, suACect and oACect, appearance and thing,in,itsel%, BIB and BNot,IB, idea and /ill, concept and matter, %orce and suAstance, the conscious and the unconscious. It is eas4 to sho/, ho/e er, that all these antitheses must Ae preceded A4 that o% oAser ation and thin1ing, this Aeing %or man the most important one. "hate er principle /e choose to la4 do/n, /e must either pro e that some/here /e ha e oAser ed it, or /e must enunciate it in the %orm o% a clear thought /hich can Ae re,thought A4 an4 other thin1er. E er4 philosopher /ho sets out to discuss his %undamental principles must express them in conceptual %orm and thus use thin1ing. -e there%ore indirectl4 admits that his acti it4 presupposes thin1ing. "hether thin1ing or something else is the chie% %actor in the e olution o% the /orld /ill not Ae decided at this point. Eut that /ithout thin1ing, the philosopher can gain no 1no/ledge o% such e olution, is clear %rom the start. In the occurrence o% the /orld phenomena, thin1ing ma4 pla4 a minor part+ Aut in the %orming o% a ie/ aAout them, there can Ae no douAt that, its part is a leading one. As regards oAser ation, our need o% it is due to the /a4 /e are constituted. Our thin1ing aAout a horse and the oACect BhorseB are t/o things /hich %or us emerge apart %rom each other. This oACect is accessiAle to us onl4 A4 means o% oAser ation. As little as /e can

%orm a concept o% a horse A4 merel4 staring at the animal, Cust as little are /e aAle A4 mere thin1ing to produce a corresponding oACect. In se@uence o% time, oAser ation does in %act come Ae%ore thin1ing. For e en thin1ing /e must get to 1no/ %irst through oAser ation. It /as essentiall4 a description o% an oAser ation /hen, at the Aeginning o% this chapter, /e ga e an account o% ho/ thin1ing lights up in the presence o% an e ent and goes Ae4ond /hat is merel4 presented. E er4thing that enters the circle o% our experience, /e %irst Aecome a/are o% through oAser ation. The content o% sensation, perception and contemplation, all %eelings, acts o% /ill, dreams and %ancies, mental pictures, concepts and ideas, all illusions and hallucinations, are gi en to us through oAser ation. Eut thin1ing as an oACect o% oAser ation di%%ers essentiall4 %rom all other oACects. The oAser ation o% a taAle, or a tree, occurs in me as soon as these oACects appear upon the horiDon o% m4 experience. Fet I do not, at the same time, oAser e m4 thin1ing aAout these things. I oAser e the taAle, and I carr4 out the thin1ing aAout the taAle, Aut I do not at the same moment oAser e this. I must %irst ta1e up a standpoint outside m4 o/n acti it4 i%, in addition to oAser ing the taAle, I /ant also to oAser e m4 thin1ing aAout the taAle. "hereas oAser ation o% things and e ents, and thin1ing aAout them, are e er4da4 occurrences %illing up the continuous current o% m4 li%e, oAser ation o% the thin1ing itsel% is a 1ind o% exceptional state. This %act must Ae properl4 ta1en into account /hen /e come to determine the relationship o% thin1ing to all other contents o% oAser ation. "e must Ae @uite clear aAout the %act that, in oAser ing thin1ing, /e are appl4ing to it a procedure /hich constitutes the normal course o% e ents %or the stud4 o% the /hole o% the rest o% the /orld,content, Aut /hich in this normal course o% e ents is not applied to thin1ing itsel%. Someone might oACect that /hat I ha e said aAout thin1ing applies e@uall4 to %eeling and to all other spiritual acti ities. Thus %or instance, /hen I ha e a %eeling o% pleasure, the %eeling is also 1indled A4 the oACect, and it is this oACect that I oAser e, Aut not the %eeling o% pleasure. This oACection, ho/e er, is Aased on an error. Pleasure does not stand at all in the same relation to its oACect as the concept %ormed A4 thin1ing. I am conscious, in the most positi e /a4, that the concept o% a thing is %ormed through m4 acti it4+ /hereas pleasure is produced in me A4 an oACect in the same /a4 as, %or instance, a change is caused in an oACect A4 a stone /hich %alls on it. For oAser ation, a pleasure is gi en in exactl4 the same /a4 as the e ent /hich causes it. The same is not true o% the concept. I can as1 /h4 a particular e ent arouses in me a %eeling o% pleasure, Aut I certainl4 cannot as1 /h4 an e ent produces in me a particular set o% concepts. The @uestion /ould Ae simpl4 meaningless. In re%lecting upon an e ent, I am in no /a4 concerned /ith an e%%ect upon m4sel%. I can learn nothing aAout m4sel% through 1no/ing the concepts /hich correspond to the

oAser ed change in a pane o% glass A4 a stone thro/n against it. Eut I do er4 de%initel4 learn something aAout m4 personalit4 /hen I 1no/ the %eeling /hich a certain e ent arouses in me. "hen I sa4 o% an oAser ed oACect, BThis is a rose,B I sa4 aAsolutel4 nothing aAout m4sel%+ Aut /hen I sa4 o% the same thing that Bit gi es me a %eeling o% pleasure,B I characteriDe not onl4 the rose, Aut also m4sel% in m4 relation to the rose. There can, there%ore, Ae no @uestion o% putting thin1ing and %eeling on a le el as oACects o% oAser ation. And the same could easil4 Ae sho/n o% other acti ities o% the human spirit. >nli1e thin1ing, the4 must Ae classed /ith other oAser ed oACects or e ents. The peculiar nature o% thin1ing lies Cust in this, that it is an acti it4 /hich is directed solel4 upon the oAser ed oACect and not on the thin1ing personalit4. This is apparent e en %rom the /a4 in /hich /e express our thoughts aAout an oACect, as distinct %rom our %eelings or acts o% /ill. "hen I see an oACect and recogniDe it as a taAle, I do not as a rule sa4, BI am thin1ing o% a taAle,B Aut, Bthis is a taAle.B On the other hand, I do sa4, BI am pleased /ith the taAle.B In the %ormer case, I am not at all interested in stating that I ha e entered into a relation /ith the taAle+ /hereas in the latter case, it is Cust this relation that matters. In sa4ing, BI am thin1ing o% a taAle,B I alread4 enter the exceptional state characteriDed aAo e, in /hich something that is al/a4s contained ,, though not as an oAser ed oACect ,, /ithin our spiritual acti it4, is itsel% made into an oACect o% oAser ation. This is Cust the peculiar nature o% thin1ing, that the thin1er %orgets his thin1ing /hile actuall4 engaged in it. "hat occupies his attention is not his thin1ing, Aut the oACect o% his thin1ing, /hich he is oAser ing. The %irst oAser ation /hich /e ma1e aAout thin1ing is there%ore this# that it is the unoAser ed element in our ordinar4 mental and spiritual li%e. The reason /h4 /e do not oAser e the thin1ing that goes on in our ordinar4 li%e is none other than this, that it is due to our o/n acti it4. "hate er I do not m4sel% produce, appears in m4 %ield o% oAser ation as an oACect+ I %ind m4sel% con%ronted A4 it as something that has come aAout independentl4 o% me. It comes to meet me. I must accept it as something that precedes m4 thin1ing process, as a premise. "hile I am re%lecting upon the oACect, I am occupied /ith it, m4 attention is %ocussed upon it. To Ae thus occupied is precisel4 to contemplate A4 thin1ing. I attend, not to m4 acti it4, Aut to the oACect o% this acti it4. In other /ords, /hile I am thin1ing I pa4 no heed to m4 thin1ing, /hich is o% m4 o/n ma1ing, Aut onl4 to the oACect o% m4 thin1ing, /hich is not o% m4 ma1ing. I am, moreo er, in the same position /hen I enter into the exceptional state and re%lect on m4 o/n thin1ing. I can ne er oAser e m4 present thin1ing+ I can onl4 suAse@uentl4 ta1e m4 experiences o% m4 thin1ing process as the oACect o% %resh thin1ing. I% I /anted to /atch m4 present thin1ing, I should ha e to split m4sel% into t/o persons, one to thin1, the other to oAser e this thin1ing. Eut this I cannot do. I can onl4 accomplish it in t/o separate acts.

The thin1ing to Ae oAser ed is ne er that in /hich I am actuall4 engaged, Aut another one. "hether, %or this purpose, I ma1e oAser ations o% m4 o/n %ormer thin1ing, or %ollo/ the thin1ing process o% another person, or %inall4, as in the example o% the motions o% the Ailliard Aalls, assume an imaginar4 thin1ing process, is immaterial. There are t/o things /hich are incompatiAle /ith one another# producti e acti it4 and the simultaneous contemplation o% it. This is recogniDed e en in =enesis 8&, 0&:. -ere =od creates the /orld in the %irst six da4s, and onl4 /hen it is there is an4 contemplation o% it possiAle# BAnd =od sa/ e er4thing that he had made and, Aehold, it /as er4 good.B The same applies to our thin1ing. It must Ae there %irst, i% /e /ould oAser e it. The reason /h4 it is impossiAle to oAser e thin1ing in the actual moment o% its occurrence, is the er4 one /hich ma1es it possiAle %or us to 1no/ it more immediatel4 and more intimatel4 than an4 other process in the /orld. Just Aecause it is our o/n creation do /e 1no/ the characteristic %eatures o% its course, the manner in /hich the process ta1es place. "hat in all other spheres o% oAser ation can Ae %ound onl4 indirectl4, namel4, the rele ant context and the relationship Aet/een the indi idual oACects, is, in the case o% thin1ing, 1no/n to us in an aAsolutel4 direct /a4. I do not on the %ace o% it 1no/ /h4, %or m4 oAser ation, thunder %ollo/s lightning+ Aut I 1no/ directl4, %rom the er4 content o% the t/o concepts, /h4 m4 thin1ing connects the concept o% thunder /ith the concept o% lightning. It does not matter in the least /hether I ha e the right concepts o% lightning and thunder. The connection Aet/een those concepts that I do ha e is clear to me, and this through the er4 concepts themsel es. This transparent clearness concerning our thin1ing process is @uite independent o% our 1no/ledge o% the ph4siological Aasis o% thin1ing. -ere I am spea1ing o% thin1ing in so %ar as /e 1no/ it %rom the oAser ation o% our o/n spiritual acti it4. -o/ one material process in m4 Arain causes or in%luences another /hile I am carr4ing out a thin1ing operation, is @uite irrele ant. "hat I oAser e aAout thin1ing is not /hat process in m4 Arain connects the concept lightning /ith the concept thunder Aut /hat causes me to Aring the t/o concepts into a particular relationship. M4 oAser ation sho/s me that in lin1ing one thought /ith another there is nothing to guide me Aut the content o% m4 thoughts+ I am not guided A4 an4 material processes in m4 Arain. In a less materialistic age than our o/n, this remar1 /ould o% course Ae entirel4 super%luous. Toda4, ho/e er, /hen there are people /ho Aelie e that once /e 1no/ /hat matter is /e shall also 1no/ ho/ it thin1s, /e do ha e to insist that one ma4 tal1 aAout thin1ing /ithout trespassing on the domain o% Arain ph4siolog4. Man4 people toda4 %ind it di%%icult to grasp the concept o% thin1ing in its purit4. An4one /ho challenges the description o% thin1ing /hich I ha e gi en here A4 @uoting CaAanis$ statement that Bthe Arain secretes thoughts as the li er does gall or the spittle,glands spittle ...B, simpl4 does not 1no/ /hat I am tal1ing aAout. -e tries to %ind thin1ing A4 a process

o% mere oAser ation in the same /a4 that /e proceed in the case o% other oACects that ma1e up the /orld. Eut he cannot %ind it in this /a4 Aecause, as I ha e sho/n, it eludes Cust this ordinar4 oAser ation. "hoe er cannot transcend materialism lac1s the aAilit4 to Aring aAout the exceptional condition I ha e descriAed, in /hich he Aecomes conscious o% /hat in all other spiritual acti it4 remains unconscious. I% someone is not /illing to ta1e this standpoint, then one can no more discuss thin1ing /ith him than one can discuss color /ith a Alind man. Eut in an4 case he must not imagine that /e regard ph4siological processes as thin1ing. -e %ails to explain thin1ing Aecause he simpl4 does not see it. For e er4one, ho/e er, /ho has the aAilit4 to oAser e thin1ing ,, and /ith good /ill e er4 normal man has this aAilit4 ,, this oAser ation is the most important one he can possiAl4 ma1e. For he oAser es something o% /hich he himsel% is the creator+ he %inds himsel% con%ronted, not A4 an apparentl4 %oreign oACect, Aut A4 his o/n acti it4. -e 1no/s ho/ the thing he is oAser ing comes into Aeing. -e sees into its connections and relationships. A %irm point has no/ Aeen reached %rom /hich one can, /ith some hope o% success, see1 an explanation o% all other phenomena o% the /orld. The %eeling that he had %ound such a %irm point led the %ather o% modern philosoph4, !escartes, to Aase the /hole o% human 1no/ledge on the principle# I thin1, there%ore I am. All other things, all other e ents, are there independentl4 o% me. "hether the4 Ae truth, or illusion, or dream, I 1no/ not. There is onl4 one thing o% /hich I am aAsolutel4 certain, %or I m4sel% gi e it its certain existence+ and that is m4 thin1ing. "hate er other origin it ma4 ultimatel4 ha e, ma4 it come %rom =od or %rom else/here, o% one thing I am certain# that it exists in the sense that I m4sel% Aring it %orth. !escartes had, to Aegin /ith, no Custi%ication %or gi ing his statement more meaning than this. All that he had an4 right to assert /as that /ithin the /hole /orld content I apprehend m4sel% in m4 thin1ing as in that acti it4 /hich is most uni@uel4 m4 o/n. "hat the attached Bthere%ore I amB is supposed to mean has Aeen much deAated. It can ha e a meaning on one condition onl4. The simplest assertion I can ma1e o% a thing is that it is, that it exists. -o/ this existence can Ae %urther de%ined in the case o% an4 particular thing that appears on the horiDon o% m4 experience, is at %irst sight impossiAle to sa4. Each oACect must %irst Ae studied in its relation to others Ae%ore /e can determine in /hat sense it can Ae said to exist. An experienced e ent ma4 Ae a set o% percepts or it ma4 Ae a dream, an hallucination, or something else. In short, I am unaAle to sa4 in /hat sense it exists. I cannot gather this %rom the e ent in itsel%, Aut I shall %ind it out /hen I consider the e ent in its relation to other things. Eut here again I cannot 1no/ more than Cust ho/ it stands in relation to these other things. M4 in estigation touches %irm ground onl4 /hen I %ind an oACect /hich exists in a sense

/hich I can deri e %rom the oACect itsel%. Eut I am m4sel% such an oACect in that I thin1, %or I gi e to m4 existence the de%inite, sel%,determined content o% the thin1ing acti it4. From here I can go on to as1 /hether other things exist in the same or in some other sense. "hen /e ma1e thin1ing an oACect o% oAser ation, /e add to the other oAser ed contents o% the /orld something /hich usuall4 escapes our attention, Eut the /a4 /e stand in relation to the other things is in no /a4 altered. "e add to the numAer o% oACects o% oAser ation, Aut not to the numAer o% methods. "hile /e are oAser ing the other things, there enters among the processes o% the /orld ,, among /hich I no/ include oAser ation ,, one process /hich is o erloo1ed. Something is present /hich is di%%erent %rom all other processes, something /hich is not ta1en into account. Eut /hen I oAser e m4 o/n thin1ing, no such neglected element is present. For /hat no/ ho ers in the Aac1ground is once more Cust thin1ing itsel%. The oACect o% oAser ation is @ualitati el4 identical /ith the acti it4 directed upon it. This is another characteristic %eature o% thin1ing. "hen /e ma1e it an oACect o% oAser ation, /e are not compelled to do so /ith the help o% something @ualitati el4 di%%erent, Aut can remain /ithin the same element. "hen I /ea e an independentl4 gi en oACect into m4 thin1ing, I transcend m4 oAser ation, and the @uestion arises# "hat right ha e I to do this7 "h4 do I not simpl4 let the oACect impress itsel% upon me7 -o/ is it possiAle %or m4 thin1ing to Ae related to the oACect7 These are @uestions /hich e er4one must put to himsel% /ho re%lects on his o/n thought processes. Eut all these @uestions cease to exist /hen /e thin1 aAout thin1ing itsel%. "e then add nothing to our thin1ing that is %oreign to it, and there%ore ha e no need to Custi%4 an4 such addition. Schelling sa4s, BTo 1no/ Nature means to create Nature.B I% /e ta1e these /ords o% this Aold Naturephilosopher literall4, /e shall ha e to renounce %or e er all hope o% gaining 1no/ledge o% Nature. For Nature is there alread4, and in order to create it a second time, /e must %irst 1no/ the principles according to /hich it has originated. From the Nature that alread4 exists /e should ha e to Aorro/ or criA the %undamental principles %or the Nature /e /ant to Aegin A4 creating. This Aorro/ing, /hich /ould ha e to precede the creating, /ould ho/e er mean 1no/ing Nature, and this /ould still Ae so e en i% a%ter the Aorro/ing no creation /ere to ta1e place. The onl4 1ind o% Nature /e could create /ithout %irst ha ing 1no/ledge o% it /ould Ae a Nature that does not 4et exist. "hat is impossiAle %or us /ith regard to Nature, namel4, creating Ae%ore 1no/ing, /e achie e in the case o% thin1ing. "ere /e to re%rain %rom thin1ing until /e had %irst gained 1no/ledge o% it, /e /ould ne er come to it at all. "e must resolutel4 plunge right into the acti it4 o% thin1ing, so that a%ter/ards, A4 oAser ing /hat /e ha e done, /e ma4 gain 1no/ledge o% it. For the oAser ation o% thin1ing, /e oursel es %irst create an oACect+ the presence o% all other oACects is ta1en care o% /ithout an4 acti it4 on our part.

M4 contention that /e must thin1 Ae%ore /e can examine thin1ing might easil4 Ae countered A4 the apparentl4 e@uall4 alid contention that /e cannot /ait /ith digesting until /e ha e %irst oAser ed the process o% digestion. This oACection /ould Ae similar to that Arought A4 Pascal against !escartes, /hen he asserted that /e might also sa4, BI /al1, there%ore I am.L Certainl4 I must go straight ahead /ith digesting and not /ait until I ha e studied the ph4siological process o% digestion. Eut I could onl4 compare this /ith the stud4 o% thin1ing i%, a%ter digestion, I set m4sel% not to stud4 it A4 thin1ing, Aut to eat and digest it. It is a%ter all not /ithout reason that, /hereas digestion cannot Aecome the oACect o% digestion, thin1ing can er4 /ell Aecome the oACect o% thin1ing. This then is indisputaAle, that in thin1ing /e ha e got hold o% one corner o% the /hole /orld process /hich re@uires our presence i% an4thing is to happen. And this is Cust the point upon /hich e er4thing turns. The er4 reason /h4 things con%ront me in such a puDDling /a4 is Cust that I pla4 no part in their production. The4 are simpl4 gi en to me, /hereas in the case o% thin1ing I 1no/ ho/ it is done. -ence %or the stud4 o% all that happens in the /orld there can Ae no more %undamental starting point than thin1ing itsel%. I should no/ li1e to mention a /idel4 current error /hich pre ails /ith regard to thin1ing. It is o%ten said that thin1ing, as it is in itsel%, is no/here gi en to us# the thin1ing that connects our oAser ations and /ea es a net/or1 o% concepts aAout them is not at all the same as that /hich /e suAse@uentl4 extract %rom the oACects o% oAser ation in order to ma1e it the oACect o% our stud4. "hat /e %irst /ea e unconsciousl4 into the things is said to Ae @uite di%%erent %rom /hat /e consciousl4 extract %rom them again. Those /ho hold this ie/ do not see that it is impossiAle in this /a4 to escape %rom thin1ing. I cannot get outside thin1ing /hen I /ant to stud4 it. I% /e /ant to distinguish Aet/een thin1ing Ae%ore /e ha e Aecome conscious o% it, and thin1ing o% /hich /e ha e suAse@uentl4 Aecome a/are, /e should not %orget that this distinction is a purel4 external one /hich has nothing to do /ith the thing itsel%. I do not in an4 /a4 alter a thing A4 thin1ing aAout it. I can /ell imagine that a Aeing /ith @uite di%%erentl4 constructed sense organs and /ith a di%%erentl4 %unctioning intelligence, /ould ha e a er4 di%%erent mental picture o% a horse %rom mine, Aut I cannot imagine that m4 o/n thin1ing Aecomes something di%%erent through the %act that I oAser e it. I m4sel% oAser e /hat I m4sel% produce. -ere /e are not tal1ing o% ho/ m4 thin1ing loo1s to an intelligence other than mine, Aut o% ho/ it loo1s to me. In an4 case the picture o% m4 thin1ing /hich another intelligence might ha e cannot Ae a truer one than m4 o/n. Onl4 i% I /ere not m4sel% the Aeing doing the thin1ing, Aut i% the thin1ing /ere to con%ront me as the acti it4 o% a Aeing @uite %oreign to me, might I then

sa4 that although m4 o/n picture o% the thin1ing ma4 arise in a particular /a4, /hat the thin1ing o% that Aeing ma4 Ae li1e in itsel%, I am @uite unaAle to 1no/. So %ar, there is not the slightest reason /h4 I should regard m4 o/n thin1ing %rom an4 point o% ie/ other than m4 o/n. A%ter all, I contemplate the rest o% the /orld A4 means o% thin1ing. "h4 should I ma1e m4 thin1ing an exception7 I Aelie e I ha e gi e su%%icient reasons %or ma1ing thin1ing the starting point %or m4 stud4 o% the /orld. "hen Archimedes had disco ered the le er, he thought he could li%t the /hole cosmos %rom its hinges, i% onl4 he could %ind a point o% support %or his instrument. -e needed something that /as supported A4 itsel% and A4 nothing else. In thin1ing /e ha e a principle /hich suAsists through itsel%. 6et us tr4, there%ore, to understand the /orld starting %rom this Aasis. "e can grasp thin1ing A4 means o% itsel%. The @uestion is, /hether /e can also grasp an4thing else through it. I ha e so %ar spo1en o% thin1ing /ithout ta1ing account o% its ehicle, human consciousness. Most present,da4 philosophers /ould oACect that Ae%ore there can Ae thin1ing, there must Ae consciousness. -ence /e ought to start, not %rom thin1ing, Aut %rom consciousness. There is no thin1ing, the4 sa4, /ithout consciousness. To this I must repl4 that in order to clear up the relation Aet/een thin1ing and consciousness, I must thin1 aAout it. -ence I presuppose thin1ing. Ne ertheless one could still argue that although, /hen the philosopher tries to understand consciousness he ma1es use o% thin1ing and to that extent presupposes it, 4et in the ordinar4 course o% li%e thin1ing does arise /ithin consciousness and there%ore presupposes consciousness. No/ i% this ans/er /ere gi en to the /orld creator /hen he /as aAout to create thin1ing, it /ould douAtless Ae to the point. Naturall4 it is not possiAle to create thin1ing Ae%ore consciousness. The philosopher, ho/e er, is not concerned /ith creating the /orld Aut /ith understanding it. Accordingl4 he has to see1 the starting points not %or the creation o% the /orld Aut %or the understanding o% it. It seems to me er4 strange that the philosopher should Ae reproached %or trouAling himsel% %irst and %oremost aAout the correctness o% his principles instead o% turning straight to the oACects /hich he see1s to understand. The /orld creator had aAo e all to 1no/ ho/ to %ind a ehicle %or thin1ing, Aut the philosopher has to see1 a secure %oundation %or his attempts to understand /hat alread4 exists. -o/ does it help us to start /ith consciousness and suACect it to the scrutin4 o% thin1ing, i% /e do not %irst 1no/ /hether thin1ing is in %act aAle to gi e us insight into things at all7 "e must %irst consider thin1ing @uite impartiall4, /ithout re%erence to a thin1ing suACect or a thought oACect. For Aoth suACect and oACect are concepts %ormed A4 thin1ing. There is no den4ing that Ae%ore an4thing else can Ae understood, thin1ing must Ae understood.

"hoe er denies this %ails to realiDe that man is not the %irst lin1 in the chain o% creation Aut the last. -ence, in order to explain the /orld A4 means o% concepts, /e cannot start %rom the elements o% existence /hich came %irst in time, Aut /e must Aegin /ith that element /hich is gi en to us as the nearest and most intimate. "e cannot at one Aound transport oursel es Aac1 to the Aeginning o% the /orld in order to Aegin our studies %rom there, Aut /e must start %rom the present moment and see /hether /e can ascend %rom the later to the earlier. As long as =eolog4 in ented %aAulous catastrophes to account %or the present state o% the earth, it groped in dar1ness. It /as onl4 /hen it Aegan to stud4 the processes at present at /or1 on the earth, and %rom these to argue Aac1 to the past, that it gained a %irm %oundation. As long as Philosoph4 goes on assuming all sorts o% Aasic principles, such as atom, motion, matter, /ill, or the unconscious, it /ill hang in the air. Onl4 i% the philosopher recogniDes that /hich is last in time as his %irst point o% attac1, can he reach his goal. This aAsolutel4 last thing at /hich /orld e olution has arri ed is in %act thin1ing. There are people /ho sa4 it is impossiAle to ascertain /ith certaint4 /hether our thin1ing is right or /rong, and thus our starting point is in an4 case a douAt%ul one. It /ould Ae Cust as sensiAle to douAt /hether a tree is in itsel% right or /rong. Thin1ing is a %act, and it is meaningless to spea1 o% the truth or %alsit4 o% a %act. I can, at most, Ae in douAt as to /hether thin1ing is correctl4 applied, Cust as I can douAt /hether a certain tree supplies /ood adapted to the ma1ing o% this or that use%ul oACect. To sho/ ho/ %ar the application o% thin1ing to the /orld is right or /rong, is precisel4 the tas1 o% this Aoo1. I can understand an4one douAting /hether, A4 means o% thin1ing, /e can gain 1no/ledge o% the /orld, Aut it is incomprehensiAle to me ho/ an4one can douAt the rightness o% thin1ing in itsel%. ----. Author*s addition, #%#&. In the preceding discussion I ha e pointed out the signi%icant di%%erence Aet/een thin1ing and all other acti ities o% the soul, as a %act /hich presents itsel% to genuinel4 unpreCudiced oAser ation. An4one /ho does not stri e to/ards this unpreCudiced oAser ation /ill Ae tempted to Aring against m4 arguments such oACections as these# "hen I thin1 aAout a rose, this a%ter all onl4 expresses a relation o% m4 BIB to the rose, Cust as /hen I %eel the Aeaut4 o% the rose. There is a relation Aet/een BIL and oACect in the case o% thin1ing Cust as much as in the case o% %eeling or percei ing. Such an oACection lea es out o% account the %act that onl4 in the thin1ing acti it4 does the BIB

1no/ itsel% to Ae one and the same Aeing /ith that /hich is acti e, right into all the rami%ications o% this acti it4. "ith no other soul acti it4 is this so completel4 the case. For example, in a %eeling o% pleasure it is per%ectl4 possiAle %or a more delicate oAser ation to discriminate Aet/een the extent to /hich the BIL 1no/s itsel% to Ae one and the same Aeing /ith /hat is acti e, and the extent to /hich there is something passi e in the BIB to /hich the pleasure merel4 presents itsel%. The same applies to the other soul acti ities. AAo e all one should not con%use the Bha ing o% thought,imagesB /ith the elaAoration o% thought A4 thin1ing. Thought,images ma4 appear in the soul a%ter the %ashion o% dreams, li1e ague intimations. Eut this is not thin1ing. True, someone might no/ sa4# I% this is /hat 4ou mean A4 Bthin1ingB, then 4our thin1ing in ol es /illing and 4ou ha e to do not merel4 /ith thin1ing Aut also /ith the /ill in the thin1ing. -o/e er, this /ould simpl4 Custi%4 us in sa4ing# =enuine thin1ing must al/a4s Ae /illed. Eut this is @uite irrele ant to the characteriDation o% thin1ing as this has Aeen gi en in the preceding discussion. =ranted that the nature o% thin1ing necessaril4 implies its Aeing /illed, the point that matters is that nothing is /illed /hich, in Aeing carried out, does not appear to the BIB as an acti it4 completel4 its o/n and under its o/n super ision. Indeed, /e must sa4 that o/ing to the er4 nature o% thin1ing as here de%ined, it must appear to the oAser er as /illed through and through. I% /e reall4 ma1e the e%%ort to grasp e er4thing that is rele ant to a Cudgment aAout the nature o% thin1ing, /e cannot %ail to see that this soul acti it4 does ha e the uni@ue character /e ha e here descriAed. A person /hom the author o% this Aoo1 rates er4 highl4 as a thin1er has oACected that it is impossiAle to spea1 aAout thin1ing as /e are doing here, Aecause /hat one Aelie es onesel% to ha e oAser ed as acti e thin1ing is nothing Aut an illusion. In realit4 one is oAser ing onl4 the results o% an unconscious acti it4 /hich lies at the Aasis o% thin1ing. Onl4 Aecause this unconscious acti it4 is not oAser ed does the illusion arise that the oAser ed thin1ing exists in its o/n right, Cust as /hen in an illumination A4 means o% a rapid succession o% electric spar1s /e Aelie e that /e are seeing a continuous mo ement. This oACection, too, rests onl4 on an inaccurate ie/ o% the %acts. In ma1ing it, one %orgets that it is the BIB itsel% /hich, %rom its standpoint inside the thin1ing, oAser es its o/n acti it4. The BIB /ould ha e to stand outside the thin1ing in order to su%%er the sort o% deception /hich is caused A4 an illumination /ith a rapid succession o% electric spar1s. It /ould Ae much truer to sa4 that precisel4 in using such an analog4 one is %orciAl4 decei ing onesel%, Cust as i% someone seeing a mo ing light /ere to insist that it is Aeing %reshl4 lit A4 an un1no/n hand at e er4 point /here it appears. No, /hoe er is determined to see in thin1ing an4thing other than a clearl4 sur e4aAle

acti it4 produced A4 the BIB itsel%, must %irst shut his e4es to the plain %acts that are there %or the seeing, in order then to in ent a h4pothetical acti it4 as the Aasis o% thin1ing. I% he does not thus Alind himsel%, he /ill ha e to recogniDe that e er4thing /hich he Bthin1s upB in this /a4 as an addition to the thin1ing onl4 leads him a/a4 %rom its real nature. >npreCudiced oAser ation sho/s that nothing is to Ae counted as Aelonging to the nature o% thin1ing except /hat is %ound in thin1ing itsel%. One /ill ne er arri e at something /hich is the cause o% thin1ing i% one steps outside the realm o% thin1ing itsel%. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. E.g., Miehen, 6eit%aden der ph4siologischen Ps4chologie, Jena &('0, p &5&. ----.

% - The &orld as Perce't.

Through thin1ing, concepts and ideas arise. "hat a concept is cannot Ae expressed in /ords. "ords can do no more than dra/ our attention to the %act that /e ha e concepts. "hen someone sees a tree, his thin1ing reacts to his oAser ation, an ideal element is added to the oACect, and he considers the oACect and the ideal counterpart as Aelonging together. "hen the oACect disappears %rom his %ield o% oAser ation, onl4 the ideal counterpart o% it remains. This latter is the concept o% the oACect. The more our range o% experience is /idened, the greater Aecomes the sum o% our concepts. Eut concepts certainl4 do not stand isolated %rom one another. The4 comAine to %orm a s4stematicall4 ordered /hole. The concept BorganismB, %or instance, lin1s up /ith those o% Borderl4 de elopmentB and Bgro/thB. Other concepts /hich are Aased on single oACects merge together into a unit4. All concepts I ma4 %orm o% lions merge into the collecti e concept BlionB. In this /a4 all the separate concepts comAine to %orm a closed conceptual s4stem in /hich each has its special place. Ideas do not di%%er @ualitati el4 %rom concepts. The4 are Aut %uller, more saturated, more comprehensi e concepts. I must attach special importance to the necessit4 o% Aearing in mind, here, that I ma1e thin1ing m4 starting point, and not concepts and ideas /hich are %irst gained A4 means o% thin1ing. For these latter alread4 presuppose thin1ing. M4 remar1s regarding the sel%,supporting and sel%,determined nature o% thin1ing cannot, there%ore, Ae simpl4 trans%erred to concepts. 8I ma1e special mention o% this, Aecause it is here that I di%%er %rom -egel, /ho regards the concept as something primar4 and original.: Concepts cannot Ae gained through oAser ation. This %ollo/s %rom the simple %act that the gro/ing human Aeing onl4 slo/l4 and graduall4 %orms the concepts corresponding to the oACects /hich surround him. Concepts are added to oAser ation.

A philosopher /idel4 read at the present da4 ,, -erAert Spencer, ,, descriAes the mental process /hich /e carr4 out /ith respect to oAser ation as %ollo/s# I%, /hen /al1ing through the %ields some da4 in SeptemAer, 4ou hear a rustle a %e/ 4ards in ad ance, and on oAser ing the ditch,side /here it occurs, see the herAage agitated, 4ou /ill proAaAl4 turn to/ards the spot to learn A4 /hat this sound and motion are produced. As 4ou approach there %lutters into the ditch a partridge+ on seeing /hich 4our curiosit4 is satis%ied ,, 4ou ha e /hat 4ou call an explanation o% the appearances. The explanation, mar1, amounts to this+ that /hereas throughout li%e 4ou ha e had countless experiences o% disturAance among small stationar4 Aodies, accompan4ing the mo ement o% other Aodies among them, and ha e generaliDed the relation Aet/een such disturAances and such mo ements, 4ou consider this particular disturAance explained on %inding it to present an instance o% the li1e relation. 8see %n &: A closer anal4sis sho/s matters to stand er4 di%%erentl4 %rom the /a4 descriAed aAo e. "hen I hear a noise, I %irst loo1 %or the concept /hich %its this oAser ation. It is this concept /hich %irst leads me Ae4ond the mere noise. I% one thin1s no %urther, one simpl4 hears the noise and is content to lea e it at that. Eut m4 re%lecting ma1es it clear to me that I ha e to regard the noise as an e%%ect. There%ore not until I ha e connected the concept o% e%%ect /ith the perception o% the noise, do I %eel the need to go Ae4ond the solitar4 oAser ation and loo1 %or the cause. The concept o% e%%ect calls up that o% cause, and m4 next step. is to loo1 %or the oACect /hich is Aeing the cause, /hich I %ind in the shape o% the partridge. Eut these concepts, cause and e%%ect, I can ne er gain through mere oAser ation, ho/e er man4 instances the oAser ation ma4 co er. OAser ation e o1es thin1ing, and it is thin1ing that %irst sho/s me ho/ to lin1 one separate experience to another. I% one demands o% a Bstrictl4 oACecti e scienceB that it should ta1e its content %rom oAser ation alone, then one must at the same time demand that it should %orego all thin1ing. For thin1ing, A4 its er4 nature, goes Ae4ond /hat is oAser ed. "e must no/ pass %rom thin1ing to the Aeing that thin1s+ %or it is through the thin1er that thin1ing is comAined /ith oAser ation. -uman consciousness is the stage upon /hich concept and oAser ation meet and Aecome lin1ed to one another. In sa4ing this /e ha e in %act characteriDed this 8human: consciousness. It is the mediator Aet/een thin1ing and oAser ation. In as %ar as /e oAser e a thing it appears to us as gi en+ in as %ar as /e thin1, /e appear to oursel es as Aeing acti e. "e regard the thing as oACect and oursel es as thin1ing suACect. Eecause /e direct our thin1ing upon our oAser ation, /e ha e consciousness o% oACects+ Aecause /e direct it upon oursel es, /e ha e consciousness o% oursel es, or sel%,consciousness. -uman consciousness must o% necessit4 Ae at the same time sel%,consciousness Aecause it is a consciousness /hich thin1s. For /hen thin1ing contemplates its o/n acti it4, it ma1es its o/n essential Aeing, as suACect, into a thing, as oACect.

It must, ho/e er, not Ae o erloo1ed that onl4 /ith the help o% thin1ing am I aAle to determine m4sel% as suACect and contrast m4sel% /ith oACects. There%ore thin1ing must ne er Ae regarded as a merel4 suACecti e acti it4. Thin1ing lies Ae4ond suACect and oACect. It produces these t/o concepts Cust as it produces all others. "hen, there%ore, I, as thin1ing suACect, re%er a concept to an oACect, /e must not regard this re%erence as something purel4 suACecti e. It is not the suACect that ma1es the re%erence, Aut thin1ing. The suACect does not thin1 Aecause it is a suACect+ rather it appears to itsel% as suACect Aecause it can thin1. The acti it4 exercised A4 man as a thin1ing Aeing is thus not merel4 suACecti e. 9ather is it something neither suACecti e nor oACecti e, that transcends Aoth these concepts. I ought ne er to sa4 that m4 indi idual suACect thin1s, Aut much more that m4 indi idual suACect li es A4 the grace o% thin1ing. Thin1ing is thus an element /hich leads me out Ae4ond m4sel% and connects me /ith the oACects. Eut at the same time it separates me %rom them, inasmuch as it sets me, as suACect, o er against them. It is Cust this /hich constitutes the douAle nature o% man. -e thin1s, and thereA4 emAraces Aoth himsel% and the rest o% the /orld. Eut at the same time it is A4 means o% thin1ing that he determines himsel% as an indi idual con%ronting the things. "e must next as1 oursel es ho/ that other element, /hich /e ha e so %ar simpl4 called the oACect o% oAser ation and /hich meets the thin1ing in our consciousness, comes into our consciousness at all. In order to ans/er this @uestion /e must eliminate %rom our %ield o% oAser ation e er4thing that has Aeen imported A4 thin1ing. For at an4 moment the content o% our consciousness /ill alread4 Ae inter/o en /ith concepts in the most aried /a4s. "e must imagine that a Aeing /ith %ull4 de eloped human intelligence originates out o% nothing and con%ronts the /orld. "hat it /ould Ae a/are o%, Ae%ore it sets its thin1ing in motion, /ould Ae the pure content o% oAser ation. The /orld /ould then appear to this Aeing as nothing Aut a mere disconnected aggregate o% oACects o% sensation # colors, sounds, sensations o% pressure, o% /armth, o% taste and smell+ also %eelings o% pleasure and pain. This aggregate is the content o% pure, unthin1ing oAser ation. O er against it stands thin1ing, read4 to Aegin its acti it4 as soon as a point o% attac1 presents itsel%. Experience sho/s at once that this does happen. Thin1ing is aAle to dra/ threads %rom one element o% oAser ation to another. It lin1s de%inite concepts /ith these elements and thereA4 estaAlishes a relationship Aet/een them. "e ha e alread4 seen ho/ a noise /hich /e hear Aecomes connected /ith another oAser ation A4 our identi%4ing the %ormer as the e%%ect o% the latter. I% no/ /e recollect that the acti it4 o% thin1ing is on no account to Ae considered as merel4 suACecti e, then /e shall also not Ae tempted to Aelie e that the relationships thus estaAlished A4 thin1ing ha e merel4 suACecti e alidit4. Our next tas1 is to disco er A4 means o% thought%ul re%lection /hat relation the

immediatel4 gi en content o% oAser ation mentioned aAo e has to the conscious suACect. The amAiguit4 o% current speech ma1es it necessar4 %or me to come to an agreement /ith m4 readers concerning the use o% a /ord /hich I shall ha e to emplo4 in /hat %ollo/s. I shall appl4 the /ord BperceptB to the immediate oACects o% sensation enumerated aAo e, in so %ar as the conscious suACect apprehends them through oAser ation. It is, then, not the process o% oAser ation Aut the oACect o% oAser ation /hich I call the BperceptB. I do not choose the term BsensationB, since this has a de%inite meaning in ph4siolog4 /hich is narro/er than that o% m4 concept o% BperceptB. I can spea1 o% a %eeling in m4sel% 8emotion: as percept, Aut not as sensation in the ph4siological sense o% the term. E en m4 %eeling Aecomes 1no/n to me A4 Aecoming a percept %or me. And the /a4 in /hich /e gain 1no/ledge o% our thin1ing through oAser ation is such that thin1ing too, in its %irst appearance %or our consciousness, ma4 Ae called a percept. The naN e man regards his percepts, such as the4 appear to his immediate apprehension, as things ha ing an existence /holl4 independent o% him. "hen he sees a tree he Aelie es in the %irst instance that it stands in the %orm /hich he sees, /ith the colors o% its arious parts, and so on, there on the spot to/ards /hich his gaDe is directed. "hen the same man sees the sun in the morning appear as a disc on the horiDon, and %ollo/s the course o% this disc, he Aelie es that all this actuall4 exists and happens Cust as he oAser es it. To this Aelie% he clings until he meets /ith %urther percepts /hich contradict his %ormer ones. The child /ho as 4et has no experience o% distance grasps at the moon, and onl4 corrects its picture o% the realit4, Aased on %irst impressions, /hen a second percept contradicts the %irst. E er4 extension o% the circle o% m4 percepts compels me to correct m4 picture o% the /orld. "e see this in e er4da4 li%e, as /ell as in the spiritual de elopment o% man1ind. The picture /hich the ancients made %or themsel es o% the relation o% the earth to the sun and other hea enl4 Aodies had to Ae replaced A4 another /hen Copernicus %ound that it /as not in accordance /ith some percepts, /hich in those earl4 da4s /ere un1no/n. A man /ho had Aeen Aorn Alind said, /hen operated on A4 !r. FranD, that the picture o% the siDe o% oACects /hich he had %ormed A4 his sense o% touch Ae%ore his operation, /as a er4 di%%erent one. -e had to correct his tactual percepts A4 his isual percepts. -o/ is it that /e are compelled to ma1e these continual corrections to our oAser ations7 A simple re%lection gi es the ans/er to this @uestion. "hen I stand at one end o% an a enue, the trees at the other end, a/a4 %rom me, seem smaller and nearer together than those /here I stand. M4 percept,picture changes /hen I change the place %rom /hich I am loo1ing. There%ore the %orm in /hich it presents itsel% to me is dependent on a condition /hich is due not to the oACect Aut to me, the percei er. It is all the same to the a enue /here er I stand. Eut the picture I ha e o% it depends essentiall4 on Cust this ie/point. In the same /a4, it ma1es no di%%erence to the sun and the planetar4 s4stem that human

