SOLIVEN, petitioner VS.

JUDGE MAKASIAR,respondent
167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel
were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President
2.
Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause
3.
Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit
DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is
LIFTED.
RATIO:
Background of the first issue
MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration
APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice
MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice
MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary
Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a
Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint
by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that
is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits
if he is so minded.
Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of
arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause

to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine
the complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrests.
-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge
is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate
the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.
Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing
her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of
immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf.
-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And
there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).
Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character
of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a
chilling effect on press freedom.
-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on
the chilling effect point.
--------------------------------S
oliven vs.
M
akasiar (
A
controversial case)
T

his case softens the doctrine laid down by the B

A
CHE case where the court states that the judge should personally depose the complainants and
witnessesunder oath and in writing in determining the existence of probable cause.
T
his is a responsibility that should not be delegated to clerk of court or other authority.
Facts:This is a consolidated petition for certiorari andprohibition to review the decision of the
respondent JudgeRamon Makasiar.In the case filed by Beltran, he alleged that therespondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when therespondent judge
issued a warrant of arrest against thepetitioner for the crime of libel, without the respondent judgepersonally
examining the complainant and witnesses for thedetermination of probable cause.The petitioner contend that
the constitution requiresthat the judge should personally examine the complainantand/or witness for the
determination of probable cause andtherefore issue an arrest warrant.Issue:Was the contention correct?
Held:No. (Sadly)What the Constitution underscores is the exclusiveand personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfyhimself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of awarrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personallyexamine the
complainant and his witnesses. Followingestablished doctrine and procedure, he shall:(
1
) Personally evaluate the report and the supportingdocuments submitted by the fiscal regarding theexistence
of probable cause and, on the basisthereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause,he may disregard the fiscal's report and requirethe submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion asto the existence of probable cause.Sound policy dictates
this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminaryexamination and investigation
of criminal complaints insteadof concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed beforetheir courts.On June
3
0
,
1
9
8
7, the Supreme Court unanimouslyadopted Circular No.
1
2, setting down guidelines for theissuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure thereinprovided is reiterated
and clarified in this resolution.It has not been shown that respondent judge hasdeviated from the prescribed
procedure. Thus, with regard tothe issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of graveabuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictioncannot be sustained
-------------------------------------------Facts: An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar
for beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo
who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustained by Gian turned out
to be more serious than they had appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was
filed and the charge for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for
grave threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a
Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats since it was made in connection with the
charge of serious physical injuries should have been absorbed by the latter, and because the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a
motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
preliminary investigation?
(2) Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation be
considered a ground to quash the informations?
Held:
(1) The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information. In the case a bar, a preliminary investigation was for slight
physical injuries was conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information was
however amended when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious. However the
change in the information was only a formalamendment and did not violate the right of Vivar
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it still involves the same facts.
(2) Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on
which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the
rule mention of a lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. When
accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemed
waived his right.
--------------------------------Villaflor vs. Vivar
Facts:
An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for beating Gian
Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next
time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious
than they had appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was filed and the
charge for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for grave threats was
filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a Motion to Quash the
Information for grave threats since it was made in connection with the charge of serious
physical injuries should have been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed
a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issues:
Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
preliminary investigation?
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation be
considered a ground to quash the informations?

Held:
The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information. In the case a bar, a preliminary investigation was for slight
physical injuries was conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information
was however amended when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious.
However the change in the information was only a formal amendment and did not
violate the right of Vivar against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it
still involves the same facts.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on
which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the
rule mention of a lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash.
When accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment,
he has deemed waived his right.
-------------------------------------------------------HO vs PEOPLE (1997)
Panganiban, J.
FACTS
On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its
chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaintagainst Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
106632 and 106678,r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , A n t h o n y
M a r d e n , A r s e n i o B e n j a m i n S a n t o s a n d L e o n a r d o O d o o . T h e complaint was
for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a publicofficer from
entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it
ism a n i f e s t l y a n d g r o s s l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s t o t h e l a t t e r , w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e
p u b l i c o f f i c e r profited or will profit thereby.According to the information, Rolando
Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the NationalSteel Corporation
(NSC), a government-owned or controlled
corporation organized ando p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e P h i l i p p i n e l a w s , a n d D o r i s H o
, t h e P r e s i d e n t o f N a t i o n a l M a r i n e Corporation (NMC), a private corporation
organized and operating under our Corporation l a w , w a s
said to have entered without legal justification into a negotiated contract
o f affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at
the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was entered
into despite their fullknowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much higher than
those offered by
theL o a d s t a r S h i p p i n g C o m p a n y , I n c . ( L S C I ) a n d P r e m i e r S h i p p i n g L i n e s ,
I n c . ( P S L I ) , i n t h e amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the
public bidding, therebygiving unwarranted benefits to the National
Marine Corporation.Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining
probable cause for theissuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the
information and the resolutionattached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without
other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. Theycontend that a judge, in personally determining
the existence of probable cause, must havebefore him
sufficient
evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed bythe investigating
prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrestwarrant. Such

evidence should not be merely described in a prosecutors resolution.Sandiganbayans

