Perla v CA G.R. No.

96452 May 7, 1992

Facts: The Lim spouses opened a chattel mortgage and bought a Ford Laser from Supercars for Php 77,000 and insured it with Perla Compania de Seguros. The ehicle was stolen while ! el"n Lim was dri ing it with an e#pired license. The spouses re$uested for a moratorium on pa"ments but this was denied b" FCP, the assignee of rights o er collection of the mortgage amount of the car. The spouses also called on the insurance compan" to pa" the balance of the mortgage due to theft but this was denied b" the compan" due to the spouses% iolation of the &uthori'ed (ri er clause stating )dri ing with an e#pired license before being carnapped*: &n" of the following: )a* The +nsured )b* &n" person dri ing on the +nsured,s order, or with his permission. Pro ided that the person dri ing is permitted, in accordance with the licensing or other laws or regulations, to dri e the Scheduled -ehicle, or has been permitted and is not dis$ualified b" order of a Court of Law or b" reason of an" enactment or regulation in that behalf. Since the spouses didn%t pa" the mortgage, FCP filed suit against them. The trial court ruled in its fa or ordering spouses to pa". The appellate court re ersed their decision. FCP and Perla appealed to the SC. +ssues: ../as there gra e abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in holding that pri ate respondents did not iolate the insurance contract because the authori'ed dri er clause is not applicable to the 0Theft0 clause of said Contract1 2. /hether or not the loss of the collateral e#empted the debtor from his admitted obligations under the promissor" note particularl" the pa"ment of interest, litigation e#penses and attorne",s fees. 3eld: 4o, 4o. Petition dismissed. 5atio: .. The car was insured against a malicious act such as theft. Therefore the 6Theft7 clause in the contract should appl" and not the authori'ed dri er clause. The ris8 against accident is different from the ris8 against theft. The appellate court stated: The 0authori'ed dri er clause0 in a t"pical insurance polic" is in contemplation or anticipation of accident in the legal sense in which it should be understood, and not in contemplation or anticipation of an e ent such as theft. The distinction 9 often sei'ed upon b" insurance companies in resisting claims from their assureds 9 between death occurring as a result of accident and death occurring as a result of intent ma", b" analog", appl" to the case at bar. There was no connection between alid possession of a license and the loss of a ehicle. 5uling in a different wa" would render the polic" a sham because the compan" can then easil" cite restrictions not applicable to the claim. 2. The Supreme Court stated: 6The chattel mortgage constituted o er the automobile is merel" an accessor" contract to the promissor" note. :eing the principal contract, the promissor" note is unaffected b" whate er befalls the sub;ect matter of the accessor" contract. Therefore, the unpaid balance on the promissor" note should be paid, and not ;ust the installments due and pa"able before the automobile was carnapped, as erronousl" held b" the Court of &ppeals.7 The court, howe er, construed the insurance, chattel mortgage, and promissor" note as interrelated contracts, hence eliminating the pa"ment of interests, litigation e#penses, and attorne"%s fees stated in the promissor" note. The promissor" note re$uired securing a chattel mortage which in turn re$uired opening an insurance contract. The insurance was made as an accessor" to the principal contract, ma8ing sure that the alue in the promissor" note will be paid e en if the car was lost. The insurance compan" promised to pa" FCP for loss or damage of the propert". C& didn%t err in re$uiring Perla to pa" the spouses, but the spouses must pa" FCP for the balance in the note.