Aeings happen to loo1 at them %rom the earth+ Aut the percept,picture o% the hea ens presented to them is determined A4 the %act that the4 inhaAit the earth. This dependence o% our percept,picture on our place o% oAser ation is the easiest one to understand. The matter Aecomes more di%%icult /hen /e realiDe ho/ our /orld o% percepts is dependent on our Aodil4 and spiritual organiDation. The ph4sicist sho/s us that /ithin the space in /hich /e hear a sound there are iArations o% the air, and also that the Aod4 in /hich /e see1 the origin o% the sound exhiAits a iArating mo ement o% its parts. "e percei e this mo ement as sound onl4 i% /e ha e a normall4 constructed ear. "ithout this the /orld /ould Ae %or e er silent %or us. Ph4siolog4 tells us that there are people /ho percei e nothing o% the magni%icent splendor o% color /hich surrounds us. Their percept,picture has onl4 degrees o% light and dar1. Others are Alind onl4 to one color, %or example, red. Their /orld picture lac1s this hue, and hence it is actuall4 a di%%erent one %rom that o% the a erage man. I should li1e to call the dependence o% m4 percept,picture on m4 place o% oAser ation, BmathematicalB, and its dependence on m4 organiDation, B@ualitati eB. The %ormer determines the proportions o% siDe and mutual distances o% m4 percepts, the latter their @ualit4. The %act that I see a red sur%ace as red ,, this @ualitati e determination ,, depends on the organiDation o% m4 e4e. M4 percept,pictures, then, are in the %irst instance suACecti e. The recognition o% the suACecti e character o% our percepts ma4 easil4 lead us to douAt /hether there is an4 oACecti e Aasis %or them at all. "hen /e realiDe that a percept, %or example that o% a red color or o% a certain tone, is not possiAle /ithout a speci%ic structure o% our organism, /e ma4 easil4 Ae led to Aelie e that it has no permanenc4 apart %rom our suACecti e organiDation and that, /ere it not %or our act o% percei ing it as an oACect, it /ould not exist in an4 sense. The classical representati e o% this ie/ is =eorge Eer1ele4, /ho held that %rom the moment /e realiDe the importance o% the suACect %or perception, /e are no longer aAle to Aelie e in the existence o% a /orld /ithout a conscious Spirit. Some truths there are so near and oA ious to the mind that man need onl4 open his e4es to see them. Such I ta1e this important one to Ae, to /it, that all the choir o% hea en and %urniture o% the earth, in a /ord, all those Aodies /hich compose the might4 %rame o% the /orld, ha e not an4 suAsistence /ithout a mind, that their Aeing is to Ae percei ed or 1no/n+ that, conse@uentl4, so long as the4 are not actuall4 percei ed A4 me, or do not exist in m4 mind or that o% an4 other created spirit, the4 must either ha e no existence at all, or else suAsist in the mind o% some Eternal Spirit. 8see %n ): On this ie/, /hen /e ta1e a/a4 the %act o% its Aeing percei ed, nothing remains o% the percept. There is no color /hen none is seen, no sound /hen none is heard. Extension, %orm, and

motion exist as little as color and sound apart %rom the act o% perception. No/here do /e see Aare extension or shape, Aut these are al/a4s Aound up /ith color or some other @ualit4 un@uestionaAl4 dependent upon our suACecti it4. I% these latter disappear /hen /e cease to percei e them, then the %ormer, Aeing Aound up /ith them, must disappear li1e/ise. To the oACection that there must Ae things that exist apart %rom consciousness and to /hich the conscious percept,pictures are similar, e en though %igure, color, sound, and so on, ha e no existence except /ithin the act o% percei ing, the aAo e ie/ /ould ans/er that a color can Ae similar onl4 to a color, a %igure onl4 to a %igure. Our percepts can Ae similar onl4 to our percepts and to nothing else. E en /hat /e call an oACect is nothing Aut a collection o% percepts /hich are connected in a particular /a4. I% I strip a taAle o% its shape, extension, color, etc. ,, in short, o% all that is merel4 m4 percept ,, then nothing remains o er. This ie/, %ollo/ed up logicall4, leads to the assertion that the oACects o% m4 perceptions exist onl4 through me, and indeed onl4 in as %ar as, and as long as, I percei e them+ the4 disappear /ith m4 percei ing and ha e no meaning apart %rom it. Apart %rom m4 percepts, I 1no/ o% no oACects and cannot 1no/ o% an4. No oACection can Ae made to this assertion as long as I am merel4 re%erring to the general %act that the percept is partl4 determined A4 the organiDation o% m4sel% as suACect. The matter /ould appear er4 di%%erent i% /e /ere in a position to sa4 Cust /hat part is pla4ed A4 our percei ing in the Aringing %orth o% a percept. "e should then 1no/ /hat happens to a percept /hile it is Aeing percei ed, and /e should also Ae aAle to determine /hat character it must alread4 possess Ae%ore it comes to Ae percei ed. This leads us to turn our attention %rom the oACect o% perception to the suACect o% perception. I percei e not onl4 other things, Aut also m4sel%. The percept o% m4sel% contains, to Aegin /ith, the %act that I am the staAle element in contrast to the continual coming and going o% the percept,pictures. The percept o% m4 BIB can al/a4s come up in m4 consciousness /hile I am ha ing other percepts. "hen I am aAsorAed in the perception o% a gi en oACect I am %or the time Aeing a/are onl4 o% this oACect. To this the percept o% m4 sel% can Ae added. I am then conscious not onl4 o% the oACect Aut also o% m4 o/n personalit4 /hich con%ronts the oACect and oAser es it. I do not merel4 see a tree, Aut I also 1no/ that it is I /ho am seeing it. I 1no/, moreo er, that something happens in me /hile I am oAser ing the tree. "hen the tree disappears %rom m4 %ield o% ision, an a%ter,e%%ect o% this process remains in m4 consciousness ,, a picture o% the tree. This picture has Aecome associated /ith m4 sel% during m4 oAser ation. M4 sel% has Aecome enriched+ its content has aAsorAed a ne/ element. This element I call m4 mental

picture o% the tree. I should ne er ha e occasion to spea1 o% mental pictures did I not experience them in the percept o% m4 o/n sel%. Percepts /ould come and go+ I should let them slip A4. Onl4 Aecause I percei e m4 sel%, and oAser e that /ith each percept the content o% m4 sel%, too, is changed, am I compelled to connect the oAser ation o% the oACect /ith the changes in m4 o/n condition, and to spea1 o% m4 mental picture. I percei e the mental picture in m4 sel% in the same sense as I percei e color, sound, etc., in other oACects. I am no/ also aAle to distinguish these other oACects that con%ront me, A4 calling them the outer /orld, /hereas the content o% m4 percept o% m4 sel% I call m4 inner /orld. The %ailure to recogniDe the true relationship Aet/een mental picture and oACect has led to the greatest misunderstandings in modern philosoph4. The perception o% a change in me, the modi%ication m4 sel% undergoes, has Aeen thrust into the %oreground, /hile the oACect /hich causes this modi%ication is lost sight o% altogether. It has Aeen said that /e percei e not oACects Aut onl4 our mental pictures. I 1no/, so it is said, nothing o% the taAle in itsel%, /hich is the oACect o% m4 oAser ation, Aut onl4 o% the change /hich occurs /ithin me /hile I am percei ing the taAle. This ie/ should not Ae con%used /ith the Eer1ele4an theor4 mentioned aAo e. Eer1ele4 maintains the suACecti e nature o% the content o% m4 percepts, Aut he does not sa4 that m4 1no/ledge is limited to m4 mental pictures. -e limits m4 1no/ledge to m4 mental pictures Aecause, in his opinion, there are no oACects apart %rom mental picturing. "hat I ta1e to Ae a taAle no longer exists, according to Eer1ele4, /hen I cease to loo1 at it. This is /h4 Eer1ele4 holds that m4 percepts arise directl4 through the omnipotence o% =od. I see a taAle Aecause =od calls up this percept in me. For Eer1ele4, there%ore, there are no real Aeings other than =od and human spirits. "hat /e call the B/orldB exists onl4 in these spirits. "hat the naN e man calls the outer /orld, or corporeal nature, is %or Eer1ele4 non,existent. This theor4 is con%ronted A4 the no/ predominant .antian ie/ /hich limits our 1no/ledge o% the /orld to our mental pictures, not Aecause it is con inced that things cannot exist Ae4ond these mental pictures, Aut Aecause it Aelie es us to Ae so organiDed that /e can experience onl4 the changes o% our o/n sel es, Aut not the things,in, themsel es that cause these changes. This ie/ concludes %rom the %act that I 1no/ onl4 m4 mental pictures, not that there is no realit4 independent o% them, Aut onl4 that the suACect cannot directl4 assimilate such realit4. The suACect can merel4, Bthrough the medium o% its suACecti e thoughts, imagine it, in ent it, thin1 it, cogniDe it, or perhaps e en %ail to cogniDe it.B 8see %n 0: This 8.antian: conception Aelie es it gi es expression to something aAsolutel4 certain, something /hich is immediatel4 e ident, re@uiring no proo%. The %irst %undamental proposition /hich the philosopher must Aring to clear consciousness is the recognition that our 1no/ledge, to Aegin /ith, is limited to our mental pictures. Our

mental pictures are the onl4 things that /e 1no/ directl4, experience directl4+ and Cust Aecause /e ha e direct experience o% them, e en the most radical douAt cannot roA us o% our 1no/ledge o% them. On the other hand, the 1no/ledge /hich goes Ae4ond m4 mental pictures ,, ta1ing mental pictures here in the /idest possiAle sense, so as to include all ps4chical processes ,, is not proo% against douAt. -ence, at the er4 Aeginning o% all philosophiDing /e must explicitl4 set do/n all 1no/ledge /hich goes Ae4ond mental pictures as Aeing open to douAt. These are the opening sentences o% <ol1elt$s Aoo1 on Immanuel .ant$s Theor4 o% .no/ledge. "hat is here put %or/ard as an immediate and sel%,e ident truth is in realit4 the result o% a thought operation /hich runs as %ollo/s# The naN e man Aelie es that things, Cust as /e percei e them, exist also outside our consciousness. Ph4sics, ph4siolog4, and ps4cholog4, ho/e er, seem to teach us that %or our percepts our organiDation is necessar4, and that there%ore /e cannot 1no/ an4thing aAout external oACects except /hat our organiDation transmits to us. Our percepts are thus modi%ications o% our organiDation, not things,in,themsel es. This train o% thought has in %act Aeen characteriDed A4 Eduard on -artmann as the one /hich must lead to the con iction that /e can ha e direct 1no/ledge onl4 o% our mental pictures. 8see %n *: Eecause, outside our organism, /e %ind iArations o% ph4sical Aodies and o% the air /hich are percei ed A4 us as sound, it is concluded that /hat /e call sound is nothing more than a suACecti e reaction o% our organism to these motions in the external /orld. Similarl4, it is concluded that color and /armth are merel4 modi%ications o% our organism. And, %urther, these t/o 1inds o% percepts are held to Ae produced in us through processes in the external /orld /hich are utterl4 di%%erent %rom /hat /e experience as /armth or as color. "hen these processes stimulate the ner es in m4 s1in, I ha e the suACecti e percept o% /armth+ /hen the4 stimulate the optic ner e, I percei e light and color. 6ight, color, and /armth, then, are the responses o% m4 sensor4 ner es to external stimuli. E en the sense o% touch re eals to me, not the oACects o% the outer /orld, Aut onl4 states o% m4 o/n Aod4. In the sense o% modern ph4sics one could someho/ thin1 that Aodies consist o% in%initel4 small particles called molecules, and that these molecules are not in direct contact, Aut are at certain distances %rom one another. Eet/een them, there%ore, is empt4 space. Across this space the4 act on one another A4 %orces o% attraction and repulsion. I% I put m4 hand on a Aod4, the molecules o% m4 hand A4 no means touch those o% the Aod4 directl4, Aut there remains a certain distance Aet/een Aod4 and hand, and /hat I experience as the Aod4$s resistance is nothing Aut the e%%ect o% the %orce o% repulsion /hich its molecules exert on m4 hand. I am aAsolutel4 external to the Aod4 and percei e onl4 its e%%ects on m4 organism.

In ampli%ication o% this discussion, there is the theor4 o% the so,called Speci%ic Ner e Energies, ad anced A4 J. MKller 8&(;& , &(2(:. It asserts that each sense has the peculiarit4 that it responds to all external stimuli in one particular /a4 onl4. I% the optic ner e is stimulated, perception o% light results, irrespecti e o% /hether the stimulation is due to /hat /e call light, or /hether mechanical pressure or an electric current /or1s upon the ner e. On the other hand, the same external stimulus applied to di%%erent senses gi es rise to di%%erent percepts. The conclusion %rom these %acts seems to Ae that our senses can transmit onl4 /hat occurs in themsel es, Aut nothing o% the external /orld. The4 determine our percepts, each according to its o/n nature. Ph4siolog4 sho/s that there can Ae no direct 1no/ledge e en o% the e%%ects /hich oACects produce on our sense organs. Through %ollo/ing up the processes /hich occur in our o/n Aodies, the ph4siologist %inds that, e en in the sense organs, the e%%ects o% the external mo ement are trans%ormed in the most mani%old /a4s. "e can see this most clearl4 in the case o% e4e and ear. Eoth are er4 complicated organs /hich modi%4 the external stimulus consideraAl4 Ae%ore the4 conduct it to the corresponding ner e. From the peripheral end o% the ner e the alread4 modi%ied stimulus is then conducted to the Arain. Onl4 no/ can the central organs Ae stimulated. There%ore it is concluded that the external process undergoes a series o% trans%ormations Ae%ore it reaches consciousness. "hat goes on in the Arain is connected A4 so man4 intermediate lin1s /ith the external process, that an4 similarit4 to the latter is out o% the @uestion. "hat the Arain ultimatel4 transmits to the soul is neither external processes, nor processes in the sense organs, Aut onl4 such as occur in the Arain. Eut e en these are not percei ed directl4 A4 the soul. "hat /e %inall4 ha e in consciousness are not Arain processes at all, Aut sensations. M4 sensation o% red has aAsolutel4 no similarit4 to the process /hich occurs in the Arain /hen I sense red. The redness, again, onl4 appears as an e%%ect in the soul, and the Arain process is merel4 its cause. This is /h4 -artmann sa4s, B"hat the suACect percei es, there%ore, are al/a4s onl4 modi%ications o% his o/n ps4chical states and nothing else.B 8see %n 2: "hen I ha e the sensations, ho/e er, the4 are as 4et er4 %ar %rom Aeing grouped into /hat I percei e as BthingsB. Onl4 single sensations can Ae transmitted to me A4 the Arain. The sensations o% hardness and so%tness are transmitted to me A4 the sense o% touch, those o% color and light A4 the sense o% sight. Fet all these are to Ae %ound united in one and the same oACect. This uni%ication, there%ore, can onl4 Ae Arought aAout A4 the soul itsel%+ that is, the soul comAines the separate sensations, mediated through the Arain, into Aodies. M4 Arain con e4s to me singl4, and A4 /idel4 di%%erent paths, the isual, tactile, and auditor4 sensations /hich the soul then comAines into the mental picture o% a trumpet. It is Cust this er4 last lin1 in a process 8the mental picture o% the trumpet: /hich %or m4 consciousness

is the er4 %irst thing that is gi en. In it nothing can an4 longer Ae %ound o% /hat exists outside me and originall4 made an impression on m4 senses. The external oACect has Aeen entirel4 lost on the /a4 to the Arain and through the Arain to the soul. It /ould Ae hard to %ind in the histor4 o% human culture another edi%ice o% thought /hich has Aeen Auilt up /ith greater ingenuit4, and /hich 4et, on closer anal4sis, collapses into nothing. 6et us loo1 a little closer at the /a4 it has Aeen constructed. One starts /ith /hat is gi en in naN e consciousness, /ith the thing as percei ed. Then one sho/s that none o% the @ualities /hich /e %ind in this thing /ould exist %or us had /e no sense organs. No e4e ,, no color. There%ore the color is not 4et present in that /hich a%%ects the e4e. It arises %irst through the interaction o% the e4e and the oACect. The latter is, there%ore, colorless. Eut neither is the color in the e4e, %or in the e4e there is onl4 a chemical or ph4sical process /hich is %irst conducted A4 the optic ner e to the Arain, and there initiates another process. E en this is not 4et the color. That is onl4 produced in the soul A4 means o% the Arain process. E en then it does not 4et enter m4 consciousness, Aut is %irst trans%erred A4 the soul to a Aod4 in the external /orld. There, upon this Aod4, I %inall4 Aelie e m4sel% to percei e it. "e ha e tra eled in a complete circle. "e Aecame conscious o% a colored Aod4. That is the %irst thing. -ere the thought operation starts. I% I had no e4e, the Aod4 /ould Ae, %or me, colorless. I cannot there%ore attriAute the color to the Aod4. I start on the search %or it. I loo1 %or it in the e4e ,, in ain+ in the ner e ,, in ain+ in the Arain ,, in ain once more+ in the soul ,, here I %ind it indeed, Aut not attached to the Aod4. I %ind the colored Aod4 again onl4 on returning to m4 starting point. The circle is completed. I Aelie e that I am cogniDing as a product o% m4 soul that /hich the naN e man regards as existing outside him, in space. As long as one stops here e er4thing seems to %it Aeauti%ull4. Eut /e must go o er the /hole thing again %rom the Aeginning. -itherto I ha e Aeen dealing /ith something ,, the external percept ,, o% /hich, %rom m4 naN e standpoint, I ha e had until no/ a totall4 /rong conception. I thought that the percept, Cust as I percei e it, had oACecti e existence. Eut no/ I oAser e that it disappears together /ith m4 mental picture, that it is onl4 a modi%ication o% m4 inner state o% soul. -a e I, then, an4 right at all to start %rom it in m4 arguments7 Can I sa4 o% it that it acts on m4 soul7 I must hence%orth treat the taAle, o% /hich %ormerl4 I Aelie ed that it acted on me and produced a mental picture o% itsel% in me, as itsel% a mental picture. Eut %rom this it %ollo/s logicall4 that m4 sense organs and the processes in them are also merel4 suACecti e. I ha e no right to spea1 o% a real e4e Aut onl4 o% m4 mental picture o% the e4e. Exactl4 the same is true o% the ner e paths, and the Arain process, and no less o% the process in the soul itsel%, through /hich things are supposed to Ae Auilt up out o% the chaos

o% mani%old sensations. I%, assuming the truth o% the %irst circle o% argumentation, I run through the steps o% m4 act o% cognition once more, the latter re eals itsel% as a tissue o% mental pictures /hich, as such, cannot act on one another. I cannot sa4 that m4 mental picture o% the oACect acts on m4 mental picture o% the e4e, and that %rom this interaction m4 mental picture o% color results. Nor is it necessar4 that I should sa4 this. For as soon as I see clearl4 that m4 sense organs and their acti it4, m4 ner e and soul processes, can also Ae 1no/n to me onl4 through perception, the train o% thought /hich I ha e outlined re eals itsel% in its %ull aAsurdit4. It is @uite true that I can ha e no percept /ithout the corresponding sense organ. Eut Cust as little can I Ae a/are o% a sense organ /ithout perception. From the percept o% a taAle I can pass to the e4e /hich sees it, or the ner es in the s1in /hich touch it, Aut /hat ta1es place in these I can, in turn, learn onl4 %rom perception. And then I soon notice that there is no trace o% similarit4 Aet/een the process /hich ta1es place in the e4e and the color /hich I percei e. I cannot eliminate m4 color percept A4 pointing to the process /hich ta1es place in the e4e during this perception. No more can I redisco er the color in the ner e or Arain processes. I onl4 add ne/ percepts, localiDed /ithin the organism, to the %irst percept, /hich the naN e man localiDes outside his organism. I merel4 pass %rom one percept to another. Moreo er there is a gap in the /hole argument. I can %ollo/ the processes in m4 organism up to those in m4 Arain, e en though m4 assumptions Aecome more and more h4pothetical as I approach the central processes o% the Arain. The path o% external oAser ation ceases /ith the process in m4 Arain, more particularl4 /ith the process /hich I should oAser e i% I could deal /ith the Arain using the instruments and methods o% ph4sics and chemistr4. The path o% inner oAser ation Aegins /ith the sensation, and continues up to the Auilding o% things out o% the material o% sensation. At the point o% transition %rom Arain process to sensation, the path o% oAser ation is interrupted. The /a4 o% thin1ing here descriAed, 1no/n as critical idealism, in contrast to the standpoint o% naN e consciousness 1no/n as naN e realism, ma1es the mista1e o% characteriDing the one percept as mental picture /hile ta1ing the other in the er4 same sense as does the naN e realism /hich it apparentl4 re%utes. It /ants to pro e that percepts ha e the character o% mental pictures A4 naN el4 accepting the percepts connected /ith one$s o/n organism as oACecti el4 alid %acts+ and o er and aAo e this, it %ails to see that it con%uses t/o spheres o% oAser ation, Aet/een /hich it can %ind no connection. Critical idealism can re%ute naN e realism onl4 A4 itsel% assuming, in naN e,realistic %ashion, that one$s o/n organism has oACecti e existence. As soon as the idealist realiDes that the percepts connected /ith his o/n organism are exactl4 o% the same nature as those /hich naN e realism assumes to ha e oACecti e existence, he can no longer use those

percepts as a sa%e %oundation %or his theor4. -e /ould ha e to regard e en his o/n suACecti e organiDation as a mere complex o% mental pictures. Eut this remo es the possiAilit4 o% regarding the content o% the percei ed /orld as a product o% our spiritual organiDation. One /ould ha e to assume that the mental picture BcolorB /as onl4 a modi%ication o% the mental picture Be4eB. So,called critical idealism cannot Ae pro ed /ithout Aorro/ing %rom naN e realism. Nai e realism can Ae re%uted onl4 i%, in another sphere, its o/n assumptions are accepted /ithout proo% as Aeing alid. This much, then, is certain# In estigation /ithin the /orld o% percepts cannot estaAlish critical idealism, and conse@uentl4, cannot strip percepts o% their oACecti e character. Still less can the principle Bthe percei ed /orld is m4 mental pictureB Ae claimed as oA ious and needing no proo%. Schopenhauer Aegins his chie% /or1 8see %n 3: /ith the /ords# The /orld is m4 mental picture ,, this is a truth /hich holds good %or e er4thing that li es and cogniDes, though man alone can Aring it into re%lecti e and aAstract consciousness. I% he reall4 does this, he has attained to philosophical discretion. It then Aecomes clear and certain to him that he 1no/s no sun and no earth, Aut onl4 an e4e that sees a sun, a hand that %eels an earth+ that the /orld /hich surrounds him is there onl4 as mental picture, that is, onl4 in relation to something else, to the one /ho pictures it, /hich is he himsel%. I% an4 truth can Ae asserted a priori, it is this one, %or it is the expression o% that %orm o% all possiAle and thin1aAle experience /hich is more uni ersal than all others, than time, space, or causalit4, %or all these presuppose it ... This /hole theor4 is /rec1ed A4 the %act, alread4 mentioned, that the e4e and the hand are percepts no less than the sun and the earth. >sing Schopenhauer$s expressions in his o/n sense, /e could repl4# M4 e4e that sees the sun, m4 hand that %eels the earth, are m4 mental pictures Cust as much as the sun and the earth themsel es. That /ith this the /hole theor4 cancels itsel%, is clear /ithout %urther argument. For onl4 m4 real e4e and m4 real hand could ha e the mental pictures BsunB and BearthB as modi%ications o% themsel es+ the mental pictures Be4eB and BhandB cannot ha e them. Fet it is onl4 o% these mental pictures that critical idealism is allo/ed to spea1. Critical idealism is totall4 un%itted to %orm an opinion aAout the relationship Aet/een percept and mental picture. It cannot Aegin to ma1e the distinction, mentioned aAo e, Aet/een /hat happens to the percept in the process o% perception and /hat must Ae inherent in it prior to perception. "e must, there%ore, tac1le this proAlem in another /a4. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. First Principles, Part I, )0.

). Eer1ele4 Principles o% -uman .no/ledge, Part I, Section 3. 0. O. 6ieAmann, Mur Anal4sis der "ir1lich1eit, p )(. *. See his !as =rundproAlem der Er1enntnistheorie, pp. &3,*;. 2. !as =rundproAlem der Er1enntnistheorie, pp. 05. 3. !ie "elt als "ille und <orstellung. ----.

( - The Act of Kno in! the &orld.

From the %oregoing considerations it %ollo/s that it is impossiAle to pro e A4 in estigating the content o% our oAser ation that our percepts are mental pictures. Such proo% is supposed to Ae estaAlished A4 sho/ing that, i% the process o% percei ing ta1es place in the /a4 in /hich O on the Aasis o% naN erealistic assumptions aAout our ps4chological and ph4siological constitution O /e imagine that it does, then /e ha e to do, not /ith things in themsel es, Aut onl4 /ith our mental pictures o% things. No/ i% naN e realism, /hen consistentl4 thought out, leads to results /hich directl4 contradict its presuppositions, then these presuppositions must Ae discarded as unsuitaAle %or the %oundation o% a uni ersal philosoph4. In an4 case, it is not permissiAle to reCect the presuppositions and 4et accept the conse@uences, as the critical idealist does /hen he Aases his assertion that the /orld is m4 mental picture on the line o% argument alread4 descriAed. 8Eduard on -artmann gi es a %ull account o% this line o% argument in his /or1, !as =rundproAlem der Er1enntnistheorie.: The truth o% critical idealism is one thing, the %orce o% its proo% another. -o/ it stands /ith the %ormer /ill appear later on in the course o% this Aoo1, Aut the %orce o% its proo% is exactl4 nil. I% one Auilds a house, and the ground %loor collapses /hile the %irst %loor is Aeing Auilt, then the %irst %loor collapses also. NaN e realism and critical idealism is related as ground %loor to the %irst %loor in this simile. For someone /ho Aelie es that the /hole percei ed /orld is onl4 an imagined one, a mental picture, and is in %act the e%%ect upon m4 soul o% things un1no/n to me, the real proAlem o% 1no/ledge is naturall4 concerned not /ith the mental pictures present onl4 in the soul Aut /ith the things /hich are independent o% us and /hich lie outside our consciousness. -e as1s# -o/ much can /e learn aAout these things indirectl4, seeing that /e cannot oAser e them directl47 From this point o% ie/, he is concerned not /ith the inner connection o% his conscious percepts /ith one another Aut /ith their causes /hich transcend his consciousness and exist independentl4 o% him, since the percepts, in his opinion, disappear as soon as he turns his senses a/a4 %rom things. Our consciousness, on this ie/, /or1s li1e a mirror %rom /hich the pictures o% de%inite things disappear the moment its re%lecting sur%ace is not turned to/ard them. I%, no/, /e do not see the things

themsel es Aut onl4 their re%lections, then /e must learn indirectl4 aAout the nature o% things A4 dra/ing conclusions %rom the Aeha ior o% the re%lections. Modern science ta1es this attitude in that it uses percepts onl4 as a last resort in oAtaining in%ormation aAout the processes o% matter /hich lie Aehind them, and /hich alone reall4 Pare.L I% the philosopher, as critical idealist, admits real existence at all, then his search %or 1no/ledge through the medium o% mental pictures is directed solel4 to/ard this existence. -is interest s1ips o er the suACecti e /orld o% mental pictures and goes straight %or /hat produces these pictures. The critical idealist can, ho/e er, go e en %urther and sa4# I am con%ined to the /orld o% m4 mental pictures and escape %rom it. I% I thin1 o% a thing as Aeing Aehind m4 mental picture, then thought is again nothing Aut a mental picture. An idealist o% this t4pe /ill either den4 the thing,in,itsel% entirel4 or at an4 rate assert that it has no signi%icance %or human Aeings, in other /ords, that it is as good as non,existent since /e can 1no/ nothing o% it. To this 1ind o% critical idealist the /hole /orld seems a dream, in the %ace o% /hich all stri ing %or 1no/ledge is simpl4 meaningless. For him there can Ae onl4 t/o sorts o% men# ictims o% the illusion that their o/n dream structures are real things, and the /ise ones /ho see through the nothingness o% this dream /orld and /ho must there%ore graduall4 lose all desire to trouAle themsel es %urther aAout it. From this point o% ie/, e en one$s o/n personalit4 ma4 Aecome a mere dream phantom. Just as during sleep there appears among m4 dream images an image o% m4sel%, so in /a1ing consciousness the mental picture o% m4 o/n I is added to the mental picture o% the outer /orld. "e ha e then gi en to us in consciousness, not our real I, Aut onl4 our mental picture o% our I. "hoe er denies that things exist, or at least that /e can 1no/ an4thing o% them, must also den4 the existence, or at least the 1no/ledge, o% one$s o/n personalit4. The critical idealist then comes to the conclusion that BAll realit4 resol es itsel% into a /onder%ul dream, /ithout a li%e /hich is dreamed aAout, and /ithout a spirit /hich is ha ing the dream+ into a dream /hich hangs together in a dream o% itsel%.B 8see %n &: For the person /ho Aelie es that he recogniDes our immediate li%e to Ae a dream, it is immaterial /hether he postulates nothing more Aehind this dream or /hether he relates his mental pictures to actual things. In Aoth cases li%e must lose all academic interest %or him. Eut /hereas all learning must Ae meaningless %or those /ho Aelie e that the /hole o% the accessiAle uni erse is exhausted in dreams, 4et %or others /ho %eel entitled to argue %rom mental pictures to things, learning /ill consist in the in estigation o% these Bthings,in, themsel es.B The %irst o% these theories ma4 Ae called aAsolute illusionism, the second is called transcendental realism A4 its most rigorousl4 logical exponent, Eduard on -artmann. 8see %n ):

Eoth these points o% ie/s ha e this in common /ith naN e realism, that the4 see1 to gain a %ooting in the /orld A4 means o% an in estigation o% perceptions. "ithin this sphere, ho/e er, the4 are unaAle to %ind a %irm %oundation. One o% the most important @uestions %or an adherent o% transcendental realism /ould ha e to Ae# -o/ does the Ego produce the /orld o% mental pictures out o% itsel%7 A /orld o% mental pictures /hich /as gi en to us, and /hich disappeared as soon as /e shut our senses to the external /orld, might 1indle as earnest desire %or 1no/ledge, in so %ar as it /as a means o% in estigating indirectl4 the /orld o% the I,in,itsel%. I% the things o% our experience /ere Bmental picturesB, then our e er4da4 li%e /ould Ae li1e a dream, and the disco er4 o% the true state o% a%%airs /ould Ae li1e /a1ing. No/ our dream images interest us as long as /e dream and conse@uentl4 do not detect their dream character. Eut as soon as /e /a1e, /e no longer loo1 %or the inner connections o% our dream images among themsel es, Aut rather %or the ph4sical, ph4siological and ps4chological processes /hich underlie them. In the same /a4, a philosopher /ho holds the /orld to Ae his mental picture cannot Ae interested in the mutual relations o% the details /ithin the picture. I% he allo/s %or the existence o% a real Ego at all, then his @uestion /ill Ae, not ho/ one o% his mental pictures is lin1ed /ith another, Aut /hat ta1es place in the independentl4 existing soul /hile a certain train o% mental pictures passes through his consciousness. I% I dream that I am drin1ing /ine /hich ma1es m4 throat dr4, and then /a1e up /ith a cough 8see %n 0:, I cease, the moment I /a1e, to Ae interested in progress o% the dream %or its o/n sa1e. M4 attention is no/ concerned onl4 /ith the ph4siological and ps4chological processes A4 means o% /hich the irritation /hich causes me to cough comes to Ae s4mAolicall4 expressed in the dream picture. Similarl4, once the philosopher is con inced that the gi en /orld consists o% nothing Aut mental pictures, his interest is Aound to s/itch at once %rom this /orld to the real soul /hich lies Aehind. The matter is more serious, ho/e er, %or the adherent o% illusionism /ho denies altogether the existence o% an Ego,in,itsel% Aehind the mental pictures, or at least holds this Ego to Ae un1no/aAle. "e might er4 easil4 Ae led to such a ie/ A4 the oAser ation that, in contrast to dreaming, there is indeed the /a1ing state in /hich /e ha e the opportunit4 o% seeing through our dreams and re%erring them to the real relations o% things, Aut that there is no state o% the sel% /hich is related similarl4 to our /a1ing conscious li%e. "hoe er ta1es this ie/ %ails to see that there is, in %act, something /hich is related to mere percei ing in the /a4 that our /a1ing experience is related to our dreaming. This something is thin1ing. The naN e man cannot Ae charged /ith the lac1 o% insight re%erred to here. -e accepts li%e as it is, and regards things as real Cust as the4 present themsel es to him in experience. The %irst step, ho/e er, /hich /e ta1e Ae4ond this standpoint can Ae onl4 this, that /e as1

ho/ thin1ing is related to percept. It ma1es no di%%erence /hether or no the percept, in the shape gi en to me, exists continuousl4 Ae%ore and a%ter m4 %orming a mental picture+ i% I /ant to assert an4thing /hate er aAout it, I can do so onl4 /ith the help o% thin1ing. I% I assert that the /orld is m4 mental picture, I ha e enunciated the result o% an act o% thin1ing. and i% m4 thin1ing is not applicaAle to the /orld, then this result is %alse. Eet/een a percept and e er4 1ind o% assertion aAout it there inter enes thin1ing. The reason /h4 /e generall4 o erloo1 thin1ing in our consideration o% things has alread4 Aeen gi en 8see Chapter 0:. It lies in the %act that our attention is concentrated onl4 on the oACect /e are thin1ing aAout, Aut not at the same time on the thin1ing itsel%. The naN e consciousness, there%ore, treats thin1ing as something /hich has nothing to do /ith things, Aut stands altogether aloo% %rom them and contemplates them. The picture /hich the thin1er ma1es o% the phenomena o% the /orld is regarded not as something Aelonging to the things Aut as existing onl4 in the human head. The /orld is complete in itsel% /ithout this picture. It is %inished and complete /ith all its suAstances and %orces, and o% this read4,made /orld man ma1es a picture. "hoe er thin1s thus need onl4 Ae as1ed one @uestion. "hat right ha e 4ou to declare the /orld to Ae complete /ithout thin1ing7 !oes not the /orld produce thin1ing in the heads o% men /ith the same necessit4 as it produces the Alossom on a plant7 Plant a seed in the earth. It puts %orth root and stem, it un%olds into lea es and Alossoms. Set the plant Ae%ore 4oursel%. It connects itsel%, in 4our mind, /ith a de%inite concept. "h4 should this concept Aelong an4 less to the /hole plant than lea% and Alossom7 Fou sa4 the lea es and Alossoms exist @uite apart %rom a percei ing suACect, Aut the concept appears onl4 /hen a human Aeing con%ronts the plant. ?uite so. Eut lea es and Alossoms also appear on the plant onl4 i% there is soil in /hich the seed can Ae planted, and light and air in /hich the lea es and Alossoms can un%old. Just so the concept o% a plant arises /hen a thin1ing consciousness approaches the plant. It is @uite arAitrar4 to regard the sum o% /hat /e experience o% a thing through Aare perception as a totalit4, as the /hole thing, /hile that /hich re eals itsel% through thought%ul contemplation is regarded as a mere accretion /hich has nothing to do /ith the thing itsel%. I% I am gi en a roseAud toda4, the picture that o%%ers itsel% to m4 perception is complete onl4 %or the moment. I% I put the Aud into /ater, I shall tomorro/ get a er4 di%%erent picture o% m4 oACect. I% I /atch the roseAud /ithout interruption, I shall see toda4$s state change continuousl4 into tomorro/$s through an in%inite numAer o% intermediate stages. The picture /hich presents itsel% to me at an4 one moment is onl4 a chance cross,section o% an oACect /hich is in a continual process o% de elopment. I% I do not put the Aud into /ater, a /hole series o% states /hich la4 as possiAilities /ithin the Aud /ill not de elop.

Similarl4 I ma4 Ae pre ented tomorro/ %rom oAser ing the Alossom %urther, and /ill thereA4 ha e an incomplete picture o% it. It /ould Ae a @uite unoACecti e and %ortuitous 1ind o% opinion that declared o% the purel4 momentar4 appearance o% a thing# this is the thing. Just as little is it legitimate to regard the sum o% perceptual characteristics as the thing. It might Ae @uite possiAle %or a spirit to recei e the concept at the same time as, and united /ith, the percept. It /ould ne er occur to such a spirit that the concept did not Aelong to the thing. It /ould ha e to ascriAe to the concept an existence indi isiAl4 Aound up /ith the thing. I /ill ma1e m4sel% clearer A4 an example. I% I thro/ a stone horiDontall4 through the air, I percei e it in di%%erent places one a%ter the other. I connect these places so as to %orm a line. Mathematics teaches me to 1no/ arious 1inds o% lines, one o% /hich is the paraAola. I 1no/ the paraAola to Ae a line /hich is produced /hen a point mo es according to a particular la/. I% I examine the conditions under /hich the stone thro/n A4 me mo es, I %ind the path tra ersed is identical /ith the line I 1no/ as a paraAola. That the stone mo es Cust in a paraAola is a result o% the gi en conditions and %ollo/s necessaril4 %rom them. The %orm o% the paraAola Aelongs to the /hole phenomenon as much as an4 other %eature o% it does. The spirit descriAed aAo e /ho has no need o% the detour o% thin1ing /ould %ind itsel% presented not onl4 a se@uence o% isual percepts at di%%erent points Aut, as part and parcel o% these phenomena, also /ith the paraAolic %orm o% the path /hich /e add to the phenomenon onl4 A4 thin1ing. It is not due to the oACects that the4 are gi en us at %irst /ithout the corresponding concepts, Aut to our mental organiDation. Our /hole Aeing %unctions in such a /a4 that %rom e er4 real thing the rele ant elements come to us %rom t/o sides, %rom percei ing and %rom thin1ing. The /a4 I am organiDed %or apprehending the things has nothing to do /ith the nature o% the things themsel es. The gap Aet/een percei ing and thin1ing exists onl4 %rom the moment that I as spectator con%ront the things. "hich elements do, and /hich do not, Aelong to the things cannot depend at all on the manner in /hich I oAtain m4 1no/ledge o% these elements. Man is a limited Aeing. First o% all, he is a Aeing among other Aeings. -is existence Aelongs to space and time. Thus, onl4 a limited part o% the total uni erse that can Ae gi en him at an4 one time. This limited part, ho/e er, is lin1ed up /ith other parts in all directions Aoth in time and in space. I% our existence /ere so lin1ed up /ith the things that e er4 occurrence in the /orld /ere at the same time also an occurrence in us, the distinction Aet/een oursel es and the things /ould not exist. Eut then there /ould Ae no separate things at all %or us. All occurrences /ould pass continuousl4 one into the other.

The cosmos /ould Ae a unit4 and a /hole, complete in itsel%. The stream o% e ents /ould no/here Ae interrupted. It is o/ing to our limitations that a thing appears to us as single and separate /hen in truth it is not a separate thing at all. No/here, %or example, is the single @ualit4 BredB to Ae %ound A4 itsel% in isolation. It is surrounded on all sides A4 other @ualities to /hich it Aelongs, and /ithout /hich it could not suAsist. For us, ho/e er, it is necessar4 to isolate certain sections o% the /orld and to consider them A4 themsel es. Our e4e can grasp onl4 single colors one a%ter another out o% a mani%old totalit4 o% color, and our understanding, can grasp onl4 single concepts out o% a connected conceptual s4stem. This separating o%% is a suACecti e act, /hich is due to the %act that /e are not identical /ith the /orld process, Aut are a single Aeing among other Aeings. The all important thing no/ is to determine ho/ the Aeing that /e oursel es are is related to the other entities. This determination must Ae distinguished %rom merel4 Aecoming conscious o% oursel es. For this latter sel%,a/areness /e depend on percei ing Cust as /e do %or our a/areness o% an4 other thing. The perception o% m4sel% re eals to me a numAer o% @ualities /hich I comAine into m4 personalit4 as a /hole, Cust as I comAine the @ualities 4ello/, metallic, hard, etc., in the unit4 Bgold.L The perception o% m4sel% does not ta1e me Ae4ond the sphere o% /hat Aelongs to me. This percei ing o% m4sel% must Ae distinguished %rom determining m4sel% A4 means o% thin1ing. Just as, A4 means o% thin1ing, I %it an4 single external percept into the /hole /orld context, so A4 means o% thin1ing I integrate into the /orld process the percepts I ha e made o% m4sel%. M4 sel%,perception con%ines me /ithin certain limits, Aut m4 thin1ing is not concerned /ith these limits. In this sense I am a t/o,sided Aeing. I am enclosed /ithin the sphere /hich I percei e as that o% m4 personalit4, Aut I am also the Aearer o% an acti it4 /hich, %rom a higher sphere, de%ines m4 limited existence. Our thin1ing is not indi idual li1e our sensing and %eeling+ it is uni ersal. It recei es an indi idual stamp in each separate human Aeing onl4 Aecause it comes to Ae related to his indi idual %eelings and sensations. E4 means o% these particular colorings o% the uni ersal thin1ing, indi idual men di%%erentiate themsel es %rom one another. There is onl4 one single concept o% BtriangleB. It is @uite immaterial %or the content o% this concept /hether it is grasped in A$s consciousness or in E$s. It /ill, ho/e er, Ae grasped A4 each o% the t/o in his o/n indi idual /a4. This thought is opposed A4 a common preCudice er4 hard to o ercome. This preCudice pre ents one %rom seeing that the concept o% a triangle that m4 head grasps is the same as the concept that m4 neighAor$s head grasps. The naN e man Aelie es himsel% to Ae the

creator o% his concepts. -ence he Aelie es that each person has his o/n concepts. It is a %undamental re@uirement o% philosophic thin1ing that it should o ercome this preCudice. The one uni%orm concept o% BtriangleB does not Aecome a multiplicit4 Aecause it is thought A4 man4 persons. For the thin1ing o% the man4 is itsel% a unit4. In thin1ing, /e ha e that element gi en us /hich /elds our separate indi idualit4 into one /hole /ith the cosmos. In so %ar as /e sense and %eel 8and also percei e:, /e are single Aeings+ in so %ar as /e thin1, /e are the all,one Aeing that per ades e er4thing. This is the deeper meaning o% our t/o,sided nature# "e see coming into Aeing in us a %orce complete and aAsolute in itsel%, a %orce /hich is uni ersal Aut /hich /e learn to 1no/, not as it issues %rom the center o% the /orld, Aut rather at a point in the peripher4. "ere /e to 1no/ it at its source, /e should understand the /hole riddle o% the uni erse the moment /e Aecame conscious. Eut since /e stand at a point in the peripher4, and %ind that our o/n existence is Aounded A4 de%inite limits, /e must explore the region /hich lies outside our o/n Aeing /ith the help o% thin1ing, /hich proCects into us %rom the uni ersal /orld existence. Through the %act that the thin1ing, in us, reaches out Ae4ond our separate existence and relates itsel% to the uni ersal /orld existence, gi es rise to the %undamental desire %or 1no/ledge in us. Eeings /ithout thin1ing do not ha e this desire. "hen the4 are %aced /ith other things, no @uestions arise %or them. These other things remain external to such Aeings. Eut in thin1ing Aeings the concept rises up /hen the4 con%ront the external thing. It is that part o% the thing /hich /e recei e not %rom outside Aut %rom /ithin. To match up, to unite the t/o elements, inner and outer, is the tas1 o% 1no/ledge. The percept is thus not something %inished and sel%,contained, Aut one side o% the total realit4. The other side is the concept. The act o% 1no/ing is the s4nthesis o% percept and concept. Onl4 percept and concept together constitute the /hole thing. The %oregoing arguments sho/ that it is senseless to loo1 %or an4 common element in the separate entities o% the /orld other than the ideal content that thin1ing o%%ers us. All attempts to %ind a unit4 in the /orld other than this internall4 coherent ideal content, /hich /e gain A4 a thought%ul contemplation o% our percepts, are Aound to %ail. Neither a humanl4 personal =od, nor %orce, nor matter, nor the Alind /ill 8Schopenhauer:, can Ae alid %or us as a uni ersal /orld unit4. All these entities Aelong onl4 to limited spheres o% our oAser ation. -umanl4 limited personalit4 /e percei e onl4 in oursel es+ %orce and matter in external things. As %ar as the /ill is concerned, it can Ae regarded onl4 as the expression o% the acti it4 o% our %inite personalit4. Schopenhauer /ants to a oid ma1ing BaAstractB thin1ing the Aearer o% unit4 in the /orld, and see1s instead something /hich presents itsel% to him immediatel4 as real. This philosopher Aelie es that /e can ne er approach the /orld so long as /e regard it as BexternalB /orld.