Denial: Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on thecertification
appearing in the information in this case in the determination of whetherprobable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the
basispredominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum
of r e s p o n s i b l e i n v e s t i g a t o r s / p r o s e c u t o r s , t h e n t h e r e c a l l o f t h e w a r r a n t o f
a r r e s t , o r t h e reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the
information, as filed,clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and substance
based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the preliminary
investigation. To require this Court to havethe entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the
complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to bean exercise in futility.
ISSUE
May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on
theb a s i s o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r ( i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e
O f f i c e o f t h e S p e c i a l Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary
investigation, without havingbefore him any of the evidence (such as complainants
affidavit, respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted
at the preliminary investigation?
DECISION & RATIO
NO.

Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution : The right of the people to be secure
in theirpersons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of w h a t e v e r n a t u r e a n d f o r a n y
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
byt h e j u d g e a f t e r e x a m i n a t i o n u n d e r o a t h o r a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e
c o m p l a i n a n t a n d t h e witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to
be searched and thepersons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution)

The word personally does not appear in the corresponding provisions o

f o u r previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitutions
intent toplace a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that
imposed underthe previous Charters.

Soliven vs.Makasiar :
In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for theissuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:(1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscalregarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid himin arriving at a conclusion as
to the existence of probable cause.

People vs. Inting :

There is a difference between the judges goal from that of theprosecutors.

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not

forthe Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election Supervisor to ascertain.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. Itmerely
assists him to make the determination of probable cause.

Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
whichd e t e r m i n e s p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e i s s u a n c e o f a w a r r a n t o f a r r
e s t f r o m t h e preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should beheld for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of oneand the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives.

The Court, in this case, reiterated and elaborated on the doctrine laid down in
People
vs. Inting
and ruled that
:

First
, as held in
Inting,
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor isfor a purpose different from that
which is to be made by the judge. Whether there isreasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged andshould be held for trial is what the
prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the otherhand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused,
i.e.
whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings onone and the
same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to theirdistinct objectives.

Second
, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of
the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrantof
arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report willsupport his
own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offenseand hold him for
trial. However, the judge must decide
independently.
Hence, hemust have supporting evidence,
other than
the prosecutors
bare
report, upon whichto legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probablecause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility
of determining personally andindependently the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause is lodged in him byno less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically,

the prosecutor couldease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by
forwarding to thelatter not only the information and his bare resolution finding
probable cause, buta l s o s o m u c h o f t h e r e c o r d s a n d t h e e v i d e n c e o n h a n d a s
to enable His Honor to

make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant
of arrest

Lastly
, it is not required that the
complete
or
entire
records of the case during thepreliminary investigation be submitted to and examined
by the judge. We do
noti n t e n d t o u n d u l y b u r d e n t r i a l c o u r t s b y o b l i g i n g t h e m t o e x a m i n e t h e c
o m p l e t e records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of
anaccused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient
supportingdocuments (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements
of w i t n e s s e s o r t r a n s c r i p t s o f s t e n o g r a p h i c n o t e s ,
i f a n y ) u p o n w h i c h t o m a k e h i s independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of theprosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point
is: he cannot rely solelyand entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as
Respondent Court did in thiscase. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in theperformance of his official duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report
thep r e s u m p t i o n o f a c c u r a c y , t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , w e r e p e a t , c o m m a n d s t h e j u
dge to
personally
determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Courthas consistently
held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on thecertification or the
report of the investigating officer.IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied
fully and completely upon the resolutionof the graft investigation officer and the
memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attachedto the information filed before it,
and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their
recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documentsfrom either the
complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People from which to
sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Respondent Court palpablycommitted
grave abuse of discretion in
ipso facto
issuing the challenged warrant of arreston the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and
recommendation, and without determiningon its own the issue of probable cause based on
evidence other than such bare findings andrecommendation.