Legal Writing Timothy Mark G.

Maderazo Juris Doctor

a. Title and Citation: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Facts: On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office. The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss term. William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. Issues 1. Whether or not Marbury has a right to the commission 2. Whether or not the law grants Marbury a remedy 3. Whether or not Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void Ruling: Court held that Marbury has a right to the commission and he was granted a remedy. Reasoning: Court says Marbury has a right to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executives constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.

Court says that the law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. Court says that the Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore void. That it is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. (http://www.lawnix.com/cases/marbury madison.html

b. Title and Citation: Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, September 29, 1966. Facts: In the year 1960 the Caltex conceived a promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil products. It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period ("Caltex Hooded Pump Contest") The contest is open to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". To participate, there is no fee or consideration required or purchase of Caltex products. Entry forms were made available upon request at each Caltex station. Prizes were also set. Representations were then made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law The then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law The appellant warned the appellee openly that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind" In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law Trial court ruled held that 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails. The respondent appealed. Issues: 1. Whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. 2. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; Ruling: Court held that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief Court affirmed trial court. It ruled that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law Reasoning: 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court says declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute Court says that the justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid because there is an assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue For this reason, the court needs to settle the controversy at hand. Court says that the appellant cannot just rely on the law to interpret itself. Judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself. On the second issue, court explains that there are three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. Court says the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery In this case, no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate. Also, gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", Court recognizes the necessity to suppress their tendency of some enterprise to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals but it does not apply to this case.

c. T it le a n d Cit at i o n : Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991. Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations. He has been a dues paying member of the IBP and he has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for

"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.

Issue: Whether or not Monsod had engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. Ruling: Petition is hereby DISMISSED. (in favor of Monsod) The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. Reasoning: Court said that Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years It reasoned that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. Separate Opinion: NARVASA, J., concurring:

Justice Narvasa concurred with the decision of the majority. He said it does not appear to me that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Justice Padilla dissented. He said that to "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily. That he said he is convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met by Monsod and if ever the latter did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years. That to recall, Monsod was lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or

a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. Padilla said that in order for practice of law to be determined, Attorney-client relationship and Compensation out of lawyers work must be established.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Cruz thinks that the court is not inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He also believes that phrase "practice of law" as defined by the ponencia was practically toothless. It made him feel that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law. Monsod, as conceded has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

Gutierrez believes that Monsod has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. The latter is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits. Gutierrez also stated that a person may have passed the bar examinations, but if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement, that person cannot claim to have been engaged in the practice of law Hon. Gutierrez also stated that the deliberate choice of words 10 years practice of law shows that the practice envisioned in that qualification is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous.

d. Title and Citation: Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122, September 20, 1996.

Facts: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client. Issue: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege information)

Ruling: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with their client. Reasoning: As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE: The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. 1. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established. 2. Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship. 3. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary. EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN: 1. Strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice. 2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case) 3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyers client unless by revealing the clients name it would provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (present in this case) 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case) 5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential. http://talkaboutphilippinelaw.weebly.com/1/post/2011/2/judges-and-lawyers-cases.html

e. Title and Citation Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Facts: Law Professors in UP published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Issue: Whether or not accused were liable for contempt of court Whether or not accused violated Code of Professional Responsibility shown through their actions Ruling: Accused were directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ratio: The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice

f. T i t l e a n d C i t a t i o n : Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1, June 22, 2006.

Facts: In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation and challenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Pias learned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.

Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow since 1998. She admitted that shes been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Issue: Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Ruling: Escritor cannot be penalized. Reasoning: The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

g. Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, March 2, 2001.

Facts: On October 4 2000, Singson went on air and accused Estrada of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The next day, Guingona delivered a privileged speech accusing Estrada of the same. The speech was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for a joint investigation. The House Committee on Public Order and Security also decided to investigate. Some Representatives moved to impeach Estrada. Calls for resignation came from various individuals and organizations, including the Catholic Church, Pres. Aquino and Pres. Ramos. Arroyo resigned as Secretary of DSWD and asked for Estradas resignation. Several heads and members of the Executive Department resigned from their positions as well. House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (signed by 115 Reps) to the Senate. The latter formally opened the impeachment trial. It was covered by live TV.