In point o% %act, the sought %or meaning o% the /orld /hich con%ronts me is nothing more than mental picture, or the passage %rom the /orld as mere mental picture o% the 1no/ing suACect to /hate er it ma4 Ae Aesides this, could ne er Ae %ound at all i% the in estigator himsel% /ere nothing more than the purel4 1no/ing suACect 8a /inged cheruA /ithout a Aod4:. Eut he himsel% is rooted in that /orld# he %inds himsel% in it as an indi idual, that is to sa4, his 1no/ledge, /hich is the determining %actor supporting the /hole /orld as mental picture, is thus al/a4s gi en through the medium o% a Aod4, /hose a%%ections are, %or the intellect, the starting point %or the contemplation o% that /orld, as /e ha e sho/n. For the purel4 1no/ing suACect as such, this Aod4 is a mental picture li1e an4 other, an oACect among oACects+ its mo ements and actions are so %ar 1no/n to him in precisel4 the same /a4 as the changes o% all other percei ed oACects, and /ould Ae Cust as strange and incomprehensiAle to him i% their sense /ere not made clear %or him in an entirel4 di%%erent /a4 .... To the suACect o% 1no/ledge, /ho appears as an indi idual through his identit4 /ith the Aod4, this Aod4 is gi en in t/o entirel4 di%%erent /a4s# once as a mental picture %or intelligent consideration, as an oACect among oACects and oAe4ing their la/s+ Aut at the same time, in @uite a di%%erent /a4, namel4 as the thing immediatel4 1no/n to e er4one A4 the /ord /ill. E er4 true act o% his /ill is at once and /ithout exception also a mo ement o% his Aod4# he cannot /ill the act /ithout at the same time percei ing that it appears as a mo ement o% the Aod4. The act o% /ill and the action o% the Aod4 are not t/o things oACecti el4 1no/n to Ae di%%erent, /hich the Aond o% causalit4 unites+ the4 do not stand in the relation o% cause and e%%ect+ the4 are one and the same, Aut the4 are gi en in t/o entirel4 di%%erent /a4s# once @uite directl4 and once in contemplation %or the intellect. 8see %n *: Schopenhauer considers himsel% entitled A4 these arguments to %ind in the human Aod4 the BoACecti it4B o% the /ill. -e Aelie es that in the acti ities o% the Aod4 he %eels an immediate realit4 ,, the thing,in,itsel% in the concrete. Against these arguments it must Ae said that the acti ities o% our Aod4 come to our consciousness onl4 through percepts o% the sel%, and that, as such, the4 are in no /a4 superior to other percepts. I% /e /ant to 1no/ their real nature, /e can do so onl4 A4 a thin1ing in estigation, that is, A4 %itting them into the ideal s4stem o% our concepts and ideas. 9ooted most deepl4 in the naN e consciousness o% man1ind is the opinion that thin1ing is aAstract, /ithout an4 concrete content+ it can at most gi e us an BidealB counterpart o% the unit4 o% the /orld, Aut ne er the unit4 itsel%. "hoe er Cudges in this /a4 has ne er made it clear to himsel% /hat a percept /ithout the concept reall4 is. 6et us see /hat this /orld o% percepts is li1e# a mere Cuxtaposition in space, a mere succession in time, a mass o% unconnected details ,, that is ho/ it appears. None o% the things /hich come and go on the stage o% perception has an4 direct connection, that can Ae percei ed, /ith an4 other. The /orld is thus a multiplicit4 o%

oACects o% e@ual alue. None pla4s an4 greater part in the /hole machiner4 o% the /orld than an4 other. I% it is to Aecome clear to us that this or that %act has greater signi%icance than another, /e must consult our thin1ing. "ere thin1ing not to %unction, the rudimentar4 organ o% an animal /hich has no signi%icance in its li%e /ould appear e@ual in alue to the most important limA o% its Aod4. The separate %acts appear in their true signi%icance, Aoth in themsel es and %or the rest o% the /orld onl4 /hen thin1ing spins its threads %rom one entit4 to another. This acti it4 o% thin1ing is one %ull o% content. For it is onl4 through a @uite de%inite concrete content that I can 1no/ /h4 the snail Aelongs to a lo/er le el o% organiDation than the lion. The mere appearance, the percept, gi es me no content /hich could in%orm me as to the degree o% per%ection o% the organiDation. Thin1ing o%%ers this content to the percept, %rom man$s /orld o% concepts and ideas. In contrast to the content o% percept /hich is gi en to us %rom /ithout, the content o% thin1ing appears in/ardl4. The %orm in /hich this %irst ma1es its appearance /e /ill call intuition. Intuition is %or thin1ing /hat oAser ation is %or percept. Intuition and oAser ation are the sources o% our 1no/ledge. An oAser ed oACect o% the /orld remains unintelligiAle to us until /e ha e /ithin oursel es the corresponding intuition /hich adds that part o% realit4 /hich is lac1ing in the percept. To an4one /ho is incapaAle o% %inding intuitions corresponding to the things, the %ull realit4 remains inaccessiAle. Just as the color,Alind person sees onl4 di%%erences o% Arightness /ithout an4 color @ualities, so can the person /ithout intuition oAser e onl4 unconnected perceptual %ragments. To explain a thing, to ma1e it intelligiAle, means nothing else than to place it into the context %rom /hich it has Aeen torn A4 the peculiar character o% our organiDation as alread4 descriAed. A thing cut o%% %rom the /orld,/hole does not exist. All isolating has onl4 suACecti e alidit4 %or our organiDation. For us the uni erse di ides itsel% up into aAo e and Aelo/, Ae%ore and a%ter, cause and e%%ect, thing and mental picture, matter and %orce, oACect and suACect, etc. "hat appears to us in oAser ation as separate parts Aecomes comAined, Ait A4 Ait, through the coherent, uni%ied /orld o% our intuitions. E4 thin1ing /e %it together again into one piece all that /e ha e ta1en apart through percei ing. The enigmatic character o% an oACect consists in its separateness. Eut this separation is our o/n ma1ing and can, /ithin the /orld o% concepts, Ae o ercome again. Except through thin1ing and percei ing nothing is gi en to us directl4. The @uestion no/ arises# "hat is the signi%icance o% the percept, according to our line o% argument7 "e ha e learnt that the proo% /hich critical idealism o%%ers o% the suACecti e nature o% perceptions collapses. Eut insight into the %alsit4 o% the proo% is not alone su%%icient to sho/ that the doctrine itsel% is erroneous.

Critical idealism does not Aase its proo% on the aAsolute nature o% thin1ing, Aut relies on the argument o% naN e realism, /hen %ollo/ed to its logical conclusion, cancels itsel% out. -o/ does the matter appear /hen /e ha e recogniDed the aAsoluteness o% thin1ing7 6et us assume that a certain perception, %or example, red, appears in m4 consciousness. To continued oAser ation, this percept sho/s itsel% to Ae connected /ith other percepts, %or example, a de%inite %igure and /ith certain temperature, and touch,percepts. This comAination I call an oACect Aelonging to the sense,perceptiAle /orld. I can no/ as1 m4sel%# O er and aAo e the percepts Cust mentioned, /hat else is there in the section o% space in /hich the4 appear7 I shall then %ind mechanical, chemical and other processes in that section o% space. I next go %urther and stud4 the processes I %ind on the /a4 %rom the oACect to m4 sense organs. I can %ind mo ements in an elastic medium, /hich A4 their er4 nature ha e not the slightest in common /ith the percepts %rom /hich I started. I get the same result /hen I go on and examine the transmission %rom sense organs to Arain. In each o% these %ields I gather ne/ percepts, Aut the connecting medium /hich /ea es through all these spatiall4 and temporall4 separated percepts is thin1ing. The air iArations /hich transmit sound are gi en to me as percepts Cust li1e the sound itsel%. Thin1ing alone lin1s all these percepts to one another and sho/s them to us in their mutual relationship. "e cannot spea1 o% an4thing existing Ae4ond /hat is directl4 percei ed except /hat can Ae recogniDed through the ideal connections o% percepts, that is, connections accessiAle to thin1ing:. The /a4 oACects as percepts are related to the suACect as percept ,, a relationship that goes Ae4ond /hat is merel4 percei ed ,, is there%ore purel4 ideal, that is, it can Ae expressed onl4 A4 means o% concepts. Onl4 i% I could percei e ho/ the percept oACect a%%ects the percept suACect, or, con ersel4, could /atch the Auilding up o% the perceptual pattern A4 the suACect, /ould it Ae possiAle to spea1 as modern ph4siolog4 and the critical idealism Aased on it do. Their ie/ con%uses an ideal relation 8that o% the oACect to the suACect: /ith a process /hich /e could spea1 o% onl4 i% it /ere possiAle to percei e it. The proposition, BNo color /ithout a color,sensing e4e,B cannot Ae ta1en to mean that the e4e produces the color, Aut onl4 that an ideal relation, recogniDaAle A4 thin1ing, suAsists Aet/een the percept BcolorB and the percept Be4eB. Empirical science /ill ha e to ascertain ho/ the properties o% the e4e and those o% the colors are related to one another, A4 /hat means the organ o% sight transmits the perception o% colors, and so %orth. I can trace ho/ one percept succeeds another in time and is related to others in space, and I can %ormulate these relations in conceptual terms, Aut I can ne er percei e ho/ a percept originates out o% the non,perceptiAle. All attempts to see1 an4 relations Aet/een percepts other than thought relations must o% necessit4 %ail. "hat, then is a percept7 The @uestion, as1ed in this general /a4, is aAsurd. A percept

emerges al/a4s as something per%ectl4 de%inite, as a concrete content. This content is directl4 gi en and is completel4 contained in /hat is gi en. The onl4 @uestion one can as1 concerning the gi en content is /hat it is apart %rom perception, that is, /hat it is %or thin1ing7 The @uestion concerning the B/hatB o% a percept can, there%ore, onl4 re%er to the conceptual intuition that corresponds to this percept. From this point o% ie/, the @uestion o% the suACecti it4 o% percepts, in the sense o% critical idealism, cannot Ae raised at all. Onl4 /hat is percei ed as Aelonging to the suACect can Ae termed BsuACecti e.L To %orm a lin1 Aet/een something suACecti e and something oACecti e is impossiAle %or an4 process that is BrealB in the naN e sense, that is, one that can Ae percei ed+ it is possiAle onl4 %or thin1ing. There%ore /hat appears %or our perception to Ae external to the percept o% m4sel% as suACect is %or us BoACecti eB. The percept o% m4sel% as suACect remains perceptiAle to me a%ter the taAle /hich no/ stands Ae%ore me has disappeared %rom m4 %ield o% oAser ation. The oAser ation o% the taAle has produced in me a modi%ication /hich li1e/ise persists. I retain the %acult4 to produce later on an image o% the taAle. This %acult4 o% producing an image remains connected /ith me. Ps4cholog4 calls this image as a memor4,picture. It is in %act the onl4 thing /hich can Custi%iaAl4 Ae called the mental picture o% the taAle. For it corresponds to the perceptiAle modi%ication o% m4 o/n state through the presence o% the taAle in m4 isual %ield. Moreo er, it does not mean a modi%ication o% some BEgo,in, itsel%B standing Aehind the percept o% the suACect, Aut the modi%ication o% the perceptiAle suACect itsel%. The mental picture is, there%ore, a suACecti e percept, in contrast /ith the oACecti e percept /hich occurs /hen the oACect is present in the %ield o% ision. Con%using the suACecti e percept /ith the oACecti e percept leads to the misconception o% contained in idealism ,, that the /orld is m4 mental picture. Our next tas1 must Ae to de%ine the concept o% Bmental pictureB more closel4. "hat /e ha e said aAout it so %ar does not gi e us the concept o% it Aut onl4 sho/s us /hereaAouts in the perceptual %ield the mental picture is to Ae %ound. The exact concept o% mental picture /ill ma1e it possiAle %or us also to oAtain a satis%actor4 explanation o% the /a4 that mental picture and oACect are related. This /ill then lead us o er the Aorder line /here the relationship Aet/een the human suACect and the oACect Aelonging to the /orld is Arought do/n %rom the purel4 conceptual %ield o% cognition into concrete indi idual li%e. Once /e 1no/ /hat to ma1e o% the /orld, it /ill Ae a simple matter to direct oursel es accordingl4. "e can onl4 act /ith %ull energ4 /hen /e 1no/ /hat it is in the /orld to /hich /e de ote our acti it4. ----.

Author*s addition, #%#&. The ie/ I ha e outlined here ma4 Ae regarded as one to /hich man is at %irst @uite naturall4 dri en /hen he Aegins to re%lect upon his relation to the /orld. -e then %inds himsel% caught in a s4stem o% thoughts /hich dissol es %or him as %ast as he %rames it. The thought %ormation is such that it re@uires something more than mere theoretical re%utation. "e ha e to li e through it in order to understand the aAerration into /hich it leads us and thence to %ind the /a4 out. It must %igure in an4 discussion o% the relation o% man to the /orld, not %or the sa1e o% re%uting others /hom one Aelie es to Ae holding mista1en ie/s aAout this relation, Aut Aecause it is necessar4 to understand the con%usion to /hich e er4 %irst e%%ort at re%lection aAout such a relation is apt to lead. One needs to arri e at Cust that insight /hich /ill enaAle one to re%ute onesel% /ith respect to these %irst re%lections. This is the point o% ie/ %rom /hich the arguments o% the preceding chapter are put %or/ard. "hoe er tries to /or1 out %or himsel% a ie/ o% the relation o% man to the /orld Aecomes a/are o% the %act that he creates this relation, at least in part, A4 %orming mental pictures aAout the things and e ents in the /orld. In conse@uence, his attention is de%lected %rom /hat exists outside in the /orld and is directed to/ards his inner /orld, the li%e o% his mental pictures. -e Aegins to sa4 to himsel%# It is impossiAle %or me to ha e a relationship to an4 thing or e ent unless a mental picture appears in me. Once /e ha e noticed this %act, it is Aut a step to the opinion# A%ter all, I experience onl4 m4 mental pictures+ I 1no/ o% a /orld outside me onl4 in so %ar as it is a mental picture in me. "ith this opinion, the standpoint o% naN e realism, /hich man ta1es up prior to all re%lection aAout his relation to the /orld, is aAandoned. So long as he 1eeps that standpoint, he Aelie es that he is dealing /ith real things, Aut re%lection aAout himsel% dri es him a/a4 %rom it. 9e%lection pre ents him %rom turning his gaDe to/ards a real /orld such as naN e consciousness Aelie es it has Ae%ore it. It allo/s him to gaDe onl4 upon his mental picture ,, these interpose themsel es Aet/een his o/n Aeing and a supposedl4 real /orld, such as the naN e point o% ie/ Aelie es itsel% entitled to a%%irm. Man can no longer see such a real /orld through the inter ening /orld o% mental pictures. -e must suppose to that he is Alind to this realit4. Thus arises the thought o% a Bthing,in,itsel%B /hich is inaccessiAle to 1no/ledge. So long as /e considers onl4 the relationship to the /orld, into /hich man appears to enter through the li%e o% his mental pictures, /e cannot escape %rom this %orm o% thought. Fet one cannot remain at the standpoint o% naN e realism except A4 closing one$s mind arti%iciall4 to the cra ing %or 1no/ledge. The er4 existence o% this cra ing %or 1no/ledge aAout the relation o% man to the /orld sho/s that this naN e point o% ie/ must Ae aAandoned. I% the naN e point o% ie/ 4ielded an4thing /e could ac1no/ledge as truth, /e could ne er experience this cra ing.

Eut /e do not arri e at an4thing else /hich /e could regard as truth i% /e merel4 aAandon the naN e point o% ie/ /hile unconsciousl4 retaining the t4pe o% thought /hich it necessitates. This is Cust the mista1e made A4 the man /ho sa4s to himsel%# BI experience onl4 m4 mental pictures, and though I Aelie e that I am dealing /ith realities, I am actuall4 conscious onl4 o% m4 mental pictures o% realit4+ I must there%ore suppose that the true realit4, the $things,in,themsel es$, exist onl4 Ae4ond the horiDon o% m4 consciousness, that I 1no/ aAsolutel4 nothing o% them directl4, and that the4 someho/ approach me and in%luence me so that m4 /orld o% mental pictures arises in me.L "hoe er thin1s in this /a4 is merel4 adding another /orld in his thoughts to the /orld alread4 spread out Ae%ore him. Eut /ith regard to this additional /orld, he ought strictl4 to Aegin his thin1ing acti it4 all o er again. For the un1no/n Bthing,in,itsel%B, in its relation to man$s o/n nature, is concei ed in exactl4 the same /a4 as is the 1no/n thing in the sense o% naN e realism. One onl4 a oids the con%usion into /hich one %alls through the critical attitude Aased on this naN e standpoint, i% one notices that, inside e er4thing /e can experience A4 means o% percei ing, Ae it /ithin oursel es or outside in the /orld, there is something /hich cannot su%%er the %ate o% ha ing a mental picture interpose itsel% Aet/een the process and the person oAser ing it. This something is thin1ing. "ith regard to thin1ing, /e can maintain the point o% ie/ o% naN e realism. I% /e %ail to do so, it is onl4 Aecause /e ha e learnt that /e must aAandon it in the case o% other things, Aut o erloo1 that /hat /e ha e %ound to Ae true %or these other things does not appl4 to thin1ing. "hen /e realiDe this, /e open the /a4 to the %urther insight that in thin1ing and through thin1ing man must recogniDe the er4 thing to /hich he has apparentl4 Alinded himsel% A4 ha ing to interpose his li%e o% mental pictures Aet/een the /orld and himsel%. From a source greatl4 respected A4 the author o% this Aoo1 comes the oACection that this discussion o% thin1ing remains at the le el o% a naN e realism o% thin1ing, Cust as one might oACect i% someone held the real /orld and the /orld o% mental pictures to Ae one and the same. -o/e er, the author Aelie es himsel% to ha e sho/n in this er4 discussion that the alidit4 o% this BnaN e realismB %or thin1ing results ine itaAl4 %rom an unpreCudiced oAser ation o% thin1ing+ and that naN e realism, in so %ar as it is in alid %or other things, is o ercome through the recognition o% the true nature o% thin1ing. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. See Fichte, !ie Eestimmung des Menschen. ). .no/ledge is called transcendental in the sense o% this theor4 /hen it Aelie es itsel% to Ae conscious that nothing can Ae asserted directl4 aAout the thing,in,itsel%, Aut ma1es

indirect in%erences %rom the suACecti e, /hich is 1no/n, to the un1no/n /hich lies Ae4ond the suACecti e 8transcendental:. The thing,in,itsel% is, according to this ie/, Ae4ond the sphere o% the directl4 1no/aAle /orld+ in other /ords, it is transcendent. Our /orld can, ho/e er, Ae transcendentall4 related to the transcendent. -artmann$s theor4 is called realism Aecause it proceeds %rom the suACecti e, the ideal, to the transcendent, the real. 0. See "e4gandt, Entstehung der TrQume, &('0. *. !ie"elt als "ille und <orstellung, Eoo1 ), par. &(. ----.

) - Human Indi$idualit*.
In explaining mental pictures, philosophers ha e %ound the chie% di%%icult4 in the %act that /e oursel es are not the outer things, and 4et our mental pictures must ha e a %orm corresponding to the things. Eut on closer inspection it turns out that this di%%icult4 does not reall4 exist. "e certainl4 are not the external things, Aut /e Aelong together /ith them to one and the same /orld. That section o% the /orld /hich I percei e to Ae m4sel% as suACect is permeated A4 the stream o% the uni ersal cosmic process. To m4 perception I am, in the %irst instance, con%ined /ithin the limits Aounded A4 m4 s1in. Eut all that is contained /ithin this s1in Aelongs to the cosmos as a /hole. -ence, %or a relation to suAsist Aet/een m4 organism and an oACect external to me, it is A4 no means necessar4 that something o% the oACect should slip into me, or ma1e an impression on m4 mind, li1e a signet ring on /ax. The @uestion# B-o/ do I get in%ormation aAout that tree ten %eet a/a4 %rom me7B is utterl4 misleading. It springs %rom the ie/ that the Aoundaries o% m4 Aod4 are aAsolute Aarriers, through /hich in%ormation aAout things %ilters into me. The %orces /hich are at /or1 inside m4 Aod4 are the same as those /hich exist outside. There%ore I reall4 am the things+ not, ho/e er, BIB in so %ar as I am a percept o% m4sel% as suACect, Aut BIB in so %ar as I am a part o% the uni ersal /orld process. The percept o% the tree Aelongs to the same /hole as m4 I. This uni ersal /orld process produces e@uall4 the percept o% the tree out there and the percept o% m4 I in here. "ere I not a /orld 1no/er, Aut /orld creator, oACect and suACect 8percept and I: /ould originate in one act. For each implies the other. In so %ar as these are entities that Aelong together, I can as /orld 1no/er disco er the common element in Aoth onl4 through thin1ing, /hich relates one to the other A4 means o% concepts. The most di%%icult to dri e %rom the %ield are the so,called ph4siological proo%s o% the suACecti it4 o% our percepts. "hen I exert pressure on m4 s1in I percei e it as a pressure sensation. This same pressure can Ae sensed as light A4 the e4e, as sound A4 the ear.

An electric shoc1 is percei ed A4 the e4e as light, A4 the ear as noise, A4 the ner es o% the s1in as impact, and A4 the nose as a phosphoric smell. "hat %ollo/s %rom these %acts7 Onl4 this# I percei e an electric shoc1 8or a pressure, as the case ma4 Ae: %ollo/ed A4 an impression o% light, or sound, or perhaps a certain smell, and so on. I% there /ere no e4e present, then no perception o% light /ould accompan4 the perception o% the mechanical disturAance in m4 en ironment+ /ithout the presence o% the ear, no perception o% sound, and so on. Eut /hat right ha e /e to sa4 that in the aAsence o% sense organs the /hole process /ould not exist at all7 Those /ho, %rom the %act that an electrical process calls %orth light in the e4e, conclude that /hat /e sense as light is onl4 a mechanical process o% motion /hen outside our organism, %orget that the4 are onl4 passing %rom one percept to another, and not at all to something l4ing Ae4ond percepts. Just as /e can sa4 that the e4e percei es a mechanical process o% motion in its surroundings as light, so /e could e@uall4 /ell sa4 that a regular and s4stematic change in an oACect is percei ed A4 us as a process o% motion. I% I dra/ t/el e pictures o% a horse on the circum%erence o% a rotating disc, reproducing exactl4 the attitudes /hich the horse$s Aod4 successi el4 assumes /hen galloping, I can produce the illusion o% mo ement A4 rotating the disc. I need onl4 loo1 through an opening in such a /a4 that, in the proper inter als, I see the successi e positions o% the horse. I do not see t/el e separate pictures o% a horse Aut the picture o% a single galloping horse. The ph4siological %act mentioned aAo e cannot there%ore thro/ an4 light on the relation o% percept to mental picture. "e must go aAout it rather di%%erentl4. The moment a percept appears in m4 %ield o% oAser ation, thin1ing also Aecomes acti e through me. An element o% m4 thought s4stem, a de%inite intuition, a concept, connects itsel% /ith the percept. Then, /hen the percept disappears %rom m4 %ield o% ision, /hat remains7 M4 intuition, /ith the re%erence to the particular percept /hich it ac@uired in the moment o% percei ing. The degree o% i idness /ith /hich I can suAse@uentl4 recall this re%erence depends on the manner in /hich m4 mental and Aodil4 organism is /or1ing. A mental picture is nothing Aut an intuition related to a particular percept+ it is a concept that /as once connected /ith a certain percept, and /hich retains the re%erence to this percept. M4 concept o% a lion is not %ormed out o% m4 percepts o% lions+ Aut m4 mental picture o% a lion is er4 de%initel4 %ormed according to a percept. I can con e4 the concept o% a lion to someone /ho has ne er seen a lion. I cannot con e4 to him a i id mental picture /ithout the help o% his o/n perception. Thus the mental picture is an indi idualiDed concept. And no/ /e can see ho/ real oACects can Ae represented to us A4 mental pictures. The %ull realit4 o% a thing is gi en to

us in the moment o% oAser ation through the %itting together o% concept and percept. E4 means o% a percept, the concept ac@uires an indi idualiDed %orm, a relation to this particular percept. In this indi idualiDed %orm, /hich carries the re%erence to the percept as a characteristic %eature, the concept li es on in us and constitutes the mental picture o% the thing in @uestion. I% /e come across a second thing /ith /hich the same concept connects itsel%, /e recogniDe the second as Aelonging to the same 1ind as the %irst+ i% /e come across the same thing a second time, /e %ind in our conceptual s4stem, not merel4 a corresponding concept, Aut the indi idualiDed concept /ith its characteristic relation to the same oACect, and thus /e recogniDe the oACect again. Thus the mental picture stands Aet/een percept and concept. It is the particulariDed concept /hich points to the percept. The sum o% those things aAout /hich I can %orm mental pictures ma4 Ae called m4 total experience. The man /ho has the greater numAer o% indi idualiDed concepts /ill Ae the man o% richer experience. A man /ho lac1s all po/er o% intuition is not capaAle o% ac@uiring experience. -e loses the oACects again /hen the4 disappear %rom his %ield o% ision, Aecause he lac1s the concepts /hich he should Aring into relation /ith them. A man /hose %acult4 o% thin1ing is /ell de eloped, Aut /hose perception %unctions Aadl4 o/ing to his clums4 sense organs, /ill Cust as little Ae aAle to gather experience. -e can, it is true, ac@uire concepts A4 one means or another+ Aut his intuitions lac1 the i id re%erence to de%inite things. The unthin1ing tra eler and the scholar li ing in aAstract conceptual s4stems are ali1e incapaAle o% ac@uiring a rich sum o% experience. 9ealit4 sho/s itsel% to us as percept and concept+ the suACecti e representati e o% this realit4 sho/s itsel% to us as mental picture. I% our personalit4 expressed itsel% onl4 in cognition, the totalit4 o% all that is oACecti e /ould Ae gi en in percept, concept and mental picture. -o/e er, /e are not satis%ied merel4 to re%er the percept, A4 means o% thin1ing, to the concept, Aut /e relate them also to our particular suACecti it4, our indi idual Ego. The expression o% this indi idual relationship is %eeling, /hich mani%ests itsel% as pleasure or displeasure. Thin1ing and %eeling correspond to the t/o,%old nature o% our Aeing to /hich re%erence has alread4 Aeen made. Thin1ing is the element through /hich /e ta1e part in the uni ersal cosmic process+ %eeling is that through /hich /e can /ithdra/ oursel es into the narro/ con%ines o% our o/n Aeing. Our thin1ing lin1s us to the /orld+ our %eeling leads us Aac1 into oursel es and thus ma1es

us indi iduals. "ere /e merel4 thin1ing and percei ing Aeings, our /hole li%e /ould %lo/ along in monotonous indi%%erence. "ere /e aAle merel4 to 1no/ oursel es as sel es, /e should Ae totall4 indi%%erent to oursel es. It is onl4 Aecause /e experience sel%,%eeling /ith sel%,1no/ledge, and pleasure and pain /ith the perception o% oACects, that /e li e as indi idual Aeings /hose existence is not limited to the conceptual relations Aet/een us and the rest o% the /orld, Aut /ho ha e Aesides this a special alue %or oursel es. One might Ae tempted to see in the li%e o% %eeling an element that is more richl4 saturated /ith realit4 than is the contemplation o% the /orld through thin1ing. Eut the repl4 to this is that the li%e o% %eeling, a%ter all, has this richer meaning onl4 %or m4 indi idual sel%. For the uni erse as a /hole m4 li%e o% %eeling can ha e alue onl4 i%, as a percept o% m4 sel%, the %eeling enters into connection /ith a concept and in this roundaAout /a4 lin1s itsel% to the cosmos. Our li%e is a continual oscillation Aet/een li ing /ith the uni ersal /orld process and Aeing our o/n indi idual sel es. The %arther /e ascend into the uni ersal nature o% thin1ing /here in the end /hat is indi idual interests us onl4 as an example or specimen o% the concept, the more the character o% the separate Aeing, o% the @uite de%inite single personalit4, Aecomes lost in us. The %arther /e descend into the depths o% our o/n li%e and allo/ our %eelings to resound /ith our experiences o% the outer /orld, the more /e cut oursel es o%% %rom uni ersal Aeing. A true indi idualit4 /ill Ae the one /ho reaches up /ith his %eelings to the %arthest possiAle extent into the region o% the ideal. There are men in /hom e en the most general ideas that enter their heads still Aear that peculiar personal tinge /hich sho/s unmista1aAl4 the connection /ith their author. There are others /hose concepts come Ae%ore us /ithout the least trace o% indi idual character as i% the4 had not Aeen produced A4 a man o% %lesh and Alood at all. Ma1ing mental pictures gi es our conceptual li%e at once an indi idual stamp. Each one o% us has his o/n particular place %rom /hich he sur e4s the /orld. -is concepts lin1 themsel es to his percepts. -e thin1s the general concepts in his o/n special /a4. This special determination results %or each o% us %rom the place /here /e stand in the /orld, %rom the range o% percepts peculiar to our place in li%e. !istinct %rom this determination is another /hich depends on our particular organiDation. Our organiDation is indeed a special, %ull4 determined entit4. Each o% us comAines special %eelings, and these in the most ar4ing degrees o% intensit4, /ith his percepts. This is Cust the indi idual element in the personalit4 o% each one o% us. It is /hat remains o er /hen /e ha e allo/ed %ull4 %or all the determining %actors in our surroundings. A li%e o% %eeling, /holl4 de oid o% thin1ing, /ould graduall4 lose all connection /ith the /orld. Eut man is meant to Ae a /hole, and %or him 1no/ledge o% things /ill go hand in

hand /ith the de elopment and education o% the li%e o% %eeling. Feeling is the means /hereA4, in the %irst instance, concepts gain concrete li%e. ----.

+ - Are There ,imits to Kno led!e- .The /ealit* of Freedom0.

"e ha e estaAlished that the elements %or the explanation o% realit4 are to Ae %ound in the t/o spheres# percei ing and thin1ing. It is due, as /e ha e seen, to our organiDation that the %ull, complete realit4, including our o/n sel es as suACects, appears at %irst as a dualit4. The act o% 1no/ing o ercomes this dualit4 A4 %using the t/o elements o% realit4, the percept and the concept gained A4 thin1ing, into the complete thing. 6et us call the manner in /hich the /orld presents itsel% to us, Ae%ore it has ta1en on its true nature through our 1no/ing it, Bthe /orld o% appearance,B in contrast to the uni%ied /hole composed o% percept and concept. "e can then sa4# The /orld is gi en to us as a dualit4, and 1no/ledge trans%orms it into a unit4. A philosoph4 /hich starts %rom this Aasic principle ma4 Ae called a monistic philosoph4, or monism. Opposed to this is the t/o,/orld theor4, or dualism. The latter does not assume Cust that there are t/o sides o% a single realit4 /hich are 1ept apart merel4 A4 our organiDation, Aut that there are t/o /orlds aAsolutel4 distinct %rom one another. It then tries to %ind in one o% these t/o /orlds the principles %or the explanation o% the other. !ualism rests on a %alse conception o% /hat /e call 1no/ledge. It di ides the /hole o% existence into t/o spheres, each o% /hich has its o/n la/s, and it lea es these t/o /orlds standing apart and opposed. It is %rom a dualism such as this that there arises the distinction Aet/een the perceptual oACect and the thing,in,itsel%, /hich .ant introduced into philosoph4, and /hich, to the present da4, /e ha e not succeeded in eradicating. According to our line o% argument, it is due to the nature o% our mental organiDation that a particular thing can Ae gi en to us onl4 as a percept. Thin1ing then o ercomes this particularit4 A4 assigning to each percept its right%ul place in the /orld as a /hole. As long as /e designate the separated parts o% the /orld as percepts, /e are simpl4 %ollo/ing, in this separating out, a la/ o% our suACecti it4. I%, ho/e er, /e regard the sum o% all percepts as the one part, and contrast /ith this a second part, namel4, the things,in,themsel es, then /e are philosophiDing into the Alue. "e are merel4 pla4ing /ith concepts. "e construct an arti%icial pair o% opposites, Aut /e can gain no content %or the second o% these opposites, since such content %or a particular thing can Ae dra/n onl4 %rom perception. E er4 1ind o% existence that is assumed outside the realm o% percept and concept must Ae

relegated to the sphere o% unCusti%ied h4potheses. To this categor4 Aelongs the Bthing,in, itsel%B. It is @uite natural that a dualistic thin1er should Ae unaAle to %ind the connection Aet/een the /orld principle /hich he h4potheticall4 assumes and the things gi en in experience. A content %or the h4pothetical /orld principle can Ae arri ed at onl4 A4 Aorro/ing it %rom the /orld o% experience and then shutting one$s e4es to the %act o% the Aorro/ing. Other/ise it remains an empt4 concept, a non,concept /hich has nothing Aut the %orm o% a concept. -ere the dualistic thin1er usuall4 asserts that the content o% this concept is inaccessiAle to our 1no/ledge+ /e can 1no/ onl4 that such a content exists, Aut not /hat it is that exists. In Aoth cases it is impossiAle to o ercome dualism. E en though one /ere to import a %e/ aAstract elements %rom the /orld o% experience into the concept o% the thing,in,itsel%, it /ould still remain impossiAle to deri e the rich concrete li%e o% experience %rom these %e/ @ualities /hich are, a%ter all, themsel es ta1en %rom perception. !uEois,9e4mond considers that the imperceptiAle atoms o% matter produce sensation and %eeling A4 means o% their position and motion, and then comes to the conclusion that /e can ne er %ind a satis%actor4 explanation o% ho/ matter and motion produce sensation and %eeling, %or Bit is aAsolutel4 and %or e er incomprehensiAle that it should Ae other than indi%%erent to a numAer o% atoms o% carAon, h4drogen, nitrogen, and so on, ho/ the4 lie and mo e, ho/ the4 la4 and mo ed, or ho/ the4 /ill lie and /ill mo e. It is impossiAle to see ho/ consciousness could come into existence through their interaction.B This conclusion is characteristic o% this /hole trend o% thought. Position and motion are aAstracted %rom the rich /orld o% percepts, The4 are then trans%erred to the notional /orld o% atoms. And then astonishment arises that real li%e cannot Ae e ol ed out o% this sel%,made principle Aorro/ed %rom the /orld o% percepts. That the dualist can reach no explanation o% the /orld, /or1ing as he does /ith a completel4 empt4 concept o% the Bin,itsel%B o% a thing, %ollo/s at once %rom the er4 de%inition o% his principle gi en aAo e. In e er4 case the dualist %inds himsel% compelled to set impassaAle Aarriers to our %acult4 o% 1no/ledge. The %ollo/er o% a monistic /orld conception 1no/s that e er4thing he needs %or the explanation o% an4 gi en phenomenon in the /orld must lie /ithin this /orld itsel%. "hat pre ents him %rom reaching it can Ae onl4 accidental limitations in space and time, or de%ects o% his organiDation, that is, not o% human organiDation in general, Aut onl4 o% his o/n particular one. It %ollo/s %rom the concept o% the act o% 1no/ing as /e ha e de%ined it, that one cannot spea1 o% limits to 1no/ledge. .no/ing is not a concern o% the /orld in general, Aut an a%%air /hich man must settle %or himsel%. Things demand no explanation. The4 exist and act on one another according to la/s /hich can Ae disco ered through thin1ing, The4 exist

in indi isiAle unit4 /ith these la/s. Our Egohood con%ronts them, grasping at %irst onl4 that part o% them /e ha e called percepts. "ithin our Egohood, ho/e er, lies the po/er to disco er the other part o% the realit4 as /ell. Onl4 /hen the Egohood has ta1en the t/o elements o% realit4 /hich are indi isiAl4 united in the /orld and has comAined them also %or itsel%, is our thirst %or 1no/ledge satis%ied ,, the I has then arri ed at the realit4 once more. Thus the conditions necessar4 %or an act o% 1no/ledge to ta1e place are there through the I and %or the I. The I sets itsel% the proAlems o% 1no/ledge+ and moreo er it ta1es them %rom an element that is aAsolutel4 clear and transparent in itsel%# the element o% thin1ing. I% /e set oursel es @uestions /hich /e cannot ans/er, it must Ae Aecause the content o% the @uestions is not in all respects clear and distinct. It is not the /orld /hich sets us the @uestions, Aut /e oursel es. I can imagine that it /ould Ae @uite impossiAle %or me to ans/er a @uestion /hich I happened to %ind /ritten do/n some/here, /ithout 1no/ing the sphere %rom /hich the content o% the @uestion /as ta1en. In our 1no/ledge /e are concerned /ith @uestions /hich arise %or us through the %act that a sphere o% percepts, conditioned A4 place, time, and our suACecti e organiDation, is con%ronted A4 a sphere o% concepts pointing to the totalit4 o% the uni erse. M4 tas1 consists in reconciling these t/o spheres, /ith Aoth o% /hich I am /ell ac@uainted. -ere one cannot spea1 o% a limit to 1no/ledge. It ma4 Ae that, at an4 particular moment, this or that remains unexplained Aecause, through our place in li%e, /e are pre ented %rom percei ing the things in ol ed. "hat is not %ound toda4, ho/e er, ma4 Ae %ound tomorro/. The limits due to these causes are onl4 transitor4, and can Ae o ercome A4 the progress o% perception and thin1ing. !ualism ma1es the mista1e o% trans%erring the antithesis o% oACect and suACect, /hich has meaning onl4 /ithin the perceptual realm, to purel4 notional entities outside this realm. Eut since the separate things /ithin the perceptual %ield remain separated onl4 so long as the percei er re%rains %rom thin1ing 8/hich cancels all separation and sho/s it to Ae due to purel4 suACecti e %actors:, the dualist is there%ore trans%erring to entities Aehind the perceptiAle realm determining %actors /hich e en %or this realm ha e no aAsolute alidit4, Aut onl4 relati e. -e thus splits up the t/o %actors concerned in the process o% 1no/ledge, namel4 percept and concept, into %our# 8&: the oACect in itsel%+ 8): the precept /hich the suACect has o% the oACect+ 80: the suACect+ 8*: the concept /hich relates the precept to the oACect in itsel%. The relation Aet/een suACect and oACect is a real one+ the suACect is reall4 8d4namicall4: in%luenced A4 the oACect. This real process is said not to appear in consciousness. Eut it is supposed to e o1e in the suACect a response to the stimulation %rom the oACect.

The result o% this response is said to Ae the percept. Onl4 at this stage does it enter our consciousness. The oACect is said to ha e an oACecti e 8independent o% the suACect: realit4, the percept a suACecti e realit4. This suACecti e realit4 is re%erred A4 the suACect to the oACect. This re%erence is called an ideal one. "ith this the dualist there%ore splits up the process o% 1no/ledge into t/o parts. The one part, namel4, the production o% the perceptual oACect out o% the thing,in,itsel%, he concei es o% as ta1ing place outside consciousness, /hereas the other, the comAination o% percept /ith concept and the re%erence o% the concept to the oACect, ta1es place, according to him, /ithin consciousness. "ith these presuppositions, it is clear /h4 the dualist Aelie es his concepts to Ae merel4 suACecti e representati es o% /hat is there prior to his consciousness. The oACecti el4 real process in the suACect A4 means o% /hich the percept comes aAout, and still more the oACecti e relations Aet/een things,inthemsel es, remain %or such a dualist inaccessiAle to direct 1no/ledge+ according to him, man can oAtain onl4 conceptual representati es o% the oACecti el4 real. The Aond o% unit4 /hich connects things /ith one another and also oACecti el4 /ith the indi idual mind o% each o% us 8as thing,in,itsel%: lies Ae4ond our consciousness in a Aeing,in,itsel% o% /hom, once more, /e can ha e in our consciousness merel4 a conceptual representati e. The dualist Aelie es that he /ould dissol e a/a4 the /hole /orld into a mere aAstract. scheme o% concepts, did he not insist on real connections Aet/een the oACects Aesides the conceptual ones. In other /ords, the ideal principles /hich thin1ing disco ers seem too air4 %or the dualist, and he see1s, in addition, real principles /ith /hich to support them. 6et us examine these real principles a little more closel4. The naN e man 8naN e realist: regards the oACects o% external experience as realities. The %act that his hands can grasp these oACects, and his e4es see them, is %or him su%%icient proo% o% their realit4. BNothing exists that cannot Ae percei edB is, in %act, the %irst axiom o% the naN e man+ and it is held to Ae e@uall4 alid in its con erse# BE er4thing /hich can Ae percei ed exists.B The Aest e idence %or this assertion is the naN e man$s Aelie% in immortalit4 and ghosts. -e thin1s o% the soul as re%ined material suAstance /hich ma4, in special circumstances, Aecome isiAle e en to the ordinar4 man 8naN e Aelie% in ghosts:. In contrast /ith this real /orld o% his, the naN e realist regards e er4thing else, especiall4 the /orld o% ideas, as unreal or Bmerel4 idealB. "hat /e add to oACects A4 thin1ing is nothing more than thoughts aAout the things. Thought adds nothing real to the percept. Eut it is not onl4 /ith re%erence to the existence o% things that the naN e man regards sense perception as the sole proo% o% realit4, Aut also /ith re%erence to e ents. A thing, according to him, can act on another onl4 /hen a %orce actuall4 present to sense perception issues %rom the one and seiDes upon the other. In the older ph4sics it /as thought that er4 %ine

suAstances emanate %rom the oACects and penetrate through the sense organs into the soul. The actual seeing o% these suAstances is impossiAle onl4 Aecause o% the coarseness o% our sense organs relati e to the %ineness o% these suAstances. In principle, the reason %or attriAuting realit4 to these suAstances /as the same as %or attriAuting it to the oACects o% the sense,perceptiAle /orld, namel4 Aecause o% their mode o% existence, /hich /as thought to Ae analogous to that o% sense,perceptiAle realit4. The sel%,contained nature o% /hat can Ae experienced through ideas is not regarded A4 the naN e mind as Aeing real in the same /a4 that sense experience is. An oACect grasped in Bmere ideaB is regarded as a chimera until con iction o% its realit4 can Ae gi en through sense perception. In short, the naN e man demands the real e idence o% his senses in addition to the ideal e idence o% his thin1ing. In this need o% the naN e man lies the original ground %or primiti e %orms o% the Aelie% in re elation. The =od /ho is gi en through thin1ing remains to the naN e mind al/a4s a merel4 BnotionalB =od. The naN e mind demands a mani%estation that is accessiAle to sense perception. =od must appear in the %lesh, and little alue is attached to the testimon4 o% thin1ing, Aut onl4 to proo% o% di init4 such as changing /ater into /ine in a /a4 that can Ae testi%ied A4 the senses. E en the act o% 1no/ing itsel% is pictured A4 the naN e man as a process analogous to sense perception. Things, it is thought, ma1e an impression on the soul, or send out images /hich enter through our senses, and so on. "hat the naN e man can percei e /ith his senses he regards as real, and /hat he cannot thus percei e 8=od, soul, 1no/ledge, etc.: he regards as analogous to /hat he does percei e. A science Aased on naN e realism /ould ha e to Ae nothing Aut an exact description o% the content o% perception. For naN e realism, concepts are onl4 the means to an end. The4 exist to pro ide ideal counterparts o% percepts, and ha e no signi%icance %or the things themsel es. For the naN e realist, onl4 the indi idual tulips /hich he sees 8or could see: are real+ the single idea o% the tulip is to him an aAstraction, the unreal thought,picture /hich the soul has put together out o% the characteristics common to all tulips. Nai e realism, /ith its %undamental principle o% the realit4 o% all percei ed things, is contradicted A4 experience, /hich teaches us that the content o% percepts is o% a transitor4 nature. The tulip I see is real toda4+ in a 4ear it /ill ha e anished into nothingness. "hat persists is the species tulip. For the naN e realist, ho/e er, this species is Bonl4B an idea, not a realit4. Thus this theor4 o% the /orld %ind itsel% in the position o% seeing its realities arise and perish, /hile /hat it regards as unreal, in contrast /ith the real, persists. -ence naN e realism is compelled to ac1no/ledge, in addition to percepts, the existence o% something ideal. It must admit entities /hich cannot Ae percei ed A4 the senses. In doing so, it Custi%ies itsel% A4 concei ing their existence as Aeing analogous to that o% sense, perceptiAle oACects. Just such h4pothetical realities are the in isiAle %orces A4 means o%

