PUBLIC CORPORATION [Cases 1, 4, 5, 9] CHAPTER 4 Disciplinary Actions Sec.

. 60 Grounds for disciplinary actions An elective official may be: disciplined suspended removed from office of any of the ff. grounds: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Disloyalty to RP PH Culpable violation of Consti Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty Commission of offense involving moral turpitude OR offense punishable by at least prision mayor Abuse of authority Unauthorized absence for 15 years (except barangay and sanguniang) Application for or acquisition of foreign citizenship or residence OR status of an immigrant of another country Other grounds provided by this Code and other laws May be removed on the grounds enumerated by order of PROPER COURT.

position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan. One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that: the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to the Republic. Held: NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending before the Court moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of public respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby REVERSED. SEC 64 Salary of respondent pending suspension receive no salary or compensation but subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension SEC 65 Rights of respondent Full opportunity to appear and defend himself by counsel Confront and cross-examine witnesses Require attendance Production of documentary evidence (compulsory process) SEC 66 Form and notice of decision a. Investigation terminated within 90 days from the start b. Within 30 days after end, Office of Pres or Sangguinian concerned shall render decision in writing (facts and reasons of decision) c. Copies shall be furnished d. Penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or 6 months for administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Garcia vs Mojica 1

AGUINALDO vs. SANTOS, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992 Pertinent provision of the Local Government Code: Section 60 Grounds for Disciplinary Actions In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan. Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the MMCN - PUBCORP

[G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999] QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1] Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation. ISSUES: 1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.

for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not. 2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the LGC.

No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. * The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, SEC 67 Administrative Appeals Appeals may be within 30 days from receipt, appealed to the ff: a. Sangguniang panlalawigan (in case decided by panglungsod) b. Office of Pres (if decided by panlalawigan) final and executor SEC 68 Execution pending appeal Appeal not prevent a decision from becoming final and executor. Placed under preventive suspension during pendency of appeal if he wins Exoneration paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal Lapid vs CA Posted on October 3, 2012 GR 142261 June 29, 2000

NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected loc al official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. [24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor as regards the peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection, except that it must be prior to said date. The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner MMCN - PUBCORP

Facts: Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired among themselves in demanding & collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such collection. The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct, which meted out the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). The DILG implemented the said Ombudsman decision. Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet become final, petitioner argued that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be issued against the DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.

Issue: WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.

Held: Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappealable. The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the respondent is 2

absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27of R.A. 6770. The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final and unappealable. The legal maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterus finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties not enumerated in the said section are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory. Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides. Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment,final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise. Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case. It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and executory. CHAPTER 2 LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM SEC 120 LOCAL INITIATIVE legal process whereby the registered voters of LGU may directly propose, enact or amend any ordinance SEC 121 WHO MAY EXERCISE? all registered voters of the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays

SEC 127 AUTHORITY OF COURTS Courts have power to declare null and void (any proposition) SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996 FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy. On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991. On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law

SEC 122 - procedure (1-8) SEC 123 Effectivity of local propositions 15 days after certification of COMELEC (if approved by a majority of the votes cast) SEC 124 Limitations on local initiatives (a-c) SEC 125 Limitations on Sanggunians SEC 126 Local Referendum legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. MMCN - PUBCORP

ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 3

2.

WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

HELD: 1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. 2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

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