Equitable PCIBank Senior VP Ocampo, as witness, testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed his signature as Jose Velarde on documents involving P500M investment agreement. A second envelope was supposed to be opened showing that Estrada held a P3.3M bank account under the name of Jose Velarde. But the senator-judges (11 no; 10 yes) ruled otherwise. As a result, the public prosecutors resigned and thousands assembled in EDSA and rallied against Estrada and the 11 Senators who voted against the opening of the 2nd envelope. Reyes, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces had defected. He, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to EDSA. Reyes declared that on behalf of the Armed Forces, they are withdrawing their support from Estradas administration. On January 20, 2001, first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started. while still negotiating, news broke out that Davide would administer oath to Arroyo at noon. Estrada and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following statement:
"20 January 2001 STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

A copy of the letter was sent to Congress. After taking oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the duties of the Presidency. Her presidency was recognized by foreign governments, by the Congress and by the people. The Senate passed a resolution declaring the impeachment court as functus officio. Several cases (plunder, graft and corruption, briber, perjury, serious misconduct, among others) filed by various parties in the Office of the Ombusman were set in motion. Estrada filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting further proceedings until after his term. He also filed for Quo Warranto and prayed that he be declared the lawful and incumbent President and that Arroyo took her oath only in an acting capacity.

Issues:

(1)Whether Estrada is only on leave and Arroyo is only an Acting Pres. (2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to Act as Pres.

Ruling: Court held that petitioner resigned as President.

Reasoning: In this case there was intent to resign and that intent was coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 Resignation can be oral, it can be written or it can be express. It can also be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. That petitioner resigned from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001. On the second issue, it can be noted that the House of Representatives already declared Arroyo to be the President and Guingona as the Vice President. The Senate confirmed the same as well. It also declared the impeachment court functus officio. Both houses started sending bills to Arroyo as President. Both houses recognized the new administration. It is clear that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary

h. Title and Citation: Lejano v. People, 638 SCRA 104, December 14, 2010.

Facts: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and her sister, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's

bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony. But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister. On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his ri ght to due process.

Issue/s: whether or not the Court should acquit Webb outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are: (main)

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Reasoning: Court said that eyewitness account should not automatically cancel out the accuseds claim or alibi when supported by facts It noted that CA disregarded DNA evidence without convincing reasons. Court also said that inconsistencies in Alfaros testimony should not be brushed aside. It appears to the SC that NBI people had a stake in making Alfaro sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. That Alfaro is obviously an NBI asset. Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. The fact that she had so much familiarity of the details in the case can be doubted. SC also raised an important concept that in weighing doubts about the innocence of the accused vis-a-vis reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the latter must prevail.

Separate Opinions (if any) Concurring: Concurring statement of one of the justices emphasized matters which are enlightening. It said that while it should be the common desire of bench and bar that crime is not left unpunished, it is no less important, that the innocent be shielded from hasty prosecution and rash conviction. It said that testimony may be impugned if the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of perceiving the event and that users of opium, or other like narcotics, become notorious liars Defense witness Dr. Rey San Pedro, then Deputy Executive Director of the Dangerous Drugs Board, opined that drug addicts or dependents are generally liars who would lie for less than noble objectives, such as for money and/or to satisfy their craving for attention.

It reiterated that Alfaro is an asset of the NBI. That Alfaro appears to be a rehearsed witness. That the trial courts order preventing the defense from cross-examining Alfaro on the inconsistencies between her two Affidavits is a manifestation of lower courts inclination. Concurring also mentioned that Webbs alibi could not have been fabricated with ease, therefore must be given credence. DISSENTING OPINION A dissenting opinion was crafted by one of the justices. It emphasized that determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court, because it has the unique position of observing the witness deportment on the st and while testifying It goes to say that indeed, Alfaro could not have divulged the foregoing details of the crime if she did not really join the group of Webb in going to the Vizconde residence and witness what happened during the time Her being a former drug user in no way taints her credibility as a witness. That the fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does not per se affect her credibility.115

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION (SERENO, J) Separate and concurring opinion was also delivered. It expressed its observation that various violations of the accuseds rights have resulted in his failure to secure a just trial. As such, the judgment of conviction cannot stand. It reminded that prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done That he may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. That a criminal trial is not about personal redress for the victims, but about determining the guilt and the just punishment of the accused This separate opinion believes that the rights of the accused are protected, to the extent necessary to ensure fairness for him. That rights of the victim are not ignored, but they are respected only to the extent that they are consistent with the fairness of the trial for the accused.9 It stressed that confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution.

That in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights should take precedence over the right of the State to prosecute It further asserts the presumption of innocence of the accused is at the center of our criminal justice system in fact the cornerstone. It is therefore the duty of the prosecution not to issue prejudicial statements about them while the trial is being conducted The Judge of the lower court here, her subsequent acts, however, as well as her Decision taken together showed a pattern now recognizable in retrospect as bias against the accused, amounting to denial of due process. That Webbs first Motion for the disqualification of Judge Tolentino, filed prior to their arraignment, was anchored on the ground that the said judge had allegedly told the media that "failure of the accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of arrest is an indication of guilt. Judged also said that accused "should not expect the comforts of home. However, it reminded parties to observe caution in disqualifying a respondent judge. It says that the trial of the petitioners is about to end and to assign a new judge to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioners will not be for the best interest of justice. The respondent judge observed the demeanor of witnesses while in the witness chair; she is in the best position to calibrate their credibility. That judges are not perfect. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who err for we all err. This separate opinion also says that access to evidence requires the correlative duty of the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or alter it. That the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere or technical right; it is a substantive right. That suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution This opinion exclaimed that society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair. That it is the duty of the prosecution to preserve evidence It says that since more than six (6) years had lapsed since the commission of the crime, there was no assurance that the semen specimen remained uncontaminated. It held that Webb was not able to show that the proper procedure for the extraction and preservation of the semen sample and that a DNA test would only lead to confusion of the issues. This is a unsubstantiated fact. So far, 261 convicts in the United States have been exonerated as a result of post-conviction DNA testing Supplemental Opinion (Brion, J.) A suplepmental opinion has been delivered. It said that although the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the observance of the restriction by punishing its violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71. That persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often invoke as

defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for contempt constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment. It reminded that freedom of speech is not absolute. That public opinion has no place in a criminal trial. Courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence. Justices and judges are no different from members of the jury, and they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media It also expound on the pressure that media can bring to bear on [witnesses and judges] directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case becomes subject to a contempt proceeding when it is intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon the dignity of the court. Contempt is constituted if the speech tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades the administration of justice. It emphasized that unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein It recognizes that people has freedom to criticize the government which includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our democratic society to ensure that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics confidence in the administration of justice is maintained.20 These criticisms must, however, be fair, made in good faith, and "not spill over the walls of decency and propriety In the overwhelming media attention this case has received, whatever the results may be, doubts will linger about the real merits of the case.

i. Title and Citation: Lejano v.People, 639 SCRA 760, January 18, 2011.

Facts :

On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking

credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."1 Issue: 1. Whether or not SC erred in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witness resulting in a final judgment acquitting the accused 2. Whether or not such instance warrant review and reversal of judgment on the part of Supreme Court Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

Reasoning As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that: Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. Court says that what the complainant questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility not the sham review of the case. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

Separate Opinions (if any) CONCURRING OPINION In a concurring opinion, it was expressed by one of the justices that in excessively protecting Alfaro, the trial court improperly ascribed to her the right reserved for an accused. It unreasonably imposed severe limitations on the extent of the right of the defense to crossexamine her. It must be remembered that Alfaro was a witness who had a legal duty to "answer questions, although his (her) answer may tend to establish a claim against him (her)." 3 The Rules provide that "the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom. This freedom was restricted by the court in a number of instances. W hen, for example, defense counsel inquired about the circumstances of Patricks (Alfaros brother)

departure for the United States, the prosecution objected to the questions on the ground of irrelevance. Respondent judge sustained. It can also be recalled that Alfaro misrepresented her educational attainment twice in both of her affidavits. Lower court sustained the prosecutions objection to the question on the ground of irrelevance when the line of testing could have tested Alfaro's penchant for "accuracy and truthfulness. Also, the trial court disallowed the defense from presenting Atty. Riveras earlier statement to impeach the Atty. Pedros credibility (prosecutions witness); again, this was disallowed on the ground of immateriality. In also belittled evidence presented by Webb. Court reminded that although official documents are not infallible, the presumption that they are accurate should only be overcome with evidence. Unfortunately, in the mind of the trial court, pure conjecture and not hard evidence was allowed to defeat a legal presumption

j. Title and Citation: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant. Facts: Version of the Prosecution: Nov 15, certain Arturo accompanied Ben (victim) to a cockfight before the incident happened. Arturoclaims that he heard Bens wife saying she wouldnt hesitate to kill Ben. The latter replied, why kill me when I am innocent. Afternoon of the next day, her neighbour Joseph rode on the same bus with the accused going to Ormoc. Marivic (accused) took her 3 children with her. November 18, neighbors of Steban (owner of rented house of the couple) told him about the foul odor emanating from the house. Steban forced open the gate and the kitchen door. He went inside the bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben covered with a blanket. Ben was wearing only briefs. He has injuries at the back of his head. Steban went out of the house and told Bens mother what he saw. SPO3 Leo Acodesin upon receiving the report went to the place and found the body. He saw blood at the nape of Ben and the latter having only his briefs on. Police officer also found a metal pipe leaning against the wall near the victim. The body of Ben had to be taken outside because of the smell Dr. Cerillo (medico legal) conducted post mortem exam before the police. She found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone]. Marivic admitted that she killed Ben. That on November 15, she said she was looking for Ben because it was payday and she worries that money has been spent by Ben, gambling. That she asked her niece Ecel Arao to go with her but they did not find Ben. Upon return to their house, Ben was already there. Marivic asked Ecel to sleep over but Ecel refused. Then Ben nagged and challenged Marivic to a fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Disappointed with her reaction, Ben

switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Marivic testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. She then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. Marivic said that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She said distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the bedroom. Version of the Defense Marivic said that in the first year of marriage, they lived happily but soon thereafter they would quarrel and fights would become violent. Bens brother, Alex, testified that the couple often quarrel, that Marivic would inflict injuries on Ben. He cited one incident when he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife. Ben had shouting for help, his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week but she returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. Second incident was when Alex and his father rushed Ben to the hospital. Bens forehead had blood and Marivic was holding an empty bottle. After this, they were reconciled. Marivics mother-in-law also testified. She said there were 3 incidents. (1) Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm (2) Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument, the eye and ear got affected (3) She saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked. Co-worker of Ben, Arturo testified. On Nov 15 he overheard Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent. He also remembered that Marivic had hit Ben and the latter had a wound on the right forehead Witnesses (not so closely related to Marivic) testified as to the abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben. (1) A fisherman, a neighbor, testified. That on November 15 he saw couple quarrelled and Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. (2) A niece and former neighbor, testified. He said that Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble, that the couple always quarrel. He said that Ben would box his wife and he sees bruises. That one time a knife was stricken to her breast. He also said he saw Ben injured too.

(3) A cousin of Marivic testified, that Marivic asked her help to look for Ben. She accompanied Marivic home, she was asked to sleep over but she refused. That she recalls one time when she sleeps over, she was awakened in the evening, the couple were very noisy. She heard something was broken like a vase. That Marivic ran into her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed them the knife through the window grill and that it scared them. (4) Dr. Caing, co-employee of Marivic, testified. That there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic (5) Barangay captain, testified that about two months before incident Marivic went to his office and sought help to settle family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning Marivic testified. She said after first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. He would provoked her, slap her, pin her down on the bed, and beat her. She said that when this happens, she runs home to her parents but Ben would follow her, ask for her forgiveness and promises he would change. She also said that she seeks medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. That these doctors have record of her injuries. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week. She said that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things. She said she shot Ben with a gun, and that he died in the bedroom. Marivic said that she threw the gun away and that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist w ith the bolo. That she left for Manila the next day, that she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, that she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

Dr Dyan, psychologist, testified. that it was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman Dr. Pajarillo, psychiatrist, testified. He said that at the time she killed her husband Marivics mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) RTC found Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide with treachery as aggravating circumstance, no mitigating circumstance. Penalty is death. To pay indemnity and moral damage 50,000 each. RTC also found self-defense untenable. It gave credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. The capital penalty was imposed and the case was elevated to SC for review. In their petition for certiorari, Defense said that the court erred in judgment.

Issues: 1. whether or not trial court erred in its decision of Convicting Marivic of Parricide (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa Ruling: WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio. Ratio / Reasoning: SC said that the appeal has merits. That the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. The rule is that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary It said that unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63]It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. Court also explained that BWS manifestations is an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. This circumstance should be considered as a mitigating factor. [76] SC considered extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. Highest court also doubted treachery in this case.

k. Title and Citation: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: An informant reported to PDEG that Gonzales, also known as Takyo, is in engaged in illegal drug pushing, on June 12, Malolos Bulacan. The following day PDEG conducted buy bust operation and used marked money. Informant introduced PO1 Dimla to Gonzales as a buyer of shabu worth P200.00. Gonzales handed to PO1 Dimla a plastic sachet containing white substances, and in turn PO1 Dimla handed the two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. Then Dimla removed his cap, signalled to other police and Gonzales was arrested. Dimla puts his initials ED on the sachet. Crime Laboratory Office certified that the contents the plastic sachet were 0.194 gram of shabu.4 Version of the Defense: Gonzales denied the accusation. He said he was only resting in front of his house in the afternoon of June 13 when five armed men approached and forced him inside his house. They queried him on the whereabouts of his father, but he told them he did not know. They prevented his mother from leaving the house to seek help from barangay officials; and that after searching his house, they brought him to Camp General Alejo Santos. Almarie, Gonzales sister, supported latters claim and said that she reported the incident to the barangay chairman, but when they reached the house, the men and her brother were no longer there. Ruling of the RTC GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby sentences Gonzales to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE OF P500,000.00

Gonzales appealed insisting RTC erred in its judgement. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Gonzales. Therefore, this petition before the Supreme Court. SC Ruling ACQUITTED appellant GONZALES due to the failure of the Prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. DIRECTED the immediate release of GONZALES

Issue: Whether or not Gonzales is guiltyfor violating of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 Reasoning:

SC said that the appeal of Gonzales has merits. Procedure must be followed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs. The unexplained noncompliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs can cause the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower courts. The prosecution cannot prove violation when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs. It raises doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimlas marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence. It can also be noted that PO1 did not explain whether his marking had been done in the presence of Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of Gonzales. He also did not tender justification in court for the non-compliance with the procedures.

The observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction, demands such record of movements and custody of seized items to include the identities and signatures of the persons who held temporary custody of the seized item, the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (2) Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-

compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;