/hich the sense,perceptiAle oACects act on one another. Another such thing is heredit4, /hich /or1s on Ae4ond the indi idual and is the reason /h4 a ne/ Aeing /hich de elops %rom the indi idual is similar to it, thereA4 ser ing to maintain the species. Such a thing again is the li%e,principle permeating the organic Aod4, the soul %or /hich the naN e mind al/a4s %inds a concept %ormed in analog4 /ith sense realities, and %inall4 the naN e man$s !i ine Eeing. This !i ine Eeing is thought o% as acting in a manner exactl4 corresponding to the /a4 in /hich man himsel% is seen to act+ that is, anthropomorphicall4. Modern ph4sics traces sensations Aac1 to processes o% the smallest particles o% Aodies and o% an in%initel4 %ine suAstance, called ether, or to other such things. For example, /hat /e experience as /armth is, /ithin the space occupied A4 the /armth,gi ing Aod4, the mo ement o% its parts. -ere again something imperceptiAle is concei ed in analog4 /ith /hat is perceptiAle. In this sense, the perceptual analogue to the concept BAod4B /ould Ae, shall /e sa4, the interior o% a totall4 enclosed space, in /hich elastic spheres are mo ing in all directions, impinging one on another, Aouncing on and o%% the /alls, and so on. 8see %n &: "ithout such assumptions the /orld /ould %all apart %or the naN e realist into an incoherent aggregate o% percepts /ithout mutual relationships and /ith no tendenc4 to unite. It is clear, ho/e er, that naN e realism can ma1e these assumptions onl4 A4 an inconsistenc4. I% it /ould remain true to its %undamental principle that onl4 /hat is percei ed is real, then it ought not to assume a realit4 /here it percei es nothing. The imperceptiAle %orces /hich proceed %rom the perceptiAle things are in %act unCusti%ied h4potheses %rom the standpoint o% naN e realism. And Aecause naN e realism 1no/s no other realities, it in ests its h4pothetical %orces /ith perceptual content. It thus ascriAes a %orm o% existence 8perceptiAle existence: to a sphere /here the onl4 means o% ma1ing an4 assertion aAout such existence, namel4, sense perception, is lac1ing. This sel%,contradictor4 theor4 leads to metaph4sical realism. This constructs, in addition to the perceptiAle realit4, an imperceptiAle realit4 /hich it concei es on the analog4 o% the perceptiAle one. There%ore metaph4sical realism is o% necessit4 dualistic. "here er the metaph4sical realist oAser es a relationship Aet/een perceptiAle things 8such as /hen t/o things mo e to/ards each other, or /hen something oACecti e enters consciousness:, there he sees a realit4. -o/e er, the relationship /hich he notices can onl4 Ae expressed A4 means o% thin1ing+ it cannot Ae percei ed. The purel4 ideal relationship is then arAitraril4 made into something similar to a perceptiAle one. Thus, according to this theor4, the real /orld is composed o% the oACects o% perception /hich are in ceaseless %lux, arising and disappearing, and o% imperceptiAle %orces /hich produce the

oACects o% perception, and are the things that endure. Metaph4sical realism is a contradictor4 mixture o% naN e realism and idealism. Its h4pothetical %orces are imperceptiAle entities endo/ed /ith the @ualities o% percepts. The metaph4sical realist has made up his mind to ac1no/ledge, in addition to the sphere /hich he is aAle to 1no/ through perception, another sphere %or /hich this means o% 1no/ledge %ails him and /hich can Ae 1no/n onl4 A4 means o% thin1ing. Eut he cannot ma1e up his mind at the same time to ac1no/ledge that the mode o% existence /hich thin1ing re eals, namel4, the concept 8idea:, is Cust as important a %actor as the percept. I% /e are to a oid the contradiction o% imperceptiAle percepts, /e must admit that the relationships /hich thin1ing estaAlishes Aet/een the percepts can ha e no other mode o% existence %or us than that o% concepts. I% /e reCect the untenaAle part o% metaph4sical realism, the /orld presents itsel% to us as the sum o% percepts and their conceptual 8ideal: relationships. Metaph4sical realism /ould then merge into a ie/ o% the /orld /hich re@uires the principle o% percei aAilit4 %or percepts and that o% concei aAilit4 %or the relationships Aet/een the percepts. This ie/ o% the /orld can admit no third sphere ,, in addition to the /orld o% percepts and the /orld o% concepts ,, in /hich Aoth the so,called BrealB and BidealB principles are simultaneousl4 alid. "hen the metaph4sical realist asserts that, Aesides the ideal relationship Aet/een the percept o% the oACect and the percept o% the suACect, there must also exist a real relationship Aet/een the Bthing,initsel%L o% the percept and the Bthing,in,itsel%B o% the perceptiAle suACect 8that is, o% the so,called indi idual spirit:, he is Aasing his assertion on the %alse assumption o% a real process, analogous to the processes in the sense /orld Aut imperceptiAle. Further, /hen the metaph4sical realist asserts that /e enter into a conscious ideal relationship to our /orld o% percepts, Aut that to the real /orld /e can ha e onl4 a d4namic 8%orce: relationship, he repeats the mista1e /e ha e alread4 criticiDed. One can tal1 o% a d4namic relationship onl4 /ithin the /orld o% percepts 8in the sphere o% the sense o% touch:, Aut not outside that /orld. 6et us call the ie/ /hich /e ha e characteriDed aAo e, into /hich metaph4sical realism merges /hen it discards its contradictor4 elements, monism, Aecause it comAines one, sided realism /ith idealism into a higher unit4. For naN e realism, the real /orld is an aggregate o% percei ed oACects 8percepts:+ %or metaph4sical realism, not onl4 percepts Aut also imperceptiAle %orces are real+ monism replaces %orces A4 ideal connections /hich are gained through thin1ing. The la/s o% nature are Cust such connections. A la/ o% nature is in %act nothing Aut the conceptual expression o% the connection Aet/een certain percepts. Monism ne er %inds it necessar4 to as1 %or an4 principles o% explanation %or realit4 other than percepts and concepts. It 1no/s that in the /hole %ield o% realit4 there is no occasion

%or this @uestion. In the perceptual /orld, as it presents itsel% directl4 to perception, it sees one hal% o% the realit4+ in the union o% this /orld /ith the /orld o% concepts it %inds the %ull realit4. The metaph4sical realist ma4 oACect to the adherent o% monism# It ma4 Ae that %or 4our organiDation, 4our 1no/ledge is complete in itsel%, /ith no part lac1ing+ Aut 4ou do not 1no/ ho/ the /orld is mirrored in an intelligence organiDed di%%erentl4 %rom 4our o/n. To this the monist /ill repl4# I% there are intelligences other than human, and i% their percepts are di%%erent %rom ours, all that concerns me is /hat reaches me %rom them through perception and concept. Through m4 percei ing, that is, through this speci%icall4 human mode o% percei ing, I, as suACect, am con%ronted /ith the oACect. The connection o% things is thereA4 interrupted. The suACect restores this connection A4 means o% thin1ing. In doing so it puts itsel% Aac1 into the context o% the /orld as a /hole. Since it is onl4 through the suACect that the /hole appears cut in t/o at the place Aet/een our percept and our concept, the uniting o% those t/o gi es us true 1no/ledge. For Aeings /ith a di%%erent perceptual /orld 8%or example, i% the4 had t/ice our numAer o% sense organs:, the continuum /ould appear Aro1en in another place, and the reconstruction /ould accordingl4 ha e to ta1e a %orm speci%ic %or such Aeings. The @uestion concerning the limits o% 1no/ledge exists onl4 %or naN e and metaph4sical realism, Aoth o% /hich see in the contents o% the soul onl4 an ideal representation o% the real /orld. For these theories, /hat exists outside the suACect is something aAsolute, %ounded in itsel%, and /hat is contained /ithin the suACect is a picture o% this aAsolute, Aut @uite external to it. The completeness o% 1no/ledge depends on the greater or lesser degree o% resemAlance Aet/een the picture and the aAsolute oACect. A Aeing /ith %e/er senses than man /ill percei e less o% the /orld, one /ith more senses /ill percei e more. The %ormer /ill accordingl4 ha e a less complete 1no/ledge than the latter. For monism, the situation is di%%erent. The manner in /hich the /orld continuum appears to Ae rent asunder into suACect and oACect depends on the organiDation o% the percei ing Aeing. The oACect is not aAsolute, Aut merel4 relati e, /ith re%erence to this particular suACect. Eridging o er the antithesis, there%ore, can again ta1e place onl4 in the @uite speci%ic /a4 that is characteristic o% the particular human suACect. As soon as the I, /hich is separated %rom the /orld in the act o% percei ing, %its itsel% Aac1 into the /orld continuum through thought%ul contemplation, all %urther @uestioning ceases, ha ing Aeen Aut a conse@uence o% the separation. A di%%erentl4 constituted Aeing /ould ha e a di%%erentl4 constituted 1no/ledge. Our o/n 1no/ledge su%%ices to ans/er the @uestions put A4 our o/n nature. Metaph4sical realism has to as1# E4 /hat means are our percepts gi en7 "hat is it that a%%ects the suACect7

Monism holds that percepts are determined through the suACect. Eut at the same time, the suACect has in thin1ing the means %or canceling this sel%,produced determination. The metaph4sical realist is %aced A4 a %urther di%%icult4 /hen he see1s to explain the similarit4 Aet/een the /orld pictures o% di%%erent human indi iduals. -e has to as1 himsel%# -o/ is it that the picture o% the /orld /hich I Auild up out o% m4 suACecti el4 determined percepts and m4 concepts turns out to Ae the same as the one /hich another indi idual is also Auilding up out o% the same t/o suACecti e %actors7 -o/ can I, in an4 case, dra/ conclusions %rom m4 o/n suACecti e picture o% the /orld aAout that o% another human Aeing7 The %act that people can understand and get on /ith one another in practical li%e leads the metaph4sical realist to conclude that their suACecti e /orld pictures must Ae similar. From the similarit4 o% these /orld pictures he then %urther concludes that the Bindi idual spiritsB Aehind the single human suACects as percepts, or the BI,in,itsel%B Aehind the suACects, must also Ae li1e one another. This is an in%erence %rom a sum o% e%%ects to the character o% the underl4ing causes. "e Aelie e that /e can understand the situation /ell enough %rom a su%%icientl4 large numAer o% instances to 1no/ ho/ the in%erred causes /ill Aeha e in other instances. Such an in%erence is called an inducti e in%erence. "e shall Ae oAliged to modi%4 its results i% %urther oAser ation 4ields some unexpected element, Aecause the character o% our conclusion is, a%ter all, determined onl4 A4 the particular %orm o% our actual oAser ations. The metaph4sical realist asserts that this 1no/ledge o% causes, though conditional, is ne ertheless @uite su%%icient %or practical li%e. Inducti e in%erence is the method underl4ing modern metaph4sical realism. At one time it /as thought that /e could e ol e something out o% concepts that is no longer a concept. It /as thought that the metaph4sical realities, /hich metaph4sical realism a%ter all re@uires, could Ae 1no/n A4 means o% concepts. This 1ind o% philosophiDing is no/ out o% date. Instead it is thought that one can in%er %rom a su%%icientl4 large numAer o% perceptual %acts the character o% the thing,in,itsel% /hich underlies these %acts. "hereas %ormerl4 it /as %rom concepts, no/ it is %rom percepts that people see1 to e ol e the metaph4sical. Since one has concepts Ae%ore onesel% in transparent clearness, it /as thought that one might Ae aAle to deduce the metaph4sical %rom them /ith aAsolute certaint4. Percepts are not gi en /ith the same transparent clearness. Each suAse@uent one is a little di%%erent %rom others o% the same 1ind /hich preceded it. Easicall4, there%ore, an4thing in%erred %rom past percepts /ill Ae some/hat modi%ied A4 each suAse@uent percept. The character o% the metaph4sical thus oAtained can, there%ore, Ae onl4 relati el4 true, since it is suACect to correction A4 %urther instances. Eduard on -artmann$s metaph4sics has a character determined A4 this Aasic method, as expressed in

the motto on the title page o% his %irst important Aoo1# BSpeculati e results %ollo/ing the inducti e method o% Natural Science.L The %orm /hich the metaph4sical realist no/ada4s gi es to his things,in,themsel es is oAtained A4 inducti e in%erences. Through considerations o% the process o% 1no/ledge he is con inced o% the existence o% an oACecti el4 real /orld continuum, o er and aAo e the BsuACecti eB /orld continuum /hich /e 1no/ through percepts and concepts. The nature o% this realit4 he thin1s he can determine A4 inducti e in%erences %rom his percepts. ----. Author*s addition, #%#&. For the unpreCudiced oAser ation o% /hat is experienced through percept and concept, as /e ha e tried to descriAe it in the %oregoing pages, certain ideas /hich originate in the %ield o% natural science are repeatedl4 %ound to Ae disturAing. Thus it is said that in the spectrum o% light the e4e percei es colors %rom red to iolet. Eut in the space Ae4ond the iolet there are %orces o% radiation %or /hich there is no corresponding color,perception in the e4e, Aut instead there is a de%inite chemical e%%ect+ in the same /a4, Ae4ond the limit o% the red there are radiations ha ing onl4 an e%%ect o% /armth. E4 stud4ing these and other similar phenomena, one is led to the ie/ that the range o% man$s perceptual /orld is determined A4 the range o% his senses, and that he /ould Ae con%ronted A4 a er4 di%%erent /orld i% he had additional, or altogether di%%erent, senses. An4one /ho chooses to indulge in the extra agant %lights o% %anc4 %or /hich the Arilliant disco eries o% recent scienti%ic research o%%er such tempting opportunities, ma4 /ell arri e at the conclusion that nothing enters man$s %ield o% oAser ation except /hat can a%%ect the senses /hich his Aodil4 organiDation has e ol ed. -e has no right to regard /hat is percei ed, limited as it is A4 his organiDation, as in an4 /a4 setting a standard %or realit4. E er4 ne/ sense /ould con%ront him /ith a di%%erent picture o% realit4. "ithin its proper limits this ie/ is entirel4 Custi%ied. Eut i% an4one allo/s this ie/ to con%use him in his unpreCudiced oAser ation o% the relationship o% percept and concept as set out in these chapters, then he /ill Aar his o/n /a4 to an4 realistic 1no/ledge o% man and o% the /orld. To experience the essential nature o% thin1ing, that is, to /or1 one$s /a4 into the /orld o% concepts through one$s o/n acti it4, is an entirel4 di%%erent thing %rom experiencing something perceptiAle through the senses. "hate er senses man might possiAl4 ha e, not one /ould gi e him realit4 i% his thin1ing did not permeate /ith concepts /hate er he percei ed A4 means o% it. And e er4 sense, ho/e er constructed, /ould, i% thus permeated, enaAle him to li e /ithin realit4. This @uestion o% ho/ he stands in the /orld o% realit4 is untouched A4 an4 speculations he ma4 ha e as to ho/ the perceptual /orld might appear to him i% he had di%%erent senses. "e must clearl4 understand that e er4 perceptual picture o% the /orld o/es its %orm to the

organiDation o% the percei ing Aeing, Aut also that the perceptual picture /hich has Aeen thoroughl4 permeated A4 the experience o% thin1ing leads us into realit4. "hat causes us to en@uire into our relationship to the /orld is not the %anci%ul pictures o% ho/ di%%erent the /orld /ould appear to other than human senses, Aut the realiDation that e er4 percept gi es us onl4 a part o% the realit4 concealed /ithin it, in other /ords, that it directs us a/a4 %rom its inherent realit4. Added to this is the %urther realiDation that thin1ing leads us into that part o% the realit4 /hich the percept conceals /ithin itsel%. Another di%%icult4 in the /a4 o% the unpreCudiced oAser ation o% the relationship Aet/een the percept and the concept /rought A4 thin1ing, as here descriAed, arises /hen, %or example, in the %ield o% experimental ph4sics it Aecomes necessar4 to spea1 not o% immediatel4 perceptiAle elements, Aut o% non,perceptiAle @uantities as in the case o% lines o% electric or magnetic %orce. It ma4 seem as i% the elements o% realit4 o% /hich ph4sicists spea1 had no connection either /ith /hat is perceptiAle or /ith the concepts /hich acti e thin1ing has /rought. Fet such a ie/ /ould Ae Aased on sel%,deception. The main point is that all the results o% ph4sical research, apart %rom unCusti%iaAle h4potheses /hich ought to Ae excluded, ha e Aeen oAtained through percept and concept. Elements /hich are seemingl4 non, perceptiAle are placed A4 the ph4sicist$s sound instinct %or 1no/ledge into the %ield /here percepts lie, and the4 are thought o% in terms o% concepts commonl4 used in this %ield. The strengths o% electric or magnetic %ields and such li1e are arri ed at, in the er4 nature o% things, A4 no other process o% 1no/ledge than the one /hich occurs Aet/een percept and concept. An increase or a modi%ication o% human senses /ould 4ield a di%%erent perceptual picture, an enrichment or a modi%ication o% human experience. Eut e en /ith this experience one could arri e at real 1no/ledge onl4 through the interpla4 o% concept and percept. The deepening o% 1no/ledge depends on the po/ers o% intuition /hich express themsel es in thin1ing 8see Chapter 2:. In the li ing experience /hich de elops /ithin thin1ing, this intuition ma4 di e do/n to greater or to lesser depths o% realit4. An extension o% the perceptual picture ma4 pro ide stimulation %or this di ing do/n o% intuition, and thus indirectl4 promote it. Eut under no circumstances should this di ing into the depths to reach realit4 Ae con%used /ith Aeing con%ronted A4 a perceptual picture o% greater or lesser Areadth, /hich in an4 case can onl4 contain hal% the realit4, as determined A4 the organiDation o% the cogniDing Aeing. I% one does not lose onesel% in aAstractions, one /ill realiDe that %or a 1no/ledge o% human nature it is a rele ant %act that in ph4sics one has to in%er the existence o% elements in the perceptual %ield %or /hich no sense organ is tuned as it is %or color or sound. Man$s Aeing, @uite concretel4, is determined not onl4 A4 /hat his organiDation presents to him as immediate percept, Aut also A4 the %act that %rom this immediate perception other things

are excluded. Just as it is necessar4 %or li%e that in addition to the conscious /a1ing state there should Ae an unconscious sleeping state, so %or man$s experience o% himsel% it is necessar4 that in addition to the sphere o% his sense perception there should Ae another sphere ,, in %act a %ar larger one ,, o% elements not perceptiAle to the senses Aut Aelonging to the same %ield %rom /hich the sense percepts come. All this /as alread4 implied in the original presentation o% this /or1. The author adds these extensions to the argument Aecause he has %ound A4 experience that man4 a reader has not read accuratel4 enough. It is to Ae rememAered, too, that the idea o% percept de eloped in this Aoo1 is not to Ae con%used /ith the idea o% external sense percept /hich is Aut a special instance o% it. The reader /ill gather %rom /hat has gone Ae%ore, Aut e en more %rom /hat /ill %ollo/, that BperceptB is here ta1en to Ae e er4thing that approaches man through the senses or through the spirit, Ae%ore it has Aeen grasped A4 the acti el4 elaAorated concept. BSensesB, as /e ordinaril4 understand the term, are not necessar4 in order to ha e percepts in soul, or spirit,experience. It might Ae said that this extension o% our ordinar4 usage is not permissiAle. Eut such extension is aAsolutel4 necessar4 i% /e are not to Ae pre ented A4 the current sense o% a /ord %rom enlarging our 1no/ledge in certain %ields. An4one /ho uses BperceptionB to mean onl4 Bsense perceptionB /ill ne er arri e at a concept %it %or the purposes o% 1no/ledge ,, e en 1no/ledge o% this same sense perception. One must sometimes enlarge a concept in order that it ma4 get its appropriate meaning in a narro/er %ield. Sometimes one must also add to the original content o% a concept in order that the original concept ma4 Ae Custi%ied or, perhaps, readCusted. Thus /e %ind it said here in this Aoo1 8see Chapter 3:# BThe mental picture is an indi idualiDed concept.B It has Aeen oACected that this is an unusual use o% /ords. Eut this use is necessar4 i% /e are to %ind out /hat a mental picture reall4 is. -o/ can /e expect an4 progress in 1no/ledge i% e er4one /ho %inds himsel% compelled to readCust concepts is to Ae met A4 the oACection, BThis is an unusual use o% /ordsB7 ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. That is, mo ements o% a 1ind similar to those /hich can Ae percei ed are supposed to occur imperceptiAl4 /ithin the Aod4 and to account %or the /armth /hich is percei ed directl4 Aut as something @uite di%%erent. ,, Translator$s %ootnote. ----.

1 - The Factors of ,ife.

6et us recapitulate /hat /e ha e achie ed in the pre ious chapters. The /orld %aces man

as a multiplicit4, as a mass o% separate details. One o% these separate things, one entit4 among others, is man himsel%. This aspect o% the /orld /e simpl4 call the gi en, and inasmuch as /e do not e ol e it A4 conscious acti it4, Aut Cust %ind it, /e call it percept. "ithin this /orld o% percepts /e percei e oursel es. This percept o% sel% /ould remain merel4 one among man4 other percepts, i% something did not arise %rom the midst o% this percept o% sel% /hich pro es capaAle o% connecting all percepts /ith one another and, there%ore, the sum o% all other percepts /ith the percept o% our o/n sel%. This something /hich emerges is no longer merel4 percept+ neither is it, li1e percepts, simpl4 gi en. It is produced A4 our acti it4. To Aegin /ith, it appears to Ae Aound up /ith /hat /e percei e as our o/n sel%. In its inner signi%icance, ho/e er, it transcends the sel%. To the separate percepts it adds ideall4 determined elements, /hich, ho/e er, are related to one another, and are rooted in a totalit4. "hat is oAtained A4 perception o% sel% is ideall4 determined A4 this something in the same /a4 as are all other percepts, and is placed as suACect, or BIB, o er against the oACects. This something is thin1ing, and the ideall4 determined elements are the concepts and ideas. Thin1ing, there%ore, %irst re eals itsel% in the percept o% the sel%. Eut it is not merel4 suACecti e, %or the sel% characteriDes itsel% as suACect onl4 /ith the help o% thin1ing. This relationship in thought o% the sel% to itsel% is /hat, in li%e, determines our personalit4. Through it /e lead a purel4 ideal existence. Through it /e %eel oursel es to Ae thin1ing Aeings. This determination o% our li%e /ould remain a purel4 conceptual 8logical: one, i% no other determinations o% our sel% /ere added to it. "e should then Ae creatures /hose li%e /as expended in estaAlishing purel4 ideal relationships Aet/een percepts among themsel es and Aet/een them and oursel es. I% /e call the estaAlishment o% such a thought connection an Bact o% cognitionB, and the resulting condition o% oursel% B1no/ledgeB, then, assuming the aAo e supposition to Ae true, /e should ha e to consider oursel es as Aeings /ho merel4 cogniDe or 1no/. The supposition, ho/e er, does not meet the case. "e relate percepts to oursel es not merel4 ideall4, through concepts, Aut also, as /e ha e alread4 seen, through %eeling. There%ore /e are not Aeings /ith a merel4 conceptual content to our li%e. In %act the naN e realist holdsGthat the personalit4 li es more genuinel4 in the li%e o% %eeling than in the purel4 ideal element o% 1no/ledge. From his point o% ie/ he is @uite right /hen he descriAes the matter in this /a4. To Aegin /ith, %eeling is exactl4 the same, on the suACecti e side, as the percept is on the oACecti e side. From the Aasic principle o% naN e realism ,, that e er4thing that can Ae percei ed is real ,, it %ollo/s that %eeling must Ae the guarantee o% the realit4 o% one$s o/n personalit4. Monism, ho/e er, as here understood, must grant the same addition to %eeling that it considers necessar4 %or percepts, i% these are to stand Ae%ore us as %ull realit4. Thus, %or monism, %eeling is an incomplete realit4, /hich, in the %orm in /hich it %irst appears to us,

does not 4et contain its second %actor, the concept or idea. This is /h4, in actual li%e, %eelings, li1e percepts, appear prior to 1no/ledge. At %irst, /e ha e merel4 a %eeling o% existence+ and it is onl4 in the course o% our gradual de elopment that /e attain to the point at /hich the concept o% sel% emerges %rom /ithin the dim %eeling o% our o/n existence. -o/e er, /hat %or us appears onl4 later, is %rom the %irst indissoluAl4 Aound up /ith our %eeling. This is /h4 the naN e man comes to Aelie e that in %eeling he is presented /ith existence directl4, in 1no/ledge onl4 indirectl4. The culti ation o% the li%e o% %eeling, there%ore, appears to him more important than an4thing else. -e /ill onl4 Aelie e that he has grasped the pattern o% the uni erse /hen he has recei ed it into his %eeling. -e attempts to ma1e %eeling, rather than 1no/ing, the instrument o% 1no/ledge. Since a %eeling is something entirel4 indi idual, something e@ui alent to a percept, the philosopher o% %eeling is ma1ing a uni ersal principle out o% something that has signi%icance onl4 /ithin his o/n personalit4. -e attempts to permeate the /hole /orld /ith his o/n sel%. "hat the monist, in the sense /e ha e descriAed, stri es to grasp through concepts, the philosopher o% %eeling tries to attain through %eelings, and he regards this 1ind o% connection /ith the oACects as the more direct. The tendenc4 Cust descriAed, the philosoph4 o% %eeling, is o%ten called m4sticism. The error in a m4stical outloo1 Aased upon mere %eeling is that it /ants to experience directl4 /hat it ought to gain through 1no/ledge+ that it /ants to raise %eeling, /hich is indi idual, into a uni ersal principle. Feeling is a purel4 indi idual a%%air+ it is the relation o% the external /orld to oursel% as suACect, in so %ar as this relation %inds expression in a merel4 suACecti e experience. There is 4et another expression o% human personalit4. The I, through its thin1ing, shares the li%e o% the /orld in general. In this manner, in a purel4 ideal /a4 8that is, conceptuall4:, it relates the percepts to itsel%, and itsel% to the percepts. In %eeling, it has direct experience o% a relation o% the oACects to itsel% as suACect. In the /ill, the case is re ersed. In /illing, /e are concerned once more /ith a percept, namel4, that o% the indi idual relation o% our sel% to /hat is oACecti e. "hate er there is in /illing that is not a purel4 ideal %actor, is Cust as much mere oACect o% perception as is an4 oACect in the external /orld. Ne ertheless, the naN e realist Aelie es here again that he has Ae%ore him something %ar more real than can Ae attained A4 thin1ing. -e sees in the /ill an element in /hich he is directl4 a/are o% an occurrence, a causation, in contrast /ith thin1ing /hich onl4 grasps the e ent a%ter/ards in conceptual %orm. According to such a ie/, /hat the I achie es through its /ill is a process /hich is experienced directl4. The adherent o% this philosoph4 Aelie es that in the /ill he has reall4 got hold o% the machiner4 o% the /orld A4 one corner. "hereas he can %ollo/ other occurrences onl4 %rom

the outside A4 means o% perception, he is con%ident that in his /ill he experiences a real process @uite directl4. The mode o% existence in /hich the /ill appears /ithin the sel% Aecomes %or him a concrete principle o% realit4. -is o/n /ill appears to him as a special case o% the general /orld process+ hence the latter appears as uni ersal /ill. The /ill Aecomes the principle o% the uni erse Cust as, in m4sticism, %eeling Aecomes the principle o% 1no/ledge. This 1ind o% theor4 is called the philosoph4 o% /ill 8thelism:. It ma1es something that can Ae experienced onl4 indi iduall4 into a constituent %actor o% the /orld. The philosoph4 o% /ill can as little Ae called scienti%ic as can the m4sticism Aased on %eeling. For Aoth assert that the conceptual understanding o% the /orld is inade@uate. Eoth demand a principle o% existence /hich is real, in addition to a principle /hich is ideal. To a certain extent this is Custi%ied. Eut since percei ing is our onl4 means o% apprehending these socalled real principles, the assertion o% Aoth the m4sticism o% %eeling and the philosoph4 o% /ill comes to the same thing as sa4ing that /e ha e t/o sources o% 1no/ledge, thin1ing and percei ing, the latter presenting itsel% as an indi idual experience in %eeling and /ill. Since the results that %lo/ %rom the one source, the experiences, cannot on this ie/ Ae ta1en up directl4 into those that %lo/ %rom the other source, thin1ing, the t/o modes o% 1no/ledge, percei ing and thin1ing, remain side A4 side /ithout an4 higher %orm o% mediation Aet/een them. Eesides the ideal principle /hich is accessiAle to 1no/ledge, there is said to Ae a real principle /hich cannot Ae apprehended A4 thin1ing Aut can 4et Ae experienced. In other /ords, the m4sticism o% %eeling and the philosoph4 o% /ill are Aoth %orms o% naN e realism, Aecause the4 suAscriAe to the doctrine that /hat is directl4 percei ed is real. Compared /ith naN e realism in its primiti e %orm, the4 are guilt4 o% the 4et %urther inconsistenc4 o% accepting one particular %orm o% percei ing 8%eeling or /ill, respecti el4: as the one and onl4 means o% 1no/ing realit4, /hereas the4 can onl4 do this at all i% the4 hold in general to the %undamental principle that /hat is percei ed is real. Eut in that case the4 ought to attach e@ual alue, %or the purposes o% 1no/ledge, also to external perception. The philosoph4 o% /ill turns into metaph4sical realism /hen it places the element o% /ill e en into those spheres o% existence /here it cannot Ae experienced directl4, as it can in the indi idual suACect. It assumes, outside the suACect, a h4pothetical principle %or /hose real existence the sole criterion is suACecti e experience. As a %orm o% metaph4sical realism, the philosoph4 o% /ill is suACect to the criticism made in the preceding chapter, in that it has to get o er the contradictor4 stage inherent in e er4 %orm o% metaph4sical realism, and must ac1no/ledge that the /ill is a uni ersal /orld process onl4 in so %ar as it is ideall4 related to the rest o% the /orld. ----.

Author*s addition, #%#&. The di%%icult4 o% grasping the essential nature o% thin1ing A4 oAser ation lies in this, that it has all too easil4 eluded the introspecting soul A4 the time the soul tries to Aring it into the %ocus o% attention. Nothing then remains to Ae inspected Aut the li%eless aAstraction, the corpse o% the li ing thin1ing. I% /e loo1 onl4 at this aAstraction, /e ma4 easil4 %ind oursel es compelled to enter into the m4sticism o% %eeling or perhaps the metaph4sics o% /ill, /hich A4 contrast appear so B%ull o% li%eB. "e should then %ind it strange that an4one should expect to grasp the essence o% realit4 in Bmere thoughtsB. Eut i% /e once succeed in reall4 %inding li%e in thin1ing, /e shall 1no/ that s/imming in mere %eelings, or Aeing intuiti el4 a/are o% the /ill element, cannot e en Ae compared /ith the inner /ealth and the sel%,sustaining 4et e er mo ing experience o% this li%e o% thin1ing, let alone Ae ran1ed aAo e it. It is o/ing precisel4 to this /ealth, to this in/ard aAundance o% experience, that the counterimage o% thin1ing /hich presents itsel% to our ordinar4 attitude o% soul should appear li%eless and aAstract. No other acti it4 o% the human soul is so easil4 misunderstood as thin1ing. "ill and %eeling still %ill the soul /ith /armth e en /hen /e li e through the original e ent again in retrospect. Thin1ing all too readil4 lea es us cold in recollection+ it is as i% the li%e o% the soul had dried out. Fet this is reall4 nothing Aut the strongl4 mar1ed shado/ o% its real nature ,, /arm, luminous, and penetrating deepl4 into the phenomena o% the /orld. This penetration is Arought aAout A4 a po/er %lo/ing through the acti it4 o% thin1ing itsel% ,, the po/er o% lo e in its spiritual %orm. There are no grounds here %or the oACection that to discern lo e in the acti it4 o% thin1ing is to proCect into thin1ing a %eeling, namel4, lo e. For in truth this oACection is Aut a con%irmation o% /hat /e ha e Aeen sa4ing. I% /e turn to/ards thin1ing in its essence, /e %ind in it Aoth %eeling and /ill, and these in the depths o% their realit4+ i% /e turn a/a4 %rom thin1ing to/ards BmereB %eeling and /ill, /e lose %rom these their true realit4. I% /e are read4 to experience thin1ing intuiti el4, /e can also do Custice to the experience o% %eeling and o% /ill+ Aut the m4sticism o% %eeling and the metaph4sics o% /ill are not aAle to do Custice to the penetration o% realit4 A4 intuiti e thin1ing ,, the4 conclude all too readil4 that the4 themsel es are rooted in realit4, Aut that the intuiti e thin1er, de oid o% %eeling and a stranger to realit4, %orms out o% BaAstract thoughtsB a shado/4, chill4 picture o% the /orld. ----.

2 - The Idea of Freedom.

For our cognition, the concept o% the tree is conditioned A4 the percept o% the tree. "hen

%aced /ith a particular percept, I can select onl4 one particular concept %rom the general s4stem o% concepts. The connection o% concept and percept is determined A4 thin1ing, indirectl4 and oACecti el4, at the le el o% the percept. This connection o% the percept /ith its concept is recogniDed a%ter the act o% percei ing+ Aut that the4 do Aelong together lies in the er4 nature o% things. The process loo1s di%%erent /hen /e examine 1no/ledge, or rather the relation o% man to the /orld /hich arises /ithin 1no/ledge. In the preceding chapters the attempt has Aeen made to sho/ that an unpreCudiced oAser ation o% this relationship is aAle to thro/ light on its nature. A proper understanding o% this oAser ation leads to the insight that thin1ing can Ae directl4 discerned as a sel%contained entit4. Those /ho %ind it necessar4 %or the explanation o% thin1ing as such to in o1e something else, such as ph4sical Arain processes or unconscious spiritual processes l4ing Aehind the conscious thin1ing /hich the4 oAser e, %ail to recogniDe /hat an unpreCudiced oAser ation o% thin1ing 4ields. "hen /e oAser e our thin1ing, /e li e during this oAser ation directl4 /ithin a sel%,supporting, spiritual /eA o% Aeing. Indeed, /e can e en sa4 that i% /e /ould grasp the essential nature o% spirit in the %orm in /hich it presents itsel% most immediatel4 to man, /e need onl4 loo1 at the sel%,sustaining acti it4 o% thin1ing. "hen /e are contemplating thin1ing itsel%, t/o things coincide /hich other/ise must al/a4s appear apart, namel4, concept and percept. I% /e %ail to see this, /e shall Ae unaAle to regard the concepts /hich /e ha e elaAorated /ith respect to percepts as an4thing Aut shado/4 copies o% these percepts, and /e shall ta1e the percepts as presenting to us the true realit4. "e shall, %urther, Auild up %or oursel es a metaph4sical /orld a%ter the pattern o% the percei ed /orld+ /e shall call this a /orld o% atoms, a /orld o% /ill, a /orld o% unconscious spirit, or /hate er, each according to his o/n 1ind o% mental imager4. And /e shall %ail to notice that all the time /e ha e Aeen doing nothing Aut Auilding up a metaph4sical /orld h4potheticall4, a%ter the pattern o% our o/n /orld o% percepts. Eut i% /e recogniDe /hat is present in thin1ing, /e shall realiDe that in the percept /e ha e onl4 one part o% the realit4 and that the other part /hich Aelongs to it, and /hich %irst allo/s the %ull realit4 to appear, is experienced A4 us in the permeation o% the percept A4 thin1ing. "e shall see in this element that appears in our consciousness as thin1ing, not a shado/4 cop4 o% some realit4, Aut a sel%,sustaining spiritual essence. And o% this /e shall Ae aAle to sa4 that it is Arought into consciousness %or us through intuition. Intuition is the conscious experience ,, in pure spirit ,, o% a purel4 spiritual content. Onl4 through an intuition can the essence o% thin1ing Ae grasped. Onl4 i%, A4 means o% unpreCudiced oAser ation, one has /restled through to the recognition o% this truth o% the intuiti e essence o% thin1ing /ill one succeed in clearing the /a4 %or an insight into the ps4che,ph4sical organiDation o% man. One /ill see that this

organiDation can ha e no e%%ect on the essential nature o% thin1ing. At %irst sight this seems to Ae contradicted A4 patentl4 oA ious %acts. For ordinar4 experience, human thin1ing ma1es its appearance onl4 in connection /ith, and A4 means o%, this organiDation. This %orm o% its appearance comes so much to the %ore that its real signi%icance cannot Ae grasped unless /e recogniDe that in the essence o% thin1ing this organiDation pla4s no part /hate er. Once /e appreciate this, /e can no longer %ail to notice /hat a peculiar 1ind o% relationship there is Aet/een the human organiDation and the thin1ing itsel%. For this organiDation contriAutes nothing to the essential nature o% thin1ing, Aut recedes /hene er the acti it4 o% thin1ing ma1es its appearance+ it suspends its o/n acti it4, it 4ields ground+ and on the ground thus le%t empt4, the thin1ing appears. The essence /hich is acti e in thin1ing has a t/o%old %unction# %irst, it represses the acti it4 o% the human organiDation+ secondl4, it steps into its place. For e en the %ormer, the repression o% the ph4sical organiDation, is a conse@uence o% the acti it4 o% thin1ing, and more particularl4 o% that part o% this acti it4 /hich prepares the mani%estation o% thin1ing. From this one can see in /hat sense thin1ing %inds its counterpart in the ph4sical organiDation. "hen /e see this, /e can no longer misCudge the signi%icance o% this counterpart o% the acti it4 o% thin1ing. "hen /e /al1 o er so%t ground, our %eet lea e impressions in the soil. "e shall not Ae tempted to sa4 that these %ootprints ha e Aeen %ormed %rom Aelo/ A4 the %orces o% the ground. "e shall not attriAute to these %orces an4 share in the production o% the %ootprints. Just as little, i% /e oAser e the essential nature o% thin1ing /ithout preCudice, shall /e attriAute an4 share in that nature to the traces in the ph4sical organism /hich arise through the %act that the thin1ing prepares its mani%estation A4 means o% the Aod4. 8see %n &: An important @uestion, ho/e er, emerges here. I% the human organiDation has no part in the essential nature o% thin1ing, /hat is the signi%icance o% this organiDation /ithin the /hole nature o% man7 No/, /hat happens in this organiDation through the thin1ing has indeed nothing to do /ith the essence o% thin1ing, Aut it has a great deal to do /ith the arising o% the ego,consciousness out o% this thin1ing. Thin1ing, in its o/n essential nature, certainl4 contains the real I or ego, Aut it does not contain the ego,consciousness. To see this /e ha e Aut to oAser e thin1ing /ith an open mind. The BIB is to Ae %ound /ithin the thin1ing+ the Bego,consciousnessB arises through the traces /hich the acti it4 o% thin1ing engra es upon our general consciousness, in the sense explained aAo e. 8The egoconsciousness thus arises through the Aodil4 organiDation. -o/e er, this must not Ae ta1en to impl4 that the ego,consciousness, once it has arisen, remains dependent on the Aodil4 organiDation. Once arisen, it is ta1en up into thin1ing and shares hence%orth in thin1ing$s spiritual Aeing.: The Bego,consciousnessB is Auilt upon the human organiDation. Out o% the latter %lo/ our

acts o% /ill. Follo/ing the lines o% the preceding argument, /e can gain insight into the connections Aet/een thin1ing, conscious I, and act o% /ill, onl4 A4 oAser ing %irst ho/ an act o% /ill issues %rom the human organiDation. 8see %n ): In an4 particular act o% /ill /e must ta1e into account the moti e and the dri ing %orce. The moti e is a %actor /ith the character o% a concept or a mental picture+ the dri ing %orce is the /ill,%actor Aelonging to the human organiDation and directl4 conditioned A4 it. The conceptual %actor, or moti e, is the momentar4 determining %actor o% the /ill+ the dri ing %orce is the permanent determining %actor o% the indi idual. A moti e %or the /ill ma4 Ae a pure concept, or else a concept /ith a particular re%erence to a percept, that is, a mental picture. Eoth general concepts and indi idual ones 8mental pictures: Aecome moti es o% /ill A4 a%%ecting the human indi idual and determining him to action in a particular direction. Eut one and the same concept, or one and the same mental picture, a%%ects di%%erent indi iduals di%%erentl4. The4 stimulate di%%erent men to di%%erent actions. An act o% /ill is there%ore not merel4 the outcome o% the concept or the mental picture Aut also o% the indi idual ma1e,up o% the person. -ere /e ma4 /ell %ollo/ the example o% Eduard on -artmann and call this indi idual ma1e,up the characterological disposition. The manner in /hich concept and mental picture a%%ects the characterological disposition o% a man gi es to his li%e a de%inite moral or ethical stamp. The characterological disposition is %ormed A4 the more or less permanent content o% our suACecti e li%e, that is, A4 the content o% our mental pictures and %eelings. "hether a mental picture /hich enters m4 mind at this moment stimulates me to an act o% /ill or not, depends on ho/ it relates itsel% to the content o% all m4 other mental pictures and also to m4 idios4ncrasies o% %eeling. Eut a%ter all, the general content o% m4 mental pictures is itsel% conditioned A4 the sum total o% those concepts /hich ha e, in the course o% m4 indi idual li%e, come into contact /ith percepts, that is, ha e Aecome mental pictures. This sum, again, depends on m4 greater or lesser capacit4 %or intuition and on the range o% m4 oAser ations, that is, on the suACecti e and oACecti e %actors o% experience, on m4 inner nature and situation in li%e. M4 characterological disposition is determined especiall4 A4 m4 li%e o% %eeling. "hether I shall ma1e a particular mental picture or concept into a moti e o% action or not, /ill depend on /hether it gi es me Co4 or pain. These are the elements /hich /e ha e to consider in an act o% /ill. The immediatel4 present mental picture or concept, /hich Aecomes the moti e, determines the aim or the purpose o% m4 /ill+ m4 characterological disposition determines me to direct m4 acti it4 to/ards this aim. The mental picture o% ta1ing a /al1 in the next hal%,hour determines the aim o% m4 action. Eut this mental picture is raised to the le el o% a moti e %or m4 /ill onl4

i% it meets /ith a suitaAle characterological disposition, that is, i% during m4 past li%e I ha e %ormed the mental pictures o% the sense and purpose o% ta1ing a /al1, o% the alue o% health, and %urther, i% the mental picture o% ta1ing a /al1 is accompanied in me A4 a %eeling o% pleasure. "e must there%ore distinguish 8&: the possiAle suACecti e dispositions /hich are capaAle o% turning certain mental pictures and concepts into moti es, and 8): the possiAle mental pictures and concepts /hich are in a position to in%luence m4 characterological disposition so that an act o% /ill results. For our moral li%e the %ormer represent the dri ing %orce, and the latter, its aims. The dri ing %orce in the moral li%e can Ae disco ered A4 %inding out the elements o% /hich indi idual li%e is composed. The %irst le el o% indi idual li%e is that o% percei ing, more particularl4 percei ing through the senses. This is the region o% our indi idual li%e in /hich percei ing translates itsel% directl4 into /illing, /ithout the inter ention o% either a %eeling or a concept. The dri ing %orce here in ol ed is simpl4 called instinct. The satis%action o% our lo/er, purel4 animal needs 8hunger, sexual intercourse, etc.: comes aAout in this /a4. The main characteristic o% instincti e li%e is the immediac4 /ith /hich the single percept releases the act o% /ill. This 1ind o% determination o% the /ill, /hich Aelongs originall4 onl4 to the li%e o% the lo/er senses, ma4 ho/e er Aecome extended also to the percepts o% the higher senses. "e ma4 react to the percept o% a certain e ent in the external /orld /ithout re%lecting on /hat /e do, /ithout an4 special %eeling connecting itsel% /ith the percept, as in %act happens in our con entional social Aeha iour. The dri ing %orce o% such action is called tact or moral good taste. The more o%ten such immediate reactions to a percept occur, the more the person concerned /ill pro e himsel% aAle to act purel4 under the guidance o% tact+ that is, tact Aecomes his characterological disposition. The second le el o% human li%e is %eeling. !e%inite %eelings accompan4 the percepts o% the external /orld. These %eelings ma4 Aecome the dri ing %orce o% an action. "hen I see a star ing man, m4 pit4 %or him ma4 Aecome the dri ing %orce o% m4 action. Such %eelings, %or example, are shame, pride, sense o% honour, humilit4, remorse, pit4, re enge, gratitude, piet4, lo4alt4, lo e, and dut4. 8see %n 0: The third le el o% li%e amounts to thin1ing and %orming mental pictures. A mental picture or a concept ma4 Aecome the moti e o% an action through mere re%lection. Mental pictures Aecome moti es Aecause, in the course o% li%e, /e regularl4 connect certain aims o% our /ill /ith percepts /hich recur again and again in more or less modi%ied %orm. -ence /ith people not /holl4 de oid o% experience it happens that the occurrence o% certain percepts is al/a4s accompanied A4 the appearance in consciousness o% mental pictures o% actions

that the4 themsel es ha e carried out in a similar case or ha e seen others carr4 out. These mental pictures %loat Ae%ore their minds as patterns /hich determine all suAse@uent decisions+ the4 Aecome parts o% their characterological disposition. The dri ing %orce in the /ill, in this case, /e can call practical experience. Practical experience merges graduall4 into purel4 tact%ul Aeha iour. This happens /hen de%inite t4pical pictures o% actions ha e Aecome so %irml4 connected in our minds /ith mental pictures o% certain situations in li%e that, in an4 gi en instance, /e s1ip o er all deliAeration Aased on experience and go straight %rom the percept to the act o% /ill. The highest le el o% indi idual li%e is that o% conceptual thin1ing /ithout regard to an4 de%inite perceptual content. "e determine the content o% a concept through pure intuition %rom out o% the ideal sphere. Such a concept contains, at %irst, no re%erence to an4 de%inite percepts. I% /e enter upon an act o% /ill under the in%luence o% a concept /hich re%ers to a percept, that is, under the in%luence o% a mental picture, then it is this percept /hich determines our action indirectl4 A4 /a4 o% the conceptual thin1ing. Eut i% /e act under the in%luence o% intuitions, the dri ing %orce o% our action is pure thin1ing. As it is the custom in philosoph4 to call the %acult4 o% pure thin1ing BreasonB, /e ma4 /ell Ae Custi%ied in gi ing the name o% practical reason to the moral dri ing %orce characteristic o% this le el o% li%e. The dearest account o% this dri ing %orce in the /ill has Aeen gi en A4 .re4enAKhl 8see %n *:. In m4 opinion his article on this suACect is one o% the most important contriAutions to present,da4 philosoph4, more especiall4 to Ethics. .re4enAKhl calls the dri ing %orce /e are here discussing, the practical a priori, that is, an impulse to action issuing directl4 %rom m4 intuition. It is clear that such an impulse can no longer Ae counted in the strictest sense as Aelonging to the characterological disposition. For /hat is here e%%ecti e as the dri ing %orce is no longer something merel4 indi idual in me, Aut the ideal and hence uni ersal content o% m4 intuition. As soon as I see the Custi%ication %or ta1ing this content as the Aasis and starting point o% an action, I enter upon the act o% /ill irrespecti e o% /hether I ha e had the concept Ae%orehand or /hether it onl4 enters m4 consciousness immediatel4 Ae%ore the action, that is, irrespecti e o% /hether it /as alread4 present as a disposition in me or not. Since a real act o% /ill results onl4 /hen a momentar4 impulse to action, in the %orm o% a concept or mental picture, acts on the characterological disposition, such an impulse then Aecomes the moti e o% the /ill. The moti es o% moral conduct are mental pictures and concepts. There are Moral Philosophers /ho see a moti e %or moral Aeha iour also in the %eelings+ the4 assert, %or instance, that the aim o% moral action is to promote the greatest possiAle @uantit4 o% pleasure %or the acting indi idual. Pleasure itsel%, ho/e er, cannot Aecome a moti e+ onl4 an imagined pleasure can. The mental picture o% a %uture %eeling, Aut not the %eeling itsel%, can act on m4 characterological disposition. For the %eeling itsel% does not 4et exist in the

moment o% action+ it has %irst to Ae produced A4 the action. The mental picture o% one$s o/n or another$s /el%are is, ho/e er, rightl4 regarded as a moti e o% the /ill. The principle o% producing the greatest @uantit4 o% pleasure %or onesel% through one$s action, that is, o% attaining indi idual happiness, is called egoism. The attainment o% this indi idual happiness is sought either A4 thin1ing ruthlessl4 onl4 o% one$s o/n good and stri ing to attain it e en at the cost o% the happiness o% other indi iduals 8pure egoism:, or A4 promoting the good o% others, either Aecause one anticipates a %a ouraAle in%luence on one$s o/n person indirectl4 through the happiness o% others, or Aecause one %ears to endanger one$s o/n interest A4 inCuring others 8moralit4 o% prudence:. The special content o% the egoistical principles o% moralit4 /ill depend on the mental pictures /hich /e %orm o% /hat constitutes our o/n, or others$, happiness. A man /ill determine the content o% his egoistical stri ing in accordance /ith /hat he regards as the good things o% li%e 8luxur4, hope o% happiness, deli erance %rom arious e ils, and so on:. The purel4 conceptual content o% an action is to Ae regarded as 4et another 1ind o% moti e. This content re%ers not to the particular action onl4, as /ith the mental picture o% one$s o/n pleasures, Aut to the deri ation o% an action %rom a s4stem o% moral principles. These moral principles, in the %orm o% aAstract concepts, ma4 regulate the indi idual$s moral li%e /ithout his /orr4ing himsel% aAout the origin o% the concepts. In that case, /e simpl4 %eel that suAmitting to a moral concept in the %orm o% a commandment o ershado/ing our actions, is a moral necessit4. The estaAlishment o% this necessit4 /e lea e to those /ho demand moral suACection %rom us, that is, to the moral authorit4 that /e ac1no/ledge 8the head o% the %amil4, the state, social custom, the authorit4 o% the church, di ine re elation:. It is a special 1ind o% these moral principles /hen the commandment is made 1no/n to us not through an external authorit4 Aut through our o/n inner li%e 8moral autonom4:. In this case /e hear the oice to /hich /e ha e to suAmit oursel es, in our o/n souls. This oice expresses itsel% as conscience. It is a moral ad ance /hen a man no longer simpl4 accepts the commands o% an outer or inner authorit4 as the moti e o% his action, Aut tries to understand the reason /h4 a particular maxim o% Aeha iour should act as a moti e in him. This is the ad ance %rom moralit4 Aased on authorit4 to action out o% moral insight. At this le el o% moralit4 a man /ill tr4 to %ind out the re@uirements o% the moral li%e and /ill let his actions Ae determined A4 the 1no/ledge o% them. Such re@uirements are the greatest possiAle good o% man1ind purel4 %or its o/n sa1e+ the progress o% ci iliDation, or the moral e olution o% man1ind to/ards e er greater per%ection+ the realiDation o% indi idual moral aims grasped A4 pure intuition. The greatest possiAle good o% man1ind /ill naturall4 Ae understood in di%%erent /a4s A4 di%%erent people. This maxim re%ers not to an4 particular mental picture o% this BgoodB Aut

to the %act that e er4one /ho ac1no/ledges this principle stri es to do /hate er, in his opinion, most promotes the good o% man1ind. The progress o% ci iliDation, %or those to /hom the Alessings o% ci iliDation Aring a %eeling o% pleasure, turns out to Ae a special case o% the %oregoing moral principle. O% course, the4 /ill ha e to ta1e into the Aargain the decline and destruction o% a numAer o% things that also contriAute to the general good. It is also possiAle, ho/e er, that some people regard the progress o% ci iliDation as a moral necessit4 @uite apart %rom the %eeling o% pleasure that it Arings. For them, this Aecomes a special moral principle in addition to the pre ious one. The principle o% the progress o% ci iliDation, li1e that o% the general good, is Aased on a mental picture, that is, on the /a4 /e relate the content o% our moral ideas to particular experiences 8percepts:. The highest concei aAle moral principle, ho/e er, is one that %rom the start contains no such re%erence to particular experiences, Aut springs %rom the source o% pure intuition and onl4 later see1s an4 re%erence to percepts, that is, to li%e. -ere the decision as to /hat is to Ae /illed proceeds %rom an authorit4 er4 di%%erent %rom that o% the %oregoing cases. I% a man holds to the principle o% the general good, he /ill, in all his actions, %irst as1 /hat his ideals /ill contriAute to this general good. I% a man upholds the principle o% the progress o% ci iliDation, he /ill act similarl4. Eut there is a still higher /a4 /hich does not start %rom one and the same particular moral aim in each case, Aut sees a certain alue in all moral principles and al/a4s as1s /hether in the gi en case this or that principle is the more important. It ma4 happen that in some circumstances a man considers the right aim to Ae the progress o% ci iliDation, in others the promotion o% the general good, and in 4et another the promotion o% his o/n /el%are, and in each case ma1es that the moti e o% his action. Eut i% no other ground %or decision claims more than second place, then conceptual intuition itsel% comes %irst and %oremost into consideration. All other moti es no/ gi e /a4, and the idea Aehind an action alone Aecomes its moti e. Among the le els o% characterological disposition, /e ha e singled out as the highest the one that /or1s as pure thin1ing or practical reason. Among the moti es, /e ha e Cust singled out conceptual intuition as the highest. On closer inspection it /ill at once Ae seen that at this le el o% moralit4 dri ing %orce and moti e coincide+ that is, neither a predetermined characterological disposition nor the external authorit4 o% an accepted moral principle in%luences our conduct. The action is there%ore neither a stereot4ped one /hich merel4 %ollo/s certain rules, nor is it one /hich /e automaticall4 per%orm in response to an external impulse, Aut it is an action determined purel4 and simpl4 A4 its o/n ideal content. Such an action presupposes the capacit4 %or moral intuitions. "hoe er lac1s the capacit4

to experience %or himsel% the particular moral principle %or each single situation, /ill ne er achie e trul4 indi idual /illing. .ant$s principle o% moralit4 ,, Act so that the Aasis o% 4our action ma4 Ae alid %or all men ,, is the exact opposite o% ours. -is principle means death to all indi idual impulses o% action. For me, the standard can ne er Ae the /a4 all men /ould act, Aut rather /hat, %or me, is to Ae done in each indi idual case. A super%icial Cudgment might raise the %ollo/ing oACection to these arguments# -o/ can an action Ae indi iduall4 made to %it the special case and the special situation, and 4et at the same time Ae determined A4 intuition in a purel4 ideal /a47 This oACection rests upon a con%usion o% the moral moti e /ith the perceptiAle content o% an action. The latter ma4 Ae a moti e, and actuall4 is one in the case o% the progress o% ci iliDation, or /hen /e act %rom egoism, and so %orth, Aut in an action Aased on pure moral intuition it is not the moti e. O% course, m4 BIB ta1es notice o% these perceptual contents, Aut it does not allo/ itsel% to Ae determined A4 them. The content is used onl4 to construct a cogniti e concept, Aut the corresponding moral concept is not deri ed A4 the BIB %rom the oACect. The cogniti e concept o% a gi en situation %acing me is at the same time a moral concept onl4 i% I ta1e the standpoint o% a particular moral principle. I% I /ere to Aase m4 conduct onl4 on the general principle o% the de elopment o% ci iliDation, then m4 /a4 through li%e /ould Ae tied do/n to a %ixed route. From e er4 occurrence /hich I percei e and /hich concerns me,there springs at the same time a moral dut4# namel4, to do m4 little Ait to/ards seeing that this occurrence is made to ser e the de elopment o% ci iliDation. In addition to the concept /hich re eals to me the connections o% e ents or oACects according to the la/s o% nature, there is also a moral laAel attached to them /hich %or me, as a moral person, gi es ethical directions as to ho/ I ha e to conduct m4sel%. Such a moral laAel is Custi%ied on its o/n ground+ at a higher le el it coincides /ith the idea /hich re eals itsel% to me /hen I am %aced /ith the concrete instance. Men ar4 greatl4 in their capacit4 %or intuition. In one, ideas Cust AuAAle up+ another ac@uires them /ith much laAour. The situations in /hich men li e and /hich pro ide the scenes o% their actions are no less aried. The conduct o% a man /ill there%ore depend on the manner in /hich his %acult4 o% intuition /or1s in a gi en situation. The sum o% ideas /hich are e%%ecti e in us, the concrete content o% our intuitions, constitutes /hat is indi idual in each o% us, not/ithstanding the uni ersalit4 o% the /orld o% ideas. In so %ar as this intuiti e content applies to action, it constitutes the moral content o% the indi idual. To let this content express itsel% in li%e is Aoth the highest moral dri ing %orce and the highest moti e a man can ha e, /ho sees that in this content all other moral principles are in the end united. "e ma4 call this point o% ie/ ethical indi idualism. The decisi e %actor o% an intuiti el4 determined action in an4 concrete instance is the disco er4 o% the corresponding purel4 indi idual intuition. At this le el o% moralit4 one

can onl4 spea1 o% general concepts o% moralit4 8standards, la/s: in so %ar as these result %rom the generaliDation o% the indi idual impulses. =eneral standards al/a4s presuppose concrete %acts %rom /hich the4 can Ae deri ed. Eut the %acts ha e %irst to Ae created A4 human action. I% /e see1 out the rules 8conceptual principles: underl4ing the actions o% indi iduals, peoples, and epochs, /e oAtain a s4stem o% ethics /hich is not so much a science o% moral la/s as a natural histor4 o% moralit4. It is onl4 the la/s oAtained in this /a4 that are related to human action as the la/s o% nature are related to a particular phenomenon. These la/s, ho/e er, are A4 no means identical /ith the impulses on /hich /e Aase our actions. I% /e /ant to understand ho/ a man$s action arises %rom his moral /ill, /e must %irst stud4 the relation o% this /ill to the action. AAo e all, /e must 1eep our e4e on those actions in /hich this relation is the determining %actor. I% I, or someone else, re%lect upon such an action a%ter/ards, /e can disco er /hat moral principles come into @uestion /ith regard to it. "hile I am per%orming the action I am in%luenced A4 a moral maxim in so %ar as it can li e in me intuiti el4+ it is Aound up /ith m4 lo e %or the oACecti e that I /ant to realiDe through m4 action. I as1 no man and no rule, BShall I per%orm this action7B ,, Aut carr4 it out as soon as I ha e grasped the idea o% it. This alone ma1es it m4 action. I% a man acts onl4 Aecause he accepts certain moral standards, his action is the outcome o% the principles /hich compose his moral code. -e merel4 carries out orders. -e is a superior automaton. InCect some stimulus to action into his mind, and at once the cloc1/or1 o% his moral principles /ill set itsel% in motion and run its prescriAed course, so as to result in an action /hich is Christian, or humane, or seemingl4 unsel%ish, or calculated to promote the progress o% ci iliDation. Onl4 /hen I %ollo/ m4 lo e %or m4 oACecti e is it I m4sel% /ho act. I act, at this le el o% moralit4, not Aecause I ac1no/ledge a lord o er me, or an external authorit4, or a so,called inner oice+ I ac1no/ledge no external principle %or m4 action, Aecause I ha e %ound in m4sel% the ground %or m4 action, namel4, m4 lo e o% the action. I do not /or1 out mentall4 /hether m4 action is good or Aad+ I carr4 it out Aecause I lo e it. M4 action /ill Ae BgoodB i% m4 intuition, steeped in lo e, %inds its right place /ithin the intuiti el4 experienceaAle /orld continuum+ it /ill Ae BAadB i% this is not the case. Again, I do not as1 m4sel%, B-o/ /ould another man act in m4 position7B ,, Aut I act as I, this particular indi idualit4, %ind I ha e occasion to do. No general usage, no common custom, no maxim appl4ing to all men, no moral standard is m4 immediate guide, Aut m4 lo e %or the deed. I %eel no compulsion, neither the compulsion o% nature /hich guides me A4 m4 instincts, nor the compulsion o% the moral commandments, Aut I /ant simpl4 to carr4 out /hat lies /ithin me. Those /ho de%end general moral standards might repl4 to these arguments that i% e er4one

stri es to li e his o/n li%e and do /hat he pleases, there can Ae no distinction Aet/een a good deed and a crime+ e er4 corrupt impulse that lies /ithin me has as good a claim to express itsel% as has the intention o% ser ing the general good. "hat determines me as a moral Aeing cannot Ae the mere %act o% m4 ha ing concei ed the idea o% an action, Aut /hether I Cudge it to Ae good or e il. Onl4 in the %ormer case should I carr4 it out. M4 repl4 to this er4 oA ious oACection, /hich is ne ertheless Aased on a misapprehension o% m4 argument, is this# I% /e /ant to understand the nature o% the human /ill, /e must distinguish Aet/een the path /hich leads this /ill to a certain degree o% de elopment and the uni@ue character /hich the /ill assumes as it approaches this goal. On the path to/ards this goal the standards pla4 their right%ul part. The goal consists o% the realiDation o% moral aims grasped A4 pure intuition. Man attains such aims to the extent that he is aAle to raise himsel% at all to the intuiti e /orld o% ideas. In an4 particular act o% /ill such moral aims /ill generall4 ha e other elements mixed in /ith them, either as dri ing %orce or as moti e. Ne ertheless intuition ma4 still Ae /holl4 or partl4 the determining %actor in the human /ill. "hat one should do, that one does+ one pro ides the stage upon /hich oAligation Aecomes deed+ one$s o/n action is /hat one Arings %orth %rom onesel%. -ere the impulse can onl4 Ae /holl4 indi idual. And, in truth, onl4 an act o% /ill that springs %rom intuition can Ae an indi idual one. To regard e il, the deed o% a criminal, as an expression o% the human indi idualit4 in the same sense as one regards the emAodiment o% pure intuition is onl4 possiAle i% Alind instincts are rec1oned as part o% the human indi idualit4. Eut the Alind instinct that dri es a man to crime does not spring %rom intuition, and does not Aelong to /hat is indi idual in him, Aut rather to /hat is most general in him, to /hat is e@uall4 present in all indi iduals and out o% /hich a man /or1s his /a4 A4 means o% /hat is indi idual in him. "hat is indi idual in me is not m4 organism /ith its instincts and its %eelings Aut rather the uni%ied /orld o% ideas /hich lights up /ithin this organism. M4 instincts, urges and passions estaAlish no more than that I Aelong to the general species man+ it is the %act that something o% the idea /orld comes to expression in a particular /a4 /ithin these urges, passions and %eelings that estaAlishes m4 indi idualit4. Through m4 instincts and cra ings, I am the sort o% man o% /hom there are t/el e to the doDen+ through the particular %orm o% the idea A4 means o% /hich I designate m4sel% /ithin the doDen as BIB, I am an indi idual. Onl4 a Aeing other than m4sel% could distinguish me %rom others A4 the di%%erence in m4 animal nature+ through m4 thin1ing, that is, A4 acti el4 grasping /hat expresses itsel% in m4 organism as idea, I distinguish m4sel% %rom others. There%ore one cannot sa4 o% the action o% a criminal that it proceeds %rom the idea /ithin him. Indeed, the characteristic %eature o% criminal actions is precisel4 that the4 spring %rom the non,ideal elements in

man. An action is %elt to Ae %ree in so %ar as the reasons %or it spring %rom the ideal part o% m4 indi idual Aeing+ e er4 other part o% an action, irrespecti e o% /hether it is carried out under the compulsion o% nature or under the oAligation o% a moral standard, is %elt to Ae un%ree. Man is %ree in so %ar as he is aAle to oAe4 himsel% in e er4 moment o% his li%e. A moral deed is m4 deed onl4 i% it can Ae called a %ree one in this sense. "e ha e here considered /hat conditions are re@uired %or an intentional action to Ae %elt as a %ree one+ ho/ this purel4 ethicall4 understood idea o% %reedom comes to realiDation in the Aeing o% man /ill Ae sho/n in /hat %ollo/s. Acting out o% %reedom does not exclude the moral la/s+ it includes them, Aut sho/s itsel% to Ae on a higher le el than those actions /hich are merel4 dictated A4 such la/s. "h4 should m4 action Ae o% less ser ice to the puAlic good /hen I ha e done it out o% lo e than /hen I ha e done it onl4 Aecause I consider ser ing the puAlic good to Ae m4 dut47 The mere concept o% dut4 excludes %reedom Aecause it does not ac1no/ledge the indi idual element Aut demands that this Ae suACect to a general standard. Freedom o% action is concei aAle onl4 %rom the standpoint o% ethical indi idualism. Eut ho/ is a social li%e possiAle %or man i% each one is onl4 stri ing to assert his o/n indi idualit47 This oACection is characteristic o% a %alse understanding o% moralism. Such a moralist Aelie es that a social communit4 is possiAle onl4 i% all men are united A4 a communall4 %ixed moral order. "hat this 1ind o% moralist does not understand is Cust the unit4 o% the /orld o% ideas. -e does not see that the /orld o% ideas /or1ing in me is no other than the one /or1ing in m4 %ello/ man. Admittedl4, this unit4 is Aut an outcome o% practical experience. Eut in %act it cannot Ae an4thing else. For i% it could Ae 1no/n in an4 other /a4 than A4 oAser ation, then in its o/n sphere uni ersal standards rather than indi idual experience /ould Ae the rule. Indi idualit4 is possiAle onl4 i% e er4 indi idual Aeing 1no/s o% others through indi idual oAser ation alone. I di%%er %rom m4 %ello/ man, not at all Aecause /e are li ing in t/o entirel4 di%%erent spiritual /orlds, Aut Aecause %rom the /orld o% ideas common to us Aoth /e recei e di%%erent intuitions. -e /ants to li e out his intuitions, I mine. I% /e Aoth reall4 concei e out o% the idea, and do not oAe4 an4 external impulses 8ph4sical or spiritual:, then /e cannot Aut meet one another in li1e stri ing, in common intent. A moral misunderstanding, a clash, is impossiAle Aet/een men /ho are morall4 %ree. Onl4 the morall4 un%ree /ho %ollo/ their natural instincts or the accepted commands o% dut4 come into con%lict /ith their neighAours i% these do not oAe4 the same instincts and the same commands as themsel es.

To li e in lo e to/ards our actions, and to let li e in the understanding o% the other person$s /ill, is the %undamental maxim o% %ree men. The4 1no/ no other oAligation than /hat their /ill puts itsel% in unison /ith intuiti el4+ ho/ the4 /ill direct their /ill in a particular case, their %acult4 %or ideas /ill decide. "ere the aAilit4 to get on /ith one another not a Aasic part o% human nature, no external la/s /ould Ae aAle to implant it in us. It is onl4 Aecause human indi iduals are one in spirit that the4 can li e out their li es side A4 side. The %ree man li es in con%idence that he and an4 other %ree man Aelong to one spiritual /orld, and that their intentions /ill harmoniDe. The %ree man does not demand agreement %rom his %ello/ man, Aut expects to %ind it Aecause it is inherent in human nature. I am not here re%erring to the necessit4 %or this or that external institution, Aut to the disposition, the attitude o% soul, through /hich a man, a/are o% himsel% among his %ello/s, most clearl4 expresses the ideal o% human dignit4. There are man4 /ho /ill sa4 that the concept o% the %ree man /hich I ha e here de eloped is a chimera no/here to Ae %ound in practice+ /e ha e to do /ith actual human Aeings, %rom /hom /e can onl4 hope %or moralit4 i% the4 oAe4 some moral la/, that is, i% the4 regard their moral tas1 as a dut4 and do not %reel4 %ollo/ their inclinations and lo es. I do not douAt this at all. Onl4 a Alind man could do so. Eut i% this is to Ae the %inal conclusion, then a/a4 /ith all this h4pocris4 aAout moralit4G 6et us then simpl4 sa4 that human nature must Ae dri en to its actions as long as it is not %ree. "hether his un%reedom is %orced on him A4 ph4sical means or A4 moral la/s, /hether man is un%ree Aecause he %ollo/s his unlimited sexual desire or Aecause he is Aound A4 the %etters o% con entional moralit4, is @uite immaterial %rom a certain point o% ie/. Onl4 let us not assert that such a man can rightl4 call his actions his o/n, seeing that he is dri en to them A4 a %orce other than himsel%. Eut in the midst o% all this %rame/or1 o% compulsion there arise men /ho estaAlish themsel es as %ree spirits in all the /elter o% customs, legal codes, religious oAser ances, and so %orth. The4 are %ree in so %ar as the4 oAe4 onl4 themsel es, un%ree in so %ar as the4 suAmit to control. "hich o% us can sa4 that he is reall4 %ree in all his actions7 Fet in each o% us there d/ells a deeper Aeing in /hich the %ree man %inds expression. Our li%e is made up o% %ree and un%ree actions. "e cannot, ho/e er, thin1 out the concept o% man completel4 /ithout coming upon the %ree spirit as the purest expression o% human nature. Indeed, /e are men in the true sense onl4 in so %ar as /e are %ree. This is an ideal, man4 /ill sa4. !ouAtless+ Aut it is an ideal /hich is a real element in us /or1ing its /a4 to the sur%ace o% our nature. It is no ideal Cust thought up or dreamed, Aut one /hich has li%e, and /hich announces itsel% clearl4 e en in the least per%ect %orm o% its existence. I% man /ere merel4 a natural creature, there /ould Ae no such thing as the search %or ideals, that is, %or ideas /hich %or the moment are not e%%ecti e Aut /hose

realiDation is re@uired. "ith the things o% the outer /orld, the idea is determined A4 the percept+ /e ha e done our share /hen /e ha e recogniDed the connection Aet/een idea and percept. Eut /ith the human Aeing it is not so. The sum total o% his existence is not %ull4 determined /ithout his o/n sel%+ his true concept as a moral Aeing 8%ree spirit: is not oACecti el4 united %rom the start /ith the percept,picture BmanB needing onl4 to Ae con%irmed A4 1no/ledge a%ter/ards. Man must unite his concept /ith the percept o% man A4 his o/n acti it4. Concept and percept coincide in this case onl4 i% man himsel% ma1es them coincide. This he can do onl4 i% he has %ound the concept o% the %ree spirit, that is, i% he has %ound the concept o% his o/n sel%. In the oACecti e /orld a di iding line is dra/n A4 our organiDation Aet/een percept and concept+ 1no/ledge o ercomes this di ision. In our suACecti e nature this di ision is no less present+ man o ercomes it in the course o% his de elopment A4 Aringing the concept o% himsel% to expression in his out/ard existence. -ence not onl4 man$s intellectual Aut also his moral li%e leads to his t/o%old nature, percei ing 8direct experience: and thin1ing. The intellectual li%e o ercomes this t/o,%old nature A4 means o% 1no/ledge, the moral li%e o ercomes it through the actual realiDation o% the %ree spirit. E er4 existing thing has its inAorn concept 8the la/ o% its Aeing and doing:, Aut in external oACects this concept is indi isiAl4 Aound up /ith the percept, and separated %rom it onl4 /ithin our spiritual organiDation. In man concept and percept are, at %irst, actuall4 separated, to Ae Cust as actuall4 united A4 him. One might oACect# At e er4 moment o% a man$s li%e there is a de%inite concept corresponding to our percept o% him Cust as /ith e er4thing else. I can %orm %or m4sel% the concept o% a particular t4pe o% man, and I ma4 e en %ind such a man gi en to me as a percept+ i% I no/ add to this the concept o% a %ree spirit, then I ha e t/o concepts %or the same oACect. Such an oACection is one,sided. As oACect o% perception I am suACected to continual change. As a child I /as one thing, another as a 4outh, 4et another as a man. Indeed, at e er4 moment the percept,picture o% m4sel% is di%%erent %rom /hat it /as the moment Ae%ore. These changes ma4 ta1e place in such a /a4 that it is al/a4s the same man 8the t4pe: /ho re eals himsel% in them, or that the4 represent the expression o% a %ree spirit. To such changes m4 action, as oACect o% perception, is suACected. The perceptual oACect BmanB has in it the possiAilit4 o% trans%orming itsel%, Cust as the plant seed contains the possiAilit4 o% Aecoming a complete plant. The plant trans%orms itsel% Aecause o% the oACecti e la/ inherent in it+ the human Aeing remains in his incomplete state unless he ta1es hold o% the material %or trans%ormation /ithin him and trans%orms himsel% through his o/n po/er. Nature ma1es o% man merel4 a natural Aeing+ societ4

ma1es o% him a la/,aAiding Aeing+ onl4 he himsel% can ma1e o% himsel% a %ree man. Nature releases man %rom her %etters at a de%inite stage in his de elopment+ societ4 carries this de elopment a stage %urther+ he alone can gi e himsel% the %inal polish. The standpoint o% %ree moralit4, then, does not declare the %ree spirit to Ae the onl4 %orm in /hich a man can exist. It sees in the %ree spirit onl4 the last stage o% man$s e olution. This is not to den4 that conduct according to standards has its Custi%ication as one stage in e olution. Onl4 /e cannot ac1no/ledge it as the aAsolute standpoint in moralit4. For the %ree spirit o ercomes the standards in the sense that he does not Cust accept commandments as his moti es Aut orders his action according to his o/n impulses 8intuitions:. "hen .ant sa4s o% dut4# B!ut4G Thou exalted and might4 name, thou that dost comprise nothing lo aAle, nothing ingratiating, Aut demandest suAmission,B thou that Bsettest up a la/ ... Ae%ore /hich all inclinations are silent, e en though the4 secretl4 /or1 against it,B 8see %n 2: then out o% the consciousness o% the %ree spirit, man replies# BFreedomG Thou 1indl4 and human name, thou that dost comprise all that is morall4 most lo aAle, all that m4 manhood most priDes, and that ma1est me the ser ant o% noAod4, thou that settest up no mere la/, Aut a/aitest /hat m4 moral lo e itsel% /ill recogniDe as la/ Aecause in the %ace o% e er4 merel4 imposed la/ it %eels itsel% un%ree.L This is the contrast Aet/een a moralit4 Aased on mere la/ and a moralit4 Aased on inner %reedom. The philistine, /ho sees the emAodiment o% moralit4 in an external code, ma4 see in the %ree spirit e en a dangerous person. Eut that is onl4 Aecause his ie/ is narro/ed do/n to a limited period o% time. I% he /ere aAle to loo1 Ae4ond this, he /ould at once %ind that the %ree spirit Cust as seldom needs to go Ae4ond the la/s o% his state as does the philistine himsel%, and certainl4 ne er needs to place himsel% in real opposition to them. For the la/s o% the state, one and all, Cust li1e all other oACecti e la/s o% moralit4, ha e had their origin in the intuitions o% %ree spirits. There is no rule en%orced A4 %amil4 authorit4 that /as not at one time intuiti el4 grasped and laid do/n as such A4 an ancestor+ similarl4 the con entional la/s o% moralit4 are %irst o% all estaAlished A4 de%inite men, and the la/s o% the state al/a4s originate in the head o% a statesman. These leading spirits ha e set up la/s o er other men, and the onl4 person /ho %eels un%ree is the one /ho %orgets this origin and either turns these la/s into extra,human commandments, oACecti e moral concepts o% dut4 independent o% man, or else turns them into the commanding oice /ithin himsel% /hich he supposes, in a %alsel4 m4stical /a4, to Ae compelling him. On the other hand, the person /ho does not o erloo1 this origin, Aut see1s man /ithin it, /ill count such la/s as Aelonging to the same /orld o% ideas %rom /hich he, too, dra/s his moral intuitions. I% he Aelie es he has Aetter intuitions, he /ill tr4 to put them into the place o% the existing ones+ i% he %inds the existing ones Custi%ied, he

/ill act in accordance /ith them as i% the4 /ere his o/n. "e must not coin the %ormula# Man exists onl4 in order to realiDe a moral /orld order /hich is @uite distinct %rom himsel%. An4one /ho maintains that this is so, remains, in his 1no/ledge o% man, at the point /here natural science stood /hen it Aelie ed that a Aull has horns in order to Autt. Scientists, happil4, ha e thro/n out the concept o% purpose as a dead theor4. Ethics %inds it more di%%icult to get %ree o% this concept. Eut Cust as horns do not exist %or the sa1e o% Autting, Aut Autting through the presence o% horns, so man does not exist %or the sa1e o% moralit4, Aut moralit4 through the presence o% man. The %ree man acts morall4 Aecause he has a moral idea+ he does not act in order that moralit4 ma4 come into Aeing. -uman indi iduals, /ith the moral ideas Aelonging to their nature, are the prere@uisites o% a moral /orld order. The human indi idual is the source o% all moralit4 and the centre o% earthl4 li%e. State and societ4 exist onl4 Aecause the4 ha e arisen as a necessar4 conse@uence o% the li%e o% indi iduals. That state and societ4 should in turn react upon indi idual li%e is no more di%%icult to comprehend than that the Autting /hich is the result o% the presence o% horns reacts in turn upon the %urther de elopment o% the horns o% the Aull, /hich /ould Aecome stunted through prolonged disuse. Similarl4, the indi idual /ould Aecome stunted i% he led an isolated existence outside human societ4. Indeed, this is Cust /h4 the social order arises, so that it ma4 in turn react %a ouraAl4 upon the indi idual. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. The /a4 in /hich the aAo e ie/ has in%luenced ps4cholog4, ph4siolog4, etc., in arious directions, has Aeen set %orth A4 the author in /or1s puAlished a%ter this Aoo1. -ere he is concerned onl4 /ith characteriDing the results o% an unAiased oAser ation o% thin1ing itsel%. ). The passage %rom the Aeginning o% the chapter do/n to this point /as added or re/ritten %or the &'&( edition. 0. A complete catalogue o% the principles o% moralit4 8%rom the point o% ie/ o% metaph4sical realism: ma4 Ae %ound in Eduard on -artmann$s Phaenomenologie des sittlichen Ee/usstseins. *. Philosophische Monatshe%te, <ol. x iii, No. 0. 2. Criti@ue o% Practical 9eason, chapter iii. ----.

13 - Philoso'h* and 4onism.

The naN e man, /ho ac1no/ledges as real onl4 /hat he can see /ith his e4es and grasp /ith his hands, re@uires %or his moral li%e, also, a Aasis %or action that shall Ae perceptiAle

to the senses. -e re@uires someone or something to impart the Aasis %or his action to him in a /a4 that his senses can understand. -e is read4 to allo/ this Aasis %or action to Ae dictated to him as commandments A4 an4 man /hom he considers /iser or more po/er%ul than himsel%, or /hom he ac1no/ledges %or some other reason to Ae a po/er o er him. In this /a4 there arise, as moral principles, the authorit4 o% %amil4, state, societ4, church and =od, as pre iousl4 descriAed. A man /ho is er4 narro/ minded still puts his %aith in some one person+ the more ad anced man allo/s his moral conduct to Ae dictated A4 a maCorit4 8state, societ4:. It is al/a4s on perceptiAle po/ers that he Auilds. The man /ho a/a1ens at last to the con iction that Aasicall4 these po/ers are human Aeings as /ea1 as himsel%, see1s guidance %rom a higher po/er, %rom a !i ine Eeing, /hom he endo/s, ho/e er, /ith sense perceptiAle %eatures. -e concei es this Eeing as communicating to him the conceptual content o% his moral li%e, again in a perceptiAle /a4 ,, /hether it Ae, %or example, that =od appears in the Aurning Aush, or that -e mo es aAout among men in mani%est human shape, and that their ears can hear -im telling them /hat to do and /hat not to do. The highest stage o% de elopment o% naN e realism in the sphere o% moralit4 is that /here the moral commandment 8moral idea: is separated %rom e er4 Aeing other than onesel% and is thought o%, h4potheticall4, as Aeing an aAsolute po/er in one$s o/n inner li%e. "hat man %irst too1 to Ae the external oice o% =od, he no/ ta1es as an independent po/er /ithin him, and spea1s o% this inner oice in such a /a4 as to identi%4 it /ith conscience. Eut in doing this he has alread4 gone Ae4ond the stage o% naN e consciousness into the sphere /here the moral la/s ha e Aecome independentl4 existing standards. There the4 are no longer carried A4 real Aearers, Aut ha e Aecome metaph4sical entities existing in their o/n right. The4 are analogous to the in isiAle B isiAle %orcesB o% metaph4sical realism, /hich does not see1 realit4 through the part o% it that man has in his thin1ing, Aut h4potheticall4 adds it on to actual experience. These extra,human moral standards al/a4s occur as accompan4ing %eatures o% metaph4sical realism. For metaph4sical realism is Aound to see1 the origin o% moralit4 in the sphere o% extra,human realit4. -ere there are se eral possiAilities. I% the h4potheticall4 assumed entit4 is concei ed as in itsel% unthin1ing, acting according to purel4 mechanical la/s, as materialism /ould ha e it, then it must also produce out o% itsel%, A4 purel4 mechanical necessit4, the human indi idual /ith all his characteristic %eatures. The consciousness o% %reedom can then Ae nothing more than an illusion. For though I consider m4sel% the author o% m4 action, it is the matter o% /hich I am composed and the mo ements going on in it that are /or1ing in me. I Aelie e m4sel% %ree+ Aut in %act all m4 actions are nothing Aut the result o% the material processes /hich underlie m4 ph4sical and mental organiDation. It is said that /e ha e the %eeling o% %reedom onl4 Aecause /e do not 1no/ the moti es compelling us.

"e must emphasiDe that the %eeling o% %reedom is due to the aAsence o% external compelling moti es, , . . Our action is necessitated as is our thin1ing. 8see %n &: Another possiAilit4 is that a man ma4 picture the extra,human AAsolute that lies Aehind the /orld o% appearances as a spiritual Aeing. In this case he /ill also see1 the impulse %or his actions in a corresponding spiritual %orce. -e /ill see the moral principles to Ae %ound in his o/n reason as the expression o% this Aeing itsel%, /hich has its o/n special intentions /ith regard to man. To this 1ind o% dualist the moral la/s appear to Ae dictated A4 the AAsolute, and all that man has to do is to use his intelligence to %ind out the decisions o% the aAsolute Aeing and then carr4 them out. The moral /orld order appears to the dualist as the perceptiAle re%lection o% a higher order standing Aehind it. Earthl4 moralit4 is the mani%estation o% the extra,human /orld order. It is not man that matters in this moral order, Aut the Aeing itsel%, that is, the extra,human entit4. Man shall do as this Aeing /ills. Eduard on -artmann, /ho imagines this Aeing itsel% as a =odhead /hose er4 existence is a li%e o% su%%ering, Aelie es that this !i ine Eeing has created the /orld in order thereA4 to gain release %rom -is in%inite su%%ering, -ence this philosopher regards the moral e olution o% humanit4 as a process /hich is there %or the redemption o% =od. Onl4 through the Auilding up o% a moral /orld order A4 intelligent sel%,conscious indi iduals can the /orld process Ae led to/ards its goal. .., True existence is the incarnation o% the =odhead+ the /orld process is the Passion o% the incarnated =odhead and at the same time the /a4 o% redemption %or -im /ho /as cruci%ied in the %lesh+ moralit4, ho/e er, is the collaAoration in the shortening o% this path o% su%%ering and redemption. 8see %n ): -ere man does not act Aecause he /ants to, Aut he shall act, Aecause it is =od$s /ill to Ae redeemed. "hereas the materialistic dualist ma1es man an automaton /hose actions are onl4 the result o% a purel4 mechanical s4stem, the spiritualistic dualist 8that is, one /ho sees the AAsolute, the Eeing,initsel%, as something spiritual in /hich man has no share in his conscious experience: ma1es him a sla e to the /ill o% the AAsolute. As in materialism, so also in one,sided spiritualism, in %act in an4 1ind o% metaph4sical realism in%erring Aut not experiencing something extra,human as the true realit4, %reedom is out o% the @uestion. Metaph4sical as /ell as naN e realism, consistentl4 %ollo/ed out, must den4 %reedom %or one and the same reason# the4 Aoth see man as doing no more than putting into e%%ect, or carr4ing out, principles %orced upon him A4 necessit4. Nai e realism destro4s %reedom A4 suACecting man to the authorit4 o% a perceptiAle Aeing or o% one concei ed on the analog4 o% a perceptiAle Aeing, or e entuall4 to the authorit4 o% the aAstract inner oice /hich it interprets as BconscienceB+ the metaph4sician, /ho merel4 in%ers the extra,human realit4, cannot ac1no/ledge %reedom Aecause he sees man as Aeing determined, mechanicall4 or

morall4, A4 a BEeing,in,itsel%B. Monism /ill ha e to recogniDe that naN e realism is partiall4 Custi%ied Aecause it recogniDes the Custi%ication o% the /orld o% percepts. "hoe er is incapaAle o% producing moral ideas through intuition must accept them %rom others. In so %ar as a man recei es his moral principles %rom /ithout, he is in %act un%ree. Eut monism attaches as much signi%icance to the idea as to the percept. The idea, ho/e er, can come to mani%estation in the human indi idual. In so %ar as man %ollo/s the impulses coming %rom this side, he %eels himsel% to Ae %ree. Eut monism denies all Custi%ication to metaph4sics, /hich merel4 dra/s in%erences, and conse@uentl4 also to the impulses o% action /hich are deri ed %rom so,called BEeings,in, themsel esB. According to the monistic ie/, man ma4 act un%reel4,/hen he oAe4s some perceptiAle external compulsion+ he can act %reel4, /hen he oAe4s none Aut himsel%. Monism cannot recogniDe an4 unconscious compulsion hidden Aehind percept and concept. I% an4one asserts that the action o% a %ello/ man is done un%reel4, then he must identi%4 the thing or the person or the institution /ithin the perceptiAle /orld, that has caused the person to act+ and i% he Aases his assertion upon causes o% action l4ing outside the /orld that is real to the senses and the spirit, then monism can ta1e no notice o% it. According to the monistic ie/, then, man$s action is partl4 un%ree, partl4 %ree. -e %inds himsel% to Ae un%ree in the /orld o% percepts, and he realiDes /ithin himsel% the %ree spirit. The moral la/s /hich the metaph4sician /ho /or1s A4 mere in%erence must regard as issuing %rom a higher po/er, are, %or the adherent o% monism, thoughts o% men+ %or him the moral /orld order is neither the imprint o% a purel4 mechanical natural order, nor that o% an extra,human /orld order, Aut through and through the %ree creation o% men. It is not the /ill o% some Aeing outside him in the /orld that man has to carr4 out, Aut his o/n+ he puts into e%%ect his o/n resol es and intentions, not those o% another Aeing. Monism does not see, Aehind man$s actions, the purposes o% a supreme directorate, %oreign to him and determining him according to its /ill, Aut rather sees that men, in so %ar as the4 realiDe their intuiti e ideas, pursue onl4 their o/n human ends. Moreo er, each indi idual pursues his o/n particular ends. For the /orld o% ideas comes to expression, not in a communit4 o% men, Aut onl4 in human indi iduals. "hat appears as the common goal o% a /hole group o% people is onl4 the result o% the separate acts o% /ill o% its indi idual memAers, and in %act, usuall4 o% a %e/ outstanding ones /ho, as their authorities, are %ollo/ed A4 the others. Each one o% us has it in him to Ae a %ree spirit, Cust as e er4 rose Aud has in it a rose. Monism, then, in the sphere o% true moral action, is a %reedom philosoph4. Since it is a philosoph4 o% realit4, it reCects the metaph4sical, unreal restrictions o% the %ree spirit as completel4 as it accepts the ph4sical and historical 8naN el4 real: restrictions o% the naN e man. Since it does not consider man as a %inished product, disclosing his %ull nature in

e er4 moment o% his li%e, it regards the dispute as to /hether man as such is %ree or not, to Ae o% no conse@uence. It sees in man a de eloping Aeing, and as1s /hether, in the course o% this de elopment, the stage o% the %ree spirit can Ae reached. Monism 1no/s that Nature does not send man %orth %rom her arms read4 made as a %ree spirit, Aut that she leads him up to a certain stage %rom /hich he continues to de elop still as an un%ree Aeing until he comes to the point /here he %inds his o/n sel%. Monism is @uite clear that a Aeing acting under ph4sical or moral compulsion cannot Ae a trul4 moral Aeing. It regards the phases o% automatic Aeha ior 8%ollo/ing natural urges and instincts: and o% oAedient Aeha ior 8%ollo/ing moral standards: as necessar4 preparator4 stages o% moralit4, Aut it also sees that Aoth these transitor4 stages can Ae o ercome A4 the %ree spirit. Monism %rees the trul4 moral /orld conception Aoth %rom the mundane %etters o% naN e moral maxims and %rom the transcendental moral maxims o% the speculati e metaph4sician. Monism can no more eliminate the %ormer %rom the /orld than it can eliminate percepts+ it reCects the latter Aecause it see1s all the principles %or the elucidation o% the /orld phenomena /ithin that /orld, and none outside it. Just as monism re%uses e en to thin1 o% principles o% 1no/ledge other than those that appl4 to men 8see Chapter 5:, so it emphaticall4 reCects e en the thought o% moral maxims other than those that appl4 to men. -uman moralit4, li1e human 1no/ledge, is conditioned A4 human nature. And Cust as Aeings o% a di%%erent order /ill understand 1no/ledge to mean something er4 di%%erent %rom /hat it means to us, so /ill other Aeings ha e a di%%erent moralit4 %rom ours. Moralit4 is %or the monist a speci%icall4 human @ualit4, and spiritual %reedom the human /a4 o% Aeing moral. ----. Author*s additions, #%#&. In %orming a Cudgment aAout the argument o% the t/o preceding chapters, a di%%icult4 can arise in that one appears to Ae %aced /ith a contradiction. On the one hand /e ha e spo1en o% the experience o% thin1ing, /hich is %elt to ha e uni ersal signi%icance, e@uall4 alid %or e er4 human consciousness+ on the other hand /e ha e sho/n that the ideas /hich come to realiDation in the moral li%e, and are o% the same 1ind as those elaAorated in thin1ing, come to expression in each human consciousness in a @uite indi idual /a4. I% /e cannot get Ae4ond regarding this antithesis as a BcontradictionB, and i% /e do not see that in the li ing recognition o% this actuall4 existing antithesis a piece o% man$s essential nature re eals itsel%, then /e shall Ae unaAle to see either the idea o% 1no/ledge or the idea o% %reedom in a true light. For those /ho thin1 o% their concepts as merel4 aAstracted %rom the sense perceptiAle /orld and /ho do not allo/ intuition its right%ul place, this thought, here claimed as a realit4, must remain a Bmere contradictionB. I% /e reall4 understand ho/ ideas are intuiti el4 experienced in their sel%,sustaining essence, it Aecomes clear that in

the act o% 1no/ing, man, on the edge o% the /orld o% ideas, li es his /a4 into something /hich is the same %or all men, Aut that /hen, %rom this /orld o% ideas, he deri es the intuitions %or his acts o% /ill, he indi idualiDes a part o% this /orld A4 the same acti it4 that he practices as a uni ersal human one in the spiritual ideal process o% 1no/ing. "hat appears as a logical contradiction Aet/een the uni ersal nature o% cogniti e ideas and the indi idual nature o% moral ideas is the er4 thing that, /hen seen in its realit4, Aecomes a li ing concept. It is a characteristic %eature o% the essential nature o% man that /hat can Ae intuiti el4 grasped s/ings to and %ro /ithin man, li1e a li ing pendulum, Aet/een uni ersall4 alid 1no/ledge and the indi idual experience o% it. For those /ho cannot see the one hal% o% the s/ing in its realit4, thin1ing remains onl4 a suACecti e human acti it4+ %or those /ho cannot grasp the other hal%, man$s acti it4 in thin1ing /ill seem to lose all indi idual li%e. For the %irst 1ind o% thin1er, it is the act o% 1no/ing that is an unintelligiAle %act+ %or the second 1ind, it is the moral li%e. Eoth /ill put %or/ard all sorts o% imagined /a4s o% explaining the one or the other, all e@uall4 un%ounded, either Aecause the4 entirel4 %ail to grasp that thin1ing can Ae actuall4 experienced, or Aecause the4 misunderstand it as a merel4 aAstracting acti it4. ~~. On page &*5 I ha e spo1en o% materialism. I am /ell a/are that there are thin1ers ,, such as Miehen, mentioned aAo e ,, /ho do not call themsel es materialists at all, Aut /ho must ne ertheless Ae descriAed as such %rom the point o% ie/ put %or/ard in this Aoo1. The point is not /hether someone sa4s that %or him the /orld is not restricted to merel4 material existence and that there%ore he is no materialist+ Aut the point is /hether he de elops concepts /hich are applicaAle onl4 to material existence. An4one /ho sa4s, BOur action is necessitated as is our thin1ingB, has implied a concept /hich is applicaAle onl4 to material processes, Aut not to action or to Aeing+ and i% he /ere to thin1 his concept through to the end, he could not help Aut thin1 materialisticall4. -e a oids doing this onl4 A4 the same inconsistenc4 that so o%ten results %rom not thin1ing one$s thoughts through to the end. It is o%ten said no/ada4s that the materialism o% the nineteenth centur4 is outmoded in 1no/ledgeaAle circles. Eut in %act this is not at all true. It is onl4 that no/ada4s people so o%ten %ail to notice that the4 ha e no other ideas Aut those /ith /hich one can approach onl4 material things. Thus recent materialism is eiled, /hereas in the second hal% o% the nineteenth centur4 it sho/ed itsel% openl4. The eiled materialism o% the present is no less intolerant o% an outloo1 that grasps the /orld spirituall4 than /as the sel%,con%essed materialism o% the last centur4. Eut it decei es man4 /ho thin1 the4 ha e a right to reCect a ie/ o% the /orld /hich ta1es spirit into account on the ground that the scienti%ic ie/ Bhas long ago aAandoned materialismB. ,,,,.

Footnotes:

&. Miehen, 6eit%aden der ph4siologischen Ps4chologie, &st edition, pp. );5 %%. For the /a4 I ha e here spo1en aAout BmaterialismB, and the Custi%ication %or doing so, see the Addition to this chapter. ). -artmann, Phaenomenologie des sittlichen Ee/usstseins, p. (5&. ----.

11 - &orld Pur'ose and ,ife Pur'ose .The 5rderin! of 4an's Destin*0.

Among the mani%old currents in the spiritual li%e o% man1ind, there is one to Ae %ollo/ed up /hich can Ae descriAed as the o ercoming o% the concept o% purpose in spheres /here it does not Aelong. Purpose%ulness is a special 1ind o% se@uence o% phenomena. True purpose%ulness reall4 exists onl4 i%, in contrast to the relationship o% cause and e%%ect /here the earlier e ent determines the later, the re erse is the case and the later e ent in%luences the earlier one. To Aegin /ith, this happens onl4 in the case o% human actions. One per%orms an action o% /hich one has pre iousl4 made a mental picture, and one allo/s this mental picture to determine one$s action. Thus the later 8the deed: in%luences the earlier 8the doer: /ith the help o% the mental picture. For there to Ae a purpose%ul connection, this detour through the mental picture is aAsolutel4 necessar4. In a process /hich Area1s do/n into cause and e%%ect, /e must distinguish percept %rom concept. The percept o% the cause precedes the percept o% the e%%ect+ cause and e%%ect /ould simpl4 remain side A4 side in our consciousness, i% /e /ere not aAle to connect them /ith one another through their corresponding concepts. The percept o% the e%%ect must al/a4s %ollo/ upon the percept o% the cause. I% the e%%ect is to ha e a real in%luence upon the cause, it can do so onl4 A4 means o% the conceptual %actor. For the perceptual %actor o% the e%%ect simpl4 does not exist prior to the perceptual %actor o% the cause. An4one /ho declares that the Alossom is the purpose o% the root, that is, that the %ormer in%luences the latter, can do so onl4 /ith regard to that %actor in the Alossom /hich is estaAlished in it A4 his thin1ing. The perceptual %actor o% the Alossom is not 4et in existence at the time /hen the root originates. For a purpose%ul connection to exist, it is not onl4 necessar4 to ha e an ideal, la/, determined connection Aet/een the later and the earlier, Aut the concept 8la/: o% the e%%ect must reall4 in%luence the cause, that is, A4 means o% a perceptiAle process. A perceptiAle in%luence o% a concept upon something else, ho/e er, is to Ae oAser ed onl4 in human actions. -ence this is the onl4 sphere in /hich the concept o% purpose is applicaAle. The naN e consciousness, /hich regards as real onl4 /hat is perceptiAle, attempts ,, as /e

ha e repeatedl4 pointed out ,, to introduce perceptiAle elements /here onl4 ideal elements are to Ae %ound. In the perceptiAle course o% e ents it loo1s %or perceptiAle connections, or, %ailing to %ind them, it simpl4 in ents them. The concept o% purpose, alid %or suACecti e actions, is an element /ell suited %or such in ented connections. The naN e man 1no/s ho/ he Arings an e ent aAout and %rom this he concludes that nature /ill do it in the same /a4. In the connections o% nature /hich are purel4 ideal he %inds not onl4 in isiAle %orces Aut also in isiAle real purposes. Man ma1es his tools according to his purposes+ the naN e realist /ould ha e the Creator Auild organisms on the same %ormula. Onl4 er4 graduall4 is this mista1en concept o% purpose disappearing %rom the sciences. In philosoph4, e en toda4, it still does a good deal o% mischie%. -ere people still as1 a%ter the extra,mundane purpose o% the /orld, the extra,human ordering o% man$s destin4 8and conse@uentl4 also his purpose:, and so on. Monism reCects the concept o% purpose in e er4 sphere, /ith the sole exception o% human action. It loo1s %or la/s o% nature, Aut not %or purposes o% nature. Purposes o% nature are arAitrar4 assumptions no less than are imperceptiAle %orces 8see Chapter 5:. Eut e en purposes o% li%e not set A4 man himsel% are unCusti%ied assumptions %rom the standpoint o% monism. Nothing is purpose%ul except /hat man has %irst made so, %or purpose%ulness arises onl4 through the realiDation o% an idea. In a realistic sense, an idea can Aecome e%%ecti e onl4 in man. There%ore human li%e can onl4 ha e the purpose and the ordering o% destin4 that man gi es it. To the @uestion# "hat is man$s tas1 in li%e7 there can Ae %or monism Aut one ans/er# The tas1 he sets himsel%. M4 mission in the /orld is not predetermined, Aut is at e er4 moment the one I choose %or m4sel%. I do not set out upon m4 Courne4 through li%e /ith %ixed marching orders. Ideas are realiDed purpose%ull4 onl4 A4 human Aeings. Conse@uentl4 it is not permissiAle to spea1 o% the emAodiment o% ideas A4 histor4. All such phrases as Bhistor4 is the e olution o% man1ind to/ards %reedom,B or B. . . the realiDation o% the moral /orld order,B and so on, are, %rom a monistic point o% ie/, untenaAle. The supporters o% the concept o% purpose Aelie e that, A4 surrendering it, the4 /ould also ha e to surrender all order and uni%ormit4 in the /orld. 6isten, %or example, to 9oAert -amerling# As long as there are instincts in nature, it is %oll4 to den4 purposes therein. Just as the %ormation o% a limA o% the human Aod4 is not determined and conditioned A4 an idea o% this limA, %loating in the air, Aut A4 its connection /ith the greater /hole, the Aod4 to /hich the limA Aelongs, so the %ormation o% e er4 natural oACect, Ae it plant, animal or man, is not determined and conditioned A4 an idea o% it %loating in the air, Aut A4 the %ormati e principle o% the totalit4 o% nature /hich un%olds and organiDes itsel% in a

purpose%ul manner. 8see %n &: And on page &'& o% the same olume /e read# The theor4 o% purpose maintains onl4 that, in spite o% the thousand discom%orts and distresses o% this mortal li%e, there is a high degree o% purpose and plan unmista1aAl4 present in the %ormations and de elopments o% nature ,, a degree o% plan and purpose%ulness, ho/e er, /hich is realiDed onl4 /ithin the limits o% natural la/, and /hich does not aim at a %ool$s paradise /here li%e %aces no death, gro/th no deca4, /ith all their more or less unpleasant Aut @uite una oidaAle intermediar4 stages. "hen the opponents o% the concept o% purpose set a laAoriousl4 collected ruAAish,heap o% partial or complete, imaginar4 or real maladaptations against a /hole /orld o% miracles o% purpose%ulness, such as nature exhiAits in all her domains, then I consider this Cust as @uaint ... "hat is here meant A4 purpose%ulness7 The coherence o% percepts to %orm a /hole. Eut since underl4ing all percepts there are la/s 8ideas: /hich /e disco er through our thin1ing, it %ollo/s that the s4stematic coherence o% the parts o% a perceptual /hole is simpl4 the ideal coherence o% the parts o% an ideal /hole contained in this perceptual /hole. To sa4 that an animal or a man is not determined A4 an idea %loating in the air is a misleading /a4 o% putting it, and the point o% ie/ he is disparaging automaticall4 loses its aAsurdit4 as soon as the expression is put right. An animal certainl4 is not determined A4 an idea %loating in the air, Aut it de%initel4 is determined A4 an idea inAorn in it and constituting the la/ o% its Aeing. It is Cust Aecause the idea is not external to the oACect, Aut /or1s /ithin it as its er4 essence, that /e cannot spea1 o% purpose%ulness. It is Cust the person /ho denies that natural Aeings are determined %rom /ithout 8and it does not matter, in this context, /hether it Ae A4 an idea %loating in the air or existing outside the creature in the mind o% a /orld creator: /ho must admit that such Aeings are not determined A4 purpose and plan %rom /ithout, Aut A4 cause and la/ %rom /ithin. I construct a machine purpose%ull4 i% I connect its parts together in a /a4 that is not gi en in nature. The purpose%ulness o% the arrangement consists in Cust this, that I emAod4 the /or1ing principle o% the machine, as its idea, into the machine itsel%. The machine Aecomes thereA4 an oACect o% perception /ith the idea corresponding to it. Natural oACects are also entities o% this 1ind. "hoe er calls a thing purpose%ul simpl4 Aecause it is %ormed according to a la/, ma4, i% he /ish, appl4 the same term to the oACects o% nature. Eut he must not con%use this 1ind o% la/%ulness /ith that o% suACecti e human action. For purpose to exist, it is aAsolutel4 necessar4 that the e%%ecti e cause shall Ae a concept, in %act the concept o% the e%%ect. Eut in nature /e can no/here point to concepts acting as causes+ the concept in ariaAl4 turns out to Ae nothing Aut the ideal lin1 connecting cause

and e%%ect. Causes are present in nature onl4 in the %orm o% percepts. !ualism ma4 tal1 o% /orld purposes and natural purposes. "here er there is a s4stematic lin1ing o% cause and e%%ect %or our perception, the dualist ma4 assume that /e see onl4 the carAon cop4 o% a connection in /hich the aAsolute cosmic Eeing has realiDed its purposes. For monism, /ith the reCection o% an aAsolute cosmic Eeing ,, ne er experienced Aut onl4 h4potheticall4 in%erred ,, all ground %or assuming purposes in the /orld and in nature also %alls a/a4. ----. Author*s addition, #%#&. No one /ho has %ollo/ed the preceding argument /ith an open mind /ill Ae aAle to conclude that the author, in reCecting the concept o% purpose %or extra,human %acts, ta1es the side o% those thin1ers /ho, A4 reCecting this concept, enaAle themsel es to regard e er4thing outside human action ,, and thence human action itsel% ,, as no more than a natural process. -e should Ae protected %rom this A4 the %act that in this Aoo1 the thin1ing process is presented as a purel4 spiritual one. I% here the concept o% purpose is reCected e en %or the spiritual /orld, l4ing outside human action, it is Aecause something is re ealed in that /orld /hich is higher than the 1ind o% purpose realiDed in the human 1ingdom. And /hen /e sa4 that the thought o% a purpose%ul destin4 %or the human race, modeled on human purpose%ulness, is erroneous, /e mean that the indi idual gi es himsel% purposes, and that the outcome o% the /or1ing o% man1ind as a /hole is compounded o% these. This outcome is then something higher than its component parts, the purposes o% men. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. Atomisti1 des "illens, ol ii, p. );&. ----.

12 - 4oral Ima!ination .Dar inism and 4oralit*0.

A %ree spirit acts according to his impulses, that is, according to intuitions selected %rom the totalit4 o% his /orld o% ideas A4 thin1ing. For an un%ree spirit, the reason /h4 he singles out a particular intuition %rom his /orld o% ideas in order to ma1e it the Aasis o% an action, lies in the /orld o% percepts gi en to him, that is, in his past experiences. -e recalls, Ae%ore coming to a decision, /hat someone else has done or recommended as suitaAle in a comparaAle case, or /hat =od has commanded to Ae done in such a case, and so on, and he acts accordingl4. For a %ree spirit, these prior conditions are not the onl4 impulses to action. -e ma1es a

completel4 %irsthand decision. "hat others ha e done in such a case /orries him as little as /hat the4 ha e decreed. -e has purel4 ideal reasons /hich lead him to select %rom the sum o% his concepts Cust one in particular, and then to translate it into action. Eut his action /ill Aelong to perceptiAle realit4. "hat he achie es /ill thus Ae identical /ith a @uite de%inite content o% perception. The concept /ill ha e to realiDe itsel% in a single concrete occurrence. As a concept it /ill not Ae aAle to contain this particular e ent. It /ill re%er to the e ent onl4 in the same /a4 as a concept is in general related to a percept, %or example, the concept o% the lion to a particular lion. The lin1 Aet/een concept and percept is the mental picture 8see Chapter 3:. For the un%ree spirit, this lin1 is gi en %rom the outset. Moti es are present in his consciousness %rom the outset in the %orm o% mental pictures. "hene er there is something he /ants to carr4 out, he does it as he has seen it done, or as he has Aeen told to do it in the particular case. -ence authorit4 /or1s Aest through examples, that is, through pro iding @uite de%inite particular actions %or the consciousness o% the un%ree spirit. A Christian acts not so much according to the teaching as according to the example o% the Sa iour. 9ules ha e less alue %or acting positi el4 than %or re%raining %rom certain actions. 6a/s ta1e on the %orm o% general concepts onl4 /hen the4 %orAid actions, Aut not /hen the4 prescriAe them. 6a/s concerning /hat he ought to do must Ae gi en to the un%ree spirit in @uite concrete %orm# Clean the street in %ront o% 4our doorG Pa4 4our taxes, amounting to the sum here gi en, to the Tax O%%ice at RG and so on. Conceptual %orm Aelongs to la/s %or inhiAiting actions# Thou shalt not stealG Thou shalt not commit adulter4G These la/s, too, in%luence the un%ree spirit onl4 A4 means o% a concrete mental picture, %or example, that o% the appropriate secular punishment, or the pangs o% conscience, or eternal damnation, and so on. "hene er the impulse %or an action is present in a general conceptual %orm 8%or example, Thou shalt do good to th4 %ello/ menG Thou shalt li e so that thou Aest promotest th4 /el%areG: then %or each particular case the concrete mental picture o% the action 8the relation o% the concept to a content o% perception: must %irst Ae %ound. For the %ree spirit /ho is impelled A4 no example, nor %ear o% punishment or the li1e, this translation o% the concept into a mental picture is al/a4s necessar4. Man produces concrete mental pictures %rom the sum o% his ideas chie%l4 A4 means o% the imagination. There%ore /hat the %ree spirit needs in order to realiDe his ideas, in order to Ae e%%ecti e, is moral imagination. This is the source o% the %ree spirit$s action. There%ore it is onl4 men /ith moral imagination /ho are, strictl4 spea1ing, morall4 producti e. Those /ho merel4 preach moralit4, that is, people /ho merel4 spin out moral rules /ithout Aeing aAle to

condense them into concrete mental pictures, are morall4 unproducti e. The4 are li1e those critics /ho can explain er4 intelligiAl4 /hat a /or1 o% art ought to Ae li1e, Aut /ho are themsel es incapaAle o% e en the slightest producti e e%%ort. Moral imagination, in order to realiDe its mental picture, must set to /or1 in a de%inite sphere o% percepts. -uman action does not create percepts, Aut trans%orms alread4 existing percepts and gi es them a ne/ %orm. In order to Ae aAle to trans%orm a de%inite oACect o% perception, or a sum o% such oACects, in accordance /ith a moral mental picture, one must ha e grasped the principle at /or1 /ithin the percept picture, that is, the /a4 it has hitherto /or1ed, to /hich one /ants to gi e a ne/ %orm or a ne/ direction. Further, it is necessar4 to disco er the procedure A4 /hich it is possiAle to change the gi en principle into a ne/ one. This part o% e%%ecti e moral acti it4 depends on 1no/ledge o% the particular /orld o% phenomena /ith /hich one is concerned. "e shall, there%ore, loo1 %or it in some Aranch o% learning in general. Moral action, then, presupposes, in addition to the %acult4 o% ha ing moral ideas 8moral intuition: and moral imagination, the aAilit4 to trans%orm the /orld o% percepts /ithout iolating the natural la/s A4 /hich these are connected 8see %n &:. This aAilit4 is moral techni@ue. It can Ae learnt in the same sense in /hich an4 1ind o% 1no/ledge can Ae learnt. =enerall4 spea1ing, men are Aetter aAle to %ind concepts %or the existing /orld than to e ol e producti el4, out o% their imagination, the not,4et,existing actions o% the %uture. -ence it is per%ectl4 possiAle %or men /ithout moral imagination to recei e such mental pictures %rom others, and to emAod4 them s1ill%ull4 into the actual /orld. Con ersel4, it ma4 happen that men /ith moral imagination lac1 technical s1ill, and must ma1e use o% other men %or the realiDation o% their mental pictures. In so %ar as 1no/ledge o% the oACects /ithin our sphere o% action is necessar4 %or acting morall4, our action depends upon such 1no/ledge. "hat /e are concerned /ith here are la/s o% nature. "e are dealing /ith natural science, not ethics. Moral imagination and the %acult4 o% ha ing moral ideas can Aecome oACects o% 1no/ledge onl4 a%ter the4 ha e Aeen produced A4 the indi idual. E4 then, ho/e er, the4 no longer regulate li%e, %or the4 ha e alread4 regulated it. The4 must no/ Ae regarded as e%%ecti e causes, li1e all others 8the4 are purposes onl4 %or the suACect:. "e there%ore deal /ith them as /ith a natural histor4 o% moral ideas. Ethics as a science that sets standards, in addition to this, cannot exist. Some people ha e /anted to maintain the standard,setting character o% moral la/s, at least in so %ar as the4 ha e understood ethics in the sense o% dietetics, /hich deduces general rules %rom the organism$s re@uirements in li%e as a Aasis %or in%luencing the Aod4 in a particular /a4 8e.g., Paulsen, in his S4stem der Ethi1:. This comparison is %alse, Aecause our moral li%e is not comparaAle /ith the li%e o% the organism. The %unctioning o% the organism occurs /ithout an4 action on our part+ /e come upon its

la/s in the /orld read4,made and can there%ore see1 them and appl4 them /hen %ound. Moral la/s, on the other hand, are %irst created A4 us. "e cannot appl4 them until /e ha e created them. The error arises through the %act that, as regards their content, moral la/s are not ne/l4 created at e er4 moment, Aut are inherited. Those that /e ha e ta1en o er %rom our ancestors appear to Ae gi en, li1e the natural la/s o% the organism. Eut a later generation /ill certainl4 not Ae Custi%ied in appl4ing them as i% the4 /ere dietetic rules. For the4 appl4 to indi iduals and not, as natural la/s do, to specimens o% a general t4pe. Considered as an organism, I am such a generic specimen and I shall li e in accordance /ith nature i% I appl4 the natural la/s o% m4 general t4pe to m4 particular case+ as a moral Aeing, I am an indi idual and ha e la/s o% m4 er4 o/n. 8see %n ): This ie/ appears to contradict the %undamental doctrine o% modern natural science 1no/n as the theor4 o% e olution. Eut it onl4 appears to do so. E olution is understood to mean the real de elopment o% the later out o% the earlier in accordance /ith natural la/. In the organic /orld, e olution is understood to mean that the later 8more per%ect: organic %orms are real descendants o% the earlier 8imper%ect: %orms, and ha e de eloped %rom them in accordance /ith natural la/s. The adherents o% the theor4 o% organic e olution ought reall4 to picture to themsel es that there /as once a time on our earth /hen a Aeing could ha e %ollo/ed /ith his o/n e4es the gradual de elopment o% reptiles out o% proto,amniotes, had he Aeen aAle to Ae there at the time as an oAser er, endo/ed /ith a su%%icientl4 long span o% li%e. Similarl4, e olutionists ought to picture to themsel es that a Aeing could ha e /atched the de elopment o% the solar s4stem out o% the .ant,6aplace primordial neAula, had he Aeen aAle to remain in a suitaAle spot out in the cosmic /orld ether during that in%initel4 long time. That /ith such mental pictures, the nature o% Aoth the proto,amniotes and the .ant, 6aplace cosmic neAula /ould ha e to Ae thought o% di%%erentl4 %rom the /a4 the materialist thin1ers do, is here irrele ant. Eut no e olutionist should e er dream o% maintaining that he could get the concept o% the reptile, /ith all its characteristics, out o% his concept o% the proto,amniotic animal, i% he had ne er seen a reptile. Just as little /ould it Ae possiAle to deri e the solar s4stem %rom the concept o% the .ant, 6aplace neAula, i% this concept o% a primordial neAula is thought o% as Aeing directl4 determined onl4 A4 the percept o% the primordial neAula. In other /ords, i% the e olutionist is to thin1 consistentl4, he is Aound to maintain that later phases o% e olution do actuall4 result %rom earlier ones, and that once /e ha e Aeen gi en the concept o% the imper%ect and that o% the per%ect, /e can see the connection+ Aut on no account should he agree that the concept attained %rom the earlier is, in itsel%, su%%icient %or e ol ing the later out o% it. From this it %ollo/s %or ethics that, though /e can certainl4 see

the connection Aet/een later moral concepts and earlier, /e cannot get e en a single ne/ moral idea out o% the earlier ones. As a moral Aeing, the indi idual produces his o/n content. For the student o% ethics, the content thus produced is Cust as much a gi en thing as reptiles are a gi en thing %or the scientist. 9eptiles ha e de eloped out o% proto,amniotes, Aut the scientist cannot get the concept o% reptiles out o% the concept o% the proto,amniotes. 6ater moral ideas e ol e out o% earlier, Aut the student o% ethics cannot get the moral concepts o% a later ci iliDation out o% those o% an earlier one. The con%usion arises Aecause, as scientists, /e start /ith the %acts Ae%ore us, and then get to 1no/ them, /hereas in moral action /e oursel es %irst create the %acts /hich /e then get to 1no/. In the process o% e olution o% the moral /orld order /e accomplish something that, at a lo/er le el, is accomplished A4 nature# /e alter something perceptiAle. The ethical standard thus cannot start, li1e a la/ o% nature, A4 Aeing 1no/n, Aut onl4 A4 Aeing created. Onl4 /hen it is there, can it Aecome an oACect o% 1no/ledge. Eut can /e not then ma1e the old a measure %or the ne/7 Is not e er4 man compelled to measure the products o% his moral imagination A4 the standard o% traditional moral doctrines7 For something that should re eal itsel% as morall4 producti e, this /ould Ae Cust as aAsurd as to /ant to measure a ne/ %orm in nature A4 an old one and sa4 that, Aecause reptiles do not con%orm to the proto,amniotes, the4 are an unCusti%iaAle 8pathological: %orm. Ethical indi idualism, then, is not in opposition to a rightl4 understood theor4 o% e olution, Aut %ollo/s directl4 %rom it. -aec1el$s genealogical tree, %rom protoDoa up to man as an organic Aeing, ought to Ae capaAle o% Aeing continued /ithout an interruption o% natural la/ and /ithout a Area1 in the uni%ormit4 o% e olution, up to the indi idual as a Aeing that is moral in a de%inite sense. Eut on no account could the nature o% a descendant species Ae deduced %rom the nature o% an ancestral one. -o/e er true it is that the moral ideas o% the indi idual ha e perceptiAl4 de eloped out o% those o% his ancestors, it is e@uall4 true that the indi idual is morall4 Aarren unless he has moral ideas o% his o/n. The same ethical indi idualism that I ha e de eloped on the Aasis o% ie/s alread4 gi en could also Ae deri ed %rom the theor4 o% e olution. The %inal con iction /ould Ae the same+ onl4 the path A4 /hich it /as reached /ould Ae di%%erent. The appearance o% completel4 ne/ moral ideas through moral imagination is, %or the theor4 o% e olution, no more miraculous than the de elopment o% a ne/ animal species out o% an old one + onl4, as a monistic ie/ o% the /orld, this theor4 must reCect, in moralit4 as in science, e er4 transcendental 8metaph4sical: in%luence, e er4 in%luence that is merel4 in%erred and cannot Ae experienced ideall4. In doing so, the theor4 %ollo/s the same principle that guides it /hen it see1s the causes o% ne/ organic %orms /ithout in o1ing the inter%erence o% an extra,mundane Eeing /ho

produces e er4 ne/ species, in accordance /ith a ne/ creati e thought, A4 supernatural in%luence. Just as monism has no use %or supernatural creati e thoughts in explaining li ing organisms, so it is e@uall4 impossiAle %or it to deri e the moral /orld order %rom causes /hich do not lie /ithin the experienceaAle /orld. It cannot admit that the moral nature o% /ill is completel4 accounted %or A4 Aeing traced Aac1 to a continuous supernatural in%luence upon moral li%e 8di ine go ernment o% the /orld %rom the outside:, or to an act o% re elation at a particular moment in histor4 8gi ing o% the ten commandments:, or to =od$s appearance on the earth 8as Christ:. "hat happens to man, and in man, through all this, Aecomes a moral element onl4 /hen, in human experience, it Aecomes an indi idual$s o/n. For monism, moral processes are products o% the /orld li1e e er4thing else that exists, and their causes must Ae sought in the /orld, that is, in man, since man is the Aearer o% moralit4. Ethical indi idualism, then, is the cro/ning %eature o% the edi%ice that !ar/in and -aec1el ha e stri en to Auild %or natural science. It is spiritualiDed theor4 o% e olution carried o er into moral li%e. An4one /ho, in a narro/,minded /a4, restricts the concept o% the natural %rom the outset to an arAitraril4 limited sphere ma4 easil4 conclude that there is no room in it %or %ree indi idual action. The consistent e olutionist cannot %all a pre4 to such narro/, mindedness. -e cannot let the natural course o% e olution terminate /ith the ape, and allo/ man to ha e a BsupernaturalB origin+ in his er4 search %or the natural progenitors o% man, he is Aound to see1 spirit in nature+ again, he cannot stop short at the organic %unctions o% man, and ta1e onl4 these as natural, Aut must go on to regard the %ree moral li%e as the spiritual continuation o% organic li%e. I% he is to 1eep to his %undamental principles, the e olutionist can state onl4 that the present %orm o% moral action e ol es %rom other %orms o% acti it4 in the /orld+ the characteriDing o% an action, that is, /hether it is a %ree one, he must lea e to the immediate oAser ation o% the action. In %act, he maintains onl4 that men ha e de eloped out o% ancestors that /ere not 4et human. "hat men are actuall4 li1e must Ae determined A4 oAser ation o% men themsel es. The results o% this oAser ation cannot contradict the properl4 understood histor4 o% e olution. Onl4 the assertion that the results are such as to exclude a natural ordering o% the /orld /ould contradict recent trends in the natural sciences. 8see %n 0: Ethical indi idualism has nothing to %ear %rom a natural science that understands itsel%# %or oAser ation sho/s that the per%ect %orm o% human action has %reedom as its characteristic @ualit4. This %reedom must Ae allo/ed to the human /ill, in so %ar as the /ill realiDes purel4 ideal intuitions. For these intuitions are not the results o% a necessit4 acting upon them %rom /ithout, Aut are due onl4 to themsel es. I% a man %inds that an action is the image o% such an ideal intuition, then he %eels it to Ae %ree. In this characteristic o% an

action lies its %reedom. "hat are /e to sa4, %rom this standpoint, aAout the distinction mentioned earlier 8see Chapter &: Aet/een the t/o propositions, BTo Ae %ree means to Ae aAle to do as one /illsB and, BTo Ae at liAert4 to desire or not to desire is the real proposition in ol ed in the dogma o% %ree/illB7 -amerling Aases his ie/ o% %ree /ill precisel4 on this distinction, A4 declaring the %irst statement to Ae correct Aut the second to Ae an aAsurd tautolog4. -e sa4s, BI can do as I /ill. Eut to sa4 I can /ant as I /ill is an empt4 tautolog4.L "hether I am aAle to do, that is, to translate into realit4, /hat I /ill, that is, /hat I ha e set Ae%ore m4sel% as m4 idea o% action, depends on external circumstances and on m4 technical s1ill 8see aAo e:. To Ae %ree means to Ae aAle o% one$s o/n accord to determine A4 moral imagination those mental pictures 8moti es: /hich underlie the action. Freedom is impossiAle i% an4thing other then m4sel% 8mechanical process or merel4 in%erred extra,mundane =od: determines m4 moral ideas. In other /ords, I am %ree onl4 /hen I m4sel% produce these mental pictures, not /hen I am merel4 aAle to carr4 out the moti es /hich another Aeing has implanted in me. A %ree Aeing is one /ho can /ant /hat he himsel% considers right. "hoe er does an4thing other than /hat he /ants must Ae impelled to it A4 moti es /hich do not lie /ithin him. Such a man is un%ree in his action. To Ae at liAert4 to /ant /hat one considers right or /hat one considers /rong, /ould there%ore mean to Ae at liAert4 to Ae %ree or un%ree. This is, o% course, Cust as aAsurd as to see %reedom in the aAilit4 to do /hat one is compelled to /ill. Eut this last is Cust /hat -amerling maintains /hen he sa4s, BIt is per%ectl4 true that the /ill is al/a4s determined A4 moti es, Aut it is aAsurd to sa4 that on this account it is un%ree+ %or a greater %reedom can neither Ae desired nor concei ed than the %reedom to realiDe onesel% in proportion to one$s o/n strength and determination.B In deed it canG It is certainl4 possiAle to desire a greater %reedom, and this %or the %irst time the true one# namel4, to decide %or onesel% the moti es %or one$s /ill. >nder certain conditions a man ma4 Ae induced to aAandon the execution o% his /ill. To allo/ others to prescriAe to him /hat he ought to do ,, in other /ords, to /ant /hat another, and not he himsel%, considers right ,, to this a man /ill suAmit onl4 to the extent that he does not %eel %ree. External po/ers ma4 pre ent me %rom doing as I /ill. Then the4 simpl4 condemn me to do nothing or to Ae un%ree. Not until the4 /ould ensla e m4 spirit, dri e m4 moti es out o% m4 head, and put their o/n moti es in the place o% mine, do the4 reall4 aim at ma1ing me un%ree. For this reason the Church sets itsel% not onl4 against the mere doing, Aut especiall4 against the impure thoughts, that is, the moti es o% m4 action. The Church ma1es me un%ree i%, %or her, all those moti es she has not hersel% enunciated seem impure.

A Church or other communit4 produces un%reedom /hen its priests or teachers ma1e themsel es into 1eepers o% consciences, that is, /hen the %aith%ul are oAliged to go to them 8to the con%essional: %or the moti es o% their actions. ----. Author*s addition, #%#&. In these chapters on the human /ill I ha e sho/n /hat man can experience in his actions so that, through this experience, he comes to Ae a/are# M4 /ill is %ree. It is particularl4 signi%icant that the right to call an act o% /ill %ree arises %rom the experience that an ideal intuition comes to realiDation in the act o% /ill. This experience can onl4 Ae the result o% an oAser ation, and is so, in the sense that /e oAser e our /ill on a path o% de elopment to/ards the goal /here it Aecomes possiAle %or an act o% /ill to Ae sustained A4 purel4 ideal intuition. This goal can Ae reached, Aecause in ideal intuition nothing else is at /or1 Aut its o/n sel%,sustaining essence. "hen such an intuition is present in human consciousness, then it has not Aeen de eloped out o% the processes o% the organism, Aut rather the organic acti it4 has /ithdra/n to ma1e room %or the ideal acti it4 8see Chapter ':. "hen I oAser e an act o% /ill that is an image o% an intuition, then %rom this act o% /ill too all organicall4 necessar4 acti it4 has /ithdra/n. The act o% /ill is %ree. This %reedom o% the /ill cannot Ae oAser ed A4 an4one /ho is unaAle to see ho/ the %ree act o% /ill consists in the %act that, %irstl4, through the intuiti e element, the acti it4 that is necessar4 %or the human organism is chec1ed and repressed, and then replaced A4 the spiritual acti it4 o% the idea,%illed /ill. Onl4 those /ho cannot ma1e this oAser ation o% the t/o%old nature o% a %ree act o% /ill, Aelie e that e er4 act o% /ill is un%ree. Those /ho can ma1e this oAser ation /in through to the recognition that man is un%ree in so %ar as he cannot complete the process o% suppressing the organic acti it4+ Aut that this un%reedom tends to/ards %reedom, and that this %reedom is A4 no means an aAstract ideal Aut is a directi e %orce inherent in human nature. Man is %ree to the extent that he is aAle to realiDe in his acts o% /ill the same mood o% soul that li es in him /hen he Aecomes a/are o% the %orming o% purel4 ideal 8spiritual: Intuitions. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. Onl4 a super%icial critic /ill %ind in the use o% the /ord B%acult4B in this and other passages a relapse into the doctrine o% %aculties o% the soul, %ound in the older ps4cholog4. The meaning o% the /ord is clear /hen ta1en in connection /ith /hat is said in 8Chapter 2:.

). "hen Paulsen 8on page &2 o% the Aoo1 mentioned aAo e: sa4s, B!i%%erent natural endo/ments and di%%erent conditions o% li%e demand Aoth a di%%erent Aodil4 and also a di%%erent spiritual,moral diet,B he is er4 close to the correct ie/, Aut 4et he misses the decisi e point. In so %ar as I am an indi idual, I need no diet. !ietetic means the art o% Aringing a particular specimen into harmon4 /ith its generic la/s. Eut as an indi idual I am not a specimen o% a general t4pe. 0. That /e spea1 o% thoughts 8ethical ideas: as oACects o% oAser ation is %ull4 Custi%ied. For, although during the acti it4 o% thin1ing the products o% thin1ing do not appear at the same time in the %ield o% oAser ation, the4 can ne ertheless Aecome oACects o% oAser ation a%ter/ards. And it is in this /a4 that /e ha e arri ed at our characteriDation o% action. ----.

1" - The 6alue of ,ife .5'timism and Pessimism0.

A Counterpart to the @uestion concerning the purpose o% li%e, or the ordering o% its destin4 8see Chapter &&:, is the @uestion concerning its alue. "e meet here /ith t/o mutuall4 opposed ie/s, and Aet/een them all concei aAle attempts at compromise. One ie/ sa4s that this /orld is the Aest that could concei aAl4 exist, and that to li e and to act in it is a Alessing o% untold alue. E er4thing that exists displa4s harmonious and purpose%ul co, operation and is /orth4 o% admiration. E en /hat is apparentl4 Aad and e il ma4, %rom a higher point o% ie/, Ae seen to Ae good, %or it represents an agreeaAle contrast /ith the good+ /e are the more aAle to appreciate the good /hen it is clearl4 contrasted /ith e il. Moreo er, e il is not genuinel4 real+ /hat /e %eel as e il is onl4 a lesser degree o% good. E il is the aAsence o% good+ it has no signi%icance in itsel%. The other ie/ maintains that li%e is %ull o% miser4 and /ant+ e er4/here pain out/eighs pleasure, sorro/ out/eighs Co4. Existence is a Aurden, and non,existence /ould in all circumstances Ae pre%eraAle to existence. The chie% representati es o% the %ormer ie/, optimism, are Sha%tesAur4 and 6eiAnitD+ those o% the latter, pessimism, are Schopenhauer and Eduard on -artmann. 6eiAnitD Aelie es the /orld is the Aest o% all possiAle /orlds. A Aetter one is impossiAle. For =od is good and /ise. A good =od /ants to create the Aest possiAle /orld+ a /ise =od 1no/s /hich is the Aest possiAle ,, -e is aAle to distinguish the Aest %rom all other possiAle /orse ones. Onl4 an e il or an un/ise =od /ould Ae aAle to create a /orld /orse than the Aest possiAle. "hoe er starts %rom this point o% ie/ /ill %ind it eas4 to la4 do/n the direction that human action must %ollo/ in order to ma1e its contriAution to the greatest good o% the /orld. All that man need do is to %ind out the counsels o% =od and to Aeha e in accordance /ith them. I% he 1no/s /hat =od$s intentions are concerning the /orld and man1ind, he

/ill Ae aAle to do /hat is right. And he /ill Ae happ4 in the %eeling that he is adding his share to the other good in the /orld. From this optimistic standpoint, then, li%e is /orth li ing. It must stimulate us to co,operati e participation. Schopenhauer pictures things @uite di%%erentl4. -e thin1s o% the %oundation o% the /orld not as an all/ise and all,Aene%icent Aeing, Aut as Alind urge or /ill. Eternal stri ing, ceaseless cra ing %or satis%action /hich is e er Ae4ond reach, this is the %undamental characteristic o% all acti e /ill. For no sooner is one goal attained, than a %resh need springs up, and so on. Satis%action, /hen it occurs, lasts onl4 %or an in%initesimal time. The entire remaining content o% our li%e is unsatis%ied cra ing, that is, dissatis%action and su%%ering. I% at last Alind cra ing is dulled, then all content is gone %rom our li es+ an in%inite Aoredom per ades our existence. -ence the Aest /e can do is to sti%le all /ishes and needs /ithin us and exterminate the /ill. Schopenhauer$s pessimism leads to complete inacti it4+ his moral aim is uni ersal idleness. E4 a er4 di%%erent argument on -artmann attempts to estaAlish pessimism and to ma1e use o% it %or ethics. -e attempts, in 1eeping /ith a %a ourite tendenc4 o% our times, to Aase his /orld ie/ on experience. From the oAser ation o% li%e he hopes to disco er /hether pleasure or pain out/eighs the other in the /orld. -e parades /hate er appears to men as Alessing and %ortune Ae%ore the triAunal o% reason, in order to sho/ that all alleged satis%action turns out on closer inspection to Ae illusion. It is illusion /hen /e Aelie e that in health, 4outh, %reedom, su%%icient income, lo e 8sexual satis%action:, pit4, %riendship and %amil4 li%e, sel%,respect, honour, %ame, po/er, religious edi%ication, pursuit o% science and o% art, hope o% a li%e herea%ter, participation in the progress o% ci iliDation ,, that in all these /e ha e sources o% happiness and satis%action. SoAerl4 considered, e er4 enCo4ment Arings much more e il and miser4 into the /orld than pleasure. The disagreeaAleness o% the hango er is al/a4s greater than the agreeaAleness o% getting drun1. Pain %ar out/eighs pleasure in the /orld. No man, e en though relati el4 the happiest, /ould, i% as1ed, /ish to li e through this miseraAle li%e a second time. No/, since -artmann does not den4 the presence o% an ideal %actor 8/isdom: in the /orld, Aut rather gi es it e@ual standing /ith Alind urge 8/ill:, he can credit his primal Eeing /ith the creation o% the /orld onl4 i% he allo/s the pain in the /orld to ser e a /ise /orld,purpose. The pain o% created Aeings is, ho/e er, nothing Aut =od$s pain itsel%, %or the li%e o% the /orld as a /hole is identical /ith the li%e o% =od. An all,/ise Eeing can, ho/e er, see his goal onl4 in release %rom su%%ering, and, since all existence is su%%ering, in release %rom existence. To trans%orm existence into the %ar Aetter state o% non,existence is the purpose o% all creation. The course o% the /orld is a continuous Aattle against =od$s pain, /hich ends at last /ith the annihilation o% all existence. The moral li%e o% men, there%ore, /ill consist in ta1ing part in the annihilation o% existence.

=od has created the /orld so that through it -e ma4 %ree -imsel% %rom -is in%inite pain. The /orld is Bto Ae regarded, more or less, as an itching eruption upon the AAsolute,B A4 means o% /hich the unconscious healing po/er o% the AAsolute rids itsel% o% an in/ard disease, Bor e en as a pain%ul poultice /hich the All,One applies to himsel% in order %irst to di ert the inner pain out/ards, and then to get rid o% it altogether.B -uman Aeings are integral parts o% the /orld. In them =od su%%ers. -e has created them in order to disperse -is in%inite pain. The pain /hich each one o% us su%%ers is Aut a drop in the in%inite ocean o% =od$s pain 8see %n &:. Man has to permeate his /hole Aeing /ith the recognition that the pursuit o% indi idual satis%action 8egoism: is a %oll4, and that he ought to Ae guided solel4 A4 the tas1 o% dedicating himsel% to the redemption o% =od A4 unsel%ish de otion to the progress o% the /orld. Thus, in contrast to Schopenhauer$s, on -artmann$s pessimism leads us to acti it4 de oted to a suAlime tas1. Eut is it reall4 Aased on experience7 To stri e %or satis%action means that our acti it4 reaches out Ae4ond the actual content o% our li es. A creature is hungr4, that is, it stri es %or repletion, /hen its organic %unctions, i% the4 are to continue, demand the suppl4 o% %resh means o% li%e in the %orm o% nourishment. The stri ing %or honour means that a man onl4 regards /hat he personall4 does or lea es undone as aluaAle /hen his acti it4 is appro ed A4 others. The stri ing %or 1no/ledge arises /hen a man %inds that something is missing %rom the /orld that he sees, hears, and so on, as long as he has not understood it. The %ul%illment o% the stri ing creates pleasure in the stri ing indi idual, %ailure creates pain. It is important here to oAser e that pleasure and pain are dependent onl4 upon the %ul%illment or non, %ul%illment o% m4 stri ing. The stri ing itsel% can A4 no means Ae counted as pain. -ence, i% it happens that in the er4 moment in /hich a stri ing is %ul%illed a ne/ stri ing at once arises, this is no ground %or sa4ing that, Aecause in e er4 ease enCo4ment gi es rise to a desire %or its repetition or %or a %resh pleasure, m4 pleasure has gi en Airth to pain. I can spea1 o% pain onl4 /hen desire runs up against the impossiAilit4 o% %ul%illment. E en /hen an enCo4ment that I ha e had creates in me the desire %or the experience o% greater or more re%ined pleasure, I cannot spea1 o% this desire as a pain created A4 the pre ious pleasure until the means o% experiencing the greater or more re%ined pleasure %ail me. Onl4 /hen pain appears as a natural conse@uence o% pleasure, as %or instance /hen a /oman$s sexual pleasure is %ollo/ed A4 the su%%ering o% childAirth and the cares o% a %amil4, can I %ind in the enCo4ment the originator o% the pain. I% stri ing A4 itsel% called %orth pain, then each reduction o% stri ing /ould ha e to Ae accompanied A4 pleasure. Eut the opposite is the case. To ha e no stri ing in one$s li%e creates Aoredom, and this is connected /ith displeasure.

No/, since it ma4 Ae a long time Ae%ore stri ing meets /ith %ul%illment, and since, in the inter al, it is content /ith the hope o% %ul%illment, /e must ac1no/ledge that the pain has nothing /hate er to do /ith the stri ing as such, Aut depends solel4 on the non,%ul%illment o% the stri ing. Schopenhauer, then, is in an4 case /rong to ta1e desiring or stri ing 8/ill: as Aeing in itsel% the source o% pain. In %act, Cust the opposite is correct. Stri ing 8desiring: in itsel% gi es pleasure. "ho does not 1no/ the enCo4ment gi en A4 the hope o% a remote Aut intensel4 desired goal7 This Co4 is the companion o% all laAour that gi es us its %ruits onl4 in the %uture. It is a pleasure @uite independent o% the attainment o% the goal. For /hen the goal has Aeen reached, the pleasure o% %ul%illment is added as something ne/ to the pleasure o% stri ing. I% an4one /ere to argue that the pain caused A4 an unsatis%ied aim is increased A4 the pain o% disappointed hope, and that thus, in the end, the pain o% non,%ul%illment /ill e entuall4 out/eigh the possiAle pleasure o% %ul%illment, /e shall ha e to repl4 that the re erse ma4 Ae the case, and that the recollection o% past enCo4ment at a time o% un%ul%illed desire /ill Cust as o%ten mitigate the pain o% non%ul%illment. "hoe er exclaims in the %ace o% shattered hopes, BI ha e done m4 part,B is a proo% o% this assertion. The Aliss%ul %eeling o% ha ing tried one$s Aest is o erloo1ed A4 those /ho sa4 o% e er4 unsatis%ied desire that not onl4 is the Co4 o% %ul%illment aAsent Aut the enCo4ment o% the desiring itsel% has Aeen destro4ed. The %ul%illment o% a desire Arings pleasure and its non%ul%illment Arings pain. Eut %rom this /e must not conclude that pleasure is the satis%action o% a desire, and pain its non, satis%action. Eoth pleasure and pain can Ae experienced /ithout Aeing the conse@uence o% desire. Illness is pain not preceded A4 desire. I% an4one /ere to maintain that illness is unsatis%ied desire %or health, he /ould Ae ma1ing the mista1e o% regarding the unconscious /ish not to %all ill, /hich /e all ta1e %or granted, as a positi e desire. "hen someone recei es a legac4 %rom a rich relati e o% /hose existence he had not the %aintest idea, this %ills him /ith pleasure /ithout an4 preceding desire. -ence, i% /e set out to en@uire /hether the Aalance is on the side o% pleasure or o% pain, /e must ta1e into account the pleasure o% desiring, the pleasure at the %ul%illment o% a desire, and the pleasure /hich comes to us /ithout an4 stri ing. On the other side o% the account /e shall ha e to enter the displeasure o% Aoredom, the pain o% un%ul%illed stri ing, and lastl4 the pain /hich comes to us /ithout an4 desiring on our part. >nder this last heading /e shall ha e to put also the displeasure caused A4 /or1, not chosen A4 oursel es, that has Aeen %orced upon us. This leads to the @uestion# "hat is the right method %or stri1ing the Aalance Aet/een these credit and deAit columns7 Eduard on -artmann Aelie es that it is reason that holds the scales. It is true that he sa4s, BPain and pleasure exist onl4 in so %ar as the4 are actuall4 %elt.B 8see %n ): It %ollo/s that there can Ae no 4ardstic1 %or pleasure other than the

suACecti e one o% %eeling. I must %eel /hether the sum o% m4 disagreeaAle %eelings together /ith m4 agreeaAle %eelings lea es me /ith a Aalance o% pleasure or o% pain. Eut %or all that, on -artmann maintains that, Bthough the alue o% the li%e o% e er4 person can Ae set do/n onl4 according to his o/n suACecti e measure, 4et it A4 no means %ollo/s that e er4 person is aAle to arri e at the correct algeAraic sum %rom all the collected emotions in his li%e ,, or, in other /ords, that his total estimate o% his o/n li%e, /ith regard to his suACecti e experiences, /ould Ae correct.B "ith this, the rational estimation o% %eeling is once more made the e aluator 8see %n 0:. An4one /ho %ollo/s %airl4 closel4 the line o% thought o% such thin1ers as Eduard on -artmann ma4 Aelie e it necessit4, in order to arri e at a correct aluation o% li%e, to clear out o% the /a4 those %actors /hich %alsi%4 our Cudgement aAout the Aalance o% pleasure and pain. -e can tr4 to do this in t/o /a4s. Firstl4, A4 sho/ing that our desire 8instinct, /ill: inter%eres /ith our soAer estimation o% %eeling alues in a disturAing /a4. "hereas, %or instance, /e ought to sa4 to oursel es that sexual enCo4ment is a source o% e il, /e are misled A4 the %act that the sexual instinct is er4 strong in us into conCuring up the prospect o% a pleasure /hich Cust is not there in that degree at all. "e /ant to enCo4 oursel es+ hence /e do not admit to oursel es that /e su%%er under the enCo4ment. Secondl4, he can do it A4 suACecting %eelings to a critical examination and attempting to pro e that the oACects to /hich our %eelings attach themsel es are re ealed as illusions A4 the light o% reason, and that the4 are destro4ed %rom the moment that our e er gro/ing intelligence sees through the illusions. -e can thin1 o% the matter in the %ollo/ing /a4. I% an amAitious man /ants to determine clearl4 /hether, up to the moment o% his en@uir4, there has Aeen a surplus o% pleasure or o% pain in his li%e, then he has to %ree himsel% %rom t/o sources o% error that ma4 a%%ect his Cudgment. Eeing amAitious, this %undamental %eature o% his character /ill ma1e him see the Co4s due to the recognition o% his achie ements through a magni%4ing glass, and the humiliations due to his reAu%%s through a diminishing glass. At the time /hen he su%%ered the reAu%%s he %elt the humiliations Cust Aecause he /as amAitious+ in recollection the4 appear to him in a milder light, /hereas the Co4s o% recognition to /hich he is so susceptiAle lea e a %ar deeper impression. No/, %or an amAitious man it is an undeniaAle Alessing that it should Ae so. The deception diminishes his pain in the moment o% sel%,anal4sis. None the less, his Cudgment is /rong. The su%%erings o er /hich a eil is no/ dra/n /ere actuall4 experienced A4 him in all their intensit4, and hence he enters them at a /rong aluation in his li%e$s account Aoo1. In order to arri e at a correct estimate, an amAitious man /ould ha e to la4 aside his

amAition %or the time o% his en@uir4. -e /ould ha e to re ie/ his past li%e /ithout an4 distorting glasses Ae%ore his mind$s e4e. Other/ise he /ould resemAle a merchant /ho, in ma1ing up his Aoo1s, enters among the items on the credit side his o/n Deal in Ausiness. Eut the holder o% this ie/ can go e en %urther. -e can sa4# The amAitious man /ill e en ma1e clear to himsel% that the recognition he pursues is a /orthless thing. Either A4 himsel%, or through the in%luence o% others, he /ill come to see that %or an intelligent man recognition A4 others counts %or er4 little, seeing that Bin all such matters, other than those that are @uestions o% sheer existence or that are alread4 %inall4 settled A4 science,B one can Ae @uite sure Bthat the maCorit4 is /rong and the minorit4 right.... "hoe er ma1es amAition the lode,star o% his li%e puts his li%e$s happiness at the merc4 o% such a Cudgment.B 8see %n *: I% the amAitious man admits all this to himsel%, then he must regard as illusion /hat his amAition had pictured as realit4, and thus also the %eelings attached to these illusions o% his amAition. On this Aasis it could then Ae said that such %eelings o% pleasure as are produced A4 illusion must also Ae struc1 out o% the Aalance sheet o% li%e$s alues+ /hat then remains represents the sum total o% li%e$s pleasures stripped o% all illusion, and this is so small compared /ith the sum total o% pain that li%e is no Co4 and non,existence pre%eraAle to existence. Eut /hile it is immediatel4 e ident that the deception produced A4 the instinct o% amAition leads to a %alse result /hen stri1ing the Aalance o% pleasure, /e must none the less challenge /hat has Aeen said aAout the recognition o% the illusor4 character o% the oACects o% pleasure. The elimination %rom the credit side o% li%e o% all pleasuraAle %eelings /hich accompan4 actual or supposed illusions /ould positi el4 %alsi%4 the Aalance o% pleasure and pain. For an amAitious man has genuinel4 enCo4ed the acclamations o% the multitude, irrespecti e o% /hether suAse@uentl4 he himsel%, or some other person, recogniDes that this acclamation is an illusion. The pleasant sensation he has had is not in the least diminished A4 this recognition. The elimination o% all such Billusor4B %eelings %rom li%e$s Aalance does not ma1e our Cudgment aAout our %eelings more correct, Aut rather oAliterates %rom li%e %eelings /hich /ere actuall4 there. And /h4 should these %eelings Ae eliminated7 For /hoe er has them, the4 are certainl4 pleasuregi ing+ %or /hoe er has con@uered them, a purel4 mental Aut none the less signi%icant pleasure arises through the experience o% sel%,con@uest 8not through the ain emotion# "hat a noAle %ello/ I amG Aut through the oACecti e sources o% pleasure /hich lie in the sel%,con@uest:. I% /e stri1e out %eelings %rom the pleasure side o% the Aalance on the ground that the4 are attached to oACects /hich turn out to ha e Aeen illusor4, /e ma1e the alue o% li%e dependent not on the @uantit4 Aut on the @ualit4 o% pleasure, and this, in turn, on the alue

o% the oACects /hich cause the pleasure. Eut i% I /ant to determine the alue o% li%e in the %irst place A4 the @uantit4 o% pleasure or pain /hich it Arings, I ma4 nor presuppose something else /hich alread4 determines the positi e or negati e alue o% the pleasure. I% I sa4 I /ant to compare the @uantit4 o% pleasure /ith the @uantit4 o% pain in order to see /hich is greater, I am Aound to Aring into m4 account all pleasures and pains in their actual intensities, /hether the4 are Aased on illusions or not. "hoe er ascriAes a lesser alue %or li%e to a pleasure /hich is Aased on an illusion than to one /hich can Custi%4 itsel% Ae%ore the triAunal o% reason, ma1es the alue o% li%e dependent on %actors other than pleasure. "hoe er puts do/n pleasure as less aluaAle /hen it is attached to a /orthless oACect, resemAles a merchant /ho enters the consideraAle pro%its o% a to4 %actor4 in his account at a @uarter o% their actual amount on the ground that the %actor4 produces nothing Aut pla4things %or children. I% the point is simpl4 to /eigh @uantit4 o% pleasure against @uantit4 o% pain, then the illusor4 character o% the oACects causing certain %eelings o% pleasure must Ae le%t right out o% the @uestion. The method recommended A4 on -artmann, that is, rational consideration o% the @uantities o% pleasure and pain produced A4 li%e, has thus led us to the point /here /e 1no/ ho/ /e are to set out our accounts, /hat /e are to put do/n on the one side o% our Aoo1 and /hat on the other. Eut ho/ is the calculation no/ to Ae made7 Is reason actuall4 capaAle o% stri1ing the Aalance7 A merchant has made a mista1e in his rec1oning i% his calculated pro%it does not agree /ith the demonstraAle results or expectations o% his Ausiness. Similarl4, the philosopher /ill undouAtedl4 ha e made a mista1e in his estimate i% he cannot demonstrate in actual %eeling the surplus o% pleasure, or pain, that he has someho/ extracted %rom his accounts. For the present I shall not loo1 into the calculations o% those pessimists /hose opinion o% the /orld is measured A4 reason+ Aut i% one is to decide /hether to carr4 on the Ausiness o% li%e or not, one /ill %irst demand to Ae sho/n /here the alleged surplus o% pain is to Ae %ound. -ere /e touch the point /here reason is not in a position to determine A4 itsel% the surplus o% pleasure or o% pain, Aut /here it must demonstrate this surplus as a percept in li%e. For man reaches realit4 not through concepts alone Aut through the interpenetration o% concepts and percepts 8and %eelings are percepts: /hich thin1ing Arings aAout 8see page 35 %%.:. A merchant, a%ter all, /ill gi e up his Ausiness onl4 /hen the losses calculated A4 his accountant are con%irmed A4 the %acts. I% this does not happen, he gets his accountant to ma1e the calculation o er again. That is exactl4 /hat a man /ill do in the Ausiness o% li%e. I% a philosopher /ants to pro e to him that the pain is %ar greater than the pleasure, Aut he

himsel% does not %eel it to Ae so, then he /ill repl4, BFou ha e gone astra4 in 4our rec1oning+ thin1 it all out again.B Eut should there come a time in a Ausiness /hen the losses are reall4 so great that the %irm$s credit no longer su%%ices to satis%4 the creditors, then Aan1ruptc4 /ill result i% the merchant %ails to 1eep himsel% in%ormed aAout the state o% his a%%airs A4 care%ul accounting. Similarl4, i% the @uantit4 o% pain in a man$s li%e Aecame at an4 time so great that no hope o% %uture pleasure 8credit: could help him to get o er the pain, then the Aan1ruptc4 o% li%e$s Ausiness /ould ine itaAl4 %ollo/. No/ the numAer o% those /ho 1ill themsel es is relati el4 unimportant /hen compared /ith the multitude o% those /ho li e Ara el4 on. Onl4 er4 %e/ men gi e up the Ausiness o% li%e Aecause o% the pain in ol ed. "hat %ollo/s %rom this7 Either that it is untrue to sa4 that the @uantit4 o% pain is greater than the @uantit4 o% pleasure, or that /e do not at all ma1e the continuation o% li%e dependent on the @uantit4 o% pleasure or pain that is %elt. In a er4 curious /a4, Eduard on -artmann$s pessimism comes to the conclusion that li%e is alueless Aecause it contains a surplus o% pain and 4et a%%irms the necessit4 o% going on /ith it. This necessit4 lies in the %act that the /orld purpose mentioned aAo e 8page &55: can Ae achie ed onl4 A4 the ceaseless, de oted laAour o% human Aeings. Eut as long as men still pursue their egotistical cra ings the4 are un%it %or such sel%less laAour. Not until the4 ha e con inced themsel es through experience and reason that the pleasures o% li%e pursued A4 egoism cannot Ae attained, do the4 de ote themsel es to their proper tas1s. In this /a4 the pessimistic con iction is supposed to Ae the source o% unsel%ishness. An education Aased on pessimism should exterminate egoism A4 ma1ing it see the hopelessness o% its case. According to this ie/, then, the stri ing %or pleasure is inherent in human nature %rom the outset. Onl4 /hen %ul%illment is seen to Ae impossiAle does this stri ing retire in %a our o% higher tas1s %or man1ind. It cannot Ae said that egoism is o ercome in the true sense o% the /ord A4 an ethical /orld conception that expects a de otion to unsel%ish aims in li%e through the acceptance o% pessimism. The moral ideals are said not to Ae strong enough to dominate the /ill until man has learnt that sel%ish stri ing a%ter pleasure cannot lead to an4 satis%action. Man, /hose sel%ishness desires the grapes o% pleasure, %inds them sour Aecause he cannot reach them, and so he turns his Aac1 on them and de otes himsel% to an unsel%ish /a4 o% li%e. Moral ideals, then, according to the opinion o% pessimists, are not strong enough to o ercome egoism+ Aut the4 estaAlish their dominion on the ground pre iousl4 cleared %or them A4 the recognition o% the hopelessness o% egoism. I% men A4 nature /ere to stri e a%ter pleasure Aut /ere unaAle to reach it, then annihilation o% existence, and sal ation through non,existence, /ould Ae the onl4 rational goal. And i% one holds the ie/ that the real Aearer o% the pain o% the /orld is =od, then man$s tas1

/ould consist in Aringing aAout the sal ation o% =od. Through the suicide o% the indi idual, the realiDation o% this aim is not ad anced, Aut hindered. 9ationall4, =od can onl4 ha e created men in order to Aring aAout his sal ation through their actions. Other/ise creation /ould Ae purposeless. And it is extra,human purposes that such a /orld conception has in mind. Each one o% us has to per%orm his o/n particular tas1 in the general /or1 o% sal ation. I% he /ithdra/s %rom the tas1 A4 suicide, then the /or1 /hich /as intended %or him must Ae done A4 another. SomeAod4 else must Aear the torment o% existence in his stead. And since /ithin e er4 Aeing it is =od /ho actuall4 Aears all pain, the suicide does not in the least diminish the @uantit4 o% =od$s pain, Aut rather imposes upon =od the additional di%%icult4 o% pro iding a suAstitute. All this presupposes that pleasure is the 4ardstic1 %or the alue o% li%e. No/ li%e mani%ests itsel% through a numAer o% instincti e desires 8needs:. I% the alue o% li%e depended on its producing more pleasure than pain, an instinct /hich Arought to its o/ner a Aalance o% pain /ould ha e to Ae called alueless. 6et us, there%ore, examine instinct and pleasure to see /hether the %ormer can Ae measured A4 the latter. In order not to arouse the suspicion that /e consider li%e to Aegin onl4 at the le el o% Baristocrac4 o% the intellectB, /e shall Aegin /ith the Bpurel4 animalB need, hunger. -unger arises /hen our organs are unaAle to continue their proper %unction /ithout a %resh suppl4 o% %ood. "hat a hungr4 man /ants %irst o% all is to satis%4 his hunger. As soon as the suppl4 o% nourishment has reached the point /here hunger ceases, e er4thing that the instinct %or %ood cra es has Aeen attained. The enCo4ment that comes /ith Aeing satis%ied consists primaril4 in putting an end to the pain caused A4 hunger. Eut to the mere instinct %or %ood a %urther need is added. For man does not merel4 desire to repair the disturAance in the %unctioning o% his organs A4 the consumption o% %ood, or to o ercome the pain o% hunger+ he see1s to e%%ect this to the accompaniment o% pleasuraAle sensations o% taste. I% he %eels hungr4 and is /ithin hal% an hour o% an appetiDing meal, he ma4 e en re%use in%erior %ood, /hich could satis%4 him sooner, so as not to spoil his appetite %or the Aetter %are to come. -e needs hunger in order to get the %ull enCo4ment %rom his meal. Thus %or him hunger Aecomes at the same time a cause o% pleasure. No/ i% all the existing hunger in the /orld could Ae satis%ied, /e should then ha e the total @uantit4 o% enCo4ment attriAutaAle to the presence o% the need %or nourishment. To this /ould still ha e to Ae added the special pleasure /hich the gourmet achie es A4 culti ating his palate Ae4ond the common measure. This @uantit4 o% pleasure /ould reach the highest concei aAle alue i% no need aiming at the 1ind o% enCo4ment under consideration remained unsatis%ied, and i% /ith the enCo4ment /e had not to accept a certain amount o% pain into the Aargain. Modern science holds the ie/ that nature produces more li%e than it can sustain, that is to sa4, more hunger than it is aAle to satis%4. The surplus o% li%e thus produced must perish in

pain in the struggle %or existence. Admittedl4 the needs o% li%e at e er4 moment in the course o% the /orld are greater than the a ailaAle means o% satis%action, and that the enCo4ment o% li%e is a%%ected as a result. Such enCo4ment as actuall4 does occur, ho/e er, is not in the least reduced. "here er a desire is satis%ied, the corresponding @uantit4 o% pleasure exists, e en though in the desiring creature itsel% or in its %ello/s there are plent4 o% unsatis%ied instincts. "hat is, ho/e er, diminished A4 all this is the alue o% the enCo4ment o% li%e. I% onl4 a part o% the needs o% a li ing creature %inds satis%action, it experiences a corresponding degree o% enCo4ment. This pleasure has a lo/er alue, the smaller it is in proportion to the total demands o% li%e in the %ield o% the desires in @uestion. One can represent this alue A4 a %raction, o% /hich the numerator is the pleasure actuall4 experienced /hile the denominator is the sum total o% needs. This %raction has the alue & /hen the numerator and the denominator are e@ual, that is, /hen all needs are %ull4 satis%ied. The %raction Aecomes greater than & /hen a creature experiences more pleasure than its desires demand+ and it Aecomes smaller than & /hen the @uantit4 o% pleasure %alls short o% the sum total o% desires. Eut the %raction can ne er Aecome Dero as long as the numerator has an4 alue at all, ho/e er small. I% a man /ere to ma1e up a %inal account Ae%ore his death, and /ere to thin1 o% the @uantit4 o% enCo4ment connected /ith a particular instinct 8%or example, hunger: as Aeing distriAuted o er the /hole o% his li%e together /ith all the demands made A4 this instinct, then the pleasure experienced might perhaps ha e a er4 small alue, Aut it could ne er Aecome alueless. I% the @uantit4 o% pleasure remains constant, then, /ith an increase in the needs o% the creature, the alue o% the pleasure diminishes. The same is true %or the sum o% li%e in nature. The greater the numAer o% creatures in proportion to those /hich are aAle to satis%4 their instincts %ull4, the smaller is the a erage alue o% pleasure in li%e. The che@ues on li%e$s pleasure /hich are dra/n in our %a our in the %orm o% our instincts, Aecome less aluaAle i% /e cannot expect to cash them %or the %ull amount. I% I get enough to eat %or three da4s and as a result must then go hungr4 %or another three da4s, the actual pleasure on the three da4s o% eating is not thereA4 diminished. Eut I ha e no/ to thin1 o% it as distriAuted o er six da4s, and thus its alue %or m4 %ood,instinct is reduced A4 hal%. In Cust the same /a4 the magnitude o% pleasure is related to the degree o% m4 need. I% I am hungr4 enough %or t/o pieces o% Aread and can onl4 get one, the pleasure I deri e %rom it had onl4 hal% the alue it /ould ha e had i% the eating o% it has satis%ied m4 hunger. This is the /a4 that the alue o% a pleasure is determined in li%e. It is measured A4 the needs o% li%e. Our desires are the 4ardstic1+ pleasure is the thing that is measured. The enCo4ment o% satis%4ing hunger has a alue onl4 Aecause hunger exists+ and it has a alue o% a de%inite

magnitude through the proportion it Aears to the magnitude o% the existing hunger. >n%ul%illed demands o% our li%e thro/ their shado/ e en upon satis%ied desires, and thus detract %rom the alue o% pleasuraAle hours. Eut /e can also spea1 o% the present alue o% a %eeling o% pleasure. This alue is the lo/er, the smaller the pleasure is in proportion to the duration and intensit4 o% our desire. A @uantit4 o% pleasure has its %ull alue %or us /hen in duration and degree it exactl4 coincides /ith our desire. A @uantit4 o% pleasure /hich is smaller than our desire diminishes the alue o% the pleasure+ a @uantit4 /hich is greater produces a surplus /hich has not Aeen demanded and /hich is %elt as pleasure onl4 so long as, /hilst enCo4ing the pleasure, /e can increase the intensit4 o% our desire. I% the increase in our desire is unaAle to 1eep pace /ith the increase in pleasure, then pleasure turns into displeasure. The thing that /ould other/ise satis%4 us no/ assails us /ithout our /anting it and ma1es us su%%er. This pro es that pleasure has alue %or us onl4 to the extent that /e can measure it against our desires. An excess o% pleasuraAle %eeling turns into pain. This ma4 Ae oAser ed especiall4 in people /hose desire %or a particular 1ind o% pleasure is er4 small. In people /hose instinct %or %ood is stunted, eating readil4 Aecomes nauseating. This again sho/s that desire is the standard A4 /hich /e measure the alue o% pleasure. No/ the pessimist might sa4 that an unsatis%ied instinct %or %ood Arings into the /orld not onl4 displeasure at the lost enCo4ment, Aut also positi e pain, miser4 and /ant. -e can Aase this statement upon the untold miser4 o% star ing people and upon the ast amount o% su%%ering /hich arises indirectl4 %or such people %rom their lac1 o% %ood. And i% he /ants to extend his assertion to nature outside man as /ell, he can point to the su%%ering o% animals that die o% star ation at certain times o% the 4ear. The pessimist maintains that these e ils %ar out/eigh the amount o% pleasure that the instinct %or %ood Arings into the /orld. There is indeed no douAt that one can compare pleasure and pain and can estimate the surplus o% one or the other much as /e do in the case o% pro%it and loss. Eut i% the pessimist Aelie es that Aecause there is a surplus o% pain he can conclude that li%e is alueless, he %alls into the error o% ma1ing a calculation that in real li%e is ne er made. Our desire, in an4 gi en case, is directed to a particular oACect. As /e ha e seen, the alue o% the pleasure o% satis%action /ill Ae the greater, the greater is the amount o% pleasure in relation to the intensit4 o% our desire 8see %n 2:. On this intensit4 o% desire also /ill depend ho/ much pain /e are /illing to Aear as part o% the price o% achie ing the pleasure. "e compare the @uantit4 o% pain not /ith the @uantit4 o% pleasure Aut /ith the intensit4 o% our desire. I% someone ta1es great delight in eating, he /ill, A4 reason o% his enCo4ment in

Aetter times, %ind it easier to Aear a period o% hunger than /ill someone %or /hom eating is no pleasure. A /oman /ho /ants to ha e a child compares the pleasure that /ould come %rom possessing it not /ith the amount o% pain due to pregnanc4, childAirth, nursing and so on, Aut /ith her desire to possess the child. "e ne er aim at a certain @uantit4 o% pleasure in the aAstract, Aut at concrete satis%action in a per%ectl4 de%inite /a4. I% /e are aiming at a pleasure /hich must Ae satis%ied A4 a particular oACect or a particular sensation, /e shall not Ae satis%ied /ith some other oACect or some other sensation that gi es us an e@ual amount o% pleasure. I% /e are aiming at satis%4ing our hunger, /e cannot replace the pleasure this /ould gi e us A4 a pleasure e@uall4 great, Aut produced A4 going %or a /al1. Onl4 i% our desire /ere, @uite generall4, %or a certain %ixed @uantit4 o% pleasure as such, /ould it disappear as soon as the price o% achie ing it /ere seen to Ae a still greater @uantit4 o% pain. Eut since satis%action o% a particular 1ind is Aeing aimed at, %ul%illment Arings the pleasure e en /hen, along /ith it, a still greater pain has to Ae ta1en into the Aargain. Eut Aecause the instincts o% li ing creatures mo e in de%inite directions and go a%ter concrete goals, the @uantit4 o% pain endured on the /a4 to the goal cannot Ae set do/n as an e@ui alent %actor in our calculations. Pro ided the desire is su%%icientl4 intense to Ae present in some degree a%ter ha ing o ercome the pain ,, ho/e er great that pain in itsel% ma4 Ae ,, then the pleasure o% satis%action can still Ae tasted to the %ull. The desire, there%ore, does not compare the pain directl4 to the pleasure achie ed, Aut compares it indirectl4 A4 relating its o/n intensit4 to that o% the pain. The @uestion is not /hether the pleasure to Ae gained is greater than the pain, Aut /hether the desire %or the goal is greater than the hindering e%%ect o% the pain in ol ed. I% the hindrance is greater than the desire, then the desire gi es /a4 to the ine itaAle, /ea1ens and stri es no %urther. Since our demand is %or satis%action in a particular /a4, the pleasure connected /ith it ac@uires a signi%icance such that, once /e ha e achie ed satis%action, /e need ta1e the @uantit4 o% pain into account onl4 to the extent that it has reduced the intensit4 o% our desire. I% I am a passionate admirer o% Aeauti%ul ie/s, I ne er calculate the amount o% pleasure /hich the ie/ %rom the mountain top gi es me as compared directl4 /ith the pain o% the toilsome ascent and descent+ Aut I re%lect /hether, a%ter ha ing o ercome all di%%iculties, m4 desire %or the ie/ /ill still Ae su%%icientl4 intense. Onl4 indirectl4, through the intensit4 o% the desire, can pleasure and pain together lead to a result. There%ore the @uestion is not at all /hether there is a surplus o% pleasure or o% pain, Aut /hether the /ill %or pleasure is strong enough to o ercome the pain. A proo% %or the correctness o% this statement is the %act that /e put a higher alue on pleasure /hen it has to Ae purchased at the price o% great pain than /hen it %alls into our lap li1e a gi%t %rom hea en.

"hen su%%ering and miser4 ha e toned do/n our desire and 4et a%ter all our goal is reached, then the pleasure, in proportion to the amount o% desire still le%t, is all the greater. No/, as I ha e sho/n 8page &(':, this proportion represents the alue o% the pleasure. A %urther proo% is gi en through the %act that li ing creatures 8including man: gi e expression to their instincts as long as the4 are aAle to Aear the pain and miser4 in ol ed. The struggle %or existence is Aut a conse@uence o% this %act. All existing li%e stri es to express itsel%, and onl4 that part o% it /hose desires are smothered A4 the o er/helming /eight o% di%%iculties aAandons the struggle. E er4 li ing creature see1s %ood until lac1 o% %ood destro4s its li%e. Man, too, does not turn his hand against himsel% until he Aelie es, rightl4 or /rongl4, that those aims in li%e that are /orth his stri ing are Ae4ond his reach. So long as he still Aelie es in the possiAilit4 o% reaching /hat, in his ie/, is /orth stri ing %or, he /ill Aattle against all miser4 and pain. Philosoph4 /ould %irst ha e to con ince him that an act o% /ill ma1es sense onl4 /hen the pleasure is greater than the pain+ %or A4 nature he /ill stri e %or the oACects o% his desire i% he can Aear the necessar4 pain, ho/e er great it ma4 Ae. Eut such a philosoph4 /ould Ae mista1en Aecause it /ould ma1e the human /ill dependent on a circumstance 8the surplus o% pleasure o er pain: /hich is originall4 %oreign to man. The original measure o% his /ill is desire, and desire asserts itsel% as long as it can. "hen it is a @uestion o% pleasure and pain in the satis%action o% a desire, the calculation that is made, not in philosophical theor4, Aut in li%e, can Ae compared /ith the %ollo/ing. I% in Au4ing a certain @uantit4 o% apples I am oAliged to ta1e t/ice as man4 rotten ones as sound ones ,, Aecause the seller /ants to clear his stoc1 ,, I shall not hesitate %or one moment to accept the Aad apples as /ell, i% the smaller @uantit4 o% good ones are /orth so much to me that in addition to their purchase price I am also prepared to Aear the expense o% disposing o% the Aad ones. This example illustrates the relation Aet/een the @uantities o% pleasure and pain resulting %rom an instinct. I determine the alue o% the good apples not A4 suAtracting the total numAer o% the good ones %rom that o% the Aad ones Aut A4 assessing /hether the good ones still ha e alue %or me in spite o% the presence o% the Aad ones. Just as I lea e the Aad apples out o% account in the enCo4ment o% the good ones, so I gi e m4sel% up to the satis%action o% a desire a%ter ha ing sha1en o%% the una oidaAle pain. E en i% pessimism /ere right in its assertion that there is more pain then pleasure in the /orld, this /ould ha e no in%luence on the /ill, since li ing creatures /ould still stri e a%ter the pleasure that remains. The empirical proo% that pain out/eighs Co4 8i% such proo% could Ae gi en: /ould certainl4 Ae e%%ecti e %or sho/ing up the %utilit4 o% the school o% philosoph4 that sees the alue o% li%e in a surplus o% pleasure 8eudaemonism: Aut not %or sho/ing that the /ill, as such, is irrational+ %or the /ill is not set upon a surplus o% pleasure, Aut upon the amount o% pleasure that remains a%ter getting o er the pain. This still appears as a goal /orth stri ing %or.

Some ha e tried to re%ute pessimism A4 stating that it is impossiAle to calculate the surplus o% pleasure or o% pain in the /orld. That an4 calculation can Ae done at all depends on /hether the things to Ae calculated can Ae compared in respect o% their magnitudes. E er4 pain and e er4 pleasure has a de%inite magnitude 8intensit4 and duration:. Further, /e can compare pleasuraAle %eelings o% di%%erent 1inds one /ith another, at least approximatel4, /ith regard to their magnitudes. "e 1no/ /hether /e deri e more entertainment %rom a good cigar or %rom a good Co1e. There%ore there can Ae no oACection to comparing di%%erent sorts o% pleasure and pain in respect o% their magnitudes. And the in estigator /ho sets himsel% the tas1 o% determining the surplus o% pleasure or pain in the /orld starts %rom %ull4 Custi%ied assumptions. One ma4 declare the conclusions o% pessimism to Ae %alse, Aut one cannot douAt that @uantities o% pleasure and pain can Ae scienti%icall4 estimated, and the Aalance o% pleasure thereA4 determined. It is, ho/e er, @uite /rong to claim that the result o% this calculation has an4 conse@uences %or the human /ill. The cases /here /e reall4 ma1e the alue o% our acti it4 dependent on /hether pleasure or pain sho/s a surplus are those /here the oACects to/ards /hich our acti it4 is directed are all the same to us. I% it is onl4 a @uestion /hether, a%ter the da4$s /or1, I am to amuse m4sel% A4 a game or A4 light con ersation, and i% I am totall4 indi%%erent to /hat I do as long as it ser es the purpose, then I simpl4 as1 m4sel%# "hat gi es me the greatest surplus o% pleasure7 And I shall most certainl4 aAandon the acti it4 i% the scales incline to/ards the side o% displeasure. I% /e are Au4ing a to4 %or a child /e consider, in selecting, /hat /ill gi e him the greatest happiness. In all other cases /e do not Aase our decision exclusi el4 on the Aalance o% pleasure. There%ore, i% the pessimists Aelie e that A4 sho/ing pain to Ae present in greater @uantit4 than pleasure the4 are preparing the ground %or unsel%ish de otion to the /or1 o% ci iliDation, the4 %orget that the human /ill, A4 its er4 nature, does not allo/ itsel% to Ae in%luenced A4 this 1no/ledge. -uman stri ing is directed to/ards the measure o% satis%action that is possiAle a%ter all di%%iculties are o ercome. -ope o% such satis%action is the %oundation o% all human acti it4. The /or1 o% e er4 indi idual and o% the /hole o% ci iliDation springs %rom this hope. Pessimistic ethics Aelie es that it must present the pursuit o% happiness as an impossiAilit4 %or man in order that he ma4 de ote himsel% to his proper moral tas1s. Eut these moral tas1s are nothing Aut the concrete natural and spiritual instincts+ and man stri es to satis%4 them in spite o% the incidental pain. The pursuit o% happiness /hich the pessimist /ould eradicate is there%ore no/here to Ae %ound. Eut the tas1s /hich man has to %ul%ill, he does %ul%ill, Aecause %rom the er4 nature o% his Aeing he /ants to %ul%ill them, once he has properl4 recogniDed their nature. Pessimistic ethics declares that onl4 /hen a man has gi en up the @uest %or pleasure can he

de ote himsel% to /hat he recogniDes as his tas1 in li%e. Eut no s4stem o% ethics can e er in ent an4 li%e tas1s other than the realiDation o% the satis%actions that human desires demand and the %ul%illment o% man$s moral ideals. No ethics can depri e man o% the pleasure he experiences in the %ul%illment o% his desires. "hen the pessimist sa4s, B!o not stri e %or pleasure, %or 4ou can ne er attain it+ stri e rather %or /hat 4ou recogniDe to Ae 4our tas1,B /e must repl4, BEut this is Cust /hat man does, and the notion that he stri es merel4 %or happiness is no more than the in ention o% an errant philosoph4.B -e aims at the satis%action o% /hat he himsel% desires, and he has in ie/ the concrete oACects o% his stri ing, not BhappinessB in the aAstract+ and %ul%illment is %or him a pleasure. "hen pessimistic ethics demands, BStri e not %or pleasure, Aut %or the attainment o% /hat 4ou see as 4our li%e$s tas1,B it hits on the er4 thing that man, in his o/n Aeing, /ants. Man does not need to Ae turned inside out A4 philosoph4, he does not need to discard his human nature, Ae%ore he can Ae moral. Moralit4 lies in stri ing %or a goal that one recogniDes as Custi%ied+ it is human nature to pursue it as long as the pain incurred does not inhiAit the desire %or it altogether. This is the essence o% all genuine /ill. Ethical Aeha iour is not Aased upon the eradication o% all stri ing %or pleasure to the end that Aloodless aAstract ideas ma4 estaAlish their dominion unopposed A4 an4 strong 4earnings %or the enCo4ment o% li%e, Aut rather upon a strong /ill sustained A4 ideal intuitions, a /ill that reaches its goal e en though the path Ae thorn4. Moral ideals spring %rom the moral imagination o% man. Their realiDation depends on his desire %or them Aeing intense enough to o ercome pain and miser4. The4 are his intuitions, the dri ing %orces /hich his spirit harnesses+ he /ants them, Aecause their realiDation is his highest pleasure. -e needs no ethics to %orAid him to stri e %or pleasure and then to tell him /hat he shall stri e %or. -e /ill stri e %or moral ideals i% his moral imagination is su%%icientl4 acti e to pro ide him /ith intuitions that gi e his /ill the strength to ma1e its /a4 against all the oAstacles inherent in his constitution, including the pain that is necessaril4 in ol ed. I% a man stri es %or suAlimel4 great ideals, it is Aecause the4 are the content o% his o/n Aeing, and their realiDation /ill Aring him a Co4 compared to /hich the pleasure that a limited outloo1 gets %rom the grati%ication o% commonplace desires is a mere tri ialit4. Idealists re el, spirituall4, in the translation o% their ideals into realit4. An4one /ho /ould eradicate the pleasure Arought A4 the %ul%illment o% human desires /ill %irst ha e to ma1e man a sla e /ho acts not Aecause he /ants to Aut onl4 Aecause he must. For the achie ement o% /hat one /anted to do gi es pleasure. "hat /e call good is not /hat a man must do Aut /hat he /ill /ant to do i% he de elops the true nature o% man to the %ull. An4one /ho does not ac1no/ledge this must %irst dri e out o% man all that man himsel% /ants to do, and then, %rom outside, prescriAe the content he is to gi e to his /ill.

Man alues the %ul%illment o% a desire Aecause the desire springs %rom his o/n Aeing. "hat is achie ed has its alue Aecause it has Aeen /anted. I% /e den4 an4 alue to /hat man himsel% /ants, then aims that do ha e alue /ill ha e to Ae %ound in something that man does not /ant. An ethics Auilt on pessimism arises %rom the disregard o% moral imagination. Onl4 i% one considers that the indi idual human spirit is itsel% incapaAle o% gi ing content to its stri ing can one expect the cra ing %or pleasure to account %ull4 %or all acts o% /ill. A man /ithout imagination creates no moral ideas. The4 must Ae gi en to him. Ph4sical nature sees to it that he stri es to satis%4 his lo/er desires. Eut the de elopment o% the /hole man also includes those desires that originate in the spirit. Onl4 i% one Aelie es that man has no such spiritual desires can one declare that he must recei e them %rom /ithout. Then one /ould also Ae entitled to sa4 that it is man$s dut4 to do /hat he does not /ant. E er4 ethical s4stem that demands o% man that he should suppress his o/n /ill in order to %ul%ill tas1s that he does not /ant, rec1ons not /ith the /hole man Aut /ith one in /hich the %acult4 o% spiritual desire is lac1ing. For a man /ho is harmoniousl4 de eloped, the so, called ideals o% irtue lie, not /ithout, Aut /ithin the sphere o% his o/n Aeing. Moral action consists not in the eradication o% a onesided personal /ill Aut in the %ull de elopment o% human nature. Those /ho hold that moral ideals are attainaAle onl4 i% man destro4s his o/n personal /ill, are not a/are that these ideals are /anted A4 man Cust as he /ants the satis%action o% the so,called animal instincts. It cannot Ae denied that the ie/s here outlined ma4 easil4 Ae misunderstood. Immature people /ithout moral imagination li1e to loo1 upon the instincts o% their hal%,de eloped natures as the %ullest expression o% the human race, and reCect all moral ideas /hich the4 ha e not themsel es produced, in order that the4 ma4 Bli e themsel es outB undisturAed. Eut it goes /ithout sa4ing that /hat is right %or a %ull4 de eloped human Aeing does not hold good %or hal%,de eloped human natures. An4one /ho still needs to Ae educated to the point /here his moral nature Area1s through the hus1 o% his lo/er passions, /ill not ha e the same things expected o% him as o% a mature person. -o/e er, it /as not m4 intention to sho/ /hat needs to Ae impressed upon an unde eloped person, Aut /hat lies /ithin the essential nature o% a mature human Aeing. M4 intention /as to demonstrate the possiAilit4 o% %reedom, and %reedom is mani%ested not in actions per%ormed under constraint o% sense or soul Aut in actions sustained A4 spiritual intuitions. The mature man gi es himsel% his o/n alue. -e does not aim at pleasure, /hich comes to him as a gi%t o% grace on the part o% Nature or o% the Creator+ nor does he %ul%ill an aAstract dut4 /hich he recogniDes as such a%ter he has renounced the stri ing %or pleasure. -e acts as he /ants to act, that is, in accordance /ith the standard o% his ethical intuitions+ and he

%inds in the achie ement o% /hat he /ants the true enCo4ment o% li%e. -e determines the alue o% li%e A4 measuring achie ements against aims. An ethics /hich replaces B/ouldB /ith mere BshouldB, inclination /ith mere dut4, /ill conse@uentl4 determine the alue o% man A4 measuring his %ul%illment o% dut4 against the demands that it ma1es. It measures man /ith a 4ardstic1 external to his o/n Aeing. The ie/ /hich I ha e here de eloped re%ers man Aac1 to himsel%. It recogniDes as the true alue o% li%e onl4 /hat each indi idual regards as such, according to the standard o% his o/n /ill. It no more ac1no/ledges a alue o% li%e that is not recogniDed A4 the indi idual than it does a purpose o% li%e that has not originated in him. It sees in the indi idual /ho 1no/s himsel% through and through, his o/n master and his o/n assessor. ----. Author*s addition, #%#&. The argument o% this chapter /ill Ae misunderstood i% one is caught A4 the apparent oACection that the /ill, as such, is the irrational %actor in man and that once this irrationalit4 is made clear to him he /ill see that the goal o% his ethical stri ing must lie in ultimate emancipation %rom the /ill. An apparent oACection o% exactl4 this 1ind /as Arought against me %rom a reputaAle @uarter in that I /as told that it is the Ausiness o% the philosopher to ma1e good Cust /hat lac1 o% thought leads animals and most men to neglect, namel4, to stri1e a proper Aalance o% li%e$s account. Eut this oACection Cust misses the main point. I% %reedom is to Ae realiDed, the /ill in human nature must Ae sustained A4 intuiti e thin1ing+ at the same time, ho/e er, /e %ind that an act o% /ill ma4 also Ae determined A4 %actors other than intuition, though onl4 in the %ree realiDation o% intuitions issuing %rom man$s essential nature do /e %ind moralit4 and its alue. Ethical indi idualism is /ell aAle to present moralit4 in its %ull dignit4, %or it sees true moralit4 not in /hat Arings aAout the agreement o% an act o% /ill /ith a standard o% Aeha iour in an external /a4, Aut in /hat arises in man /hen he de elops his moral /ill as an integral part o% his /hole Aeing so that to do /hat is not moral appears to him as a stunting and crippling o% his nature. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. -artmann, Phaenomenologie des sittlichen Ee/usstseins, pp. (33 %%. ). Philosophie des >nAe/ussten, 5th edition, <ol. II, p. )';. 0. Those /ho /ant to settle A4 calculation /hether the sum total o% pleasure or that o% pain is the Aigger, ignore that the4 are suACecting to calculation something /hich is no/here experienced. Feeling does not calculate, and /hat matters %or the real aluing o% li%e is /hat /e reall4

experience, not /hat results %rom an imaginar4 calculation. *. Philosophie der >nAe/ussten, <ol. II, p. 00). 2. "e disregard here the case /here excessi e increase o% pleasure turns pleasure into pain. ----.

1% - Indi$idualit* and 7enus.

The ie/ that man is destined to Aecome a complete, sel%,contained, %ree indi idualit4 seems to Ae contested A4 the %act that he ma1es his appearance as a memAer o% a naturall4 gi en totalit4 8race, people, nation, %amil4, male or %emale sex: and also /or1s /ithin a totalit4 8state, church, and so on:. -e Aears the general characteristics o% the group to /hich he Aelongs, and he gi es to his actions a content that is determined A4 the position he occupies among man4 others. This Aeing so, is indi idualit4 possiAle at all7 Can /e regard man as a totalit4 in himsel%, seeing that he gro/s out o% one totalit4 and integrates himsel% into another7 Each memAer o% a totalit4 is determined, as regards its characteristics and %unctions, A4 the /hole totalit4. A racial group is a totalit4 and all the people Aelonging to it Aear the characteristic %eatures that are inherent in the nature o% the group. -o/ the single memAer is constituted, and ho/ he /ill Aeha e, are determined A4 the character o% the racial group. There%ore the ph4siognom4 and conduct o% the indi idual ha e something generic aAout them. I% /e as1 /h4 some particular thing aAout a man is li1e this or li1e that, /e are re%erred Aac1 %rom the indi idual to the genus. The genus explains /h4 something in the indi idual appears in the %orm /e oAser e. Man, ho/e er, ma1es himsel% %ree %rom /hat is generic. For the generic %eatures o% the human race, /hen rightl4 understood, do not restrict man$s %reedom, and should not arti%iciall4 Ae made to do so. A man de elops @ualities and acti ities o% his o/n, and the Aasis %or these /e can see1 onl4 in the man himsel%. "hat is generic in him ser es onl4 as a medium in /hich to express his o/n indi idual Aeing. -e uses as a %oundation the characteristics that nature has gi en him, and to these he gi es a %orm appropriate to his o/n Aeing. I% /e see1 in the generic la/s the reasons %or an expression o% this Aeing, /e see1 in ain. "e are concerned /ith something purel4 indi idual /hich can Ae explained onl4 in terms o% itsel%. I% a man has achie ed this emancipation %rom all that is generic, and /e are ne ertheless determined to explain e er4thing aAout him in generic terms, then /e ha e no sense %or /hat is indi idual. It is impossiAle to understand a human Aeing completel4 i% one ta1es the concept o% genus as the Aasis o% one$s Cudgment. The tendenc4 to Cudge according to the genus is at its most stuAAorn /here /e are concerned /ith di%%erences o% sex. Almost in ariaAl4 man sees in /oman, and /oman in man, too much o% the general character o% the other sex and too

little o% /hat is indi idual. In practical li%e this does less harm to men than to /omen. The social position o% /omen is %or the most part such an un/orth4 one Aecause in so man4 respects it is determined not as it should Ae A4 the particular characteristics o% the indi idual /oman, Aut A4 the general picture one has o% /oman$s natural tas1s and needs. A man$s acti it4 in li%e is go erned A4 his indi idual capacities and inclinations, /hereas a /oman$s is supposed to Ae determined solel4 A4 the mere %act that she is a /oman. She is supposed to Ae a sla e to /hat is generic, to /omanhood in general. As long as men continue to deAate /hether a /oman is suited to this or that pro%ession Baccording to her natural dispositionB, the so,called /oman$s @uestion cannot ad ance Ae4ond its most elementar4 stage. "hat a /oman, /ithin her natural limitations, /ants to Aecome had Aetter Ae le%t to the /oman hersel% to decide. I% it is true that /omen are suited onl4 to that pro%ession /hich is theirs at present, then the4 /ill hardl4 ha e it in them to attain an4 other. Eut the4 must Ae allo/ed to decide %or themsel es /hat is in accordance /ith their nature. To all /ho %ear an uphea al o% our social structure through accepting /omen as indi iduals and not as %emales, /e must repl4 that a social structure in /hich the status o% one hal% o% humanit4 is un/orth4 o% a human Aeing is itsel% in great need o% impro ement. 8see %n &: An4one /ho Cudges people according to generic characters gets onl4 as %ar as the %rontier /here people Aegin to Ae Aeings /hose acti it4 is Aased on %ree sel%,determination. "hate er lies short o% this %rontier ma4 naturall4 Aecome matter %or academic stud4. The characteristics o% race, people, nation and sex are the suACect matter o% special Aranches o% stud4. Onl4 men /ho /ish to li e as nothing more than examples o% the genus could possiAl4 con%orm to a general picture such as arises %rom academic stud4 o% this 1ind. Eut none o% these Aranches o% stud4 are aAle to ad ance as %ar as the uni@ue content o% the single indi idual. !etermining the indi idual according to the la/s o% his genus ceases /here the sphere o% %reedom 8in thin1ing and acting: Aegins. The conceptual content /hich man has to connect /ith the percept A4 an act o% thin1ing in order to ha e the %ull realit4 8see Chapter 2 %%.: cannot Ae %ixed once and %or all and Ae@ueathed read4,made to man1ind. The indi idual must get his concepts through his o/n intuition. -o/ the indi idual has to thin1 cannot possiAl4 Ae deduced %rom an4 1ind o% generic concept. It depends simpl4 and solel4 on the indi idual. Just as little is it possiAle to determine %rom the general characteristics o% man /hat concrete aims the indi idual ma4 choose to set himsel%. I% /e /ould understand the single indi idual /e must %ind our /a4 into his o/n particular Aeing and not stop short at those characteristics that are t4pical. In this sense e er4 single human Aeing is a separate proAlem. And e er4 1ind o% stud4 that deals /ith aAstract thoughts and generic concepts is Aut a preparation %or the 1no/ledge /e get /hen a human indi idualit4 tells us his /a4 o% ie/ing the /orld, and on the other

hand %or the 1no/ledge /e get %rom the content o% his acts o% /ill. "hene er /e %eel that /e are dealing /ith that element in a man /hich is %ree %rom stereot4ped thin1ing and instincti e /illing, then, i% /e /ould understand him in his essence, /e must cease to call to our aid an4 concepts at all o% our o/n ma1ing. The act o% 1no/ing consists in comAining the concept /ith the percept A4 means o% thin1ing. "ith all other oACects the oAser er must get his concepts through his intuition+ Aut i% /e are to understand a %ree indi idualit4 /e must ta1e o er into our o/n spirit those concepts A4 /hich he determines himsel%, in their pure %orm 8/ithout mixing our o/n conceptual content /ith them:. Those /ho immediatel4 mix their o/n concepts into e er4 Cudgment aAout another person, can ne er arri e at the understanding o% an indi idualit4. Just as the %ree indi idualit4 emancipates himsel% %rom the characteristics o% the genus, so must the act o% 1no/ing emancipate itsel% %rom the /a4 in /hich /e understand /hat is generic. Onl4 to the extent that a man has emancipated himsel% in this /a4 %rom all that is generic, does he count as a %ree spirit /ithin a human communit4. No man is all genus, none is all indi idualit4. Eut e er4 man graduall4 emancipates a greater or lesser sphere o% his Aeing, Aoth %rom the generic characteristics o% animal li%e and %rom domination A4 the decrees o% human authorities. As regards that part o% his nature /here a man is not aAle to achie e this %reedom %or himsel%, he constitutes a part o% the /hole organism o% nature and spirit. In this respect he li es A4 cop4ing others or A4 oAe4ing their commands. Eut onl4 that part o% his conduct that springs %rom his intuitions can ha e ethical alue in the true sense. And those moral instincts that he possesses through the inheritance o% social instincts ac@uire ethical alue through Aeing ta1en up into his intuitions. It is %rom indi idual ethical intuitions and their acceptance A4 human communities that all moral acti it4 o% man1ind originates. In other /ords, the moral li%e o% man1ind is the sum total o% the products o% the moral imagination o% %ree human indi iduals. This is the conclusion reached A4 monism. ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. Immediatel4 upon the puAlication o% this Aoo1 8&('*:, critics oACected to the aAo e arguments that, e en no/, /ithin the generic character o% her sex, a /oman is aAle to shape her li%e indi iduall4, Cust as she pleases, and %ar more %reel4 than a man /ho is alread4 de,indi idualiDed, %irst A4 the school, and later A4 /ar and pro%ession. I am a/are that this oACection /ill Ae urged toda4 8&'&(:, e en more strongl4. None the less, I %eel Aound to let m4 sentences stand, in the hope that there are readers /ho appreciate ho/ iolentl4 such an oACection runs counter to the concept o% %reedom ad ocated in this Aoo1, and /ho /ill Cudge m4 sentences aAo e A4 a standard other than the de,indi idualiDing o%

man through school and pro%ession. ----.

8ltimate 9uestions - The Conse:uences of 4onism.

The uni%orm explanation o% the /orld, that is, the monism /e ha e descriAed, deri es the principles that it needs %or the explanation o% the /orld %rom human experience. In the same /a4, it loo1s %or the sources o% action /ithin the /orld o% oAser ation, that is, in that part o% human nature /hich is accessiAle to our sel%,1no/ledge, more particularl4 in moral imagination. Monism re%uses to in%er in an aAstract /a4 that the ultimate causes o% the /orld that is presented to our percei ing and thin1ing are to Ae %ound in a region outside this /orld. For monism, the unit4 that thought%ul oAser ation O /hich /e can experience O Arings to the mani%old multiplicit4 o% percepts is the same unit4 that man$s need %or 1no/ledge demands, and through /hich it see1s entr4 into the ph4sical and spiritual regions o% the /orld. "hoe er see1s another unit4 Aehind this one onl4 pro es that he does not recogniDe the identit4 o% /hat is disco ered A4 thin1ing and /hat is demanded A4 the urge %or 1no/ledge. The single human indi idual is not actuall4 cut o%% %rom the uni erse. -e is a part o% it, and Aet/een this part and the totalit4 o% the cosmos there exists a real connection /hich is Aro1en onl4 %or our perception. At %irst /e ta1e this part o% the uni erse as something existing on its o/n, Aecause /e do not see the Aelts and ropes A4 /hich the %undamental %orces o% the cosmos 1eep the /heel o% our li%e re ol ing. "hoe er remains at this standpoint sees a part o% the /hole as i% it /ere actuall4 an independentl4 existing thing, a monad /hich recei es in%ormation aAout the rest o% the /orld in some /a4 %rom /ithout. Monism, as here descriAed, sho/s that /e can Aelie e in this independence onl4 so long as the things /e percei e are not /o en A4 our thin1ing into the net/or1 o% the conceptual /orld. As soon as this happens, all separate existence turns out to Ae mere illusion due to percei ing. Man can %ind his %ull and complete existence in the totalit4 o% the uni erse onl4 through the experience o% intuiti e thin1ing. Thin1ing destro4s the illusion due to percei ing and integrates our indi idual existence into the li%e o% the cosmos. The unit4 o% the conceptual /orld, /hich contains all oACecti e percepts, also emAraces the content o% our suACecti e personalit4. Thin1ing gi es us realit4 in its true %orm as a sel%,contained unit4, /hereas the multiplicit4 o% percepts is Aut a semAlance due to the /a4 /e are organiDed 8see page 35:. To recogniDe true realit4, as against the illusion due to percei ing, has at all times Aeen the goal o% human thin1ing. Scienti%ic thought has made great e%%orts to recogniDe realit4 in percepts A4 disco ering the s4stematic connections Aet/een them. "here, ho/e er, it /as Aelie ed that the connections ascertained A4 human thin1ing had onl4 suACecti e alidit4,

the true Aasis o% unit4 /as sought in some entit4 l4ing Ae4ond our /orld o% experience 8an in%erred =od, /ill, aAsolute spirit, etc.:. On the strength o% this Aelie%, the attempt /as made to oAtain, in addition to the 1no/ledge accessiAle to experience, a second 1ind o% 1no/ledge /hich transcends experience and sho/s ho/ the /orld that can Ae experienced is connected /ith the entities that cannot 8a metaph4sics arri ed at A4 in%erence, and not A4 experience:. It /as thought that the reason /h4 /e can grasp the connections o% things in the /orld through disciplined thin1ing /as that a primordial Aeing had Auilt the /orld upon logical la/s, and, similarl4, that the grounds %or our actions la4 in the /ill o% such a Aeing. "hat /as not realiDed /as that thin1ing emAraces Aoth the suACecti e and the oACecti e in one grasp, and that through the union o% percept /ith concept the %ull realit4 is con e4ed. Onl4 as long as /e thin1 o% the la/ and order that permeates and determines the percept as ha ing the aAstract %orm o% a concept, are /e in %act dealing /ith something purel4 suACecti e. Eut the content o% a concept, /hich is added to the percept A4 means o% thin1ing, is not suACecti e. This content is not ta1en %rom the suACect, Aut %rom realit4. It is that part o% the realit4 that cannot Ae reached A4 the act o% percei ing. It is experience, Aut not experience gained through percei ing. I% someone cannot see that the concept is something real, he is thin1ing o% it onl4 in the aAstract %orm in /hich he holds it in his mind. Eut onl4 through our organiDation is it present in such isolation, Cust as in the case o% the percept. A%ter all, the tree that one percei es has no existence A4 itsel%, in isolation. It exists onl4 as a part o% the immense machiner4 o% nature, and can onl4 exist in real connection /ith nature. An aAstract concept ta1en A4 itsel% has as little realit4 as a percept ta1en A4 itsel%. The percept is the part o% realit4 that is gi en oACecti el4, the concept the part that is gi en suACecti el4 8through intuition O see page 50 %%.:. Our mental organiDation tears the realit4 apart into these t/o %actors. One %actor presents itsel% to perception, the other to intuition. Onl4 the union o% the t/o, that is, the percept %itting s4stematicall4 into the uni erse, constitutes the %ull realit4. I% /e ta1e mere percepts A4 themsel es, /e ha e no realit4 Aut rather a disconnected chaos+ i% /e ta1e A4 itsel% the la/ and order connecting the percepts, then /e ha e nothing Aut aAstract concepts. 9ealit4 is not contained in the aAstract concept+ it is, ho/e er, contained in thought%ul oAser ation, /hich does not one,sidedl4 consider either concept or percept alone, Aut rather the union o% the t/o. That /e li e in realit4 8that /e are rooted in it /ith our real existence: /ill not Ae denied A4 e en the most orthodox o% suACecti e idealists. -e /ill onl4 den4 that /e reach the same realit4 /ith our 1no/ing, /ith our ideas, as the one /e actuall4 li e in. Monism, on the other hand, sho/s that thin1ing is neither suACecti e nor oACecti e, Aut is a principle that emAraces Aoth sides o% realit4.

"hen /e oAser e /ith our thin1ing, /e carr4 out a process /hich itsel% Aelongs to the order o% real e ents. E4 means o% thin1ing, /ithin the experience itsel%, /e o ercome the one,sidedness o% mere percei ing. "e cannot argue out the essence o% realit4 A4 means o% aAstract conceptual h4potheses 8through pure conceptual re%lection:, Aut in so %ar as /e %ind the ideas that Aelong to the percepts, /e are li ing in the realit4. Monism does not see1 to add to experience something non,experienceaAle 8transcendental:, Aut %inds the %ull realit4 in concept and percept. It does not spin a s4stem o% metaph4sics out o% mere aAstract concepts, Aecause it sees in the concept A4 itsel% onl4 one side o% the realit4, namel4, the side that remains hidden %rom perception, and onl4 ma1es sense in connection /ith the percept. Monism does, ho/e er, gi e man the con iction that he li es in the /orld o% realit4 and has no need to loo1 Ae4ond this /orld %or a higher realit4 that can ne er Ae experienced. It re%rains %rom see1ing aAsolute realit4 an4/here else Aut in experience, Aecause it is Cust in the content o% experience that it recogniDes realit4. Monism is satis%ied A4 this realit4, Aecause it 1no/s that thin1ing has the po/er to guarantee it. "hat dualism see1s onl4 Ae4ond the oAser ed /orld, monism %inds in this /orld itsel%. Monism sho/s that /ith our act o% 1no/ing /e grasp realit4 in its true %orm, and not as a suACecti e image that inserts itsel% Aet/een man and realit4. For monism, the conceptual content o% the /orld is the same %or all human indi iduals 8see page 3(:. According to monistic principles, one human indi idual regards another as a1in to himsel% Aecause the same /orld content expresses itsel% in him. In the unitar4 /orld o% concepts there are not as man4 concepts o% the lion as there are indi iduals /ho thin1 o% a lion, Aut onl4 one. And the concept that A %its to his percept o% the lion is the same that E %its to his, onl4 apprehended A4 a di%%erent percei ing suACect 8see page 3':. Thin1ing leads all percei ing suACects to the same ideal unit4 in all multiplicit4. The unitar4 /orld o% ideas expresses itsel% in them as in a multiplicit4 o% indi iduals. As long as a man apprehends himsel% merel4 A4 means o% sel%,perception, he sees himsel% as this particular man+ as soon as he loo1s at the /orld o% ideas that lights up /ithin him, emAracing all that is separate, he sees /ithin himsel% the aAsolute realit4 li ing and shining %orth. !ualism de%ines the di ine primordial Eeing as that /hich per ades and li es in all men. Monism %inds this di ine li%e, common to all, in realit4 itsel%. The ideas o% another human Aeing are in suAstance mine also, and I regard them as di%%erent onl4 as long as I percei e, Aut no longer /hen I thin1. E er4 man emAraces in his thin1ing onl4 a part o% the total /orld o% ideas, and to that extent indi iduals di%%er e en in the actual content o% their thin1ing. Eut all these contents are /ithin a sel%contained /hole, /hich emAraces the thought contents o% all men. -ence e er4 man, in his thin1ing, la4s hold o% the uni ersal primordial Eeing /hich

per ades all men. To li e in realit4, %illed /ith the content o% thought, is at the same time to li e in =od. A /orld Ae4ond, that is merel4 in%erred and cannot Ae experienced, arises %rom a misconception on the part o% those /ho Aelie e that this /orld cannot ha e the %oundation o% its existence /ithin itsel%. The4 do not realiDe that through thin1ing the4 %ind Cust /hat the4 re@uire %or the explanation o% the percept. This is the reason /h4 no speculation has e er Arought to light an4 content that /as not Aorro/ed %rom the realit4 gi en to us. The =od that is assumed through aAstract in%erence is nothing Aut a human Aeing transplanted into the Ee4ond+ Schopenhauer$s "ill is human /ill,po/er made aAsolute+ -artmann$s >nconscious, a primordial Eeing made up o% idea and /ill, is Aut a compound o% t/o aAstractions dra/n %rom experience. Exactl4 the same is true o% all other transcendental principles Aased on thought that has not Aeen experienced. The truth is that the human spirit ne er transcends the realit4 in /hich /e li e, nor has it an4 need to do so, seeing that this /orld contains e er4thing the human spirit re@uires in order to explain it. I% philosophers e entuall4 declare themsel es satis%ied /ith the deduction o% the /orld %rom principles the4 Aorro/ %rom experience and transplant into an h4pothetical Ee4ond, then it should Ae Cust as possiAle to Ae satis%ied /hen the same content is allo/ed to remain in this /orld, /here %or our thin1ing as experienced it does Aelong. All attempts to transcend the /orld are purel4 illusor4, and the principles transplanted %rom this /orld into the Ee4ond do not explain the /orld an4 Aetter than those /hich remain /ithin it. I% thin1ing understands itsel% it /ill not as1 %or an4 such transcendence at all, since e er4 content o% thought must loo1 /ithin the /orld and not outside it %or a perceptual content, together /ith /hich it %orms something real. The oACects o% imagination, too, are no more than contents /hich Aecome Custi%ied onl4 /hen trans%ormed into mental pictures that re%er to a perceptual content. Through this perceptual content the4 Aecome an integral part o% realit4. A concept that is supposed to Ae %illed /ith a content l4ing Ae4ond our gi en /orld is an aAstraction to /hich no realit4 corresponds. "e can thin1 out onl4 the concepts o% realit4+ in order to %ind realit4 itsel%, /e must also ha e perception. A primordial /orld Aeing %or /hich /e in ent a content is an impossiAle assumption %or an4 thin1ing that understands itsel%. Monism does not den4 ideal elements, in %act, it considers a perceptual content /ithout an ideal counterpart as not %ull4 real+ Aut in the /hole realm o% thin1ing it %inds nothing that could re@uire us to step outside the realm o% our thin1ing$s experience A4 den4ing the oACecti e spiritual realit4 o% thin1ing itsel%. Monism regards a science that limits itsel% to a description o% percepts /ithout penetrating to their ideal complements as incomplete. Eut it regards as e@uall4 incomplete all aAstract

concepts that do not %ind their complements in percepts, and that %it no/here into the conceptual net/or1 that emAraces the /hole oAser aAle /orld. -ence it 1no/s no ideas that re%er to oACecti e %actors l4ing Ae4ond our experience and /hich are supposed to %orm the content o% a purel4 h4pothetical s4stem o% metaph4sics. All that man1ind has produced in the /a4 o% such ideas monism regards as aAstractions Aorro/ed %rom experience, the %act o% Aorro/ing ha ing Aeen o erloo1ed A4 the originators. Just as little, according to monistic principles, can the aims o% our action Ae deri ed %rom an extrahuman Ee4ond. In so %ar as /e thin1 them, the4 must stem %rom human intuition. Man does not ta1e the purposes o% an oACecti e 8transcendental: primordial Eeing and ma1e them his o/n, Aut he pursues his o/n indi idual purposes gi en him A4 his moral imagination. The idea that realiDes itsel% in an action is detached A4 man %rom the unitar4 /orld o% ideas and made the Aasis o% his /ill. There%ore it is not the commandments inCected into this /orld %rom the Ee4ond that li e in his action, Aut human intuitions Aelonging to this /orld itsel%. Monism 1no/s no such /orld,dictator /ho sets our aims and directs our actions %rom outside. Man %inds no such primal ground o% existence /hose counsels he might in estigate in order to learn %rom it the aims to /hich he has to direct his actions. -e is thro/n Aac1 upon himsel%. It is he himsel% /ho must gi e content to his action. I% he loo1s outside the /orld in /hich he li es %or the grounds determining his /ill, he /ill loo1 in ain. I% he is to go Ae4ond merel4 satis%4ing his natural instincts, %or /hich Mother Nature has pro ided, then he must see1 these grounds in his o/n moral imagination, unless he %inds it more con enient to let himsel% Ae determined A4 the moral imaginations o% others+ in other /ords, either he must gi e up action altogether, or else he must act %or reasons that he gi es himsel% out o% his /orld o% ideas or that others select %or him out o% theirs. I% he ad ances Ae4ond merel4 %ollo/ing his li%e o% sensuous instincts or carr4ing out the commands o% others, then he /ill Ae determined A4 nothing Aut himsel%. -e must act out o% an impulse gi en A4 himsel% and determined A4 nothing else. It is true that this impulse is determined ideall4 in the unitar4 /orld o% ideas+ Aut in practice it is onl4 A4 man that it can Ae ta1en %rom that /orld and translated into realit4. The grounds %or the actual translation o% an idea into realit4 A4 man, monism can %ind onl4 in man himsel%. I% an idea is to Aecome action, man must %irst /ant it, Ae%ore it can happen. Such an act o% /ill there%ore has its grounds onl4 in man himsel%. Man is then the ultimate determinant o% his action. -e is %ree. ----. Author*s additions, #%#&. ----.

1.

In the second part o% this Aoo1 the attempt has Aeen made to demonstrate that %reedom is to Ae %ound in the realit4 o% human action. For this purpose it /as necessar4 to single out %rom the /hole sphere o% human conduct those actions in /hich, on the Aasis o% unpreCudiced sel%,oAser ation, one can spea1 o% %reedom. These are actions that represent the realiDation o% ideal intuitions. No other actions /ill Ae called %ree A4 an unpreCudiced oAser er. Fet Cust A4 oAser ing himsel% in an unpreCudiced /a4, man /ill ha e to see that it is in his nature to progress along the road to/ards ethical intuitions and their realiDation. Eut this unpreCudiced oAser ation o% the ethical nature o% man cannot, A4 itsel%, arri e at a %inal conclusion aAout %reedom. For /ere intuiti e thin1ing to originate in an4thing other than itsel%, /ere its essence not sel%,sustaining, then the consciousness o% %reedom that %lo/s %rom moralit4 /ould pro e to Ae a mere illusion. Eut the second part o% this Aoo1 %inds its natural support in the %irst part. This presents intuiti e thin1ing as man$s in/ardl4 experienced spiritual acti it4. To understand this nature o% thin1ing A4 experiencing it amounts to a 1no/ledge o% the %reedom o% intuiti e thin1ing. And once /e 1no/ that this thin1ing is %ree, /e can also see to /hat region o% the /ill %reedom ma4 Ae ascriAed. "e shall regard man as a %ree agent i%, on the Aasis o% inner experience, /e ma4 attriAute a sel%,sustaining essence to the li%e o% intuiti e thin1ing. "hoe er cannot do this /ill ne er Ae aAle to disco er a path to the acceptance o% %reedom that cannot Ae challenged in an4 /a4. This experience, to /hich /e ha e attached such importance, disco ers intuiti e thin1ing /ithin consciousness, although the realit4 o% this thin1ing is not con%ined to consciousness. And /ith this it disco ers %reedom as the distinguishing %eature o% all actions proceeding %rom the intuitions o% consciousness. ----.
2.

The argument o% this Aoo1 is Auilt upon intuiti e thin1ing /hich ma4 Ae experienced in a purel4 spiritual /a4 and through /hich, in the act o% 1no/ing, e er4 percept is placed in the /orld o% realit4. This Aoo1 aims at presenting no more than can Ae sur e4ed through the experience o% intuiti e thin1ing. Eut /e must also emphasiDe /hat 1ind o% thought %ormation this experience o% thin1ing demands. It demands that /e shall not den4 that intuiti e thin1ing is a sel%,sustaining experience /ithin the process o% 1no/ledge. It demands that /e ac1no/ledge that this thin1ing, in conCunction /ith the percept, is aAle to experience realit4 instead o% ha ing to see1 it in an in%erred /orld l4ing Ae4ond experience, compared to /hich the acti it4 o% human thin1ing

/ould Ae something purel4 suACecti e. Thus thin1ing is characteriDed as that %actor through /hich man /or1s his /a4 spirituall4 into realit4. 8And, actuall4, no one should con%use this /orld conception that is Aased on the direct experience o% thin1ing /ith mere rationalism.: On the other hand, it should Ae e ident %rom the /hole spirit o% this argument that %or human 1no/ledge the perceptual element onl4 Aecomes a guarantee o% realit4 /hen it is ta1en hold o% in thin1ing. Outside thin1ing there is nothing to characteriDe realit4 %or /hat it is. -ence /e must not imagine that the 1ind o% realit4 guaranteed A4 sense perception is the onl4 one. "hate er comes to us A4 /a4 o% percept is something that, on our Courne4 through li%e, /e simpl4 ha e to a/ait. The onl4 @uestion is, /ould it Ae right to expect, %rom the point o% ie/ that this purel4 intuiti el4 experienced thin1ing gi es us, that man could percei e spiritual things as /ell as those percei ed /ith the senses7 It /ould Ae right to expect this. For although, on the one hand, intuiti el4 experienced thin1ing is an acti e process ta1ing place in the human spirit, on the other hand it is also a spiritual percept grasped /ithout a ph4sical sense organ. It is a percept in /hich the percei er is himsel% acti e, and a sel%,acti it4 /hich is at the same time percei ed. In intuiti el4 experienced thin1ing man is carried into a spiritual /orld also as percei er. "ithin this spiritual /orld, /hate er con%ronts him as percept in the same /a4 that the spiritual /orld o% his o/n thin1ing does /ill Ae recogniDed A4 him as a /orld o% spiritual perception. This /orld o% spiritual perception could Ae seen as ha ing the same relationship to thin1ing that the /orld o% sense perception has on the side o% the senses. Once experienced, the /orld o% spiritual perception cannot appear to man as something %oreign to him, Aecause in his intuiti e thin1ing he alread4 has an experience /hich is purel4 spiritual in character. Such a /orld o% spiritual perception is discussed in a numAer o% /ritings /hich I ha e puAlished since this Aoo1 %irst appeared. The Philosoph4 o% Freedom %orms the philosophical %oundation %or these later /ritings. For it tries to sho/ that the experience o% thin1ing, /hen rightl4 understood, is in %act an experience o% spirit. There%ore it appears to the author that no one /ho can in all seriousness adopt the point o% ie/ o% The Philosoph4 o% Freedom /ill stop short Ae%ore entering the /orld o% spiritual perception. It is certainl4 not possiAle to deduce /hat is descriAed in the author$s later Aoo1s A4 logical in%erence %rom the contents o% this one. Eut a li ing comprehension o% /hat is meant in this Aoo1 A4 intuiti e thin1ing /ill lead @uite naturall4 to a li ing entr4 into the /orld o% spiritual perception. ----.

Appendix + Added to the ne, edition, #%#&. OACections /hich /ere made %rom the philosophical side immediatel4 upon the puAlication o% this Aoo1 induce me to add the %ollo/ing Arie% discussion to this ne/ edition. I can /ell understand that there are readers /ho are interested in the rest o% the Aoo1, Aut /ho /ill loo1 upon /hat %ollo/s as a remote and unnecessar4 tissue o% aAstract concepts. The4 can lea e this short statement unread. Eut in philosoph4 proAlems arise /hich ha e their origin more in certain preCudices on the thin1ers$ part than in the natural course o% human thin1ing itsel%. Other/ise it seems to me that this Aoo1 deals /ith a tas1 that concerns e er4one /ho is tr4ing to get clear aAout the nature o% man and his relationship to the /orld. "hat %ollo/s is rather a proAlem /hich certain philosophers insist should Ae discussed as part o% the suACect matter o% such a Aoo1, Aecause, A4 their /hole /a4 o% thin1ing, the4 ha e created certain di%%iculties /hich do not other/ise occur. I% one /ere to pass A4 such proAlems altogether, certain people /ould Ae @uic1 to accuse one o% dilettantism and the li1e. And the impression /ould arise that the author o% the ie/s set do/n in this Aoo1 has not come to terms /ith those points o% ie/ he has not discussed in the Aoo1 itsel%. The proAlem to /hich I re%er is this# there are thin1ers /ho Aelie e that a special di%%icult4 arises /hen one tries to understand ho/ another person$s soul li%e can a%%ect one$s o/n. The4 sa4# m4 conscious /orld is enclosed /ithin me+ in the same /a4, an4 other conscious /orld is enclosed /ithin itsel%. I cannot see into the /orld o% consciousness o% another person. -o/, then, do I 1no/ that he and I are Aoth in the same /orld7 The theor4 /hich Aelie es it possiAle to in%er %rom the conscious /orld an unconscious /orld /hich can ne er enter consciousness, tries to sol e this di%%icult4 in the %ollo/ing /a4. It sa4s# the /orld I ha e in m4 consciousness is the representati e in me o% a real /orld to /hich I ha e no conscious access. In this real /orld lie the un1no/n causes o% m4 conscious /orld. In it also lies m4 o/n real Aeing, o% /hich I ha e onl4 a representati e in m4 consciousness. In it also, ho/e er, lies the Aeing o% m4 %ello/ man. No/ /hate er is experienced in the consciousness o% m4 %ello/ man corresponds to a realit4 in his Aeing /hich is independent o% his consciousness. This realit4 acts, in the realm /hich cannot Aecome conscious, upon m4 o/n real Aeing /hich is said to Ae unconscious+ and in this /a4 something is created in m4 consciousness representing /hat is present in a consciousness that is @uite independent o% m4 o/n conscious experience. It is clear that to the /orld accessiAle to m4 consciousness an inaccessiAle one is here Aeing added h4potheticall4, since one Aelie es that other/ise one is %orced to the conclusion that the /hole external /orld, /hich I thin1 is there in %ront o% me, is nothing Aut the /orld o% m4 consciousness, and to the %urther ,, solipsistic ,, aAsurdit4 that other

people, too, exist onl4 /ithin m4 consciousness. This proAlem, /hich has Aeen created A4 se eral recent tendencies in epistemolog4, can Ae clari%ied i% one tries to sur e4 the matter %rom the point o% ie/ o% the spirituall4 oriented oAser ation adopted in this Aoo1. "hat is it, in the %irst instance, that I ha e Ae%ore me /hen I con%ront another person7 The most immediate thing is the Aodil4 appearance o% the other person as gi en to me in sense perception+ then, perhaps, the auditor4 perception o% /hat he is sa4ing, and so on. I do not merel4 stare at all this, Aut it sets m4 thin1ing acti it4 in motion. Through the thin1ing /ith /hich I con%ront the other person, the percept o% him Aecomes, as it /ere, transparent to the mind. I am Aound to admit that /hen I grasp the percept /ith m4 thin1ing, it is not at all the same thing as appeared to the outer senses. In /hat is a direct appearance to the senses, something else is indirectl4 re ealed. The mere sense appearance extinguishes itsel% at the same time as it con%ronts me. Eut /hat it re eals through this extinguishing compels me as a thin1ing Aeing to extinguish m4 o/n thin1ing as long as I am under its in%luence, and to put its thin1ing in the place o% mine. I then grasp its thin1ing in m4 thin1ing as an experience li1e m4 o/n. I ha e reall4 percei ed another person$s thin1ing. The immediate percept, extinguishing itsel% as sense appearance, is grasped A4 m4 thin1ing, and this is a process l4ing /holl4 /ithin m4 consciousness and consisting in this, that the other person$s thin1ing ta1es the place o% mine. Through the sel%,extinction o% the sense appearance, the separation Aet/een the t/o spheres o% consciousness is actuall4 o ercome. This expresses itsel% in m4 consciousness through the %act that /hile experiencing the content o% another person$s consciousness I experience m4 o/n consciousness as little as I experience it in dreamless sleep. Just as in dreamless sleep m4 /a1ing consciousness is eliminated, so in m4 percei ing o% the content o% another person$s consciousness the content o% m4 o/n is eliminated. The illusion that it is not so onl4 comes aAout Aecause in percei ing the other person, %irstl4, the extinction o% the content o% one$s o/n consciousness gi es place not to unconsciousness, as it does in sleep, Aut to the content o% the other person$s consciousness, and secondl4, the alternations Aet/een extinguishing and lighting up again o% m4 o/n sel%,consciousness %ollo/ too rapidl4 to Ae generall4 noticed. This /hole proAlem is to Ae sol ed, not through arti%icial conceptual structures /ith in%erences %rom the conscious to things that can ne er Aecome conscious, Aut rather through genuine experience o% /hat results %rom comAining thin1ing /ith the percept. This applies to a great man4 proAlems /hich appear in philosophical literature. Thin1ers should see1 the path to open,minded, spirituall4 oriented oAser ation+ instead o% /hich the4 insert an arti%icial conceptual structure Aet/een themsel es and the realit4. In a treatise A4 Eduard on -artmann entitled The >ltimate ProAlems o% Epistemolog4 and Metaph4sics 8see %n &:, m4 Philosoph4 o% Freedom has Aeen classed /ith the

philosophical tendenc4 /hich /ould Aase itsel% upon an Bepistemological monismB. Eduard on -artmann reCects such a position as untenaAle. This is explained as %ollo/s. According to the /a4 o% thin1ing expressed in his treatise, there are onl4 three possiAle positions in the theor4 o% 1no/ledge. Firstl4, one remains at the naN e point o% ie/, /hich regards percei ed phenomena as real things existing outside human consciousness. This implies a lac1 o% critical 1no/ledge. One %ails to realiDe that /ith the content o% one$s consciousness one remains, a%ter all, onl4 /ithin one$s o/n consciousness. One %ails to percei e that one is dealing, not /ith a BtaAle,in,itsel%B, Aut onl4 /ith an oACect in one$s o/n consciousness. "hoe er remains at this point o% ie/, or %or /hate er reason returns to it, is a naN e realist. Eut this /hole position is untenaAle %or it %ails to recogniDe that consciousness has no other oACects than its o/n contents. Secondl4, one appreciates this situation and admits it %ull4 to onesel%. One /ould then Ae a transcendental idealist. Eut then one /ould ha e to den4 that an4thing o% a Bthing,in, itsel%B could e er appear in human consciousness. In this /a4, ho/e er, pro ided one is consistent enough, one /ill not a oid aAsolute illusionism. For the /orld /hich con%ronts one no/ trans%orms itsel% into a mere sum o% oACects o% consciousness, and, moreo er, onl4 o% oACects o% one$s o/n consciousness. One is then compelled ,, aAsurdl4 enough ,, to regard other people too as Aeing present solel4 in the content o% one$s o/n consciousness. The onl4 possiAle standpoint is the third, transcendental realism. This assumes that there are Bthings,inthemsel esB, Aut that the consciousness can ha e no 1ind o% dealings /ith them in immediate experience. Ee4ond the sphere o% human consciousness, and in a /a4 that does not enter it, the4 cause the oACects o% our consciousness to arise in it. One can arri e at these Bthings,in,themsel esB onl4 A4 in%erence %rom the content o% consciousness, /hich is all that is actuall4 experienced Aut is ne ertheless merel4 pictured in the mind. Eduard on -artmann maintains in the article mentioned aAo e that Bepistemological monismB ,, %or such he ta1es m4 point o% ie/ to Ae ,, must in realit4 accept one o% these three positions+ and it %ails to do so onl4 Aecause it does not dra/ the logical conclusions %rom its postulates. The article goes on to sa4# I% one /ants to %ind out /hich theoretical position a supposed epistemological monist occupies, one need onl4 put certain @uestions to him and compel him to ans/er them. For such a person /ill ne er /illingl4 commit himsel% to an expression o% opinion on these points, and /ill, moreo er, see1 A4 all means to e ade ans/ering direct @uestions, Aecause e er4 ans/er /ould sho/ that epistemological monism cannot claim to Ae di%%erent %rom one or other o% the three positions. These @uestions are as %ollo/s# Are things continuous or intermittent in their existence7 I% the ans/er is BcontinuousB, then one is dealing /ith some %orm o% naN e realism. I% the ans/er is BintermittentB, then one has transcendental idealism. Eut i% the ans/er is that the4 are, on the one hand, continuous

8as contents o% the aAsolute consciousness, or as unconscious mental pictures, or as possiAilities o% perception:, Aut on the other hand, intermittent 8as contents o% limited consciousness:, then transcendental realism is estaAlished. "hen three people are sitting at a taAle, ho/ man4 distinct taAles are there# "hoe er ans/ers BoneB is a naN e realist+ /hoe er ans/ers BthreeB is a transcendental idealist+ Aut /hoe er ans/ers B%ourB is a transcendental realist. -ere, o% course, it is assumed that it is legitimate to emArace such di%%erent things as the one taAle as a thing,in,itsel% and the three taAles as perceptual oACects in the three consciousnesses under the common designation o% Ba taAleB. I% this seems too great a liAert4 to an4one, he /ill ha e to ans/er Bone and threeB instead o% B%ourB. "hen t/o people are alone together in a room, ho/ man4 distinct persons are there# "hoe er ans/ers Bt/oB is a naN e realist. "hoe er ans/ers B%ourB 8namel4, one sel% and one other person in each o% the t/o consciousnesses: is a transcendental idealist. "hoe er ans/ers BsixB 8namel4, t/o persons as Bthings,in,themsel esB and %our persons as mentall4 pictured oACects in the t/o consciousnesses: is a transcendental realist. I% an4one /ants to sho/ that epistemological monism is di%%erent %rom an4 o% these three positions, he /ould ha e to gi e a di%%erent ans/er to each o% these three @uestions+ Aut I /ould not 1no/ /hat this could Ae. The ans/ers o% the Philosoph4 o% Freedom /ould ha e to Ae# "hoe er grasps onl4 the perceptual contents o% things and ta1es these %or realit4, is a naN e realist, and he does not realiDe that, strictl4, he ought to regard these perceptual contents as existing onl4 as long as he is loo1ing at the things, so that he ought to thin1 o% the things Ae%ore him as intermittent. As soon, ho/e er, as it Aecomes clear to him that realit4 is present onl4 in the percepts that are permeated A4 thought, he /ill see that the perceptual contents /hich appear as intermittent re eal themsel es as continuous as soon as the4 are permeated /ith the results o% thin1ing. -ence /e must count as continuous the perceptual content that has Aeen grasped through the experience o% thin1ing, o% /hich onl4 that part that is merel4 percei ed could Ae regarded as intermittent, i% ,, /hich is not the case ,, it /ere real. "hen three people are sitting at a taAle, ho/ man4 distinct taAles are there7 There is onl4 one taAle present+ Aut as long as the three people /ent no %urther than their perceptual images, the4 /ould ha e to sa4, BThese perceptual images are not a realit4 at all.B As soon as the4 pass on to the taAle as grasped A4 their thin1ing, the one realit4 o% the taAle re eals itsel% to them+ then, /ith their three contents o% consciousness, the4 are united in this realit4. "hen t/o people are alone together in a room, ho/ man4 distinct persons are there7 There are most certainl4 not six ,, not e en in the sense o% the transcendental realists ,, Aut onl4 t/o. All one can sa4 is that, at the %irst moment, each person has nothing Aut the

unreal perceptual image o% himsel% and o% the other person. There are %our o% these images, and through their presence in the thin1ing acti it4 o% the t/o people, realit4 is grasped. In this acti it4 o% thin1ing each person transcends his o/n sphere o% consciousness+ in it the consciousness o% the other person as /ell as o% himsel% comes to li%e. In these moments o% coming to li%e the t/o people are as little enclosed /ithin their o/n consciousnesses as the4 are in sleep. Eut at other moments the a/areness o% the aAsorption in the other person appears again, so that the consciousness o% each person, in the experience o% thin1ing, apprehends Aoth himsel% and the other. I 1no/ that a transcendental realist descriAes this as a relapse into naN e realism. Eut then, I ha e alread4 pointed out in this Aoo1 that naN e realism retains its Custi%ication %or the thin1ing that is experienced. The transcendental realist /ill ha e nothing /hate er to do /ith the true state o% a%%airs regarding the process o% 1no/ledge+ he cuts himsel% o%% %rom the %acts A4 a tissue o% thoughts and entangles himsel% in it. Moreo er, the monism /hich appears in The Philosoph4 o% Freedom ought not to Ae laAeled BepistemologicalB, Aut, i% an epithet is /anted, then a Bmonism o% thoughtB. All this has Aeen misunderstood A4 Eduard on -artmann. -e has ignored all that is speci%ic in the argumentation o% The Philosoph4 o% Freedom, and has stated that I ha e attempted to comAine -egel$s uni ersalistic panlogism /ith -ume$s indi idualistic phenomenalism 8see %n ):, /hereas in %act The Philosoph4 o% Freedom has nothing /hate er to do /ith the t/o positions it is allegedl4 tr4ing to comAine. 8This, too, is the reason /h4 I could not %eel inclined, %or example, to go into the Bepistemological monismB o% Johannes 9ehm1e. The point o% ie/ o% The Philosoph4 o% Freedom is simpl4 @uite di%%erent %rom /hat Eduard on -artmann and others call epistemological monism.: ,,,,.
Footnotes:

&. B!ie letDten Fragen der Er1enntnistheorie und Metaph4si1B, Meitschri%t %Kr Philosophie und philosophische .riti1, <ol. &;(, p. 22. ). Meitschri%t %Kr Philosophie, <ol. &;(, p. 5&, note.